



Report

Tigray regional report

2018–2019 refugee and host
community context analysis

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About this paper

This report is part of a context analysis commissioned by UNICEF Ethiopia in support of its work in refugee-hosting regions of Ethiopia. It was carried out by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and ODI, with funding from UK aid. This study is focused on the context that shapes the hosting of refugees in Tigray region, and the ways in which services are provided to them and to host communities. It was led by Eva Ludi (ODI) and Tsionawit Gebre Yohannes (DRC). Five separate reports on each of the main refugee-hosting regions in Ethiopia will be published during the course of 2020, based on research conducted in 2018–2019.

These studies are intended to support the government of Ethiopia's efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its models for hosting and supporting refugees. These efforts have been undertaken in light of the global policy reform set out by the Global Compact for Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Reform Framework (CRRF). Ethiopia's approach is laid out in the government's 2017 'Roadmap for the implementation of the CRRF' and the pledges made by the government in 2016.

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Acronyms

ARRA	Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs
BoE	Bureau of Education
BoPF	Bureau of Planning and Finance
BoW	Bureau of Water
BSRP	Building Self-Reliance Programme
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DICAC	Development and Inter-Church Aid Commission
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRDIP	Development Response to Displacement Impact Project
EPLF	Eritrean's People Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD	focus group discussion
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
IDI	in-depth interview
IP	implementing partner
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KII	key informant interview
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OCP	Out of Camp Policy
PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice
RCC	Refugee Coordination Committee
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
RHB	Regional Health Bureau
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
TVET	technical and vocational education and training
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WOoA	Woreda Office of Agriculture
WOoW	Woreda Office of Water

Executive summary

Relationships between Ethiopian and Eritrean populations have been shaped by wider historical and political processes, including the complex relationship between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrean's People Liberation Front (EPLF) over the past 40 years. Unlike refugees of other nationalities in the country, Eritrean people were, until Eritrea's independence in 1993, Ethiopian citizens themselves. Eritreans started to flee to Ethiopia during the war that lasted from 1998 to 2000. As of 31 August 2018, Tigray hosted 73,740 refugees across four camps. Many of the refugees are young single males who fled Eritrea in fear of persecution and indefinite forced military conscription, arbitrary arrest and systemic human rights violations. Many refugees feel 'stuck in limbo', unable to return to Eritrea but deprived of the right to work and the right to freedom of movement in Ethiopia, contributing to onward movement to third countries.

The two camps considered for this study – Shimelba and Adi Harush - are distinctively different in their location and population and thus in their interactions with the resident population. Relationships between refugees and residents are more related to agricultural activities and labour exchange in Shimelba, whereas the relationship between refugees and residents in Adi Harush are more cash- and market-based. In both camps, significant interactions take place around religious events, with religious institutions often shared by both refugees and residents. Social interactions were highlighted and praised as positive examples of how well refugees and residents get along and support each other, but other interactions, especially economic ones and issues around where refugees reside, were approached with more caution. Security and conflicts were rarely mentioned as a problem.

The general perception among the resident population is that services are better in camps

than in villages. Considerable integration already happens as local residents access services inside the camps (e.g. water, health), while refugees, especially from Adi Harush camp, access services in Mai Tsebri town (e.g. secondary education, private pharmacies, shops, banks and internet cafes). Different groups' perceptions of the result of the current service delivery arrangements directly affected their views on integration. The majority of refugees mentioned that they preferred the status quo of service delivery, i.e. generally separated for refugees and residents, being concerned about increasing competition if services were integrated, and a reduction in quality levels to the (perceived) lower standard of those provided by the local government. Residents, on the other hand, preferred the idea of integrated services. They generally perceived service levels (quality, quantity, accessibility, affordability) to be better in the camps and were anticipating that if services were delivered in an integrated way, service levels would increase.

One of the defining institutional structures of the refugee operation in Tigray is the absence of a dedicated coordination mechanism or structure at regional level, as both the Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have their operational base in Shire. Sector-specific coordination between government, ARRA and its implementing partners happens at woreda level, where human and financial resources are scarcest. Overall, regional government representatives had limited understanding of the refugee operation, and hardly any involvement. They knew about the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) but were unsure what it meant operationally, presenting a significant constraint to the development of a strong partnership. The main concern of regional authorities was the additional costs that they incurred as services were also accessed by refugees

without any extra compensation. The diversity of internal and external funding sources also leads to overlapping lines of accountability. Given the devolved nature of Ethiopia's service delivery arrangements there is a level of frustration among local government officials who feel they should be more strongly involved in refugee operations. There are, however, a number of examples of joint working and positive interactions across the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), education, and health sectors, but these are often focused on resolving specific issues rather than reflective of wider institutional cooperation.

Because the refugee operation is not part of the regional aid coordination system, the Tigray Bureau of Planning and Finance does not know how much money is spent for refugees or in communities around camps, making it difficult to allocate external funds equitably across the different woredas. Regional and woreda governments expected that they would be responsible for administering at least part of the refugee funding currently handled by ARRA if services were to be delivered in an integrated manner and would thus be in a better position to balance investments inside and outside of camps.

Tigray, in comparison to other refugee-hosting regions, has a relatively high capacity of regional and woreda governments which will support the implementation of the CRRF. This is further supported by close relationships, common language and cultural backgrounds of refugee and resident populations. The institutional and administrative set-up, however, could hinder a smooth implementation of the CRRF since ARRA does not have a permanent representation at regional level,

hampering institutionalised coordination between ARRA and the regional government.

The heterogeneous character of the refugee population requires a differentiated approach to CRRF implementation, which provides different opportunities and risks. CRRF implementation will have to take account of the different refugee populations (e.g. Kunama, Tigrigna-speaking Eritreans), including their different aspirations with regards to local integration or third-country resettlement and the existing levels of socio-economic integration, which is partly a result of the geographical context of the camps. Independent of this, coordination mechanisms between ARRA and the regional government need to be established and woreda sector ministries need to be strengthened to be able to play a much more active role in the refugee operation and in the integrated delivery of services to refugees and residents. The Out of Camp Policy (OCP) will also have to be re-examined in light of the CRRF to ensure that it is not limited to a policy in which self-reliance is a prerequisite, but rather a mechanism to promote self-reliance.

The specific conditions of Adi Harush, especially its urban setting and close location to Mai Tsebri town, and the already considerable socio-economic integration combined with the existing capacity of the woreda administration and sector offices could provide a basis for a pilot testing key concepts and ideas of the CRRF. Specific projects such as the Mai Tsebri Water Supply Scheme could be used as examples to demonstrate that coordination is possible and does not have to be at the disadvantage of either group.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

UNICEF commissioned this context analysis to support implementation of the Building Self-Reliance Programme (BSRP), a four-year project funded by UK government aid to improve service delivery to refugees and ‘host communities’ across Ethiopia. Specifically, the joint Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and ODI team is conducting a series of studies to better understand the programme’s operating context. The studies cover the service delivery sectors UNICEF focuses on under the BSRP: health; education; water, sanitation and health (WASH); nutrition; and child protection.

Of particular significance at the policy level is the national process underway to implement the Government of Ethiopia’s Nine Pledges related to hosting refugees, agreed in September 2016, and in support of the Global Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). The pledges of most specific relevance to service delivery are the Education Pledge (‘Increase of enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education to all qualified refugees without discrimination and within the available resources’) and the Social and Basic Services Pledge (‘Enhance the provision of basic and essential social services’), although the wider ambition to allow refugees to integrate more fully into Ethiopian life, particularly through ‘local integration’ (GoE, 2017), is also highly relevant in Tigray, given the existence of the OCP for Eritrean refugees. This process has led to the development of a Roadmap for implementation, and the government, led by ARRA, is currently developing a 10-year strategy that will shape the future support provided to both refugees and ‘host communities’.

This regional study is one of five being conducted as part of this context analysis. The

objective of each is to provide UNICEF with a more detailed understanding of the contextual factors affecting relationships between refugees, non-refugees and key institutional actors involved in service delivery in the region. It was carried out in Tigray in May–June 2018.

1.2 Methods

A mixed methods approach was used in this study. To get the views of policymakers, a total of 31 key informant interviews (KIIs) were carried out at regional, zonal and woreda level. Specific details of the respondents (anonymised to protect interviewees) are given in Annex 2. In-depth interviews were conducted with refugees and members of ‘host communities’ to elicit their views on service delivery and integration. Eighteen in-depth interviews (IDIs) and eight focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in camps and with residents with the support – where necessary – of a team of locally recruited translators.

Two camps were selected for this study – Shimelba and Adi Harush – and interviews and FGDs were conducted in the camps, in villages surrounding the camps in Tahtay Adiabo and Tselemti woreda, in Shire (capital of the North Western Zone of Tigray) and in Mekele (capital of Tigray Region). The camps were selected to provide diverse perspectives on the refugee operation. Shimelba, one of the oldest camps in Tigray, was established in 2004 in response to the refugee influx after the Ethiopian–Eritrean war of 1998–2000, and hosts a large group of refugees of Kunama origin. Adi Harush was established in 2010 to accommodate the growing number of Eritrean refugees. Interviews with residents were carried out in neighbouring villages identified largely by levels of interactions with refugees.

1.2.1 A note on terminology

In this report, the following terms are used:

- Tigray: administrative region in Ethiopia
- Tigray: also an ethno-linguistic group living in Tigray region and speaking Tigrigna
- Tigringa: language spoken in Tigray and Eritrea.

1.3 Structure of the report

This report opens with an overview of key structural factors shaping the context of the refugee operation in Tigray region, before highlighting key challenges and issues that emerged from interviews and FGDs with residents and refugees. It then sets out findings in terms of the key institutional relationships relating to different service delivery sectors. The next section reflects on perceptions of integration and self-reliance among residents and refugees. The report ends with a section on implications and recommendations. To provide further context, this report should be read in conjunction with the other reports covering refugee operations in other regions of Ethiopia (Gambella, Somali, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz) produced as part of this context analysis.

2 Tigray: refugees and the region

Perceptions of and engagement with Eritrean refugees are shaped by the fact that Eritrean people – unlike refugees of other nationalities – were, until Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopian citizens themselves. It is therefore critical to understand how identities of Tigrigna-speaking populations from Ethiopia and Eritrea have been shaped in relation to each other and to wider political processes, and what this means for populations in refugee-hosting regions of Tigray today. This section provides background on these dynamics and illustrates the impact on the refugee operation today.

2.1 The Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front

Both the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) have shaped the politics of Ethiopia and Eritrea over at least the past 40 years, a process intimately bound up with ethno-linguistic identity, identification and self-determination. The two fronts had in common deep feelings of frustration with both the ‘national integration policy’ of Emperor Haile Selassie (reigning from 1930 to 1974) and the ‘Ethiopia First’ motto of the Derg regime (1974 to 1991) (Aregawi Berhe, 2008). The TPLF started its armed struggle in 1975, informed by a hybrid ideology that mixed ethno-nationalism with Marxism – not dissimilar to the ideology of the EPLF (ibid.; Young, 1996). While the EPLF and TPLF had much in common – supported by the same ethno-linguistic group, from similar peasant backgrounds, informed by Marxist ideology – they pursued very different objectives and forms of national identity. This is fundamental to explaining the differences

between the two movements, and was at the root of the conflict that broke out in 1998.

The EPLF, while recognising ethno-linguistic diversity, refused to allow ethnicity to undermine the idea of a united independent state. There are nine different languages spoken in Eritrea and the country’s population is divided between two major religious groups. The Eritrean struggle for independence over the long course of the war generated a powerful sense of collective identity. The TPLF, on the other hand, attempted to liberate Tigray and mobilised among the population in Tigray, and only later broadened its objectives and collaborated with other ethno-linguistically based movements in Ethiopia to overthrow the Derg regime (Gilkes, 2005). Ethnicity was the main mobilising factor in galvanising support among the people of Tigray, while Marxism was the ideological tool that informed policy. Although there were many ideological disagreements between the EPLF and the TPLF during the civil war from 1975 to 1991, the TPLF was clear that the right to independence for Tigray and other Ethiopian nationalities would also apply to the people of Eritrea (Young, 1996). ‘Self-determination’ for every ethno-national group in Ethiopia was a key principle upheld by the TPLF, driving support during the latter stages of the war against the Derg and in the formation of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989, which gradually drew in other ethno-linguistically based liberation movements (Berhe, 2008).

The different interpretations of nationalism by the TPLF and the EPLF informed how each movement went about shaping the new states. In Ethiopia, the TPLF/EPRDF re-formed

Ethiopia into a federal structure along ethno-linguistic lines, whereas in Eritrea, which became independent in 1993, the ruling EPLF, renamed the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) in 1994, opted for a highly centralised state with a single-party structure (Plaut and Gilkes, 1999), bound together by a national identity based on values and social norms of dedication, heroism, solidarity, unity, mutual trust, sacrificial patriotism and allegiance to the 'common good' of all Eritreans as the foundation for nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction (Kibreab, 2013).

The PFDJ leadership feared that the shared values developed and consolidated during the war of independence could dissipate after the common enemy was defeated. In response, it introduced National Service as a means of safeguarding and transmitting the values created during the war to present and future generations of Eritreans, with the aim of consolidating Eritrean national identity, contributing to nation-building and defeating the country's external and internal enemies (*ibid.*). National Service, compulsory for every Eritrean citizen between 18 and 40 years of age, became the mechanism through which a sense of national identity would be engineered to eradicate sub-national allegiances and provide an opportunity for every Eritrean to demonstrate their willingness to sacrifice their life for the common good (*ibid.*). Following the 1998–2000 war with Ethiopia, National Service has become open-ended, with all able-bodied Eritrean men and women serving indefinitely under very harsh conditions. It was also following the war that the PFDJ started arbitrary arrests of political opponents, journalists, academics and religious leaders.

The TPLF emerged as an 'integrated insurgent organisation' characterised by strong central leadership, unity and cohesion and high levels of local support among the Tigray people. It finally evolved into the dominant political party post-1991 (van Veen, 2015), when Ethiopia was reconfigured on the basis of a 'voluntary federation' of the 75-plus ethno-linguistic groups in the country (Abbink, 2011). After 1991 the TPLF/EPDRF expanded its already formidable (though all-Tigray) party organisation,

characterised by strong and capable governance systems. It successfully developed into a national party whose structure extended far into everyday life across Ethiopia. This reach also served the purpose of maintaining control and political alignment (*ibid.*), making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between state and party (Vaughn, 2011). Despite the adoption of a federal governance model and a new constitution in 1995, which defined 'political sovereignty' as vested in the 'nations, nationalities and peoples' of the country, with a clause that – in theory – allowed any nation, nationality or people (i.e. ethno-linguistic group) to secede (Abbink, 2011), efforts to increase internal democratisation of EPDRF decision-making were limited. On the contrary, as a result of internal splits within the TPLF, a tendency towards increased centralisation of power and a growing dominance of then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi emerged after 2001 (van Veen, 2015; Lefort, 2016).

The blurring of the distinction between party and state is especially evident in Tigray Region, where a discourse of joint revolutionary struggle by the TPLF and the population of rural Tigray is central to community mobilisation in support of the government's development programmes (Segers et al., 2009). At the district and sub-district (*tabia*) level, it is TPLF party members who are likely to take leadership positions within community structures for development projects. Conversely, successful members of the community at the sub-district level are likely to be invited into the TPLF as party members (*ibid.*). This reciprocal relationship is reflected at regional and national levels of government, politics and economic structures, where affiliation to the party is often aligned with financial success. Finally, a blurring of lines is also evident between the party and the security forces, comprising the National Defence Force, the Federal Police, State Police Forces and the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) (van Veen, 2015). This is of particular relevance to the refugee operation and response, since the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), a semi-autonomous organisation that both implements and monitors, regulates and authorises partners

to operate in refugee responses, sat within the NISS (Ruauadel and Morrison-Métois, 2017). As such, ARRA was located at the heart of the security sector that has, until recently, been dominated by Tigray elites.

Overall, the blurring of lines between party, state, the economy and the security forces, and the dominant position of the TPLF within the EPRDF, resulted in a considerable concentration of power among the TPLF and Tigray, which in turn has created deep resentment, especially among Oromo and Amhara populations, culminating in violent protests in 2015–2016 and, ultimately, the start of a new political dispensation in Ethiopia in 2018 under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. While it is too early to be clear about the outcomes of this process, it undoubtedly represents a significant shift from the past 25 years of EPRDF rule. This new political order, while still establishing its vision for the country, has in its first six months sought to define itself against the former regime: easing security restrictions; releasing political prisoners; removing perceived ‘hardliners’, particularly in the security sector, from positions of authority; and signing a peace agreement with the Eritrean government.

These changes have already had an enormous impact on the position of the Tigray elite within Ethiopian political life, and it is yet to be seen how they will respond. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has continued to reform the EPRDF, with rapprochement with Eritrea at the heart of foreign policy. With support, most notably from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, Afwerki and Ahmed have signed two peace deals so far. The most recent seven-point agreement, signed on 18 September 2018, reaffirms the Joint Declaration on Peace and Friendship signed on 9 July 2018 (Addis Standard, 2018). Most notably, it commits the two countries to cooperation on security and defence, as well as trade and investment. Seemingly addressing concerns around Eritrea’s engagement in human trafficking, be it through its policies or the direct facilitation of trafficking networks, the agreement also points to the two countries’ commitment to combat trafficking in people (van Reisen, 2018).

While considerable progress has been made in Ethiopia in terms of improving human rights – bans on rebel movements have been lifted, political prisoners freed and control over the media loosened, less change is visible in Eritrea. Although some religious prisoners have been released, political prisoners are still incarcerated, no announcement has been made that elections will be held, there is no independent media and, most importantly in terms of whether Eritrean people will continue to leave their country as they did in the past, there has been little indication that National Service or conscription will be reduced to 18 months as alluded to by the Eritrean Government in June 2018 (Plaut, 2018; Reuters, 2018).

The normalisation of relations between the two countries can be a critical first step towards creating a conducive environment for national, regional and international efforts to eliminate human trafficking and smuggling. The resumption of air and land transport routes across the border has made it easier for people to move legally between the two countries, and will help reduce profits for human trafficking networks operating in Eritrea (van Reisen, 2018), but it does not necessarily reduce the number of people seeking to leave the country in the absence of significant changes in Eritrean policy.

2.2 Ethiopian–Eritrean relations and movement of people

Rural poverty and periodic droughts, including famines, are chronic conditions of Tigray and Eritrea regions, which have led inhabitants over many decades to develop a number of survival strategies, including distress migration to surplus-producing areas of lowland Tigray and eastern Sudan (Hendrie 1991). In response to the famine of 1985, the TPLF organised a march of close to 200,000 famine victims into the Sudan, which allowed it to turn the catastrophic implications of the famine to its advantage. The TPLF played a significant role in managing the famine of 1984–1987 in northern Ethiopia, and succeeded in using the situation to gain international attention (Hammond, 1989; Hendrie, 1991). Due to the political sensitivities around supporting relief operations in insurgent-controlled zones,

the TPLF's humanitarian branch REST (Relief Society of Tigray) operations was prevented from receiving assistance from UNHCR and other international organisations, but was assisted by a handful of volunteers despite its demonstrated capacity to reach famine-affected people (ibid.; Smith 1987). Despite the lack of any meaningful external support, the TPLF and REST managed the movement of refugees to and later repatriation out of Sudan. By demonstrating its ability to manage large-scale displacement, REST showed that it had a capable organisational structure and received some international humanitarian aid and funding for small-scale development projects in Tigray (Hammond, 1989). The capacity built in these years would later go on to be partially absorbed into ARRA.

Movement of people and goods back and forth over what was previously an internal border has been influenced significantly by the state of relations between the two countries since 1991. The end of the Eritrean independence war, which itself displaced thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians, did not end disputes between the two sides. Relations soured when Eritrea introduced its own currency, the Nakfa, in 1997. This hit trade between the two countries hard, and especially affected Tigray. Following several disputes and skirmishes, including around Badme, an area that was sparsely populated until recently and largely used by Kunama agro-pastoralists and later settled by Eritrean and Tigray farmers, war between the two countries broke out in May 1998, displacing hundreds of thousands of people on both sides and leaving between 70,000 and 100,000 dead (Plaut and Gilkes, 1999; Mosley, 2014). The once-porous border between the two countries was transformed into a barrier obstructing the free movement of people and goods (Getachew, 2018).

Despite claims that the war was over the exact location of the border between the two countries, it was rather 'over rival hegemonic claims in the Horn of Africa and over national pride and territorial integrity' (Barry and Gilkes, 2005), and an attempt by both countries to advance their national security interests in a historically unstable region where 'cross-border interference is the norm, not the exception' (Mosley, 2014: 3). The ruling parties in Eritrea and Ethiopia actively supported each other's opposition groups.

Ethiopia supported a number of opposition groups in Eritrea, such as the Kunama and some sections of the Afar, and also tried to bring together the divided Eritrean opposition, while Eritrea wooed the Afar and provided support to the Somali and Oromo opposition movements in Ethiopia (Plaut and Gilkes, 1999; Mosley, 2014).

Despite these concerns the Ethiopian government has followed an open border policy towards Eritrean refugees, granting them refugee status on a *prima facie* basis. Some analysts suggest that this has been part of a wider political campaign on the part of the Ethiopian authorities to send a message to Eritrean citizens that the Ethiopian government is 'on their side', unlike their own government, seeking to reduce their loyalty towards Asmara (pers. comm.). While the open border with Ethiopia allowed Eritrean refugees safe passage, with camps in Tigray acting as transit points en route to Europe via Sudan and Libya, Eritrea's policies have also inadvertently helped to contribute to this flow (van Reisen, 2018). Since the political rapprochement and opening of the border on 11 September 2018, movement across it has become easier – while the majority of movement is of Eritreans and Ethiopians visiting family and friends, and conducting trade, there has been a sharp increase in the number of people seeking asylum. Between 12 September and 13 October 2018, 9,905 Eritreans were newly registered as refugees. Three-quarters of these new arrivals cited family reunification, both within and outside Ethiopia, as a secondary motive for movement (UNHCR, 2018b).

2.3 Eritrean refugees in Tigray

The flow of Eritreans to Ethiopia began during the war, with entries into Wa'ala Nihibi refugee camp, set up in August 2000 in what is now Tahtay Adiabo Woreda, 13km from the town of Shiraro and on the road to Badme. First to arrive were the Kunama, a Nilo-Saharan ethnic community living between the Gash and Setit rivers in south-western Eritrea, who also have a community in north-western parts of Tigray in Ethiopia. Since Eritrea's independence in 1993, Kunama have accused the government of expropriating their land for investment and

the resettlement of Eritrean refugees returning from Sudan (RIC, 2003). Following the war, Kunama have fled in greater numbers fearing that there may be retaliation from the Eritrean government, which has questioned their loyalties (ibid.). Administered by ARRA, UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the camp hosted around 4,000 Kunama refugees but was deemed unsafe due to the proximity to the Eritrean border and the scarce resources, especially land and water, available in the area.

By 2004, the camp was hosting 4,272 Kunama refugees as well as Tigrigna-speaking Eritrean refugees (3,851) and other minority groups. As the number of Eritreans entering Ethiopia increased as repression by the Eritrean government grew stronger and wider, refugees were transferred to Shimelba refugee camp, 60km from Wa'ala Nihibi (Refugees International, 2004).

By 2007, the number of refugees in Shimelba had reached 13,732, with Tigrigna-speaking Eritreans (8,993) far outnumbering Kunama (4,405). Eritrean refugees from Shimelba camp were offered opportunities for resettlement, with the first of 700 Kunama refugees leaving Ethiopia in June 2007. The programme was accelerated by the United States (US) in 2008 (US Department of State, 2008), which made group resettlement available to Eritrean refugees from the camp. While Tigrigna-speaking refugees were keen to take up this opportunity, those of Kunama origin were less willing to leave, both because it disrupted their way of life and due to a smear campaign by the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Eritrean Kunama, at the time an armed opposition group fighting Eritrea (Chicago Tribune, 2007).

The rationale for the establishment of Mai Aini and Adi Harush camps in their current location is less clear. The federal government asked the Woreda authorities to identify available plots of land, but it was not made clear to the administration of Tselemti Woreda that this was for refugee settlements (KII28). Unlike Shimelba, which is isolated from nearby local settlements, Mai Aini and Adi Harush are along the asphalt main road from Shire to the city of Gonder in Amhara Region. Adi Harush is also close to Mai Tsebri town, an urban centre where refugees can access services and markets.

When Adi Harush camp first opened in 2010, it had the lowest average household size of any camp in Ethiopia – as it mainly comprised young single men, who made up 84% of the camp population. Single women, female-headed households and unaccompanied minors were referred to Mai Aini Camp, which was thought to be better equipped than Adi Harush camp, which lacked many basic services and infrastructure (WFP, UNHCR, ARRA, 2010). While this has since changed, Mai Aini is still perceived to be the better managed camp as services such as education are operated by ARRA, with refugees not required to share these services with residents from neighbouring communities (FGD6). By 2013, before Hitsats refugee camp opened, the population in Adi Harush had increased to 22,000. Growing unrest and reported protests spread in the camp, fuelled by anger at the death of hundreds of Eritreans off Lampedusa (Molinario, 2014).

Following verification by UNHCR of the Eritrean refugee population in Tigray in 2015, 73,078 refugee accounts were deactivated – of these, 8,000 have been identified as having moved to Addis Ababa, with the rest believed to have migrated out of the camps, probably towards Sudan on a now well-known route to Europe via Libya (for a detailed analysis of human trafficking, including the role camps in Tigray play, see van Reisen, 2016 and van Reisen and Mawere, 2017).

As of 31 August 2018, Tigray hosted 43,740 refugees across four camps (UNHCR, 2018a). The effects of the opening of the border on the onward migration of refugees are yet to be seen. The influx of new arrivals is vastly different from the current refugee population. While the majority of refugees in Tigray are young men, 90.85% of the 9,905 new arrivals since mid-September 2018 were women and children, now able to make the crossing safely on major roads from Eritrea to Rama and Zalambesa in Tigray. While 41% report having family in Ethiopia, 79% have indicated an intention to pursue reunification with family members abroad, mostly in Europe and North America (UNHCR, 2018b). It is too early to tell to what extent these new arrivals will pursue

migration, with what ends, and whether they will do so regularly or irregularly.

2.4 Motivations of refugees in Tigray

The reasons for Eritreans fleeing their country have included forced conscription, arbitrary arrest and detention without trial, compulsory land acquisition by the state, religious persecution and other human rights violations (Mallett et al., 2017; Diaz, 2018). Other factors include poverty, joblessness and political repression. Eritreans fleeing conscription face arrest and detention, torture and punishment of family members (*ibid.*). The militarisation of the country's labour force has damaged family structures, resulting in the slow disintegration of families as members are forced to flee and live separately for prolonged periods (Hirt and Mohammad, 2013; Mallett et al., 2017).

Since 2014, on average, between 2,300 and 5,000 Eritrean refugees have arrived in Tigray Region, with peaks during the dry seasons between October and March (Samuel Hall, 2014). This is despite the existence of a 'shoot-on-sight' policy enforced against people attempting to cross the border, and the risk of prolonged arbitrary detention (*ibid.*). Of particular concern is the large number of unaccompanied and separated children (particularly teenage boys) arriving in the camps. Children accounted for 39% of the total refugee population in Tigray camps in 2016, of whom 25% arrived unaccompanied or separated from their families (UNHCR, 2016). Many of the unaccompanied children arriving in Tigray have been raised with only one – or no – parent because parents have been drafted into National Service. The breakdown of traditional family structures (Mallett et al., 2017), and fear of being drafted into National Service themselves at a later stage, drives even small children to leave Eritrea. Being under-age and without resources, they are extremely vulnerable to being trafficked (van Reisen and Mawere, 2017). Many of the young women arriving in the camps have also been subject to sexual and gender-based violence (SGVB).

The dominant group among Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia are men between the ages of 18 and 45 (around 55%), who are generally literate (89%). Otherwise they have a limited skill set, but nevertheless express a desire to be engaged in livelihood activities as a means of useful occupation when they do not enjoy the formal right to work (Samuel Hall, 2014). These characteristics make it difficult for them to adjust to camp life. They come with high expectations, including of security, work opportunities and the freedom to pursue their aspirations (Mallett et al., 2017), and when these are not met they struggle with a sense of hopelessness and entrapment (Getachew, 2018). They speak of being 'stuck in limbo': unable to return because the penalty of leaving Eritrea illegally amounts to persecution and extrajudicial punishment (Home Office, 2018), but at the same time not engaging in any meaningful occupation and not being allowed to fully integrate locally (Samuel Hall, 2014). This feeling of 'being stuck', being treated differently and as socially inferior, deprived of the right to work and the right to freedom of movement makes a large number of Eritreans feel that they will never truly become full members of Ethiopian society (Mallett et al., 2017).

A considerable number of young men, and women, continue their migration towards third countries, especially when they are left with no livelihood opportunities and no prospect for durable solutions in Ethiopia, such as meaningful local integration or opportunities for resettlement in third countries (e.g. Samuel Hall, 2014; Afera, 2015; Getachew, 2018). According to UNHCR (2018), approximately 80% of Eritrean refugees left the camps in Tigray within 12 months of arriving in Ethiopia, many going on to leave the country. Because there are limited opportunities for local integration, human trafficking acts as a pull factor in displacement, while at the same time undermining efforts towards longer-term integration. As of 2015, Eritreans were considered to be the third-largest group of migrants embarking on the dangerous Mediterranean crossing to Europe, exceeded only by Syrians and Afghans (Smith, 2015).

2.5 Being out of camp and the Out of Camp Policy

The Ethiopian government's desire to strengthen 'people to people relations' and demonstrate its generosity towards Eritreans, and support for their aspirations, according to the government, led to the introduction of the OCP scheme for Eritrean refugees. The first such scheme was implemented in 2010 in response to the level of self-reliance achieved by refugees in camps in areas around Shire (Africa Monitors, 2017). The officially stated aim of the OCP is to improve self-reliance among refugees to enable them to live more independent lives (Mallett et al., 2017). Once settled in towns or cities, OCP beneficiaries receive little assistance from either ARRA or UNHCR, as refugees are categorised as being self-reliant (Africa Monitors, 2017). The scheme's parameters remain unclear, without a clear reference document or legal framework, and there are multiple different interpretations among different organisations of what it is and what it entails (Samuel Hall, 2014).

The OCP allows Eritrean refugees to live and move freely across the country (Tamrat and Dermas, 2018), provided they meet basic eligibility criteria. As a result of this scheme, it is estimated that around 17,300 refugees currently reside in Addis Ababa. Another scheme gives Eritrean refugees free access to higher education (Samuel Hall, 2014). So far, the scheme has enabled 1,600 Eritrean refugees to pursue their studies in public universities across the country, with around 1,300 students sponsored by the Ethiopian government and the rest sponsored by UNHCR's scholarship programme, DAFI (the Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative) (ibid.). Over 700 refugees have

graduated from vocational training; some were given start-up kits and others hired to construct shelters in the camps. Yet in general there seems to be an ambiguity around what graduates are allowed and expected to do after completing their degree or training: while ARRA officials say that graduates are expected to go back to the camps and find jobs there, young refugees said that they were given the choice to remain in the city if they could prove they could sustain themselves (ibid.). Under the CRRF, the government has announced plans to gradually shift the balance from encampment in favour of out-of-camp settlement and the local integration of refugees.

Movement in and out of the camps is generally fluid, either through the OCP or otherwise (educational, medical, humanitarian or resettlement reasons), making it difficult to establish the precise number of refugees living outside the camps (Africa Monitors, 2017; Getachew, 2018). Given the number of refugees moving northwards towards Europe, it is even more difficult to estimate the number of OCP beneficiaries residing in Addis Ababa or other parts of the country (ibid.). An unknown, but likely large, number of refugees are also living outside the camps without formal documentation (UNHCR, n.d.). The recent opening of the border between the two countries also adds to the uncertainty around the number of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia. Currently, little to no documentation is required to cross the border – and while Eritreans do not need formal documentation to stay in Ethiopia, refugee registration remains the only form of documentation available to them. A growing number of people are entering Ethiopia to visit family and friends or engage in trade without registering (Gardner, 2018).

3 The challenges facing refugees and residents in Tigray

The two camps considered for this study – Shimelba and Adi Harush – are distinct in their location and population, and thus in their interactions with the resident population. Overall, interactions between refugees and residents are more common and diverse in Adi Harush than in Shimelba. The key reasons for these differences are: (i) the ethnic composition and language of the refugee population: Shimelba has a large Kunama population residing in a Tigrigna area, whereas the largely Tigrigna-speaking refugee population, both in Shimelba and in Adi Harush, is closer to the Tigray and therefore better able to interact with neighbouring residents; (ii) stronger social interdependencies as a result of economic interactions and trade between refugees in Adi Harush and residents in Mai Tsebri town; (iii) refugees in Adi Harush being more active economic actors, having greater access to financial resources, including remittances from family and friends living and working mostly across Europe, the Middle East and North America; and (iv) camp location: Adi Harush is just a few minutes from Mai Tsebri town, the seat of the Tselemti woreda administration, whereas Shimelba is much more isolated, with the nearest town, Shiraro, 30km away. Because of these characteristics, relations between refugees and residents are related more to agricultural activity and labour exchange in Shimelba, whereas the relationship between refugees and residents in Adi Harush is much more cash- and market-based.

3.1 Economic interactions between residents and refugees

3.1.1 Agriculture-based interactions

In Shimelba, the majority of Kunama refugees were agro-pastoralists before fleeing Eritrea. Many had lived in the camp for 15 years or more, established some relations with residents from neighbouring villages especially around agriculture, but also had more time to establish their own herds of livestock. Many refugees in Shimelba also mentioned that they wanted to return to Eritrea, reclaim their land and continue with their traditional forms of agro-pastoralism, or alternatively live with the Kunama community in Ethiopia. In this regard, there was a large generational gap, where younger Kunama expressed interest in going abroad, stating that ‘there is nothing here for us’ (FGD 2). While unable to fully articulate what opportunities they would be able to access abroad, the desire for resettlement among those who grew up in the camp was much stronger than among the older generations. An older woman and mother stated that she was only in the camp for her children – once they were resettled, she would leave to join Kunama in Lemlem tabia in Ethiopia (FDG 2).

A number of refugees from Shimelba are engaged in sharecropping. Refugees have entered into arrangements with residents and are working on residents’ land in return for a portion of the yield. This arrangement is possible because many refugees own cattle – including oxen for ploughing. Entering into sharecropping

arrangements is often the only way female-headed households can access the male labour required to perform certain agricultural tasks, given strict labour divisions. Shimelba's remote rural location makes it likely that there are more opportunities for sharecropping than in the vicinity of Adi Harush. Livestock ownership also brings refugees an income from selling livestock products, using donkey carts to collect water from wells outside the camp and selling water in the camp for housebuilding or to businesses or consuming livestock products to improve nutrition.

Livestock ownership by refugees also creates problems with residents since refugees drive their cattle into grazing areas claimed by residents. Grazing cattle has been further complicated since the early 2000s, when the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources launched a country-wide programme to replace free grazing with a 'cut-and-carry' system. As refugees do not have formal access to land where they could cut grass, they either have to do so clandestinely or enter into formal arrangements with residents.

In Adi Harush it was mentioned that ARRA did not permit sharecropping by refugees (FGD 5). In addition, refugees in Adi Harush are younger, often from urban areas and recent arrivals, making engagement in agriculture less appropriate. Interest among this population is much more focused on resettlement to a third country.

3.1.2 Markets and trade

Trade is minimal in Shimelba, with goods bought in Shiraro being sold in the camp by Ethiopians and refugees, and agricultural produce from refugees being bought by the local population around Shimelba (FGD 4; IDI 5).

In Adi Harush, refugees access the weekly market or buy goods and services in shops, internet cafes, banks, pharmacies, restaurants, cafes, bars and nightclubs in Mai Tsebri town, only a few minutes away from the camp. Refugees mentioned that accessing goods and services in Mai Tsebri was crucial as these goods and services were not available in the camp. Some owners of shops, restaurants or internet cafes highlighted that they moved to Mai Tsebri from other areas of Tigray to set up shop or start a business entirely because of the presence of the

camp and the opportunities for business refugees offered (KIIs 25 and 26).

While refugees in Adi Harush do not produce agricultural goods for sale, as in Shimelba, some are engaged in livestock fattening – buying sheep or goats from farmers at low prices and selling them to other refugees in the camp (FGD 8; IDIs 17 and 18). Local residents also reported that, due to the demand created by refugees, especially for agricultural goods, dairy products and eggs, they were able to benefit directly from the refugee operation. While they do not live in close proximity to the refugee camp, farmers in Wuhdet tabia reported that, before the refugees arrived, eggs would go bad and milk would not be used, especially during the fasting season. However, the steady demand for these products in the camp has allowed them to make money and increased their income (IDIs 17 and 18).

The presence of refugees was also blamed for increasing the cost of living in the area because higher demand for some goods, such as wood and charcoal, outstripped supply and pushed prices up (FDGs 7 and 8). While those engaged directly in businesses providing goods or services consumed by refugees can compensate for increased prices, members of the local community noted that people on fixed incomes and the urban poor struggled (FGD 8).

The diversity and quality of goods and services in Mai Tsebri is in part a result of the presence of the camp, which has both created demand and provided the required cash. High rates of remittances and cash flow have given refugees access to some banking services in Mai Tsebri. Eritreans at one bank in the town made up 30% of accounts opened at that branch (KII 27). How much of this urbanisation will remain if and when the camps close remains to be seen. Even with the announcement of Ethiopia's acceptance of the Algiers Agreement, at the time of data collection residents in the town feared that economic opportunities would decline significantly if the camp closed or if refugees were allowed to move out of the camp and settle. 'Now they're talking about possible peace, not every business person realises this, but they [the refugees] are the reason why we can make profits' (KII 26).

3.1.3 Cash income

Access to income – both formal salaried income and income from the sale of primary production (i.e. sale of livestock products, grass or firewood) – was consistently raised as a problem by both refugees and residents, although with very different dynamics in each camp. While in Shimelba the few formal income opportunities that do exist are largely related to refugee operations, for example through employment by ARRA or its implementing partners, there are better, though still limited, opportunities in and around the Adi Harush camp because of its vicinity to Mai Tsebri town.

Refugees in the camps, residents living nearby and government officials mentioned the sale of firewood, charcoal and grass as an important livelihood strategy for refugees to supplement their income (FGDs 1 and 5; KIIs 5 and 9). This is also recognised by UNHCR (2016) as an important source of income, but also a major issue in terms of environmental degradation, conflicts with local residents and sexual violence. While residents and government officials recognised that this is often one of the only sources of cash income for refugees and showed a great deal of understanding, they also mentioned the detrimental impacts of these activities on the natural environment. One resident (IDI 16) mentioned that, before the refugees' arrival, only a few of the very poorest households were engaged in charcoal production, but that this has now become an important livelihood activity for the majority of resident households because of increased demand from refugees. He pointed out the damaging impact that this has had on the environment, but was also very clear where the responsibility lies: he pointed to the government, stating that 'if refugees had access to power like people in town there would be no problem with deforestation'. Another resident from May Khuli pointed out that, prior to the establishment of Shimelba camp, 'the area was dense forest, with large indigenous trees' (IDI 10). In FGDs, residents were able to map the geographical areas where tree coverage had declined since the refugee camp was created. Residents were quick to point out that, while refugees were settled in one area, their impact on natural resources extended far beyond the immediate village (FGD 4). However, they

were also clear that this was not just a result of the presence of the camp, but also because of the increasing resident population.

In both sites – as across Tigray as a whole – the collection of firewood from natural shrub and forest land is banned and people are fined if they are caught. There is a sense among both groups of differential treatment. While refugees complained that they were reported to camp authorities even for carrying an axe (FGD 1), residents complained that they were fined when caught with wood whereas refugees were not fined (FGD 7).

Because the Kunama diaspora is much smaller than that of the Tigrigna-speaking Eritrean refugee population, links between refugees and the diaspora are much stronger in Adi Harush than Shimelba. This results in less cash flowing into Shimelba camp compared to Adi Harush. Money sent from relatives and friends is largely meant to support livelihoods and enable refugees' onward movement, but it is often also invested in local businesses. In both camps, refugees run shops, restaurants and cafes, beauty parlours and electricity supplies. In addition to support from implementing and operational partners, starting capital has been provided by relatives living abroad or through taking over existing businesses from friends or relatives resettled abroad. One private power generator in Shimelba camp, for example, is owned and run by a refugee who moved from Mai Aini camp to Shimelba. The money to buy the generator came from relatives abroad (IDI 9). Besides offering goods and services (e.g. electricity) which are otherwise not available and not provided by ARRA or its implementing partners, these businesses are also important social hubs where people meet and access information.

In both areas residents said that they engaged refugees as daily labourers. In Wuhdet tabia, residents pointed to specific skills, such as fattening livestock, carpentry or masonry, which made refugees employable (IDI 16; FGD 7), while in May Khuli tabia daily labourers were mostly employed to help with fieldwork and house construction (IDI 10). In both instances payment for daily labourers was the same for refugees and local residents (ranging between ETB 70/day for unskilled (e.g. farm work) to ETB 120/day for semi-skilled labour (e.g. masonry, carpentry))

(FGD 6). In Wuhdet tabia it was mentioned that refugees had a stronger work ethic than local residents, leading to increased joblessness among the resident population as refugees were preferred as daily labourers (IDI 16; FGD 7).

Another employment opportunity for refugees in the camps is the ‘incentive worker’ positions employed by ARRA or implementing partners, such as teachers, health workers or social workers. Because of restrictions on formal employment, income is capped at ETB 700 (around \$25) per month, below what Ethiopian employees in similar positions would earn. Despite the low salary, these positions are important sources of income, especially for refugees with formal education or university degrees (KIIs 13 and 22). Refugees mentioned that, despite having achieved above-average grades in Ethiopian universities, being forced to take up jobs with little pay and few opportunities for professional advancement was socially and psychologically harmful (IDI 8).

I was a nurse in Eritrea, I retrained to be a nurse in Ethiopia but when I came back to the camp, my first job was to dig latrines! I work as an incentive worker in the health centre now but I cannot practise my profession. I have a profession – I am not just a ‘refugee’, being a refugee is not my profession (IDI 9).

Besides low pay, which affects motivation, other concerns raised related to the lack of transparent recruitment processes (IDI 9). However, even if refugees are able to find employment as incentive workers and can compete with their Ethiopian counterparts, the level of responsibility that they can take on and their opportunities for further employment are limited, especially in health. Whereas refugee teachers are allowed to carry out tasks and responsibilities as teachers on a par with their Ethiopian counterparts, refugee incentive workers in health centres who have prior experience and relevant qualifications, such as local degrees, are limited in their responsibilities; they cannot, for example, administer medicine or conduct routine tasks such as drawing blood from patients.

3.2 Social interactions

In both camps, significant interactions take place around religious events, within religious institutions often shared by both refugees and local residents. Both residents and refugees (FGDs 3, 5, 7 and 8; IDIs 11 and 16) mentioned that refugees worship in nearby churches or mosques. This has created important bonds between refugees and residents. Orthodox Christians celebrate specific saints’ days, where they take turns to gather in the home of a member of a *mahiber* association to pay homage to a specific saint and share a meal. Both refugees and residents (IDIs 10, 11 and 16) mentioned that their *mahiber* association included members from both groups. As members host the group in turn, this means that interactions are taking place both in the surrounding villages and in the camp. For residents, such gatherings are among the few reasons for entering the camp. Marriages between residents and refugees are also not uncommon (IDI 10; FGD 7), most likely as a result of contacts fostered through religious interactions. Intermarriage is more prevalent among Tigrigna-speaking refugees and residents. There are far fewer marriages between Kunama and Tigrigna-speaking refugees in the camp itself, or between Ethiopians and Kunama refugees (FGD 2; IDI 5).

3.2.1 Residents living in camps

In both camps we encountered bi-national couples, where the Ethiopian spouse lived with their Eritrean partner in the camp (IDIs 2 and 5; FGD 5). The main reason offered for this arrangement – as opposed to the refugee spouse residing outside the camp in the local community – was that traditionally the wife moves to live with her husband, even if this means living in the camp. There was less evidence of refugees settling in communities, not because they do not move out of camps, but because, once they do, they are likely to try to integrate as much as possible. Following the state of emergency in 2016–2017, during which refugees were told to move back into camps, Shimelba camp hosted a number of Eritreans who identified themselves as refugees who had been living in villages

around the camp (KII 29). While refugees living outside of camps are formally registered through the OCP in urban areas, not all refugees notify the authorities if they leave the camp to live in surrounding communities.

These examples of interactions between refugees and residents demonstrate the blurred boundaries between the two groups and their main locations of residence. This offers opportunities to both groups, even if in some cases this might mean bending or breaking rules. For example, Ethiopian women are known to seek out Eritrean refugee husbands for the purpose of moving abroad through resettlement (IDI 9). It is understandable that neither refugees nor residents were fully open in conversations about their interactions with the other group. In conversations with ARRA representatives, social interactions were highlighted and praised as positive examples of how well refugees and residents get along and support each other (KIIs 10, 23 and 29). Other interactions, especially economic ones and issues around where residents or refugees reside, were approached with much more caution.

Insecurity and violent conflict were rarely mentioned as a problem. Despite the presence of different ethno-linguistic groups among the refugees – Kunama, Nara, Saho, Tigre, Tigray, Bilen – there seems to be little tension between them. Where tensions exist, they relate largely to teenage and young unaccompanied male Eritrean refugees' behaviour, including anti-social behaviour linked to alcohol (IDIs 15 and 16). Tensions have also been reported in relation to how refugees are treated by local security forces when caught with firewood.

3.2.2 Shared use of services

Economic and social interactions influence the way services are accessed and used by refugees and residents, with poorer refugees and residents in particular feeling that they do not exert sufficient control over the nature and quality of the services they receive. Across the interviews there was a sense of a lack of accountability and responsiveness from those responsible for delivering services, both in camps and in communities.

3.2.3 Water, sanitation and hygiene

Most respondents in Shimelba reported no problems with water availability and quality during the rainy season, but highlighted that, during the dry season, water quantity was an issue (FGD 1), and noted that queuing times increased. Some refugees mentioned that the key issue that prevented them from collecting sufficient water was a lack of jerry cans or vessels to store water at home since regular distributions of non-food items stopped (IDI 4). They also raised concerns about water trucking from the borehole that was meant to serve refugees in Shimelba camp as having a negative effect on their water supply (FGD 1; IDI 9). Refugees from Adi Harush camp raised more problems with water availability. Depending on where in the camp people lived, the amounts each household could collect each day seemed to be restricted: 'People living in Zone 4 are only allowed to collect two jerry cans per day for the entire household, irrespective of household size' (FGD 5). Refugees from both camps reported that local residents from neighbouring villages also collect water from tap-stands inside the camps, on a regular basis by people living nearby camps and during the dry season by people from further away, but did not express any concerns about this with regard to having a negative impact on their water access.

Outside the camps, the situation with water is more complex. In villages surrounding Shimelba camp, residents reported severe water shortages, mainly because handpumps were broken and not repaired, forcing people to collect water from unprotected hand-dug wells (FGD 3). Some of these wells were privately owned, meaning that residents could only collect water after the owner had collected water and had watered his cattle. Besides the travel distance, it also meant long queueing times. Residents living nearby mentioned that they collected water from tap-stands inside the camp. Residents complained about trucking water to other camps, especially during the dry season, resulting in water shortages in Shimelba camp and surrounding villages, instead of maintaining existing handpumps or extending piped water to May Khuli and other villages.

Water is also an issue in the environs of Adi Harush camp. The Regional Bureau of Water (BoW) reports that Tselemti has the second lowest water coverage of all the woredas in Tigray, at 43%, compared with the average across Tigray of 61%. According to the Woreda Office of Water (WOoW) the situation is even worse than this: their figures show coverage at 27% in Mai Tsebri town and 38% in rural areas. Representatives from the WOoW mentioned as one of their main problems the low budget (both capital and recurrent), which does not allow them to increase water supply to residents or maintain broken-down systems. Tselemti woreda is also severely affected by drought, and an increasing number of water sources are running dry: of the 77 systems reported as being non-functional in 2017–2018, 56 (73%) were dry. The drying up of springs in Imbamadri forced IRC (the implementing partner in Adi Harush responsible for WASH) to divert water from Adi Harush camp to serve the residents of Imbamadri and surrounding areas (KII 24). The situation will hopefully improve with the construction by UNICEF of a UK aid-funded piped water system and the establishment of a water utility to service Mai Tsebri town, the two refugee camps and surrounding communities drawing water from Serenta dam, 4km outside of Mai Tsebri (KII 18).

3.2.4 Education

Inside the camps, perceptions of education were mixed. While education up to 8th grade appears to be available to all refugees who want it, concerns were raised by a number of refugees about the quality of teaching and the difficulties they faced accessing high school education (11th and 12th grade). In Shimelba, there are two separate primary schools (grades 1 to 8) for refugees and residents and children from the two groups do not mix in class, despite the buildings being in the same location, whereas refugees and local children mix in the secondary school (grades 9 and 10) close to Shimelba camp. Both groups have to travel to Shiraro to attend grades 11 and 12.

In terms of infrastructure, the refugee school in Shimelba is of much better quality than the local school (see photos in this sub-section), and there are additional buildings for a library and a laboratory. In terms of quality, however, teaching

standards are lower in refugee schools, largely because of a shortage of teachers, or poorly qualified and motivated teachers. On average, across the Shire refugee operation, there is one teacher for every 65 pupils (one per 58 for grades 1–4 and one per 75 for grades 5–8), whereas across Tigray Region the ratio is one teacher per 39 pupils for grades 1–4 and one per 34 for grades 5–8 (MoE, 2017). The two schools are next to each other, and while refugee and resident children attend different buildings and classes, there are close interactions during breaks.

In Shimelba, the education situation has become more complicated since 2016, when responsibility for education shifted from the IRC to ARRA. With this change came a round of redundancies of incentive workers, as well as a change in curriculum and teaching language, from Kunamigna to Tigrigna, following the curriculum set by the Tigray Bureau of Education (KII 8). Because a significant number of refugees in Shimelba are Kunama, primary education (grades 1–4) in the camp was taught until 2016 by Kunama incentive teachers in Kunamigna, which is based on the Latin alphabet, and following the Eritrean curriculum. From grade 5 onwards, all subjects were taught in English and children learned Tigrigna and Amharic, including the Ge'ez alphabet.

Some respondents reported that, since non-governmental organisations (NGOs) stopped running refugee schools, the quality of teaching has declined, partly because there are fewer teachers – especially Kunama-speaking incentive teachers. There were complaints that English as a teaching language was abolished for grades 5–8. One incentive teacher pointed out that he strongly believes Eritrean students were much better in the use of the English language compared to Ethiopian students because they were taught English from a much younger age and that this advantage would be lost (IDI 9).

In the nearby local community school, subjects are taught in Tigrigna up to grade 8 and English is used as a language of instruction only for grades 9 to 12. However, the Kunama are recognised as one of the two minority groups in Tigray regional state. With this recognition comes the right to self-determination, including secession, development of their language and



Classroom for refugee children, Shimelba. © Eva Ludi, 2018

culture and preservation of their history, as well as participation in government and fair representation (Mamo, 2017). This has been put into practice to some extent in relation to the Ethiopian Kunama, who are concentrated in Lemlem tabia in Tahtay Adiyabo woreda. As they are few in number (2,981 as of 2010 (ibid.)) they are not represented at the woreda administrative level, though they do have representatives at the tabia level (ibid.). Kunamigna is taught in schools in Lemlem, while the regional government is making efforts to introduce the Kunama language as a language of instruction in primary schools (KII 16). However, while this bodes well for Ethiopian Kunama, there has been resistance in refugee schools as Kunamigna in Ethiopia is written using the Ge'ez alphabet, and not the Latin alphabet as in Eritrea (KII 30).

Because incentive teachers are paid very little, teaching is not necessarily attractive for refugees with good qualifications. Both teachers and parents mentioned the low motivation and low-quality teaching as a major concern (IDIs 4 and 9). But it was also noted that teaching was made very difficult since camp schools do not have

access to sufficient teaching materials, text books or other teaching aids (IDI 9). Whenever they can afford it, refugee parents send their children to private tutors in the camp.

Given the proximity of schools to Shimelba camp, there seems to be no major issue with sending children to school, at least up to 8th grade. At national level, the Primary Completion Rate for grade 5 is 88.6% for boys and 81.7% for girls. This drops significantly to 56% for boys and 52.2% for girls, respectively, completing grade 8. The grade 8 completion rate among refugee girls in Shire (comprising all four camps of Hitsats, Shimelba, Mai Aini and Adi Harush) is considerably higher than the national average, at 66.3%, while for boys it is lower than the national average, at 52.4% (MoE, 2017). The latter can be seen as an indication of onward movement of boys and young men. Along similar lines, there are more young refugee women enrolled in secondary school (grades 9–12) (7.7%) than young refugee men (5.3%) in the Shire refugee operation. No other refugee region sees a similar trend – in all other refugee operations (Samara, Assosa,

Dollo Ado, Gambella and Jigjiga) there are more young men than young women enrolled in secondary education (MoE, 2017). In Shimelba, normative values in relation to girls' education and the opportunity costs of girls attending school instead of engaging in household chores, this was also explained by a lack of education among parents, especially common among Kunama, and therefore lack of motivation and ability to support children in doing homework (IDI 9). Another reason mentioned for high school dropout rates was the lack of child protection officers able to follow up on children's educational progress and a lack of awareness-raising efforts to convince parents of the importance of education (ibid.). One motivation for parents to send children to school relates to the opportunities this offers for resettlement – the belief is that the better-educated children are, the better their chances of being eligible and chosen for resettlement. Similar views were shared by students themselves (IDI 4).

The education situation in Adi Harush is affected by the high prevalence of secondary movement out of camps. Discussions with

head teachers from Mai Tsebri Secondary School (KII 22) highlighted high drop-out rates among refugee students and low motivation to attend school. 'Refugee students come for relaxation and distraction from camp life, not to study, while they wait for resettlement' (ibid.). Behavioural issues among refugee students were also mentioned as leading to problems with resident students. While, for example, resident students are not allowed to carry mobile phones and are punished if they do, refugee students, even when caught with mobile phones in class, are not reprimanded or punished. Similarly, if resident students do not wear their uniforms they are banned from attending class and sent home, while refugee students often attend school without uniforms with no repercussions. The school board is unhappy with the Development and Inter-Church Aid Commission (DICAC) and ARRA, which they claim do not take adequate responsibility or action to address these behavioural issues, even when the school raises these problems with them. This unequal treatment by the school of refugee and resident students creates resentment among resident



Classroom (extension) for resident children. © Eva Ludi, 2018

students, with some saying that, if refugee students are treated differently and get away with certain behaviours because rules are not enforced, then it would be better for them to change nationality (ibid.).

Despite issues related to behaviour and drop-out rates, respondents said that it would not be a good idea to separate refugee and resident students in school. Because refugee students attend the secondary school in Mai Tsebri, the school receives support from DICAC in the form of materials (e.g. computers, printers) and teaching aids (e.g. text books). There is, however, no additional support to employ more teachers. The number of teachers is determined solely by the number of resident students, and refugee students are not taken into account when the Bureau of Education (BoE) assigns teachers to the school. Similarly, the school only reports on the achievements of resident students to the Office of Education. A separate report is provided to DICAC on refugee students. Having two separate reports was mentioned as being in the interest of the school, since the drop-out rate among refugee students is much higher than among resident students due to high rates of onward migration among refugee youth compared to local youth (KII 21). Reporting on both cohorts together would paint a worse picture of school performance than reporting separately.

3.2.5 Health and nutrition

Basic health services in the camps were the most consistently criticised services by respondents – with the exception of maternal health services. The main complaints related to opening times and the regular closure of the health post during ration distributions as nurses helped with food distribution, the level of services provided and the referral system. Many respondents mentioned that, for whatever health problem they have and seek medical help for, the only treatment they received were tablets (i.e. painkillers), with some respondents also mentioning that frequently not even tablets were not available and patients were told to return later (IDIs 2 and 3). Respondents complained that important tests (i.e. malaria) were not carried out, although health post staff countered that they had the necessary

equipment and performed tests regularly (FGD 5). Refugees in Adi Harush seek to access privately run pharmacies in Mai Tsebri whenever they have the cash to pay for services and medication (KIIs 27 and 28). In relation to referrals, respondents mentioned that, although in theory referrals do exist to nearby hospitals (Shire, Axum or even Mekele), the time it takes for patients to be referred is usually too long, and there were reports of several patients dying in the meantime (IDI 3). Another issue mentioned by refugees was insufficient support for travel to the health facilities that they are referred to – with additional costs such as food, clothing and transportation difficult for refugees to cover (FGD 6). An Ethiopian mother living in the camp with a refugee husband and children mentioned that, despite referrals for her son, she could not afford to travel with him to access appropriate care (IDI 5).

Healthcare for residents is equally, if not more, problematic, with health posts in surrounding villages understaffed and understocked. Residents were under the impression that health services were better in the camps than in the villages, and a significant number of local residents are trying to access healthcare within the camps (FGD 3; IDI 6). This is especially true in May Khuli, where the resident population benefits from the additional health centre in the camp, and were particularly grateful for services related to maternal care (FGD 4; IDI 6). Residents across both woredas complained that, despite having signed up to the health insurance scheme provided by the government, which gives them access to free healthcare and medicine, the low stocks in primary hospitals meant that they would be forced to look for more expensive alternatives in pharmacies, or not get treatment (FGDs 4 and 8).

In relation to nutrition, issues around school feeding, supplementary food for pregnant women and infants and rations came up. Residents mentioned that, even if the quality of education is lower in refugee schools than in government schools, the school feeding programme made refugee schools very attractive and an incentive to send their children there if they could (FGD 3). The tendency to extend feeding programmes beyond primary school, as was the case in

Shimelba refugee camp, had been noted as problematic by a new implementing partner trying to ‘wean off’ students from such programmes as they enter secondary school (KII 30).

Supplementary food for pregnant women and infants was reportedly available from the camp clinic in Shimelba, as long as pregnant women reported regularly to the clinic for a check-up (IDIs 2 and 10). Where such services were available through government schools or clinics, the food provided was said to be of shorter duration, less plentiful and lower-quality, indicating better services in camps and an incentive for residents to access services in camps rather than in their community (FGD 4; KII 17).

Recent cuts to rations were mentioned in most IDIs and FGDs in both camps as a major issue, and as having a significant impact on people’s nutrition. It also meant that people were forced to earn income through the sale of

wood or charcoal to supplement the ration with purchased food.

3.2.6 Child protection¹

Child protection interventions are handled very differently in villages and in camps. While in villages child protection tends to be handled by community structures and systems such as local teachers, health workers or religious figures (KII 22), systems in camps are set up and managed with far greater financial support. Nevertheless, in both camps a shortage of social workers was mentioned as hindering the delivery of adequate child protection. Even though camps have a much better ratio of social workers to children than surrounding communities, especially in Adi Harush, the large number of unaccompanied children and youth was mentioned as a significant problem that required much more attention from a child protection perspective (KII 23).

¹ Information collection on child protection during field work in May/June 2018 was limited. More in-depth work would be required to better understand the protection environment for children across the refugee and resident populations.

4 Institutional relationships across the sectors

There are currently no coordination structures or mechanisms for the refugee response at Tigray Regional level in Mekelle, as both ARRA and UNHCR have their operational base in Shire, the capital of the North Western Zone. Because there are no line ministries at zonal level, coordination between ARRA, UNHCR and government at this level occurs entirely through the Zonal Administration (KII 9), whereas sector-specific coordination between the government, ARRA and its implementing partners takes place at woreda level only.

Overall, the impression gained when talking to regional government representatives in Mekelle was that they had limited understanding of the refugee operation, and hardly any involvement. They knew about the CRRF and the pledges, but were unsure what they meant in detail or what their specific role in the implementation of the pledges would be. Their main concern was that they – or rather the administrative units for which they are responsible, i.e. the woredas – incurred additional costs since some services were also used by refugees, for which they were not compensated (KII 2).

Two key issues were raised by line ministry representatives at regional and woreda levels as problematic in terms of institutional relationships. Both are related to financial resources and how they are allocated. First, it was said that woreda line ministries regularly delivered services to refugees but were not compensated for doing so. Woreda staff especially complained that, while they try to account for the refugee population using services outside the camp, they do not see a similar approach from ARRA. Examples mentioned were the secondary school planning

for a certain number of refugee students to attend classes or the water office including refugee numbers in their planning of water service delivery. Woreda staff perceive ARRA as taking as its point of reference the number of refugees in the camp in relation to the available budget (KIIs 12, 13 and 18), without considering residents in their planning of service delivery. The key concern of woreda government offices is that, by including refugee numbers in their planning, they are allocating less money to residents than they actually should, as they do not receive any compensation – neither from the regional level through block grants nor from federal level through ARRA – for providing services to refugees (KII 18).

Second, because of the refugee presence, resource allocation is skewed towards some tabias at the expense of others. This primarily relates to external resources targeted to hosting communities, which are allocated not based on a prioritisation of needs (e.g. population, development gap), as is used for budgeting in the government structure. Instead, government informants felt that donors prioritised according to proximity when it came to refugee-related funding, which did not always align with the woreda's planning and interventions. Specific projects, such as the Development Response to Displacement Impact Project (DRDIP), are targeted to selected tabias in the immediate vicinity of the camps, but not necessarily where needs are greatest. This meant that government actors had to explain to their constituents why certain interventions only went to specific tabias, even though the woreda as a whole was very poor and should receive much more support (KIIs 19 and 28).

Related to this is the perceived lack of reporting and information provided by ARRA. Examples referred to were of government agencies providing services to refugees, but not being informed by ARRA how many refugees there are or other information, for example about previous treatment plans of refugees when they are utilising government health facilities, or ARRA not following up with refugee students who have been reported to them by the school for breaking school regulations or misbehaving (KII 3 and 22). Another example mentioned regularly was that government agencies had to provide reports to both the government and ARRA separately. Although positive in the sense that ARRA is asking for woreda expertise and not bringing in external experts, woreda government actors complained that experts from woreda offices are supporting ARRA or implementing partners (IPs), often without being remunerated or having a daily subsistence allowance paid (KII 18). Otherwise, regional and woreda government actors saw ARRA as a distinct federal actor – although they did recognise that it too was a government agency (KII 2 and 12).

The diversity of internal and external funding sources leads to overlapping lines of accountability. Government actors complained that they did not have the information they needed to deliver services. They felt that, since service delivery is a devolved responsibility of woreda offices, they should be much better informed about what ARRA is doing in camps, including, for example, how much it is spending per person. Some went so far as to suggest that the budget for services that is currently channelled through ARRA should go through the woreda accounting system, and would certainly have to be transferred when pledges are implemented and service delivery is more closely integrated (KII 18). There were complaints that ARRA did not engage sufficiently with local government, and therefore that local government was not aware of what goes on in the camps (KII 13).

Our staff have to go collect reports from ARRA, it's not like that with other health centres or private clinics – [our staff] has not collected the report in a

few months because he no longer wants to be the one making the effort (KII20).

Regional and woreda staff across sectors also mentioned how limited their access to the camps has been, and therefore being unable to understand how ARRA or IPs provide services in general, and what service delivery standards they use, in particular. This reluctance on the part of ARRA seems to be linked to mistrust of local authorities and their perception of service delivery levels and quality:

Services at woreda level are not as good as those in camps. It is also questionable if the woreda is able to appreciate the special needs of refugees. If they were to deliver services to refugees but at current woreda standards, that would be very problematic (KII 23).

ARRA representatives complained that woreda actors consider ARRA as being part of UNHCR or an implementing partner, and not as a full part of government. They were also of the opinion that the woreda government needs to be sensitised to consider refugees as part of their responsibility (KII 23). In general, there appears some work to be done to facilitate information sharing and better coordination between ARRA and woreda or regional governments.

The EU's Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) has been operating in Tigray for two years. While the intention is to improve service delivery for both refugees and residents and work towards a more integrated system, as yet it has struggled to have much impact at the system level. Split across a number of sectors and partners, its resources are fragmented, and without a strong strategy for engaging counterparts from local government at the zonal level it has instead been pushed down to woreda governments, but without clear direction or objectives. It is also being delivered in a crowded programmatic environment, and has been unable to clearly articulate how it differs from other activities already underway inside and outside the camps, or draw meaningful learning from the various areas of implementation. Finally, the resources available

to it are inadequate for responding to long-term development challenges in the region (KIIs at regional level).

There are a number of examples of joint working and positive interactions (see Table 1) across sectors, but these often focus on specific problems, rather than being reflective of wider institutional cooperation. In responding to public health concerns, NGOs, ARRA and government actors coordinate in order to respond quickly and efficiently – both communities and actors mentioned successful coordinated responses to outbreaks of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) in Shimelba and scabies in Mai Tsebri (IDI 8; KIIs 17 and 20; FGD 4), and examples where they had

helped each other out when pharmaceutical stocks ran low (KII 3). There are similar examples in the WASH sector, where different levels of government, ARRA, donors and NGOs have coordinated in making strategic investments in the development of the Mai Tsebri Water Supply Scheme (KIIs 1, 6, 14 and 23). In education, joint oversight and school inspections have been launched – an example where collaboration has gone beyond addressing a specific problem and appears to become institutionalised (KII 8). Coordination falters where problems are not perceived as urgent, or when the resources for coordination or responsibility to coordinate are not specific (KII16, KII18, KII21).

Table 1 Examples of interactions and coordination between the Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and local government

Sector	Positive examples	Negative examples
WASH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of Mai Tsebri Water Supply Scheme serving both Mai Tsebri town, surrounding communities and Adi Harush camp. This scheme is funded by UNICEF (through UK aid) and allows the woreda government to spend more resources on local communities. Establishment of WASH coordination structure in Mai Tsebri, attended by ARRA, UNHCR, IRC and the woreda administration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No joint planning of resource allocation, even though all concerned parties know that services are used by both refugees and residents. Water trucking from Shimelba camp borehole to Hitsats camp despite acute water shortage in surrounding villages and severe delays in expanding piped water to villages in the immediate vicinity of the camp.
Education and child protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of textbooks and other supplies by Bureau of Education to camp schools. Refugee students formally attending government high school. Extra provision of computers by DICAC to government-run high school because refugees attend. This material is also accessible to local students. Recent joint UNICEF–BoE school inspections/assessments. Discussions between BoE and ARRA on education policy issues and curriculum. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak integration of child protection at woreda and kebele level. Limited day-to-day information-sharing. Differences in data management systems used by ARRA and by local government.
Health and nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Working relations in vaccination campaigns and responding to disease outbreaks. The Regional Health Bureau (RHB) captures disease prevention and control data from camps. Whenever there is a shortage of medication in either government or camp facilities, the other would provide support. Provision of mosquito bed nets from UNICEF to resident communities and refugees based on needs assessment carried out by Woreda Office of Health covering both camps and communities. Training for service providers offered by RHB also open to camp service providers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ARRA facilities are not providing data to government health surveillance system because of different software systems used by ARRA/UNHCR and RHB. Camp health systems do not use the common check-lists for quality control otherwise used at woreda and regional level but have separate reporting system No joint planning and reporting. No systematic sharing of data between ARRA/UNHCR and RHB at regional level. Lack of data sharing (e.g. treatment plans) makes follow-up of refugees using health services at zonal or regional level difficult.

Resources are a major concern, both in terms of staffing as well as recurrent and capital budgets. Within the refugee operation itself, there are issues around the enormous disparity between incentive workers' salary of ETB 700 and salaries paid to national staff of ETB 3,000 and upwards. This is a source of considerable frustration to incentive workers, resulting in high staff turnover and low motivation (IDIs 4 and 9). Another issue is the salary differentials between ARRA and local government staff. According to an ARRA official, current ARRA staff would not be willing to be integrated into the woreda structure because of the lower salary. According to this official, the difference was small and not sufficient to displace staff (KII 23), a sentiment not shared by local government (KII 8).

Given the devolved nature of Ethiopia's service delivery arrangements there is a level

of mistrust and frustration, especially among local government staff, who feel they should have a larger say in refugee operations but feel ARRA does not want this. Local government staff would like ARRA to work in a way that is more aligned with local actors, especially themselves (KIIs 12 and 13). Local government experts mentioned frequently that they expected ARRA to align its operations to local plans and standards. For its part, ARRA complained that it was regarded by local government officials as an extension of UNHCR and not part of the government – 'it seems there are two governments working in parallel' (KII 23). With increasingly scarce resources, ARRA is recognising that it will have to coordinate more effectively with other government actors in future and work in closer partnership with the woreda government (*ibid.*).

5 Views on integration and self-reliance

While there is some knowledge about the Pledges among some refugees, local communities were in general unaware of them. Concepts of self-reliance and integration are as yet not fully defined by the Government of Ethiopia and it is thus not surprising that there is a level of confusion among residents, the refugee population and local government about what integration entails. The CRRF rollout has been slow getting to regional administration and bureaus – unlike other policies that are rolled out through the existing line ministries at all levels of governance, the CRRF is being rolled out by a federal actor with little previous relationship with regional government. Given the launch of the CRRF in Tigray was on 7 May 2018 in Mekele it had, at the time of the fieldwork for this study, not yet been communicated from the regional level down.²

5.1 Residents' and refugees' perspectives

Integration was seen differently by refugees and residents. While more refugees mentioned that they preferred service delivery to remain as it is, i.e. generally separated for refugees and residents, more residents preferred to have services delivered jointly to them and the refugees. Refugees were more concerned about increasing competition over services if delivered in an integrated manner and a reduction in service levels to the (perceived) lower standard

of local government-provided services, thus preferring the status quo. On the other hand, residents generally perceived service levels (quality, quantity, accessibility, affordability) to be better in the camps than outside, and were anticipating that, if services were delivered in an integrated way, service levels for them would increase to levels similar to camps. Examples mentioned were education in Shimelba, where refugee children had access to decent classrooms, sufficient furniture and teaching aids as well as a library and other facilities, whereas resident children were crammed into small classrooms or even extensions covered in plastic, corrugated iron sheets and grass and rocks for children to sit on (see images in chapter 3).³ A main factor in the preference for integrated service delivery was clearly the expectation that services would be free to access, as is currently the case for refugees but not necessarily for residents: residents have to be subscribed to the health insurance scheme to access free health care, have to pay for water (20 cents or more per jerry can) plus additional costs to the WASH committee for guards of handpumps, there are fees to pay each year to the school and residents have to pay for school uniforms, whereas refugee students have their uniforms provided by DICAC etc.

Demonstrating empathy for the refugees, there was also a common feeling among the resident population that Eritreans did not choose to come to Ethiopia but were forced to flee a regime that treated their own people badly. They mentioned

2 Fieldwork for this study was conducted between 29 May and 15 June 2018.

3 While infrastructure of camp schools is certainly better than infrastructure of community schools, there are reports that quality of education is better in community schools compared to camp schools, largely because of teacher quality (personal communication).

that refugees were ‘our brothers and sisters’ (FGD 7; IDI 10) and that they therefore would not mind sharing services with refugees, even if this meant that delivery standards could decline. It was also mentioned that residents, when unhappy with the services they received, could go elsewhere, whereas refugees were forced to stay in the camp, limiting their choices.

Some residents were also open to suggestions of accommodating refugees in villages instead of camps. They pointed out that refugees were already engaging in sharecropping arrangements. Some residents even suggested that the government should embark on a new programme of ‘villagisation’ in Tigray as a means of improving service delivery to residents similar to the services provided to refugees in the camps. While residents were clear that refugees should not be entitled to land on their own, they argued that they should have access to electricity to reduce environmental degradation and access work (FGDs 4 and 7; IDI 18).

Residents who wanted to maintain the status quo, i.e. for services to be delivered separately to refugees and residents, even though they believed that refugees had access to better support, anticipated that, if services were delivered in an integrated manner by local government to both residents and refugees, this would put further pressure on already stretched services. They were not confident that the woreda administration would get more resources from the federal level to deliver services to both groups.

Overall, residents had no preference whether services were delivered in an integrated or separate manner: what mattered was having access to services at all.

5.2 The government perspective

Regional and woreda government authorities were wary about too rapid a shift towards integrating service delivery systems, and indicated that this would require significant work given current levels of interaction. A common sentiment heard at the regional level was ‘we don’t know ARRA, there is no regional structure that would facilitate coordination. ARRA is only in the Northwestern Zone where there are refugees’ (KII 2). This makes

it often difficult for regional authorities to know what ARRA’s ideas of integration and self-reliance are, or what level of services it is providing to refugees. This lack of knowledge was mentioned as problematic as it meant that regional authorities were unable to respond appropriately to complaints raised by residents about the quality of service provision.

Regional and woreda authorities feared that further integration might lead to even more budget constraints. Regional authorities highlighted that, because of the refugee presence, there was already an additional burden and stress on service providers. For example, it was mentioned that woredas had to provide for additional security through increased numbers of militia around camps (KII 2). There was no acknowledgement of such extra expenditures by federal line ministries or ARRA, and no compensation was provided when regional authorities requested additional support from federal authorities (*ibid.*). Integrating service delivery or even allowing more refugees to reside outside camps would only further blur the distinction between refugees and residents, and expand the scope of responsibility of government agencies at woreda level to provide services for larger numbers of people for which there would be no budget. Although regional authorities were aware of the CRRF and the Pledges, there was considerable scepticism as to whether this would result in additional resources for regional and woreda authorities to provide services to both groups (KIIs 2, 3 and 6).

At the regional level, there was also concern at the lack of a mechanism to share the financial burden across all woredas in Tigray, as the formula to allocate federal block grants to woredas is based on population numbers derived from census data which does not include refugees, an assessment of the development gap in pro-poor sectors (e.g. agriculture, WASH, health, education) and the ability of the woreda to generate revenue. Additional responsibilities, such as providing services to refugees, are not part of this formula. Because of increased financial burden on the woreda in also catering for refugees without any additional budget to

do so, according to the regional authorities, woredas that host refugees are being forced to allocate resources for recurrent expenditures at the cost of capital spending. The consequences of this are reduced investments in, for example, improving access to water (KII 6).

Because the refugee operation is not part of the regional aid coordination system, the Tigray Bureau of Planning and Finance (BoPF) also does not know how much money is spent for refugees or in communities around camps. This was further complicated by the fact that some NGO support to refugees and residents in neighbouring communities flowed directly through line ministries to camps and surrounding areas, but did not pass through BoPF. BoPF thus feels unable to allocate external funds equitably across woredas. Although there is a regional strategy that aims to allocate external resources to those areas that lag furthest behind (e.g. on service provision) or that are especially remote or drought-prone, funding for refugees does not consider these criteria. This, according to BoPF officials, results in unequal distribution of external support as NGOs are more likely to cluster around camps, resulting in tabias around camps being better served than tabias further away (KII 2), which may be affected by the refugee presence or may have larger needs, but are not adequately supported (FGD 4).

Among the reasons given by regional authorities for being cautious about integration without a proper plan is the experience of Eritrean university students after graduation. While they are supported to study, once they have graduated they are sent back to the camps, where they are generally unemployed. It was stated that, without a proper plan for what refugee students can or cannot do after graduation, integrating more refugees into the education system would not make much sense – on the contrary, better-educated unemployed refugees are more likely to be tempted to try their luck elsewhere and embark on secondary migration (KII 8). Giving them jobs would be the obvious solution, but that could create tensions with residents if it was perceived that refugees would receive preferential treatment.

Arguments in favour of integrated service delivery through government staff at regional

and woreda level were linked to the condition that they administer the refugee funding that is currently handled by ARRA (KIIs 2, 6, 18 and 19). In their view, this would open up opportunities to increase spending for residents. Integrating service delivery was also seen as offering the potential to better utilise technical experts. Woreda line ministry experts highlighted that, because so many NGOs are concentrated around camps, they had to allocate more staff time for coordination, providing the service of technical experts (e.g. siting water points, watershed planning) to those tabias at the cost of the other tabias further away. Overall, it was felt that, if services were delivered in an integrated way, it would be easier for woreda offices to deliver services equitably among all tabias across the woreda, whereas currently there is more focus on, and staff and funding allocated to, a few tabias in the immediate vicinity of camps (KII 19).

Integration of service delivery and planning in agriculture and natural resource management was also seen as important to avoid misallocation of funding (KII19), particularly with reference to the DRDIP project. Because this project was set up with the objective of supporting host communities through improving access to social services, expanding economic opportunities and addressing environmental degradation resulting from population concentrations in camps, resource allocation is restricted to a select number of tabias around camps. While the programme is administered at the woreda level through the Office of Agriculture (WOoA) and services and activities follow government standards, concern was expressed that opportunities are limited to reallocate government funds away from those tabias that benefit from DRDIP interventions to other tabias, some of which are extremely remote, drought-affected and poor. This creates tensions among tabias that the WOoA is not able to resolve as it does not have the freedom to reallocate resources.

An ARRA representative in Adi Harush (KII 23) also held the view that, in future, some portion of the budget to provide services to refugees would flow through woreda government

channels, but that this would require UNHCR to agree and line ministries would need to be able to prove that they had the capacity to absorb additional financial flows. They thought, though, that financial flows that were directly related to the special needs of refugees, such as protection,

shelter or nutrition, would still be entirely managed by ARRA as the woreda does not have, in their view, a mandate to deliver those services. They were also concerned about the risk of a drop in service delivery standards if woreda offices were to deliver services to refugees.

6 Conclusions and recommendations

In the everyday political, economic and social life of Tigray region, the refugee operation has played, until very recently, a minor role. The number of refugees in the camps has been small in comparison to the rest of the population of around 5.3 million. There have been significant changes, however, in the months since the opening of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea on 11 September 2018. Not only has this enabled people from both countries to cross the border to visit family and friends and engage in cross-border trade, but over 9,000 Eritreans – mostly women and children – have registered as asylum-seekers between 12 September and 13 October 2018 (UNHCR, 2018b). The opening of the border and the resulting movement of people, as well as the impact this has on service delivery, on the local economy and on relations between the Ethiopian and Eritrean populations, will have to be followed very closely and managed carefully.

However, due to the concentration of the four refugee camps in just one zonal administration, the impacts of, and interactions between, refugees and local populations are more pronounced here. Shifts in policy such as those anticipated under the CRRF will have more pronounced effects on the dynamics in the Northwestern Zone than in the rest of Tigray. At this moment, and in light of the fluid political situation in both countries internally and in their relations, the number of Eritrean refugees in Tigray is not likely to decline in the near future. If the trend of significantly increasing numbers of refugees continues, refugee operations would have to adapt quickly, including in terms of service provision targeted specifically at these newly arrived asylum-seekers and refugees (e.g. women, small children). Poole and Riggan (2018) reported that some refugees fear that the opening of the border between

the two countries may put them in even greater danger, as it will allow Eritrean authorities to more easily cross the border and target Eritrean refugees in the camps. If that was the case, it would require the Ethiopian authorities to significantly enhance protection (*ibid.*).

One of the standout features of Tigray – and an institutional element that will support the implementation of the CRRF in Tigray – is the relative high capacity of regional and woreda governments. Overall, Tigray region should be in a much better position compared to other refugee-hosting regions to implement the Pledges made under the CRRF – not least thanks to the close relationships, common language and cultural backgrounds, including family relations, between the Eritrean and Tigray populations.

Despite this, there are challenges. First, it is unclear how recent political developments, and the shift of power away from the TPLF, will affect the relationship between the Ethiopian federal government and Tigray region in relation to the refugee operation. As part of the security sector, ARRA was a key player in the traditionally Tigray-dominated part of the state, but as this dynamic shifts, its relationship to regional authorities could also change.

Second, and more closely related to the refugee operation itself, is the institutional and administrative set-up. There is currently no ARRA representation at regional level, which means there is no institutionalised coordination mechanism between ARRA and the regional government in Mekele. ARRA, UNHCR and CRRF focal points are all located at zonal level in Shire. However, at Zonal level no specific sector ministries are represented and coordination is only between ARRA/UNHCR and the zonal administration. While there is sector-specific coordination at

woreda level, institutional and human capacities are lowest at the woreda level and constraints highest. Without a clearly defined framework for coordination that aligns with woredas' lines of administration and reporting to regional bureaus, sector-specific coordination on the ground happens when actors perceive a problem, and is generally not institutionally based.

While there are clear opportunities for CRRF implementation and integration in Tigray, a number of factors need careful consideration. Besides the above-mentioned institutional and administrative arrangements, which pose specific challenges for sectoral coordination, the heterogeneous character of the refugee population in the region means that a 'one solution approach' will not work across the region. Refugees in Shimelba are very different from refugees in Adi Harush. Refugees who were already in Ethiopia prior to the rapprochement between the two governments and the opening of the border are very different to new arrivals, who are almost entirely women and children who wish to be reunited with their families residing either in Ethiopia or abroad. Refugees in Shimelba have often been there for a decade or longer, are more often in families, and have established close socio-economic relationships with the resident population. Shimelba camp is also special as it is very isolated and hosts a considerable Kunama population with different aspirations from Tigrigna-speaking Eritrean refugees. The population in Adi Harush is made up almost entirely of Tigrigna-speaking Eritreans, more urban, younger, single and male and with closer links to the Eritrean diaspora in Europe, the Middle East and North America. Adi Harush camp is near Mai Tsebri town, the capital of Tselemti woreda, which allows for close economic interactions between residents and refugees. These differences provide varying opportunities and risks that have shaped the recommendations that follow.

Activities supported under the CRRF should contribute directly to easing tensions over natural resources and services between residents and refugees, and be targeted at the specific situations in the different camps, as well as the particular refugee community and their relationships with the resident population.

Recommendations

Establish coordination mechanisms between ARRA and the regional government

First and foremost, coordination between ARRA and the regional government needs to be improved. Currently, there is no ARRA representation in Mekele that would support the level of institutional coordination between ARRA and the regional government that is required for integrated service delivery. This makes integrated service delivery and the implementation of the CRRF very difficult, not least because funding streams and budgets are entirely separate, with the regional government not knowing who spends what on refugee issues, or if investments targeted towards the refugee operation also include investments accessible by the resident population. It is thus recommended that ARRA establishes a more senior permanent representation – building on the existing CRRF officer position – in Mekele that would allow for more consistent coordination with the regional government. In particular, ARRA could post a liaison officer within BoPF, where economic and development planning takes place. This would not only allow regular sharing of information, but would also be a prerequisite for budgeting, planning and delivery of integrated services to refugees and residents.

Second, because of the location of ARRA and UNHCR at the zonal level where there are no sector ministries, woreda sector ministries need to be strengthened in terms of their capacity (e.g. levels of skills, number of staff) to play a much more active role in the refugee operation and in the integrated delivery of services to refugees and residents. Coordination mechanisms and alignment with existing planning and community consultation processes between woreda line ministries and camp managers in relation to service delivery and natural resource management should be established. This might also require ARRA and UNHCR currently posted at zonal level to participate in such woreda-level needs assessments and intervention planning.

Third, it should be a requirement that ARRA reports regularly to woreda sector offices alongside its reports to the federal level. This would ensure closer interaction between the two and help align operations.

Population and camp-specific implementation of the CRRF

Given the very different demographics and composition of the refugee population in the two camps visited, different strategies in relation to integration – in terms of integrated service delivery, socio-economic integration and the OCP – are required. The OCP should be re-examined in light of the CRRF, and the proposed revisions to the refugee proclamation. In particular, it should not be limited to a policy in which self-reliance is a prerequisite, but rather a mechanism to promote self-reliance. This would require that ARRA, regional and woreda governments and NGOs work together to support refugees to become self-reliant even where they have settled outside of a camp.

Shimelba – refugees of Kunama origin

In Shimelba, there is a considerable Kunama population who have been in the camp for over a decade, who have established close socio-economic links with the resident population and many of whom wish to settle outside the camp among Ethiopian Kunama in Lemlem tabia, where Kunama are represented and are playing an active role in the administration. Those refugees who wish to do so should be supported to settle in Lemlem tabia without losing their refugee status. This would require a shift in how the OCP systems works: currently, people have to demonstrate first that they are self-reliant before being allowed to settle outside of camps. A reformed approach should be discussed with the Kunama refugee population, the local administration at tabia and woreda level, the regional administration and ARRA regarding what options there might be to take away this requirement and allow those people who might wish to do so to resettle first to areas outside the camp, and be provided with support as part of a programme that assists refugees to become self-reliant.

Better understanding of the intentions and aspirations of Kunama refugees and how the OCP might be used to support those aspirations is needed. Should it emerge that Kunama refugees wish to settle locally, a transitional programme would be required whereby ARRA, the regional and local governments and NGOs closely collaborate to ensure the legal protection of refugees settling in communities on the one hand, while durable solutions are developed on the other. Local and regional government would also need to be strongly involved to ensure that the local population is adequately supported to integrate Eritrean Kunama, including delivering services that can cater for an increased population. Since this cannot be done within the regular woreda budget, funding currently targeted to the refugee operation would have to be redirected and integrated into the woreda budget. Settling Kunama locally, providing services in an integrated manner to both refugees and residents and joined-up delivery of services and protection between ARRA, the woreda government and NGOs could serve as an excellent test case and pilot for the CRRF, including assessing the financial requirements and administrative capacities needed for such integrated delivery of services. This would also help in assessing what local integration means to different groups, and what might be required to develop durable solutions for specific groups of refugees.

Allowing Eritrean Kunama to settle in Lemlem tabia and their children to attend school there, which is taught in Kunamigna (but using Ge'ez and not the Latin alphabet) following the Ethiopian curriculum, would also address the issue of the medium of instruction in schools, which was often raised by refugees as problematic. Hybrid curriculum models, including teaching English, Tigrigna and Amharic earlier to support integration would be conducive either to local integration or return to Eritrea.

However, although especially the older generation of Kunama refugees from Shimelba wish to settle in Lemlem tabia, the younger generation is still aspiring to resettlement in a third country. Local resettlement and integration would require that concerns about losing refugee status, and with it the right to third-country resettlement, are taken

seriously by providing reassurance that people would not lose their refugee status by virtue of local resettlement and integration.

Settlement in Lemlem tabia may not be feasible for all Kunama refugees. For as long as Kunama are still residing in Shimelba, active support should be provided to enable Kunama families to maintain livestock as a foundation for future durable livelihoods outside the camp. This must be accompanied by active interventions to produce fodder.

Significant investment in natural resource management in the tabias surrounding the camp is required. This will have to be accompanied by efforts to develop alternative energy sources for both the refugee camp and surrounding villages, to reduce the degradation of forest resources and ease tensions between residents and refugees.

Since resettlement will only be an opportunity for a few refugees, young Kunama who do no longer aspire to an agro-pastoral livelihood need to be supported. One possibility would be to reinstate vocational training in Shimelba camp. Formal training, including technical and vocational education and training (TVET) in professions that meet the needs of the labour market, should be accessible to refugees to equip them with professional and technical skills they can either use in Ethiopia, or if they return to Eritrea. Such training must also be available for resident youth. Providing formal technical and professional training for both refugee and resident populations would be an excellent opportunity for CRRF implementation, not least in improving skills among the population that could potentially benefit if more jobs and business parks were to be created.

Shimelba – Tigrigna-speaking Eritrean refugees

A considerable number of refugees from Shimelba are not Kunama, but Tigrigna-speaking Eritreans who have often lived in the camp for over a decade. Their aspiration is not to resettle to neighbouring villages or woredas like the

Kunama, but to resettle to third countries. Some have left Shimelba camp because of limited opportunities for resettlement. Among those still waiting, mental health issues or harmful practices are fairly widespread because people feel ‘trapped’ and without much prospect of finding a durable solution. Given that resettlement opportunities will remain limited, this group of refugees will need specific support to become self-reliant. In addition, they also have limited connections to Eritreans living abroad, and so access to finance is limited, as are opportunities for family reunification. It is thus recommended that an in-depth assessment of their aspirations is carried out. This would help shape appropriate support systems for them to become increasingly self-reliant and find durable solutions.

Adi Harush

A majority of refugees in Adi Harush want to resettle to third countries. Because of limited opportunities for resettlement, significant secondary migration and human trafficking has been reported from this camp. Overall, given the large population of Eritrean youth and young adults reluctant to believe their government’s promise to limit National Service to 18 months,⁴ much more effort, coordination and resources should be directed towards supporting their aspirations, and providing them with a stronger sense of permanence.

The specific conditions of Adi Harush, although not as appropriate as in Shimelba for encouraging forms of local integration, could provide a basis for a pilot for testing other key concepts and ideas of the CRRF, including providing services in an integrated manner to both refugees and resident populations. These conditions include: its urban setting and proximity to Mai Tsebri town; the already considerable economic integration of the refugee population, including access to finance; as well as the capacity of the woreda administration and sector offices.

Moving away from a camp management model would provide opportunities for

4 Amid the improvements of relations between the Ethiopian and the Eritrean governments, the Eritrean government announced in June 2018 at a graduation ceremony for conscripts that the latest batch of national recruits will be enlisted for 18 months only. However, the Eritrean information minister dampened expectation saying that there has been no formal announcement as of yet as it was ‘early days’ for the normalisation of relations between the two countries (Reuters, 2018).

programming and delivering services in an integrated way to both refugees and residents:

- Seizing the opportunities of the influx of refugees, many of whom will be going to Adi Harush. Increased funding for these new arrivals should be spent in an integrated manner to benefit both population groups.
- Building on existing initiatives, such as the Mai Tsebri Water Supply Scheme, that demonstrate that coordination is possible, and that addressing the needs of refugees and residents simultaneously does not result in either group being put at a disadvantage. With the recent influx of refugees and their accommodation in Adi Harush, pressure on existing water service delivery will increase. The Mai Tsebri Water Supply could be a flagship project for CRRF implementation in the woreda, with well-coordinated engagement from ARRA, UNHCR, UNICEF and the local government, improving service provision to both refugees from Adi Harush and Mai Aini and residents well beyond the immediate neighbouring tabias, benefiting Tselemti woreda as a whole. Integrating refugee representatives and ARRA into the Mai Tsebri Water Utility Board as planned will be required, and will offer an opportunity to test and showcase joined-up planning and delivery of services.
- Expand access to electric power for both residents and refugees. This would not only enable increased business activities, but would also make a direct contribution to reducing deforestation and environmental degradation, as well as addressing health issues related to indoor pollution.
- Support formal and informal ways for refugees to be economically active, but monitor carefully where this could lead to increased competition over business and work opportunities between residents and refugees.
- Support the upgrading of the health centre in Mai Tsebri town, benefiting both residents and refugees. Alongside the Mai Tsebri Water Supply Scheme and the electrification of the camp, this could be another CRRF flagship programme.

- Ensure that education opportunities in the camp are increased commensurate with the influx of new arrivals.
- Significantly enhance opportunities for Eritrean refugees to attend high school and further their education outside of the camp.
- Support recent refugee graduates to take advantage of ‘out of camp’ opportunities by supporting them to engage in self-employment and meet the out of camp criteria, which would further incentivise school and university attendance.
- Expand vocational training opportunities, including at TVET level, that equip refugees with professional and technical skills and in professions that match the needs of the labour market. Vocational training must be accessible to resident youth as well.

Moving from humanitarian-led to development-led approaches

The CRRF and the pledges, while familiar to some extent to regional government authorities, were largely unknown at lower administrative levels at the time of the fieldwork for this study. Zonal and woreda authorities might have heard that these pledges were made at federal level, but the implications of implementation, or even the role they would play in their implementation, were not clear. So far, the leadership of the CRRF and the Pledges has come largely from ARRA and UNHCR. However, the aim of the Pledges is to shift the agenda away from humanitarian interventions towards development, and away from humanitarian agencies with largely a protection focus towards local government actors playing a much more central role in providing services, offering opportunities for refugees to be economically active and in improving opportunities for greater self-reliance among refugee and resident populations.

Top-down policy implementation without strong ownership by local authorities has a history of failure. Similarly, a more developmental-oriented approach will not be successful if it is primarily owned by humanitarian actors with short-term funding cycles.

In order for the pledges to be successful, donor and UN agencies need to shift their approach away from short-term funding cycles and independent and institutionally based programming towards need-based programming that is aligned with long-term development planning owned by regional and local authorities. In a region like Tigray, with well-functioning government structures, capacities to assess needs and plan accordingly and capacity to absorb significant financial resources, the shift towards a developmental approach will also entail moving budgets away from parallel streams into government planning and budgeting process. Such a move will certainly not be easy, as it will take decision-making power and independence away from ARRA and UNHCR. To facilitate such a transition, a coordination mechanism should be established that provides a platform where regional, zonal and woreda governments present to ARRA, UNHCR and NGOs their development vision for the Region, their analysis of where development needs are greatest, what resources are required and where a joined-up approach to service delivery and alternative livelihoods, including regional and woreda governments, ARRA, UNHCR and NGOs, might result in sustainable change. This would allow for a much stronger integration of the CRRF into regional and woreda strategies, and thus ownership for the pledges and their implementation.

Recommendations for UNICEF

- Advocate at national and regional level that the pledges need to be aligned with existing needs assessments and development visions and plans in Tigray in general, and more specifically of the Northwestern Zone and the woredas hosting camps.
- Establish coordination mechanisms at the regional level, including sharing of information between all concerned parties and stronger coordination between woreda sector offices and camp management, backed by strong government–ARRA relationships at zonal and regional level.
- Continue monitoring alignment of the BSRP with existing government systems and practices, and advocate for other actors

engaged in the refugee operation to align themselves with government systems with regard to service delivery (e.g. standards, protocols, reporting).

- Support dialogue between humanitarian and development actors and the regional government on how resources can be allocated as part of one process.

Recommendations for UNHCR and ARRA

- Determine how there can be greater transparency within the region about the resources being used by the refugee operation, preferably moving towards them being on-budget. Initiate discussions over resource allocations between the regional and woreda government and humanitarian and development actors. CRRF-focused programming, at a minimum, should be integrated into BoPF and regional plans.
- Initiate a review of the OCP in light of the CRRF, considering how the scheme can be adjusted to promote, rather than require, self-reliance.
- Ensure that the response to the recent influx of refugees is implemented as far as possible in line with CRRF principles, ensuring greater involvement of local authorities in any new investments required to support refugees.
- Support a joint study on adapting the current administrative set-up of the refugee operation to better integrate with local programming and policymaking.

Recommendations for the regional government

- Use specific projects such as the Mai Tsebri Water Supply Scheme to demonstrate that coordination is possible.
- Provide a leadership role for the CRRF process by integrating into the wider planning process long-term and needs-based plans for refugees and residents to which donors can align themselves. This should include all resources being spent in the region, including RDPP.
- Commission, jointly with ARRA and UNHCR, a study, involving regional, zonal and woreda stakeholders and stakeholders

engaged in the refugee operation, to identify key challenges in relation to the specific administrative set-up in Tigray (i.e. lacking coordination mechanism at regional level, no sector ministries at zonal level with which ARRA/UNHCR could coordinate their activities, limited capacity at woreda level) and ways of addressing these.

Recommendations for donors

- Ensure CRRF-related programming is integrated into BoPF and all parties are part of the BoPF aid coordination mechanism. This will be supported if effective coordination mechanisms between ARRA and the regional government are established in Mekele.
- Ensure CRRF programming, including RDPP, is in line with the regional development plan, including its timeframe.
- Ensure coordination among different donor organisations in their engagement with the regional government, ARRA and UNHCR to promote a coherent change model for integrated service delivery, including RDPP and DRDIP.
- Ensure that development interventions are not unduly focused only on tabias around camps, but that tabias further away but with very high development needs are equally supported to reduce poverty, increase food security and address natural resource degradation.

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Annex 1 Interviews conducted

Table A1 In-depth individual interviews

Interview code	Date	Location	Sex	Age	Ethnic origin	Status
IDI 1	06/06/18	Shimelba	M	27	Eritrean (Tigrayan)	Refugee
IDI 2	06/06/18	Shimelba	F&M	27 & 33	Ethiopian and Eritrean (Tigrayan)	Non-refugee & refugee
IDI 3	06/06/18	Shimelba	M&M	35 & 73	Eritrean (Tigrayan)	Refugee
IDI 4	06/06/18	Shimelba	F&F	50s & 20	Eritrean (Kunama)	Refugee
IDI 5	06/06/18	Shimelba	F&M	25–35	Ethiopian and Eritrean (Kunama)	Refugee, Ethiopian
IDI 6	06/06/18	Coffee tent - close to Shimelba camp	F	20–25	Ethiopian	Non-refugee
IDI 7	06/06/18	Coffee tent - close to Shimelba camp	F	20–25	Ethiopian	Non-refugee
IDI 8	07/06/18	Shimelba (4 representatives)	M	35–55	Eritrean (Tigrayan, Kunama)	Refugee
IDI 9	07/06/18	Shimelba	M	31	Eritrean (Tigrayan)	Refugee
IDI 10	07/06/18	May Khuli	M	50	Ethiopian	Non-refugee
IDI 11	11/06/18	Adi Harush –close to resettlement	F	25–35	Eritrean (Tigrayan)	Refugee
IDI 12	11/06/18	Adi Harush	F	18–20	Eritrean (Tigrayan)	Refugee
IDI 13	11/06/18	Adi Harush – business owner	F	25–35	Ethiopian	Non-refugee
IDI 14	08/06/18	Mai Tsebri	F	25–35	Ethiopian	Non-refugee, shop owner
IDI 15	09/06/18	Mai Tsebri	F	35	Ethiopian	Non-refugee, restaurant owner
IDI 16	09/06/18	Wuhdet Tabia	M	29	Ethiopian	Non-refugee
IDI 17	09/06/18	Wuhdet Tabia	M	35–45	Ethiopian	Non-refugee, farmer
IDI 18	09/06/18	Wuhdet Tabia	M	35–45	Ethiopian	Non-refugee, farmer

Table A2 Focus group discussions

Interview code	Date	Location	Description of participant	Number of participants
FGD 1	05/06/18	Shimelba RC	M, mixed age, Tigrayan and Kunama refugees	7
FGD 2	05/06/18	Shimelba RC	F, mixed age, Tigrayan and Kunama refugees	5
FGD 3	06/06/18	May Khuli Tabia	F, middle aged, Ethiopian non-refugees	6
FGD 4	06/06/18	May Khuli Tabia	M, middle aged, Ethiopian non-refugees	10
FGD 5	08/06/18	Adi Harush RC	F, Eritrean, refugees	6
FGD 6	08/06/18	Adi Harush RC	M, Eritrean, refugees	5
FGD 7	09/06/18	Wuhdet Tabia	M, middle aged, Ethiopian non-refugees	6
FGD 8	09/06/18	Wuhdet Tabia	F, middle aged, Ethiopian non-refugees	7

Table A3 Key informant interviews

Interview code	Date	Location	Description
KII 1	30/05/18	Mekele	Round table discussion with UNHCR staff
KII 2	30/05/18	Mekele	Experts, BoPF
KII 3	31/05/18	Mekele	Experts, Tigray RHB
KII 4	31/05/18	Mekele	Researchers, Mekele University, Institute of Population Studies
KII 5	31/05/18	Mekele	Experts, DRDIP, BoA
KII 6	01/06/18	Mekele	Experts, BoWIE
KII 7	01/06/18	Mekele	Experts, BoLSA
KII 8	01/06/18	Mekele	Experts, BoE
KII 9	04/06/18	Shire	Experts, Zonal Administration
KII 10	04/06/18	Shire	Experts, ARRA
KII 11	04/06/18	Shire	Experts, UNHCR
KII 12	05/06/18	Shiraro	Experts, Woreda Office of Agriculture
KII 13	05/06/18	Shiraro	Experts, Finance and Woreda Administration
KII 14	05/06/18	Shiraro	Experts, Woreda Office of Water
KII 15	05/06/18	Shiraro	Expert, Woreda Health
KII 16	05/06/18	Shiraro	Expert, Woreda Education
KII 17	05/06/18	Mai Khuli	Health Officer, health centre
KII 18	08/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Experts, Woreda Office of Water
KII 19	08/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Experts, Woreda Office of Agriculture
KII 20	08/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Expert, Woreda Health
KII 21	08/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Expert, Woreda Education

Table A3 Key informant interviews (continued)

Interview code	Date	Location	Description
KII 22	11/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Teachers, May Tsebri Secondary School
KII 23	11/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Experts, ARRA
KII 24	11/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Experts, IRC
KII 25	12/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Nurse, private clinic
KII 26	12/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Employee, private pharmacy
KII 27	11/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Employee, private bank
KII 28	11/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Employee, Tselemti Woreda Administration
KII 29	07/06/18	Shimelba	Expert, ARRA
KII 30	07/06/18	Shimelba	Expert, secondary school (high school)
KII 31	08/06/18	Mai Tsebri	Expert, Woreda Child Health



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