Report

Somali regional report

2018–2019 refugee and host community context analysis

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October 2020

This material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government's official policies.

About this paper

This report is part of a context analysis commissioned by UNICEF Ethiopia in support of its work in refugee-hosting regions of Ethiopia. It was carried out by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and ODI, with funding from UK aid. Five separate reports on each of the main refugee-hosting regions in Ethiopia will be published during the course of 2020, based on research conducted in 2018–2019.

These studies are intended to support the government of Ethiopia's efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its models for hosting and supporting refugees. These efforts have been undertaken in light of the global policy reform set out by the Global Compact for Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Reform Framework (CRRF). Ethiopia's approach is laid out in the government's 2017 'Roadmap for the implementation of the CRRF' and the pledges made by the government in 2016.

Acknowledgements

The researchers would like to thank the DRC and UNICEF Somali region teams for hosting and facilitating their visits to the region, as well as Semhal Belay in the DRC office in Addis Ababa for all her support. The inputs of the UNICEF team, and Tobias Hagmann, Cedric Barnes and Patrick Phillips of DRC, were all invaluable in informing the final product. Finally, thanks to all those who gave up their time to be interviewed for the study.

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Acronyms

ARRA	Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs
BoFED	Somali Regional State Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
BSRP	Building Self-Reliance Programme
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DICAC	Development and Inter-Church Aid Commission
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRDIP	Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project
DRS	Developing Regional States
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
FGD	focus group discussion
GEQUIP	General Education Quality Improvement Programme
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDI	in-depth interview
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KII	key informant interview
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
NCRRS	National Comprehensive Refugee Response Strategy
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PFSA	Pharmaceuticals Fund and Supply Agency
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PTA	Parent–Teacher Association
RCC	Refugee Coordination Committee
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
UNEPPG	United Nations Emergency Preparedness and Planning Group
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	water, sanitation and health
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive summary

The northeastern part of the Somali region in Ethiopia (referred to in this report as 'the Jijiga area') is a complex environment for implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). It is home to a mixed cohort of refugees, with one of Ethiopia's oldest camps as well as more recent arrivals from the late 2000s. These refugees are hosted in an area that has for decades acted as an important hub for Somalis from across Somalia, creating a complicated flow of people in and out of Jijiga. The CRRF is also coming at a time of political transition following the end of the 10 year rule of Abdi Mohamoud Omar, who exerted enormous control over all aspects of life in the region. These factors create both opportunities and risks for new approaches to refugee/'host community' support, so implementation will need to move forward carefully and focus on those areas where positive change seems most feasible.

The area represents a particularly interesting case study for the CRRF because of its long history of hosting refugees. Studies focusing on the refugee operation in the 1990s and 2000s provide an important baseline to determine what has and has not changed over that time, and also bring out important lessons from previous attempts at reform. The so-called 'Cross-Mandate Operation' of the early 1990s, led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), while focusing on a slightly different set of operational problems, contains a number of important parallels with the CRRF, and its failure to deliver a genuine shift from a humanitarian to a development approach is worth reflecting on. A central flaw was that the development resources and actors that were supposed to take more of a leadership role in the process never did so, leaving implementation in the hands of humanitarian actors. There was also a failure to recognise the gap between the normative frameworks created by the international humanitarian system and realities on the ground, meaning that changes in approach created unforeseen incentives for local communities. Another lesson from the past comes from Hartisheikh, the site of what was the world's largest refugee camp in the late 1980s. Indications are that the camp's legacy has been far from positive for the people of the area, and further work exploring this would be valuable.

The study fieldwork, conducted in and around Sheder and Kebrebeyah camps, found very different sets of interactions and dynamics in each. In Sheder, the presence of a refugee camp in the area has, in effect, created its own 'host community', as what was a small village has grown significantly. People have been drawn there from different parts of the region to make the most of new economic opportunities and opportunities associated with the operation itself, as well as the capital and skills that well-networked refugees from urban areas have brought. With substantial interaction between refugee and resident communities, and straightforward movement in and out of the camp, parallel service delivery systems in effect provide a set of mutually supportive alternatives. Overall, there appears to be a reasonably positive atmosphere around the town and camp, although one based on a delicate balance of benefits and costs to different communities.

In Kebrebeyah, this balance appears to have broken down. At least three key factors are at work. First, the refugees still living in Kebrebeyah are poorer and less well networked, given that these are people who, after 30 years, have not been able to take advantage of resettlement opportunities or informal integration, and so offer less to the local economy. Second, Kebrebeyah today is a much larger urban centre than when the camp opened, so inevitably the camp plays a far less important role in the life of the town. Third, the camp itself appears more neglected in terms of investment

and service delivery, with the majority of refugee respondents complaining strongly of their current situation. As in Sheder, the impact of large-scale resettlement programmes over the last 10 years has been a significant influence on the mindset of refugees, with the desire for resettlement clearly a prime motive for remaining a refugee.

From an institutional perspective, the key issue that emerged from the study was the extent to which very limited resources for delivering services in and around the camps are fragmented. The dominant concern of all service delivery actors was how to improve accountability across a system in which it is currently divided across multiple actors in multiple locations. Examples such as the secondary school that receives resources in at least four different ways with four different accountability mechanisms, or long-standing arguments over the maintenance of water supply systems in Kebrebeyah, illustrate some of the negative outcomes of this fragmentation. In the context of dwindling resources for the refugee operation in the area, there is a clear need to find efficiencies and improved approaches, but work is required to improve trust between the Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and local service delivery actors, and there are few incentives to coordinate apart from where additional resources are being provided. New approaches are clearly required to address these issues.

Tensions between refugees and residents are not a major factor in relation to integration in the area, though there was a recognition on both sides that some of the changes proposed under the Government of Ethiopia's Nine Pledges related to hosting refugees could create tensions were they to undermine the existing balance. The main concern expressed by refugees about the prospects for greater self-reliance was the potential impact on their resettlement status. Although they are well aware that resettlement is unlikely to continue at scale, the attraction is so great that they will be reluctant to undermine their potential eligibility. A key challenge in discussing integration and self-reliance in the area was the lack of clarity around how it will proceed and what exactly it will mean for the various stakeholders. There is a serious risk of creating expectations that will not be met.

The study's recommendations focus on Kebrebeyah, as there appears to be a clear set of issues there that the CRRF has the potential to address for the benefit of all. A process is proposed for creating a much more coordinated and locally-led approach to CRRF implementation in the town, which it is hoped will have a positive effect. If such a process can be effectively launched, its lessons could helpfully be applied in other locations in the region and elsewhere in Ethiopia.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

UNICEF commissioned this context analysis to support implementation of the Building Self-Reliance Programme (BSRP), a four-year project funded by UK government aid to improve service delivery to refugees and 'host communities' across Ethiopia. Specifically, the joint Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and ODI team is conducting a series of studies to better understand the programme's operating context. The studies cover the service delivery sectors UNICEF focuses on under the BSRP: health; education; water, sanitation and health (WASH); nutrition; and child protection.

Of particular significance at the policy level is the national process underway to implement the Government of Ethiopia's Nine Pledges related to hosting refugees, agreed in September 2016, and in support of the CRRF. The pledges of most specific relevance to service delivery relate to education ('Increase of enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education to all qualified refugees without discrimination and within the available resources') and social and basic services ('Enhance the provision of basic and essential social services'), although the wider ambition to allow refugees to integrate more fully into Ethiopian life, particularly through 'local integration', is also relevant (GoE, 2017). This process has led to the development of a roadmap for implementation, and the government, led by ARRA, is currently agreeing a ten-year strategy that will shape the future support provided to both refugees and 'host communities'.

This study is one of five conducted as part of this context analysis. The objective of each is to provide UNICEF with a more detailed understanding of the contextual factors affecting relationships between refugees, residents and key institutional actors involved in service delivery in the region. It was carried out in Somali region in June and July 2018.

1.2 Methods

A mixed methods approach was used (outlined in more detail in a separate methodology note available from the research team). To hear the views of policymakers, a total of 51 key informant interviews (KIIs) were carried out at regional, zonal and woreda level: these included current and former government officials from all of the key bureaus involved in sectoral policy and delivery, ARRA and a wide range of UN agencies and international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Anonymised details of the interviews are given in Annex 1. In-depth fieldwork was conducted with refugees and members of 'host communities' to elicit their views on service delivery and integration. Forty in-depth interviews (IDIs) and 16 focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in camps and 'host communities', with the support of a team of locally recruited male and female Somali translators.

It is important to note that, primarily for reasons of alignment with the BSRP, the study focused only on the area surrounding Jijiga which contains three camps (Aw Barre, Sheder and Kebrebeyah); the larger refugee operation around Dolo Ado, in the southern part of Somali region, is therefore not covered here. Of the three camps, Sheder and Kebrebeyah were selected for in-depth study, and interviews and FGDs were conducted in the camps, in Aw Barre and Kebrebeyah woredas, and in Jijiga town itself. Kebrebeyah camp was selected as it is much older than the others, is in a different location and has been identified as suitable for pilots for implementation of the local integration pledge (one of the government's Nine Pledges). It was therefore decided to focus only on one of the other two camps: Sheder was selected on the basis that it is separate from

the woreda headquarters, unlike Kebrebeyah and Aw Barre. 'Host communities' were broken down into constituent groups based on localised mapping, to allow for different perspectives.

1.3 Structure of the report

The report opens with an overview of key historical factors shaping the context of the refugee operation in Somali region, before highlighting key challenges that emerged from interviews and FGDs with local people. It then sets out major findings in terms of the institutional relationships relating to different service delivery sectors, and reflects on perceptions of integration and self-reliance. It concludes by considering the implications and making recommendations.

2 The Jijiga area: refugees and the region

Before considering the main fieldwork findings of the study, it is necessary to understand the implications of historical and contextual factors relating to refugees, refugee operations and wider politics in the Jijiga area.[1] This section identifies three key factors:

1. Historical patterns of migration among Somali populations in the region.
2. The history of refugee operations in the region in the past 30 years.
3. The impact of geopolitical developments relating to the region in the last ten years.

2.1 Past Somali populations movements in the area

As with other Ethiopian border regions, the history, culture and economy of Somali region are bound up as much with territory outside the Ethiopian state as they are with Ethiopia itself. Because of genealogical affiliation the Somali territories (including land in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya and Somalia itself) have often operated as a single economic and cultural space, despite the lack of administrative and political unity between them (Little, 2003). The long history of both man-made and natural hazard-related crises throughout the territory has made migration across it, including across international boundaries, a critical coping strategy. Migration includes seasonal movements of livestock keepers, drought and conflict displacement and a complex set of primary and secondary movements by Somali migrants in search of better opportunities.

The plains around Jijiga have been a central part of this story: they have a longer history of farming, agro-pastoralism and sedentarisation than other parts of Somali region, and are more integrated economically into the Ethiopian state because of imperial settlement in Jijiga and the presence of Somali–Oromo populations in the area (Cossins, 1971). Others have provided fuller accounts of historical population movements in the area,[2] but here it is important to highlight a few pivotal moments. The Ogaden war of 1977–1978, when the then President of Somalia, Siad Barre, invaded eastern Ethiopia before being pushed back, displaced large numbers of Somali-speaking Ethiopians into Somalia as refugees: the total numbers were contested, but aid was provided to 700,000 people at the time (Lewis, 2002; Ambroso, 2002b). In 1988, when civil war broke out inside Somalia, and particularly after the destruction of Hargeisa, the situation reversed, with hundreds of thousands of these Ethiopian refugees crossing into Ethiopia, along with Somalis who became refugees. These were primarily people with shared clan identity with populations in the area. They arrived initially in the Hartisheikh area (close to Kebrebeyah) in large numbers: in 1988, the Hartisheikh camp hosted 400,000 people and was for a time the world's largest refugee camp (Van Brabant, 1994; Hammond, 2014).

1 This phrase is used as shorthand for the territory around Jijiga where Somali refugees are currently hosted, and where they were hosted between 1988 and 2005, roughly contiguous with what is currently known as Fafan Zone.

2 A relatively concise historical account can be found in Ambroso (2002a).

Over the next five years, refugee numbers in the area increased substantially as the civil war in Somalia spread southwards, and by the early 1990s there were nine refugee camps in the Jijiga area.[3] Throughout this period, a major challenge for those seeking to provide assistance to these populations was determining who they were and their numbers (Hogg, 1996). Van Brabant succinctly described the perennial problem of identifying beneficiaries in Somali region:

> international law and institutional mandates obliged the grouping of these people into 'refugee', 'returnee' and 'local or locally displaced' categories. But this categorization does not fit the logic and the life stories of the many Somali families who exploit what, for them, is one regional economic space, and who have been driven back and forth across the border in search of refuge (Van Brabant, 1994: 60).

A major concern of aid agencies was the fact that local Ethiopian–Somalis living outside the camps registered as refugees to avail themselves of the benefits being provided inside, as a result of the lack of developmental resources in the region at the time. These concerns appeared to be validated when, in 1994, ARRA, with the support of the Ethiopian army, led a surprise one-day verification exercise across all nine camps to confirm who was actually living there: the result was a 70% fall in the official population of the camps, from 628,000 to 184,900 (Ambroso, 2002b).

By 2005, all of the camps apart from Kebrebeyah had closed through a combination of repatriation and 'dispersal' into local areas (discussed in more depth in section 2.2). The refugees in Kebrebeyah remained primarily for reasons of clan identity: while the majority of the refugees in the area had been from the Issaq and Gadabursi clans, which had significant populations over the border from the Jijiga area, these people were predominantly Darod from South/Central Somalia, who faced much greater challenges in returning. A small population of refugees from Hartisheikh camp who had nowhere else to go were also added to the camp population at this time (Da Rugna, 2005).[4]

The lull was brief, however, and from 2006 conditions in South/Central Somalia worsened considerably, first in terms of the conflict and then with drought (Lindlay, 2010). Refugees began to enter Ethiopia again, primarily from the south, heading towards the Jijiga area via Gode. They were temporarily settled in Kebrebeyah before the Aw Barre and Sheder camps were opened in 2007 and 2008 respectively (UNHCR, 2007; 2008). Once these camps were deemed to be operating at capacity there was a policy shift, on the basis of security, clan identities and geography, with new arrivals then settled in the south of Somali region, close to Dolo Ado, where there are now more than 200,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2009a; KII 47). This decision created a different dynamic around the camps in Fafan Zone: with no new refugees coming into the area, the camps involuntarily became more static parts of the economic and social life of the region.

Since then, the focus of the Ethiopian government and donors has been on trying to reduce the refugee population of the Jijiga area through international resettlement. A major programme between 2011 and 2016 saw more than 1,000 Somali refugees resettled from Ethiopia each year (over 12,000 in total), amounting to more than 80% of all such resettlements since 2003 (UNHCR, 2018a). Despite resettlement, camp populations have remained relatively stable: at the start of 2009 the population of the three camps was estimated at 40,390 (UNHCR, 2009b), and at the time of writing estimates are around 37,000 (UNHCR, 2018b; 2018c; 2018d). While some suggest that these relatively static population figures are a function of high birth rates in the camps replacing those who have left (KII 39, KII 48), it

3 Of these nine camps the only one remaining today is Kebrebeyah, although today's Aw Barre camp is in the same location as the former Teferi Ber, originally closed in 2001.

4 Figure 1 provides an approximation of the clan boundaries across the Somali territories, including those that cross the border between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Figure 1 Map of Somali clan distribution



Source: Adapted from State Secretariat for Migration (2017)

is widely asserted in the area that the resettlement programme has provided a strong incentive for Ethiopian Somali citizens in the area, some as far afield as Jiijiga and Dire Dawa, to register as refugees (KIIs in Jijiga and Kebrebeyah). Based on the findings of the fieldwork set out in this report, the potential opportunities for resettlement have clearly made refugee status a valuable commodity.

2.2 Lessons from earlier international refugee assistance in Somali region

The population of the Jijiga area, then, is very familiar with the presence of refugees, and – crucially – also of international refugee assistance, both within the territory and across the border in what is today Somaliland. Research in the region has demonstrated how the coping strategies of local populations have evolved around the longstanding presence of humanitarian assistance, and in particular interaction with the strong kinship networks that lie at the heart of Somali culture (see, for example, Carruth, 2017). The same is true of refugee programming, with complex interactions between traditional migratory coping mechanisms and the establishment of camps that become quasi-urban centres of attraction because of the provision of food and services.

In the early 1990s there was significant concern among policymakers in Addis Ababa about the effectiveness of the refugee response. It is worth dwelling briefly on the nature of the international community's response to these concerns given the parallels with current policy debates. In 1992 the Government of Ethiopia and the UN system established a 'Cross-Mandate Policy' in Somali region, a formally reoriented approach to refugee assistance governed by a Memorandum of Understanding. The purpose was to move away from programming based on legal categorisations of returnees and refugees, which struggled for relevance on the ground, and to shift away from a focus on camps. To quote the UN:

> Ultimately, the objective should be to close all camps in Eastern Hararghe [the name at the time of this part of Somali region]. They are a gross anomaly and form poles of attraction which draw in large numbers of people and divert scarce resources which could otherwise be used to develop the whole region. There has never been a problem of protection for refugees coming into Ethiopia. The government has an open door policy. For that reason it is better to try and assist refugees through the host communities, through the provision of better services and infrastructure, rather than perpetuate the problem by keeping people in artificial camps. Camps are nothing more than a logistical convenience for agencies providing relief assistance that take away a refugee's self-respect and make him a dependent beneficiary, a mere statistic (UNEPPG, 1992, quoted in Van Brabant, 1994: 50).

The parallels between the early 1990s 'Cross-Mandate Policy' and the CRRF's objectives are striking, particularly the focus on closing camps and providing assistance through existing local structures. This parallel is reinforced by the inclusion within the Cross-Mandate Policy of a focus on food for work rather than relief handouts, echoes of which can be found in current discussions around including refugees within Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) caseloads. There was also to be a 'shift in policy whereby UNHCR began to more directly support line ministries to enable them to extend their services in localities where refugees were living … under the cross-mandate approach UNHCR developed agreements with the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Agriculture, and provided them with financial support' (UNHCR, 1995: 12–14). Even more striking, given that policy today is in many ways similar 24 years later, is the statement that 'the policy as such was not entirely new' (Van Brabant, 1994: 50).

This is a helpful reminder that the CRRF is in many ways not breaking new ground, and there are useful lessons to be found in the challenges that undermined the Cross-Mandate Policy's effectiveness in delivery, particularly given the

criticism levelled in 1994 that 'one of the most incomprehensible aspects of the cross-mandate approach was the total absence of any reference to previous resettlement and rehabilitation programmes' (ibid.: 82). In particular, two key lessons stand out.

First, there was a significant gap between the implied aspirations of the approach – no less than a total reorientation of humanitarian and development assistance to the region – and its delivery, which remained in the hands of a few actors, particularly UNHCR, 'the main proponent and interpreter of the policy' (ibid.: 74). The lack of broad ownership left it 'a policy without a strategy and without a plan' (ibid.: 81). Communications between the UN and the Government of Ethiopia were poorly handled, meaning limited ownership of the policy outside of UNHCR and its government counterparts at the time (Van Brabant, 1994).

Moreover, expected development resources did not materialise: 'the degree of UNHCR's concern for the uprooted populations could not be matched with other United Nations agencies' longer-term planning priorities' (UNHCR, 1995: 19). Food for work initiatives, for example, were never resourced at an appropriate scale and foundered (UNHCR, 1995). UNHCR itself focused on projects that prioritised visible results (repairs to school buildings, the digging of shallow wells) over sustainable outcomes (Van Brabant, 1994). Ultimately, expectations were raised with the local government that were not met: 'the government assumed that the concept of pooling of resources would mean that greater financial support would be put at its disposal. When increased resources did not materialize, the government expressed its disappointment' (UNHCR, 1995: 14). All of these past policy concerns are also potential threats to the successful implementation of the CRRF.

The second main lesson is that policies defined according to the frameworks and norms of the international community can look very different in implementation, particularly in places where these norms are of limited relevance, and will be understood very differently by local populations. While the Cross-Mandate Policy was framed around bringing different resource flows together and providing integrated assistance, the failure to mobilise the development assistance expected meant that it became understood instead as a 'dispersal and resettlement scheme', focused on moving Ethiopian returnees out of the camps and into local populations, reducing the financial burden of the camps and playing into local political demographic interests (Van Brabant, 1994).

Echoes of this second lesson can be found in the closure of the camps ten years later. When Aisha camp, close to the Djibouti border, was closed in 2005, residents were given the option of voluntary repatriation to Somalia or 'dispersal' in the local area. The second option was offered in recognition of the fact that there were significant numbers of Ethiopian citizens in the camp that should not be eligible for repatriation, but in practice this became a form of local integration, with significant numbers taking up the opportunity to naturalise in the area (Da Rugna, 2005). Given the importance of population numbers to resource flows in Ethiopia, any such process will have important political ramifications, and it will be critical to understand how these could interact with attempts under the Nine Pledges to promote 'local integration'.

2.3 Evolving geopolitical concerns in Somali region after 1991

The strategic significance of Somali region has only increased over recent decades: since Eritrea's secession in 1991, it has been one of Ethiopia's primary routes to the Red Sea ports on which it relies for imports and exports; it has become a critical front in managing both internal and external security threats, particularly the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Al-Shabaab; and substantial oil reserves have now been discovered (Hagmann, 2014). As security deteriorated in the mid-2000s, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) recognised that it needed a more

reliable security partner in Jigiga, and supported Abdi Mohamoud Omar,[5] the then security chief, to become Regional President. Elements within the federal government enabled him to create the most powerful local security force in Ethiopia, the Liyu police, estimated to be more than 40,000-strong in 2018 (Gardner, 2018; HRW, 2018). Following Meles Zenawi's death, Abdi Mohamoud Omar's grip on power in the region became ever tighter: an article from early 2018 described him as 'one of the most powerful Somali leaders in the Horn of Africa … [with] an authority unprecedented in the region's recent history' (Gardner, 2018). Within the region his regime was marked by authoritarianism; the regional government took increasing control of cross-border trade and movement, while also expanding basic service delivery to win popular support.

In recent years there has also been a significant increase in humanitarian activity, as a result of repeated droughts and displacement linked to conflict around the internal border with Oromia, which has severely affected food security. At the peak of the response between 2016 and 2017, the World Food Programme (WFP) was feeding more than 3.5 million people in the region, almost 70% of the population, through relief programming and the PSNP (KII 19). The costs and risks of operating in Somali region are high, including high fiduciary risk, markets dominated by clan ties and the local political elite, poor infrastructure and long supply chains (Devereux, 2006). As such, the international community expended significant financial resources and political capital in this effort, particularly in the face of a regional government that proved willing to put significant pressure on international actors working in the region, forcing out or even detaining individuals that it considered out of step with their political objectives (Benequista, 2008; Davison, 2012).

The wider political transition under way in Ethiopia has had a significant impact on Somali region. The new Prime Minister's desire to break with the security-focused policies of previous EPRDF governments, the authoritarian approach of Abdi Mohamoud Omar, which aligned poorly with the new political dispensation, and the high levels of autonomy he enjoyed in such a strategic area, led to increasing pressure from the federal state. After attempts to remove him peacefully in July 2018, he was eventually ousted in August following street violence in Jijiga, with the involvement of federal security forces (Reuters, 2018). A new President, Mustafa Omar, was installed. A vocal critic of Abdi Mohamoud Omar and with a reputation as a technocrat (he had been employed by the UN in Somalia (Solomon and Ahmed, 2018), Mustafa Omar represents a significant break with the past.

With the removal of Abdi Mohamoud Omar by the federal government a chapter has come to a close. However, this does not necessarily mean that the situation on the ground will change quickly. The new regime will have to establish itself, involving a significant overhaul in personnel at all levels of government and across sectors. This may lead to tensions, and the presence of armed men still loyal to the previous regime may pose a significant threat. In the short term, therefore, further instability and uncertainty are likely, with the potential for meaningful reform in the longer term. Development partners will have a key role in supporting the many newly appointed officials in their roles.

Amid this turmoil, the refugee presence, certainly around Jijiga, will remain a relatively low priority for the regional government (KIIs in Jijiga and Addis Ababa). Current and recent politics nonetheless have a number of important implications for refugees and the CRRF:

- Under Abdi Mohamoud Omar, the nature of the federal government's relationship with Somali region meant that there was less scope for it to operate at the regional level than in Ethiopia's other so-called Developing Regional States (DRS), and than has been the case in Somali region in the past (Hagmann, 2005). For example, the Ministry of Federal and Pastoral Development Affairs' programme of capacity-building support to regional and woreda government has not been operational, reportedly at the request

5 More commonly known at the national level as Abdi Iley.

of the regional government (KII 16). Some analysts indicate that the space for the National Intelligence and Security Service to operate significantly shrank, with the military having dominated the security sector in Jijiga in partnership with increasingly assertive regional security forces (KII 1). All of this meant that ARRA's space to operate in the region, and the nature of its relationship with regional government, was very different from the other DRSs. The changes that are under way within both the security sector and the Somali/Federal relationship will clearly alter the power dynamics in the region fundamentally, although it is too early to say how this will evolve.

- Movement has been far more regulated in Somali region than in other parts of the country due to the strong security presence. Movement from town to town was closely monitored by Liyu police and other security forces, and although refugees were not the primary target of this regulation, their movement was clearly affected by it (KIIs with refugees in Sheder and Kebrebeyah). It is yet to be seen if the new administration changes these policies significantly.
- The regional government's focus on increasing service delivery could have been an important opportunity for the CRRF, but it was highly personalised around the President as part of his patrimonial power system. Rather than establishing long-term capacity within woreda governments, high levels of turnover at all levels of government, and the imposition of officials from outside local areas, have risked undermining both the legitimacy and capacity of local government actors (KIIs in Jijiga). As personnel begin to change at the various levels of government it will be important to monitor closely for any opportunities that may arise.

3 The challenges facing refugees and residents in the Jijiga area

Each of the three camps in the Jijiga area is linked to an associated village or town, making the camps interdependent with these urban settlements. There is free movement within these spaces for both refugees and residents,[6] whereas movement further afield is much more challenging for refugees because of checkpoints that require Ethiopian ID cards. These wider 'ecosystems', each containing two parallel administrative structures – one created by refugee assistance, the other by the local administration – are crucial to understanding the context of refugee integration in Somali region. Although the two locations visited for this study share this broad dynamic, the details are very different.

3.1 Sheder

Sheder is the most rural of the three camps in the Jijiga area. It is clear from interviews with people from outside the camp that the settlement that predated it was very different from today's. One interviewee said that 'it was empty. It would have become a dead town [if the refugees had not come]. Ten years ago you could not even buy a cup of tea' (IDI 13). Another interlocutor added that there were 'only ten people here in Sheder' (IDI 20). Sheder was a small, agricultural village situated between the much larger centres of Lefe Isa, towards Jijiga, and Aw Barre, towards Hargeisa, but has been transformed by the refugee presence: 'through them urbanisation and modernisation emerged. Our communities benefited from … expanding markets, importing new skills and creating expanded social networks' (FGD 5). Of those residents interviewed for the study, more than half had arrived in the town since the arrival of the refugees in 2008, taking advantage of a host of new opportunities (IDIs 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20).

While some of these opportunities resulted from the refugee operation, starting with the trucking operations that brought the refugees to Sheder in the first place, more fundamental are the changes that refugees themselves have brought. Many had an urban background that contrasted with the local rural community. Coming from large cities such as Mogadishu and Baidoa they brought with them different skills, a different mindset and – crucially – money. Coming from regions with high levels of displacement, including global displacement internationally, they brought their diaspora connections and significant financing into Sheder. In effect, the refugee presence contributed to the capitalisation and commoditisation of the local economy (IDIs in Sheder camp and town).

One of three money transfer agents working in Sheder reported that, two years ago, he was transferring an average of $5,000 a day into Sheder for a total client base of more than 1,000, '99%' of whom were refugees (IDI 20). While most remittances appear to be used to supplement the free goods available in the camp in support of daily life, there were indications of refugees setting up small businesses, both in the

6 The term 'resident' is preferred to 'host community' to define those populations who live in the vicinity of refugee camps but are not registered inhabitants of the camp with refugee status.

camp and in the town itself (FGDs 3 and 7; IDI 17). This cash infusion into the local economy also attracted people from across the region: one interviewee had come to open a shop, another was taking work portering between the town and the camp, and the money transfer agent had come from Djibouti (IDIs 17, 19 and 20). However, the amount of money coming into the town has reduced considerably in the last two years, with the average now $500 a day, to somewhere between 150 and 200 people (IDI 20), as people have been resettled or have moved elsewhere: 'when you have money, you have a choice to go everywhere' (IDI 20). Those who remain have far less access to cash, and may have little option but to stake their hopes on resettlement: researchers observed a high proportion of physical disability in the camp, and mental health problems were commonly reported in interviews (IDIs in Sheder camp).

This dynamic provides an important nuance to the idea of 'host community', which suggests an existing population providing shelter to refugees arriving in their midst. A significant proportion of the 'host community' in Sheder is actually a creation of the refugee camp, and the relationship is therefore one of symbiosis rather than extraction: 'our social, economic and livelihoods are intertwined' (FGD 4). This symbiosis has a number of elements to it.

First, as already set out, there are **economic benefits** to both refugees and residents to living in such close proximity. On the one hand, refugees have more access to capital, are able to do business directly in the town, and bring skills and trades – such as construction and decorating, or English tutoring – that are in demand in Sheder (IDIs in Sheder camp and town). The refugees' urban background also means they have a different taste in clothes and consumer goods to the rural host population, creating demands for new goods (IDI 13). On the other hand, the legal and social constraints imposed by their refugee status provide residents with important advantages. Being able to travel more easily around the region – particularly to key trading posts – allows them to dominate the trade in goods and materials into the town (FGD 2). Indeed, there were complaints from some Sheder residents that, in recent months, refugees were finding it easier to move and that this was starting to damage their businesses (FGD 8). Residents are also in a better position to deal with the state's bureaucratic requirements, for example registering as taxpayers, owning land and securing access to micro-finance or loans (FGD 1, KII 29). There were reports of refugees and residents going into business together, using the former's capital to leverage the latter's ability to access loans (KII 12).

Second, **social interaction** between the two groups is clearly high, and appears to be largely positive (IDIs in Sheder town and camp). Although refugees, coming from a wide range of locations, have few clan or sub-clan connections with the local population of the area, over time strong bonds have developed (FGD 2). There were reports of extensive intermarriage between refugees and residents (which raises complex legal questions, particularly for children).[7] Other examples of interaction included religious festivals and the mosque, markets and sports events (IDIs and FGDs in Sheder camp and town). People spoke of strong friendships on both sides, and one resident indicated that she received financial support from refugee friends who had been resettled (IDI 18).

Third, and of most direct relevance to this study, **services** have played an important role in bringing the various communities together: 'frankly speaking, refugees are everything to us. Every one of us could remember before hosting refugees, there was nothing in our kebele, by the time the camp was established all services we have now come with them' (FGD 6).

The impact on **education** appears to have been almost entirely positive. Sheder had no secondary school before the arrival of the refugees, but since then a Development and Inter-Church Aid Commission (DICAC) school has been established, bringing prospective students and their families to Sheder from other parts of the region (IDIs 14 and 17). Of the 718 students,

7 While resettlement programmes have created a strong incentive for mixed families to identify as refugees, it appears that the current official practice in relation to the children of mixed parents is for them to choose their legal status (i.e. refugee or Ethiopian citizen) at the age of 7.

35% are local residents, and there is enough space for anyone who wants to attend (KII 26). Refugee and resident children are treated the same in terms of the provision of free uniforms and books, and feedback from both sides was generally positive (although concerns were raised about the effectiveness of non-Somali-speaking teachers) (IDIs and FGDs in Sheder town and camp). The main challenge identified in relation to education, particularly for refugees, is one of motivation: with even university education not providing a formal right to work or move, and the more attractive prospect of international resettlement dominating their thoughts, it can be difficult to convince children of the value of education to their future (IDIs 9 and 11). At primary level, there are different schools for refugees and residents, but some resident children still appear to choose to attend the ARRA school because it is considered better (IDI 16).

Healthcare provided a more mixed picture. Interviewees consistently described the ARRA health centre as clearly superior in terms of quality to the town's health clinic, which lacked supplies and qualified staff (IDIs and FGDs in Sheder town and camp). While there seem to be no formal barriers to residents accessing care at the refugee health centre, there were concerns over the willingness of ARRA staff to refer residents to Jijiga (FGDs 1 and 2). This was particularly problematic as the nearest local government ambulance is in Lefe Isa, and waiting for it can slow down treatment considerably. One FGD participant, a resident, stated: 'the medical staff usually see us as aliens and parasites … we feel insulted and abused and this frustrates us when it happens in our own localities' (FGD 6). The ARRA health centre is also clearly in high demand; another respondent stated that the queues are so long she would prefer to pay for medicine in the market if she could afford it (IDI 18).

With reference to both healthcare and education, refugees heavily criticised the prevailing incentive worker system, with the salary levels described as 'insulting' (FGD 4). One teacher said that they considered their role to be effectively voluntary (IDI 12). One female respondent indicated that she had nursing experience but elected not to work because the incentives were so small (IDI 1). This fed into a wider view that refugees were discriminated against financially (IDIs 2 and 10).

Access to water is the most challenging issue, for both refugees and residents. While the refugee camp brought a new piped water system to the town, funded by UNHCR and built by the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), this is a source of considerable frustration (IDIs and FGDs in Sheder town and camp). As with most refugee-related infrastructure, it is skewed towards providing for refugees (KIIs in Jijiga, Sheder and Aw Barre), and breakdowns are common. The Aw Barre Water Bureau estimated that the town gets 10% of the water rather than the theoretical 25%, although LWF contested this (KII 32). Resident FGD participants found this problematic in terms of accountability: 'we as host community elders are not able to get access to complain or negotiate on issues pertaining to water service delivery … we talk to our kebele administrators, but they always tell us they took the issue to ARRA … in vain we wonder what to do' (FGD 8).

The town population has easier access to *birkeds*[8] and other storage systems, which are not available in the camp. Respondents expressed concern at the options available to refugees during dry periods (IDIs 13, 17 and 18). Some refugees said that they bought water from *birked* owners at 10–15 birr per jerrycan (IDIs 1, 13 and 14). Both LWF and the woreda government have access to water trucks that visit the town regularly: the latter is a recent addition, donated by the Regional President on a visit to the area early in 2018 (IDIs 13 and 18). There are fees associated with the government truck, reported as 10 birr a jerrycan, to cover the costs of the drivers, although UNHCR and LWF provide in-kind support in the form of fuel (IDI 18; KII 28).

Child protection services, provided by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), were generally perceived to be strong in the camp, with particular reference to group activities such as a Roots and Shoots club (IDIs 4 and 6).

8 *Birkeds* are cemented underground water cisterns, generally privately owned or controlled through clan authorities, that have become increasingly important as a source of water in the region. For more on their history, see Sugule and Walker (1998).

Residents pointed to a need for greater access to these kinds of facilities outside the camp, including play areas, with the distance between the camp and the town an obstacle for younger children (IDI 17).

In terms of other services, refugees raised concerns around cuts to elements of the non-food support they receive, in particular in the cash they receive for food (now 100 birr per person per month) and to the provision of ethanol for cooking (IDIs and FGDs in the camp). The latter was raised in relation to the potential for increased friction among refugees and residents (IDI 8; FGD 2). Without ethanol provision, refugees will need to gather more firewood from the local area, bringing them into spaces where women in particular are more vulnerable to attack, and potentially increasing competition with residents for natural resources.

Overall, although people in Sheder clearly face challenges in their daily lives, particularly around access to water, the overall picture was of relatively positive co-existence between refugees and residents, where the different social, legal and economic circumstances of these communities are largely mutually supportive. But this is a delicate balance to maintain, particularly as the town's population has grown in recent years.

3.2 Kebrebeyah

The overall picture painted by refugees interviewed in Kebrebeyah was far more negative. The overall impression was of a community that had been left behind. In fact, this is exactly what has happened, twice. First, as outlined above, Kebrebeyah is the only camp remaining in the region from the wave of refugees in the 1980s. It has been a home of last resort for people who could not return to Somalia or disperse.[9] Second, those present in the camp today are people left behind by the significant resettlement programmes of the last decade. These programmes are not likely to pick up again at scale in the immediate future. For a range of reasons these people have been unable to take advantage of the opportunities available, and have been left destitute (IDIs and FGDs in Kebrebeyah camp).

The growth of Kebrebeyah town has left those in the camp a marginalised minority within the local area. In 1994, the town's population was estimated at just under 9,000 people (Office of the Population and Housing Census Commission, 1994), fewer than the number of refugees, compared to over 37,000 today (KII 40), and it has recently been upgraded to the status of a City Council. The town has thus outgrown the refugee camp. Interviews in different parts of Kebrebeyah provided very different perspectives depending on respondents' level of daily interaction with refugees. For example, interactions between a peripheral area of the camp (populated by refugees that came to the camp when Hartisheikh was closed in 2004) and the neighbouring kebele were clearly far more regular and meaningful than those between refugees from the heart of the camp and economic actors in the town market.

A detailed account of the camp from an unpublished 2005 UNHCR paper paints a similarly negative picture, with critical accounts of service provision in the camp and the limited extent to which refugees were integrated with the local town (Da Rugna, 2005). Unlike in Sheder, refugees did not have extensive transnational connections and there was little work for them in the town. One of the main opportunities for income was child labour, with girls between 11 and 18 working as domestic servants in Kebrebeyah and other nearby towns: 'the main reason for child labour … is the fact that the refugee parents are fully dependent on the relief ration assistance rendered by UNHCR. But the assistance … doesn't meet their basic needs' (Da Rugna, 2005: 34).

In fact, although the significantly diminished prospects of resettlement over the last 18 months have clearly had a negative impact on refugees' mindset, their situation does appear to have materially improved since 2005. As Kebrebeyah

9 Kebrebeyah's creation was complicated as it was originally a returnee, rather than refugee, camp and therefore initially designated for 100% dispersal. This policy changed over the course of 1992–1993 when a large number of Darod refugees were settled there, but the lack of clear planning can still be seen in the fact of its unusual (for refugee camps) layout. In 2002, it was estimated that only around 50% of its population were '*bona fide* refugees'. (Van Brabant, 1994; Ambroso, 2002: 13).

town has grown the area's economy has provided many more opportunities. Almost every refugee interviewed, both men and women, described being able to undertake some kind of work (IDIs and FGDs in the camp). For men, examples included construction, portering and driving, and for women, selling goods, food or milk, both in the town and the camp, and washing clothes. Wages varied, but were generally between 50 and 200 birr a day. There were also a number of references to refugees owning larger commercial enterprises within Kebrebeyah town, although it was not possible to confirm this (IDIs and FGDs in Kebrebeyah camp). In the more remote kebele, it was noted that the milk trade had helped connect the two communities (IDIs and FGDs in Istanbud kebele). There were still references to child labour in the area (IDI 22). And although those left behind by the resettlement programme clearly resent this fact, the resettlement of friends and relatives has still brought benefits for them, with the flow of remittances back to the camp increasing significantly (IDI 23): the Refugee Coordination Committee (RCC) chairman went so far as to say that, in comparison to before, they now had a 'good life'.

Consistent with this picture of greater economic interaction between residents and refugees, social interactions also appear to be deeper than in 2005. In particular, mosques were cited as an important point of contact between refugees and residents, and, as in Sheder, there were reports of inter-marriage between the two communities (IDIs and FGDs in Kebrebeyah town and camp). However, there were also far more reports of negative interaction, and refugees felt discriminated against by people from the town (IDIs 24 and 28). One respondent put this down to sub-clan dynamics, and the fact that the dominant clan identities of the refugees are perceived as 'lower' (IDI 39). Conflict over firewood was raised as an issue far more frequently than in Sheder, and was a more pressing concern: residents and refugees alike mentioned it as part of a general concern around competition for scarce natural resources (IDIs 28 and 38; FGD 9). There are also tensions over the land the refugees are living on, which is poorly demarcated from the town itself and has more permanent houses and larger compounds mixed in with the refugees' shelters: as the town has grown and real estate values have increased, these tensions are rising. A number of respondents indicated that landowners were agitating to reclaim their plots, and even attempting to clear refugees off the land to do so (FGDs 9 and 10). One respondent said this was 'causing depression' among the refugees (IDI 25).

While there were commonalities in the views on services provided in Kebrebeyah camp and Sheder, the differences are also telling – and largely negative. In terms of education, the proximity of the host and refugee primary schools (which share a compound in the town) has created tensions in the past due to the differing levels of support provided to the different groups of students (IDI 24). This was particularly the case when supplementary feeding was being provided to refugees, although as this has now halted these problems have eased (KII 39). The main divisive issue identified at the Kebrebeyah secondary school (a local government school that refugees attend, with DICAC support) was demotivation among refugee students due to a lack of future options (IDIs 24 and 26; KIIs 29 and 46).

There were far more complaints from refugees in Kebribeyah than in Sheder about the quality of **healthcare** in the refugee health centre. Issues concerned supplies, the quality and attitude of staff and their willingness to refer patients to Jijiga (IDIs and FGDs in Kebrebeyah camp).[10] However, there were also indications that residents would still go to the ARRA clinic, particularly in an emergency (IDIs 28 and 29). As in Sheder, private healthcare providers were identified as the most effective source of care, but

10 One notable anecdotal experience was from a young woman with a sick infant. Having been refused referral to Jijiga, she travelled there anyway (the first time in her life she had left Kebrebeyah) and saw a doctor in the hospital. He indicated that her son needed an operation, but they established that she could not afford it. He told her to return to Kebrebeyah and again seek referral, but again it was refused. The situation was only resolved when the doctor managed to find funding for the operation from an Addis Ababa-based NGO, and told her to make her way back to Jijiga independently.

are too expensive for many (IDIs and FGDs in Kebrebeyah camp and town).

Again, the provision of **water** was unanimously identified as the most pressing concern, consistent with UNHCR's 2005 report. The piped water system rarely functions (IDIs and FGDs in Kebrebeyah camp and town). With free, trucked water provided far less regularly than in Sheder, all refugees indicated that the local *birkeds*, owned by the 'host community', were their primary source of water (IDIs and FGDs in Kebrebeyah camp and town). This involves payment, with sums of 3–5 birr per jerrycan quoted for the rainy season and 8–10 birr for the dry season. Refugees and residents were both aware of the health risks of *birked* water (blamed by the woreda health bureau for an outbreak of what they named 'cholera' the year before), but had few other options: this was particularly the case for refugees, who rely on a small number of *birkeds* close to the camp. At least one of these has had past support from UNHCR to improve the fencing (IDI 40).

Refugees raised particular concerns about **child protection** in the camp, with examples of dangers faced by young children including falling into open *birkeds* (FGDs 11 and 12; IDI 28) and the dangerous journey to the primary school across the town's main road (IDI 25). There was little awareness that any child protection services were available in the camp.

As in Sheder, there were consistent complaints that the cash replacement for **food** provision was inadequate to cover families' needs (IDIs and FGDs in Kebrebeyah camp). The switch to cash was made in 2013 (KII 18), a few years before the cuts of the last 18 months, and it is difficult to determine whether the problem is the cuts or the appropriateness of the modality, but concerns were consistent enough to warrant further investigation. Supplementary feeding programmes in the camp were rated as excellent (FGD 11).

Overall, Kebrebeyah appears to have been neglected in terms of service delivery in the last five years. This reflects declining UNHCR resources (see chapter 4) and more pressing priorities elsewhere (KII 49). Indeed, until 2016 there was an active discussion within UNHCR about closing the camp for good (KII 23). The fact that the camp is so old, and so many refugees have left, appears to have been a factor in this prioritisation: one refugee described how her complaints have been met with accusations that as all the refugees have moved on or been resettled, anyone left must be a fraud and should look after themselves (IDI 25). Whether there is truth in this accusation, the effect of this neglect is to break the quid pro quo of the camp, whereby the refugees give up certain rights in return for the provision of certain free goods. A number of the refugees interviewed were very conscious of the rights they did not have, but could not see that the concomitant benefits were any longer very meaningful: 'the support is already down, so now we need those rights' (IDI 29). The wider benefits to residents in the area are also reduced, increasing resentment at their loss of land and natural resources. As one man in Istanbud kebele said: 'they have gone to USA, and we are left with the problems' (IDI 35).

Even more damaging has been the interaction of these trends with the end of the resettlement programme. Resettlement, and its absence, was prominent in almost every interview in Kebrebeyah camp. Many refugee respondents described how young men, and in rarer cases young women, in the camp had become increasingly focused on *tahrib*[11] in the absence of likely resettlement, although this has become a less attractive option in recent months as news of closed borders in Europe and the dangers of the journey becomes clearer (IDIS 22, 26 and 27; see also Ali, 2016). This appeared to be one of the dominant concerns of the older generation (IDI 26); one man described having to travel to Jijiga and Dire Dawa to bring his children back to the camp before they got any further. This demonstrates how the introduction and removal of certain kinds of external interventions, such as resettlement programmes, can have significant unintended consequences on those at the receiving end of the decisions.

11 *Tahrib* is the word commonly used by Somali speakers to refer to onward migration, usually to Europe, through informal means.

4 Institutional relationships across service delivery sectors

The dominant themes in interviews with institutional actors delivering services in refugee-hosting areas (regional and woreda government officials, UN agencies, international and national NGOs) were **resources** and **accountability**: resources are stretched thinly among all actors, leading to increased competition; and multiple internal and external funding sources lead to overlapping lines of accountability. Within this messy environment, there are significant advantages to a centralised operation of the type that ARRA and UNHCR have run in relation to refugees, but the cuts that they have been facing in recent years are fundamentally challenging elements of this operating model.[12] The pressure that has been placed on the refugee operation make the pledges and the CRRF, which stress shifting more responsibility to local government actors, potentially highly sensitive for local actors.

The education and WASH sectors in Kebrebeyah are prime examples of the fragmentation in service delivery to both refugees and residents.

4.1 Education

The high school in the town, catering to no more than a few hundred students, has four separate sources of funding: its core budget, from the newly established city council; its school grant, provided under General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQUIP) and paid directly into a school bank account overseen by the School Director and Parent–Teacher Association (PTA); financial support from DICAC for refugee students, paid on a 60-birr-per-pupil basis through the Regional Education Bureau in Jijiga; and in-kind support provided by DICAC, including support to the library and the provision of photocopiers, though recently this has dried up (KIIs 24, 26 and 39). This involves three separate accountability chains and, in reference to DICAC, very little ability to predict or manage for any support that may come. DICAC themselves identified this problem, indicating that, in the past, the woreda education bureau had assumed that they would cover resourcing gaps, which DICAC have been increasingly unable to do. Another example of the lack of clarity over who is responsible for meeting needs is around the fencing of the shared compound that houses the ARRA and local government primary schools. This relatively minor but locally important issue was raised by three different actors in Kebrebeyah with a great deal of frustration, and there seem to be multiple, conflicting understandings of how to proceed (KIIs 34, 39 and 40).

12 Only in two of the five years prior to this research (2018–2019) do UNHCR's budgets provide a separate figure for the costs of the Jijiga camps from the much larger operation in the south of Somali region, so it is difficult to determine the precise expenditure in the area, but there appears to have been a roughly 20% cut in budgets from 2013 to 2017. In 2016, this meant a total expenditure in the area of just over $9.4 million (UNHCR financial data provided to the research team). It appears that this has led to a range of cost-saving measures in the area, including the use of primarily national NGO implementing partners instead of international NGOs in the camps (KII 9).

4.2 Water supply

The water supply in Kebrebeyah has always been problematic, with few reliable sources of clean water close to the camp. The best source is over 20km away, in the Jarar valley. In 2005, the then Deputy UNHCR Representative in Addis Ababa, Fernando Protti, confirmed that discussions about the Jarar valley pipeline project had started in 1992, in response to the expense involved in water trucking (Da Rugna, 2005). After an investment of 25 million birr (approximately $3–4 million, taking inflation and exchange rates into account), it finally started operating in 2003 (ibid.). However, by 2005 it was clear that there were problems with the system, with expectations that management of the pipeline would be handed over to the local government not being realised and supply becoming increasingly erratic. As Da Rugna observed: 'the regional water bureau … that should now have the responsibility of the project … [is] too weak to approach this problem … The misuse of resources is huge: the revenue collected by tap attendants disappears, the fuel meant for the generators to pump the water to the camp is not utilized to effect, operators at the valley do not work efficiently etc.' (ibid.: 22). According to Protti: 'the … project should have been a development project involving the local government a lot more. If we would have thought about this we wouldn't have these problems now!' (ibid.: 22).There have been several attempts since 2005 to find different governance arrangements to resolve these problems, including the creation of a Water Board chaired by the Head of Woreda, and the subsequent establishment of an independent entity, the Jarar Valley Water Supply Agency, to oversee operations. None has worked effectively, as the resourcing requirements for maintaining what is a complex system were unmet (KIIs in Jijiga and Kebrebeyah). Currently, ARRA and UNHCR are responsible for the boreholes and treatment centre, and ensure that water reaches Kebrebeyah. The city council manages the pipes in the town as well as the distribution of the water (KII 38). This split responsibility, with split budgets, seems unlikely to be the most effective way to tackle a failing system, which currently faces severe challenges around power and treatment (KII 48). Any future initiatives to improve water provision in Kebrebeyah will need to carefully consider both governance and long-term resourcing.

4.3 Institutional relationships

It was notable how often respondents from Ethiopian government organisations appealed to the need for clear accountability to avoid problems like these. From ARRA's perspective, their priority is to 'stand with the refugees' and ensure that clear mechanisms are in place to address their needs (KII 7). From that starting point it makes little sense to focus on integrating structures in the camps with those outside, since this just introduces complications: one ARRA staff member said that integration could not be about 'making as one, but to enable all to live together in harmony' (ibid.). Newer interventions such as the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) and BSRP, which work across the camps and host communities under different modalities to ARRA's established systems for appointing and overseeing Implementing Partners, have already presented a challenge to these clear lines of accountability (KIIs 12 and 41).

ARRA and UNHCR's reliance on their own established systems, of which they have exclusive oversight, is a major challenge to the integration of service delivery with local government, but has important strengths if the priority is to reduce the risk of wasted funds in an environment of scarce resources. New interventions will need to give careful thought to how to address this concern if they are to work more effectively with ARRA. Poorly coordinated initiatives will only increase these concerns, and there is evidence of limitations in the coordination between BSRP, RDPP and the Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) (KIIs 12, 15 and 42). A clearer joint strategy between these actors would make coordination and alignment significantly easier for ARRA. A single point of coordination will be difficult to identify given the breadth of the interventions and the diversity of implementation models, but could fall under the new post suggested in chapter

6 of this report. Irrespective, a starting-point would be for UNICEF, the European Union (EU) and the World Bank, as the main donors to these programmes, and UNHCR as the lead refugee coordination body, to dedicate time and resources to reaching agreement on how to strengthen coordination.

Many local Implementing Partners (IPs) indicated that one of the main challenges in working on refugees is the somewhat rigid programming approach within the camps (KIIs 13, 14 and 25). This is partly driven by the fact that accountability chains require decisions to be taken in Addis Ababa. One Regional Bureau expressed concern about not being able to hold refugee staff to account for their support to resident populations (KII 21). Caution is also needed in relation to having service delivery controlled solely by one actor, and the risks to downwards accountability associated with such monopolies. By way of illustration of the potential risks, in 2005 an RCC representative noted that 'in reality, my function is only on paper to make the camp look good and organized. ARRA doesn't listen to the zone representatives, and we are not taken serious. They have the power and do whatever they want no matter what we say. And often we don't say anything because we are afraid of them' (Da Rugna, 2005: 28).

There are also legitimate concerns about the capacity of local government to manage additional needs. In both Sheder and Kebrebeyah, respondents indicated that local government had struggled to respond adequately to the growing populations within their own territories (FGD 13; KIIs 28 and 33). In Kebrebeyah, one refugee respondent felt that this failure contributed unfairly to residents' growing resentment against refugees (FGD 8). Another challenge for local governments is the dominance of emergency funding modalities in the region. The Regional Health Bureau indicated that this was their main source of external funding, which represents a significant challenge to predictable resource planning and allocation. Finally, the presence of refugees may actually worsen the wider resourcing picture for the woredas. The Regional Water Bureau indicated that Aw Barre and Kebrebeyah were deprioritised for funding because of the presence of the refugees and additional WASH funding provided by UNHCR.

In addition to high staff turnover, administrative changes such as the creation of the city council in Kebrebeyah also affect service delivery capacity. In the medium term, the creation of local government entities should bring additional resources to the area, but in the short term it has created considerable confusion and overlapping responsibilities (KIIs 42 and 43). The city council finance team indicated that they are intending to recruit heavily to move from 300 staff to 'over 1,000' in the next year, which will add to the upheaval. These administrative changes also appear to have been a challenge for the World Bank's DRDIP, as its support was originally for woreda administrations and it has not been able to reorient itself appropriately to the new council structures (KII 39). It is these kinds of administrative changes and complications in delivery that ARRA is keen to avoid.

With diminishing funding, ARRA's independent approach, although internally logical, appears to have sustainability challenges, particularly if the outcome is the current quality of services being provided in Kebrebeyah. There are indications that ARRA staff recognise the need to work more in partnership with others, and overall the quality of relationships between ARRA officials and local government actors appears to be better than in some other parts of the country, particularly in the health sector, where roles and responsibilities are relatively clear and both sides clearly benefit from joint working (KIIs 17 and 35). One UN employee suggested that overall health outcomes were better for having two systems because it meant more collective resources for all local populations (KII 43). In other sectors there is less confidence that each system can benefit from working with the other, and therefore a greater level of competition.

Specific examples of positive and negative interaction between service delivery actors inside and outside the camps, identified through KIIs in Jijiga, Sheder, Aw Barre and Kebrebeyah, are given in Table 1.

Overall, then, while there are examples of positive interactions between ARRA and its implementing partners and local government actors

on service delivery, the fundamental challenges to greater levels of integration remain. The instinctive approach of the refugee agencies remains to retain control by using their own structures and resources, and to limit their accountability to other actors. The more positive examples given above are characterised by either strong interpersonal relations, the provision of additional resources by an external partner, or where there is no challenge to the basic refugee delivery operating model. The resource constraints that all actors are operating under are a strong incentive to increase the efficiency with which funds are spent, but unless solutions can be identified that provide clear lines of accountability they are unlikely to be acceptable, particularly to ARRA.

Table 1 Examples of interaction and coordination between ARRA and local governments, based on key informant interviews with relevant officials at both regional and woreda level

	Positive examples	Negative examples
Overall cooperation	The kebele administrator in Sheder reported an excellent relationship with ARRA, with a strong feeling of being consulted on key changes being proposed in the camp. Important contributions being made by ARRA and its IPs to the revenue base in both Aw Barre and Kebrebeyah, estimated to be 600,000 birr a year in the former and 1.2m birr a year in the latter (10% of all the revenue they raised in 2017–2018). In Aw Barre, ARRA recently contributed resources to the woreda government to support the construction of new infrastructure for a visit by the Regional President. There is a formal process by which the woreda government makes such requests to ARRA.	Difficulties accessing refugee-related data were raised as a concern across sectors. This particularly applies to financial data, with regional bureaus having no sense of ARRA or their partners' available resources, but also health and nutrition data. Harmonising planning across sectors was cited as very challenging because of the different planning cycles being utilised by ARRA and regional government actors. Refugee response interventions are not included in multi-sectoral emergency response coordinated by OCHA (although the impact is mitigated by refugee-hosting woredas generally not being emergency hotspots).
Education	Recent commitment to train nationally recruited ARRA teachers from all camps at a summer school in Jijiga (although restrictions on movement meant incentive teachers would not be included). Joint PTA structures at high schools with mixed student bodies, made up of refugee and resident parents.	The issue of competing salary scales for staff was raised by a range of actors in both the health and education sectors – between incentive teachers, ARRA's national teachers, DICAC teachers and the local government system, four separate salary scales are in operation. With salaries for ARRA teachers more than double those of local government teachers, this represents a major obstacle to integration, particularly as education salaries already make up the largest proportions of local government budgets in the region. A reported reluctance on the part of ARRA to come to meetings chaired by the Regional Education Bureau.
WASH	Constructive recent conversations in Aw Barre woreda about restructuring water supply systems for both camps in the woreda, with direct responsibility for managing the systems for both refugees and residents shifting to the woreda government, after a likely two-year period of renewed investment by UNHCR. RDPP resources starting to rebalance investments in WASH in Aw Barre and Sheder towards the 'host community'.	
Health	Health officials reported having good access to the camps, and years of experience of joint collaboration on planning vaccination campaigns, responses to disease outbreaks and nutrition programmes. In Kebrebeyah, the woreda health bureau reported regular sharing of medicines with the ARRA health centre, and highlighted a recent joint decision, between them and ARRA, to open up the refugee health centre to residents, and develop a joint plan for the treatment of water in birkeds, in response to an outbreak labelled as 'cholera' by the woreda health bureau of the year before.	Limited evidence of coordination on procurement at the regional or woreda level, either of materials such as drugs (which are procured for ARRA by UNHCR rather than using the PFSA) or of local services.
Protection	ARRA and UNHCR providing additional funding for the University of Jijiga to extend legal counselling services to the camps (although with pressure to set up separate offices in the camps despite the proximity of existing offices).	Parallel coordination systems for child protection inside and outside the camps.

5 Views on integration and self-reliance

Respondents had a wide range of perspectives on the prospects for, and viability of, integration and self-reliance, summarised below. An important theme that emerged was one of skepticism at the prospects for fundamental change. This may well be informed by the experiences of the 1990s. In particular, there was palpable anger in the camp in Kebrebeyah at the many visits over 2018–2019 to discuss 'local integration' issues, with one respondent saying 'we feel we are a place for tourists to come' (IDI 23). With communication about what the CRRF means not always clear, given that much of the agenda has not been firmly defined by the government, there is also considerable confusion among local populations. One common interpretation is that the CRRF is a new project that will bring resources. A number of respondents bemoaned the lack of concrete activities getting under way (IDIs 22, 23 and 24; KII 30), despite RDPP, BSRP and DRDIP – projects that have a strong relationship with CRRF objectives – all being implemented in the area. There is therefore a strong need to manage expectations better through clearer communication.

5.1 Refugee perspectives

Refugees are, in principle, largely positive about the offer of greater freedoms. They frame this in terms of obtaining greater self-reliance and economic opportunity: 'now we are small chickens in a coop. If I want to go to Jijiga tomorrow, I must go to ARRA. If people get free movement, we will start businesses' (IDI 2); 'we want to work and get [a] better salary so that we can support our daily life' (FGD 10); 'we prefer to work and manage our lives rather than waiting in the camp for handouts from NGOs and donors' (FGD 12). Others talked about the benefits of being able to obtain firmer rights to land (FGD 1), and even of interest in work in industrial parks (IDI 9). This was particularly the case in Sheder, where the prospect of integration was linked to existing positive interactions between refugees and residents.

However, there is a critical caveat to this positive view: concern about the potential loss of refugee status and the right to resettlement (IDIs and FGDs with refugees). This question was posed directly to the EU mission that visited Kebrebeyah in parallel with the fieldwork for this study, and the responses received were considered unclear and unsatisfactory (KII 3). Despite the uncertain future of resettlement programmes, they remain an extremely strong attraction for retaining refugee status. When asked directly what they would choose between an indefinite wait for potential resettlement and the certainty of increased freedoms as an Ethiopian citizen, it is not clear that refugees would definitely choose the latter (IDI 25).

It is possible that this concern shapes the more negative perspectives that refugees did offer. These revolved around the belief that, even if greater rights were offered, it would not make much difference: 'refugees don't get equal rights, no matter what I do in the future' (IDI 2). In both Sheder and Kebrebeyah, refugees felt that there was discrimination against them from local populations, which would not be overcome by integration. To understand this better, it would be important to know how Somali clan hierarchies might be contributing to this belief. There were concerns about a lack of opportunities: 'so many Ethiopians don't have work. How can you add the refugees?' (IDI 7). There was also a less tangible concern of being left in limbo, neither fully Ethiopian nor fully Somali: 'today I am a refugee.

If tomorrow you tell me I am free in Ethiopia, I will feel something [negative] … I will not feel like I am free in Somalia' (IDI 38); 'when you are not in your [own] country, always you feel something [negative]. So we do not agree' (IDI 39). Some expressed a preference for returning to Somalia if resettlement was no longer an option, though with concern about ongoing insecurity in the country (IDIs 23, 29 and 39).

Overall, it appeared that younger and better-educated refugees – particularly those in Sheder – felt more positive about their prospects under integration (IDIs 8, 9 and 10). Those who were more vulnerable, or who had spent their whole lives with refugee status, were far more nervous about the impact on them (IDIs 2, 17 and 29).

5.2 Residents' perspectives

Residents in both Sheder and Kebrebeyah were largely positive about the prospects for greater integration, but they were skeptical that refugees would be willing to give up their potential claim to international resettlement. As with refugees, views were more positive where refugee–resident interactions and relationships were already strong, as integration was seen as an extension of an existing relationship (IDIs and FGDs in Sheder and Istanbud). Only one respondent raised a concern around potential competition for jobs that are already in short supply (IDI 21). One IP representative from the local area flagged that the key challenge would be around land (KII 13): only if the local government can provide land will local integration be a meaningful alternative. Given the tensions reported around land ownership in Kebrebeyah, this will be an important issue for further investigation.

There was some concern in Sheder that the current arrangement between refugees and residents might erode under integration. The argument put forward was that refugees' greater freedom of movement could negatively affect residents' livelihoods, reducing their customer base (IDIs 17, 19 and 20). One respondent speculated that refugees would likely travel back and forth to Somalia more (IDI 17). This type of mobility is currently discouraged by the potential threat to their refugee status. If they knew they could keep their current base in Sheder, the respondent argued, refugees would be able to play a much larger role in cross-border trade.

The research team also made a brief visit to Hartisheikh to conduct interviews focusing on local people's experiences with the closure of the refugee camp in the 1990s. While the findings of these interviews must be considered tentative given that they could not be fully triangulated, experiences resonate with many of the findings of this report. Respondents indicated that the presence of the camp stimulated significant economic growth in Hartisheikh town, with increased access to services, and that its closure had had a significantly negative economic impact. Whereas there was an expectation that refugee-related infrastructure would be made available to town-dwellers, in many cases this did not happen. While one former refugee school is still in use, and WFP is using some Rubb hall tents for storage, the woreda government warned local people against making use of the buildings, for reasons that could not be determined.

Twenty-five years later, the research team observed a number of these buildings now in ruins. The environmental damage caused by the camp has also not recovered. Shrubs and bushes now replace what had been a densely forested area, while the land appears to be largely deserted. Finally, respondents confirmed that a small proportion of the camp's population did settle in the area, mainly those who 'had relatives in the host community through intermarriages or blood relation … or those who … have had some income to do business … or have got some herds of livestock'. More investigation is warranted to confirm these indications, but they suggest that this experience is unlikely to have left local residents feeling positive about the long-term legacy of the refugee presence (KIIs 50 and 51).

5.3 Institutional perspectives

ARRA are clear that refugees' self-reliance is the ultimate goal of the CRRF, and the focus of senior officials in the region is on improving the poor track record of livelihoods programmes with refugees. Unless refugees can be made more independent of assistance, there will be no way forward (KII 47). This view was echoed by UNHCR (KII 4). In the past, much livelihoods

work was highly projectised, and constrained by legislation around refugees' right to work. While many new livelihoods initiatives are starting in the region, including under RDPP, until this legislation is revised it will be very difficult to develop sustainable interventions. It will also be important to analyse in more depth the existing economic relationships in the camps, which this report has touched on.

What is much less clear is how ARRA understands the concept of 'local integration'. A senior official in the region indicated that nothing had yet been defined (KII 47). One suggestion was that it might involve the provision of freedom of movement into the towns with which the camps are already associated, though this would be merely rendering the current de facto situation into a de jure one. While there would be some benefits for refugees if equality of employment were established, such a move would fall far short of current expectations of local integration.

There is clearly skepticism on ARRA's part about the prospect of unifying service delivery. This reservation seems to be partly informed by concerns about the capacity constraints of local government authorities, and the inability of either the Ethiopian government or the international community to mobilise adequate resources to address this (KIIs 7 and 47). As the zonal ARRA coordinator put it, 'all we have at the moment is good intentions'. This challenge will need to be properly addressed if ARRA is to be more supportive of the integration of service delivery systems.

From the local government's perspective, the main emphasis was on ending the isolation of refugee programming rather than taking full control (KIIs with regional and woreda government officials). Of particular importance was having greater clarity on resourcing levels and enabling more joint planning, although there was a recognition of the logistical obstacles involved in doing this (KIIs with regional and woreda government). Those closest to the ground felt most strongly about taking greater responsibility for the refugees, particularly within the WASH sector: there was a strong feeling that woreda governments were better placed to manage water supply systems than ARRA. Yet at regional government level there appeared to be more comfort with the idea of ARRA retaining their current responsibilities. As one senior official in the regional government put it, 'everyone has their own scope' (KII 6). Officials were clear, however, that only if needs were looked at collectively would it be possible to avoid increasing tensions between refugees and residents: if the needs of one population appeared to be prioritised over the other this could cause problems (KIIs 28 and 34).

5.4 Summary

These views expose some of the key contradictions that risk undermining implementation of the government's Nine Pledges. While there is a desire to see more self-reliant refugees contributing to the Ethiopian economy, there remains a strong policy imperative to keep them under relatively tight control. Refugees themselves are in two minds, welcoming the prospect of increased freedoms while being concerned at the threat this may pose to potential resettlement. In terms of services, there is a degree of convergence around the need for improved service delivery outcomes for both refugees and residents, but mixed views on how this should be achieved.

6 Conclusions and recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

The Jijiga area presents real opportunities for the implementation of the CRRF's agenda of promoting self-reliance and integration. The refugee population in the area is broadly accepted, and to a large extent de facto integration has already taken place. The refugee presence is not particularly politically sensitive locally, meaning that changes should be feasible, although the recent political upheavals in the region are likely to present a challenging environment in which to pursue major reforms. The gradual dwindling of UNHCR funding in the area is another strong reason for changing approach: current trends do not appear sustainable in the medium term. But the risks and potential pitfalls are also clear.

Between them, Sheder and Kebrebeyah provide an excellent pair of examples of how refugee programming becomes integrated within local economies. In Sheder, the balance of constraints and opportunities has allowed a reasonably constructive symbiosis to emerge. But this is – to some extent – a result of the refugee programme and the existence of parallel structures. Were these two systems of service delivery to be joined together too quickly, there would be a significant risk of upsetting this status quo and potentially damaging the relatively positive relationships that currently exist. That said, Kebrebeyah provides a cautionary tale of what can happen if things are allowed to stagnate. Over time, those who have access to funds leave, through both formal and informal means, while refugees who are left behind are increasingly poor and vulnerable. If the support that is provided to these individuals then also starts to diminish, their situation deteriorates considerably. The fact that there appears to have been such a rapid drop in remittances coming into the Sheder refugee community over 2018–2019 may be an early sign of this process. It would be worthwhile tracking this closely to understand how the situation may evolve in the coming years.

The experience of the implementation and failure of the 'Cross-Mandate Policy' in the 1990s, while different in many ways, holds important lessons for the CRRF. It would be unfortunate if ODI were commissioned to undertake a political economy analysis of the refugee operation in the Jijiga area in another 24 years and were to find that none of these lessons had been taken on board. The fieldwork conducted for this study suggests that these lessons are relevant in a number of ways:

- The most important lesson relates to resources. In the 1990s there was an expectation that the Cross-Mandate Policy would lead to an increase in collective resources. The fact that this did not materialise fatally undermined the entire policy approach. Many of the respondents spoken to for this study were concerned that the same would happen with the CRRF, and are struggling to see what concrete advantages it will bring. The opportunity will be lost if stakeholders cannot at least see that new approaches will improve the overall effectiveness of the existing resource base, if not actually increase it. Thus far, implementation of the 'integration' agenda is highly fragmented, with a number of programmes (BSRP, DRDIP, RDPP) that are not clearly aligned or mutually supportive.

- Related to this, ownership of the CRRF within the region still clearly rests with ARRA, with support from UNHCR. This has strong echoes with one of the lessons of the Cross-Mandate Policy, which is that overly narrow ownership by refugee and humanitarian agencies will undermine what needs to be a developmental agenda. While there is a good deal of support for greater oversight of the refugee operation within the regional government, this is not currently being harnessed in an effective way. And this is unlikely to be a priority for the Regional President in the near future.
- Lesson three: communication has not been clear to date, with local people unclear about what is being proposed, what it means for them and what choices will be made available to them. Refugees in Kebrebeyah are already tired of having discussions of this topic before serious implementation has even begun.

An additional factor that is likely to shape implementation, and one which was not present in the same way in the 1990s, is the impact of recent resettlement programmes. The promise of resettlement is an overwhelming incentive for refugees to remain refugees. Refugees are well aware of the current global political climate and the likelihood that prospects for resettlement will be reduced in the future, but the main response to date has been informal migration via *tahrib*. Refugees will still take considerable convincing that they should risk their resettlement status. Even if guarantees are given that this status will not be threatened, they are unlikely to be trusted. In other words, refugees will only give up one of the few assets they have – refugee status and the potential promise of resettlement – in exchange for something very real and very tangible.

The aftermath of the recent political changes in Jijiga will clearly affect the environment for CRRF implementation, and will fundamentally alter the relationship between Addis Ababa and the region. Inevitably, there are new opportunities and risks. On the positive side, a closer alignment between the objectives of the region and the federal state may provide a more conducive environment for pushing on with what is currently a centrally-owned reform agenda. The new Regional President also seems likely to appoint more experienced and professional staff to key positions in the region. More negatively, high staff turnover is likely to make establishing relationships and developing shared agendas with government officials challenging.

The President's office should, in principle, be an ally for the CRRF process, but in the short term it is unlikely that it will be able to prioritise it. It will be critical for UNICEF and other external actors to build their relationships at an early stage and be clear about the policies and programmes they are looking to support. One feasible strategy might be to focus efforts at a lower level, albeit it would be crucial to obtain the blessing of the President's office and assurances about continuity of policy in the areas in question.

Finally, there is an important issue that this study has not been able to adequately explore: the potential interaction between sub-clan identities and hierarchies with refugee and resident relationships. Yet these are critical issues in Somali society, with complex relationships between sub-clans with different social status. The logic of *shegad* is one example, where clan groups of lower status are adopted by, and develop client–patron relationships with, higher-status communities: it is possible that such a relationship informs the dynamic around Kebrebeyah. More ethnographically focused socio-economic research may allow these kinds of issues to emerge more clearly.[13]

6.2 Recommendations

The next stage of implementation must focus on tangible, real-world issues, and on demonstrating to skeptical stakeholders at all levels that, if implemented in the right way, the pledges can be a positive benefit to everyone. It should therefore be focused as close to the ground as possible. Given the political uncertainty at the regional level, it may also be sensible to focus

13 For more background on *shegad* and unequal clan relationships in Somali culture, see, for example, Luling, 2006; Jean-Jacques, 2004; and Iazzolino, 2016.

efforts a level below this for the time being. The fact that the current service delivery situation in Kebrebeyah appears so challenging may make it a suitable starting point. When people are not happy with the status quo, there is, in principle, a conducive environment for making changes – even if the initial mindset may present challenges. The fact that the camp has already been selected as a pilot for the local integration pledge provides a strong justification for prioritising it. This is not to say that no efforts should be made on implementation of the CRRF agenda in Sheder or Aw Barre, but conditions in Kebrebeyah might be appropriate for setting out what a comprehensive approach could look like, and elements of this will be relevant for the other camps in the area.

What might such a focused effort look like? A first step might be the creation of a multi-stakeholder leadership group for implementation of the government's pledges in Kebrebeyah town, co-chaired by the Kebrebeyah town mayor and the ARRA Zonal Coordinator from Jijiga.[14] This group should have a clear mandate to develop a local vision for implementation, and a resourced plan for its fulfilment. This mandate should come from political leaders at the regional and federal level, but should also provide as much freedom as possible to push things forward locally. It should include representatives of the regional government, perhaps using the Somali Regional State Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BoFED) as a focal point but drawing in other parts of the government as necessary. Membership should include all the key organisations providing resources to the process, so that these resources can be committed to a single, locally-owned plan rather than through multiple project implementation plans all being run from outside.

Such a group is unlikely to emerge of its own accord. If international actors want to facilitate its creation, this would involve advocacy with the key decision-makers involved and a degree of pressure being exerted at all levels – including the federal – to indicate that the release of additional donor resources to support CRRF implementation will require this sort of structure.[15] To enable this advocacy to be taken forward in a coordinated way, clear leadership would be required on the international side. It would be preferable if this were not left to UNHCR for the reasons outlined above, but equally if one of the major UN agencies took this on they may be seen to be partial as it would likely be associated with attracting additional resources for existing activities. Alternatively, one of the main donors to the CRRF process could resource a senior seconded position hosted within, but independent from, UNDP or UNICEF, mandated to work across all the key actors. This could usefully be informed by a review of lessons from the first year of CRRF posts in ARRA and UNHCR.

If such a group can be put in place, it should also take responsibility for managing consultations and communication with local populations. Given the already high levels of frustration, particularly among refugees, this is only likely to succeed if work has already been done to translate ideas into concrete, resourced plans. These plans should be focused around tackling the priority concerns of local people. This could include:

Communicate a clear way forward for improving the water supply in the town

While past failures suggest that there are risks, this is an area where improvements would send an important message. It may be advisable to develop short-, medium- and long-term plans which can, in parallel, help make rapid improvements in the current situation, while also laying out a clear vision for the future. In the short term, it might be possible to consider resourcing the creation of new *birkeds* co-owned

14 It is not straightforward to match ARRA with the local government system given their very different structures, but having leadership at this level on the ARRA side would assist in ensuring meaningful decision-making discussions could take place.

15 In time, consideration could be given to creating a pooled aid instrument at the local level that would provide greater ownership to the local authorities and could incentivise reform.

and managed by refugees and residents, perhaps as a forms of cooperative.[16] In the longer term, before taking forwards a water utility model, it will be essential to resolve both the governance and resourcing questions. It might be advisable to conduct further interviews with those involved in the Jarar Valley Water Supply Agency to ensure that lessons from its failure have been fully identified and understood.

Support a number of flagship pilot livelihoods projects

In line with the new refugee proclamation, this should be a priority area. While resourcing for these projects may come from different sources, there should be a role for the leadership group in tracking progress to demonstrate the seriousness with which this area is being treated. Lessons should be learnt from Mercy Corp's work in the area on market systems-based approaches and market systems analyses, and more effort put into understanding the detail of remittance flows into the camps. Private sector bodies such as the Somali Micro-Finance Initiative, which runs the Hello Cash mobile money programme, could be brought in. Milk production and sale may be a fruitful area for joint working between refugees and residents. There may also be value in looking at developing small construction cooperatives.[17] With all such activities, it would be important to closely monitor the impact on traders in Kebrebeyah town market and around the camp.

Identify a number of small-scale service improvement interventions

Local government and ARRA can work jointly to deliver concrete improvements to services for both refugees and residents. These should primarily be about building confidence on all sides: to local populations, that this process can have a positive impact; and to institutions, that they can successfully work together. It should also help ensure that DRDIP implementation is seen as a meaningful part of the wider process of implementing the pledges. Possible examples could include: providing technical assistance to the high school to support the development of a single operational plan that can help with the allocation of resources; resolving the issue of the fencing around the primary school compound; investing in child-friendly spaces in Kebrebeyah town; working with *birked* owners and refugees to address the perceived risks to young children in the camp; and reviewing the appropriateness of the current levels of cash being provided by WFP to refugees in lieu of cereals. Experience with previous over-reliance on 'quick-impact' projects is that they can only be useful if part of a larger, longer-term strategy.

Long-term issues

Once a process is under way, and confidence is built, it should be easier to open up discussions and consultations on more challenging long-term issues, helping refugees understand likely future scenarios in relation to resettlement programmes and thinking through their options, or developing a plan for the allocation of land to those refugees who may take up local integration as an option, working with residents in the town who have a stake in the land currently occupied by the camp. The ethnographic socio-economic research recommended above would form an important foundation for these longer-term plans.

Institutional recommendations

In light of these recommendations, the following specific suggestions are made:

16 The research team understands that as a matter of policy, the WASH cluster in Jijiga has agreed not to resource *birkeds* given their lack of sustainability and issues over hygiene. However, given that they are already the main source of water for people in Kebrebeyah, unless there are other interventions that can make a difference in the short-term there would appear to be little lost in investing limited resources in this area on a temporary basis.

17 SEE, a national NGO, has had a positive experience with setting up such groups in Sheder camp to assist in the process of constructing new shelters in the camp. Unfortunately UNHCR has recently shifted policy away from providing cash to refugees for this purpose, to providing vouchers that can only be used with certain construction companies in the town (KII 23).

- **UNICEF** should use this study as a basis to convene discussions with, primarily, UNHCR, the World Bank and the EU to agree a collective way forward on CRRF-related coordination in Jijiga and develop a shared view on the process recommended above (including the creation of a single coordination post at regional level). Agreement should also be sought on resourcing a clan-focused local study to better understand clan and sub-clan dynamics.
- The **Somali regional government** should provide its endorsement to the piloting process outlined above and – to the extent possible – allocate additional resources for Kebrebayah town council to take this forward, primarily as a symbol of its commitment.
- **Kebrebeyah City Council** should allocate staff and leadership to the creation of a multi-stakeholder group at the city level.
- **ARRA** with **UNHCR** support should develop a comprehensive plan for CRRF implementation around Kebrebeyah, as a pilot, taking into consideration all relevant elements of the pledges, and with the support of the regional, woreda and council governments.
- **Donors** should support stronger coordination of CRRF resources at local level, including jointly resourcing coordination functions within the region. They should provide strong incentives to existing projects to pool resources against a common strategy wherever possible.
- **NGOs** working in Kebrebeyah, both in the camp and the town, should lend their full support to this process, allocating resources wherever feasible. There will be a key part to play here for Save the Children given its role as the consortium lead for RDPP.

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Annex 1 Interviews conducted

Table A1 In-depth individual interviews

Interview code	Date	Location	Sex	Age	Status
IDI 1	27/6/18	Sheder camp	F	47	Refugee
IDI 2	27/6/18	Sheder camp	M	40	Refugee
IDI 3	28/6/18	Sheder camp	F	44	Refugee
IDI 4	28/6/18	Sheder camp	F	45	Refugee
IDI 5	28/6/18	Sheder camp	F	46	Refugee
IDI 6	28/6/18	Sheder camp	F	–	Refugee
IDI 7	28/6/18	Sheder camp	M	56	Refugee
IDI 8	28/6/18	Sheder camp	F	45	Refugee
IDI 9	29/6/18	Sheder camp	M	32	Refugee
IDI 10	29/6/18	Sheder camp	M	24	Refugee
IDI 11	29/6/18	Sheder camp	M	23	Refugee
IDI 12	29/6/18	Sheder camp	M	25	Refugee
IDI 13	30/6/18	Sheder town	M	35	Resident
IDI 14	30/6/18	Sheder town	M	22	Resident
IDI 15	30/6/18	Sheder town	M	40	Resident
IDI 16	30/6/18	Sheder town	F	18	Resident
IDI 17	30/6/18	Sheder town	M	20	Resident
IDI 18	30/6/18	Sheder town	F	35	Resident
IDI 19	30/6/18	Sheder town	M	30	Resident
IDI 20	2/7/18	Sheder town	M	36	Resident
IDI 21	2/7/18	Sheder town	M	–	Resident
IDI 22	3/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	M	55	Refugee
IDI 23	3/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	M	60	Refugee
IDI 24	3/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	F	55	Refugee
IDI 25	3/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	F	25	Refugee

Table A1 In-depth individual interviews (continued)

Interview code	Date	Location	Sex	Age	Status
IDI 26	3/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	M	55	Refugee
IDI 27	3/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	M	–	Refugee
IDI 28	3/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	F	55	Refugee
IDI 29	3/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	F	47	Refugee
IDI 30	3/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	F	36	Refugee
IDI 31	4/7/18	Guyo kebele	M	60	Resident
IDI 32	4/7/18	Guyo kebele	F	35	Resident
IDI 33	5/7/18	Kebrebeyah town	M	55	Resident
IDI 34	5/7/18	Kebrebeyah town	F	30	Resident
IDI 35	5/7/18	Istanbod kebele	M	51	Resident
IDI 36	5/7/18	Istanbod kebele	M	74	Resident
IDI 37	5/7/18	Kebrebeyah town	F	24	Resident
IDI 38	6/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	F	25	Refugee
IDI 39	6/7/18	Kebrebeyah camp	F	50	Refugee
IDI 40	6/7/18	Kebrebeyah town	F	–	Resident

Table A2 Focus group discussions

Interview code	Date	Location	Description of participants	Number of participants
FGD 1	27/6/18	Sheder camp	F, older group	10
FGD 2	28/6/18	Sheder camp	M, younger group	7
FGD 3	28/6/18	Sheder camp	F, mixed ages	6
FGD 4	28/6/18	Sheder camp	M, mixed ages	10
FGD 5	29/6/18	Sheder town	M, younger group	6
FGD 6	29/6/18	Sheder town	M, younger group	8
FGD 7	30/6/18	Sheder town	F, mixed ages	8
FGD 8	30/6/18	Sheder town	F, mixed ages	9
FGD 9	3/7/18	Kebribeyah camp	F, mixed ages	5
FGD 10	3/7/18	Kebribeyah camp	F, mixed ages	7
FGD 11	3/7/18	Kebribeyah camp	M, mixed ages	5
FGD 12	3/7/18	Kebribeyah camp	M, mixed ages	6
FGD 13	4/7/18	Kebribeyah town	F, mixed ages	6
FGD 14	4/7/18	Guyo kebele	M, mixed ages	6

Table A2 Focus group discussions (continued)

Interview code	Date	Location	Description of participants	Number of participants
FGD 15	5/7/18	Istanbud kebele	F, younger group	8
FGD 16	5/7/18	Kebribeyah town	M, older group	5

Table A3 Key informant interviews

Interview code	Date	Location	Description of participant
KII 1	19/6/18	Addis Ababa	Somali region analyst
KII 2	21/6/18	Addis Ababa	Somali region analyst
KII 3	25/6/18	Jijiga	INGO staff member
KII 4	25/6/18	Jijiga	UN staff member
KII 5	25/6/18	Jijiga	UN staff members
KII 6	26/6/18	Jijiga	Regional government official
KII 7	26/6/18	Jijiga	ARRA officials
KII 8	26/6/18	Jijiga	INGO staff members
KII 9	26/6/18	Jijiga	INGO staff members
KII 10	27/6/18	Jijiga	UN staff member
KII 11	27/6/18	Jijiga	Regional government official
KII 12	27/6/18	Jijiga	INGO staff member
KII 13	27/6/18	Jijiga	National NGO staff member
KII 14	27/6/18	Jijiga	National NGO staff member
KII 15	27/6/18	Jijiga	Regional government official
KII 16	28/6/18	Jijiga	Regional government official
KII 17	28/6/18	Jijiga	Regional government official
KII 18	28/6/18	Jijiga	UN staff member
KII 19	28/6/18	Jijiga	UN staff member
KII 20	28/6/18	Jijiga	University employee
KII 21	28/6/18	Jijiga	Regional government official
KII 22	28/6/18	Jijiga	Regional government official
KII 23	29/6/18	Jijiga	National NGO staff member
KII 24	29/6/18	Jijiga	Regional government official
KII 25	29/6/18	Jijiga	National NGO staff member
KII 26	29/6/18	Jijiga	National NGO staff member
KII 27	2/7/19	Aw Barre	Woreda government official

Table A3 Key informant interviews (continued)

Interview code	Date	Location	Description of participant
KII 28	2/7/19	Aw Barre	Woreda government official
KII 29	2/7/19	Aw Barre	Private sector worker
KII 30	2/7/18	Aw Barre	Woreda government official
KII 31	2/7/18	Aw Barre	Woreda government official
KII 32	2/7/18	Sheder	INGO staff member
KII 33	4/7/18	Kebrebeyah	Woreda government official
KII 34	4/7/18	Kebrebeyah	Woreda government official
KII 35	4/7/18	Kebrebeyah	Woreda government official
KII 36	5/7/18	Kebrebeyah	Private sector worker
KII 37	5/7/18	Kebrebeyah	Council employee
KII 38	5/7/18	Kebrebeyah	Council employee
KII 39	5/7/18	Kebrebeyah	Council employee
KII 40	5/7/18	Kebrebeyah	Council employee
KII 41	5/7/18	Jijiga	UN employee
KII 42	5/7/18	Jijiga	UN employee
KII 43	5/7/18	Jijiga	UN employee
KII 44	5/7/18	Jijiga	UN employee
KII 45	5/7/18	Jijiga	UN employee
KII 46	6/7/18	Kebrebeyah	Council service provider
KII 47	6/7/18	Jijiga	ARRA official
KII 48	6/7/18	Jijiga	UN employee
KII 49	6/7/18	Jijiga	UN employee
KII 50	6/7/18	Hartisheikh	Individual with historical knowledge
KII 51	6/7/18	Hartisheikh	Individual with historical knowledge

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