Working paper

Social protection and forcibly displaced people: a literature review

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Series

Key messages

There is a long way to go to meet commitments made in the Global Compact on Refugees to 'enhance refugee self-reliance' and the Sustainable Development Goals to 'leave no-one behind'.

The evidence from the literature reviewed, from countries hosting the largest numbers of protracted forcibly displaced populations, where international humanitarian and development actors have been engaged in the response, suggests that IDPs and refugees often lack *de facto* access to state social protection.

- There is very little discussion in the publicly available literature of refugees' inclusion in state social protection programmes. Only in IDA18 Refugee Sub-Window-funded countries – where inclusion of refugees in state social protection was a specific component of that support – did we find literature about the inclusion of refugees.
- Access to the formal labour market for refugees varies considerably across contexts. This exacerbates the exclusion of refugees in regard to state social insurance schemes.
- There is some evidence of inclusion of IDPs in state social assistance programmes, but limited literature was found on their *de facto* inclusion in social insurance programmes.

There is some evidence of alignment/integration between state social protection systems and humanitarian cash programmes.

- Out of the 46 countries reviewed, we found around a dozen explicit references to interventions aligned or integrated with state social protection systems and programmes.
- This suggests a tendency still to establish humanitarian systems largely parallel to state systems.
- Some states are coordinating with and learning from the humanitarian sector on social assistance programme management and delivery. This is particularly evident in the Syrian regional response.

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There is a lack of evidence on decision-making processes and reasons for adopting certain levels of alignment/integration.

- Overall, the literature does not include sufficient detail on why certain integration approaches were adopted. Detailing the reasons for adopting particular approaches across different contexts would allow for better understanding of the incentives and barriers humanitarian and state actors face.

More research is needed on what works to ensure more inclusive social protection.

- Understanding the consequences of different integration approaches for affected populations (both forcibly displaced and host communities) is an important area that requires further research. The empirical work that will be undertaken as part of the wider research project, of which this paper forms a part, will address three areas: social cohesion, protection and well-being, and economic agency.
- More research is needed on what adjustments or reforms should be adopted. While this can build on the evidence available on shock-responsive and adaptive social protection, there should be clear recognition of the unique situation of forcibly displaced populations.

Building the Evidence on Forced Displacement

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About this publication

This paper is a literature review that provides background to a wider research project. The overall aim of this project is to better understand effective mechanisms for the integration of social protection programmes and humanitarian assistance. By providing clearer guidance about when, how and why different forms of integration might be considered, the project will develop the theory, evidence base and operational guidance on how social protection systems and humanitarian systems can work together to meet the needs of those affected by displacement crises, including not only the displaced but vulnerable households in their host communities as well. The research is grounded in three country contexts with a total of six study sites that present different contexts of displacement and humanitarian response: Greece (Athens and Ioannina), Colombia (Bogotá/Cúcuta) and Cameroon (Far North/East). The project is led by ODI, who work in close collaboration with the Centre for Applied Social Sciences Research and Training (CASS-RT) in Cameroon, the School of Government at the University of Los Andes in Colombia and the National Centre for Social Research ('EKKE') in Greece.

This work is part of the programme 'Building the Evidence on Protracted Forced Displacement: A Multi-Stakeholder Partnership'. The programme is funded by UK Aid from the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), it is managed by the World Bank Group (WBG) and was established in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The scope of the programme is to expand the global knowledge on forced displacement by funding quality research and disseminating results for the use of practitioners and policy-makers. This work does not necessarily reflect the views of FCDO, the WBG or UNHCR.

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Acronyms/Glossary

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
AMB	Al Amal Microfinance Bank
CCAP	Citizen's Charter Afghanistan Project
CCTE	Conditional Cash Transfer for Education
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSO	civil society organisation
CVA	cash and voucher assistance
DGMM	Directorate General for Migration Management
ECT	emergency cash transfer
EEC	Ehsaas Emergency Cash Transfer
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECTP	Emergency Cash Transfer Project
ECC	Ehsaas Emergency Cash Transfer
EUTF	EU Trust Fund
FCDO	United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FDMA	FATA Disaster Management Authority
FVC	fragile, conflict-affected and violent context
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	international non-governmental organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JHDF	Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework
JRP	Jordan Response Plan
KII	key informant interview
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
MCCG	Maintenance and Construction Cash Grant
MENA	Middle East and North Africa

MEHE Ministry of Education and Higher Education (Lebanon)

MIES Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion

MIS Management Information System

MoFSP Turkish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services

MoNE Ministry of National Education

MoSA Ministry of Social Affairs

MRA Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation, and Refugees

MPCA Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance

NADRA National Database and Registration Authority

NAF National Aid Fund

NFI+ non-food items

NGO non-governmental organisation

NPTP National Poverty Targeting Programme

NSR national social registry

NSSF National Social Security Fund

NUFUS Turkish National Identity Card

PAF Plan de Acompañamiento Familiar

PDS Public Distribution System

PWP Public Works Programme

SASF Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation

SDC Social Development Centre

SFD Social Fund for Development

SIG Social Inclusion Grant

SOCU State Operational Coordinating Unit

SSA Social Service Agency

SWF Social Welfare Fund

TDP-ERP Temporarily Displaced Person's Early Recovery Programme

TP Temporary Protection

TRC Turkish Red Cross

TSA Targeted Social Assistance Programme

UCT Unconditional Cash Transfer

URB unified registry of recipients

VASyR Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

WFP World Food Programme

YECRP Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project

YESSO Youth Employment Social Support Operations

YERP Youth Employability and Retention Programme

Executive summary

Objectives of the review

Social protection is an increasingly important component of low- and middle-income countries' poverty reduction and social policy strategies (Barrientos, 2013; Bastagli et al., 2016). The vast majority of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), including 85% of the world's refugees, are found in these same low- and middle-income countries (UNHCR, 2019a). However, forcibly displaced populations are typically excluded from state social protection, and are more often served by internationally financed humanitarian programmes that are often short-term and unsustainable. There are also concerns as to the impacts of serving different populations with different cash programmes, including variations in transfer value and frequency. While social protection for refugees and IDPs is addressed under several international human rights covenants, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, as well as regional or domestic legal frameworks, there are important gaps between the rights as prescribed and those actually enjoyed by refugees and IDPs. UNHCR argues that 'more systematic efforts are needed to scale up social protection systems to cover the needs of refugees and host communities, as stressed by the outcomes of the first International Conference on Social Protection in Contexts of Fragility and Forced Displacement in 2017' (UNHCR, 2018b).

Recent years have seen closer attention paid to the inclusion of the forcibly displaced in state social protection programmes in line with global commitments, including the commitment to 'leave no one behind' set out in the Sustainable Development Goals and commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit. The Global Compact on Refugees, with the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which was set out to facilitate implementation of the Compact, 'supports responses that move away from encampment and parallel systems for refugees, wherever possible' (Turk, 2018: 578). The focus of the Compact is on 'strengthening national and local infrastructure to ensure that they can meet the needs of both refugees and their host communities', with the framework supporting 'the economic and social inclusion of refugees, so that they can benefit from and contribute to the social and economic well-being of the communities where they are living' (ibid.). Key stakeholders identify the inclusion of forcibly displaced people in state social protection programmes as an important aspect of achieving these aims. At the same time, there has been increasing focus and effort on developing links between humanitarian cash and state social protection programmes.

Despite the complexity of operating in contexts of crisis, including mass displacement, key stakeholders argue that there are numerous benefits to aligning or integrating humanitarian cash programmes with state social protection, including the potential to enhance the scope, scale and adequacy of social protection systems and programmes, strengthen national systems to provide

more effective assistance, and reduce the need for humanitarian assistance. Despite this potential, evidence for these impacts remains limited (CaLP, 2020), a gap that the overall research project this paper is part of hopes to address.

This literature review is part of a much larger series of research projects tackling the main global research questions on forced displacement. ODI is leading the component on social protection, which aims to better our understanding of how social protection systems and humanitarian systems can work together to meet the needs of forcibly displaced populations, including vulnerable households in host communities – and how these systems can improve social cohesion between these two groups. The research project will include empirical evidence from Greece, Colombia and Cameroon.

This literature review addresses three overarching research questions:

1. What is the evidence of alignment/integration of humanitarian cash with state social assistance programmes in forced displacement contexts, or on the inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in state systems, in protracted situations?
2. How do national policy-makers and international or national humanitarian and development actors decide how and to what extent to align/integrate with state social protection systems for the host population, or to include forcibly displaced populations in state programmes?
3. What does the evidence say about the effects of alignment/inclusion in forced displacement contexts on outcomes for refugees, IDPs and hosts? The outcomes covered by the review are social cohesion between forced displaced people and host populations, economic agency and the protection/well-being of the displaced.

Finally, the paper will review existing literature that considers implications for equity, costs and efficiency of national social protection systems and implications for overall accountability and adaptability.

Findings

This review finds that, overall, there is still very limited literature on the inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in state social protection systems. According to the evidence, refugees in particular were not fully included in state social protection systems in any of the countries reviewed. While there is some inclusion of IDPs, even then it is limited and more likely to involve contributory social assistance schemes, rather than social insurance schemes. This demonstrates the divide between rights enjoyed in practice and the right to social protection on paper, which is a universal human right under international law, for refugees as well as citizens. This gap between enjoyment of rights in practice and rights available in law is exacerbated by additional barriers facing the forcibly displaced in terms of access to state social protection systems. While not a focus of our research questions, some additional barriers identified include the absence of documentation and ID. And we know from the wider literature that refugees face barriers to

accessing the formal labour market, with no right to work in many contexts (Zetter and Ruandel, 2016; Asylum Access and the Refugee Work Rights Coalition, 2014), which in turn has an impact on their access to contributory social insurance.

The literature also shows that international humanitarian and development actors make some efforts to align and integrate with state systems, rather than adopting an entirely parallel system to serve forcibly displaced populations. There is some indication that these efforts have increased in recent years. In particular, in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, there is an emerging and growing body of evidence around efforts by international and government actors to align and integrate systems.

One gap in the literature is the lack of documentation of the reasons for adopting a particular integration approach in a given context. Decision-making processes by international and government actors were not laid out in the literature, with the exception of Turkey. Moving forward, documenting the reasons for decisions around integration approaches is important to better understand the opportunities and barriers facing international humanitarian actors and national policy-makers in terms of integration approaches and inclusion of the forcibly displaced.

A further gap in the evidence is around the impact of integration approaches on affected populations. What are the consequences for the forcibly displaced of various integration approaches? Most of the existing evidence focuses on social cohesion, a clear policy priority, but even that evidence is limited. Much more systematic research is required to build an evidence base on the type of integration approach adopted and the consequences that approach has for affected populations, in particular on the protection of the forcibly displaced. We also found very little publicly available literature on the impact of integration approaches on both the state social protection system and international humanitarian/development programmes. Our wider project will seek to address this evidence gap through empirical work that is being conducted in Greece, Colombia and Cameroon.

While the integration approaches adopted over the period of the Covid-19 pandemic has been beyond the scope of this paper, there has been increased attention on the needs of forcibly displaced populations and the potential policy options for addressing them. What we have also seen in the pandemic period is that refugees and IDPs in low- and middle-income contexts have been particularly vulnerable to the economic consequences of the pandemic and lockdowns (Dempster et al., 2020). Refugees and IDPs excluded from state social protection programmes and from the formal labour market will be among the hardest hit (ibid.). Economic inclusion is an essential component of economic recovery from the pandemic and its economic consequences. The response and recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic should be used as a strategic moment to reinforce the importance of inclusion in terms of improved economic and other outcomes for all.

There are a number of areas where further research is needed to contribute to our understanding of the types of alignment/integration/inclusion, and the impact on refugees, IDPs and host

communities. First, there is a need for additional evidence on the extent to which humanitarian actors are seeking to align with state social protection programmes in the design of their humanitarian cash transfer programming at the outset of a displacement crisis. Second, in terms of programme evaluations, we could find very little on the impact on outcomes for refugees, IDPs and host communities. There is an urgent need for a greater focus on outcomes for affected communities in evaluations of humanitarian cash transfer programmes that align or integrate in some way. Such information would be useful to document and would complement additional evidence on outcomes gathered from more subject- specific literature, including academic studies. The majority of the evidence and studies reviewed were from the Middle East, in particular Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, and to a lesser extent Latin America, in particular Colombia and Ecuador. The evidence base would benefit from a more diverse collection of evidence across geographies.

1 Introduction

In recent decades there has been an increased drive for the inclusion of refugees in state social protection systems. Forced displacement is frequently protracted, making 'care and maintenance' approaches unsustainable for humanitarian response. As of 2020, more than 26.4 million people were displaced across an international border (refugees) and 48 million people were displaced internally (IDPs) according to UNHCR's latest global figures (UNHCR, 2019a). Some 77% of refugees are displaced for more than five years (UNHCR defines protracted displacement as displacement for five years or more), with most displacement crises unresolved – more than 80% of all refugee crises last for over 10 years.[1] Compounding these stark figures is the urban nature of displacement, which means that refugees and IDPs often join the urban poor, living alongside host communities who may themselves also be vulnerable, excluded or marginalised and in need of social protection. According to the World Refugee Council, 60% of refugees and 80% of IDPs live in urban areas (Muggah and Abdenur, 2018). As UNHCR notes, without economic and social inclusion, 'the consequences of having so many human beings in a static state include wasted lives, squandered resources and increased threats to security'.[2]

The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the trialling of the CRRF, the New York Declaration, and the Global Compact on Refugees all call for better coordination between humanitarian and development assistance and for closer working with state systems, so that a sustainable approach for meeting the needs of the forcibly displaced can be achieved. The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit included a specific commitment for the humanitarian system to 'support the further expansion and strengthening of social protection systems … as a means of responding to shocks and protracted crises'. It is not just humanitarian policy processes that have been calling for greater social and economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced, including access to social protection. The Sustainable Development Goals, with their call to 'leave no one behind', universal social protection initiatives and the World Bank's fragile, conflict-affected and violent contexts (FVC) Strategy all call for the scaling up of state-led social protection systems.

Despite a growing body of evidence on how social protection and humanitarian systems can work together (Harvey and Holmes, 2007; Bastagli, 2014; Cherrier and Tuzzolino, 2014; O'Brien et al., 2018), there is little evidence around integration approaches in contexts of mass forced displacement, in particular evidence is sparse as to how humanitarian systems can align or integrate with social protection systems in forced displacement contexts, how to move towards greater inclusion of the forcibly displaced in state systems and how to ensure the particular

1 https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

2 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Protracted Refugee Situations, Standing Committee, 30th Meeting http://tiny.cc/UNHCR_ExCom

vulnerabilities of the forcibly displaced, especially their protection needs, can be met, as well as the extent to which their inclusion can support improved social cohesion with non-displaced communities.

This paper brings together existing evidence on how social protection and humanitarian systems can work together in contexts of very large, forced displacement where there is an international humanitarian presence.[3] It also sets out the evidence around the consequences of various integration approaches[4] for affected people and state social protection systems.

Box 1 Alignment, integration and inclusion

Alignment describes an intervention implemented by humanitarian or development actors that is broadly designed and implemented in parallel to state systems and programmes, but where one or more of the design features or implementation modalities align or mirror those adopted by state programmes. This can include transfer value, duration or eligibility criteria.

Integration describes interventions which use one or more of the implementation modalities of state social protection systems, including recipient lists or payment modalities. The greater the use of state systems in the implementation of the intervention, the greater the level of integration.

Inclusion describes the inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in programmes managed and implemented by the state. This can include programmes designed specifically for the forcibly displaced, or the inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in regular state programmes – i.e. programmes not specifically designed or implemented for forcibly displaced populations. The inclusion of forcibly displaced populations can be financed directly by the state or by international humanitarian or development actors who channel resources through the state.

The paper covers the key literature in contexts of mass forced displacement where there has been at least some effort to integrate humanitarian systems with the state social protection system. Alongside setting out the state of the evidence globally on these 'integration approaches', the paper also explores what the literature says in regard to decision-making processes, including whether (and which) contextual factors might shape the integration approach adopted, and what factors affect the feasibility and desirability of aligning/integrating systems (technical,

3 As a result, contexts in Europe and North America are not included in this literature review. See methodology section for further details on the scope of literature included.

4 Integration approach is used as shorthand to refer to the approach adopted to integrate or align humanitarian assistance with state social protection.

financial and political economy factors). The paper also considers what the literature has to say on the impact of these integration approaches on outcomes for affected people, with a focus on social cohesion, financial inclusion and basic needs. It also reviews the literature for evidence on implications for equity, costs and efficiency of national social protection systems, and how this impacts overall accountability and adaptability. The paper does not compare the performance of alternative integration approaches.

1.1 Structure of the report

The paper is in seven chapters, with two appendices.

The following chapter describes the methodology and approach, before the paper turns to the state of the evidence retrieved from the publicly available literature on alignment between humanitarian cash transfer programmes targeting forcibly displaced populations and state social protection programmes (i.e. social assistance and social insurance). The paper then sets out the reasons, as gathered from the literature, for the variation in alignment, integration and inclusion across contexts. It analyses the factors influencing decisions by government actors to include forcibly displaced populations in state programmes, as well as factors influencing humanitarian actors and government actors on why and how to align or integrate humanitarian cash transfer programmes with state social protection programmes. This section of the report also details what may be considered as opportunities for both humanitarian actors and host governments in terms of alignment or inclusion as well as the challenges.

The next part of the paper addresses the evidence on outcomes for refugees, IDPs and host communities impacted by mass displacement, in terms of inclusion, integration and alignment. It reviews the evidence on social cohesion between host and displaced communities, the economic agency of the displaced and the ability of host and refugee communities to meet immediate needs and ensure basic protection.

The report concludes by bringing together the key findings of the review, provides a summary of the evidence base and draws attention to the main policy implications arising from that evidence. We also highlight areas where future research is required.

Box 2 Definitions

For the purpose of this report, we define key terms as follows:

Social protection – Social protection refers to the range of policies and programmes adopted by governments to address, alleviate and/or prevent poverty and vulnerability when individuals or households face shocks or risks. It encompasses a range of instruments that can be classified under social assistance, social insurance and labour market policies. This literature review's main focus is on social assistance because this is the instrument most discussed in the publicly available literature about social protection for forcibly displaced populations. Social assistance as a set of policies includes a primary and explicit objective of poverty reduction and providing support to poor and vulnerable households. Social assistance is typically financed through general taxation or donor assistance, in comparison to social insurance, which is generally funded through employer and employee contributions.

Forcibly displaced person – A person forced to move from their locality or environment and occupational activities due to conflict, persecution, violence or human rights violations. This includes refugees, asylum-seekers and IDPs.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) – Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.

Refugee – A person who, 'owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country' (1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees Art. 1A(2)).

Asylum-seeker – A person who has left their home country as a political refugee and is seeking asylum in another. They may well meet the definition of a refugee but have not yet been recognised as such by the government.

Host community – A national or local community in which displaced persons reside.

2 Methodology and approach

2.1 Research overview

This research is part of a larger World Bank Trust Fund project on forced displacement, financed by the UK FCDO. The overall aim of the wider project is to build our knowledge base to understand **how social protection and humanitarian systems can be best aligned or integrated in a displacement crisis, to improve outcomes for displaced and vulnerable households in host communities – and to facilitate social cohesion between these groups**. The overarching research question for the wider research project is as follows: **What are the optimal approaches for integrating social protection and humanitarian assistance to respond to forced displacement in different contexts?** By providing clearer guidance about when, how and why different forms of integration might be considered, the project will develop the theory, evidence base and operational guidance on how social protection systems and humanitarian systems can work together to meet the needs of those affected by forced displacement crises, including not only the displaced but vulnerable households in their host communities as well. The research also aims to better understand whether and how a system that works together in this way can improve social cohesion between these groups, economic agency for the displaced as well as protection and basic needs.

The research does not address the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic or the interventions implemented in response to it that have targeted or included forcibly displaced populations.

2.2 Research questions

Within the wider research project, this paper aims to identify and review publicly available literature to answer **three key research questions**:

1. What does the publicly available literature tell us about integration approaches of humanitarian cash assistance with state social protection in forced displacement contexts?
2. According to the publicly available literature, how do policy-makers and international and national humanitarian and development actors reach their decisions as to how and to what extent to align/integrate or not with state social protection for the host population, or to include forcibly displaced populations in state programmes?
3. What does the literature say about the effects of alignment/integration/inclusion in forced displacement contexts on outcomes for refugees and IDPs, focusing on social cohesion between forcibly displaced and host populations; the economic agency of refugees/IDPs and the protection/well-being of the displaced?

With regards to the last question, the research team drew from the three hypotheses from the overall research project (see Box 3). As well as this literature review, these hypotheses will be tested in our empirical studies in Greece, Colombia and Cameroon, which will follow this literature review as further ODI publications under this project.

Box 3 Research hypotheses on outcomes for forcibly displaced populations

In this research, we are interested in how the nature of alignment / inclusion impacts the following outcome areas: (i) social cohesion (ii) economic agency (iii) basic needs and protection. We define them as follows:

1. **Social cohesion** – (i) social identity, understood as people's sense of belonging to a community; (ii) horizontal trust (trust between different groups in society); (iii) vertical trust (trust between society and the government); and (iv) willingness to engage in fostering common goods (Chan et al., 2006; Boehnke et al., 2014).
2. **Economic agency** – a person or unit's ability to use land, labour or capital. Of note is the overlap with notions of economic inclusion. UNHCR emphasises economic inclusion as a pathway to self-reliance that would include concepts of agency. Broadly, self-reliance refers to the ability of individuals, households or communities to meet their essential needs and enjoy their human rights in a sustainable manner and to live with dignity. Self-reliant people lead independent and productive lives and are better able to enjoy their rights, while also contributing to their host societies (UNHCR, 2017a: 3).[5]
3. **Basic needs and protection** – we use the basic needs approach (as defined by UNHCR for multi-sector cash programming). Basic needs include an enabling protection environment; access to essential services; and ensuring a minimum safety net.

Source: www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/operations/590aefc77/basic-needs-approach-refugee-response.html

2.3 Scope of the literature review

The scope of the literature review was defined along three key dimensions.

5 See also UNHCR's Refugee Self-Reliance Index initiative (available at: www.refugeeselfreliance.org/self-reliance-index).

Displacement contexts

The literature review focuses specifically on countries hosting the largest numbers of protracted forcibly displaced populations, *and* where international humanitarian and development actors have been engaged in the response to forced displacement. The research team began by establishing a comprehensive list of protracted forced displacement contexts through a review of UNHCR data and in consultation with experts in the area of forced displacement. Cameroon, Colombia and Greece were purposely excluded from the review as these are the three case studies in the wider research project in which primary data is being collected and analysed, and individual case study reports will be produced for each. Appendix 2 presents the 46 countries that were shortlisted for the review.

Intervention type

The review aimed to identify three main types of interventions:

- The **inclusion** of forcibly displaced populations in state social assistance and social insurance programmes.
- The **alignment** of humanitarian and development interventions for forcibly displaced populations with state social protection programmes. The review focused on interventions that used cash as their delivery method.
- The **integration** of humanitarian and development interventions for forcibly displaced populations with state social protection programmes. The review focused on interventions that used cash as their delivery method.

We acknowledge that social protection typically refers to a wider range of provision than social assistance and social insurance programmes. Similarly, international humanitarian and development interventions typically use a wide range of implementation modalities, including in-kind support and services, to meet the needs of forcibly displaced populations. However, the scope of the review was limited to the types of interventions noted above. This approach was adopted given the sheer scale of wider social protection issues and humanitarian/development interventions, which would make the scope of this paper, given the in-depth nature of the literature review, unmanageable. In addition, other research projects are building knowledge on these wider issues, including under the World Bank Trust Fund, which has commissioned research to examine the inclusion of the forcibly displaced in health, education and the labour market. Finally, we felt it was important to limit the study to social assistance and social insurance inclusion and integration approaches given that these topics are increasingly important policy agendas at a global level and are gaining the attention of governments and international donors alike. The increased use of cash assistance by both humanitarian and development actors has opened up the possibility of linking humanitarian assistance with state social protection.

Timeframe

The searches identified literature published between 2010 and 2019. The rationale for focusing on this time period was that this is when we have seen a growth in cash transfer programming in forced displacement contexts. Literature post-2019 was only reviewed when this added complements to the information identified in the literature within our timeframe (mostly updated information about coverage). Interventions implemented in 2020 to respond to the impacts of Covid-19 have not been included. This ensures consistency across information retrieved for each of the countries considering the different dates at which research in each country was undertaken. However, in recognition of the increase in attention paid to – and efforts around – the provision of social protection to forcibly displaced populations during this period, relevant examples from Covid-19 responses have been included in boxes throughout the text, drawing on a separate piece of research recently published by ODI.

2.4 Research methodology

We conducted a semi-structured literature review to extract relevant documentation for this paper. To retrieve relevant documentation, we followed the three core tracks outlined in Hagen-Zanker and Mallett (2013), namely, academic literature search, snowballing and grey literature capture. This multipronged approach aimed to ensure we comprehensively captured the range of existing publicly available literature on the topics of interest. The literature reviewed was broad and included academic literature, various donor documents (including from project design and implementation documents to final impact evaluation and monitoring and evaluation reports), and other relevant grey literature.

For each of the 46 countries, we reviewed the literature to identify relevant documentation about alignment, integration or inclusion. We also reviewed background documentation on displacement and host country context from relevant international and national institutions and NGOs. The focus of the review has been existing publicly available literature in which alignment, integration or inclusion for forcibly displaced populations was explicitly discussed – we did not systematically review a country's policies or legal frameworks towards forcibly displaced populations. Within the 46 countries, the team identified relevant literature in 16 countries. Relevant information to the paper's research questions was then extracted and forms the evidence base used for this paper.

2.5 Limitations of this review

A vast majority of the literature compiled for this paper was located beyond peer-reviewed journal articles, which meant that the authors had to manually search institutional websites. This led to a more subjective approach and may have complicated the identification of some relevant material. Also, some of the literature and studies did not have titles and abstracts that were easy to find under general search terms and this required more manual searching.

In turn, the review focused on identifying *publicly available literature* that would provide a basis to be able to address the research question outlined above. We are, however, aware that there is likely a body of literature that is not published or publicly available that may have better informed some of the research questions. This literature review therefore does not aim to be exhaustive but instead aims to help us understand better what the publicly available evidence currently is on each research question.

Our geographic focus was on large-scale protracted forced displacement contexts that are in receipt of international humanitarian assistance – as such the European and North American context are excluded, although we recognise that there are lessons to be learnt from the inclusion of refugees into social protection systems there and some of these lessons will be presented in the Greece case study.

In general, we found very little publicly available literature that discussed the inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in state social protection systems. Most of the literature on contexts where international assistance is available focuses on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the Syrian refugee crisis response and as such the majority of the literature referred to in this paper is on Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and to a lesser extent Iraq, as well as Yemen.

3 State of the evidence

This chapter outlines the findings from the publicly available literature about the extent and range of alignment, integration or inclusion. Table 1 provides an overview of the different interventions and their identified connection points[6] as outlined in the literature reviewed; more detail about each country is presented in Appendix 1. Importantly, in some countries several different approaches are being adopted simultaneously.

3.1 Inclusion in state programmes

The evidence on the inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in state social protection systems and programmes is largely confined to **IDPs**. Our searches only brought up literature about interventions in which IDPs are *explicitly* included – including literature on adjustments made to include IDPs, or where these are explicitly designated as being eligible. As IDPs are citizens who usually hold the same rights as non-displaced populations, including the right to social protection (in contexts where social protection is rights-based) (Long and Sabates-Wheeler, 2017), it could be assumed that many more interventions include these displaced populations. However, we recognise that, despite what should be their right on paper, many IDPs do not enjoy these rights in practice due to the impacts of conflict or where the state is the cause of displacement. Our findings point to the very limited range of literature in which this is discussed. In particular, we found no publicly available literature about the inclusion of IDPs in social insurance programmes in the countries reviewed.

Within state programmes that did include IDPs, we identify three distinct categories, representing different approaches in terms of specific objectives and target populations. The first are state programmes that are *not* specifically designed to meet IDP needs and have wider development objectives, for which IDPs are explicitly identified as eligible. This is the case with the regular Public Distribution System and pensions in Iraq, the Youth Employment Social Support Operations and the National Cash Transfer Programme in Nigeria, and in regular social assistance and pension programmes in Ukraine and Azerbaijan. In the second category are programmes which were designed from the outset to address the needs of IDPs alongside those of the host population, such as the Maintenance and Construction Cash Grant, the Social Inclusion Grant and the Eshteghal Zaiee Karmondena interventions implemented in Afghanistan by the state with World Bank support. The third category refers to instances where states have designed *status-based* programmes to meet the specific needs of – and targeted exclusively at – IDPs, an approach adopted in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.

6 Connection points refers in this project to the components of the social protection system to which a degree of alignment or integration can be applied – for example, payment modality, transfer value, etc.).

In the countries reviewed, we found very few instances of **refugees** being included in state programmes. The only examples of refugee inclusion in *social assistance* programmes are countries that have received support from the World Bank's IDA18 Refugee Sub-Window,[7] and where inclusion of refugees in state social protection was a specific component of that support. In most of those cases, refugees were not included in state programmes prior to the IDA18. Some countries excluded from the review because they host relatively small numbers of refugees do include this population in their national social assistance programmes; examples are South Africa, Brazil and Chile.

Box 4 Inclusion of refugees in the Covid-19 response in the Republic of Congo

In the Republic of Congo, the social protection response to the pandemic was designed to include refugees from the outset. The government has scaled up social protection in two ways in response to the crisis, which includes refugees. First, an emergency cash transfer (ECT) programme is being implemented for poor households to compensate for any income loss and avoid negative coping strategies. The ECT is expected to cover some 355,000 vulnerable host and refugee households. Second, the emergency response will include a cash component after the most acute phase of the pandemic to assist households in rebuilding their assets and strengthening their resilience, integrated with the regular income-generating component of the *Lisungi* programme (the pre-Covid-19 social assistance safety net programme). This is expected to cover 20,000 households, including refugees, who are targeted using the same eligibility criteria as nationals. Both interventions are implemented with financial support from the World Bank's IDA.

Sources: World Bank, 2020e; World Bank, 2020f

With regard to *social insurance*, refugee access is tied to their right to work in the host country, which varies considerably from one country to the next. Once again there is limited literature on access for refugees. The only explicit discussions were about refugees' access to social insurance in Ecuador – where refugees have the same work rights as nationals – and in Jordan, where the Jordan Compact is providing some refugees with access to work permits for certain sections of the labour market, which also ensures their right to social insurance.

7 The IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for refugees and host communities supports states to enact policy change and address the social and economic dimensions of refugee situations. Fragile and Conflict Affected (FGV) contexts can be the most challenging contexts to reduce poverty and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, including refugee inclusion to social protection. In response to addressing FCV, the World Bank IDA18 has mobilised unprecedented financing for addressing these contexts.

3.2 Alignment or integration

In our review of the literature of the hundreds of interventions implemented by international humanitarian actors in situations of protracted forced displacement, we found around a dozen explicit references to interventions having aligned or integrated with state social protection systems and programmes. While there may be evidence on efforts to align that is not currently public, this does suggest that 'in practice, to date most systems of support for refugees are largely parallel to national systems' (Seyfert et al., 2019: 9). In some instances, there is very limited information about the actual approach towards alignment or inclusion with state social protection systems, with most of the literature gathered from case studies on this specific topic. The varying degree of detail in the country case studies in Appendix 1 reflects differences in the availability of information about each specific alignment or inclusion approach.

Where we did find alignment or inclusion, this was almost entirely in programmes implemented by UN agencies (namely UNICEF, UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP)), although these are often implemented in partnership with NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs). Our review of the evidence explicitly included literature about interventions implemented by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) (the International Rescue Committee [IRC], CARE, Save the Children); while INGOs engage in cash working groups and at times coordinate and align with one another, we did not find literature about these interventions that mentioned alignment or integration with state programmes. The exception is Turkey, with the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme implemented jointly initially by WFP and currently by the Turkish Red Cross (TRC). INGO interventions in the country were all subsumed into that programme.

Strengthened coordination with national social protection programmes is a priority for the UN institutions noted above. WFP and UNHCR are also strengthening their approaches towards coordination with state social protection, although a recent evaluation of UNHCR engagement in humanitarian–development cooperation (with research in three countries) pointed to the further potential to strengthen engagement on this front (Steets et al., 2019). As Table 1 illustrates, there is great variation in the integration approaches adopted by international humanitarian actors, covering the whole range of the alignment and integration spectrum.

We find three instances of interventions that partly aligned their design with that of state interventions, namely the Livelihoods Grant and the non-food items (NFI+) scheme, both implemented by UNHCR in Niger, and the Multi-Purpose Cash Programme implemented in Lebanon. In these cases, the transfer value provided by international humanitarian was aligned with a state intervention.

WFP in Ecuador aligned the transfer value of its cash and voucher assistance between 2011 and 2014 with that of the state conditional cash transfer. Here, however, the intervention also covered refugees and hosts. In Jordan, humanitarian multi-purpose cash programming included at least

30% of the host communities, in line with a requirement from the government. The inclusion of hosts in programmes that were originally designed for displaced populations can represent a means for international humanitarian actors to complement state provision of social protection.

Finally, there are interventions that integrated with the implementation modalities of state social protection programmes. There is great variation here, with interventions integrating with one or more state implementation modalities. In some cases, these interventions also align some or all of their design features with those of state programmes. Interventions that have stronger levels of integration are typically implemented in countries with relatively mature or well-trusted state social protection systems.

In Turkey, the EU-funded ESSN programme works through the national identification, verification and registration system, while the programme design partly aligns with national programmes. Similarly, in Ecuador the Graduation Model implemented by UNHCR aligned ex-ante with a state intervention with similar objectives, and the Graduation Model's training component is implemented by the state. Yemen represents an example of very close alignment as the World Bank and UN agencies specifically aimed to uphold the national social protection system during the conflict in the implementation of their interventions. Providing international funds through national programmes to continue implementation was not feasible considering the conflict situation and lack of official government. Instead, programmes align closely with those previously implemented by the Social Welfare Fund and the Social Fund for Development, and both work extensively through national institutions.

In the literature we also find examples of governments coordinating with and learning from the humanitarian sector on social assistance programme management and delivery. Where states have nascent social protection systems and limited capacity and experience, they may adopt measures by international actors that support state system strengthening over the medium to long term, including building in shock-responsive mechanisms. Most of this, however, is restricted to host populations as the entry point, rather than forcibly displaced populations or being universal. In some cases, this is part of an explicit objective of international humanitarian agencies to strengthen state social protection systems and institutions.

Table 1 Connection points

Parallel	Alignment	Integration	National systems-led

		Target population	Implementing institution	Connection points			
				Policy	Design	Administration	Financing
Afghanistan	MCCG, Ez-Kar and SIG	Hosts and IDPs	State	State programme that includes IDPs			Donor funding through state
Azerbaijan	Monthly allowance	IDPs	State	State programmes designed specifically for IDPs			Government-funded
Ecuador	Graduation model	Refugees	UNHCR	Linked	Humanitarian broadly aligned with state programme.	Training component implemented by state	Parallel
Ecuador	WFP support (2011–2014)	Hosts and refugees	WFP	Parallel	Transfer value set to be roughly comparable to the national conditional cash transfer Covered both hosts and refugee populations	Parallel	Parallel
Ecuador	Social insurance	Hosts; refugees are eligible	State	State programmes to which refugees are eligible			Contributory system
Georgia	Status-based social allowance	IDPs	State	State programmes designed specifically for IDPs			Government-funded
Georgia	Cash assistance	IDPs	WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR	Parallel	Parallel	Reverse integration: the one-card platform designed by international agencies now integrated in the national social protection system	Parallel

		Target population	Implementing institution	Connection points			
				Policy	Design	Administration	Financing
Georgia	Targeted social assistance	Citizens; IDPs are eligible	State	State programme to which IDPs are eligible			
Iraq	PDS	Hosts; IDPs eligible prior to displacement maintain their entitlements	State	State programme to which IDPs are eligible			Government-funded
Iraq	Contributory and non-contributory pensions	IDPs eligible prior to displacement maintain their entitlements	State	State programme to which IDPs are eligible			Government-funded / contributory programme
Iraq	MPCA	IDPs and citizen hosts	Multiple humanitarian actors	Parallel	Parallel	Targeting approach aims to align with that adopted by state social protection	Parallel
Jordan	Multi-purpose cash assistance (see also links to NAF)	Refugees	WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR	Alignment of emergency response and longer-term programming: transition of emergency caseload (refugees) onto national systems	Covered both host and refugee communities following a specific requirement of the Jordanian government that programming includes either 30% or 50% of recipients, depending on the type of support	From 2018 onwards scaling up of the NAF. Design and implementation was supported by the World Bank	International financing

		Target population	Implementing institution	Connection points			
				Policy	Design	Administration	Financing
Jordan	Hajati by UNICEF also covered both hosts and refugees						
Jordan	Jordan Compact	Refugees	State	Joint initiative between EU, World Bank (provided concessional financing) and government of Jordan			EU, World Bank
Lebanon		Refugees	WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR	Alignment of emergency response and longer-term programming: convergence in elements of programme design and implementation for the national population and for refugees		Used national bank	EU Regional Trust Fund and FCDO

		Target population	Implementing institution	Connection points			
				Policy	Design	Administration	Financing
Niger	UNHCR Livelihoods grant and NFI+ scheme	Refugees	UNHCR	Parallel	Alignment of benefit value with that of state transfers	Parallel	Parallel
Nigeria	NCTP and YESSO	Citizens; IDPs are eligible	State	State programmes to which IDPs are eligible			Government-funded
Pakistan	Ehsaas Kafaalat, Zakat	Citizens; IDPs are eligible	State	State programmes to which IDPs are eligible			Government-funded with donor support
Turkey	ESSN	Refugees	WFP (initial implementing partner), TRC (current implementing partner), state	The ESSN is aligned with Turkish state policy reforms that aim to increase access to services for refugees	Alignment of transfer value with state cash assistance	Registration and eligibility verification conducted through state system. Communication conducted partly by state social protection agencies	Separate funding from national welfare system. Funded by the EU as part of the EU Facility for Refugees
Turkey	CCTE	Refugees	UNICEF, TRC, state		Payment schedule, target group and conditions align with the CCTE. Benefit value aligns with ESSN, which itself aligns with national cash assistance, not the national CCTE	Registration conducted through state system. Communication conducted partly by state social protection agencies. Used state monitoring systems	Donor funding to UNICEF – separate from national system
Ukraine	Social assistance for IDPs	IDPs	State	State programme designed specifically for IDPs			Government-funded

		Target population	Implementing institution	Connection points			
				Policy	Design	Administration	Financing
Ukraine	Social assistance and pensions	Hosts; IDPs are eligible	State	State programmes for which IDPs are eligible			Government-funded
Ukraine	Cash assistance	IDPs	UNHCR	Parallel	Parallel	Payments made through the state administration of children and family services until 2017	Parallel
Ukraine	Cash transfer for housing support	IDPs	IOM	Parallel	Parallel	Initial list of recipients drawn from state social protection institution	
Yemen	SFD	Hosts and IDPs	UNDP, UNICEF, SFD, PWP with World Bank support	Integrated	Intervention builds on design of programmes previously implemented by SFD and public works	Project implemented through state institutions	Parallel
Yemen	SWF	Hosts and IDPs	UNICEF and SWF	Integrated	Target group aligned with SWF with some variations	In the first phase, UNICEF used SWF payment mechanism, human resources and institutions; in the second phase, UNICEF also drew on SWF targeting list	Parallel
IDA18 countries (Chad, Republic of Congo)		Hosts and refugees	State and World Bank	Interventions implemented by state institutions that include forcibly displaced (mainly refugees) and host communities			World Bank blended loans to government

4 Barriers to and opportunities for integration approaches

This chapter reviews the literature on barriers, opportunities, incentives and challenges impacting decision-making on integration approaches. Overall, we find a lack of publicly available literature on decision-making processes and have consequently drawn links between political factors in the country, legal frameworks and affordability to understand what may impact decision-making. Each is closely linked and influences others, while the importance of each factor (or mix of factors) will vary significantly from one context to another.

4.1 Government decision-making

Type of displacement and legal context

The type of displacement, whether internal or across an international border, appears to play a role in terms of decisions around inclusion, with the literature detailing much greater inclusion of IDPs in state social protection programmes than refugees in low- and middle-income contexts. For example, in Pakistan, which hosts both IDPs and refugees, only IDPs are included in state programmes. Differences in access for refugees and IDPs are driven to a large extent by legal frameworks, with refugees more likely to face *direct* legal barriers as a result of their lack of a permanent legal status (e.g. in countries that have not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, as in Pakistan). Legal barriers for refugees also include limitations to other social and economic rights, such as the right to work, which hinders access to contributory social protection schemes.

There is also some indication that refugees' access to social protection, in particular non-contributory provision, can be more heavily politicised than access to other forms of state social service provision. For example, there is evidence of refugees being granted broad rights to state social services including health and education, while being explicitly excluded from certain forms of social protection – as in the case of Ecuador with regard to social assistance.

Box 5 Entitlement to rights and enjoyment of rights in practice (de jure or de facto)?

Forcibly displaced people may have de jure access to state social protection but may not be de facto included. For example, in Ecuador refugees have the same rights to work as nationals under national law and are eligible to enrol in social insurance schemes. However, until recently the format of refugee identification documents was not compatible with social security registration, which led many to be de facto excluded until a legislative change in 2017 granted refugees access to national ID (UNHCR, 2017b). In Iraq, some IDPs who had participated in the Public Distribution System (PDS) programme prior to their displacement lost access thereafter, because they misplaced their documentation, because they were not re-enrolled automatically when registering their IDP status (World Bank, 2017ccc), or because of requirements in the programme that recipients can only redeem the PDS (and other services) in their registered place of residence (US State Department, 2019). IDPs in Ukraine have also faced significant barriers to accessing their social protection entitlements because of the complex and lengthy bureaucratic process required to register and remain eligible (Bulakh, 2020).

IDPs and refugees also tend to be excluded from state social registries, creating challenges where state systems rely on social registries for the identification of programme recipients. However, we also saw evidence that some countries are addressing these barriers; in Mauritania, Djibouti and Congo, for instance, governments have started the process of including refugees in their social registries (Leite et al., 2017; UNHCR and WFP, 2021; Hagen-Zanker and Both, 2021). Thus, even where forcibly displaced populations are de jure included in state provision, adjustments are typically required in the implementation modalities of such programmes to ensure their de facto inclusion. Ensuring effective coverage therefore requires not only political will, financial resources and mature national social protection programmes, but also proactive efforts to adjust implementation modalities.

Political factors

While social protection programmes can be costly for governments and there are real fiscal constraints, the greater factor influencing decision-making is **political will** (Samson, 2009). For example, in Pakistan the well-being of IDPs is a key priority of the government, and IDPs and others affected by conflict are identified as priority target groups in the national social protection strategy (Watson et al., 2018). Similarly, in Nigeria the state is committed to the inclusion of IDPs in national social development plans as this is considered central to development and economic growth, and IDPs are included in two of the state's flagship social assistance programmes (Debarre et al., 2018).

However, a lack of political will can also influence government decision-making on whether or not to include the displaced. It is also likely related to concerns over *fair burden-sharing*, as in the case of Lebanon where the government 'does not consider that it is responsible for the provision of social assistance for Syrian refugees' (EC, 2019f). In refugee contexts too, exclusion may be an implicit policy of the government, for example in Bangladesh and Lebanon.

Box 6 Inclusion of refugees in state responses to Covid-19: the example of Colombia

In response to Covid-19, Colombia rolled out the *Ingreso Solidario* cash transfer programme to support poor and vulnerable households during the pandemic. This was the first large-scale state cash transfer programme to include displaced Venezuelans. The question of including this population in state social protection programmes had been debated for some time, but the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the needs of displaced Venezuelans more clearly. However, the decision to include refugees in the response was partly influenced by the temporary nature of *Ingreso Solidario*, raising questions regarding the long-term inclusion of refugees in state social assistance in the future.

Source: Hagen-Zanker and Both, 2021

Political will is closely linked to political feasibility, which is heavily influenced by the interaction between the level of vulnerability or poverty in the host country and the coverage of the state social protection system. Where vulnerability or poverty rates are high among citizens, and social protection coverage is low, priority may be given to extending coverage to citizens rather than refugees, and citizens may be opposed to the inclusion of refugees when they are themselves excluded from state social protection provision (Gentilini et al., 2018).

Geopolitical concerns may also play a role in decisions around inclusion. In Azerbaijan, for example, the government is reluctant to promote the integration of IDPs into their host communities because of concerns that this 'may render their return to their original homes in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as less likely in the future, thereby weakening Azerbaijan's claim to sovereignty over these territories' (Gureyeva-Aliyeva and Huseynov, 2011: 9). This may partly explain why assistance programmes in the form of subsidies, tax breaks and social assistance targeted specifically at IDPs are favoured over more sustainable approaches that would promote long-term integration into host communities.

Box 7 Other factors influencing the feasibility of inclusion approaches

The legal and policy environment Any decision-making process around inclusion of refugees in state systems is very complex. Initial reform around laws may need to take place, and changes in legislation can be slow and deeply political. At the same time, countries may not have finalised or formalised their refugee and asylum laws to guarantee access to socio-economic rights but may still have made progress on inclusion of refugees in their social protection programmes. In such a context, refugees may enjoy access to benefits despite a lack of formal legal rights.

Political and social inclusion of refugees Refugees often lack political rights, including the right to vote, which can mean that governments may be less inclined to spend tax revenues and budgets on their social protection needs. The willingness of governments to include refugees can also be affected by pre-existing factors that influence acceptance of refugees and overall social cohesion, including ethnic ties and cultural proximity.

Persecution of IDP groups by the state Where governments are a party to the conflict leading to internal displacement, or where IDPs are systematically discriminated against or persecuted, this will inevitably impact decision-making around inclusion. Thus, while IDPs may have rights on paper, they may be prevented from taking up their entitlements, and the systematic exclusion of certain persecuted groups may even be a policy objective.

Capacity and availability of resources

Domestic fiscal constraints are a common challenge to a state's ability to deliver effective, adequate and inclusive social protection. Availability of resources will influence the maturity and scale of social protection systems, impacting their ability to absorb additional populations both in terms of coverage and systems capacity. Having pre-existing capacity within state social protection systems prior to the onset of any displacement influx will mean governments are better prepared to respond. For example, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan have mature social protection systems which have proven more resilient to mass displacement, enabling wide coverage and a range of programmes to cover various risks, including for IDPs.

But there are many contexts globally that have limited resources to invest in – and expand – social protection, even where there are signs of political will. In Ecuador the government has 'expressed willingness to include refugees in similar conditions in state programmes for the poor, but the state lacks the necessary resources amidst an economic downturn' (International Conference of Social Protection in Contexts of Fragility and Forced Displacement, 2017). Similarly, in Iraq, Smart (2017) finds that transitioning the (largely displaced) humanitarian caseload of IDPs and refugees onto the state cash transfer system is unlikely due to the fiscal situation.

There are also countries that might have resources, but where there is limited investment in social protection, which leads to a system with limited provision, and lacking programmes in which the forcibly displaced can be included. For example, comparatively low investment in social assistance in Lebanon, based on an economic and social model of minimum intervention exacerbated by conflict and subsequent interruptions to public service provision, has led to weak state provision of social assistance and high dependency on non-governmental, private and civil society groups, mostly faith-based organisations, to deliver and administer social assistance, with financing directed through these organisations (Bastagli et al., 2019: 25).

With the support of international assistance, a lack of domestic fiscal space and nascent state social protection systems may not necessarily be a barrier for countries to include forcibly displaced populations. The provision of international assistance, such as the World Bank's IDA18 funding, is targeted at low-income countries, many of which have limited state provision, with few programmes and limited coverage and can therefore provide a critical financial incentive. Some of these countries are – or are in the process of – including refugees in state social protection programmes with IDA18 financial and technical support from the World Bank. In Niger, where national social protection is still nascent and not fully financed by the state, the main social protection programme is financed (and partly implemented) by the World Bank (O'Brien et al., 2017). Indeed, according to one key informant interview (KII) conducted as part of this research, the Niger government was in favour of refugee inclusion in the national *Cellule des Filets Sociaux* programme because it recognised that this would bring additional donor funding to the state system. Similarly, international financing is supporting the inclusion of IDPs in contexts such as Afghanistan (largely funded by the World Bank). In turn, IDA18 grants include a component aimed at strengthening the capacity and systems of state social protection. For example, in the case of the Republic of Congo and Chad IDA18 resources aimed to strengthen the state targeting and enrolment process in these countries' cash transfer programmes (World Bank, 2018c). This demonstrates how inclusion policies can shift if international funding is available to support domestic fiscal space. Even where there are suitable legal frameworks and political will to include the forcibly displaced in state social protection programmes exists, financial feasibility and affordability is a key factor influencing government decisions (McCord, 2010). As such, international resources appear to be a particularly important factor for the inclusion of the displaced and for alignment with commitments made by governments in the Global Compact for Refugees for responsible burden-sharing by governments and international actors.

In the case of IDA18 funding, the argument may in some cases become quite circular. Indeed, in order for governments to access IDA18 funding, they must meet specific requirements relating to the legal and policy environment for refugees. Eligible countries must 'have an adequate framework for the protection of refugees' and 'an action plan or strategy with concrete steps, including possible policy reforms for long-term solutions that benefit refugees and host communities' (IDA, n.d.). For example, Mauritania is an IDA18 recipient country and the World Bank notes that it 'is strongly committed to ensuring the protection of refugees while promoting

their increased self-reliance and the resilience of host communities' (UNHCR and WFP, 2019). Thus, while financing may play a role in these countries, the political will towards refugee inclusion in national social protection programmes is a requirement.

Several countries receiving IDA18 Sub-Window financing have not as yet included refugees in their state social protection systems. In Uganda, Djibouti and Mauritania we understand this is a work in progress. Some governments, although they are an exception, will be prepared to accept international financing for inclusion, despite no formal inclusion policy at a domestic level. For example, in Bangladesh, political factors and a policy to exclude refugees from national systems outweigh the financial support of the international community.

Transition period around financing and design/implementation

First, adjustments may be required around targeting, enrolment and data management sharing systems, particularly where targeting criteria adopted by state programmes are not adequate to identify the needs of refugees or where there may be protection concerns around data sharing. An example of this upfront adaptation is seen in the World Bank's financing to strengthen social protection systems in Chad – including supporting adaptation of the targeting system to expand coverage of the poverty targeting system to poor households to also encompass refugee households and to support adaptation of the Management Information System (World Bank, 2018c). No single agency or intervention can address the many needs of refugees, other forcibly displaced people and host communities and so partnership across major agencies and stakeholders is vital. Importantly, however, during the transition to state support, humanitarian support will by and large need to be maintained in order to support the basic needs of the most vulnerable.

4.2 International actors' decision-making

There is limited publicly available literature that plainly articulates the factors influencing decisions made by international humanitarian and development actors around alignment or integration. What evidence we do find is outlined below.

Sustainability

In line with the GCR, with its objectives of easing pressure on host countries and enhancing refugee self-reliance, governments, international humanitarian and development actors and donors alike aim to find durable solutions to support forcibly displaced populations, particularly in protracted contexts. The protracted nature of many forced displacement contexts, together with declining humanitarian aid funding and denials of the right to work for many displaced, can make meeting such objectives extremely difficult in the long term.

In humanitarian responses there is a growing awareness of the need to ensure that programming around cash is supporting efforts towards the inclusion of refugees and IDPs. From the outset of the response in Niger, UNHCR was interested in including refugees in the national social protection system, and the decision was taken to align the benefit value of UNHCR's programme with the national programme as a way to enable that transition (KII). Similarly, in Turkey, with refugee inclusion an objective, working through the national system was considered by European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) as supporting 'the transition to a nationally owned and institutionalised cash transfer for refugees in the future' (EC, 2019e: 4). This also in part influenced UNICEF to include nationals in its Hajati programme in Jordan.

Alignment or integration may provide an entry point for international humanitarian and development actors to advocate for the inclusion of refugees in state social protection systems in the longer term. The closer collaboration fostered by such approaches can provide an opportunity for dialogue and to share findings. For example, in Ecuador, UNHCR was able to strengthen its relationship with the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion through its Graduation Model, which enabled it to advocate for the inclusion of refugees in certain services that were previously closed to them (KII). UNHCR was able to bring resources from the *Plan de Acompañamiento Familiar* (PAF) to previously underserved areas. For example, in the town of San Lorenzo there were limited ID services, but UNHCR – having focused its work there – was able to advocate for the state to strengthen those services to the region (KII). Similarly, in Ecuador the Ministry of Social and Economic Inclusion is interested in collaborating on the Graduation Approach in order to expand its own PAF programme (Ayoubi and Saavedra, 2018).

That said, there is limited evidence that these efforts bear out in the longer term. For example, UNICEF's Hajati programme in Jordan and its humanitarian cash transfers in Lebanon and the ESSN in Turkey were identified as providing such an opportunity (Smith, 2017). However, these governments remain opposed to full inclusion of refugees in state programmes, with Maunder et al. (2018: 46) noting that, in regard to Turkey, 'donor expectations that the ESSN would be integrated and sustained within national systems are not shared by the government'. Identifying possible exit strategies for humanitarian engagement in situations of protracted displacement is therefore a key challenge, particularly in contexts where opposition by government to refugee inclusion is driven primarily by political and legal blockages. While beyond the scope of this literature review, with its focus on humanitarian cash, other livelihoods interventions and links to public works, labour market interventions and new innovations on working with the informal labour market are important areas to better understand in terms of providing possible exit strategies for international donors.

Efficiency

In turn, aligning or integrating with national systems avoids the need for parallel costly international systems, which can potentially lead to cost efficiencies, time savings and reaching scale more easily. Efficiency is seen as a motivating factor in decisions to integrate in the

case of Turkey, where *one of the factors* influencing ECHO's decision to integrate part of the implementation of the ESSN in Turkey with the state system was that it 'saw the potential of this approach to generate efficiencies compared to establishing a parallel system' (EC, 2019e: 4).

However, we found very limited publicly available literature detailing the actual efficiencies achieved through integration approaches. Smith (2017: 6) notes on UNICEF cash-transfer programming in MENA, for example, that 'across all country programmes there is no robust documented evidence demonstrating the added value of linking humanitarian CTP to national systems compared to the alternative of a standalone humanitarian intervention'. Instead, much of the literature contains broad statements without much detail or breakdown of the efficiencies achieved. For example, on the UNICEF intervention in Yemen the European Commission (EC) notes that working through the SWF 'avoided the need to spend additional time and resources establishing new systems and processes' (EC, 2019a: 7). In addition, the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) already has strong relations with local authorities as well as vulnerable and hard to reach communities, which enabled UNICEF to interact with groups that otherwise it might have found difficult to reach (Smith, 2017).

A notable exception here is the ESSN programme implemented in Turkey, where an evaluation commissioned by WFP investigated the efficiency of working through national systems (Maunder et al., 2018). This found that 'there is credible evidence that the ESSN resulted in large cost savings compared to the previous humanitarian basic needs assistance' which was not aligned or integrated, and in comparison to other state social protection interventions (Maunder et al., 2018: 48). However, these cost efficiencies are largely attributed to the scale of the intervention when compared to the previous situation in which multiple interventions were being implemented simultaneously. At the same time, Maunder et al. note that 'there is clearly room for further significant reductions in administrative costs' (ibid.: vii).

Moving forward, it will be important for interventions that do integrate with state implementation modalities with the objective of achieving efficiencies to closely monitor the extent to which integration actually leads to cost and time efficiencies, as well as monitoring potential challenges in terms of coverage.

Improving the well-being of affected communities

Humanitarian and development actors are present in forced displacement contexts to improve the lives of those affected by mass displacement. As such, finding ways to enhance the enjoyment of rights and the well-being of these populations is an imperative. Where there are concerns that alignment, integration or even inclusion may undermine the rights or well-being of affected communities (for example by reducing the adequacy of the support provided), regardless of the extent to which it achieves other objectives, humanitarian and development actors may take this into account in their decision-making. This was seen in Ukraine, for example, where

many international humanitarian actors opted not to work through or align with the state social protection system due to concerns that the value of the transfer would be too low to meet the needs of forcibly displaced people (Bailey and Agiss, 2016).

In Turkey, the ESSN initially aligned with the benefit value of the state social protection programme, but subsequent analysis found this was too low to meet refugees' needs (which are higher than those of hosts due to the challenges they face accessing livelihood opportunities, for example), and the value was increased. Similarly, with the Condition Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE), while the government's preference was for it to align with its own programme in terms of value, duration and frequency, analysis by UNICEF found that the value would be insufficient to meet the needs of refugee families with children so opted to align with the value of the ESSN instead (EC, 2019e). But trade-offs were made by UNICEF in regard to the CCTE programme by maintaining alignment in terms of conditions around school attendance, at the request of the Turkish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services (MoFSP), in spite of a recognition that this approach may not be the 'optimum' approach for meeting the needs of refugee children (Smith et al., 2018). UNICEF is closely monitoring these elements in order to inform the design of the CCTE – both for refugees and for citizens (ibid.).

The impact of inclusion and integration approaches on social cohesion is increasingly a policy priority. While the evidence is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this paper, international actors increasingly recognise that failure to align or integrate can have an impact on social tensions. For example, achieving greater social cohesion may be a motivating factor in the pursuit of integration or alignment. Humanitarian cash programmes in Jordan and Lebanon under the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (the 3RP) included both refugees and hosts with the clear objective of addressing the tensions that emerged when only refugees were included in humanitarian interventions – particularly in a context where state social protection programmes offered fewer benefits than humanitarian programmes (Guay, 2015). The Graduation Model adopted by UNHCR and the WFP programme in Ecuador also cover both hosts and refugees, partly to minimise resentment among locals towards refugees (Valli et al., 2018). Similarly, in Niger, UNHCR did not want to appear to give preferential treatment to refugees compared to the treatment received by nationals from their government, and therefore aligned the value of livelihoods and NFI+ interventions with state social assistance (KII).

A common challenge for humanitarian actors operating in low- and middle-income contexts will be keeping in mind the overall goal of inclusion, and that there will be changes in basic needs standards when going from humanitarian assistance and internationally financed standards to state systems, where standards may be lower. The pathway to inclusion means evolving away from purely humanitarian sources towards long-term funding through the state and considering wider social cohesion issues between host and forcibly displaced communities.

Box 8 International humanitarian Covid-19 responses for refugees and state responses: the example of Pakistan

UNHCR in Pakistan implemented a large-scale emergency cash transfer for the first time to meet the needs of refugees during the Covid-19 pandemic and aligned the benefit level with that provided by the state in the *Ehsaas Emergency Cash Transfer* intervention. However, the benefit amount of the state response was not set with refugees' needs in mind. This is particularly important when considering that refugees' needs had been identified as higher than those of nationals because they often worked as daily wage labourers and lost their income during the lockdown. KII respondents considered the benefit amount to be inadequate to meet the minimum needs of refugees.

Source: Hagen-Zanker and Both, 2021

In some instances, in particular where the international response adopts a common and coordinated area-based approach, some international humanitarian actors will target refugees and host communities, so that the needs of both are addressed, thus in some respects complementing state provision. This approach is adopted in contexts of mass displacement, where the state social protection system lacks capacity to absorb such large numbers of refugees (Valli et al., 2018), such as in Ecuador, Lebanon and Jordan.

Transitioning refugee management

Concerns over changing refugee management processes may be relevant for both government and humanitarian actors. For humanitarian actors and donors, one aspect of decision-making may be the extent to which they are relinquishing their control over resources and operational direction. Questions might be raised over how inclusion or alignment may impact impartiality and independence. In East Africa, for example, humanitarian donors and agencies, while recognising the significant role played by states in hosting refugees, had been 'hesitant to entrust refugee management to national governments' or to channel their resources through the state over concerns about corruption (Crawford and O'Callaghan, 2019: 6).

There may also be concerns around the identity and mandate of humanitarians in a protracted displacement context where there is also a need for structural development support. For example, in Turkey there is unresolved tension over whether the primary objective of the ESSN is providing needs-based humanitarian assistance, or institutionalising assistance to refugees within the national system. This raises questions around the role of humanitarian actors, given that working within the national system is often the role of traditional development actors. At the same time, governments may fear relinquishing control over refugee affairs where those issues are dealt with in a centralised, specific refugee department, as is the case in Kenya, to

separate ministries responsible for social protection. As Crawford and O'Callaghan (2019) note, the department responsible for refugees, the 'Refugee Affairs Secretariat', has been reluctant to decentralise refugee management (something they are responsible for across government). They may have vested interests in maintaining control of refugee management or may have concerns that refugee protection will be deprioritised in other departments.

4.3 Feasibility of integration approaches

Aligning or integrating humanitarian cash programmes with state social protection systems requires a degree of maturity in the social protection system – including the range of programmes, their coverage and adequacy, and the robustness of implementing processes and modalities.

Considerations in contexts with nascent social protection systems

Where there is limited or no state provision that can effectively meet the needs of the displaced population, there are limited opportunities for alignment or integration. However, the absence of suitable programmes to integrate international humanitarian or development interventions does not necessarily preclude actors from potentially aligning or complementing state provision. Instead, this can be used as a justification to implement interventions that aim to contribute to strengthening state social protection provision. The implementation of interventions that strengthen state social protection provision, supported by international financing, while not in the short term enabling alignment or integration, can be highly strategic in the longer term; as Mitchell argues: 'investment in social protection systems is highly strategic for the management of protracted displacement in terms of supporting a transition out of humanitarian assistance and towards more sustainable solutions' (2018: 1). This is also reflective of the reality that these transitions are processes, and the economic inclusion of refugees and IDPs in state systems, and away from humanitarian aid, is likely to take place in phases, and may take considerable time and investment to reach a sustainable model.

The literature points to the multiple ways in which humanitarian interventions targeting displaced populations have been able to strengthen state social protection systems. In Lebanon, interventions implemented by UNICEF were initially set up largely in parallel to state systems as integrating with national systems was not feasible operationally (Smith, 2017). However, international humanitarian actors and donors have invested heavily in strengthening components of the state social protection system (Bastagli et al., 2019). Similarly, in Jordan, international humanitarian and development actors have committed to support the state to strengthen and enhance the state social protection system so that it is better able to absorb the additional Syrian refugee population.[8] UNICEF has begun a collaboration with the government to improve

8 See Supporting the future of Syria and the Region Brussels Conference II 24-25 April 2018 Joint partnership paper Conference document.

administrative processes around the National Aid Fund (NAF) (Smith, 2017). One interesting example of system strengthening is where humanitarian interventions have set up implementation modalities that have – or could be – adopted by states to strengthen their own delivery processes. In Jordan, for example, UNHCR, alongside the World Bank and other UN partners, works closely with NAF providing IT equipment, including 300 tablets and printers worth over 200,000JODs ($282,000), to enable NAF staff to register additional vulnerable Jordanians and expand the national assistance scheme (UNHCR, 2019c). Similarly, in Georgia, the state has now integrated a 'one-card platform' which was initially designed and used by international agencies in their humanitarian approaches.

Box 9 International humanitarian actors and the national social protection response to Covid-19 in Jordan

While refugees – with limited exceptions – are not included in the core state social protection response to Covid-19 in Jordan, the government implemented responses use some mechanisms established by international humanitarian and development actors. The NAF used UNICEF's RapidPro communication system in its social protection programme to support daily wage workers. Set up for the Hajati cash transfer programme, RapidPro enables two-way communication between UNICEF and programme recipients. The tool was used to reach new recipients of the emergency programme, validate their identity and confirm whether they had existing mobile money wallets where emergency transfers could be paid. Through this mechanism, the government was able to support 62,000 daily workers eligible under the first batch of Takaful II payments to set up mobile wallets. The NAF is now rolling out e-wallets in other interventions (such as bread subsidies).

The government is also using the Management Information System (MIS) system – designed with the technical and financial support of UNICEF, WFP, the World Bank and UNHCR based on their own prior experience – for the Takaful programme. The targeting of Covid-19 response interventions also relies on the unified registry of citizens created prior to the pandemic with the support of the World Bank.

Source: Hagen-Zanker and Both, 2021; Albaddawi et al., 2020

Considerations in mature social protection systems

Adaptations of project design and implementation modalities

Even where systems are robust and alignment or integration is considered feasible, adjustment to design and implementation modalities will inevitably be required to ensure the effective inclusion and coverage of the forcibly displaced. Adjustments are needed for a wide variety of reasons: to

be able to accommodate the needs and vulnerabilities of displaced populations, which differ from those of citizens; where availability of information is limited; or due to restrictions imposed by the contexts in which these interventions are implemented (EC, 2019a; 2019e; Smith, 2017).

Adjustments may be required when aligning or integrating with targeting and enrolment processes, particularly where targeting criteria used by state programmes are not adequate to identify the needs of refugees, or where refugees may face barriers to registering through existing systems. In Turkey, adjustments were made by humanitarian agencies to the initial targeting criteria of the ESSN programme, which was broadly in line with the state programme. This was in order to maximise the inclusion of vulnerable households into the ESSN programme (EC, 2019e). In turn, programme designers 'implicitly assumed that every refugee can obtain the documents required to apply' (Maunder et al., 2018: VI), but in practice refugee households faced challenges in the registration process with the Directorate General for Migration Management due to backlogs.

In turn, using state registry lists to undertake programme targeting will likely require some adjustments. What registries are displaced people on (if any)? Will further adaptations be needed to add displaced people, depending on what kind of registry it is (some registries are intended to be comprehensive of the whole population, while others only include details of people pre-identified as 'vulnerable' or poor)? Questions also arise around how to respond if the criteria for eligibility are different for displaced people. This might require new data fields if the registry is to be used as an eligibility check. For unregistered displaced communities, a common challenge can be a lack of disaggregation according to legal status, lack of monitoring and state policies not to provide this data, all of which can make it difficult to know what type of social protection benefits displaced populations have access to.

In Yemen UNICEF initially drew on the SWF recipient list but had to make modifications to the targeting criteria in order to ensure all vulnerable groups were included (EC, 2019a). In Ukraine the International Organization for Migration (IOM) initially drew on the registration lists of the Ministry of Social Protection to target its intervention, but this did not include data about non-registered IDPs (Bailey and Agiss, 2016). IOM therefore had to conduct its own verification process. In many contexts it is difficult to identify which population groups have access to what types of social protection benefits for a variety of reasons linked to lack of disaggregation according to legal status, lack of monitoring or government policy not to provide such data.

Adjustments may also be required around data sharing systems, as there are significant concerns over the safety and confidentiality of sharing personal information about displaced people between institutions. In Turkey, one bottleneck to effective implementation of the ESSN was the availability of data and legislation around data sharing. The Turkish government has strict regulations around data sharing, and access for non-governmental actors is heavily protected. WFP and UNICEF were reliant on agreements between the government and the TRC but could not access personal information about refugee households (Smith et al., 2018).

Adjustments may also be required for interventions to be able to effectively meet the needs of the forcibly displaced. This is particularly important as these are typically different to those of hosts in light of the different rights they might hold (particularly around access to livelihoods), the locations where they live, their access to documentation or challenges around registration and data.

Box 10 Alignment in the Covid-19 response in Pakistan

At the onset of the pandemic the Pakistani government requested for UNHCR to expand the coverage of its Ehsaas Emergency Cash Transfer (EEC) programme to refugee populations by providing them with a cash transfer. Thus, UNHCR implemented – for the first time – a large-scale cash transfer that mirrors the EEC in many respects. First, in terms of value and duration, the transfer provides a one-time lump sum of 12,000 rupees to meet recipients' needs for four months, in line with the state provision. UNHCR also aimed to partly align its eligibility criteria with that of the EEC. Finally, the implementation of the UNHCR cash transfer partly matches that of the EEC as it is paid through urgent money orders by the post office, the same mechanism used by the state for recipients without a bank account.

However, UNHCR could not align with the EEC identification and registration mechanisms, as refugees are not included in the national social registry used by the state programme for targeting. Thus, UNHCR relied on community leaders to conduct outreach with affected communities in partnership with the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees to identify and register recipients.

Source: Hagen-Zanker and Both, 2021

Finally, adjustments may be required due to the nature of the context in which these interventions operate. Given the constraints faced by international actors in channelling funds through state institutions in Yemen, adaptations were required whereby payments were only made through one of the state payment providers (the Al Amal Microfinance Bank) (ibid.).

Box 11 Conflict contexts: the example of Yemen

In Yemen, full inclusion – or working directly through the state institutions – was not a feasible approach for international actors. Donors faced internal institutional limitations on what they could disburse to Yemeni state institutions, considering the ongoing conflict and the role of the government therein. For example, the World Bank worked through UNICEF and the United Nations Development Programe (UNDP) to implement cash transfers and cash for work programmes because they would not make disbursements to government authorities active in conflict (Al Ahmadi and De Silva, 2018). Similarly, UNICEF could not make payments directly through the SWF for the ECTP because of donor conditions. These donor conditions also meant they were unable to make payments through the post office (the main tool used by SWF) and used the AMB instead.

State capacity to manage integrated approaches

In addition to reviewing design and implementation modalities and making adjustments to ensure effective provision for the forcibly displaced, it is also important to ascertain the *capacity* of state institutions to manage integrated approaches. For example, in some instances UN organisations were concerned that an integrated approach would overwhelm the system. But integrated approaches can also contribute to strengthening state systems to address capacity barriers.

In Ukraine, UNDP and WFP conducted an analysis of the national system to understand whether it would be an effective approach to respond to the displacement and conflict situation and found that the system was already stretched and would not be able to take on new caseloads (Bailey and Agiss, 2016).

In Yemen, the World Bank noted that the social protection system (and the SWF and Social Fund for Development (SFD) in particular) had 'highly capable local institutions with their proven track record' (Al-Ahmadi and De Silva, 2018: 11) which allowed the Bank to continue to operate despite the 'highly volatile environment'. Capacity strengthening to meet the additional requirements of covering forcibly displaced populations was a factor. For example, UNICEF has been training SWF social welfare officers in data monitoring and targeting (Smith, 2017).

In the case of the ESSN in Turkey, Maunder et al. (2018: vi) found 'no evidence of assessments being undertaken of the capacity of implementing institutions and their operational systems for delivering social assistance'. ECHO had not conducted a feasibility study on integration ex-ante, and during the roll-out of the ESSN some state institutions became stretched by the additional requirements of the integration approach, and capacity gaps became apparent. This was caused by pressures to scale-up the ESSN intervention quickly and reach ambitious coverage

targets, which prevented international humanitarian actors investing in capacity strengthening and preparatory studies on the ability of state institutions to cope with the increased caseload (Maunder et al., 2018).

Implementing partners in Turkey were also heavily involved in strengthening – or complementing – state provision to ensure effective roll-out of the intervention. WFP had to take on a greater role than initially anticipated, thus blurring responsibilities between the different agencies involved (Maunder et al., 2018). In turn, both WFP and TRC strengthened the capacity of the state to take over the implementation of the ESSN (Maunder et al., 2018).

Pre-existing working relations between international humanitarian and development actors and the state

A final factor that appears to increase the feasibility of alignment or integration is the level of familiarity of international humanitarian and development actors with the state system and pre-existing working relations. For example, in Nigeria, where no instances of alignment or inclusion were found, Sterk and Issaka (2019: 41) note that 'humanitarian organisations on the ground often have limited information on policies, plans and programmes of state and federal government'. This presents a key barrier to the intensification of collaboration required for aligned or integrated approaches.

In Yemen the social policy unit of UNICEF 'had an existing working relationship with the SWF, which meant that UNICEF already had a good understanding of the strengths and limitations of these national systems' (EC, 2019a: 8). This sped up the process of discussing how UNICEF and the SWF were going to work together. The same applies with regard to the World Bank in the implementation of the Yemen Emergency Response Programme, where 'maintaining a collaborative and ongoing dialogue with the legitimate government of Yemen, including during program suspension, allowed for rapid reengagement when the opportunity arose' (Al-Ahmadi and de Silva, 2018: 9). In Niger, UNHCR had an established relationship with the *Céllule des Filets Sociaux*, and ongoing conversations were 'a cornerstone for setting the amounts for all the grants' and allowed for joint decision-making (Grootenhuis and Calo, 2016).

Where in the past forcibly displaced populations had been served by international assistance substituting for the state, with the vulnerability and capacity of this population largely unknown by line ministries, part of the new 'joint' actions on alignment or inclusion include merging international and domestic resources behind a common approach. This common approach is evidenced in the design and implementation of the ESSN in Turkey, which was the result of close partnership between WFP, TRC, ECHO and the state, and the government's leadership role in the response and its willingness to engage with partners is identified as a key factor enabling scale-up of cash activities (EC, 2019e). The literature also highlights that government preference influenced the decision to integrate implementation, as the MoFSP expressed a desire for the

CCTE to be broadly implemented through state systems (Smith, 2017). In Jordan, citizens were included in the UNICEF Hajati programme (which had previously targeted refugee children) following government requests.

5 The impacts of integration approaches on affected communities

This chapter sets out what the literature says regarding the impacts of different integration approaches on displaced and host communities. We focus on three hypotheses (see Box 3). These are the working hypotheses of the research and were therefore developed as part of the wider project.

5.1 The impact of integration approaches on social cohesion

(i) Definitions and measurement of social cohesion

With displacement increasingly urban, forcibly displaced communities are now living alongside local communities, overwhelmingly in contexts experiencing high levels of poverty and economic vulnerability. This can lead to economic competition over services and resources, which may increase social tensions between the two communities. Achieving improved cohesion between host and displaced communities has therefore escalated as a priority for all responders to a displacement crisis, in particular given how, over time, social tensions can progress to discrimination and violence. Yet, research on social cohesion between the displaced and their host communities, in particular in low- and middle-income contexts, is limited, resulting in a lack of understanding of the factors that contribute to social tensions and how to improve social cohesion.

There is no common understanding of what is meant by social cohesion in a forced displacement context (de Berry, 2018). As a result, there are numerous constructs of social cohesion in the literature, both how to conceptualise it and how to measure it. Box 12 summarises definitions from the literature.

There is weak analysis of the impacts of forced displacement on social dynamics between displaced and host communities. This includes gaps in the assessment of the historical and political context, including historical events, sectarian and political identities and cultural and geographic profile, which can all impact cohesion, as well as influencing how societies and communities deal with social tensions and breakdowns in cohesion (de Berry, 2018). There is also a lack of evidence of the impact of programmes over the longer term (ibid.), and this includes cash programmes where there has been alignment, integration or inclusion.

Box 12 Definitions of social cohesion in the literature

The literature identifies two dimensions of social cohesion: horizontal and vertical, and subjective and objective (Tänzler, 2018). The horizontal aspect focuses on relationships between individuals and between groups. The vertical dimension focuses on the relationship between individuals and the state. The subjective aspect focuses on the perceived sense of inclusion or belonging to a group and the manifestations of attachment to that group. The objective dimension is the actual number of relationships an individual has (Grimalda and Tanzler, 2018, citing Bollen and Hoyle, 1990, and Williams and Solano, 1983).

Burchi et al. (2020: 2) describe social cohesion as 'the vertical and horizontal relations among members of society and the state as characterised by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good'.

Babajanian (2012) sees social cohesion as relational and encompassing the nature and quality of those relations, both interpersonal and social, as well as how things are distributed and the nature of that distribution.

REACH (2014: 7) defines social cohesion in the context of the MENA region as 'a perceived measure of trust and level of tension between members of community groups as well as between community members and local institutions'. The main elements include 'social relations, interactions and ties; building trust and understanding between communities; reducing community inequalities; and adopting a holistic strategy on livelihoods, public services and other socio-economic interventions to improve community participation'.

Guay (2015: 5), also in the MENA context, identifies social cohesion as 'the nature and set of relationships between individuals and groups and between those groups and institutions that govern them in a particular environment'.

Below, we set out the existing evidence on the impact of inclusion/alignment on social cohesion outcomes. Where evidence is lacking, we draw on other literature, including literature that explores social cohesion in displaced contexts more broadly.

(ii) Impact of integration approaches on social cohesion in contexts of forced displacement

A large part of the literature presenting evidence on the impact of integration approaches on social cohesion refers to international humanitarian programmes **that cover both hosts and forcibly displaced populations**. Evidence suggests that one way these programmes impact social cohesion is by creating new and more opportunities for hosts and forcibly displaced to

interact or gather socially. In Jordan, for example, a study of cash for work programmes covering both hosts and refugees found they had a 'moderately positive effect on social cohesion' between Jordanian and Syrian participants (Loewe et al., 2020: 85). The authors note that this results largely from the fact that host and refugee communities worked together during these programmes, which enabled them to speak more, work together towards a common goal and take part in leisure activities after work. However, the authors also highlight that the impact is 'moderate' because 'their mutual trust was already at quite a high level even before the CfW [cash for work] programmes were launched in Jordan'. However, the effect on both refugee and host relationships with the state ('vertical trust') was less clear. One assumption was that despite being funded by the Jordanian state as well as international donors, respondents felt that international donors were responsible for the programme (Loewe et al., 2020: 22). In Ecuador, a KII noted that covering both hosts and refugees with the Graduation Model reduced friction, as communities interacted more and worked together, emphasising the ability of alignment to increase opportunities for host and displaced populations to interact and meet.

Another channel through which coverage of both hosts and refugees in a programme can impact relations is by improving the perception of fairness. A study by Berg et al. (2013) of the WFP programme which covered both hosts and refugees in Ecuador found that 'the strategy of including vulnerable Ecuadorians in WFP's assistance likely contributed to mitigating tensions between local people and refugees and supported the inclusion of Colombian refugees into Ecuadorian communities' (Berg et al., 2013: 86). Conversely, there were tensions where poor Ecuadorians were not targeted for assistance (ibid.).

Another study of the same WFP programme in Ecuador does not seem to identify the specific channel through which integration impacts social cohesion. Valli et al. (2018) find that the programme led to improvements in social cohesion among Colombian refugees but not among Ecuadorian participants. Among Colombian refugees, the positive impacts were on 'enhanced personal agency, attitudes accepting diversity, confidence in institutions, and social participation', but there were no identified impacts on trust in individuals or freedom from discrimination (Valli et al., 2018: 142). The authors were not able to identify the specific channels through which these positive impacts (among one of the two groups) were achieved but hypothesise that this may be due to 'joint targeting of Colombians and Ecuadorians, the interaction between nationalities at monthly nutrition sessions, and the messaging around social inclusion by programme implementers' (ibid.: 128).

Evidence **from other alignment, integration or inclusion approaches** points in three different directions. First are examples where the integration approach is not identified specifically as having impacted social cohesion. For example, a study of the Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance (MPCA) programme implemented by WFP in Lebanon does not appear to identify the integration approach (alignment of transfer value) as affecting social cohesion. According to the study, the channels through which the MPCA affected relations was by providing opportunities for interaction either at ATMs, as the MPCA was paid close to the payment date of government

salaries, which resulted in tensions, or by enabling some recipients to visit markets and interact with hosts there; enabling refugees to repay debts or pay rent on time, reducing tensions and increasing trust; or enabling access to credit in shops by increasing shop owners' confidence in their ability to repay (Samuels et al., 2020). In turn, the programme appears to have affected perceptions of fairness, but again it is the receipt of support – and not the specific value of that support – that is important. The authors find that some hosts considered it unfair that Syrians received support, while the perception is that hosts do not (Samuels et al., 2020). While for some this translated into a 'negative feeling' against refugees, for others the anger was directed more towards the Lebanese government (ibid.). In turn, some hosts perceived that the financial support received allowed some refugees to accept jobs with lower wages, creating competition in the labour market.

Second are cases where the integration approach appears to be having negative effects. In Turkey, Maunders et al. (2018) suggest that the integration approach has negative impacts on social cohesion. Some hosts expressed negative reactions towards the programme and pointed to community tensions due to the misperception that the programme is government-funded, and because of 'increased competition for services', such as banks, the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) and the Turking National Identity Card (NUFUS) (ibid.) – which are the connection points where the ESSN integrates with the state system. Thus, the integration of the ESSN with government programmes seems to have a negative effect on hosts' perception of the programme. In the case of Azerbaijan, the monthly allowance provided to IDPs caused resentment and jealousy among hosts against IDPs because poverty rates, unemployment levels and access to basic services are similar for IDPs and hosts, so providing assistance based on status – rather than vulnerability – led to tensions and was considered unfair by hosts (Gureyeva-Aliyeva and Huseynov, 2011).

Finally are examples where the integration approach seems to have had a more clear positive impact. In Georgia, the IDP benefit implemented by the state seems to have contributed to vertical trust (i.e. trust in government). Qualitative research finds that, as a result of receiving that support, some recipients reported feeling that their plight had not been forgotten and that their 'situation is of concern to the government' (Funke and Bolkvadze, 2018: 13). The programme was therefore identified as having symbolic value. In Yemen, upholding existing programme implementation modalities in the Youth Employability and Retention Programme (YERP) had positive outcomes, as the YERP was found to promote social cohesion through transparent targeting and inclusive participation in the selection and implementation of public works projects (Al-Ahmadi and de Silva, 2018).

However, it is important to note that levels of social cohesion are affected by a much wider range of factors than just the support received from government or international humanitarian actors (Fajth et al., 2019).

5.2 The impact of integration approaches on economic agency

There is currently a concerted effort by key stakeholders to identify successful models to promote the economic agency of forcibly displaced populations, for instance by strengthening financial inclusion, contributing to their self-reliance and diversifying income-generating activities. Examples include providing support through mobile money or bank accounts; providing livelihood grants; or adopting a 'graduation model' drawn from development approaches.

However, this review identified no studies that explicitly assessed the manner in which integration approaches themselves had affected or mediated impacts on economic agency. While there is evidence on the impacts of programmes adopting an integration approach on economic agency, the causal link between the integration approach and outcomes is not explored.

Below we briefly outline the broader impacts on economic agency of programmes that adopt an integration approach.

- In **Jordan**, UNHCR cash assistance – which covers both hosts and refugees – was found to have little effect in increasing opportunities or the likelihood of adult employment, largely due to the limited transfer value combined with the need to prioritise expenditure on basic needs and barriers to the legal right to work (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017).
- In **Lebanon**, some refugees in receipt of WFP's MPCA fared better in terms of repaying debts and accessing credit and loans compared to those who were not on the programme (Bastagli et al., 2020).
- In **Turkey** Maunders et al. (2018) found several impacts on recipients' economic agency. Recipients were able to prioritise their spending in productive ways – such as spending on transport to seek livelihood opportunities in urban contexts. The study found a significant shift in recipient households away from reliance on unskilled labour 'and an increase in reliance on skilled labour' (ibid.: 32).
- In **Niger**, about half of recipients of the livelihood grant implemented by UNHCR will be able to support themselves after they leave the scheme, although '35 percent of households were unsure they could manage after the end of the grant and about 15 percent said they would not be able to cope when the grant ended' (Grootenhuis and Malo, 2016: 20). In particular, recipients of the livelihood grant said that they had been able to diversify their productive assets and develop their income-generating activities.
- In **Pakistan**, an OCHA evaluation of FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) support to IDPs and returnees in North Waziristan found that this was not sufficient to allow people to make durable investments, but only to meet basic needs (UNOCHA, 2017).

There is an urgent need for more rigorous evidence to be able to draw conclusions on the benefits and drawbacks of integration approaches on economic agency. This will be one of the areas of focus of the three country case studies of this project, but evidence from a wider range of contexts will also be important.

5.3 The impact of integration approaches on the ability of recipients to meet basic needs and ensure basic protection

There is limited research seeking to understand the causal links between integration approaches and the impact of programmes on recipients' ability to meet basic needs or on protection outcomes. We report on those findings below.

Basic needs

There is some evidence to suggest that alignment of transfer values with those of national programmes as an integration strategy can affect whether an intervention meets the basic needs of forcibly displaced people. For example, in **Turkey** the ESSN had originally aligned its transfer value with that of the national cash transfer programme. But this was a point of contention, as 'humanitarian actors argued that the needs of refugees were greater than those of poor Turks' (Maunders et al., 2018: 9). This seems to have been confirmed by market monitoring, which found that 'the initial transfer value was insufficient to meet basic needs' (ibid.: 30). The value of the transfer was subsequently reviewed and increased – and thus de-aligned from that of the government programme. A study by the World Bank found that the amended transfer value (TL 120) 'is sufficient to significantly raise beneficiaries' budgets, measured as a proportion of pre-transfer expenditure levels' (Facundo Cuevas et al., 2019: 35). Recipient households were able to repay debts (while debts rose among non-recipients), and were less likely to use negative livelihood coping strategies (such as taking their children out of school) compared to the pre-transfer period (ibid.; Maunders et al., 2018).

In **Lebanon**, the MPCA implemented by WFP – the value of which aligns with state programmes – is found to have mixed results. Recipients of the programme with school-age children stated that the scheme supported them in meeting the costs of keeping their children in school (including travel costs and school supplies), while some households who had been 'discontinued' from the programme had to withdraw their children from school (Bastagli et al., 2020). In turn, the MPCA is considered to play a 'critical role' in supporting households to meet their basic needs (ibid.: 12). Yet the transfer 'is seen to be insufficient', particularly among larger households and those with health-related expenditures (ibid.: 12).

In other contexts, it is unclear to what extent the integration approach itself affected outcomes on basic needs. For example, in **Pakistan** OCHA's assessment of the impact of the cash programmes implemented by the FDMA on both returnees and IDPs in North Waziristan found that the support alleviated stress, enabled recipients to purchase and eat their preferred food, enhanced access to medicine and schooling, covered rent and transportation, and enabled the repayment of debts (UN OCHA, 2017). But the study does not specify the extent to which the integration approach led to such outcomes. In turn, the study on cash assistance in Mangaize camp in **Niger** found that each of the interventions (including the NFI+ and the livelihood grant implemented by UNHCR, but also a non-aligned food voucher) 'supplemented a specific household need', with

the overall combination of support helping 'families to prioritise their needs and enhanced their respective activities' (Grootenhuis and Calo, 2016: 18). Here, it appears to be the combination of programmes – rather than the value of each programme's transfers – that is identified as driving these outcomes.

In **Lebanon**, one study found children with disabilities to be at risk of exclusion from the UNICEF Winter Cash Programme.[9] The study found that the programme did not take sufficient account of the needs of these children (Morsy, 2017: 36, cited by Bastagli at al., 2019). These challenges of scale and availability of financing to meet needs have been exacerbated by rising prices for food, services and goods over the course of the Syrian displacement crisis, leaving levels of assistance inadequate to address basic needs (Kukrety et al., 2016, cited by Bastagli et al., 2019).

Protection

In **Turkey**, the integration approach does appear to have affected the ability of programme implementers to respond to recipients' protection needs. While a formal ESSN referrals system was established in late 2017 and staff are trained to identify protection risks, referrals to specialist providers often take time to action, with key gaps identified in referrals to women's shelters, child protection including services for unaccompanied children, specialist health services and gaps in the provision of special needs education (Maunder et al., 2020: iii). In addition, while UNHCR was expected to staff protection desks of the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF)[10] to be able to 'assess the protection needs of applicants', this was not implemented because of government 'restrictions on placing United Nations staff inside government offices' (p. 15). As Maunder et al. (2020) note: 'There is an opportunity to better link protection cases with the SASF discretionary allowance. Few protection partners consulted knew about the SASF discretionary allowance or how it works' (p. iii). Similarly, according to Cetinoglu and Yilmaz (2020), a lack of focus on protection was exacerbated by the challenges that faced the EU Commission in getting approval for the involvement of INGOs at the funding stage of the programme. For example, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies 'did not agree to authorise INGOs to carry out certain key protection activities namely case management and household visits' (ibid.: 616). Indeed, 'the Commission had to cancel four projects with a total budget of €14 million, even though they were considered relevant for funding to address the pressing need for protection of the refugee

9 The programme is designed through a 'collaborative process between UNICEF, National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP), Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), and the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the Prime Minister and the Lebanese Presidency of the Council of Ministers' (Bastagli et al. 2019: 40).

10 'The SASF discretionary allowance serves as a complementary mechanism to reach vulnerable households who may be excluded by the programme's demographic targeting criteria. It was introduced in November 2018 with the objective of decreasing exclusion errors and started to be implemented in December 2018. The scheme enables each SASF office to select, on a discretionary basis, a small number of vulnerable applicants who were not eligible under the established criteria, to be included as ESSN beneficiaries. Each SASF office is entitled to a quota of allowances calculated as 5% of total applications received by that SASF in October 2018' (Maunder et al 2020: i).

population' (European Court of Auditors, 2018: 30). These elements suggest that UNHCR and other partners lost independence of action as the Turkish government did not allow it to conduct the same level of protection oversight it would normally have conducted for refugees. Such lack of independence may be a trade-off when it comes to integration.

Maunders et al. (2018: 9) note at the design stage of the ESSN 'limited analysis of gender and protection issues', alongside 'limited specialized professional resources available at the start of the programme' (ibid.: 8). Possibly as a result, the literature identifies missed opportunities by UN agencies and NGOs to advocate for the inclusion of links to complementary protection services at the design stage of the programme (ibid.: 8). In turn, the 'referral of protection cases by the ESSN to other service providers developed slowly and remained inconsistent' (ibid.: vi). This was all the more problematic given that the ESSN replaced other existing programmes that used cash as an entry point to protection work – resulting in a loss of proactive monitoring of the protection concerns of vulnerable refugees.

The integration of targeting approaches may have led to the exclusion of specific vulnerable groups. The programme had a standard design for all refugees (including refugees granted both temporary protection and international protection, male and female, different age groups and those with disabilities). This targeting strategy fell short as it did not consider the rights and specific needs of different groups as its vulnerability criteria were not broken down by specific vulnerabilities (e.g. young boys or unmarried girls), and were not 'flexible nor broad enough to cover all those with protection needs' (Cetinoglu and Yilmaz, 2020: 618). As a result, in 2017, UNHCR Turkey recognised the need to deliver monthly cash assistance to groups with specific needs that were not covered by the ESSN. UNHCR are providing cash support for a minimum of two years, to these groups.

In other contexts, the research on impacts on protection outcomes does not clearly bring out a causal link between the integration approach and the outcomes identified. In **Lebanon**, Bastagli et al. (2020) review protection outcomes for Syrian refugees of the MPCA implemented by WFP. The findings appear positive. The authors find that some recipients noted that receipt of the support was linked with a decrease in early marriage. Receipt of the MPCA is also associated with a reduction in tensions and violence in the household (mainly related to reduced financial concerns), and reduces refugees' reliance on exploitative work, as some refugees in receipt of the assistance are able to turn down such work (ibid.). Concerns have however been raised over the distance recipients have to travel to collect the assistance at ATMs and the length of the lines (ibid.).

In **Niger**, one study found that UNHCR programmes implemented in Mangaize camp had some negative impacts on protection and safety. Here, the mode of delivery – using cash – resulted in an increase in feelings of insecurity 'due to the presence of banditry in the area' (Grootenhuis and Calo, 2016: 21). These left recipients feeling that they had to spend their money almost immediately, which in turn may have knock-on effects on their ability to meet basic needs (i.e. by

waiting for prices to fall), or their ability to make savings. While this suggests payment modality can impact protection and feelings of safety, there is no documented evidence on how alignment or integration around payment modality has impacted on protection.

6 Conclusion

Most assistance to displaced persons is designed and implemented in parallel to state social protection. However, there is evidence of more alignment and integration happening in situations of mass forced displacement. For example in the Syrian displacement response across the Middle East, an awareness of social cohesion impacts between host and refugee communities and host governments requirements to include vulnerable host communities has increased efforts to align and integrate.

We found publicly available literature with details of integration approaches being adopted between humanitarian cash programmes and state social protection systems in around a quarter of the countries we reviewed. We also found that efforts are increasing, with more publicly available evidence being published towards the end of our 10-year timeframe, in particular regarding the Syrian refugee response, where we found the most literature on integration approaches. This was a rare example of a crisis of mass displacement across middle-income states, where governments had functioning state systems and aid agencies were not permitted to establish parallel systems for refugees alone, but were required also to respond to the needs of vulnerable host communities. Even so, the Syria response shows that humanitarian agencies are making efforts to align and integrate with state systems, rather than create parallel systems.

This is not to say, however, that integration approaches are not without challenges. Alignment or integration is never straightforward. Adjustments will always be needed because of the specific needs of the displaced. It is critical to understand the protection needs of the forcibly displaced, which distinguishes this area from other work on shock-responsive social protection.

Important questions remain inadequately addressed in the literature. Inquiries are needed as to what the outcomes are for the displaced as a result of alignment or inclusion in state social protection systems and what impacts decision-making around integration approaches and how can it be improved. Yet understanding the answers to these questions are central to policy and to implementation.

Evidence gaps need to be addressed, including improving understanding of how integration approaches can support state social protection systems and the impact on outcomes for affected people (for example, on better outcomes for the displaced, improved social cohesion, greater inclusion of the displaced by hosting states or greater efficiency of aid). Expanding the evidence base is crucial to inform policy-making, and to assess if and how integration approaches may benefit displaced populations, as well as identifying situations where it may not be in their best interests (e.g. where further system strengthening of the state social protection system is required, or where a government is the perpetrator of abuses against an IDP group). The wider research project, of which this paper is part, will seek to address this evidence gap with empirical

work in Greece, Colombia and Cameroon, which will include research on the impact of integration approaches and inclusion in state social protection systems on displaced populations. But more is needed from other contexts and about other types of integration approaches.

The debate to date has not been about inclusion, i.e. the extent to which social protection is a vehicle for integrating the forcibly displaced into societies, economies and the labour market. For example, the World Bank's IDA18 has promoted the inclusion of displaced people in state social protection programmes, but literature does not discuss the extent of ownership by hosting countries, rather than inclusion being driven by international financing, such as from the World Bank.

In our literature review, we found no context where refugees enjoyed full access to the host state's social protection systems. There is an absence of literature on the displaced and social insurance schemes with some but still limited literature on access to social assistance programmes for IDPs – for example in Nigeria and Eastern European countries – and for refugees mainly in IDA18 Refugee Sub-Window countries. Most of the available literature focuses on technical alignment measures rather than how to achieve overall inclusion of the displaced in national systems.

Access to social insurance programmes may have advantages over social assistance in that it is potentially more financially sustainable and may reduce social tensions (entitlements are based on contributions, which may be perceived as fairer). There are, however, significant barriers to inclusion, including that access to decent employment is closed to refugees in many contexts. Another challenge in many of the countries under review is the high level of informal work (both among hosts and forcibly displaced) and thereby limited coverage of social insurance schemes. There is a need for more research to explore access to social insurance programmes for the displaced and links to labour market access in particular for refugees. At the same time, it is important to recognise that social assistance for those unable to work (people with disabilities, the elderly, etc.) will always be required.

To date, the debate has not been about inclusion, reflected in the lack of attention to outcomes for the forcibly displaced. Moreover, the literature is almost entirely silent on the extent to which states use their social protection systems to support displaced people, even with the backing of international financing, including decision-making processes, either from the perspective of governments or humanitarian actors. In future, literature should document decision-making processes to enable a better understanding of the opportunities and barriers for inclusion and integration of the displaced into social protection programmes.

A lack of access to social protection for forcibly displaced people should be a priority for policy makers and practitioners focused on responding to forced displacement. States have a long way to go to meet their commitments to leave no-one behind as set out in the Sustainable Development Goals, while much more investment is required if commitments to social and economic inclusion made in the Global Compact for Refugees are to be met. As the world moves

through and prepares to recover from the Covid-19 pandemic, those working on solutions for the forcibly displaced face a strategic moment to reinforce the importance of inclusion for all in terms of access to social protection.

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Appendix 1 Country case studies

Afghanistan

The conflict between Afghan security forces and the Taliban and Islamic State in Khorsan Province, along with recurring disasters, has displaced some 4.2 million people, alongside 72,000 refugees from Pakistan (IDMC and UNHCR data). The majority of those forcibly displaced live in urban settlements, although there are also some in rural areas or camp settings. The government's policy framework for IDPs and returnees focuses on the safe reintegration of these populations into the social fabric, promoting sustainable solutions through self-reliance (GOIRA, 2017).

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

There are roughly 42 INGOs and CSOs implementing cash programmes in Afghanistan (UNOCHA, 2021), but no alignment or integration with national social protection programmes was identified. The state, with support from the World Bank, implements two cash for work programmes that explicitly include IDPs. The two programmes are part of the state's Citizen's Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP), a wider project aimed at promoting inclusive development by providing cash for work activities that contribute to strengthening local infrastructure. The Maintenance and Construction Cash Grant (MCCG) provides cash for work mainly in rural areas, targeting 35% of the most vulnerable households in eligible communities (World Bank, 2017a). Communities in which the programme is implemented are identified based on the number of IDPs and returnees in each province and district (ibid.). IDPs are eligible if they meet the vulnerability criteria applied to locals; in addition, they must meet at least two of the following criteria: living with relatives; not having work opportunities in the past few weeks; and/or being food insecure in the past few weeks (ibid.). Recipients are targeted through community development approaches. According to World Bank status reports, as of May 2020 157,511 households had received assistance through the programme, of which 23,843 were IDPs or returnees (World Bank, 2020a). The Eshteghal Zaiee Karmondena (Ez-Kar) project – also to be implemented with World Bank support – will adopt a similar design approach as the MCCG, but is implemented in urban areas hosting large numbers of IDPs and returnees, in recognition of the influx of displaced populations to urban and peri-urban locations (World Bank, 2018b).

The MCCG is complemented by the Social Inclusion Grant (SIG), targeted at households with no able-bodied men (including female-headed households and people with disabilities) who are unable to participate in public works. This component of the CCAP also includes IDPs.

Participating households are eligible to receive food, cash or fuel raised in the community (World Bank, 2017a). By May 2020, 489 IDP or returnee households had been supported by the SIG intervention (World Bank, 2020a).

Azerbaijan

The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Kazabakh region between 1991 and 1992 led to mass displacement in Azerbaijan, and data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) indicates that there were still 651,000 IDPs in the country as of December 2019 (IDMC, 2019; IDMC data). In December 2018 some 344,000 IDPs were in need of housing, while 300,000 had been relocated to temporary accommodation (IDMC, 2019).

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

IDPs in Azerbaijan have a number of privileges based on national legislation, including exemptions from certain taxes and fees and support for education and access to healthcare (UN, 2015). The government implements a monthly subsistence allowance specifically for IDPs which reached some 550,000 IDPs in 2010 (Nazarov, 2012). The programme is implemented by the Government Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan; transfer values range from AZN33 to AZN60 ($19 to $35) (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Nations Office and other International Organisations, 2019).

Ecuador

In 2020, Ecuador hosted some 70,000 refugees, roughly 96% of whom had fled internal conflict in Colombia, as well as some 418,000 displaced Venezuelans (UNHCR data; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Migration of Ecuador, 2020). Almost 20,000 Colombian refugees fled to Ecuador between 1989 to 2006, with another 20,000 arriving in 2008 alone (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Migration of Ecuador, 2020). In turn, some 1.5 million displaced Venezuelans have arrived in Ecuador since 2016, although the vast majority continue their journey further south (UNHCR data). The country's Constitution makes several commitments to refugees and displaced populations, guaranteeing the full exercise of basic human rights and equal rights to health and education as nationals (UNHCR, 2011).

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

Refugees and asylum-seekers in Ecuador have the same rights to employment and employment protection as nationals, which also includes the right to access social security (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2016). Until recently, many refugees faced challenges in registering and enrolling in such schemes because the refugee scheme was not compatible with the National Civil Registry (ibid.). A study by the *Centro de Estudios de Población y Desarollo Social* found that 35% of registered refugees did

not receive the same social security benefits as their national counterparts (as cited in Zetter and Ruaudel, 2016). In 2017 the government extended guarantees to refugees and asylum-seekers, and enabled them to access Ecuadorian ID cards, (UNHCR, 2018a).

While the government has expressed willingness to include refugees and asylum- seekers in state programmes targeted at the poor, the fiscal situation in the country has not made this possible in the immediate term (International Conference of Social Protection in Contexts of Fragility and Forced Displacement, 2017).

Nevertheless, some humanitarian actors have closely aligned or integrated their interventions with state programmes. In 2015, UNHCR began implementation of the Graduation Model in Ecuador. The intervention was designed at HQ level and is implemented in some 10 countries, and includes a regular cash component complemented by support to households to develop livelihood activities, save and strengthen their entrepreneurial skills (UNHCR, 2016a). The intervention is drawn from developmental (rather than humanitarian) approaches, with the key objective of strengthening the resilience of refugees and forcibly displaced persons. In Ecuador, the programme primarily targets Colombian refugees, whose displacement situation has become protracted and where humanitarian approaches are not sustainable – although more recently displaced Venezuelans continue to require humanitarian support. The Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES) implements an intervention with a very similar model, the PAF. UNHCR has aligned and integrated its design and implementation with the PAF, although clear differences remain. The value of the transfer provided under the Graduation Model is aligned with the *Bono de Desarollo Humano* implemented by the state. The services provided by the Graduation Model integrate with the PAF, and some coaching activities are undertaken by the MIES. Referrals under the Graduation Model are made to state services to which refugees are entitled. Finally, the Graduation Model covers not only refugee populations, but also host families (KII). However, while families under the Graduation Model are on the programme for a period of 18 months and are eligible for income support for 12 months, enrolment in the PAF is not time-bound. Since the launch of the intervention in 2015, some 3,000 families have been supported (KII). The programme has been of interest to the government to extend coverage of the PAF, and the World Bank (which provides support to the PAF programme) is also keen to draw lessons on the 'exit strategy' of the Graduation Model to apply to the PAF (KII).

Between 2011 and 2014, WFP implemented a pilot intervention that used both cash and voucher modalities to test the differential impacts of each (WFP, 2014). The programme covered both vulnerable Colombian refugees and vulnerable Ecuadorian families as a means of meeting food needs without creating tensions between Colombian refugees and the Ecuadorean population (WFP, 2014). The transfer value was set to be roughly comparable to that provided under the state's *Bono de Desarrollo Humano* cash transfer programme, which at the time was $35 (the WFP programme was set at $40) (Hidrobo et al., 2012).

Georgia

As of December 2019, IDMC estimated that there were some 301,000 IDPs living in Azerbaijan displaced by the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the 1990s and in 2008 (IDMC, 2020). The majority of IDPs live around the conflict zone or close to urban centres (World Bank, 2016). The government of Georgia adopted a law to ensure the protection of displaced populations, which included social assistance from the state (Funke and Bolkvadze, 2018).

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

The Georgian government provides several forms of support targeted specifically at IDPs (Gabrichidze, 2013). IDPs are eligible for health insurance, which is typically poverty-targeted. The Social Service Agency (SSA) provides a status-based and poverty-targeted monthly allowance of GEL45 ($16) per person per month for IDPs with incomes below GEL1,250 ($440) (ibid.; UNICEF, 2016; World Bank, 2016). IDPs eligible for the regular poverty-targeted social assistance programme can apply, but have to forego the status-based allowance implemented by the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation, and Refugees (MRA) (Gabrichidze, 2013). The government had anticipated that state social support (the Targeted Social Assistance Programme (TSA)) would eventually replace status-based support for IDPs, but this has not happened. Indeed, the transfer value of the TSA is calculated based on family size, with smaller transfers to larger families, while the IDP allowance is provided per person and thus provides higher transfer values for larger families (Tarkhan-Mouravi, 2009). IDPs considered the TSA to be overly complicated (World Bank, 2016).

Since 2013, the state has provided IDPs with an allowance to cover communal expenses such as electricity, water or waste disposal, the value of which depends on IDPs' geographical location (ibid.). The MRA also provides a housing allowance for IDPs facing eviction (ibid.), and one-off financial assistance for IDPs in extremely difficult situations who require medical services, eligibility for which is assessed by the Commission for IDPs (UNICEF, 2016). IDP students are also eligible for state grants for education (Gabrichidze, 2013).

WFP's emergency cash transfer in response to the conflict in 2008 was implemented through the People's Bank of Georgia, which also delivers state-provided social protection programmes (WFP, 2012). WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR have adopted unified approaches to targeting, transfer size and payment mechanisms for their cash transfer programming, and the 'one-card platform' used by UN agencies has been incorporated into the state social protection system (ibid.).

IDA18 countries

Several countries have received technical assistance and funding through the World Bank's IDA18 Refugee Sub-Window, where resources have been partly channelled towards supporting the inclusion of refugees in state social assistance interventions.

According to UNCHR data, **Chad** hosts some 490,000 refugees, and there are just over 400,000 IDPs in the country. IDA18 resources are supporting the expansion of the state social protection programme to include 25,000 of the poorest refugee and host community households (roughly 1,250,000 individuals) in selected areas through the Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (World Bank, 2018c). The intervention is implemented by the *Céllule des Filets Sociaux*. Between 30% and 50% of recipients are expected to be refugee households. Each household will receive a cash transfer of 15,000FCFA, which is aligned with current state provision. This is not expected to fill the poverty or food gap completely (ibid.), but aims to complement humanitarian support in the country. Targeting uses a combination of geographical targeting and proxy means-testing, and refugee household data is drawn from WFP and UNHCR, through a harmonised questionnaire which aligns closely with that used by the *Céllule des Filets Sociaux*. As of August 2020, some 1,800 refugees were covered by the intervention (World Bank, 2020b). The project also includes a resilience and self-reliance component, providing small grants to support selected households, expected to cover some 100,000 individuals (World Bank, 2018c). Here too, 30% to 50% of recipients will be refugee households. Households receiving the cash transfer will not be eligible for the grant. As of August 2020 there were no reported recipients of this intervention (World Bank, 2020b).

The **Republic of Congo** hosts some 25,700 refugees, mainly from the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR data). The World Bank had been providing technical and financial support for the government's Lisungi cash transfer project since 2014, and in 2019 additional IDA18 funding was agreed to support the programme to expand to a wider share of the population and to include refugee households. The additional funding focuses on refugee inclusion in Likouala region – where most refugees reside – and in the urban areas of Pointe Noire and Brazzaville (World Bank, 2018d). The programme provides households with FCFA 10,000 a month, with an additional FCFA 5,000 per child per month up to three children (ibid.). The project is expected to cover some 2,000 refugee and 2,000 host households, in addition to the existing programme caseload (3,455 households). As in Chad, the programme includes an income-generating component providing small grants to support livelihoods. This component is expected to reach 4,000 refugee and 4,000 host households. Financing under the IDA18 Sub-Window also supports the scaling up of the social registry and contributes to strengthening complementary sectors.

Niger hosts some 234,000 refugees along with 300,000 IDPs, mainly displaced by the Boko Haram crisis. IDA18 resources for the Refugees and Host Communities Support Project finance a range of activities, including public works which are expected to benefit some 4,700,000 people, and grants to support income-generating activities targeting 62,500 recipients (World Bank, 2018a). Target recipients include refugees, IDPs, returnees and host communities. Of the 62,500 recipients of income-generating activities, some 50% will be refugees. However, as at November 2020, implementation was still ongoing, and the programme had not reached any households (World Bank, 2020c). Unlike Chad and the Republic of Congo, this intervention is not implemented directly through the state social safety net, as the activities are different. The

targeting approach aligns with that used in the cash transfer programme and harmonises targeted groups with those of UNCHR and WFP. The funding is also supporting capacity and system strengthening of state social protection institutions.

Also in Niger, the UNHCR livelihoods grant and NFI+ scheme targeted at refugee households aligned the transfer value, duration and periodicity of the intervention with the national *Projet des Filets Sociaux* (Grootenhuis and Calo, 2016). However, periodicity was later changed because UNHCR interventions were aimed at supporting investments in livelihoods, and recipient households were better able to make investments when the transfer was provided at less frequent intervals. While the programme was initially meant to provide support to households for a period of two years, limited funding curtailed the programme (KII).

According to UNHCR data **Mauritania** currently hosts some 68,000 refugees. IDA18 funding was only approved very recently and is in the process of implementation. The aim is to support state social protection and expand coverage to refugees. Project components cover the inclusion of refugee households in the Social Registry used for targeting cash assistance, and will support the inclusion of Malian refugees in and around Mbera refugee camp in the state's Tekavoul conditional cash transfer programme (covering some 5,000 refugee households) and in the shock-responsive Elmaouna cash transfer programme (World Bank, 2020d). The funding also aims to support system strengthening, including for the social registry noted above, and for management information systems.

Iraq

Iraq hosts almost 300,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, including 250,000 Syrian refugees, of whom 69% of are women and children. Some 1.4 million people have been internally displaced due to conflict.

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

Conflict and instability mean that progress towards improving social protection and coverage has been slow despite high levels of vulnerability. Iraq's PDS provides food support to most of the population, and represents a key part of the wider social protection system. IDPs who were eligible for the PDS programme prior to their displacement remain so, but challenges to access have been noted. For example, almost one-fifth of the displaced have lost key identification documents during their displacement, which can represent a barrier to accessing the PDS programme (World Bank, 2017b). The EC has recommended strengthening facilities for replacing ration cards or supporting IDPs to reregister in their new locations (EC, 2019b). Citizens who were entitled to pensions or other forms of social protection (such as cash) prior to their displacement also maintain their entitlement after displacement (Alzobaidee, 2015).

Historically, refugees from Palestine who have entered Iraq since 1948 had enjoyed the same rights as citizens under Law 202 of 2001, including the right to the PDS and to pensions. The 2017–2018 Rapid Welfare Monitoring Survey found that some 10% of refugee respondents were receiving support from the PDS. However, legislation adopted in 2018 removed many of these benefits for Palestinian refugees (UNDP, 2020).

Given serious constraints to the state's social protection capacity and systems, humanitarian cash transfers (through the multi-purpose cash assistance scheme MPCA) have been a critical aspect of both the humanitarian and state-led response in the country. While full integration has not been feasible, there have been features of alignment. In particular, the assessment model used by the humanitarian MPCA has recently been redefined to align closely with that adopted by state social protection programmes (with support from the World Bank). This new model of assessment 'laid the groundwork for understanding if and how much of the humanitarian case load can be considered eligible for state-led social safety nets' (Khan and Clerici, 2020). The Cash Consortium of Iraq determined the length of eligibility of vulnerable groups – displaced households with documentation – on the basis of state guidance on 'how long it takes for this category of beneficiaries to reconnect with social safety nets' (IRC, 2018: 7), representing a complementary approach to state-provided assistance.

The EU is supporting a 'sequenced, multi-purpose cash assistance programme to help displaced people and vulnerable households in host communities', with the objective of aligning state-led and humanitarian cash programming more closely in order to 'avoid creating parallel systems and establish close cooperation between humanitarian assistance and long-term support' (EC, 2016). Demonstrating the importance of building capacity at local governorate level, the level most directly impacted by displacement, the cash programme was launched at local/governorate level in order to develop local linkages that are then able to be brought to the national level of government for the reform of state social protection policies and legislations.

Jordan

Jordan hosts an estimated 650,000 Syrian refugees, which in addition to an existing refugee population means that there are approximately 1.3 million refugees in the country. Some 81% reside in urban or peri-urban areas (UNHCR, 2020a), with two-thirds living below the national poverty line.

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

Refugees are not included in Jordanian state social protection schemes. For example, they remain ineligible for programmes implemented by the NAF, the main social protection body in Jordan (Zureiqat and Shama, 2015). While refugees are in principle eligible for the Zakat Fund

administered by the Ministry of Awaqaf Islamic Affairs and Holy Places, which delivers cash and in-kind assistance, ODI research in 2017 found 'no evidence of refugees accessing transfers under this scheme' (Röth et al., 2017: 6).

Refugees in formal employment are covered by the Social Security law, which includes all workers irrespective of nationality or status. However, the share of refugees in formal employment in Jordan is low, and therefore so is social security coverage, with 94% of Egyptian workers and 94% of Syrian workers excluded (Razzaz et al., 2021). One of the objectives of the Jordan Compact signed in 2016 is to increase the number of refugees in formal employment (Barbelet et al., 2018). The Jordan Compact aimed to create some 200,000 work permits for refugee workers, which would facilitate access to the social security scheme. As of October 2017 , some 71,000 permits had been issued (ibid.).

International humanitarian organisations, with funding from international donors, provide the vast majority of the support available to refugees, with a multitude of cash assistance, voucher and winterisation schemes – although the focus has been on Syrian refugees, with Iraqis, Yemenis and other nationalities often excluded. There are clear attempts to improve coordination, complementarity and coherence between humanitarian programming and state provision. The 3RP and the 2019 Jordan Response Plan (JRP) both prioritise humanitarian cash and social protection for vulnerable groups.

Several years into the response, the state introduced a requirement that international humanitarian actors include 30%–50% of vulnerable Jordanians as recipients of international humanitarian cash programmes (Röth et al., 2017: 7). International donor engagement has played a critical role in pushing the issue of the inclusion of refugees in Jordan's state social protection up the agenda. In 2015 the EU launched a Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework (JHDF) which aimed to improve the coordination of funding across humanitarian and development priorities in Jordan, including in relation to social protection. In 2018 it was agreed to transition towards a structured safety net away from humanitarian cash transfers to refugees, and since then ECHO has been reducing its commitments towards cash transfers to refugees. This shift away from cash transfers is evidenced in an EU Trust Fund (EUTF) project, with the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNICEF and UNHCR as implementing partners, which aims to support the self-reliance of refugees and host communities in Jordan. The objective is to move towards 'an inclusive national social protection system and accelerating decent job opportunities for Syrians and vulnerable Jordanians'.[11] A specific aim is to 'Establish mechanisms for the implementation and coordination of the National Social Protection Strategy, with the scope to promote more sustainable livelihood opportunities and create national employment and social protection interventions for *all* vulnerable in Jordan' (EU Trust Fund, 2018 (emphasis added)).

11 For more information on the EU Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, see EC (2019g).

In addition to formal work permits, the Jordan Compact has established a number of cash for work programmes employing both Jordanians and Syrian refugees. While the emphasis appears more towards sustainable jobs and income opportunities, and links between social security and employment, these initiatives demonstrate that the inclusion of refugees in the state social protection system in Jordan is on the policy agenda and is being enabled and encouraged through international financing, in particular from the EU.

International humanitarian and development actors have also supported the technical capacity of the state social protection system. UNICEF, the World Bank, WFP and UNHCR supported the NAF to expand coverage of its programme between 2019 and 2021 by improving coordination of assistance and using best practice for cash assistance for Jordanian host communities.

Lebanon

With over 1.5 million Syrian refugees entering Lebanon since 2011, adding to existing refugee populations, one in four people in Lebanon is a refugee. The country has the largest number of refugees per capita in the world. Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention and there is no legislation on the protection or reception of refugees.

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

Registration with the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) – which implements social security in the county – is not dependent on citizenship, and refugees would technically be eligible. However, Lebanon has high levels of informal work, and given that refugees do not have the right to work in Lebanon, the overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees work informally, and are therefore excluded from the provisions of the NSSF. Non-citizens are excluded from social assistance programmes, including the National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP), the disability programme and institutional care for children.

Assistance for refugees in the Syrian response has been provided largely as part of the international humanitarian response. As the response became increasingly protracted, it has sought to align with national state strategies (Bastagli et al., 2019: 36). For example, efforts have been made 'to extend Lebanese social policies and social assistance programmes to deliver services and support to non-nationals', as well as relying on 'humanitarian-initiated interventions to provide social assistance to vulnerable Lebanese households and delivering initiatives that aim to 'strengthen national social protection system components to deliver services and support to both non-nationals and Lebanese' (Bastagli et al., 2019). There are also plans for increasing alignment in the short to medium term with the state social protection system, with a longer-term vision that lessons learned from the implementation of cash assistance to refugees can provide a foundation for the development of a more inclusive and effective social protection system for vulnerable Lebanese. Recognising that full integration or alignment is not politically or financially feasible, the aim is for the two systems to 'operate in the same way at the point of use, regardless

of the status of the client or beneficiary' (EC, 2019f: 5). A Lebanon Social Safety Net Forum was formed in 2019, co-chaired by the EU Delegation and the World Bank, with the participation of UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Germany, the United Kingdom and Oxfam, with the aim of improving the coordination of efforts to link cash and voucher assistance (CVA) and social protection.

To reduce tensions between nationals and refugees, WFP and the NPTP aimed to harmonise the value of the transfer received by households through their interventions. WFP provides $27 per household per month, while the NPTP provides between $27 and $30 (Gentilini et al., 2018). Given the shortcomings of the state social protection system, links between humanitarian assistance and social protection involve humanitarian interventions extending coverage to provide social assistance to vulnerable Lebanese, thus complementing state provision. Basic assistance being offered by the humanitarian response – both cash and in-kind services – has been extended to vulnerable Lebanese. In 2016, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) partners targeted approximately 1,800 Lebanese households with multi-purpose cash, and eligibility criteria for Lebanese households were aligned with the eligibility criteria for the NPTP (Bastagli et al., 2019). In-kind transfers included school feeding programmes, which aimed to improve school attendance and food and nutrition, as well as providing daily snacks to both Lebanese and Syrian schoolchildren. These programmes were implemented by LCRP partners in collaboration with the Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) and targeted both Syrian refugee and Lebanese children (ibid.).

Another effort to align includes a joint vulnerability assessment of Lebanese citizens to be carried out with the support of the EUTF. This will be based on the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR), an annual survey of refugees conducted jointly by UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP, with an extended and more inclusive methodology. Alignment has been enabled by bringing in Lebanese experts across state and academia so that a common understanding and analysis of vulnerability is achieved as well as financial support and technical advisory support from international donors, all of which has supported building the capacity of Lebanese officials.

There are also efforts to harmonise targeting approaches between international humanitarian and development actors and with the NPTP, with a focus on the mode of delivery, and monitoring and development of a future strategy. In an example of integration, Social Development Centres (SDCs), which implement the policies of the Ministry of Social Affairs, have increasingly acted as a common 'service window' for both schemes. Their use across refugee cash programming has enabled not only this common 'service window' but also additional investment in Lebanon's pre-existing institutions and infrastructure and capacity building opportunities (EC, 2019f: 5). The long-term plan is that they will not only continue to be used as a common service window but also be responsible for managing access to social services and referral pathways onto other services for all vulnerable groups in Lebanon. This approach is illustrated, for example, by the Temporary Cash Assistance programme in Tripoli, implemented by Oxfam, between 2016 and 2017 through local SDCs, targeting several hundred Lebanese and Syrian refugee households. Participants received four months of cash assistance and referrals to other services to help them meet basic

needs following a household shock (Oxfam, 2018). Identification of households is conducted through community-based targeting and referrals via the NPTP together with the MoSA-run SDCs and a local NGO partner, 'Utopia' (ibid: 4). Another example of integration is the use by UNICEF of the NPTP database of households to better target their CVA as part of its winterisation programme in 2017 in Lebanon (Bastagli et al., 2019: 46).

International humanitarian and development actors – along with donor support – have also contributed to strengthening state social protection more widely. The World Bank and WFP supported the NPTP to launch an e-card food voucher programme for vulnerable Lebanese households, building on the infrastructure established by – and through stores contracted by – WFP in its e-card food voucher programme, including the cash delivery platform and the recipient management system (Gentilini et al., 2018). As of December 2016, the e-voucher component of the NPTP covered 10,008 Lebanese households (ibid.). The World Bank and WFP also provided financial support for capacity development and training and operational support to the Ministry of Social Affairs to enable it to assume responsibility for the e-voucher prorgamme (EC, 2019d).

Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency, which began in the north-east of Nigeria, has displaced millions of people in the Lake Chad region. About 2,140,000 have been internally displaced in Nigeria, mainly in the north-east states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, while over 300.000 Nigerians have fled to Niger, Chad and Cameroon (UNHCR data). Displacement also results from clashes between pastoralists and farmers in Taraba and Gombe states (World Bank, 2019b).

The state has a strong commitment to including IDPs in its development strategies (Debarre et al., 2018). The National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria, published in 2012, provides a framework for the 'realisation of the rights, dignity and wellbeing of vulnerable populations through the prevention of the root causes, mitigation of the impact and achievement of durable solutions to internal displacement in Nigeria' (GoN, 2012: 20).

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

IDPs have been included in two state-run social protection programmes. IDPs in three refugee camps in Borno state are eligible for the state-run National Cash Transfer Programme (also known as the Household Uplifting Programme). The programme targets poor and vulnerable households in 28 states in the country covering 420,000, with a target coverage of 1 million in 36 states (Sterk and Issaka, 2019). The programme provides a monthly cash transfer of 5,000 Naira per eligible household, with households meeting the health, education, nutrition and environment conditions receiving a further 5,000 Naira as a top-up. The transfer is paid every two months. Targeting takes place using the national social registry (NSR), a database of poor and vulnerable households covering 36 states.

IDPs are also eligible for the state-run Youth Employment Social Support Operations (YESSO). YESSO has three components: employment opportunities, cash transfers and grant transfers. IDPs living in the north-eastern states where the programme is implemented are eligible. The programme targets recipients through the national social register as well as the unified registry of recipients (URB), the register for IDPs implemented by the State Operational Coordinating Unit (SOCU).

While a number of humanitarian actors provide relief to IDPs in Nigeria, they work independently from development actors, including the national social protection system (Sterk and Issaka, 2019). No instances of humanitarian actors integrating or aligning with state programmes were identified in the mapping. However, there seems to be a trend towards promoting such approaches. For example, a cash working group initiated discussions in 2018 to strengthen links between humanitarian cash programming and state social protection programmes, and a mapping was commissioned to identify potential connections (ibid.). A concept note was then developed by the cash working group to establish a 'state-led State Humanitarian Social Protection Forum' in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states to 'provide a common platform for humanitarian and SP actors to share information and identify opportunity to link both programs' (CWG, 2019). OCHA presents humanitarian cash activities at a monthly social protection meeting hosted by the Ministry of Budget and National Planning together with UNICEF (Sterk and Issaka, 2019). Several INGOs, including Mercy Corps, as well as WFP, are implementing cash transfers and providing technical assistance for state social protection authorities.

Pakistan

Pakistan has faced several internal displacement situations in the past decade, either caused by disasters such as earthquakes and flooding or by conflict and militancy in various parts of the country. In 2014 , IDMC estimated there were roughly 1.9 million IDPs in Pakistan, although this number has fallen in recent years.

Pakistan hosts the second largest refugee population in the world after Turkey, with about 1.4 million registered refugees from Afghanistan, and a further million unregistered refugees. This is one of the most protracted refugee situations in the world, with the first waves of migration from Afghanistan beginning in the late 1970s. At the peak, there were 4 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Pakistan is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Refugees' rights to social services are limited, and they have no access to state social protection programmes.

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

Several social protection or humanitarian interventions cover displaced populations in the country, focusing mainly on IDPs. Indeed, IDPs are identified as a priority 'vulnerable group' in the draft national social protection framework (Watson et al., 2017). However, the picture is

complicated by the decentralised approach to social protection policy, which is devolved to the state level – with a limited number of programmes run at federal level. Our mapping focused on inclusion or alignment with federal support.

The state Ehsaas Kafaalat social assistance programme (formerly the Benazir Income Support Programme) has provided cash assistance to IDPs affected by the conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Watson et al., 2017), and was set to expand to IDPs in North Waziristan in 2014 (The Nation, 2014). The federal programme did not cover that region previously due to security concerns. The BISP approach has typically been 'demand-based', relying on registration centres set up by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) (Seyfert and Ahmad, 2020). NADRA's core mandate is the civil registration of Pakistani citizens, but over time its remit has expanded to include cash assistance and social protection programmes.

Zakat – a form of Islamic charity typically run by non-state institutions but which, in some contexts, can represent a significant form of assistance – has covered IDPs in the country. For example, in 2010/2011 around 100 million PKR ($578,000) of assistance was distributed to IDPs through Zakat (Watson et al., 2017).

Several programmes cover specific types of displaced populations. In 2010 the Benazir Income Support Programme (now Ehsaas Kafaalat) provided assistance to people affected by flooding, including temporarily displaced households. In 2014, NADRA implemented the Temporarily Displaced Person's Early Recovery Programme (TDP-ERP) with World Bank support to assist households affected by the conflict in FATA (Watson et al., 2017). The state has also implemented cash transfers to support returnee IDPs in FATA (UNOCHA, 2017).

Beginning in 2009, the FDMA has implemented a one-off return grant for returnees in the region, with the support of international donors and the humanitarian community, and in 2014 launched a monthly unconditional cash support programme for registered IDPs from North Waziristan residing in neighbouring districts, covering approximately 600,000 displaced people (UNOCHA, 2017). The Provincial Relief and Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority implemented food, cash and transport support programmes for people displaced in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA.

A number of international humanitarian actors have implemented cash and voucher programmes in response to the impacts of disasters and conflict, but the mapping did not identify any international humanitarian interventions that have aligned or integrated their approaches with state social protection programmes – with the exception of UNHCR, in response to the Covid-19 pandemic (see Box 10).

Turkey

Turkey is host to the largest number of refugees and asylum-seekers in the world (UNHCR, 2019a), including approximately 3.59 million registered Syrian refugees. Given Turkey's lack of accession to the 1967 Protocol, maintaining its geographical exception to the Refugee Convention, Syrian refugees are not granted refugee status and have instead been granted temporary protection status by the Turkish state.

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

The initial response to the refugee crisis in Turkey was largely through traditional humanitarian mechanisms, with funding channelled through international agencies and national civil society organisations (EC, 2019c). However, in light of the scale of the displacement and its protracted nature, in 2013 the 3RP aimed to transition towards supporting state and local systems (ibid.).

ECHO sought to work through national systems where possible (EC, 2019e). Implemented nationwide in 2016 (EC, 2019e), the ESSN, designed together with the Turkish state, was funded by and co-implemented through a partnership with the MoFSP, WFP, TRC, the DGMM, the Directorate General of Citizenship and Population Affairs and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency. The ESSN is a multi-purpose Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) cash benefit programme (Smith et al., 2018), with the primary objective of supporting the most vulnerable refugee households outside of camps, including to meet basic needs, improve educational outcomes and improve food security (Maunder et al., 2018). There are also 'secondary objectives', such as including refugee households in the economy, and the 'eventual integration of ESSN into the Turkish social safety net to promote social cohesion' (ibid.:16).

While the programme remains conceptually and administratively separate from the national system, it does capitalise on national infrastructure. The national Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation undertakes the eligibility assessment, verification of applications from refugees and enrolment, although in areas with high numbers of refugees, the TRC has set up centres to share the load (EC, 2019e). Backlogs in the registration of refugees for the Temporary Protection (TP) ID card (a prerequisite for applying to the ESSN) led to delays in some refugees' registration with the ESSN (ibid.). The programme could not align the targeting approach with the national system as relevant information on socio-economic status was not available for refugees to the same extent as for nationals (ibid.). Payments were made through a separate mechanism: recipient households received a 'Kizilaykart', which had been previously used by WFP and TRC in the implementation of their food assistance programme (EC, 2019e). The value of the ESSN was set to not exceed that of the assistance provided by the state for vulnerable citizens, based on state concerns, and concerns over sustainability and social cohesion (Smith et al., 2018). The value was initially set at TL100 for each family member, with one person receiving the cash on behalf of all other family members. This was increased to TL120 (€17) in 2017, with a quarterly top-up added in August 2017. Benefits are distributed monthly via a state-owned bank.

While falling short of full integration by remaining a separate programme from the national social protection system, and with funds channelled not through the state, but directly through WFP or UNICEF to the TRC, the ESSN nonetheless builds on the social assistance administrative processes of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy (ECHO, 2016; Oxford Policy Management, 2017; EC, 2019e), aligning with Turkey's national policies and capitalising on its national institutions. The objective of this close alignment is to guarantee longer-term national ownership and thus the sustainability of the programme, which will continue to receive support from humanitarian actors, with payments managed by the TRC.

The Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) Programme complements the ESSN by providing support for the education of refugee children. Launched in 2017, the programme is a partnership between UNICEF, MoFSP, Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and the TRC, with donor funding (Smith et al., 2018). The CCTE is designed to expand the coverage of the national conditional cash transfer to refugee children (Smith et al., 2018). The programme provides refugee households with children with a cash transfer of TL120 paid every two months (aligned with the similar national CCTE programme) and an additional TL100 at the start of each semester. Eligibility for the programme is based on enrolment in formal education (EC, 2019e). The MoFSP initially wanted the CCTE to adopt the same design features (frequency, duration, transfer modality) as the national programme, but these were not considered optimum for meeting the needs of refugee children. The design was therefore aligned with that of the ESSN (EC, 2019e). UNICEF uses the ESSN to deliver additional cash transfers for refugee households with children, and the design, targeting process and grant size are aligned with those of the national programme for Turkish children (Oxford Policy Management, 2017: 17–18). Some 80% of ESSN recipient households also receive support through the CCTE, as ESSN recipients enrolled in public schools or temporary education centres are automatically included in the CCTE – meaning that the CCTE represents additional 'top-up assistance' for some, while also covering households not receiving the ESSN (Smith et al., 2018; EC, 2019e). The CCTE is conditional on school attendance, which is monitored in partnership with the MoNE and the MoFSP. In addition, UNICEF provides protection support to refugee children whose school attendance falls below the minimum threshold through household visits by TRC and referrals and follow-ups (ibid.). UNICEF is analysing the integration of these child protection measures into the national system (ibid.).

Eligible households under both the ESSN and the CCTE register with the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (Smith et al., 2018). While the national system screens eligibility through various state databases, refugee eligibility is confirmed through the DGMM and the Directorate General of Citizenship and Population Affairs.

Ukraine

At its peak, the conflict in eastern Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 led to the displacement of over 1.8 million people (Sasse, 2020). In 2014, Ukraine passed legislation to extend the rights of IDPs to protect them against discrimination and forced return (UNCHCR , 2014).

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

IDPs in Ukraine have access to a wide range of state social protection programmes. The state introduced social assistance programmes for IDPs in 2014 through Resolution 505, which was designed to support IDPs with housing and utility costs, and was set at UAH949 for people with disabilities, UAH884 per month for families with children and pensions, and UAH442 per month for able-bodied individuals, on condition that they were actively seeking employment (Shelter Cluster Ukraine, 2015). A family can only access assistance of up to UAH2,400 per month, and support is provided for a maximum of six months (ibid.). IDPs of pensionable age are entitled to the state pension, and IDPs on low incomes are eligible for state social assistance. As of 2016, to access these state assistance programmes IDPs have to register with the Ministry of Social Policy, and their residence in areas surrounding the contact line or in occupied territories has to be verified (Bulakh, 2020). IDPs could lose their IDP status if they were absent from their registered residence for over 60 days, or if they did not originate from specific settlements. New regulations introduced five types of IDP verification (ibid.). Social support payments were also suspended for residents in non-state-controlled areas. These new criteria led to the suspension of support for IDPs who did not meet these criteria (UNHCR, 2017b).

Two humanitarian interventions have aligned or integrated with state social protection systems. Between 2014 and 2016, IOM implemented an unconditional cash transfer making a one-off payment to IDPs to support with housing costs. The benefit per household was set at €235, then translated back to Ukrainian hryvnia at the time of payment to ensure that the value of the transfer was not affected by inflation (IOM, 2015). The initial list of recipients was prepared by the state social security service.

UNHCR implemented a one-off cash transfer to vulnerable IDPs, paid through the state administration of children and family services. A total of 11,800 families were reached by the cash transfer in December 2018 (UNHCR, 2014). This was replaced in 2017 by the Individual Personal Assistance cash transfer scheme. The programme covers vulnerable households, mainly conflict-affected households, but it also includes IDPs and returnees (UNHCR, 2020b). Payments are no longer made through state institutions so that payments can be made to non-registered IDPs, who are not on the recipient lists of state institutions (Baily and Agiss, 2016).

Yemen

The conflict between the state and Ansar Allah (the Houthi) has displaced 3.6 million people. Some 80% of the population (24.3 million people) are in need of humanitarian assistance.

Overview of alignment/integration/inclusion

The response to the crisis in Yemen has involved close collaboration between international humanitarian and development actors and state institutions. Donor funding currently covers approximately 80% to 85% of the state budget (Al-Ahmadi and De Silva, 2018).

The World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF partner with the national Social Fund for Development (SFD) and Public Works Programme (PWP) to implement a cash-for-work scheme which includes IDPs. The project is part of the World Bank- financed Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project (YECRP). The works aim to restore basic services, alongside support for small businesses through training and the provision of equipment. Some 400,000 individuals – including about 78,000 IDPs – have accessed short-term employment through the project (UNDP, 2020). Al-Ahmadi and De Silva (2018: 22) note that 'building and investing in local capacity and national systems during peacetime enables rapid and scalable crisis response during conflict'.

The project began in 2016, with financing through the World Bank's IDA window; UNDP and UNICEF are recipients of the grant, and the project is implemented by the SFD and the PWP, building on the existing national cash transfer system, which had been supported by World Bank financing for the past two decades (Al-Ahmadi and De Silva, 2018).

One of the key objectives of the programme is to support and strengthen existing local institutions, including social protection institutions. Collaboration has been enabled by the long-standing partnership between the World Bank and national institutions (ibid.). The transparent targeting approach has ensured 'political neutrality and increases buy-in by diverse – and often opposing – political actors' (ibid.). Engagement with local partner institutions has enabled access across the country despite the conflict context (ibid.).

UNICEF cash transfers have also aimed to support vulnerable households while supporting national social protection institutions. Cash transfers from the SWF were interrupted due to the conflict, and UNICEF began the implementation of an unconditional cash transfer programme to meet basic needs – covering Sana'a in the first phase, then extending coverage to Taiz governorate in its second phase (EC, 2019a). The programme was implemented separately from the SWF but used its administrative structures and capacity, including its payment mechanism, human resources and institutions (ibid.). SWF social welfare officers were trained to conduct targeting for the programme. A total of 20,150 households were supported by the programme, which ended in 2017.

UNICEF then partnered with the World Bank to launch the Emergency Cash Transfer Project (ECTP), also under the YECRP (with additional financial support from the United States). The programme targeted 1.45 million households (9 million individuals), including IDPs across the country's 22 governorates. Coordination with the SWF was strengthened, as the ECTP used (but refined and verified) the SWF recipient list, and made payments through one of the mechanisms used by the SWF, the Al Amal Microfinance Bank (AMB) (ibid.). UNICEF had prior experience working with the SWF, which facilitated implementation of the ECTP (EC, 2019a).

The SFD implements a cash-for-nutrition programme, also funded through the World Bank YECRP, which targets women with children under five, including displaced women. While the programme was initially launched prior to the conflict to address child stunting, it was expanded during the conflict (Kurdi et al., 2019). The programme provides cash transfers for a duration of one year and nutrition training to mothers, reaching 88,000 women across 21 districts in 2020 (ibid.).

Appendix 2 Countries included in the review

Countries highlighted in red are those where some form of alignment, integration or inclusion was identified in the literature.

MENA/Europe	Africa	Latin America and Caribbean	Asia and Pacific
Azerbaijan	Burundi	Ecuador	Afghanistan
Georgia	Central African Republic	El Salvador	Bangladesh
Iran	Chad	Haiti	Fiji
Iraq	Côte d'Ivoire	Honduras	Indonesia
Jordan	Democratic Republic of Congo	Mexico	Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon	Ethiopia	Peru	Malaysia
Libya	Kenya	Venezuela	Myanmar
Morocco	Malawi		Nepal
Palestine	Mali		Pakistan
Turkey	Mauritania		Philippines
Ukraine	Mozambique		Sri Lanka
Yemen	Niger		Thailand
	Nigeria		
	Somalia		
	South Sudan		
	Sudan		
	Tanzania		
	Uganda		