Ghana: macroeconomic and trade profile

Opportunities and challenges towards implementation of the AfCFTA

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Key messages

• Ghana’s GDP grew at 5.4% in 2021, after slowing to 0.5% in 2020 during Covid-19. In 2022, the Russia–Ukraine war, lingering pandemic effects and high public debt contributed to the deterioration of the economy. Ghana has announced local debt restructuring and external debt payment suspension, and has applied to the G20 Common Framework. It may need to expedite efforts to secure creditor assurances to support its debt restructuring, which is needed to unlock IMF financing.

• Ghana’s total trade (exports + imports) in goods and services reached 68.2% of GDP on average per year between 2010 and 2021. In 2021, services exports recovered to their pre-pandemic level, while goods exports grew only modestly, by 5.5% (below the 2019 level), owing to lower volumes of the country’s main exports, gold and crude oil. Data from January to September 2022 indicate a trade surplus, thanks to higher global prices of gold and oil induced by the Russia–Ukraine war.

• Trade and investment are concentrated in gold, oil and cocoa but there is room to support the exporting of cashew nuts, guavas, mangoes, mangosteens, tuna and plastic products, given increasing world demand for these products. In the immediate term, Ghanaian companies are seeking support from the government and organisations to help them continue operations in the face of increasing borrowing costs, sharp cedi depreciation and a potential reduction in consumer demand.

• The share of intra-African goods trade in Ghana’s total goods trade dropped from 21.5% in 2014 to 14% ($4 billion) as of 2019, heavily influenced by non-technical barriers to trade, lack of comprehensive intra-African trade policy and incentives, and insufficient cross-border trade infrastructure.

• Ghana launched its national AfCFTA plan in August 2022, participated in the AfCFTA Guided Trade Initiative in October 2022 and has assisted 30 firms to secure certificates of origin to trade under the AfCFTA. Ghana may expedite efforts to establish policies on investment and competition, which will be relevant during the next phase of AfCFTA negotiations, which will cover these areas.
Acknowledgements

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About this publication

This brief aims to inform relevant stakeholders, including the private sector and non-AfCFTA experts, on Ghana’s current economic situation and its implementation of the AfCFTA. This brief represents an update of the first edition of a paper on Ghana’s macroeconomic and trade profile published by ODI in February 2022. Data and information for this update were mostly collected between October and December 2022.

This ODI–GIZ policy brief series is part of a larger project titled the GIZ Support Programme to the AfCFTA. This supports GIZ’s partners on the continental (African Union Commission, AfCFTA Secretariat), regional (currently East African Community and Economic Community of West African States; planned Southern African Development Community) and national levels on the negotiations surrounding and implementation of the AfCFTA.

Disclaimer: The content of this publication was produced rapidly to provide early ideas and analysis on a given theme. It has been cross-read and edited but the usual rigorous processes have not necessarily been applied.

About the author

Sherillyn Raga is a Research Fellow at ODI. Sherillyn has a decade of professional experience on policy-oriented research covering macroeconomics, financial integration, trade and investment in Asian and African contexts. Prior to joining ODI, she worked at the Philippine central bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank.
1 Recent economic developments

The Ghanaian economy grew at 6.6% per year on average from 2011 to 2019, above the average growth rate in lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) (5%) and sub-Saharan African countries (3.5%) during the same period.\(^1\) Growth has been traditionally anchored by the agricultural as well as the mining and utilities sectors, contributing to 37% of total value added on average from 2016 to 2020 (UNDESA, 2022). Notably, the share of the mining sector in Ghana’s total value added increased from 3% in 2010 to 14% in 2019, while the level of the sector’s employment fell, highlighting the challenge involved in having a sizable portion of growth that has not generated many jobs (World Bank, 2021).

Table 1  Ghana country facts and social indicators

| Capital: Accra | Geographical size: 238,537 km\(^2\) surface area in Western Africa |
| Languages: English, Akan, Ewe, Twi |
| Religion: Christian, Islam, indigenous beliefs |
| Currency: exchange rate: 8.0 Ghanaian cedi per US$ (20 December 2022) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2021/latest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (million)</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency ratio (%)(^1)</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (years)</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross national income per capita (constant 2017 purchasing power parity $)</td>
<td>2,741.2</td>
<td>3,757.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty rate (% of population living on less than $2.15 a day, 2011 purchasing power parity)</td>
<td>42.5(^2)</td>
<td>25.7(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Inequality Index(^5)</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index(^6)</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1 dependency ratio of the young (0–14 years old) to the working-age (15–64 years old) population; 2 as of 2005; 3 as of 2012; 4 as of 2016; 5 higher score = higher gender inequality; 6 higher score = better human development.
Sources: BoG website; UNDP (2022); World Bank (2022a).

By 2020, the Ghanaian economy was facing the adverse effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and related disruptions, which slowed gross domestic product (GDP) growth to 0.5%. Nevertheless, the country rebounded with 5.4% GDP growth by 2021, following the easing of Covid-19 restrictions, driven by growth in the relatively inclusive and labour-intensive agriculture (by 8.4%) and services (by 9.4%) sectors.\(^2\) During the pandemic years of 2020 and 2021, remittances continued grow, contributing around 6% of GDP (based on World Bank, 2022a; 2022c).

However, the country is facing new headwinds as a result of the lingering effects of the pandemic and the spillover effects of the Russia–Ukraine war on food and fuel prices, as well as the tightening of global financial conditions, combined with

\(^1\) Author’s computations based on World Bank (2022a) data.
\(^2\) Data based on data from the Ghana Statistical Services website.
deteriorating domestic macro-financial conditions linked to accelerating inflation and high risk of debt distress.

As of November 2022, inflation had accelerated to 50.3%, building up from the pass-through effects of ex-pump oil prices, transport costs, cedi depreciation and food prices in prior months, but becoming broad-based across food and non-food items more recently (BoG, 2022a; 2022b; 2022g). The inflation rate is already double what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had forecast (27.2%) over the year (Table 2). To contain inflation, the Bank of Ghana (BoG) increased its policy rate to 27% as of November 2022, nearly 13 percentage points higher than the 14.5% of the beginning of the year (January 2022). Bank lending rates also increased to 31.4% as of October 2022, compared with 20.2% in January 2022 (BoG, 2022c; 2022g).

In the external sector, Ghana’s trade surplus has been growing thanks to favourable price effects on its major exports, gold and crude oil. In the first nine months of 2022, the trade surplus reached $1.8 billion (BoG, 2022g). However, the same period saw $1.5 billion in outflows from portfolio reversals, reduced foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, lower private capital loan inflows and a higher build-up of deposit-taking corporations’ foreign assets, resulting in an overall balance of payments (BOP) deficit of $3.4 billion as of September 2022 (compared with a BOP surplus of $3.5 billion in September 2021) (ibid.). Between January and October 2022, the cedi depreciated by 53.8% against the US dollar, driven by a combination of factors, including policy rate hikes in the US, concerns regarding fiscal risks and speculation over debt restructuring (ibid.). Reserves stood at $9.7 billion, or equivalent to 2.9 months of import cover as of end-October 2022 (ibid.). To boost foreign reserves, BoG has been working with companies and bankers to purchase all foreign exchange arising from the voluntary repatriation of export proceeds from mining companies and oil and gas companies (BoG, 2022d).

On the fiscal side, Ghana’s fiscal deficit has widened since the pandemic, reaching 15.3% in 2020 and an estimated 11.4% in 2021 (Table 2). This has been driven by spending on the Covid-19 response, interest payments and other expenditure related to the financial sector clean-up and energy bail-outs since 2018 (MOF, 2022). More than 30% of the central budget in 2022 was allocated to interest payments and 8% to financial and energy sector bail-outs and independent power producers; only 10% went to capital expenditure (ibid.). The fiscal deficit has put upward pressure on debt, which reached 82% of GDP in 2021 (Table 2). By September 2022, public debt stood at 79.6% of GDP (BoG, 2022g); the IMF forecasts it will reach 91% of GDP for 2022 (Table 2). The increased reliance of Ghana on domestic borrowing (22% of GDP in 2015 vs. 41.4% in 2021) with often shorter maturities and higher interest rates is exposing public debt to interest rate and refinancing risks, while the sharp depreciation of the cedi is exposing external debt to foreign exchange risks (see Raga et al., 2022). Since 2021, the IMF and World Bank have classified Ghana as being at high risk of debt distress.

The Ghanian government requested IMF financing on 1 July 2022 (IMF, 2022b). In view of the deteriorating economic conditions, major credit rating agencies (i.e., Moody’s, Fitch, Standard & Poors) downgraded Ghana between August and September 2022. Given economic uncertainties, BoG (2022a) expected that Ghana’s GDP growth would slow by between 3.7% and 4.5% in 2022.

By 4 December 2022, Ghana had requested its local bondholders accept losses as it restructured its debt to qualify for IMF financing (Ibukun and Dontoh, 2022). Shortly after this (12 December 2022), IMF staff and the Ghanian government reached agreement on $3 billion in financing to support Ghana’s economic policies and reforms, particularly to ensure the sustainability of public finances while
strengthening social safety nets for the poor (IMF, 2022c). The cedi strengthened by 30% week on week (from 12 to 19 December 2022) after the IMF announcement. However, before the IMF programme can be presented to the IMF Executive Board for approval, the IMF will need sufficient assurances and progress in terms of Ghana’s efforts towards comprehensive debt restructuring (ibid.).

By 20 December 2022, Ghana had announced suspension of its external debt payments as an ‘interim measure’, as the government prepares to engage in discussion with its creditors to make the country’s debt sustainable (Aljazeera, 2022). This was shortly followed by the creation of a creditor committee by Ghana’s external bondholders, which expressed support for the government’s plan to resolve the country’s debt challenges, particularly through finding solutions in terms of collaborating on fair burden-sharing among Ghanaian authorities, official creditors, and domestic and international private creditors (GNA, 2022). In January 2023, Ghana has requested G20 Common Framework to restructure its bilateral debt with Paris Club and non-Paris Club creditors (Reuters, 2023).

Against this backdrop, the next section (Section 2) presents Ghana’s trade landscape and business environment. This is followed by a more focused discussion of Ghana’s intra-African trade and progress on AfCFTA implementation (Section 3). Section 4 identifies Ghana’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in relation to maximising benefits from the AfCFTA, and trade and investment more generally. Section 5 concludes.

Table 2  Selected macroeconomic performance and forecast in Ghana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022f</th>
<th>2023f</th>
<th>2024f</th>
<th>2025f</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP (% growth)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real non-oil GDP (% growth)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average consumer prices (% growth)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government revenue (% of GDP)</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government expenditure (% of GDP)</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross fiscal balance (% of GDP)</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-15.3</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary fiscal balance (% of GDP)</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross government debt (% of GDP)</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance (% of GDP)</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: e = estimate; f = forecast.
Sources: IMF (2022a), except for real non-oil GDP data, which are based on the Ghana Statistical Service website.
2 Trade landscape and business environment

2.1 Trade landscape

Trade has played an important role in Ghana's economy. Total trade (exports + imports) in goods and services was equivalent to 68.2% of GDP on average per year from 2010 to 2021. During the pandemic in 2020, total trade in goods declined by 7.7% from its 2019 level, to $26.8 billion (or 39.3% of GDP). By 2021, trade in goods had grown by 5.5%, to $28.4 billion (or 37.2% of GDP), with faster growth from imports (9.7% to $13.6 billion) than from exports (1.8% to $14.7 billion). Subdued exports may be explained by the lower export volume of gold and crude oil in 2021 compared with in previous year (BoG, 2022e).

Meanwhile, total trade in services has been gaining in importance more in Ghana relative to other African countries since 2015, reaching 28.2% of GDP as of 2021 (Figure 1). This expansion has been driven by the growing presence in Ghana of multinational companies that supply business services to other African countries (WTO, 2022). During the pandemic, the services sector contracted by 23.4%, to $7.6 billion, but it bounced back with 20.6% growth to $9.2 billion (12% of GDP) in 2021. Meanwhile, services imports, which comprised about 20% of GDP in 2019, were also negatively affected by Covid-19, declining by 10.2% to $12.1 billion in 2020; services imports continued to be weak, at $12.3 billion, in 2021 (Figure 1).

Aggregate trade data for the first nine months of 2022 indicate a trade surplus of $1.8 billion ($14.3 billion in exports less $12.4 billion in imports), driven by the gains from higher prices of crude oil and gold exports (BoG, 2022g).

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3 Author’s computations based on United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data.
Ghana was a net goods importer until 2017, when global prices of major exports (i.e., gold, oil, cashew nuts) increased. From 2019 to 2021, gold, followed by crude oil (25.2%), comprised more than 40% of Ghana’s exports (Figure 2). This posed a challenge, given the relatively lower contributions in terms of productivity and job creation to the Ghanaian economy of these sectors compared with agro-processing and manufacturing. With regard to trading partners, the latest data available for 2015 to 2019 indicate that the majority of Ghana’s exports went to India, Switzerland, China, and South Africa, while growth in export demand was most evident from China, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, and the US (Figure 3).

Source: Author’s computations based on UNCTAD data.

Source: Author’s computations based on data from BoG (2022e).
Ghana’s imports are quite diverse, with the highest share comprising vehicles for the transportation of goods and people (12% on average from 2015 to 2019). The majority of Ghana’s imports in the past five years have been sourced from China (17.7%), the US (6.6%), the UK (7.1%), Belgium (5.4%) and India (5.3%). Since 2015, Ghana’s demand for imported products has declined across major trading partners.\footnote{Data in his paragraph are author’s computations based on World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data (four-digit export product category).}

We investigate the efficiency (in terms of revealed comparative advantage, RCA) and world demand (from all countries) of Ghana’s top 25 exported products (accounting for 90% of Ghana’s total exports) in the past five years (i.e. 2015–2019, or latest available data).\footnote{The top 25 products are based on the annual average percentage of total exports in the six-digit category from 2015 to 2019 (latest available data), while world demand refers to world imports of such products sourced globally during the same period (data from WITS).} Table 3 presents the products that can be supported through export promotion or intervention to increase competitiveness.

### Table 3  Export products for promotion and targeted intervention in Ghana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increasing RCA (e.g. for export promotion, facilitation)</th>
<th>Declining RCA (e.g. intervention to increase competitiveness)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing world demand</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• semi-manufactured gold and gold compounds</td>
<td>• cashew nuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• crude petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals</td>
<td>• tunas, skipjack and bonito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• manganese ores and concentrates</td>
<td>• petroleum oils (not crude; not light oils and preparations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• aluminium</td>
<td>• plastics household, hygienic or toilet articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• carbon dioxide</td>
<td>• plastic sacks and bags for conveyance or packing of goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• mahogany</td>
<td>• coniferous wood in the rough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• cocoa butter, fat, oil and paste</td>
<td>• cocoa powder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• guavas, mangoes and mangosteens</td>
<td>• fixed vegetable fats and oils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Declining world demand</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• wholly or partly defatted cocoa paste</td>
<td>• cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• palm oil and its fractions, other than crude</td>
<td>• unwrought gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• natural rubber</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on WITS data.
2.2 Foreign direct investment

In 2019, FDI flows to Ghana were concentrated in the extractives sector and in cocoa (UNCTAD, 2020). As Covid-19 hit in 2020, FDI flows to Ghana declined by 33.6%, to $1.9 billion. By 2021, FDI inflows had rebounded with 33.9% growth to $2.6 billion, mainly thanks to the extractive industries, through the construction of a $850 million gold mining facility by a US company and a cement factory by a Moroccan company (UNCTAD, 2022). To some extent, Ghana may also have benefited from being a preferable investment destination compared with Nigeria, as the latter experienced economic uncertainties when oil prices plummeted at the peak of the pandemic.

Meanwhile, the latest data from the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC, 2022) show a decline in value of registered FDI projects in 2021 by 51% to $1.3 billion. At this point there were 271 projects, expected to generate 15,775 jobs with operations at full capacity. By sector, the services sector had the highest share of projects in terms of number (139) and value ($689 million). Oil and gas, and manufacturing registered an FDI value of $265.87 million (for 50 projects) and $131.41 million (for 19 projects), respectively. FDI projects from China registered the highest number (40), valued at $57 million. Meanwhile, Singapore’s five registered projects generated the highest value ($370 million). In terms of value, Singapore was followed by Australia ($204.7 million) and India ($93.8 million).

Figure 4  FDI stock and flow in Ghana

![Graph showing FDI stock and flow in Ghana](image)

Source: Author’s computations based on UNCTAD data.

Ongoing economic uncertainty externally (e.g. the lingering effects of Covid-19, the Russia–Ukraine war, global financial tightening) and domestically (e.g. high inflation, high risk of debt distress) could potentially hurt FDI investment in the country. Since July–November 2022, BoG (2022b; 2022g) has already indicated declining FDI inflows to the country.

2.3 Business environment

Overall, Ghana ranks better than its African counterparts on several indicators of digital readiness and the policy and regulatory environment. Digital readiness is higher in Ghana compared with other countries in Africa, especially in terms of individual usage of technology and putting in place regulation, policy and planning to promote participation and inclusivity in the network economy (Figure 5A). Ghana also performs better than 83 International Development Association (IDA) borrowing countries (including other African countries) on the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Ghana’s top CPIA scores are on trade policy,
policies and institutions for environmental sustainability, and property rights (Figure 5B). Oxford Business Group (2018) also highlights Ghana’s young and growing population, as well as the expanding middle class, as a significant market opportunity in the long term.

In addition, Ghana’s strategic position as host of the AfCFTA Secretariat also helps in increasing the visibility of the country as an investment destination. Growing multinational companies have chosen Ghana as their headquarters and supply business services to other African countries (WTO, 2022). Overall, the latest Trade Policy Review of Ghana by the World Trade Organization (WTO) indicates that Ghana’s investment regime is fairly liberal and foreign investment is generally welcome (ibid.). However, the report also notes that there are still activities/sectors that are reserved for Ghanaians and/or require Ghanaian equity participation and local content. The government also has a significant stake, with close to 160 state-owned enterprises, agencies and joint ventures, many of which continue to make losses (ibid.).

**Figure 5 Policies, institutions and digital readiness, 2021 (higher score = better performance)**

A. Network readiness index, 2022
(highest score = better readiness; Ghana rank: 103/131)

B. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

The above challenges are consistent with views at the firm level. ODI interviews with foreign (British) investors in Ghana highlighted concerns around volatility in...
exchange rates, frequent tax audits, lack of clarity in the policy-making process, minimum capital requirements (which make it harder for small funders to invest), expensive mobile phone licences and substantial barriers to trade with neighbouring countries (Mendez-Parra et al., 2020).

Perhaps the most immediate challenge businesses face relates to the ongoing fast deterioration of the macroeconomy (e.g. 50.3% inflation, 31.4% interest rates) and its adverse effect on business operations. As of October 2022, BoG’s Business Confidence Index score had declined to 73.9, from 98.4 as of end-2021 (BoG, 2022f; 2022g). The latest score is lower than that at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, at 77.2 in April 2020. The Ghana Association of Industries has already appealed for support from the government and financial institutions, as the increase in utility tariffs, fuel prices and lending rates, accelerating inflation, and sharp depreciation have led many businesses to find potentially negative ways to survive, including through reduced production (Punsu, 2022).
3 Intra-African trade performance and the AfCFTA

3.1 Background: Ghana’s goods trade with Africa

Ghana’s trade (exports and imports) with the rest of Africa dropped from 21.5% of its total trade (or $6 billion) in 2014 to 11.1% (or $2.7 billion) in 2016 (Figure 6). Ghana’s trade within the continent has picked up gradually, reaching $4 billion as of 2019. By product and on average from 2015 to 2019, Ghana’s exports to African countries were mainly gold (31%) and crude and non-crude petroleum oils (24%), while Ghana’s imports from the continent were mainly frozen fish (11%), vehicles for the transportation of goods (8%) and cement products (5.5%). Of Ghana’s total exports to Africa, almost half went to South Africa, 16.8% to Burkina Faso and 9.2% to Togo, on average, between 2015 and 2019. During the same period, Ghana’s imports from Africa were mainly from South Africa (32.7%), Nigeria (13.9%) and Morocco (9.1%).

Figure 6  Ghana’s intra-African trade in goods

Source: Author’s computations based on WITS data.

6 Author’s computations based on WITS data (four-digit export product category, average 2015–2019).
7 Author’s computations based on WITS data covering 45 African countries with complete goods exports and imports data for 2015–2019.
The trade-weighted most favoured nation (MFN) tariff rates imposed by Ghana on imports from African countries ranged from 3.2% for Tanzania to 32.6% for Niger.\(^{8}\) As a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Ghana extends preferential tariff rates (0%) to 14 other ECOWAS members.\(^{9}\) As part of the AfCFTA, Ghana’s tariffs will be liberalised progressively, apart from ‘sensitive’ and ‘exclusion list’ products. Tariffs will be liberalised (to zero) for 90% of tariff lines over a period of ten years for least developed countries (LDCs), five years for non-LDCs, and 15 years for six selected countries\(^{10}\) (Hartzenberg, 2023).

Sensitive products shall not exceed 7% of total tariff lines, while the exclusion list shall not exceed 3% of total tariff lines with an intra-Africa total trade value limit of not more than 10% (ibid.).

The applied tariff rate (AHS) is defined by the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) as the lowest existing preferential tariff rate or applied MFN tariff. Figure 7 shows the top 15 imports by Ghana from Africa, which account for more than half of Ghana’s imports from the continent. It also shows that the AHS imposed by Ghana on imports from African countries is broadly lower than the AHS imposed on imports from the rest of the world, which means it makes sense for Ghana to source these products from African neighbours. However, this raises further questions about whether Ghana may have diverted away from a more efficient supplier (but without preferential treatment, being outside a trade agreement) towards a less efficient supplier (but with preferential treatment within a trade agreement).

Figure 7 Effectively applied tariff rates (AHS) on Ghana’s top imported products from Africa and the rest of the world, 2019

![Figure 7](image)

Note: There is no AHS information on product category 2710 (petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous mineral other than crude).

Source: Author based on WITS data.

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\(^{8}\) Author’s computations based on WITS data.

\(^{9}\) ECOWAS members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

\(^{10}\) Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Non-tariff measures (NTMs), including sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical barriers to trade, pre-shipment inspection, and price and quality control – ranging from 60 NTMs to 768 NTMs imposed by Niger and Mauritius, respectively – also affect Ghana’s imports from Africa. Similarly, Ghana is implementing its own NTMs, albeit on a relatively lower level (118 NTMs), among 20 African countries. However, the number of NTMs does not indicate the magnitude of restrictiveness on trade. Figure 8 shows ad valorem equivalent trade costs that incorporate not only international transport costs and tariffs but also other components, including costs associated with differences in languages, currencies and cumbersome import or export procedures. It also shows the ad valorem equivalent trading costs between Ghana and respective trading partners as of 2019.

Based on this measure, trade between Ghana and Madagascar involves additional costs amounting to around 763% of the value of the goods compared with when these two countries trade goods within their borders. In other words, trading with Madagascar is about eight times more expensive than trading within Ghana’s borders (and vice versa). The data also suggest that, other than when trading with ECOWAS members and South Africa, Ghana’s bilateral trading costs are higher with most African partners than with those outside the region (e.g. China, the UK, the US).

**Figure 8** Bilateral ad valorem trade costs between Ghana and respective partners, 2019

Note: Trade costs for total goods in the case of Zambia are based on available data as of 2017.
Source: UNESCAP database.

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11. Author’s computations based on the Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS) database, accessed in September 2021. Ghana ranked 13th out of the 20 African countries with the most NTMs. Only 20 African countries have available data.
12. Or as a percentage of the estimated value of the goods.
13. It should be noted that the measure is an average for all traded goods, some of which may not be traded (or traded very little) in practice owing to prohibitively high trade costs. This measure, developed by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) and the World Bank in 2017, includes all costs involved in trading goods internationally with another partner (i.e. bilaterally) relative to those involved in trading goods domestically.
14. Or as a percentage of the estimated value of the goods.
15. See Arvis et al. (2012) for a full discussion of the methodology.
More specifically, the Ghanian government recognises the following challenges to boosting Ghana’s trade with the rest of Africa (MoTI and NCO, 2022):

- lack of a clear policy and incentive framework for companies exporting to Africa
- dependency by other African countries on tariffs as national revenue
- prevalence of NTMs that impede the flow of goods to other African countries
- multiplicity of visa and travel restrictions
- limited access to and high cost of financing for production and exports
- language barriers, especially low levels of literacy in French, Arabic, Portuguese and Kiswahili languages
- non-compatibility of customs procedures
- costly sanitary and phytosanitary measures
- complex rules on product standards and licensing requirements
- inadequate definition of rules of origin and customs cooperation
- challenges associated with expeditious trade remedies
- inadequate trans-border infrastructure, logistics and transportation (sea, air, road)
- lack of strong long-term partnerships and commercial linkages between Ghanaian businesses and distributors and agents in African countries
- absence of cross-border value chains for products and services and
- absence of foreign trade representatives in Ghana’s key markets in Africa.

Addressing the above bottlenecks to increasing Ghana’s intra-African trade can unlock the opportunities from Ghana’s intra-continental trade, including in the context of the AfCFTA.

3.2 Status of Ghana’s AfCFTA implementation

Ghana has been one of the strongest advocates of the AfCFTA. It was one of the very first countries to sign and ratify the agreement. It submitted its instrument of ratification to the African Union Commission (AUC) in May 2018. As of February 2023, 54 out of the 55 African countries (except Eritrea) had signed the AfCFTA and 46 countries had deposited their instruments of ratification to the AUC (Tralac, 2023).

Countries ratifying the agreement can trade with each other based on their tariff concessions and rules of origin. As of January 2022, 87.7% of tariff lines had been agreed, with tariff lines pending in textiles, automotives, sugar and tobacco (AU, 2022a). Negotiations are ongoing, with 46 countries having submitted their provisional schedules of tariff concessions as of February 2023 (AU, 2023).

A World Bank (2020) simulation suggests that the share of continental imports to total imports could grow from 12% in 2020 to 18% in 2035, but with the AfCFTA to 25% by 2035. The share of intra-African exports is also expected to increase from 12% in 2020 to 15% in 2035, but up to 21% with the AfCFTA. The simulation suggests that Ghana (together with Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania) will reap the highest benefits from the increase in imports. Ghana (together with Cameroon, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) is also expected to benefit from the fastest growth of intra-AfCFTA exports to the AU, with exports doubling or trebling with respect to the baseline. Building on this study, Echandi et al. (2022) project that, under a scenario whereby AfCFTA attracts greater flows of FDI, Ghana would experience one of the fastest increases in wages of unskilled females compared with the national average in 18 out of 29 countries and regions, helping reduce poverty and inequality in Ghana.
Ghana’s steering role in the AfCFTA is also demonstrated by its hosting of the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra. Government initiatives towards AfCFTA implementation, such as national plans, export development, customs management, electronic registries and stakeholder engagements in the context of the AfCFTA were embedded in the budget statement released in March 2021 to ensure that Ghanaian businesses benefit fully from the AfCFTA (MOF, 2021).

Four days after the commencement of the AfCFTA on 1 January 2021, two Ghanaian companies exported products using the AfCFTA preferences. Alcoholic product manufacturer Kasapreko airfreighted a container-load of goods to South Africa, whereas Ghandour Cosmetics shipped items to Guinea by sea (Ighobor, 2021). However, more than one year since the AfCFTA took effect, commercially meaningful trade has not commenced (AU, 2022b).

In this regard, the Ninth Meeting of the AfCFTA Ministers of Councils, in July 2022, announced the AfCFTA Secretariat Guided Trade Initiative (GTI). Ghana, along with seven other countries (Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania and Tunisia), will participate. The GTI aims to (i) allow commercially meaningful trading under the AfCFTA; (ii) test the operational, institutional, legal and trade policy environment under the AfCFTA; and (iii) send an important positive message to African economic operators (ibid.). The products earmarked for trade under the GTI include ceramic tiles, batteries, tea, coffee, processed meat products, corn starch, sugar, pasta, glucose syrup, dried fruits and sisal fibre, among others, aligned with the AfCFTA focus on value chain development (AfCFTA Secretariat, 2022). While the GTI needs to cover more products and countries, this is nonetheless a positive step in generating longstanding business relations, especially among countries in the continent with weaker trade links (Mendez-Parra, 2022).

Following the announcement of the GTI, Ghana received exported batteries from Kenya under the AfCFTA on 23 September 2022 (Gichuku, 2022). This was followed by the Ghana AfCFTA National Coordinating Office’s (NCO’s) announcement that the country would start to participate in the pilot trading in a commercially meaningful way by October 2022 (Jonny-Nuekpe, 2022). The NCO has assisted 30 Ghanaian firms in securing certificates of origin that allow them to start trading under the AfCFTA. Two of these firms (Benso Oil Palm Plantation Ltd and KEDA Ghana Ceramics) have started exporting under the AfCFTA since October 2022 (Business Ghana, 2022).

In addition to participating in the GTI, Ghana launched its National AfCFTA Policy Framework and Action Plan (NAPFAP) on 2 August 2022. This identifies strategic objectives, policies and action plans for 2022–2027, focusing on trade policy, trade facilitation, trade-related infrastructure, productive capacity enhancement, trade information, trade and development finance, and market integration (MoTI and NCO, 2022; Table 4). It also outlines the role of implementing agencies and details a communication strategy and a framework for monitoring and evaluation (with timeframes) of the implementation of identified activities. The National Steering Committee for Boosting Trade with Africa, supported by technical working groups, provides technical guidance and oversight for the execution of the NAPFAP. Meanwhile, the NCO is responsible for the day-to-day management of the NAPFAP’s implementation and programme administration.

A digital platform, the AfCFTA Hub, was launched on 29 August 2022 to promote, enhance and advance Ghana’s digital trading, electronic commerce, marketplace and general services in the context of the AfCFTA (MoCD, 2022). This also aims to make it easier for tech start-ups, small and medium enterprises, and other information and communication technology goods producers and service providers to find markets across Africa, in time for Ghana’s participation in the pilot GTI (ibid.).
Table 4  Overview of main components and strategic objectives of Ghana’s National AfCFTA Policy Framework and Action Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Strategic objectives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. AfCFTA Trade policy</td>
<td>• increase Ghana’s exports to other AfCFTA markets</td>
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<td>• incorporate AfCFTA rules and regulations into the laws of Ghana by implementing AfCFTA obligations in Ghana</td>
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<td>2. Trade facilitation</td>
<td>• ensure speedy and efficient cargo clearance processes at ports and border posts in a safe and secure environment</td>
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<td>• ensure non-tariff barriers and technical standards do not constrain Ghana’s trade with Africa</td>
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<td>3. Trade-related infrastructure</td>
<td>• provide reliable, accessible and competitively priced energy for businesses trading under the AfCFTA</td>
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<td>• establish a world-class inter-modal transport and logistics hub to facilitate inter-country and sub-regional connectivity across Africa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• provide appropriate market infrastructure including warehouses, storage and distribution facilities to enhance trade with Africa</td>
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<td>4. Enhancing productive capacity</td>
<td>• provide targeted support for increased value addition for Ghanaian exports to the rest of Africa</td>
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<td>• provide appropriate production infrastructure including special economic zones, industrial parks and logistics parks to enhance productive capacity for export to Africa</td>
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<td>• improve access to raw materials and other critical inputs for strategic sectors in such quantity and quality at strategic prices</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• support the adoption and deployment of modern technology and machinery to enhance productivity in strategic sectors</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• improve availability and quality of managerial and entrepreneurial skills in strategic sectors</td>
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<td>5. Trade information</td>
<td>• coordinate and improve existing trade information platforms to enhance access to information for intra-African trade</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• stimulate demand for ‘Made in Ghana’ goods and services across Africa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• provide timely and accurate information on market trends for Ghanaian businesses</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Trade and development finance</td>
<td>• develop innovative financing mechanisms for production and trading under AfCFTA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• facilitate cross-border payment to support Ghana’s trade across Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ensure availability of finance for production of tradeable goods and services, and for e-commerce and digital trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Factor market integration</td>
<td>• conclude and implement agreements on mutual recognition of qualifications</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• harmonise and align relevant national laws with the relevant protocols on free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment</td>
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</table>

Source: MoTI and NCO (2022).

At the level of regional communities (of which Ghana is a member), the ECOWAS Commission submitted its tariff offer on 5 December 2020 (AU, 2021). ECOWAS conducted a technical review with partner organisations of the draft Regional Implementation Strategy in November 2021, which it presented to state and non-state actors in March 2022 (ECOWAS, 2021a; 2022a). The regional ECOWAS strategy for implementation of the AfCFTA is aimed at (i) reinforcing implementation of the ECOWAS mandate in strengthening intra-regional trade; (ii) guiding its contribution to the negotiation and implementation of the AfCFTA at regional level and (iii) supporting its member states in implementing their national AfCFTA strategies (ECOWAS, 2022a).

ECOWAS technical working groups covering goods, services, dispute settlement, investment, intellectual property rights (IPR), competition policy and digital trade as well as women and youth in trade in the context of AfCFTA have been established, and they held a coordination meeting in January 2022 (ECOWAS, 2022b). At the national level, the ECOWAS Commission has supported national AfCFTA initiatives

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16 This review was undertaken at a meeting held by the ECOWAS Commission, in collaboration with officials from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the West African Economic and Monetary Union Commission, the United Nations Development Programme and GIZ.
through a series of sensitisation and capacity-building workshops (ECOWAS, 2020a; 2020b; 2021b). As of March 2022, 12 ECOWAS member states had developed or were in the process of developing their national AfCFTA implementation strategies.

Meanwhile, Ghana may need to expedite its preparations for the next phases of AfCFTA negotiations, such as for the protocols on investment, competition and IPR. In November 2022, the AfCFTA Council of Ministers in charge of Trade adopted these AfCFTA protocols (GMI, 2022). Based on ODI interviews, it is understood that the AU Heads of State noted these protocols in November 2022, and, pending a legal review, they are expected to be formally adopted in February 2023. Following this, the member states will need to ratify the protocols. Currently, Ghana has relevant IPR laws, particularly the amended Industrial Designs Act, the Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act (WTO, 2022). However, Ghana is yet to develop a national competition policy and enact a national competition law, which are targeted to be accomplished by Q42022 and Q12023, respectively (MoTI and NCO, 2022). Strong commitment to implementing the NAPFAP’s monitoring and evaluation component with detailed activities, key performance indicators, timeframes and lead agencies will be instrumental in implementing the planned actions in a timely manner.
4 Opportunities and challenges for Ghana’s trade and investment

Based on the analysis in the previous sections of Ghana’s macroeconomic performance, trade and investment landscape, and AfCFTA implementation, Table 5 summarises Ghana’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks for key stakeholders (e.g. policy-makers, traders/investors, international donors) to consider for Ghana to make the most out of trade, investment and the AfCFTA.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 5</th>
<th>Ghana’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks</th>
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| **Strengths** | • young and increasingly educated population with expanding middle class  
• stable remittances flows (around 5.7% of GDP in 2015–2021), tending to be higher during shock periods (e.g. 6.1% of GDP in 2020 at the peak of Covid-19)  
• above average performance in terms of overall digital readiness and structural policies compared with other African countries  
• build-up of years of strong political (democracy), social and human capital  
• strong political will and strategic government efforts in positioning Ghana as a regional hub for ECOWAS and the AfCFTA |
| **Weaknesses** | • dependence of the export industry on the extractives sector exposing the economy to global price shocks, with implications for household income, fiscal sustainability and stability of prices and exchange rates  
• deterioration of macro-financial conditions, including a persistent fiscal deficit, high risk of public debt distress, accelerating inflation, sharp depreciation of the cedi and increasing interest rates, which have contributed to credit rating downgrades; the latest current local debt restructuring and suspension of international debt payments are furthering exchange rate pressure and overall uncertainty  
• a challenging investment and business environment (e.g. intermittent power supply, low-skilled labour force, underdeveloped financial sector, burdensome bureaucracy, high interest rates)  
• specific challenges on intra-African trade and implementation of the AfCFTA, including prevalence of non-technical barriers to trade, inadequate cross-border infrastructure and absence of a policy and incentive framework for companies to trade across Africa (until August 2022, when the NAPFAP was launched) |
| **Opportunities** | • strategic geographical location and position within ECOWAS and the AfCFTA (as host of the AfCFTA Secretariat) to capture a continental market base for goods and services in manufacturing, logistics, finance and the digital economy  
• the increasing role of Ghana’s trade in services (faster growth than goods)  
• interventions to boost exports in the following major Ghanaian export products with increasing world demand: semi-manufactured gold and gold compounds; petroleum oils; manganese ores and concentrates; aluminium; carbon dioxide; mahogany; coniferous wood; cocoa products; guavas, mangoes and mangosteens; cashew nuts; tuna; vegetable fats and oils; plastic household articles; and products for conveyance or packaging  
• faster gains from inter-African trade facilitated by the GIT, combined with timely implementation of the NAPFAP |
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<th>Threats (risks)</th>
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<td>• delays in accessing the IMF programme, which may contribute to prolonged loss of Ghana's market access to international financing, and put more pressure on the already deteriorating macro-financial economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>• further escalation of the Russia–Ukraine war, which could put further upward pressure on domestic food and oil prices, affecting household consumption, and induce sharp global price volatility, affecting export demand</td>
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<tr>
<td>• further tightening of global financial conditions, inducing capital outflows from Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>• delays in AfCFTA implementation or higher preference to trade outside Africa owing to relatively higher costs (tariff and non-tariff measures) of intra-African trade and/or domestic legislative constraints</td>
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<tr>
<td>• adverse weather conditions that may negatively affect the agricultural harvest, including that of cocoa (major export)</td>
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</table>
Ghana exhibited faster economic growth (6.6% on average) than its counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa (3.5%) or LMICs (5%) in the decade (2011–2019) prior to Covid-19. However, the overlapping shocks of the pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war spillover effects, combined with Ghana’s pre-existing public debt vulnerabilities, have led to the fast deterioration of the economy. As of October/November 2022, inflation was at 50.3%, lending rates were at 31.4%, the cedi had depreciated by 58.3% (January–October 2022) and the government had announced the restructuring of domestic debt and the suspension of payments of international debt.

There has been staff-level agreement for $3 billion in IMF financing, which may help re-anchor Ghana’s macro environment, but final IMF approval will require sufficient assurances by Ghana of a comprehensive debt restructuring. By January 2023, Ghana has applied to the G20 Common Framework to restructure its bilateral debt with Paris Club and non-Paris Club members. Hence, the growth outlook and macro stability hinge very greatly on the progress of the government’s discussions with all its creditors, which will take time, based on the recent experiences of other countries (e.g. Chad, Zambia, Sri Lanka). Protracted delays in IMF financing may exacerbate pressures in the Ghanian economy, especially in the context of other external developments (e.g. Russia–Ukraine war spillover effects, global financial tightening, potential slowdown in China).

Despite the difficult macroeconomic environment, Ghana is taking positive steps to capitalise on other opportunities from investment and trade. The country continued to attract FDI projects in services, oil and gas, and manufacturing in 2021. While the extractives (crude oil, gold) largely drove the trade surplus in the first nine months of 2022, services in trade have been gaining in importance (e.g. faster growth than in goods and a higher share of GDP compared with in other African countries) in recent years, presenting a unique opportunity. In addition, the government has been making active efforts to increase Ghanaian firms’ participation in the AfCFTA. It has joined another pioneer seven countries in the AfCFTA Secretariat’s GTI, helped 30 firms secure certificates of origins necessary for trading under the AfCFTA and launched a national AfCFTA plan with clear action points and targets to help the country expedite and maximise its participation in the AfCFTA.

Nevertheless, the current macroeconomic instability has erected serious constraints to business, trade and investment activities (e.g. purchasing power erosion, high borrowing rates, a weaker cedi). This may have lowered Ghana’s attractiveness as an investment destination. Government efforts and resources have been reallocated towards debt restructuring, potentially putting other government initiatives on hold. Hence, in the short term, it may be necessary for all stakeholders (e.g. donors, international financial institutions, creditors) to support Ghana’s expedited efforts towards debt restructuring and the securing of international financing. Boosting implementation of the AfCFTA may also help expand and diversify Ghana’s trade and investment, contributing to the country’s future economic resilience.


AU (2022c) ‘What is the AfCFTA Guided Trade Initiative all about?’ (https://au-afcfta.org/2022/10/what-is-the-afcfta-guided-trade-initiative-all-about/).


ECOWAS (2020b) ‘ECOWAS holds regional sensitisation workshop on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) for the private sector’ (www.ecowas.int/ecowas-holds-regional-sensitisation-workshop-on-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-afcfta-for-the-private-sector/).


ECOWAS (2021b) ‘ECOWAS holds capacity building workshop on digital trade for the AfCFTA e-commerce agenda’ (www.ecowas.int/ecowas-holds-capacity-building-workshop-on-digital-trade-for-the-afcfta-e-commerce-agenda/).


