

HPG Commissioned Report

Grand Bargain annual independent report 2020

Executive summary

Victoria Metcalfe-Hough, Wendy Fenton,
Barnaby Willitts-King and Alexandra Spencer

June 2020

HPG

Humanitarian
Policy Group



About the authors

Victoria Metcalfe-Hough is an independent consultant and a Research Associate with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at ODI.

Wendy Fenton is the Coordinator of the Humanitarian Practice Network and a Senior Research Fellow with HPG.

Barnaby Willitts-King is a Senior Research Fellow with HPG.

Alexandra Spencer is a Research Officer with HPG.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Samuel Carpenter (DFID), as well as other members of the Grand Bargain Facilitation Group, the Grand Bargain Secretariat and the office of the Eminent Person for their guidance and support throughout this project. Thanks also to Paul Harvey of Humanitarian Outcomes, Nick Van Praag and Meg Sattler of Ground Truth Solutions, Liz Steele, Wendy Rogers and Verity Outram of Development Initiatives, and Lydia Poole (independent) for their inputs and review.

The authors also express their sincere appreciation to the many individuals – from signatory and non-signatory institutions – who gave their time to speak with us as part of the research process.

Finally, sincere thanks to HPG colleagues, including Sorcha O’Callaghan (Director of HPG) for her overall leadership and support; Matthew Foley for his usual expert editing; Hannah Bass for her support with infographics and publishing; Katie Forsythe for proofreading; and Catherine Langdon and Sarah Cahoon for their unwavering administrative support.



Disclaimer

This document has been produced by the Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group contracted through the Expert Advisory Call Down Service Lot B ‘Strengthening resilience and response to crises’, managed by DAI Europe Ltd (contact info@lotb-resilience.org).

The views expressed in this document are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent DAI Europe’s views or policies.

Published June 2020 © CROWN COPYRIGHT

Executive summary

In May 2016, representatives of 18 donor countries and 16 international aid organisations from the UN, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRCM) agreed a ‘Grand Bargain’. This outlined 51 commitments to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international humanitarian aid, and included a voluntary annual reporting mechanism, supported by an annual independent review, in order to monitor progress against the commitments.

The third Annual Independent Report (AIR), published in June 2019, concluded that there were a number of areas where important progress had been made in the previous year, including on cash programming, amounting to a growing systemic shift in policy and practice; on localising responses, with emerging positive practice that could be scaled up; successful testing of the premise that a harmonised reporting template could reduce the reporting burden for aid organisations, while satisfying donors’ requirements for a quality narrative on how their funds were spent; and on joint intersectoral needs analysis, with signatories coming together to address key technical challenges. The report also highlighted outstanding gaps and challenges to greater progress identified in the AIR 2018. These included the sheer breadth and scope of the commitments, the overly bureaucratic nature of the Grand Bargain, the lack of a more strategic approach to delivering across thematic areas, the focus on the technical rather than the political obstacles that continued to stall progress and a lack of clarity on the common vision that the signatories were working towards.

This fourth AIR assesses the collective progress made by signatories against the commitments under the Grand Bargain during 2019. It was commissioned by the UK Department for International Development

(DFID) on behalf of the Grand Bargain Facilitation Group (FG). The analysis for this report was conducted using the same methodology as past AIRs, with self-reports provided by 58 of the 61 donors and aid organisations that were signatories in 2019 used as the primary evidence base. Additional data was collated through narrative reports from the co-conveners of each of the eight workstreams that have a coordination mechanism, as well as a review of available literature. The research team sought to verify data provided and address data gaps through semi-structured interviews with 54 of the 58 signatories that submitted reports, and with 17 co-conveners for the eight workstreams.

The review process for 2019 was undertaken in early 2020 as the Covid-19 pandemic unfolded across the world. The nature of this unprecedented crisis, including the widespread and prolonged lockdown imposed by governments, impacted all involved in this process – signatories, other stakeholders and the research team. The research team would like to thank all those involved for their understanding, and their efforts to keep this year’s review process on track.

Key areas of progress

In 2019, collective and individual efforts by signatories have brought tangible results in a number of areas, demonstrating that the Grand Bargain can lead to system-wide changes in policy and practice. As in past years, workstream 3 (*increase the use and the coordination of cash*) saw the greatest investments by signatories, including the co-conveners (the UK and the World Food Programme (WFP)). These investments brought positive results, including in relation to the core commitment (3.1+3.6 – *increase the routine use of cash, where appropriate,*

alongside other tools. Some may wish to set targets): preliminary statistics from the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and Development Initiatives (DI) indicate that the volume of cash programming in humanitarian settings, including multi-purpose cash, has doubled since 2016, reaching \$5.6 billion by the end of 2019. Progress was also made on enhancing efficiencies in cash programming; in instituting common standards; in nascent discussions on localising cash responses; and in more coordinated approaches at global and country level. Although not the principal driver, the Grand Bargain has helped forge a system-wide shift in policy and practice on cash programming.

Progress was also made on localising responses, under workstream 2 (*more support and funding for local and national responders*), co-led by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and Switzerland. In respect of core commitment 2.4 (*achieve by 2020 a global aggregated target of at least 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible to improve outcomes for affected people and reduce transaction costs*), there was an increase in the number of signatories meeting the 25% target for providing funding to local actors as directly as possible – from seven in 2018 to 10 in 2019. There was an increased level of activity reported by signatories against core commitment 2.1 (*increase and support multi-year investments in the institutional capacities of local and national responders, including preparedness, response and coordination*): the same group of aid organisation signatories continued their investments in capacity-strengthening support for local actors, but some that did not traditionally work with local partners in this way also reported making a more concerted shift in this respect, including instituting multi-year partnership agreements. There has clearly been a system-wide shift at policy level towards more localised responses, and this review evidences a range of positive practices that can be built on to bring about a similar shift in system-wide practice – if signatories can make the requisite political and financial investments.

Progress in workstream 5 (*improve joint and impartial needs assessments*) continued apace in 2019. The momentum gained in 2018 was

sustained throughout 2019, with the co-conveners (the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)) focusing on delivering a package of tools to support joint or more joined-up country-level multisectoral assessments and intersectoral analysis. This package was deliberately embedded in the roll-out of the enhanced Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) for 2020, with positive results: 75% of 16 Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs) for 2020 that were assessed by a multi-stakeholder team against agreed criteria were scored 75% or above, reaching the target set by the workstream in early 2019. Together with the results of the HPC Multi-Partner Review (MPR), this indicates an overall upward trend in the quality of intersectoral analyses being conducted by HCTs.

Responding to concerns outlined in the AIR 2019, there was also a concerted effort from the co-conveners (the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), OCHA, Sweden and Canada) of workstream 7+8 (*enhance quality funding through reduced earmarking and multi-year planning and funding*) to institute stronger leadership and a clear division of labour, and to formulate a plan of action to support delivery against the commitments under this theme. These efforts are starting to bear fruit, with a range of initiatives under way at end-2019, including gathering evidence to enable better understanding of challenges and identify possible solutions. Crucially, the number of donors reporting having met or exceeded the target of 30% of their humanitarian funding allocated as unearmarked/softly earmarked funding, as per core commitment 8.2+8.5 (*donors progressively reduce earmarking, aiming to achieve a global target of 30% of humanitarian contributions that is unearmarked or softly earmarked by 2020. Aid organisations reduce earmarking when channelling donor funds with reduced earmarking to their partners*), increased from seven in 2018 to 11 in 2019. Seven donors reported year-on-year increases in the volume of multi-year funding that they provide.

Progress was also made in instituting greater transparency in the publication of funding and activity data, with the percentage of signatories (or one or more of their members/affiliates) publishing some data on their funding and activity to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) Standard by the end of 2019 increasing to 85%, from 73% in June 2017 (commitment 1.1 – *signatories publish timely, transparent, harmonised and open high-quality data on humanitarian funding within two years of the World Humanitarian Summit, with IATI serving as the basis for a common standard*). And 45% of signatories reported that they ‘used’ IATI data in some way during 2019, according to the definition developed by DI. The self-reporting also evidenced a strong commitment among signatories to fulfilling commitments on enhancing collaboration between humanitarian and development actors, including continued collective investment from the UN system and its partners to develop better-quality joint humanitarian and development analyses and plans at country level, in collaboration with national counterparts.

Leadership and governance processes of the Grand Bargain were strengthened in 2019. The new Eminent Person (EP), Minister Sigrid Kaag of the Netherlands, took up her role in June 2019 at the Grand Bargain Annual Meeting and swiftly began investing significant efforts in encouraging signatories to make greater progress – efforts which have already begun to bring results in terms of increased political momentum for change. With support from signatories and the EP, the FG adopted a stronger governance role in response to recommendations made in the AIRs in 2018 and 2019 – enhancing the self-reporting process in order to better capture where progress was being made and what challenges were inhibiting progress, focusing discussions at the Annual Meeting on identifying and agreeing specific action points at collective and institutional levels, and instituting, by the end of the year, preliminary discussions within and across workstreams on risk management and risk sharing. The Secretariat was expanded in the latter half of 2019 with the appointment of a second staff member. With this additional

capacity, the team was able to support increased internal coordination and information flows among the various structures of the Grand Bargain and increase communication with stakeholders outside of the mechanism.

Although there was still no strategy for rolling out the commitments to country and crisis levels, many signatories and groups of signatories have taken steps to institute changes in their operational practice at that level in accordance with the commitments; there is a wealth of positive practice emerging from the field on supporting local and national responders, on enhancing the quality of funding, on cash programming and on increasing collaboration between humanitarian and development actors; and there is continued interest from both international and national actors at country level to use the Grand Bargain – its content, if not its ‘brand’ – to bring about real change. Progress on gender equality and women’s empowerment was relatively positive in 2019, with the Friends of Gender Group (FoGG) continuing to use the Grand Bargain to bring pressure to bear on signatories to fulfil commitments on this theme that they have made elsewhere.

Four years into the Grand Bargain process, it is clear that the mechanism is acting as a lever for change, that it is evolving in response to the dynamics of the wider aid context and even that it is maturing, offering advantages not necessarily envisaged when it was originally designed in 2016. Many smaller signatories from all constituent groups asserted that their participation in this mechanism has afforded them opportunities to contribute to, even influence, system-wide discussions on key issues in a way they had not been able to in the past. While substantive shifts in *practice* have not yet been realised in most areas, the Grand Bargain has facilitated a more nuanced discussion between signatory groups of the challenges each faces in changing their practice, and how to work together to address these. It is evident that the Grand Bargain *is* having a wider impact in terms of a more cohesive, collaborative approach across the international humanitarian aid sector – a crucial element in helping drive forward reforms of the whole humanitarian system.

Remaining challenges, weaknesses and key barriers to change

Notwithstanding the above, there remained substantial challenges in moving towards the original goals of the Grand Bargain, with very limited substantive progress on some of the core commitments in particular. Although a large number of donor signatories (87%) reported activity on core commitment 4.5 (*make joint regular functional monitoring and performance reviews and reduce individual donor assessments, evaluations, verifications, risk management and oversight processes*), there is little evidence that these efforts are having a tangible impact. Several donors referred to their efforts to share assessment or partner information with other donors, but while they may consider this a significant shift in their internal rules, the practical impact on many of their partners (particularly those with multiple donors) is likely to be limited – as indicated in the reporting from aid organisation signatories. The lack of progress in this regard reflects under-performance in workstream 4 (*reduce duplication and management costs with periodic functional review*) as a whole. The focus of the workstream remained largely the same as in 2018, with the co-conveners (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Japan) focusing efforts on using UN Reform initiatives to secure efficiency gains for UN agencies in procurement and shared premises, as well as rolling out agreed comparable cost structures. But the failure to expand the workstream strategy, the continued lack of engagement with NGO initiatives towards more transparent and comparable cost structures, and the glacially slow pace of coordinated activity on the core commitment has increased frustration with this workstream, among aid organisations and donors alike.

In past AIRs, workstream 9 (*harmonise and simplify reporting requirements*) has been highlighted as performing well. However, despite the best efforts of the co-conveners (the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and Germany), the self-reports and interviews indicate that little progress had been made by the end of 2019 in rolling out the

finalised 8+3 narrative reporting template: just six signatories (9%) had rolled the template out globally to their downstream partners by the end of the year. Little evidence was presented during interviews to justify this low take-up, with many signatories explaining that they were unaware that the pilot had been concluded and the template finalised. Whatever the reasons, the opportunities that the template offers to reduce the narrative reporting burden, particularly for smaller aid organisations, are not being realised.

Although there was important progress under workstream 7+8, specifically on increased provision of flexible and multi-year funding, the evidence available indicates a complex picture. The way in which much of the multi-year funding reported by donors is given (i.e. multi-year framework agreements with staggered annual release of funds on the basis of an annual performance assessment) may limit its ‘predictability’ in the sense that current modalities generally do not offer aid organisations sufficient guarantees to enable them to make the longer-term institutional, programmatic or partnership investments required to support multi-year planning or approaches. It is also unclear how much of the increased volume of unearmarked or softly earmarked funding from donors is allocated directly to aid organisations rather than via the OCHA-managed Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and/or Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) or other pooled funds, which then effectively earmark those funds onwards against specific objectives. Certainly, aid organisations reported no or only very limited increases in the volume that they receive, and explained that, even if they do receive flexible funds, there is a limit to how far they can pass that flexibility down the chain as it ultimately needs to be allocated against specific programming objectives. For some signatory aid organisations, funding patterns have not changed at all – their funding from institutional donors remains largely earmarked, projectised and short-term.

There are also a number of weaknesses in the overarching strategy of the Grand Bargain which, though highlighted in past AIRs, have not been addressed and continue to impede

further progress overall. The workstreams have remained largely focused on technical issues, with some success in this respect. But there was no corresponding political investment in addressing the long-standing challenges that continue to inhibit change, including a lack of agreement on the leadership and coordination of multi-purpose cash programming, low tolerance of the risks inherent in more localised responses and a lack of investments to augment capacities for better-quality intersectoral analysis. Although there was increased collaboration with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 2019, most notably between the co-conveners (the United States and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR)) of workstream 6 (*a participation revolution*), and outreach by the EP to the IASC Principals, there was no major effort to articulate the added value of the Grand Bargain in relation to pre-existing mechanisms, including the IASC, the UN Reform process, the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative and the donor members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). Nor was there a strategic approach to working in concert, rather than in competition, with these entities and mechanisms to further common goals on reforming the humanitarian system.

Most problematic, however, has been the continued failure to take to scale many of the positive or illustrative practices that have emerged through the Grand Bargain process. A large number of pilots and innovative initiatives have been launched or implemented across the commitments by workstreams, by individual signatories and at country or crisis level. But contrary to recommendations in past AIRs, very few are being scaled up even where there are measurable results.

The key barriers to change are both practical and political. The scope of the commitments is still too broad, and much of their content too vague to provide guidance or direction, or to measure progress. It is abundantly clear from successive years of self-reporting that few signatories treat the Grand Bargain as a whole package, with the vast majority, including the largest institutions, having determined their

own priorities from among the original list. This ‘pick-and-choose’ approach has been compounded by the sheer scale and scope of the bureaucracy that has been created around the Grand Bargain (i.e. the multiple sub-groups, meetings, consultations and reporting processes). The designation in 2018 of a set of 11 core commitments, drawn from the original 51, was an effort to address this by articulating where collective efforts should be focused. But by the end of 2019, it had become clear that the effect of this strategy had been limited. The priorities selected were not strategic and were not interconnected, and progress against them has been very uneven. In addition, there were limited efforts to link workstreams or identify and address issues and challenges that cut across all workstreams, including those suggested in the AIR 2019. Some signatories have made their own connections across workstreams, articulating for example how they have integrated efforts to achieve more localised and people-centred approaches in their nexus programming. But the impact of such efforts will be limited unless they can be taken to scale through a more strategic, cross-cutting approach at the collective level.

Measuring performance against the core commitments still presents a major challenge. The number of signatories reporting against the indicators developed in early 2019 and revised again in early 2020 increased slightly overall, but still varied considerably per indicator: 91% of donors reported some data against the indicator for core commitment 7.1a, compared with only 23% of aid organisations. Many signatories explained that they simply do not have access to the data required to report against many of the quantitative indicators, or need to collate data manually and do not have sufficient resources, or interest, to do this. Where quantitative data was reported, it was often not comparable because signatories used different metrics or terminology, or had different interpretations of the guidance issued by co-conveners on data to be reported.

Some long-standing issues arising from the original framing of the Grand Bargain have never been fully reconciled and continue to inhibit progress overall. There is still no clear

agreement and no strategy on how the Grand Bargain should be delivering at country level, which means that the cascading effect of changes at headquarters are slow and ad hoc, and that efforts to scale-up or expand positive practices at country level have been minimal. The AIR 2018 highlighted the lack of agreement among signatories on whether membership should be expanded. In the absence of a clear decision, membership has slowly increased, but managing the trade-offs between inclusivity and efficiency has proved challenging. When the Grand Bargain was publicly announced in 2016 there was specific reference to a goal of saving \$1 billion through increased efficiencies, but there has since been a distinct lack of reference to, and an apparent nervousness about, this goal, which in turn has led to a lack of focus on how to achieve, consolidate and measure efficiency gains arising from signatories' efforts. The lack of constructive debate in this area has meant that there is an unhelpful divergence of views on what efficiency means as a concept; who is responsible for making efficiency gains and how this might impact others in the chain; and, crucially, how to balance efficiency with increased effectiveness of humanitarian aid interventions.

The mechanism has engendered a spirit of collaboration between donors and aid organisations that is helping them address the challenges they face in trying to achieve their collective objectives. But this is in spite of, rather than because of, the quid pro quo principle on which the Grand Bargain was founded. In reality, the quid pro quo (the 'bargain') is not functioning, and has instead become an unhelpful framing, with some signatories excusing their lack of action in some areas as linked to a (perceived) lack of action by counterparts in other groups. Making the institutional changes and investments required to deliver against the commitments calls for the highest level of political commitment within each signatory institution. However, the majority of Sherpas are not principals, ministers or senior officials, and may therefore not have adequate influence over institutional direction and decision-making. The above factors

combined are resulting in a decreasing sense of ownership among many signatories over the mechanism itself and the commitments, and in a limited sense of accountability to deliver what has been promised.

Conclusions and recommendations

In the fourth year of the Grand Bargain, progress was consolidated, even accelerated, in key areas, but there was also a continuing failure to address the long-standing challenges that have inhibited positive change in the international humanitarian system. Cash programming continued to expand, with common standards and a strong evidence base attesting to efficiency and effectiveness gains against a range of programming objectives. Funding to local actors slowly increased, and targeted investments to strengthen the capacities of local partners are bringing measurable results. The quality of joint intersectoral analysis and related planning improved, and there was greater strategic direction and focus on addressing the barriers to quality funding and instituting more coherent and consistent approaches to participation. The new EP has brought stronger, more visible leadership; the FG has adopted a more strategic and substantive role in holding signatories to account for delivering on their commitments; and the expanded Secretariat team is proving a valuable support to these efforts, enabling greater communication between signatories at different levels, as well as with external audiences.

But ownership and accountability for the transformation envisaged by the Grand Bargain remained variable. Although the number of signatories reporting is high, the bulk of investments are being made by a core group, and it is hard to say that there is a truly 'collective' effort to achieve the Grand Bargain's overarching goals. There is a lack of strategic focus on the three or four key areas in which all signatories have a vested interest and a contribution to make, and which could genuinely help drive efficiencies and effectiveness across the whole international humanitarian system. The vast

majority of signatories continue to focus on their own institutional priorities, with the result that investments are spread too thin to achieve system-wide change. There has been a general failure to take the wealth of emerging positive practice to scale, even where tangible results have been demonstrated, largely due to a lack of appetite or motivation to take the risks inherent in changing entrenched business practices.

Looking ahead to the final year of the original five-year timeframe agreed for the Grand Bargain, there is both the means and the opportunity to achieve a step change in at least four key areas – if sufficient political will can be harnessed among signatories.

First, increased use of cash programming, particularly multi-purpose cash, could effect a transformation, not just in efficiency terms but also in shifting power from international actors to affected populations – enabling them to use aid to address priorities they, not we, determine. Realising this ambition, however, requires a clear global agreement on coordination of cash programming, an agreement which to date has been stalled by inter-agency competition, rather than technical challenges. Building on the nascent discussions in the workstream 3 sub-group on political obstacles, signatories should now move swiftly to use the more objective platform offered by the Grand Bargain to exert collective pressure on the IASC Principals to agree upon and enact a global mechanism that provides predictable leadership and a clear division of labour, and ensures common standards for cash programming, including at country and crisis level.

Second, increasing access for local partners to international humanitarian funding has been a core element of the Grand Bargain since its inception. However, there has been no comparable collective effort to strengthen the capacities of local and national responders to absorb additional international funding. Long-standing practice by a number of aid organisation signatories has demonstrated the positive return on targeted investments of this kind, enabling local responders to expand the impact and sustainability of programmes and minimise their and their upstream partners’

risks. A sharp increase in the volume of funding for mentoring, training and peer and other support for local actors, including to cover their overhead costs to allow continuity of operations and institutional development, is now essential to enable a system-wide shift to localisation *in practice* – and all the benefits this would bring to the wider humanitarian response.

Third, the co-conveners and other participants of workstream 9 have demonstrated that the concept of a harmonised narrative reporting template can work: that a simplified, common template can satisfy donor requirements for a quality narrative on how their money is spent, while reducing aid organisations’ efforts to provide it. It may not be perceived as the most transformative element of the Grand Bargain, but rolling out the 8+3 template globally for use by all downstream NGO partners could reap substantial savings, freeing up resources that could be dedicated elsewhere. Importantly, it can also send a strong political message that signatories can work together to achieve success at scale. The investments now required by signatories to fully deliver on commitment 9.1 by mid-2021 are minimal, but the practical and political benefits to be gained are substantial.


Fourth, quality funding is the key enabler of progress in many other substantive areas that signatories have sought to address: it facilitates more localised and participatory responses and more effective humanitarian–development programming, and it can generate greater efficiencies through more responsive and anticipatory programmes and longer-term planning. The important progress made so far by donors in terms of the increased provision of multi-year and less earmarked funding has not yet achieved the results that were hoped for: there was no clear uplift in the *predictability* of funds committed through multi-year frameworks and divergent views over what level of flexibility is required, and whether and how it can be passed down the chain. The nature of ‘quality funding’ now needs to be redefined, and the complex challenges inherent in current humanitarian funding models need to be recognised and tackled in a more strategic way. Signatories

should come together over the next 12 months to articulate a more comprehensive strategy for funding for humanitarian response – one that combines different levels of flexibility with different levels of predictability. Reflecting on how the global funding landscape has changed since 2016, such an approach would ensure that, in the shorter term, signatories make

smarter use of current financing models and scale up best practices to ensure funding is carefully calibrated to the specific response, context and programme, *and* that, over the medium term, they work together in a more collaborative way to design new approaches to address the perennial gap between humanitarian needs and available funding.

The Grand Bargain in 2019

There was a minor increase in the percentage of signatories reporting actions or results against each commitment



6 signatories rolled out the harmonised narrative reporting template globally to downstream partners



11 donors met the target for allocating **30%** of their annual funding as unearmarked or softly earmarked



10 signatories met the target for allocating **25%** of annual funds to national/local responders as directly as possible



97%

97% of signatories reported that they are integrating gender equality and women's empowerment in their activities

Progress remained uneven



Obstacles to greater progress remain political, not technical



4 key areas for action in 2020–2021



Institute a global agreement on coordination of cash programming



Increase funding for strengthening local actors' institutional capacities



Roll out the harmonised narrative reporting template to all downstream partners globally



Increase the quality of funding by combining predictability and flexibility

Progress made per workstream

- ★☆☆☆ Little progress
- ★★☆☆ Some progress
- ★★★☆☆ Good progress
- ★★★★ Excellent progress

Workstream	Donor activity	Aid organisation activity	Activity on joint commitments	Links to other workstreams	Links to other existing processes
1: Greater transparency	★★★☆☆	★★★☆☆	★★★☆☆	★☆☆☆☆	★★★☆☆
2: More support and funding for local and national responders	★★★☆☆	★★★☆☆	★★★★	★★☆☆☆	★★★☆☆
3: Increase the use and coordination of cash	★★★★	★★★★	★★★★	★★★☆☆	★★★★
4: Reduce duplication and management costs with periodic functional review	★★☆☆☆	★★★☆☆	★☆☆☆☆	★☆☆☆☆	★★★☆☆
5: Improve joint and impartial needs assessments	★★☆☆☆	★★★☆☆	★★★☆☆	★★★☆☆	★★☆☆☆
6: A participation revolution	★★★☆☆	★★★☆☆	★★★☆☆	★☆☆☆☆	★★★☆☆
7+8: Enhanced quality funding through reduced earmarking and multi-year planning and funding	★★★☆☆	★★★☆☆	★★☆☆☆	★☆☆☆☆	★★☆☆☆
9: Harmonise and simplify reporting requirements	★★☆☆☆	★★☆☆☆	★★☆☆☆	★☆☆☆☆	★☆☆☆☆
10: Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors	★★★☆☆	★★★☆☆	N/A (workstream closed in 2018)	N/A (workstream closed in 2018)	N/A (workstream closed in 2018)

HPG

Humanitarian Policy Group

The Humanitarian Policy Group is one of the world's leading teams of independent researchers and communications professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue and debate.

Humanitarian Policy Group
Overseas Development Institute
203 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NJ
United Kingdom

Tel.: +44 (0) 20 7922 0300
Fax.: +44 (0) 20 7922 0399
Email: hpgadmin@odi.org
Website: odi.org/hpg

Cover image: Hannah Bass

