Flagship report

Annex 1: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano and Yobe case studies

Laure-Hélène Piron and Suwaiba Said Ahmad (Jigawa), Clare Cummings and Sunny Kulutuye (Kaduna and Kano), Gareth Williams and Imrana Alhaji Buba (Yobe)

October 2021
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1 Introduction

This annex to the Flagship Report on the impact of 20 years of UK governance programming in Nigeria summarises key findings from the four longer case studies that form the evidence on which it is based.

It first reviews the experience of Jigawa State, which has benefited from UK governance assistance since 2001, and has made the most progress in core and sector governance and the second most progress in health and education outcomes (Chapter 2). Kaduna State has undergone rapid transformation under the leadership of Governor El-Rufai since 2015, contrasting with the preceding years since the start of UK support in 2006 (Chapter 3). Yobe State, which has been affected by violent conflict and received the shortest period of UK governance support (2011–2021), demonstrates that UK assistance has made some impact even in these circumstances (Chapter 4). Kano State offers an example of a challenging context for governance reforms over 15 years, but where all health and education final outcomes have nonetheless improved (Chapter 5).

These case studies have followed the Flagship methodology inspired by a realist synthesis approach (explained in the main report). Each chapter provides an overview of the state context and UK programmes, followed by a summary of outcomes indicators. These provide the background information to the presentation of various combinations of contextual factors (C), interventions (I) and mechanisms (M), which together contributed to some of the intermediary outcomes (O) – CIMOs for short.

The case studies do not present all the UK interventions over 10–20 years, nor all state-level research findings. They are illustrative of how change has happened (or failed to take place) in relation to specific governance, health or education initiatives or reforms in each case. Selected CIMO stories (presented in boxed text) serve to assess the contribution of UK interventions to these outcomes, whether as a firm contribution, partial contribution or association.

The political settlements in each of the four states are represented by diagrams, placing at their heart the State Governors and their close allies, a wider group of ‘contingently’ loyal stakeholders, and opposition groups. These diagrams were based on discussions within PERL during 2020, and schematically illustrate the range of interests, opposition and alliance each of the states.

Each State case study concludes with the main implications for the Flagship Report.
2 Jigawa State

2.1 Context

Jigawa is a predominantly rural state. It was carved out of Kano State in 1991, and has an estimated population of around 6 million. It is ethnically homogenous (Hausa-Fulani) and relatively peaceful, apart from farmer–herder conflicts and banditry. It has the lowest level of conflict-related deaths of the four states, but the highest rate of poverty. Jigawa is heavily dependent on federal transfers and formal public-sector employment. Its economy is agrarian and undiversified, and generates few formal private-sector jobs.

In Jigawa’s clientelist political settlement, a small elite protects the interests of a large number of social groups, and few groups can displace the status quo. The ruling elite is more unified than in more politically divided states such as Kano and Kaduna, resulting in less competition for votes. This creates somewhat more space for development policies and less pressure to fall back on patronage and clientelist politics. Prospective State Governors must build alliances with the five Emirates who can influence voters in their home areas. The Emirate Councils have significant political influence individually (and compete to lobby for state resources) but can be controlled because their divisions prevent them operating as a collective bloc (PERL, 2019i).

Jigawa has only had three Governors over the last 20 years, providing more stability than in any of the four case-study states. Governor Turaki (1999–2007, All Nigeria Peoples Party – ANPP), described in interviews as a ‘maverick’, gave civil servants the freedom to pursue a wide range of reforms. Governor Lamido (2007–2015, People’s Democratic Party – PDP) was supported by Turaki (who had switched to PDP in his last year in office), whose political allies remained in place. This provided Lamido with the political space to implement a reform-oriented agenda, relying on the existing civil service. Towards the end of his second term, political actors left the PDP to support Governor Abubakar (2015–present, All Progressives Congress – APC), who was elected with a strong electoral mandate and was supported by the APC at the federal level. After the 2019 elections, the APC became dominant and controlled all the elected positions in the state. Formerly an accountant, nicknamed ‘the calculator’ because of his scrutiny of financial proposals, Governor Abubakar has continued previous PDP policies in Jigawa, supported by the same civil service, deeper state–society connections and continued UK assistance (UK programmes’ political economy analyses – PEAs).
2.2 UK programmes

UK governance assistance started soon after Jigawa became one of the first four DFID ‘focal’ states in 2000. SLGP began implementation in 2001, responding to the priorities of a government-led State Reform Team, which laid the ground for many of the initiatives which the UK was to support over 20 years, through SAVI, SPARC and PERL. The UK-funded health and education programmes started at the same time or soon after SLGP: PATHS1 then PATHS2, PRRINN-MNCH, MNCH2, W4H, and Lafiya (health) and CUBE, ESSPIN and TDP (education).

A key characteristic of UK governance programmes in Jigawa is the long-term and continuous relationships that have been established with political leadership, the civil service, State House of Assembly (SHoA) and media, and with civil society. No other state in Nigeria has benefited from such long-term and continuous UK support across such a wide range of governance issues. In terms of aid per capita, UK support in Jigawa has been the most intensive of the four states.

2.3 Outcomes

Looking at outcomes from each of the states, it is clear that Jigawa State has seen the strongest performance across all the indicators for core and sector (health and education) governance (with improvements in 10 out of 12 core governance, six out of seven health governance and five out of six education governance intermediate indicators that were assessed). It has the second most progress in final outcomes, with sustained improvements in seven out of eight health and education final outcomes.

Public Financial Management (PFM). Sustained and substantial improvements in PFM supported
by UK governance programmes. Jigawa’s aggregate budget execution rate has exceeded 80% for nearly all of the study period (indicator 5). There have been substantial improvements in budget transparency (Jigawa was the best-performing state in the 2020 and 2018 Nigeria States Budget Transparency Index (indicator 2) and PERL Most Significant Change Study (MSC Jg-2), substantial and sustained increase in citizen participation in the budget (indicator 4) and improvements in public procurement (indicator 6). Jigawa’s PFM progress has been recognised by the World Bank SFTAS programme where Jigawa received the largest payments for results in the 2018 and 2019 Annual Performance Assessment ($19.6 million for the two years combined) of any Nigerian state (see MSC Jg-7).

**Public Sector Management (PSM).** Limited improvement despite long-term support from UK governance programmes. There is no evidence of improvement in central civil service human resource management (HRM) (indicator 8) with continued politicisation of appointments and a failure to address adequately the need to rejuvenate the ageing civil service. Uptake of corporate planning recommendations made by UK programmes has been limited (indicator 7). Pensions reform appears to have gained more traction (see Box 2), partly in connection with support from UK governance programmes (especially SLGP), although this reform area is not captured in the core indicators for this study as it was not pursued in all four states.

**Empowerment and Accountability (E&A).** Over 20 years Jigawa’s state-society relations have been profoundly transformed. Civil society’s capacity to hold the State Government to account has increased substantially as a result of the civil society Project Monitoring Partnership (PMP) which scrutinises budget proposals, procurement processes and implementation (indicator 11 and MSC Jg-5). There has been a clearly improving trend on media reporting on governance and accountability (indicator 10). The SHoA is playing a stronger role in budget preparation (indicator 3) and is the only one out of the four states where it is also exercising its scrutiny role to a greater extent (indicator 9).

**Health and education expenditure.** Following sharp increases in health and education spending prior to 2010 under Governor Lamido, the share of the budget allocated to these two sectors has remained higher than in other states (indicators 14 and 21). On a per capita basis, Jigawa spends significantly more on health and education than the other three states studied. Health expenditures grew more significantly as a share of the budget than education, but education remained larger overall. Health funding grew from 5.5% of the budget in 2004 to 12.8% in 2018 (roughly three times). Education funding grew from 24.1% in 2004 to 33.9% in 2018 (roughly a third). Expenditure has been backed by improvements in budget execution at the sectoral level (indicators 16 and 23). There is also evidence of increased allocation of expenditure to primary health and basic education services (indicators 15 and 22). These trends are particularly impressive given the substantial overall decline in the value of federal transfers to Jigawa over the research period.

**Health and education governance.** There are strong and improving processes of health and education policy, planning and budgeting in Jigawa State (indicators 13 and 20). Human resource management and civil society oversight in the health and education sectors have improved (indicators 17, 18 and 25 as well as MSCs Jg-3 and Jg-4).
Health and education final outcomes. There have been marked improvements in maternal and child health indicators (indicators 27–30), but no clear improvement in basic immunisation coverage (indicator 31) due to inconsistent data. Primary school enrolment rates (indicator 32), completion rates (indicator 33) and gender parity (indicator 34) have improved.

2.4 What combinations of context, interventions and mechanisms explain outcomes in Jigawa?

This section explores whether and how UK governance programmes contributed to Jigawa State’s progress across almost all the governance, health and education indicators over a 20-year period, by developing CIMO combinations. Not all the policy areas or intermediate outcomes are reviewed as noted above; together, the selected examples illuminate different ways in which UK governance programmes stimulated changes and enable an assessment of successive UK governance programmes’ contributions to Jigawa outcomes.

2.4.1 PFM and PSM core governance

In a less competitive political context (C), Jigawa Governors who belonged to different political parties (moving from APP to PDP and then to APC) could ensure continuity in the agendas they pursued as elites would also switch sides and tended to support the State Governor of the day.

While successive Governors were motivated by political credit and constituency linkages mechanisms, the ‘broad-based political legitimacy’ mechanism (M) best explains the successes under Governor Lamido (2007–2015), the most reform-minded of the three Jigawa Governors since 1999, who built on a period of experimentation under Governor Turaki (1999–2007) to lay the ground for continuous reforms. Not only did he not face significant opposition and benefited from a more conducive fiscal framework – prior to the fall in oil prices (C) – he also had a clear agenda to improve the management of the state’s affairs, as well as service delivery (C). His commitment can be related to his intention to build the legitimacy of his government on the basis of its record in delivering public goods and his early political career as part of the left-of-centre People’s Redemption Party (Piron, 2017). An in-depth evaluation of all UK state-level programmes concluded: ‘In Jigawa reform progress has mainly been the result of an independent, reform-minded governor, who has been able to exercise unchallenged power’ (IMEP, 2017: 33). He both significantly increased the share of the state budget allocated to health and education, and also improved budget execution for both sectors and at an aggregate level. He reportedly managed to favour politically important actors in awarding contracts, but also expected performance (Piron, 2017).

International and Nigeria-wide contextual factors (C) (the post-2015 oil price crash and COVID-19 fiscal crunch) have constrained Governor Abubakar (2015–present), who was described as having a weaker commitment to broad-based development. This is an example of how political vision and fiscal constraints interact: politics become more contested when resource rents are reduced, making broader-based commitments a less appealing strategy. For example, progress related to teachers’ recruitment and training has been slow, with a high-quality recruitment process halted for political reasons in 2018, before 4,000 additional teachers were finally recruited in 2020 following support from PERL through the education Technical Working Group (TWG).
A relatively capable and motivated Jigawa civil service (C) has provided the instrument for politicians to achieve their agenda. Jigawa’s civil service was carved out of Kano’s when Jigawa State was created in 1991. This resulted in a legacy of relatively strong bureaucratic capacity. By 2001, when SLGP started, the civil service had been disorganised through a radical decentralisation of MDAs across the five Jigawa Emirates (promoted by Governor Turaki as a way of meeting the demands of these powerful constituencies). Nonetheless, politicians and the civil service leadership were able to develop a vision for Jigawa’s development as Governor Turaki granted them some autonomy, expressed in Jigawa’s State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (2007) which SLPG supported. Under Governor Abubakar, the politicisation of the civil service is reported to have increased, potentially linked to greater resource constraints, and civil service capacity gains to date seem under threat as a generation of senior civil servants retires and is not replaced.

SLGP’s responsive approach explicitly sought to build ‘reform ownership’ (M). It did not impose a menu of reforms but instead facilitated the preparation and implementation of proposals from the State Reform Team, led by the Deputy Governor. Two of them, pensions and procurement reforms, were initiated at that time and have been consolidating since then (see Box 1). There has been a great continuity of civil servants, counterparts for UK governance programmes, who have been able to gain increased expertise and capacity over the years through the technical assistance, training and material support provided by successive UK programmes. SLGP, SPARC and PERL-ARC in particular have continued to work closely with the Budget and Economic Planning Directorate which has driven many of the policy and PFM outcomes documented in this research. ‘Reform ownership’ (M) was less visible in other initiatives which were not successful, such as HRM where, from a political patronage perspective (C), there is much less to gain, and a great deal more to lose.
SGLP had more room to be responsive to state priorities than successive governance programmes which developed a more standard menu of PFM and PSM issues. In 2001, Jigawa, with SLGP technical support, reviewed its existing pension scheme and established Nigeria’s first **contributory pensions scheme** for its 50,000 public servants, ahead of federal-level reforms. By 2018, it had paid nearly 10,000 pensions, although the scheme’s long-term sustainability was under threat due to its low funding ratio, an issue that PERL is helping Jigawa State address.

SLGP also experimented with **issues-based programming**. The provision of water for hospitals was a targeted issue which became a successful entry point for wider **procurement reforms** in Jigawa. It was identified as an issue that would require a broad coalition rather than a government-led reform, designed in collaboration with PATHS1. Ten hospitals benefited from access to water and sanitation through a process that improved procurement and budget allocation for generators’ maintenance costs. Health and hospital staff gained greater skills while the State Ministry of Health budget department received more credible data. These improvements to procurement then expanded across Jigawa through the new Due Process and Project Monitoring Bureau.

SLGP principally worked with state officials; in the years immediately after the political transition, civil servants were highly suspicious of non-state actors. The SLGP team was nonetheless able to establish the first **Radio Jigawa phone-in programme** as an E&A intervention that enabled women and men from rural communities to express their priorities to government authorities. SAVI and PERL-ECP interventions built on this legacy.

SLGP is assessed to have made a **firm contribution** to these results as the only similar programme at the time, providing flexible facilitation and technical assistance to support the Jigawa State Government.

Sources: Interviews, DFID, 2006, Jigawa State Government, 2006; Gbadebo-Smith et al., 2006

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**Box 1 SLGP approach to ownership and experimentation in Jigawa**

**Why did Jigawa politicians and civil servants respond so well to resources and opportunities provided by UK governance programmes?**

Interviews suggested a profound motivation akin to ‘state-building’ (M), a desire to build new state structures and policies to develop a rural state (and individual emirates within it) and bring it up to the level of wealthier Kano. Box 2 provides quotes demonstrating the motivation associated with improved systems and the pride in being seen as innovators. Jigawa was an ‘early adopter’ of many reforms supported by the UK across Nigeria; Jigawa often shared many of its innovations with other states (triggering an ‘early adoption’ combined with a ‘peer pressure’ mechanism (M)). Jigawa politicians and officials appear particularly motivated by rankings across Nigeria’s states, aiming to outdo Kano and Kaduna, coming first in transparency or SFTAS rankings, for example. In Jigawa, even the ‘routinisation' mechanism (M) would be reported as progress and an opportunity to be proud.

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of processes’ (M), crucial in budgeting, was associated with an enthusiasm for ‘scientific methods’ (an ‘innovation’ mechanism).

Box 2 Jigawa appetite for innovation

Many interviews in Jigawa with civil servants and civil society actors who had collaborated with DFID/FCDO for nearly 20 years indicated a personal motivation for innovation, which was also combined with a state-building-like agenda, the pride of contributing to rural Jigawa’s transformation:

‘They came with something better than what we have, we accept. This is what motivate me.’

‘When you project it realistically, coming up with CDF, MTSS, and annual plans with involvement of CSO, this helps me to broaden my mind and wholeheartedly accept the reform.’

Several interviews were proud of new ‘scientific approach’ to budgeting, and felt politicians in particular ‘cannot go back as they have seen the benefits’.

2.4.2 E&A reforms

Combined with the contextual factors reviewed above, the nature of civil society and the lack of an organised private sector (C) in Jigawa explains how citizens have interacted with the state. In a rural state with high rates of poverty, grassroots communities were in the early 2000s too weakly organised to make demands on their State Governments or elected representatives beyond the traditional patronage networks. Over the years, civil servants (often but not always retired) have set up or become involved in CSOs (C) keen to contribute to the development of their own communities, in which they are well embedded. This is one of the factors which has enabled a constructive approach with state officials, often based on ‘insiders’ access’ (M), for example a private meeting to make the case to the Governor, a Commissioner or a SHoA member that a new policy should be adopted or sectoral funds should be released, appealing to their political incentives (M), whether personalised credit, targeted constituencies or continuing with a broader-based political agenda.

In parallel, the development of media capacity, and reporting on governance funded by SLGP, SAVI and PERL-ECP, made use of the potential for ‘eyes and ears, with voice’ (M) by publicising some failings in public policy to stimulate a government response, or enabling citizens to directly communicate their views to politicians. Interviews provided anecdotes of governors and politicians taking measures in response to these public events (for example in relation to deaths in child-birth or girls’ access to school). The threat of public shaming, and more confrontational approaches, have not been documented in Jigawa as a significant causal mechanism. The combination of media reporting incidents, citizens being able to directly contact some of the governors (e.g. Governor Lamido reportedly took direct phone calls, a practice continued under Governor Abubakar), and insider lobbying, combined to create sufficient pressure for the State Government to take action on a number of health and education issues. The growth of social media during the period has facilitated responsiveness.
Starting with SLGP, then SAVI and SPARC, but intensified under PERL, UK programmes have simultaneously worked both with officials and those representing citizens’ voices (CSOs, media and SHoA) to institutionalise ‘new spaces and processes’ (M) around which constructive engagement could take place. These have contributed to improvements in budget transparency (for example, through interventions that ensured budgets were prepared so they could be understood by CSOs), institutionalising budget participation (to the extent that the 2019 budget was described as ‘the people’s budget’ (PERL, 2019d)), improving the gender and inclusion sensitivity of policies and other core governance outcomes. Box 3 illustrates how, over time, continuous but evolving UK interventions assisted both government and non-government partners to establish a more robust procurement system, which is now feeding into policy processes. This combined a number of bureaucratic mechanisms (such as ‘reform ownership’ and ‘innovation’) with ‘eyes and ears, with voice and teeth’ (M) to generate effective action in response to the monitoring.

Box 3 PFM and procurement improvements in Jigawa

The end of military rule in Nigeria was associated with greater political attention to improving PFM and tackling corruption, including at the federal level under the second President Obasanjo administration (C).

Governor Turaki (1999–2007), who had switched to the President’s PDP party in his last year in office, was sensitive to some of these measures, but it is under Governor Lamido (2007–2015) that dramatic improvements in PFM and procurement systems became visible, benefiting from technical assistance and training from SLGP and then SPARC (I). His second year in office, 2008, saw the approval of 20-year PFM Reform Plan and the adoption of the Due Process and Project Monitoring Bureau/Law (2008). The Economic and Fiscal Responsibility Law was adopted in 2009, and the first State Development Plan (Comprehensive Development Framework – CDF) a year later. Aggregate expenditure peaked in 2011, and for the 2010–2012 period, budget performance did not fall below 93%. The period also saw much improved contract performance. Contracts were still awarded to favoured parties, but increasingly on condition that they were completed to an acceptable standard and at a reasonable price.

The Due Process and Project Monitoring Bureau was established in 2009 as a centre of government core governance reform, initially with SLGP then SPARC and PERL-ARC support (through support to legislative revisions, preparation of guidelines, procurement plans, training in open contract standards, etc. – I). Funding conditions, attached to World Bank and DFID capital projects, incentivised respect for clauses on due process, and Open Contracting Data Standard is a condition of SFTAS (‘access to international funding’ – M).
The procurement system now also includes an accredited civil society monitoring network. The Project Monitoring Partnership (PMP) is an effective civil society platform which monitors the implementation of projects such as roads or schools (‘eyes and ears’ mechanism). It is backed up by the ability to inform government action because it has developed trust with government and is invited to policy-making processes as well as through its collaboration with Jigawa media, which attend monitoring visits and can report procurement problems (‘voice’ mechanism). Through its close collaboration with the Due Process Bureau, its monitoring can also lead to sanctions as CSOs can inform government when contractors do not meet expected standards and the Due Process Bureau is expected to take action (sanction or ‘teeth’ aspect of the mechanism). This has led to a reported change of behaviour on the part of contractors, who increasingly comply with bills of quantities.

In a context where CSOs could operate relatively freely (C), PMP and CSOs in all of Jigawa’s LGAs were trained and mentored by SAVI then PERL-ECP in monitoring the quality of project implementation, engaging communities, state officials and other stakeholders (I). They gained sufficient confidence and credibility to challenge government and contractors when they identified inappropriate work (‘new skills and awareness’ mechanism). Over time, this has extended to the confidence to take part in budget processes, as well as policy-making and advocacy (e.g. on health or education).

The PMP initiative was originally created by grassroots CBOs which monitored local development interventions. UK governance programme support has helped PMP become a network across the state, operating in ‘invited’ spaces (such as those related to policy and budget). Its close collaboration with the Due Process Bureau means that locally identified wrongdoings (in terms of project delivery) can be backed up by credible sanctions. A series of procurement laws have established and reinforced the role of the Due Process and Project Monitoring Bureau, while PMP CSOs register with it, which gives them legitimacy when they monitor contract implementation. Communities now contact the Bureau directly and not only through PMP. This collaboration has resulted in improved contract vetting; and, according to PERL, saved an estimated N610 million during the 2018–19 period in reduced losses from wastage and corruption (O).

UK programmes made a firm contribution to this procurement outcome given the intensive and sustained support across various stakeholders over 15 years.

Sources: Interviews; IMEP, 2017; SPARC, 2016c; PERL, 2021a (MSC Jg-5)

2.4.3 Core governance contributing to health and education outcomes

In the conducive political, bureaucratic and state–society relations context described above, UK governance programmes have been able to contribute to health and education improvements through interventions focused on different steps in the service delivery chain. Because of the duration of UK support, and
Jigawa’s politicians’ and civil servants’ relative openness to change, there is evidence that core governance policy and PFM reforms have influenced sector governance (see Box 4).

**Box 4 SLGP, SAVI and SPARC collaboration with sector programmes on health and education policy and budget**

Under Governors Turaki and Lamido, state health and education ministries were ‘pilots’ for a range of policy and PFM reforms, such as sector strategies and MTSS, initiated by the central Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, supported by SLGP then SPARC (I). Interviews confirmed *politico-bureaucratic incentives* (M) similar to those identified for core governance: reform ownership, routinisation of the policy-budget cycle, a sense of state-building and appetite for innovation, as well as personal commitments to developing individual skills. Through their involvement in the pilots, and the adoption of a ‘train the trainers’ approach, whereby sector staff would train their colleagues, sector ministries were motivated to continue the processes, which have cumulatively led to *improved sector PFM and policy processes* (O).

SLGP collaborated with CUBE and SPARC with ESSPIN and MNCH2 on CDF, MTSS, sector strategies and annual sector reviews, a workstream which has continued under PERL. **When sector programmes had their own governance expertise, this could sometimes lead to conflicting approaches.** Sector programmes were working with higher-capacity ministries, able to move faster on reform, whereas SLGP-SPARC-SAVI had to work on policies across the entire state, including with weaker ministries. Interviews suggest that when ESSPIN first decided to support the education MTSS without SPARC collaboration, this resulted in an education sector plan and budget higher than the state’s overall budget; the next year, ESSPIN worked closely with SPARC and the Budget Department. Collaboration with governance programmes improved budget realism as they have the overview of the entire budget. ESSPIN used SPARC MTSS toolkits and collaborated with SAVI to facilitate budget releases through SAVI’s access to SHoA members. Coordination between governance programmes was not always smooth; there were sometimes tensions and inconsistencies between SAVI and SPARC, for example, between supporting advocacy to increase funding for specific policies (such as MNCH) which may not be affordable or sustainable.

Governance programmes can demonstrate *partial contribution* to these sector governance policy and PFM improvements; they are unlikely to have happened in such a state-wide manner without their support, but sector programmes (and other development partners’ programmes) have also supported a range of sector governance initiatives.

Sources: Interviews; review of programmes’ final reports; Derbyshire and Williams, 2021
The ‘personalised political credit’ and ‘constituency linkage’ mechanisms (M) were at play throughout the period (for example in balancing the interests of rival emirates in the allocation of government positions and infrastructure). They were most visible in terms of health and education. Box 5 provides an example from the health sector under Governor Abubakar (2015–present).

**Box 5 Political credit and constituency linkage mechanisms and rural health**

Governor Abubakar has made improving rural health a political priority, visibly communicated through infrastructure investments, such as constructing new health training schools, which were to be located in different Emirates. PERL and Women for Health (W4H) have built on this and other political incentives (M) to strengthen human resources (to staff health facilities rather than leave new buildings empty), such as ensuring that the School of Nursing in Hadejia was not only built, but also awarded provisional accreditation with 50 approved indexed places (State Government N9 million contribution to accreditation costs).

Initiatives that linked legislators to developments in their electoral constituencies have the potential to combine personalised credit in their constituencies (M) with more systematic and transparent processes across the state. For example, PERL helped W4H obtain SHoA support for a foundational year’s training for nurses and midwives by making use of PERL personal connections in the SHoA built on years of UK collaboration (I). PERL staff put forward influential arguments: politicians were able to see the links to rural girls from their constituencies who would benefit from the training and be incentivised to return to work as local midwives or nurses.

Such facilitation by PERL therefore contributed to W4H results in Jigawa: a training and retention scheme for community midwives, primarily in rural areas, has improved human resources for maternal health services (O). This has been adopted by local governments and the State Government which are now contributing their own funds to the scheme. All LGAs now have at least one trained midwife, making maternal healthcare more readily available across the state.

The evidence suggests a partial contribution by UK governance programmes to these health outcomes which depended on collaboration with UK health programmes. Governance programmes played a key role through support to health TWG and the PMP that has engaged in health sector monitoring and advocacy.

Sources: Interviews; DFID, 2018b; PERL, 2021c (MSC Jg-4)
2.5 Conclusion

The experience of Jigawa State powerfully demonstrates the cumulative contributions of UK governance programmes over 20 years. Although health and education indicators are still relatively low, Jigawa has made the most progress relative to other states over 20 years for a number of reasons:

- A relatively favourable political context with limited political competition and competent civil servants meant demands for patronage could be balanced with improvements to state systems and service delivery, with a view to ensuring broader-based access.
- Motivation of politicians, civil servants and citizens to developing their Emirates and their State, open to new ideas – which UK programmes were able to build on or stimulate through relevant interventions and collaborative approaches.
- Governor Lamido was the most reform-minded of State Governors; the legacy of his initiatives continues to this day as he focused on institutional development, and not simply on short-term service delivery or other visible but less broad-based results. The fiscal crisis is constraining Governor Abubakar’s ability to make such rapid and deep progress.
- The parallel development of state capacity with civil society’s capacity to organise and make demands on the state.
- Continuity and intensity of UK support, at a political level and through its programmes. As a result, DFID/FCDO have become part of the state context, rather than solely external actors.

Despite these achievements, health and education final outcomes indicators are still relatively low in Jigawa, and will be hard to improve in a more financially constrained environment. Educated youth prefer to move to Kano or more developed cities and states, rather than remain in Jigawa, challenging the state’s technical capacity despite years of investments.

With regards to DFID/FCDO continued engagement, the flipside of a long-lasting partnership is whether some support has continued for too long in some dimensions, and whether the UK could disengage from some areas of relatively sustained progress to free up resources to help the state address more challenging issues.
3 Kaduna

3.1 Context

Kaduna is a politically and economically powerful state of 8 million people; a vibrant commercial hub with numerous private-sector-led businesses as well as Federal Government institutions, attracting highly skilled Nigerians. Kaduna’s elite has a reputation for being internationally connected, and interested in more competent government. While Kaduna’s industry has declined, it is the richest of the four case-study states, with poverty and inequality levels close to the national average and significant internally generated revenue (IGR). Of the four states, it has the highest rates of female and male literacy (near to the national average) and lowest rates of under-5 mortality (lower than the national average).

The state is ethnically and religiously heterogenous, and has suffered from conflict and insecurity. It has the highest rate of conflict-related deaths of the four states (6,000 from 2000 to 2020). Violence has displaced communities and led to school closures. Conflict factors include the polarisation between northern and southern Kaduna (Muslim and Christian populations); herder–farmer violence in rural areas; and banditry especially along Kaduna–Abuja road. Banditry is now reaching schools and suburbs of Kaduna City.

Since 2015 there has been less inter-elite competition in Kaduna and less powerful opposition. This represents a significant change from the previous period affected by political instability, inter-elite competition and intense patronage and clientelism. During the 1999–2015 period, Kaduna was governed by the PDP under the leadership of Governors Makarfi, Sambo, Yakowa and Yero. Although there were important differences between them, the period was marked by weak PFM, a subservient SHoA, and disempowerment and defunding of local government (PERL, 2020a). In the absence of development-minded and reformist leadership, there was a notable neglect of the health and education sectors (PERL, 2020a).

Following the 2015 elections, political control shifted to Governor Mallam Nasir El-Rufai (APC) who has embarked on a vigorous programme of reforms. He was elected without the backing of powerful ‘godfathers’, giving him freedom to appoint people who share his vision of governance (PERL, 2019a). Kaduna serves as a high-profile state in which El-Rufai may build his reputation. His political position is secure due to his popularity with the metropolitan elite and Muslim population, his reputation for efficacy and his support from President Buhari. While power is becoming more concentrated around El-Rufai, political leadership appears to be following a strategy of co-opting potentially competing elites, rather than ignoring or repressing them.
3.2 UK programmes

UK governance support started in 2006 in Kaduna with the last years of SLGP, coming after UK support to CSO development (CBDD). It followed education support (CUBE started in 2003, followed by ESSPIN and TDP) and health programmes (PATHS1 in 2001, followed by PATHS2, MNCH2 and Lafiya).

By comparison to the other three states, Kaduna State leads in coordinating development partners’ assistance, adhering to a mutual accountability framework with the UK (since 2015). PERL has focused more on local governance, PSM, and IGR (since 2015). PERL has also had strong partnerships with MNCH2 and TDP relative to the other three states.

3.3 Outcomes

The research focused on the post-2015 period in Kaduna, to document processes through which governance and sector outcomes can improve. UK governance programmes were able to adjust, and drew on the technical capacities and processes developed with civil servants during the 2006–2015 period of collaboration when the political environment was less conducive to reform.

Kaduna State has achieved rapid progress since 2015 in particular. Over the period of UK support, data indicates improvements in seven out of 11 intermediate governance outcomes, five out of seven health governance and five out of seven education governance intermediate outcomes. Available data suggests it has only achieved sustained improvements in five out of eight final health and education outcomes indicators.
**PFM.** Most indicators are on an upward trend. The best PFM results in Kaduna have related to the increased connection between the State Development Plans, Sector Investment Plans (MTSS) and annual budgets since 2017 *(indicator 1)*, improved budget transparency *(indicator 2)*, public participation in the budget through the Community Development Charters *(indicator 4 and MSC Kd-1 and Kd-3)* and growth in IGR *(340% growth between 2015 and 2020; see MSCs Kd-4)*. Budget execution rates have fluctuated (no overall trend over the 20-year period) at aggregate and sector level *(indicators 5, 16 and 23)*, but there has been an improvement in aggregate budget performance since 2015.

Kaduna has been rewarded for its PFM performance through the World Bank SFTAS programme. It was the best-performing state nationwide in the first Annual Performance Assessment (2018) and fourth best overall in the second Annual Performance Assessment (2019).

**PSM.** Despite considerable support by PERL-ARC and SPARC, the indicators used in this report *(indicators 7 and 8)* have not measured any improvement.

**E&A.** Positive trends have been measured in relation to media reporting on governance and accountability *(indicator 10)*, civil society capacity to hold the State Government to account *(indicator 11)* and sensitivity to gender equality and social inclusion in core governance processes *(indicator 12)*. A standout feature of Kaduna’s governance reforms has been the empowerment of citizens at the level of local government through the Local Government Fiscal Transparency, Accountability and Sustainability programme and Community Development Charters (see MSC Kd-3).

**Health and education expenditure.** Kaduna has increased the share of public spending on health and education *(indicators 14 and 21)* despite the decline in the real value of federal transfers. However, budget execution remains weak at sector level *(indicators 16 and 23)*.

**Health and education governance.** There have been notable improvements in health and education sector governance over the past few years, in particular in the areas of development partners’ coordination (e.g. Health Sector MoU), policies for managing human resources in the health and education sectors *(indicators 17 and 24 and MSCs Kd-5 and Kd-6)*, and increased civil society advocacy on health and education *(indicators 18 and 25)*. The Kaduna Maternal Accountability Mechanism (KADMAM) and the Kaduna Basic Education Accountability Mechanism (KADBEAM) play a key role in monitoring the performance of services (see MSCs Kd-5 and Kd-6).

**Health and education outcomes.** These have followed mixed, but generally improving, trends. There have been improvements in some MNCH indicators: the percentage of women receiving antenatal care from a skilled health provider *(indicator 27)* and under-5s who slept under an insecticide-treated net the night before the survey *(indicator 30)*. However, there has been no improvement in the percentage of women who gave birth in a health facility or were attended by a skilled health provider *(indicators 28 and 29)*. Immunisation coverage *(indicator 31)* has not improved. In the education sector there has been a marked increase in the primary school enrolment rate *(indicator 32)*, primary completion rates *(indicator 32)*, and gender parity in school enrolment *(indicator 34)*.
3.4 What combinations of context, interventions and mechanisms explain outcomes in Kaduna?

UK governance programmes have facilitated the implementation of Governor El-Rufai’s governance and sector agenda in three main ways:

- support to the bureaucracy, including to access donor funds through coordination or meeting programme conditions
- support to constructive state–society relations
- collaboration between governance and sector programmes in response to state leadership

3.4.1 State PFM and PSM reforms

In Kaduna, Governor El-Rufai has succeeded in consolidating his control over the civil service in order to implement his reforms. He appointed several technocrats, who share his vision for development, to ministerial positions. Soon after gaining power, he also removed a large number of civil servants who might have blocked his reform agenda by reducing overall staff numbers and restructuring MDAs. A new cadre of civil servants is gradually emerging who are young, less likely to have established political ties, and more open to a new organisational culture within the state bureaucracy. The ability of Governor El-Rufai to make these disruptive changes reflects his political security; they were necessary for him to achieve his vision of development for the state. SPARC and PERL-ARC were not involved in these initiatives.

In this less competitive context where the Governor reformed the civil service to achieve his agenda (C), PERL provided technical assistance and facilitation (I) which was clearly aligned with political and bureaucratic incentives (M). Progress had been slow under SLGP and SPARC but some systems and processes were put in place. Notably, the Kaduna State Government had agreed to a State Development Plan with SPARC’s support (I) in order to satisfy development partners but without any real government interest. The plan was made and published with little political engagement and was not implemented.

In contrast, Governor El-Rufai was interested in the outcomes of reforms and fulfilling his manifesto promises, such as reducing the number of children out of school (‘political credit’ mechanism - M). He took ownership of the State Development Plan; used it to streamline Sector Investment Plans (SIPs, as MTSSs have been renamed in Kaduna State) with state priorities; and is using SIPs to coordinate external support. Building on previous UK support, Governor El-Rufai is using these governance reforms or programmes (I) to improve development partners’ coordination (see Box 6) in order to implement his wider developmental commitments, responding to the ‘accessing donor funds through development partners coordination’ mechanism (M).
Box 6 Development partner coordination in Kaduna

Governor El-Rufai has made explicit and effective use of the PFM reforms and capacities that successive UK programmes had been building since 2007 to streamline and coordinate education and health assistance provided by development partners in support of the State Government’s agenda (‘political credit’ M).

**Governance frameworks (I)**, established with the long-term support of DFID governance programmes, are acting as a central coordination mechanism for governance and sector programmes (M), helping to build trust between the State Government and development partners, and encourage the use and strengthening of government systems rather than creating parallel systems for service delivery. DFID/FCDO has played a key role in establishing constructive relations between programmes and the State Government, for example by promoting the Development Cooperation Framework in Kaduna, coordinating development partners’ work behind Kaduna State priorities. This is moving towards the model of a mutual accountability framework (I) setting out the commitments of the State Government and development partners which has been in place since 2010 and has been updated in 2021. It creates condition for more stable and trusting relationships, close alignment of development programmes with State Government plans, use of government systems, and stronger collaboration among development programmes.

DFID/FCDO and governance programmes have made a firm contribution to improvements in the coordination of development partners based on their technical support to establishing the governance frameworks used for the coordination as well as the UK’s visible political leadership of the approach. Coordination between FCDO governance and sectoral programmes has been stronger in Kaduna compared to other states and started earlier (around 2010) with an agreement on cross-programme indicators.

DFID/FCDO is trying to promote the same principles elsewhere, and strategic dialogues have taken place in Jigawa, Kano and Kaduna. There is a more concerted approach to develop Mutual Accountability Frameworks backed by UK diplomatic pressure and connecting the FCDO portfolio across sectors.

Sources: Interviews; Derbyshire and Williams, 2021

PERL has made use of another ‘accessing donor funds mechanism’ (M) by providing PFM, PSM and E&A technical assistance (I) to enable Kaduna (as well as Jigawa and Yobe) to access large grants from the World Bank. See Box 7 for an illustration.
Box 7 Incentives through the State Fiscal Transparency Accountability and Sustainability Program for Results (SFTAS)

SFTAS is a World Bank programme that makes grants to states that are conditional on PFM and PSM improvements. Critical eligibility criteria include the publication of the state budget and audited financial accounts. Other Disbursement Linked Indicators incentivise a range of additional reforms. Jigawa, Kaduna and Yobe have each performed significantly better than Nigerian states on average and have received substantial funding from SFTAS over the past two years (whereas Kano has performed less well than the Nigerian average). For the 2018 and 2019 Annual Performance Assessments, the four states received $56.4 million from the SFTAS programme, which was $15.2 million more than they would have received had their performance been at the level of the average Nigerian state. The short duration of the SFTAS programme (three years) raises questions about whether the reforms will be sustained. However, many of the indicators have required visible changes in practices (e.g. publication of audited financial statements) that will be difficult to reverse without complaints from legislative, civil society and media bodies.

In 2018 and 2019, Kaduna obtained **$16.6 million through SFTAS (O)** by meeting indicators related to fiscal transparency, Treasury Single Account, IGR reforms, public procurement reforms, biometric registration of civil servants, and debt management. PERL’s presence in the state, and its flexibility in the use of resources, meant that it could respond quickly to new opportunities by offering **technical assistance** for toolkits, forecasting advice and facilitating a Community of Practice for Commissioners of Planning and Budget from all 36 states in Nigeria to address PFM reform and SFTAS indicators; as well as in Kaduna a PFM rapid annual assessment framework and support for a Planning and Budget Commission and Economic Intelligence Unit overseeing PFM reforms (I).

PERL was able to provide relevant and timely support, demonstrating a **firm contribution** to SFTAS-related governance outcomes in Kaduna and other states.

The Kaduna State Government has been so taken by SFTAS that it created its own version of the scheme to **incentivise local governments** to improve their performance through Local Fiscal Transparency, Accountability and Sustainability initiatives. PERL is collaborating closely with the State Government, building on the work of M4D to help local governments to meet the programme criteria and so receive extra funding.

Sources: Interviews; PERL 2021f, (MSC Kd-3)
3.4.2 State–society engagements and sector outcomes

DFID/FCDO programmes in Kaduna have mostly been able to collaborate strategically so that technical support to planning and budget processes are aligned with support to non-state actors working on service sectors and other issues. This enables non-state actors to engage more easily with core governance processes, scrutinise budgets and monitor government service provision. They have also been able to build on the work of previous programmes, supporting existing accountability mechanisms so that they become institutionalised and replicating them across the state to increase the inclusiveness of citizen participation in governance (see Box 8).

Across the four case-study states, UK governance programmes have used different forms of constructive state–citizen engagement. The one significant example of a more confrontational civil society approach (M), under SAVI in Kaduna, did not lead to a change in government policy. More constructive approaches since 2016, encouraged by Governor El-Rufai’s own willingness to engage and co-opt organised CSOs, has been more fruitful.

Box 8 From confrontational to constructive civil society engagement in Kaduna: Know Your Budget campaign vs the Kaduna Basic Education Accountability Mechanism

In 2010, the SAVI-supported Know Your Budget campaign highlighted the over-inflated Kaduna State Government budget. In the short term, this contributed towards the Governor making a public statement about reducing the budget – which was widely celebrated at the time. The campaign involved citizens scrutinising the budget and taking it to the SHoA where it was reduced. ‘SPARC support to Ministries of Economic Planning and Finance led to a reduction in the overall budget from N196 billion to N153 billion. This revision was resubmitted to the SHoA by the Executive in order to “inform” their oversight and review process. [...] SPARC/SAVI/DFID formed an extremely powerful partnership, which led directly to a budget reduction of N30 billion – whilst the problems of credible budgeting have certainly not been resolved, there is some cause to claim success’ (SPARC-SAVI, 2010).

However, the more lasting effect was hostility between CSOs and government and a closing down of civil society space until Governor El-Rufai was elected in 2015. Some of the SAVI team had preferred a confrontational, rights-based approach to engaging with government which also contributed to a breakdown in relations between the development partners and the State Government.
Learning from health-sector initiatives and SAVI’s establishment of the Kaduna Maternal Accountability Mechanism (KADMAM), PERL-ECP supported media and civil society activists to engage in education sector, in particular to form the Kaduna Basic Education Accountability Mechanism (KADBEAM), a platform for organising and engaging with the State Government on education issues. This has focused in particular on providing input into the new education policy and monitoring the performance of over 700 schools in 11 LGAs (I).

KADBEAM has a constructive working relationship with the Kaduna Ministry of Education and is enabling real-time monitoring of education across the state (‘eyes and ears’ mechanism - M). Social media users can more easily engage with the State Government, share ideas and express demands and criticism. This appears to be relatively effective at eliciting a government response in Kaduna, such as influencing the location of an education project or inviting KADBEAM to participate in procurement processes for SUBEB projects. KADMAM and KADBEAM are also using internet-based systems to gather data via scorecards from across the state, enabling government responsiveness beyond those with access to social media. As of 2021, KADBEAM continues to develop as an organisation, expanding its activities with guidance from PERL and seeking external funding.

KADMAM and KADBEAM would not have existed without UK support, though civil society platforms on health and education could have been established in other ways. A UK partial contribution to civil society monitoring of health and education monitoring and policy can therefore be demonstrated through these interventions.

The Kaduna State Government has established an Eyes and Ears project, based in the Department of Monitoring and Evaluation that assesses government programmes and alignment with the SDPs. The project includes a citizen engagement platform. This initiative has not been supported by UK governance programmes, and is indicative of the State Government’s home-grown agenda.

Sources: Interviews, Williams et al., 2020a; PERL, 2021 (MSC Kd-6)

In our case studies and in a dedicated LEAP report, the most clearly evidenced links between core and sector governance take place when governance programmes collaborate with sector programmes (I). Sector programmes often had governance components, making collaboration crucial. For example, human resources for primary health and for basic education have improved in Kaduna through the joint support of PERL and the Teacher Development Programme (TDP) for the development of the state’s policy on teacher recruitment and deployment.

Improvements in the training, recruitment and deployment of frontline health workers and teachers, in particular in remote rural areas, might seem more closely associated with improved service delivery. The UK developed targeted programmes (W4H and TDP) to
address these blockages. By collaborating with these sub-sector programmes, core governance programmes contributed to improved sectoral HRM. Results were even more evident under PERL, which had the mandate and resources to address these issues (see Box 9).

Box 9 Collaboration between governance and sector programmes in Kaduna

In the health sector, PERL assisted the Kaduna State Development Cooperation Framework coordinated by the Kaduna State Planning Commission and signed by Development Partners, and the related Health Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This was established by the Kaduna State Government in 2016, coordinating the inputs of all major health programmes in support of agreed priorities in the State Development Plan and Health SIP. While the Health MoU contains a large (and expanding) group of high-spending development partners, PERL plays a critical and valued role in having shaped the governance framework which is used to coordinate inputs, advising on organisational development, and linking health sector reform to wider governance reform in the state (I).

In the context of a pro-education sector Governor from 2015, PERL and TDP were able to collaborate on teachers’ recruitment and training. PERL supported the development of the new education policy (I), which has had a major impact by eliminating school fees and is likely to have been a factor in increased school enrolment. In line with Governor El-Rufai’s manifesto commitments, the new policy provided for free and compulsory education for all pupils. The TDP PCR states that PERL’s assistance on developing the teacher recruitment policy was critical to the success of its support in the recruitment and training of 21,000 qualified teachers, indicating a firm contribution.

Sources: DFID, 2019a; Derbyshire and Williams, 2021; PERL, 2021h (MSC Kd-5); PERL 2021i (MSC Kd-6)

3.5 Conclusion

The vision, ambition and prior experience of Governor El-Rufai are fundamental to the reforms taking place in Kaduna State. The most significant improvements have occurred since 2017, by which time El-Rufai had been able to consolidate and implement governance and sector reforms instigated by DFID programmes prior to his election.

The long duration and consistency of DFID/FCDO support to core governance and service sectors has built capacities and created strong relationships between government and programme staff. Over the last 20 years, these programmes have laid the groundwork for the faster change that has been possible since Governor El-Rufai came to power.

Without the work of the predecessor programmes, there would not have been a ready ‘cadre’ of trained bureaucrats (some of whom have since retired but remain influential), non-government activists, journalists, CSOs and politicians able to take advantage of the current reform-conducive political environment.

One of the challenges in Kaduna State is ensuring that political motivation for reform and government
responsiveness reaches beyond the more powerful citizens living in Kaduna City to those living in rural areas who are much poorer and less connected. Worsening security conditions in Kaduna State constitute a major threat to recent gains in governance and service delivery. UK governance programmes have not been directly working ‘on’ conflict issues.
4 Yobe

4.1 Contextual factors

Yobe is an agrarian state with a small and predominantly rural population of 3 million, and a high poverty rate. It was created from Borno State in 1991. There are many ethnic groups with a history of peaceful co-existence and rivalry between Kanuri and non-Kanuri elites. Government revenues are almost entirely dependent on federal transfers with limited IGR capacity.

The Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgency has disrupted livelihoods, destroyed infrastructure and denied access to basic services, in particular in the eastern part of the state bordering Borno. The crisis peaked in 2014–15, but after a short lull the conflict has worsened since 2018 with frequent attacks on government facilities and villages. There are around 132,000 internally displaced persons living in host communities in Yobe, and a large-scale humanitarian response.

Yobe is the only case-study state with the same party in power in the executive and legislature since 1999 (APP, ANPP and APC, coinciding for the first time since 2015 with the federal level under President Buhari). As in Jigawa, competition between elites for control of political power and economic rents has been relatively restrained. Political leadership has been able to govern with only limited challenge from political opposition. The civil service is relatively professional and not politicised, some parts of which show strong capacity. The lack of development and economic diversification means that there are few influential business groups or individuals. The private sector is primarily focused on winning government contracts and servicing humanitarian agencies.
4.2 UK programmes

UK governance programmes in Yobe began in 2011 with SPARC and SAVI, followed by PERL in 2016. This was part of DFID’s expansion into Northern Nigeria in 2010–12, bringing in other new states – namely Zamfara and Katsina – and motivated by their low socioeconomic indicators and also by an increase in DFID Nigeria’s overall budget. The original rationale for SPARC and SAVI engagement in Yobe was to complement the health programme PRRINN-MNCH by addressing core governance blockages affecting health service delivery. However, the mandate of governance programmes then broadened and included standalone governance interventions. The UK has maintained a strong presence in the health sector with PRRINN-MNCH, MNCH2, W4H and Lafiya, but assistance to the education sector has been more limited and funded through the Girls Education Programme (GEP). Since the conflict began, there have been large-scale humanitarian programmes supported by the UK and the international community, which has presented particular coordination challenges.

In March 2021, after 10 years of support, FCDO Nigeria decided to end PERL’s activities in Yobe. UK programmes in Yobe will continue through the North East Nigeria Transition to Development programme (NENTAD), health-sector programmes and humanitarian support.

In addition to relatively a short period of interventions, the distinctive feature of UK governance programmes has been their mainly remote management, with a limited presence in the state due to security concerns.
4.3 Outcomes

Yobe State has benefited from UK governance, health and education support for less time than the other three states and much less for education. Nonetheless, it has seen improvements in six of the 11 intermediate governance outcomes, two of five intermediate health outcomes but none of the four intermediate education outcomes over the 2011–2020 period. (Indicators for which there was no data have been excluded.)

Data indicates improving trends in five out of seven final health and education outcomes.

**PFM.** There have been significant improvements in budget management, in particular budget transparency (indicator 2), parliamentary scrutiny of the budget (indicator 3), citizen participation in the budget (indicator 4) (through Community Charters of Demand, which are increasingly influencing the composition of the budget), overall improvements in aggregate budget execution (indicator 5) and improvements in public procurement (indicator 6). Although there is no overall trend in budget execution (indicator 5) over the 20-year period, there has been a significant improvement since 2014. These have been closely connected with technical improvements in budget preparation, including greater budget realism and better adherence to the budget calendar. Yobe’s improvements in fiscal management have been recognised in the Annual Performance Assessments of the World Bank SFTAS programme. For the 2018 and 2019 assessments combined, Yobe was ranked fifth out of the 35 states participating in the programme (also MSC NE-1).

**Policy and planning.** There are ongoing shortcomings in broader policy and planning functions, mostly at the sectoral level where MTSS processes are weak and there is a lack of connection between state and sector-level plans and the annual budget (indicators 1, 13 and 20). However, Yobe’s performance in developing its overall state development plans (YOSERA) has been stronger.

**PFM.** PFM indicators do not show improvement (indicators 7 and 8), although these may not fully capture the uptake of corporate planning supported by UK governance programmes, the strength of the PFM core group (a group of civil servants leading reforms) and notable improvements in the efficiency of parts of the public administration identified through interviews.

**E&A.** The functioning of CSOs, media and SHoA (indicators 3, 10 and 11) has increased markedly over the period of UK programming, leading to greater engagement by citizens and their elected representatives in budget and planning processes and emerging interest in monitoring the quality of service delivery.

**Health and education expenditure.** There has been a notable increase in the share of the public budget allocated to the health sector (indicator 14), although not to education (indicator 21). This has been during a period when the real value of federal transfers has declined. There are still weaknesses in budget execution at the sectoral level (in particular for health, see indicator 15).

**Health and education governance.** There has been no improvement in policy, planning and budgeting processes where MTSS processes are quite weak (indicators 13 and 20). Civil society advocacy on health issues has been strengthened (indicator 18) through the Yobe State Accountability Mechanism for Health supported by MNCH2, Lafiya and PERL.
Health and education outcomes. There have been improvements in most health and education indicators, although immunisation rates and primary school enrolment have not changed. In general, health improvements appear to be stronger than for education.

Humanitarian coordination. Another key outcome that is not captured by the indicators is the emerging signs of improvement in the coordination of humanitarian assistance, which has been a major focus of PERL interventions (MSC NE-3; Law et al., 2021).

4.4 What combinations of context, interventions and mechanisms explain outcomes in Yobe?

All of the improvements noted above coincide with areas of focus of UK governance programmes, which have tended to focus on the ‘upstream’ end of the governance and service delivery chain, working on strengthening core governance improvements by working with state and non-state counterparts.

4.4.1 State and non-state engagement in PFM improvements

SPARC and PERL budget interventions with the civil service benefited from two enabling sets of contextual factors in a challenging, but generally supportive, political economy context. The relatively subdued level of inter-elite competition and weakness of political opposition (C) has enabled political leadership to focus on achieving reform. Patronage politics is still active in Yobe State, and has been key to maintaining political stability, but conducted in ways that have not undermined reform progress. Successive governors have pursued coherent agendas; a ‘developmental leadership’ committed to the State Development Plan and reconstruction agenda with priorities shifting from health (under Governor Gaidam, 2009–2019) to education (under Governor Buni, 2019–present).

In addition, UK governance support built on pre-existing attempts to reform the civil service (C) under Governor Gaidam (2009–2019). Continuity of staffing in middle- to high-level officials committed to developing a rural state can also be identified. However, under current Governor Buni (2019–present), there are increasing indications of politically motivated appointments and spending on patronage projects (e.g. foreign scholarships, infrastructure projects directed at more politically influential constituencies), possibly in response to the same fiscal pressures (C) documented in the Jigawa case study.

Budget preparation intervention in Yobe (see Box 10) provides a good example of the relevance of the ‘routinisation’ mechanism (M) as a motivating factor in introducing PFM reforms, combined with civil servants’ commitment to Yobe as a new state, catching up with Borno, akin to ‘state-building’ (M).

The conflict has had negative impacts on service delivery and fiscal management (C). Reduced domestic revenues and unforeseen emergencies and security needs have made it difficult to implement budgets as planned. However, there is also evidence that the conflict is incentivising politicians to seek to improve services and transparency in order to regain legitimacy in the eyes of the population affected by violence (Laws et al., 2021). Many interviewees for this study suggested that the security crisis has led to a recognition among politicians of the need to strengthen trust and communication with citizens by demonstrating
responsive and accountable governance. Examples of concrete measures have included providing access to healthcare in the aftermath of attacks, being more transparent in policy-making, or creating spaces for participation in state processes.

PERL’s assistance to the Community Charters of Demand (see Box 10) was fully consistent with the nature of political competition and patronage in the state, but can also be seen to draw on a ‘broad-based political legitimacy’ mechanism (M): a strategy to ‘win hearts and minds’ in the ideological struggle with Boko Haram/ISWAP by providing citizens the opportunity to express their priorities.

A final causal factor influencing PFM progress has been the availability of additional finance conditional on improved fiscal management stimulating the ‘accessing donor funds’ mechanism (M). In particular, the World Bank SFTAS programme appears to have incentivised recent progress in fiscal reform in Yobe as in Jigawa and Kaduna (see above).

Box 10 Routinisation and participation in Yobe’s budget processes

Yobe budget reforms illustrate the interplay of interventions with state and non-state partners, and how they collectively contribute to a strengthened budget process that is somewhat more responsive to citizens’ priorities.

PERL-ARC contributed to more realistic budgeting and better adherence to the budget calendar (O). Interventions (I) include technical assistance (in particular the use of revenue forecasting tools), the introduction of budget planning and calendar templates, support for the preparation of a new PFM law, and long-term capacity-building and institutional strengthening of the PFM Core Group and Budget Working Group. PERL influenced bureaucratic incentives, in particular the ‘politico-bureaucratic ownership mechanism’ (M) in a context of reform-minded political leadership and a relatively capable and professional civil service (C) because it stimulated the PFM Core Group and Budget Working Group to identify and implement their own priorities. The ‘routinisation mechanism’ (M) has also been important. As more realistic and timely budgeting becomes more normalised, it makes it difficult to deviate from these improved practices without exacting a political cost. ‘Financial incentives’ (M) through the World Bank SFTAS programme have also reinforced political commitment to these reforms.

State–society relations have also been a key part of the mechanisms driving change. In particular, the SHoA, civil society and media supported the push towards realistic and timely budgets, as the routine budget processes gave them more influence ('new spaces and processes’ mechanism – M). PERL-ECP and SAVI interventions supported this mechanism through the establishment of the Voice and Accountability platform (I), which is a broadly inclusive grouping of citizens and community groups organised in clusters aligned with SHoA constituencies and thematic interests. UK programmes were instrumental in establishing and strengthening the platform by providing organisational support, training, and mentoring and brokering connections with the executive and legislature (I).
With PERL support, the Constituency Clusters have organised **Community Charters of Demand (I)** which have enabled more structured citizen participation in the budget process and resulted in increased implementation of citizen-identified projects (O). Charters of Demand provide an opportunity for politicians to appear responsive to their constituencies and earn ‘political credit’ (M). The context of the ideological struggle with Boko Haram (C) may have also prompted politicians to consider the ways in which they could improve trust, and ‘win hearts and minds’ in their constituency. As a result, Charters of Demand can also be seen as incentivising a ‘political legitimacy’ mechanism (M), to ensure a wider and more inclusive distribution of benefits that is more developmental and more broadly distributed than spending based on narrow patronage-related interests.

These outcomes have been supported by improvements in a complementary intermediate outcome, **budget transparency (O)**. PERL has provided technical support (I) to improve the presentation of budgetary data (including a citizens’ budget) and enable publication on the state’s PFM website (pfm.yb.gov.ng). This has created enabling conditions for increased scrutiny of the budget by the SHoA (O) and increased citizen participation in budget processes (O).

The level of contribution of UK programmes to these outcomes is assessed as being **partial to firm**. Some of these changes could have occurred in the absence of UK programmes since the political leadership and bureaucracy were already reform-minded and supported by other development programmes (e.g. SFTAS). However, many of the improvements can be traced to the adoption of PFM tools promoted by UK programmes, long-term relationship-building with the PFM Core Group and Budget Working Group, and the establishment of the Voice and Accountability Platform, which did not exist before UK support.

Sources: Interviews; Williams et al., 2021b

### 4.4.2 Humanitarian coordination

Yobe is the only case-study state where **humanitarian assistance is significant (C)**.

Spending by humanitarian agencies on providing direct services exceeds government spending, and is only loosely coordinated. Humanitarian assistance in Yobe is estimated at $500 million per year, considerably larger than the State Government budget of around $300 million. In this context, successive UK governance programmes’ objectives of improving core governance for service delivery requires improving the targeting and use of humanitarian aid.

PERL contributed to this objective through interventions that fired the ‘**accessing donor funding through donor coordination**’ mechanism (M) by supporting the State Government’s own coordination (see Box 11). This mechanism depended on a prior PERL presence during which it had built network and trust across a range of state actors.
Box 11 Humanitarian coordination and the incentive of ‘accessing donor funds’

Rather than attempting to perform a coordination role directly, PERL interventions (I) have supported government bodies, such as the Yobe Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and the ad hoc Committee on Recovery in the SHoA, and established the Humanitarian Platform of the civil society Voice and Accountability Platform. This has proved challenging in view of a context (C) in which reconstruction and humanitarian programmes are fragmented and poorly coordinated with government programmes because of divergent interests, including competition and lack of trust.

PERL’s role has generally been appreciated by government partners and humanitarian agencies, and has contributed to greater alignment between government and humanitarian agencies (O), evidenced for example in the joint response to the cholera outbreak in 2018–2020 and coordinated reconstruction in Gujba and Gulani LGAs under the PERL-brokered ‘Governance under One Roof’ initiative. PERL was able to capitalise on its strong relationships with the State Government, the SHoA and civil society to enable it to act as honest broker. It was able to draw on these relationships at a critical moment during 2016–17 when the State Government had become so frustrated with the behaviour of humanitarian agencies and their failure to align with State Development Plans that it threatened to expel them. PERL connected humanitarian actors to state-led governance processes in a way that incentivised the access to donor funds through coordination mechanism (M) because it built trust and improved communications and as a result strengthened mutual willingness to collaborate.

There are few other agencies working on the problem of government-led humanitarian coordination, suggesting that UK governance programmes have made a firm contribution to the achievements so far, even though improvements in coordination have to date been quite modest.

Sources: Interviews; Laws et al., 2021

4.5 Conclusion

The results of 10 years of UK governance programmes in Yobe have mainly been at the level of improvements in core governance, although there are signs of improvement in the governance of the health sector. This reflects the shorter duration of UK support and limited education sector interventions.

UK programmes contributed to significant improvements in PFM and E&A in a context of protracted conflict and insecurity. The model of governance programming has been adapted to this context and has also been relevant to peace-building and state-building goals (Laws et al., 2021).

An important lesson from the Yobe experience is that in contexts with large-scale humanitarian
programmes, governance programmes should broaden engagement beyond the government budget and services to include resources and services provided by humanitarian agencies. Government needs to be encouraged and supported to perform a coordination function. So far, this has only been partially effective in Yobe.
5 Kano

5.1 Context

**Kano is a powerful Northern state** of regional and national importance, with the largest economy and population (13 million) of the four case studies. Kano has the largest commercial hub in Northern Nigeria but, since the mid-1990s, industry and the wider private sector have struggled to expand. Most residents are Muslim, predominantly Hausa-Fulani, but there is a large number of immigrants from other Nigerian states. Of the four states, it has the highest male literacy rate (higher than the national average) and second highest female literacy rate, but the worst under 5-mortality rate, indicating unequal service provision.

**Kano’s politics are characterised by intense political competition** resulting in a fractured political elite, politicians switching parties, election violence, patronage-driven appointments and short-term policies designed to win votes. Power and resource-sharing between the Emir of Kano and successive State Governors is often a source of political tension. Successive Governors have experienced political insecurity, which has motivated personalised control of the budget and prevented the SHoA or wider citizen groups from scrutinising it (PERL, 2019f).

Governor Ganduje, in power since 2015, belongs to the APC, as did the previous Governor Kwankwasi (2011–15), but their rivalry led Kwankwasi to defect to the PDP. Political heavyweights in the PDP have been displaced by Kwankwasi and joined the APC (PERL, 2019f). Currently, political power is concentrated among a small group of allies (including the Governor’s wife, reportedly influential in appointing officials). The Governor’s political insecurity may have prevented him from according greater control and resources to the state bureaucracy, civil society, the SHoA and the Emirate. Instead, to protect his power, he has appointed loyalists to the civil service and deliberately weakened its capacity by removing staff who may have supported Kwankwasi (PERL, 2019f).
5.2 UK programmes

**UK governance support started in 2004** with SLGP when Kano became a DFID focal state, followed by SAVI, SPARC and PERL. Health programmes had already started with PATHS1 in 2001, followed by PATHS2, MNCH2, W4H and Lafiya. Education programmes started after SLGP (with CUBE in 2006, followed by GEP, ESSPIN and TDP).

**Kano State is a politically significant partnership for the UK government given its population size and regional influence.** DFID set up a Northern Nigeria office in Kano for a period and the UK has continued to invest in development despite successive governors’ limited interest in UK governance programmes.

5.3 Outcomes

**Kano State demonstrates the weakest performance in terms of intermediate outcomes** for which data has been analysed (with improvements in four of 11 governance indicators, two of seven health sector governance indicators, and two out of six education sector governance indicators). However, out of the four states, it has the strongest performance in terms of the number of improved final health and education outcomes. All eight indicators improved. This is despite the lack of progress on governance and sector governance (second only to Yobe State, which has received much less sustained UK assistance).
PFM. There has been an improvement in budget transparency (indicator 2), but no improvement over the 15 years of UK governance assistance in citizen participation in budget processes (indicator 4) and aggregate budget execution is weak and has worsened (indicator 5). Kano’s weak PFM performance is also reflected in the low level of grants received under the World Bank SFTAS programme.

Policy and planning. Kano has established state-level and sectoral development plans, but these practices are judged to be less institutionalised than in the other states, and are not well connected to annual budgets (indicator 1).

PSM. There has been no improvement in corporate planning processes for State Government MDAs (indicator 7) and central civil service HRM (indicator 8).

E&A. There has been an improvement in media reporting on governance and accountability (indicator 10) and civil society capacity to hold the State Government to account (indicator 11). There has been a sustained improvement in SHoA scrutiny of the budget preparation (indicator 3), but SHoA oversight of the budget and legislative implementation has worsened (indicator 9).

Health and education expenditure. Kano has increased the share of expenditure on health and education (indicators 14 and 21), but budget execution rates have not improved (indicators 16 and 23). In per capita terms, Kano still has the lowest expenditure on health and education of any of the four states.

Health and education governance. There have been no measured improvements in policy planning and budgeting frameworks for health and education (indicators 13 and 20), but some very recent improvements in health and education financing have been documented in the latest PERL case-study evidence (MSC Kn-5 and Kn-7). Civil-society-led advocacy and accountability appear to be stronger in the education sector than the health sector (indicators 18 and 25).

Health and education outcomes. The indicators reviewed for this study indicate strong improvements for health and education outcomes, but there is no available data since 2016 for education and 2018 for health. Before these dates, donor programmes were heavily engaged in the direct provision of health and education services which may partly explain the observation of improving service provision in a context of weak governance and low per capita government spending.

5.4 What combinations of context, interventions and mechanisms explain outcomes in Kano?

5.4.1 PFM interventions with government and parliamentary partners

In the context of competitive politics in a large, urbanised and influential state (C), UK governance programmes have had less traction than in smaller, rural states. This political insecurity, and resulting instability, have prevented longer-term reform agendas concerning core governance processes, such as predictable, transparent and inclusive policy, planning and budgeting. For example, SPARC provided technical assistance to central government agencies (I), but a reliance on patronage for political survival meant there was little uptake. SPARC therefore withdrew support to MTSS processes and cash management. Greater success was achieved through SPARC’s support
to increase IGR where there were political incentives (M) to allow bureaucrats to work more effectively with SPARC as an issue with politico-bureaucratic ownership (M).

When SLGP adopted the issues-based approach to water management, making improvements in governance visible to beneficiaries, it was able to achieve targeted progress on water management in Wudil (O) despite the difficult political context (see Box 12). The programme incentivised change through visible progress affecting a large number of people, thereby making it politically salient (M). It changed provider–citizen relations by enabling consumers to have a say (M). SLGP’s ability to support reform ownership (M) due to its flexibility to experiment and respond was critical to this and other initiatives.

### Box 12 Wudil Water Issues-Based Project

From 2003, in response to the DFID Drivers of Change study findings, SLGP introduced Issues Based projects in all states – practical service-delivery projects involving government and non-government actors working together, designed to make the role of governance reform visible to beneficiaries and galvanise support for it. The key was to identify locally salient issues and collaborate with those willing to address them (‘reform ownership’ – M).

The Wudil Water project is widely acknowledged to have been the most successful. It involved the rehabilitation of tube wells, water pumps and transmission pipelines supplying water to five LGAs (and a population of about 250,000) and related management arrangements (I). The scheme was large, visible and extremely popular (‘political credit’ and ‘constituency visibility’ mechanisms – M). It was notable in particular for achieving significant changes in water governance (O). It established an innovative system whereby the supplier of water was answerable to consumers, who paid for their water supply and whose interests were represented through 128 consumer associations (‘new spaces and processes’, as well as ‘eyes, ears and voice’ mechanisms – M). However, by the end of SLGP in 2008, this arrangement was still in its infancy.

Sources: Interviews, Mshana et al., 2007; DFID, 2008

In Kano, politically insecure State Governors operating in highly competitive politics (C) have come under pressure over issues affecting a large rural population with little access to healthcare or education. Rural populations are important as a vote bank; the presence of an international programme can benefit a Governor. Politically, there is little to lose, and potentially more to gain, by being seen to contribute to more girls attending schools or fewer mothers dying in childbirth (‘low cost’ political mechanism – M). Access to federal and international funds for health, without having to implement core governance reforms, creates a strong financial incentive (M), which contributed to improved health outcomes (O) in Kano (see Box 13). The clearest improvements in the education and health sectors have been achieved through narrow, semi-vertical interventions, such as immunisation and school
feeding. These have not directly challenged rent-seeking structures and in some cases have even supported them. As such, they have not posed a threat to political stability.

**Box 13 Accessing federal and international health funds**

The national Primary Healthcare Under One Roof (PHCUOR) programme was developed with support and pressure from Nigerian civil society and international donors, including federal-level DFID/FCDO programmes over many years (I).

PATHS2 was important in encouraging and supporting the Kano State Government to implement the PHCUOR reform in the state by first establishing a State Primary Health Care Management Agency and Board (SPHCMA/B). PATHS2 and PERL supported the SPHCDA to meet the federal government requirements (I) so that the board would be eligible for the release of funds from the Basic Health Care Provision Fund (‘federal funding’ – M).

Similarly, the World Bank’s Saving One Million Lives (SOML) programme offers funding to state governments if the health sector fulfils a set of governance criteria. The ‘financial incentive’ combined with the opportunity to ‘claim political credit’ at ‘low political cost’ (M) motivated the Kano State Governor to support the required improvements in health governance. MNCH2 worked with the SPHCDA and State Ministry of Health to enable Kano State Government to be awarded SOML funding.

These two illustrations show that if a State Governor wishes to boost his political reputation and needs greater revenue, and a reform does not seriously challenge existing political interests (‘low political cost’ – M), State Government MDAs may be receptive to technical assistance.

We find partial contribution by UK governance programmes in these examples given the influence of UK and other donors’ health programmes in Kano.

Sources: Interviews; DFID, 2016; DFID, 2019b

While such funding for service delivery looks unsustainable, development partners can be assumed to have made a bet that eventually, external funding (I) may shift citizens’ expectations (O), thereby influencing the context such that the respective State Governments will face sustained demand from a broad section of citizens for continued service provision (new C). This would be an example of development partners influencing the institutional context of norms and expectations (but not the core distribution of power or political settlement).
This appears to have happened in Kano where Governor Ganduje has been pushed to reinstate his predecessor Governor Kwankwaso’s school-feeding programme, in response to popular demand (see Box 14).

### Box 14 Political interest in education in Kano State – but not in sector governance reforms

High-level political interest in education in Kano State has primarily concerned prominent public schemes closely linked to the State Governor at the time. The state school-feeding programme and the Free and Compulsory Basic and Post-Basic Education (FCBPE) programme appear to encourage an increase in school enrolment (O) by creating immediate, tangible incentives for children to attend school while also generating high visibility and ‘political credit’ for the Governor (M). PERL and other donor agencies’ programmes are seeking to embed the reform within the state education system, although this, arguably, goes against the political interest driving the programme.

For example, the Kano State school-feeding programme was closely associated with former Governor, Kwankwaso, who used it to gain widespread popularity while also channelling the funding via political appointees rather than the Ministry of Education. This appears to have allowed Kwankwaso to use the programme to increase his political security by offering rents to his supporters and evading scrutiny from robust monitoring and evaluation systems (political incentives – M).

Technical assistance to Kano State education MDAs (I), combined with performance-based financing to the sector by other donor agencies, creates potential political credit (M) and motivated the Governor to allow bureaucrats to work with donor agencies so that the state can receive grants from the World Bank Global Partnership for Education and Better Education Service Delivery for All (BESDA) schemes.

Similarly, ESSPIN supported the SUBEB to develop a workplan and MTSS (I) which has enabled it to meet UBEC requirements (O), and access federal funds (M). Overall, while State Government efforts to improve the education sector have not been consistent, sustained or comprehensive, there has been gradual progress. The state education sector budget has slowly increased, and enrolment rates and gender equity in primary schools have improved.

In Kano State, it could also be argued that UK and other development partners’ efforts to promote good governance reforms in the context of the current State Government-led FCBPE are seeking to push the government in a direction that goes against the interests of those driving the policy. Meaningful reform to governance and budgeting could threaten political security, while the education programme is generating political credit for Governor Ganduje.

Source: Interviews; Outhred and Turner, 2020; PERL, 2021k (MSC Kn-5); PERL 2021k (MSC Kn-7)
In such a context, governance initiatives can contribute to human development outcomes if they either (i) **directly support stakeholders who can influence the use of public resources for service delivery at state level** and/or (ii) support the **operations of large development partners** sector programmes which have political clout. An example of the former is the progress in SHoA scrutiny of the budget, which can be attributed to direct UK governance programmes support (see Box 15).

**Box 15 Skills and innovation to use horizontal accountability channels**

UK programmes have supported ‘horizontal accountability’ channels by developing **skills and systems in SHoA and their committees to help them understand their roles and potential for influence** (I). UK programmes’ facilitation then helped SHoA partners to apply their skills. Governors play an important role in selecting SHoA candidates, which reduces their political independence. Federal and State Governments have not prioritised parliamentary development in their resource allocations, creating space for external programmes to make a clear contribution.

In Kano, SAVI and PERL have continually supported the State Government and members of the SHoA with **tools and processes for realistic budget planning and budget scrutiny** (I). In the past, the executive presented the appropriation bill to the SHoA without its prior contribution; SHoA members would then add their own priorities, which contributed to an unrealistic overloaded budget. Since 2017, the legislature, executive and civil society now prepare the state’s budget together, which may have contributed to **budget realism** (O), and the approval of the 2019 budget without adjustment. These improvements have not yet been picked up in the indicators reviewed for this study, which cover the period up to 2018. The motivating factors seem to have been the realisation by SHoA members that SAVI and PERL could benefit them by enabling them to **understand and exercise their full powers in the SHoA**, and gain more independence by engaging directly with citizens (‘skills and innovation’ mechanism – M).

While these interventions have **contributed to improved budget scrutiny** (O) by the SHoA in Kano, this has not yet had a major impact on expenditure allocation and execution.

UK governance programmes have demonstrated **partial contribution** to this change, which is associated with their interventions, although SHoA members are also motivated by other powerful interests and PFM outcomes are still to be confirmed.

Source: Interviews
5.4.2 E&A and sector outcomes

UK governance programmes’ constructive approach to state–civil society engagement has in all four states contributed to specific human development processes through collaboration with UK sector programmes. The case of free MNCH advocacy (Box 16) illustrates the combination of public and private forms of constructive engagements by civil society groups, the media as well as the SHoA (M).

**Box 16 Free MNCH advocacy as an example of government–CSO constructive engagement**

In Kano, the State Government’s free MNCH policy has provided a focus for civil society groups. SAVI and PATHS2 supported these groups to work with media partners and the SHoA to campaign for a bill to pass a free MNCH law (I). PERL has continued to support civil society to advocate better MNCH. Although the bill was not passed into law, activities raised the profile of the issue. The combination of highly competitive state politics, a large rural population with little access to healthcare, national and international pressure to improve healthcare and local public advocacy on the issue makes it politically difficult for the State Government to ignore MNCH concerns (‘low political cost’ mechanism – M).

The support from SAVI and PATHS2 enabled civil society to identify and focus on an achievable, specific change, which would resolve a blockage in the service delivery chain. SAVI and PATHS2 supported civil society to lobby (I) for monthly (instead of quarterly) disbursements from the State Ministry of Health to the State Hospital Management Board to improve the flow of funds for maternal healthcare. Civil society actors collected their own data on the problem and used radio as a public platform for sharing their campaign (‘eyes and ears with voice’ mechanism – M). They also used their contacts within the State Government to advocate for the change at a dinner organised in 2012 by another health programme. Working through personal contacts, civil society insiders used their power to persuade key individuals in the State Ministry of Health to make this change to funding disbursements (‘insider’ mechanism – M).

These activities did not affect political patronage ties or rent-seeking opportunities, and therefore operated within Kano’s existing political context. There is partial contribution by SAVI and PATHS2 to these small-scale results, as there were many other MNCH programmes and interventions.

Source: Interviews; SAVI (n.d.)
5.5 Conclusion

Improvements in service delivery outcomes can be explained in part because of the political credit they bring the political elite, but they have not been priority political objectives. The large amount of development partner funding for health and education in Kano State, and the direct provision of services, is the more likely explanation, rather than improvements in core governance and sector governance. This potentially displaces the responsibility of the State Government and does not establish sustainable systems or capacities to continuously improve health and education outcomes.

The long-term presence of development partner programmes can build relationships between programme staff and civil servants, and between programme staff and civil society groups. This can incrementally and increasingly build trust and the capacity of civil servants and civil society actors, which may allow for small gains on issues that are not very politically sensitive and will enable these actors to be more effective if in future there is a more reform-conducive political period – although in Kano State, there has not been a pro-reform political environment for 20 years.

The UK government has continued to support Kano State because of its political importance to the country and the size of its population to make progress towards DFID/FCDO national-level human development objectives. The combination of large aid programmes associated with ‘low political cost’ issues offers a solid explanation for Kano’s progress despite a relative lack of interest in core governance.