Report

Afar regional report

2018–2019 refugee and host community context analysis

Dereje Feyissa and Dawud Mohamed

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About this paper

This report is part of a context analysis commissioned by UNICEF Ethiopia in support of its work in refugee-hosting regions of Ethiopia. It was carried out by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and ODI, with funding from UK aid. Five separate reports on each of the main refugee-hosting regions in Ethiopia will be published during the course of 2020–2021, based on research conducted in 2018–2019.

These studies are intended to support the government of Ethiopia's efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its models for hosting and supporting refugees. These efforts have been undertaken in light of the global policy reform set out by the Global Compact for Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Reform Framework (CRRF). Ethiopia's approach is laid out in the government's 2017 'Roadmap for the implementation of the CRRF' and the pledges made by the government in 2016.

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Acronyms

AHA	Africa Humanitarian Action
ALF	Afar Liberation Front
APDA	Afar Pasoral Development Association
ARRA	Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs
AWD	acute watery diarrhoea
BoWCA	Bureau of Women and Children's Affairs
BSRP	Building Self-Reliance Programme
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DEC	Development Expert Centre
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRDIP	Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
FGD	focus group discussion
FGM	female genital mutilation
GBV	gender-based violence
IDI	in-depth interview
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Association for Development
IPDA	Integrated Protection and Development Assistance for Eritrean Refugees and their Host Communities in Afar Region
KII	key informant interview
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OSD	Organisation for Sustainable Development
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
RCC	Refugee Central Committee
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive summary

The Afar region of Ethiopia hosts around 38,000 Afari Eritrean refugees in two camps in the far north and east of the country, alongside a total population of 1.8 million people, of whom 91% are ethnic Afar. This study focuses on the eastern camp, Asayita, which hosts around 15,000 refugees.

Perhaps the most important feature of the wider region for this study is the extent of Afar marginalisation, both geographically, at the edge of the country in an area facing extreme climatic conditions, and politically, with under-resourcing and historical discrimination by the Ethiopian state. Poverty is extreme, with up to 75% of the population receiving some form of food aid in recent years from humanitarian programming and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP).

The level of ethnic solidarity between Ethiopian and Eritrean Afar is striking, with the phrase 'Afar Afari' recurring among respondents: 'Afar are Afar no matter where they come from'. This strong sense of solidarity is in part responsible for the extent of de facto integration in the region: more than 25% of recognised refugees live outside the camps, though they are still able to access monthly rations and other benefits available to refugees. This provides a unique context for implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).

The research found strong economic links between refugees and host populations. The refugee operation is a significant economic input into the region, including the provision of around one million Birr every month in the form of cash transfers, as well as significant food rations that reach local markets. Some local actors see the refugees as a valuable labour resource. In the past, refugees have been encouraged to take daily labour in local factories, and the study found examples of resident–refugee cooperation around sharecropping, which may bode well for implementation of the livelihoods pledges developed by the government. However, refugees expressed concerns about discrimination by some employers and in markets, and reported that they had little legal protection under the current legislative framework. Some also felt that the relatively good relationship they had with host populations was partly a function of the refugee operation working as a separate, parallel structure, and were therefore nervous about the potential consequences of greater integration.

Service delivery in the region as a whole is inadequate, and those responsible for delivering services both inside and outside the camps are perceived with a degree of frustration. The picture appears to be more positive in the camps, but services are not reliable or consistent across the board, and the level of de facto integration means that the refugees present an increased burden for the regional and woreda governments, and one that specific resources are not allocated to.

From an institutional perspective, relations between the federal and regional governments have been generally positive, and this has created a conducive environment for the relationship between the Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and the local authorities. However, structural constraints in the way the refugee operation is run in Afar – with ARRA and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) both reporting to managers in Tigray – have contributed to a relatively weak partnership with local authorities. The local government feels that it is under-resourced, as well as facing additional pressures as a result of the refugee presence, and this creates frustrations about their inability to exert greater control over resources allocated to refugees. Some progress has been made in creating a framework for such a partnership through the European Union (EU)'s Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), but this is not embedded in Ethiopian government structures.

Overall, the refugee operation in the Afar region has many features that suggest that implementation of the CRRF could have a positive impact. The approach should be to work with the grain of the de facto integration that already exists in the region, and take advantage of the particularly strong opportunities in the livelihoods sector. The challenges facing service delivery are also such that the benefits of more efficient allocation of resources and use of complementary skill sets should be clear to all actors, but they will need to be persuaded that this is about helping them meet their core objectives more effectively.

It will also be important to strike the right balance in terms of investment inside and outside the camps: the extent to which refugees are already integrated with host populations, the deprivation in host areas and the potential for repatriation to become more attractive in the context of the ongoing peace process with Eritrea make a strong case for increasing the proportion of resources targeted outside the camps. Any such changes must be accompanied by clear communication and consultation: the current lack of clarity over what the CRRF means operationally is a significant constraint to developing a stronger partnership. The political transition currently underway in Ethiopia may also bring both opportunities and risks. On the one hand, new leadership at both federal and regional level may see advantages in supporting an approach that could be portrayed as more equitably focusing on the needs of all groups. On the other, uncertainty over the future may reduce confidence and limit the space for innovation.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) commissioned this context analysis to support implementation of the Building Self-Reliance Programme (BSRP), a four-year programme funded by the UK government and designed to improve service delivery to refugees and host communities across Ethiopia. Specifically, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC)/ODI team conducted a series of studies to better understand the implications of the programme's operating context. The focus of the studies is therefore the service delivery sectors that UNICEF focuses on under the BSRP: health; education; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); nutrition; and child protection.

Of particular significance at the policy level is the national process to implement the Ethiopian government's Nine Pledges related to hosting refugees, agreed in September 2016, and in support of the CRRF. The pledges of most relevance to service delivery are the education pledge ('Increase of enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education to all qualified refugees without discrimination and within the available resources') and the social and basic services pledge ('Enhance the provision of basic and essential social services'), although the wider ambition to enable refugees to integrate more fully into Ethiopian life is also relevant (GoE, 2017). This process has led to the development of a roadmap for implementation, with ARRA leading the strategy process. The government is currently agreeing a ten-year strategy that will shape future support to both refugees and host communities.

This is one of five regional studies conducted as part of this context analysis. The objective of each is to provide UNICEF and other development partners with a more detailed understanding of the contextual factors affecting relations between refugees, residents and key institutional actors involved in service delivery. It was carried out in June–July 2018.

1.2 Methods

The study used a mixed methods approach. To get the views of policymakers, 27 key informant interviews (KIIs) were carried out at regional, zonal and woreda level. Interviewees included current and former government officials from all of the key bureaus involved in sectoral policy and delivery, ARRA and a range of United Nations (UN) agencies and international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Anonymised details of the interviews are given in Annex 1. In-depth fieldwork was conducted with refugees and members of host communities to elicit their views on service delivery and integration: 40 in-depth interviews (IDIs) and 12 focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in camps and host communities with – where necessary – support from a team of locally recruited male and female Afar translators.

Of the two refugee camps in Afar region, Asayita and Berhale, the team chose to focus on Asayita and its surroundings. Berhale is a significant distance from Asayita and Samara, the regional capital, and the additional logistics involved in reaching it would have constrained the research. The Asayita area hosts the majority of refugees in the region, and focusing there also allowed for in-depth engagement with officials in Samara.

1.3 Structure of the report

The report opens with an overview of key historical factors shaping the context of the refugee operation in Afar region, before highlighting key challenges that emerged from interviews and FGDs with local populations. It then sets out findings in terms of the institutional relationships relating to different service delivery sectors and reflects on perceptions of integration and self-reliance, before considering the implications and making recommendations.

2 Afar: refugees and the region

2.1 The regional setting

Afar regional state is in the Ethiopian lowlands. According to estimates based on the 2007 census, the region has a population of 1.8 million people, 90% of whom are in rural areas. The population is homogeneous, with 91% ethnic Afar and 98% practising Muslims (CSA, 2008), with the rest either from the Argoba ethnic minority or highlanders, particularly from Tigray and Amhara. Although a minority, highlanders constitute a vocal part of the regional population, dominate the business sector and feature prominently in woreda administrations (Feyissa, 2011). The two major sources of livelihood in the region are pastoral and agro-pastoral, with a small number of people working in salt extraction and sale and casual employment in agriculture and in urban centres.

Asayita woreda in the east hosts one of the region's two refugee camps. It has a population of 69,196, with a mix of urban, pastoral and agricultural kebeles (KII 4). Asayita is the seat of the historic Aussa sultanate, which played a key role in the long-distance trade between the coast and the Ethiopian hinterland due to its proximity to Djibouti. It served as the capital of the Afar Regional State from 1991 to 2003, when it was replaced by Samara (Abdallah, 1993). Asayita and Samara represent two different centres of political power, and as such there are underlying tensions between them. Asayita's trading activities declined after the transfer of the regional capital, and particularly after a government crackdown on the contraband trade in 2008 (Yasin, 2008). Located in the Upper Awash Valley, Asayita also has huge potential for irrigated commercial agriculture, and currently hosts large-scale state and private cotton and sugar plantations.

2.2 The refugees

Eritrean Afar refugees have been fleeing to Ethiopia since the 1998–2000 war with Eritrea, escaping persecution due to discrimination, violation of human rights, forced conscription and movement restrictions. Fear of conscription, lack of education and employment opportunities, the desire to join relatives in another country and hopes for resettlement are the main reasons for migration out of Eritrea (IDI 11). Eritrean Afar, who make up almost a quarter of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, are also politically and economically marginalised by the Eritrean state (Dahilon, 2001).

The two camps in Afar region, Asayita and Berhale, were formally established in 2007. According to UNHCR, a total of 38,559 Eritrean Afar refugees are hosted in the region, of whom 27,759 are in camps and 10,800 outside (KII 1). Information about refugees outside the camps, mainly in Dalol, Erebti and Ayinadib, is limited, though UNHCR administered a thorough registration of all refugees in Ethiopia in September 2018. Notwithstanding the lack of detailed information, the fact that 28% of refugees in the region live outside the camps makes Afar unique in Ethiopia. While the overall 'out of camp' policy towards Eritrean refugees, in place since 2010, has created an enabling environment for this, there are a number of contributing factors other than government policy specific to the region.

For many years Eritrean Afar refugees were not encamped at all: numbers were relatively

small and did not grow rapidly, and many stayed in a temporary camp at the Bure entry point before integrating into local communities.[1] Strong clan solidarity between Afar refugees and Ethiopian Afars in Dalol, Erebti and Ayinadib encouraged refugees to live among Ethiopian communities. When the camps at Berhale and Asayita opened in 2007 there were therefore already large numbers of refugees in the region, and it was not possible to provide adequate accommodation for them all. One ARRA representative in Asayita described the camp as '*dekamawa* camp' (the weakest camp) because of the capacity gaps faced there (KII 3). ARRA therefore has an incentive to be more relaxed with out-of-camp residence in Afar region than elsewhere in the country.

Most refugees are formally registered and come to the Asayita camp for their monthly food ration (KII 2). Some see more economic opportunities out of the camps, such as setting up small businesses while still accessing refugee resources (KII 1). Although the number is not known, some of these refugees have entirely melted into host communities and have no contact with the refugee operation; some have even become local government officials.[2] ARRA intends to open more accommodation and move some of these refugees into the camps, but no clear timetable for this is in place. Given the brighter prospects for future repatriation in the context of the ongoing peace process with Eritrea, it seems unlikely that ARRA will mobilise the resources to expand the camps.

Refugees in the region are mainly from the Asab, Masawa and Danakil areas of south-eastern Eritrea and are exclusively ethnic Afar (KIIs 1, 2 and 3). While still having a strong ethnic affiliation with local Ethiopian populations, refugees living inside the camps tend to have weaker clan affiliations than those outside. This is particularly the case in Asayita given its distance from the Eritrean border (KII 5). Around half of the refugees in the region are under the age of 11 and more than 60% are children (KIIs 1 and 2). The majority of refugees are herders who rear goats and camels, while refugees from the Red Sea coast are expert in fishing, and some have business skills.

2.3 The history and nature of federal–regional relations

The Afar people are one of the most marginalised groups in the Horn of Africa, in part as a result of their settlement in such a geopolitically strategic area. They are split across three countries – Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea – with the Ethiopian settlement being the largest. Successive governments led by more powerful ethnic groups from neighbouring areas have appropriated the fertile riverine lands in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia and pushed Afar out of Red Sea areas in Eritrea and Djibouti (Dahilon, 2001). The 'Qafar Siidice Amo' (the 'Afar Triangle') is a political project that seeks to unite Afar in the three countries into a single nation-state (Yasin, 2010).

In the pre-colonial period Afari politics was organised into sultanates, the most prosperous and powerful of which was the Aussa sultanate in present-day Asayita woreda (Yasin, 2008). It rose to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century thanks to its strategic location on the long-distance trade route between the coast and the Ethiopian hinterland, as well as Sultan Alimira's diplomatic skills and connections with the Ethiopian empire, particularly through a personal link with Emperor Haile Selassie. Under Alimira the Afar managed to resist the encroachment of irrigated commercial agriculture into the prime grazing land of the fertile Awash river basin. However, in the 1960s the Ethiopian government and Western companies expropriated

1 The relatively lower priority afforded to the Afar operation can also be seen in the fact that ARRA still oversees it from Shire, in Tigray.

2 The president of Samara University, for instance, is an Eritrean Afar from Asab. So is the university's public relations officer. No Afar has ever complained that they are 'foreigners' who took over a job of Ethiopian citizens. As the experience from the Somali and Gambella regions indicate, the concept of 'belonging' is often invoked in the politics of inclusion and exclusion from power and resources.

most of these lands to grow cotton for the international market, heralding the start of the economic decline of the Aussa sultanate, and with it the Afar at large (Kassim, 1985). When the Derg government continued the process of political centralisation, challenging the Afar's long-standing autonomy, they launched a resistance movement led by the Afar Liberation Front (ALF). The ALF was loosely allied with the major resistance movement against the Derg, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

When the Ethiopian federation was created in 1995, Afar became one of the country's nine states, raising hopes among the Afar that this political empowerment would be translated into economic development and better services. Although Ethiopia's new federal order has significantly delivered on the Afar's aspirations, they remain one of the country's most marginalised people in terms of basic services and overall development, not just in reference to national averages but also by the standard of the other three lowland states.[3] This is partly a product of the extreme conditions in the region, the most arid of all the Ethiopian lowlands and, during the dry season, the hottest. Currently, various social protection programmes sustain three-quarters of the population.

Despite the efforts of the federal and regional governments, as well as projects supported by international organisations, the Afar region still faces daunting developmental challenges and is recognised as one of the least developed parts of Ethiopia (Cerritelli et al., 2008). Food insecurity and acute child malnutrition are reportedly increasing (Abubeker et al., 2014); one commentator goes as far as to suggest that the Afar are on the brink of extinction as a result of recurrent drought (Yassin, 2008). In a 2016 interview, the current sultan, Sultan Hanfare, lamented that 'in the past, a very poor Afar had 100 cows and a similar number of camel and goats, but currently a poor Afar has two goats. This time, the Afar people are not only suffering but also at the verge of extinction' (German Radio Amharic Service, 2016). An analysis in 2014 by the Afar Bureau of Finance and Economic Development found that the poor quality of service provision in almost all sectors had hampered the region's development. Under-development was discussed in the national parliament in 2015, when former prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn identified safe drinking water as the major challenge and pledged to tackle it through the construction of pipelines to improve water supply in the region.

The regional government's willingness to respond to the developmental challenges and humanitarian crises the region has faced is undermined by division and power struggle among the regional political class. The federal government has vital interests to protect in the region, including securing the rail and road route to the port of Djibouti, the country's economic artery, containing Eritrean incursions and subversion in the region (at least until the recent thaw in relations between the two countries), and commercial agriculture in the Awash basin. Access to and maintenance of political power within the region depends primarily on whether leaders deliver on these 'national interests', rather than popular legitimacy (Nicol and Otulana, 2014). However, recognising that extreme inequality is unlikely to be sustainable, the federal government has sought to redress it through a special support programme for the four 'developing regional states', channelled through the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Pastoral Development. This includes service delivery, capacity-building and a twinning arrangement, whereby a 'developed regional state' is tasked with mentoring a neighbouring 'developing' one. The Afar region is twinned with Tigray, an indicator of their close political relationship in recent years.

Villagisation is another part of the federal government's approach to improving service delivery in the region, though there have been claims that it has also been used to free up land for larger-scale investment (Buzuayew et al., 2016). The scheme has been implemented by the Equitable Development Support Directorate of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, with staff

3 The so-called 'developing regional states' within the Ethiopian federation are the four lowland regional states: Afar, Somali, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz.

decentralised down to regional, zonal and woreda levels. With minimal consultation, the scheme was coercively implemented in the early 2010s. Although a significant number of people later deserted the villages, the regional government reported the movement of 37,602 households in 2015, leading to a local and international backlash (Gebresenbet, 2016). The federal government has since admitted that villagisation has not delivered on its promises in the Afar region and that 'there were shortcomings in convincing and engaging the public' about its benefits. As a result, the ministry has achieved less than 25% of its target. Delays with social and economic infrastructure and the failure of regional governments to release funding on time have also been cited as reasons for the failure of the scheme.

Echoing the historic highland/lowland power imbalance in the process of state formation in Ethiopia, highlanders dominate the regional economy (Feyissa, 2011). They are also dominant in the civil service of the regional government and in the staffing and leadership of the refugee operation. Currently, only the World Food Programme (WFP) has an Afar in a senior leadership position (KIIs in Samara). While this is partly a result of the educational capacity gap of the indigenous Afar people, it also reflects historic imbalances. It also affects relations between the refugee operation and both local refugees and residents.

It is not yet clear how the political reform process under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will affect and shape regional politics in Afar but, as in other parts of the country, it is likely to create an unpredictable political environment in the short to medium term. Expectations are growing among educated Afar that a change in regional political leadership – as was seen in the neighbouring Somali region and Gambella over the course of 2018 – should be the top priority. The coming of the diaspora-based Afar opposition party – Afar People's Party – to pursue a peaceful political struggle is a positive step. But should the ruling party see this as a competition, it is likely to generate political tension in the run up to the 2020 election.

3 The lives of refugees and residents in the Afar region

3.1 Access to income

Of the region's rural population, 90% relies on pastoral livelihoods and subsistence livestock-rearing. Agro-pastoralists, using a mixture of livestock production and rain-fed and irrigated crop production along the Awash river, make up the other 10% (CMI, 2015). A small number of people engage in the extraction and sale of salt, casual employment in agricultural schemes and work in urban centres.

These rural livelihoods have been significantly affected by recurrent droughts, leaving many dependent on humanitarian assistance. Three-quarters of the region's population need emergency assistance: 446,881 emergency relief and 562,082 assistance under the PSNP (KII 12). As of July 2018, 23 woredas were considered 'priority 1' hotspots, and only nine 'priority 2'. There is a substantial need for targeted supplementary feeding, with 365 schools in the WFP school-feeding programme (KII 18).

The invasive plant species *prosopis juliflora* has spread to more than 1.8 million hectares of pastoral land, posing another serious threat to the viability of Afar pastoralism (KII 5). Residents confirm that significant amounts of labour are expended on clearing *prosopis* from their homesteads and footpaths, and keeping livestock away from deep thickets of the plant (IDI 38). There have been no significant external interventions targeting the problem aside from those described below.

Lack of business development and entrepreneurial experience and skills, as well as limited access to capital, is a significant constraint to people's ability to engage in alternative income-generating activities, and in any case, as noted, the business sector is dominated by highlanders (KIIs 9, 10 and 15). High youth unemployment, including in refugee-hosting woredas, contributes to increasing migration to Arab countries and high levels of addiction to chat and shisha (KII 9). DCA is trying to address these problems through a livelihood programme for residents and refugees providing alternative means of income generation, including communal irrigation and vegetable production and the introduction of new drought-resistant and highly nutritious cereal crops imported from abroad (KII 10).

Refugee livelihoods are highly dependent on the rations delivered by WFP. However, rations have been reduced in recent years, causing deep resentment (FGDs 1–4). From 15 kg per person per month, refugees now receive 4 kg or 5 kg, plus 50–100 Birr per person per month (FGDs 5 and 6). Refugees do not understand why the ration has been so drastically reduced, compounding the problem and leaving room for speculation that there 'might be corruption'. Refugees have resorted to a variety of coping mechanisms, including collecting firewood; the production of cultural goods such as mats (called *dibora*) and the grass carpets used for Islamic prayers; breeding goats for sale; or working as wage labourers in the Tendaho sugar factory or in the construction sector in Samara and Logia (IDI 1). As described below, some have entered into sharecropping arrangements with residents

(KII 9). Finally, some refugees sell a portion of their rations to buy clothes, additional food items and to cover other miscellaneous expenses (IDIs 9, 14 and 25; KII 10). To supplement the livelihoods of refugees, Mekaneyesus Church has organised 37 refugee women self-help groups, nine of which run shops in the camp. Mekaneyesus also provides goats for refugees with specific needs, who fatten them up for sale at Asayita market (KII 10).

Wage labour is another source of income. However, refugees indicate that there are instances of discrimination and abuse by employers, from which they do not feel protected (IDIs 1, 17 and 23):

> There is problem of payment. ARRA would not side with us whenever there is labour issue. They say you are not allowed to work in the first place. You can work only when we allow you. They used to take many refugees to the sugar factory. Sometimes up to 70 people were taken by truck to work in the sugar plantation. We also used to work in the private cotton plantations, which needs more people. Ass Mohammed [one of the few Afar businessmen] used to pay us a lot of money for his cotton farm. There is now competition with the *habesha* [highlanders]. They also started to work as daily labourers (IDI 1).

The refugee/resident sharecropping arrangement described above has been a success; one well-known refugee even raised enough cash from sharecropping in Hinole kebele to set up his own business in Asayita town (IDIs 11 and 18). Building on this initiative, Mekaneyesus organised 22 refugees and 22 host community members into three groups in a sharecropping arrangement in Hinole. Together they farm 25 hectares of land, from which they have already produced 360 quintals of maize, equally divided between the two groups. They also produce cotton. Refugees get 80% of the profit from the cotton sharecropping, as cotton is more labour-intensive. As the head of the project put it, 'refugees cannot live on 4–5 kg/month. Such an initiative aligns well with the livelihood pledges made by the Ethiopian government, particularly pledge 5, which commits the government to increasing the amount of irrigable land available for refugees to grow crops (GoE, 2017). The sharecropping land was previously covered by *prosoposis*. 'We support refugees and host communities to clear the land; provide them with tools and improved seeds adapted to local ecological context. We also provide pesticide and agronomic practices' (KII 10).

For some refugees remittances are a major source of income, particularly from people who have been resettled:

> My grandmother and her uncle went to Canada through the resettlement programme. They send us money from time to time. We collect the money through the UNHCR card and collect it from [a] commercial bank. They recently sent 7,000 Birr for Eid (IDI 4).

There is considerable disappointment among refugees that more have not been resettled, and there is speculation that this is partly a consequence of corruption or nepotism. One respondent suggested that zone 5 is a 'ghost zone' created to enable local inhabitants to sneak into the camp and avail themselves of resettlement opportunities (IDI 2). Three high school refugee students expressed their disappointment about the slow pace of the process. Having gone through the medical examination two years ago they were still waiting for a final decision (FGD 2).

3.2 Interactions between residents and refugees

There are close connections between refugees and residents in Asayita woreda based on shared ethnic identity and the historic relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Eritrean port of Assab, where most of the refugees are from, used to be Ethiopia's major access to the sea and handled most of its international trade. There was regular movement of people from both sides of the border, with Eritrean Afar coming to the Afar region of Ethiopia for trade and Ethiopian Afar going to Asab to work in the port

and related sectors (FGD 3). These interactions have made integration in the region far easier. The proximity of the camp, just 2.5–3 km from Asayita town, and shared social networks also help. Shared identities and blurred distinctions between refugees and residents are key factors in the relatively smooth running of the refugee operation in the region.

Although entry to the camp for residents is restricted, refugees move in and out relatively easily (KII 5). Every day, hundreds of refugee students move between the camp and schools in the area. Many refugees regularly attend the weekly market in Asayita and use health services in the town, some through the formal referral system and others accessing private clinics. Many women and youth also leave the camp to fetch firewood. Security in the area is generally reported to be good, although two rape cases have been reported, both involving resident youth attacking refugee women while they were fetching firewood (IDI 16). There have also been reports from the Bureau of Women and Children's Affairs (BoWCA) of increasing anti-social behaviour (smoking, chewing chat) among young refugees with little else to do (private communication with authors).

Close connections between refugees and residents have enabled different forms of integration. 'Afar Afari' ('Afar are Afar wherever they are from') is a standard response when refugees and residents are asked about integration (FGDs 1, 4, 11 and 12). As one resident respondent noted: 'to begin with they are not even refugees for us but rather relatives and friends. It is the government which calls them refugees' (IDI 17). As explained above, this has enabled more than 10,000 refugees to live outside of the camps, mainly in Dalol, Erabti and Ayinadib woredas, but also in Asayita, Samara, Logia and as far south as Gewane. The refugees did stay at the Bure entry point for years, from where they joined friends and relatives across the region. Refugees living in host communities access services provided by ARRA, particularly the monthly food ration (KIIs 1–3). Since 2010, the Ethiopian government's 'out of camp' policy for Eritrean refugees has made integration even more attractive and feasible. Hundreds of refugee students attend local Ethiopian schools, from junior high to high school and tertiary level (at Samara University) (KII 19).

Refugees also leave the camp for work, including as wage labourers in the Tendaho sugar factory and, for some, as civil servants (KII 4), and to shop at the weekly market in Asayita town. Located in neighbouring Dubti woreda, the Tendaho factory is one of the largest sugar projects in the country.[4] At full production capacity it requires as many as 60,000 workers, most of whom come from the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) (KII19). Local Afar are less keen to work as wage labourers. They rather prefer the Afar refugees to be employed. In fact, the Afar refugees are perceived as a 'political resource' in maintaining the demographic balance between Afar and non-Afar in regional politics, and are therefore preferential for local Afar politicians to those from elsewhere in the country. There is a concern that labour migration could undermine their regional standing as political 'owners' of the Afar regional state. This dynamic creates a potentially significant opportunity for refugees in any new industrial initiatives in the region, such as the new industrial park in Samara announced by Prime Minister Abiy during a visit to Afar in June 2018. Unlike elsewhere in the country, there may be general support for the idea of refugees having access to a significant number of any new jobs created.

Refugees can also access land, partly because land is owned and administered through a clan structure they are familiar with. No major problems have been reported in refugees' access to land through sharecropping arrangements with host communities (KII 18), with the woreda administration playing an important role in enforcing contracts between refugees and residents (KII 10). There is also market integration between refugees and host communities. Some food rations, particularly nutritional supplements, are sold in the weekly market in Asayita town. In return, refugees buy maize, rice, sugar and salt and coffee (KII 16). The introduction of cash to supplement

4 The factory is expected to produce 6.2 million quintals of sugar and 63 million litres of ethanol and cultivate sugarcane on 50,000 hectares of land. Thirteen mini towns are planned between Asayita and Dubiti woredas for these sugar factory workers.

the reduced food ration has injected a significant amount of money into the local economy. One WFP representative told the study that 'Every month over a million cash [Birr] is injected in the local economy. This has created an economic revival of Asayita woreda as this cash further increased economic exchanges at the weekly market place in Asayita town' (KII 12). Another area with potential for promoting integration is an initiative from the Organization for Sustainable Development (OSD) to use the invasive *prosoposis* shrub to make smokeless charcoal. There could be a significant market for this in the camps and beyond; the Shire refugee operation in Tigray has expressed interest in importing briquettes from Afar (KII 15).

Overall, the socioeconomic impact of the refugee presence on residents has been both positive and negative. Negative effects largely relate to the depletion of local resources due to the demand for firewood and building materials (KIIs 2 and 3), and the increased burden on services such as health and education. Residents indicated that the arrival of the refugees increased the prices of some commodities and crops, such as maize and sorghum (FGD 8). At the same time, residents also acknowledge that the presence of the refugees has made some food items cheaper as refugees sell a portion of their monthly ration (FGD 7).

There are also new economic and business opportunities thanks to the presence of aid agencies (FGD 7), although these do not necessarily benefit local people equitably. For example, contracts are primarily won by highlander-owned businesses, with local businesses in Asayita not even responding to invitations to tender from NGOs because of a perception of bias against them, as well as a lack of capacity (KIIs 9 and 12). Accordingly, these contracts are often won by businessmen from outside Asayita, in most cases in Dessie, Kombolcha and even Addis Ababa, who are all viewed as 'highlanders' despite their ethnic diversity. The Afar region is yet to see Afar entrepreneurs and businessmen who could make use of refugee-related contracts (IDI 32). National staff working in the camp are also perceived as 'highlanders', while incentive workers are all Afar. Salaries differ substantially: in teaching, for instance, incentive workers earn 700 Birr a month, compared to 15,000 Birr for Ethiopian nationals. Although this system is based on legal restrictions around refugees' right to work, it is perceived as part of a wider bias against the Afar. That nearly every service provider in the camp, including NGOs, are non-Afar also undermines effective and culturally sensitive communication with refugees (IDI 30).

4 Perspectives on service delivery

Service provision in the camp is under the auspices of ARRA, the most powerful institutional actor. However, there appears to be a need to rebuild trust between refugees, ARRA and other camp service providers, and a growing sense of powerlessness among refugees on issues related to service provision and food distribution. Cuts to food rations in recent years were refugees' main concern. Refugee women expressed this sense of powerlessness metaphorically:

> It feels as if we tied a *nikah* [a symbol of Islamic marriage] with ARRA. We are at the mercy of ARRA. They would not let us go out of the camp even during public holidays. For instance, we wanted to go and see the Nationalities Day celebration in Samara, but ARRA did not allow us. We need more interaction with the host community. At least ARRA supports us celebrating Refugees Day, Eritrean Liberation Day. They bring Lucy Band to entertain us. We hope Abiy will also liberate us from the plight of ARRA's 4kg wheat and the 100 Birr ration! (FGD 6).

Refugee men recounted an incident in 2016 when they demonstrated in the camp against the reduction, which has badly damaged the credibility of service providers in the eyes of the refugees:

> We hoped to obtain better services in the camp. Students of grade 5 or even grade 6 do not know how to properly write and read, which a grade 1 student in Eritrea knows. Most of the teachers are not qualified. It has been more than three months since we run into trouble with water provision [...] the medical facility in the clinic is adequate! The amount of food we get now is much smaller than what we used to get. This is not even regular, often getting food every 40 days! The difference between Eritrea and Ethiopia is that Eritrea kills you openly. But in Ethiopia one dies silently, such as from a lack of food (IDI 5).

ARRA regards these grievances as a 'deliberate strategy' to extract more resources and get better services:

> This so-called refugee grievance is also fuelled by the story circulating in the camp that refugees in other countries, or even other camps in Ethiopia, are better served. There is a newly constituted zone 5 for Eritrean refugees from Yemen. The word is spread that refugees in Yemen are given $150/monthly in addition to the food ration. The refugees here compare this with what they get, which is 6 kg wheat and 100 Birr. Except food, the other refugees' complaints are not founded (KII 24).

The Refugee Central Committee (RCC) leader was also critical:

> True that people are not getting 15 kg of food. They are getting 6 kg of food and 100 Birr. Previously, every person used to get 15 kg of food on regular basis. But later on, the amount was changed from 15 kg to 6 kg and 100 Birr based on refugees' request. I hear many refugees complain they do not even get

> the full 6 kg. First, those who measure and distribute food [wheat flour] are not ARRA or WFP staff. Few selected individuals from the refugee community are the food distributors. Even if their claim is right, ARRA and WFP are not to take the blame. It is the refugees themselves that should be blamed. ARRA staff [are] never involved in the food distribution process except that one representative from ARRA checks the names of the refugees as they take their food from the distribution spot. Other than that, all food distribution activities are undertaken by the refugees themselves. At times, it is highly likely that the person scooping the food may not scoop to the fullest extent of the container and that may result in reduced amount being distributed to some (KII 5).

Although not effectively communicated to refugees, WFP explains the reduction of the food ration as follows:

> Food provision has declined because many of the donors have failed to deliver on their pledges. This relates to the global refugee crisis. In Asayita refugee camp, it is also believed there is carryover because most refugees go to the host. The reduction of the food ration also relates to the cash demand by the refugees to buy supplementary food such as tomatoes, sugar or salt. That is why the food ration is reduced. A five-member family gets 500 Birrs (100 Birr/person/month). There is a need to sensitise the beneficiaries regarding the reduction of the food ration (KII 12).

Refugees were involved in the creation of the new distribution system and were consulted on the balance of cash and food. In Asayita they chose to receive 100 Birr a month in cash per person, whereas in Berhale they chose to receive only 50 Birr a month (in exchange for additional food in-kind).

Host communities put the blame for difficulties in accessing services squarely on local government officials. In Hinole kebele, for instance, respondents deeply resented the perceived focus on providing quality services to the two urban kebeles of Asayita woreda, where the majority of officials live, at the expense of rural kebeles (FGD 11). However, a closer look at the service sector suggests a more complex picture, both in the camp and in host communities. Below we provide key findings in each sector.

4.1 Water, sanitation and hygiene

4.1.1 Water provision in the camp

Before the construction of water delivery infrastructure, refugees relied on water trucked in from Asayita town. Initially, one deep well was dug as the main water source for the camp by the African Humanitarian Association (AHA). Currently there are 13 water distribution centres in the camp, each with four taps, and officially this is enough capacity for all refugees to access 20 litres per person per day within less than 500 m of their home. However, thousands of refugees live outside of the camp; if they are moved into the camp as planned, this will exceed the capacity of the system.

There were indications that the water system is already over-stretched, and in need of an additional generator, reservoir and borehole to satisfy the growing number of refugees in the camp as well as local residents. Water consumption among both refugees and local communities is substantial because of the extreme heat, especially between April and October. Water provision in the camp was particularly problematic in the first half of 2018 as the water pipe broke in the heat. While working on maintenance in collaboration with AHA, ARRA has approached the woreda administration to allow refugees access to the borehole of the host communities (KII 11).

IDIs and FGDs with refugees confirmed the deep resentment regarding the availability and reliability of water provision in the camp:

> The water supply in the camp is not consistent and reliable. Each zone is scheduled to get water one day per

> week and that is for one hour only. Most of the time, the water doesn't run on schedule. Due to this problem, we have been forced to go out of the camp and fetch water from Asayita town. The camp authorities tell us that the problem of water is caused due to the breaking of the pipelines through which water flows. During such times, we go out of the camp to fetch water and carry our jerry cans all the way from the water point to the camp. That is so tiresome. On top of that, there is a shortage of water containers such as jerry cans. The challenge of water supply in the camp is increasing from time to time, especially since the last three months (IDI 22).

4.1.2 Sanitation and hygiene in the camp

Sanitation is a significant challenge. While there are rubbish carts, and ARRA sanitation incentive workers move around the camp collecting refuse from the homes of camp residents, most refugees do not use the carts and leave their garbage around the camp. Garbage dumps are hazardous to children playing in them or looking for waste to sell. Toilet facilities are also reportedly insufficient: 'We don't have toilets at all because those toilets which were constructed many years ago when we first arrived here are full and not usable at all. Neither do we have a place to take a shower' (KII 11). Communal latrines constructed by AHA are inadequate for the number of refugees in the camp.

4.1.3 Water outside the camp

Accessing clean water in Asayita woreda is a major challenge. Almost half of residents use rivers (particularly the Awash), ponds and unprotected springs as their primary source of water for drinking, cooking and other domestic uses. Safe and protected drinking water was provided to only a third of households in the woreda, mainly in the two kebeles in Asayita town (Aklilu, 2016). During the dry season, a fifth of communities spend more than half a day fetching drinking water. An FGD participant from the host community in Hinole kebele said 'there isn't a single well dug by the government.[5] We dug our own well. Government used to provide us with a water purifier [once a year] but not any longer. As a result, we suffer from mosquito- and water-borne diseases such as typhoid, low immunity and malaria' (FGD 11).

Water from the Awash river has a very high mineral content. The river is also used for disposing of industrial waste, with a direct effect on residents' health. As one respondent in Korodora kebele noted:

> We have a problem with drinking water in our kebele. We used to have water pipe but now it is broken. Because of that we drink from the Awash River. It has been four months since the problem occurred. UNICEF dug the well and we used to cover the cost of fuel. The water from Awash River is getting fewer because of the nearby Tendaho sugar plantation. It also has health problems. The woreda administration is not cooperative. The water pipe was broken when they build irrigation channels. They do not care for us as long as they drink bottled water in Asayita town! (FGD 9).

Asayita woreda administration and experts from sector bureaus counter that they lack the resources to maintain systems properly. They are also critical of the low level of community awareness in the administration of community-based wells:

> It is true that there is a problem in the provision of clean drinking water in the woreda. The woreda water system was designed 40 years ago when there were only 5,000 inhabitants. Currently there are more than 60,000 people! Asayita used to have water tankers and wells. Now there are only two functional wells one of which is operated by solar energy. There is a maintenance problem. We are using the same equipment from

5 Other actors involved in service delivery in the area indicated that this statement is untrue.

> 40 years ago … There are up to 65 shallow wells dug by communities. The wells in the town are much better. There is a well under construction in Asayita town with water pipes of 9 km long for two kebeles. Besides, one well [the solar well] is given to the refugees, so that the woreda administration would not be held responsible for failing to take care of refugees […] There is also a problem of communal water administration. There is an awareness and ownership problem. Pipes have been broken more than 20 times. Communities are not willing to pay for maintenance. That is why they prefer to use the Awash River, which is not healthy. It cost the government 4.8 million Birr for the water pipes. In fact, they cut the pipe and re-channel the water into their farms specially to produce the henna plant (KII 8).

4.1.4 Sanitation and hygiene outside the camp

There is a significant shortage of sanitation facilities outside the camp: more than 80% of households defecate in the open and only 12% use toilets in private compounds. Overall, fewer than 4% of households use community toilets and fewer than 2% use proper toilets in their yards (Central Statistics Agency, 2012). Three-quarters of households dispose of their dry waste by dumping it and only 7% of households use the community refuse site (ibid.).

4.2 Health and nutrition

4.2.1 Health inside the camp

Refugees expressed considerable dissatisfaction with health services in the camps, particularly the availability of medical supplies; one refugee complained that 'regardless of the type of illness we are all given the same medicine, amoxicillin' (IDI 17). Refugees also disliked the quota system, whereby the camp clinic treats only 15 patients a day: 'No matter how seriously sick you might be, you would be sent back if you are the 16th person in the queue' (IDI 23). ARRA's referral system was also criticised: 'It is no wonder that nearly all refugees who were sent to referrals would die because they are referred at a very late stage' (IDI 10).

A particular concern for refugee women are 'undocumented children': babies born at home, and who are, as a result, not registered by ARRA and thus not entitled to camp services including the monthly food ration (IDI 27). This is explained as a means to encourage institutional, not home, delivery. As the camp nurse mentioned during a KII:

> there is problem of awareness among the refugees. They prefer home delivery to institutional delivery. Initially we allowed home delivery, but they stopped coming to the clinic. It is to discourage home delivery that we refused to register children born outside of the clinic […] Refugees also abuse the service system. There used to be an ambulance but stopped functioning because some of them order ambulance for a simple headache (KII 25).

One refugee woman countered that, in the absence of an ambulance, she could not deliver her baby at the clinic: 'how can we deliver at the clinic if there is no ambulance? How can we do that if we are sent back because the delivery is not due? Above all, only Allah knows when we are born or die. In fact, some women even deliver either while going to the clinic or in [the] queue' (IDI 26). Some undocumented children are now as old as five. ARRA is addressing the issue, and is in the process of registering children born through home delivery.

4.2.2 Health outside the camp

Host communities also consider health service provision a major problem. Key factors include the high incidence of water-borne diseases and a lack of medical supplies and qualified health personnel. Most respondents said they preferred to visit the Asayita district hospital for treatment, and bought their own medicine. As a last resort, people pay higher fees to access private clinics and pharmacies. Some residents, particularly in kebeles 1 and 2 in Asayita town, attribute the healthcare difficulties they face to the presence of refugees (FGDs 7 and 8).

4.2.3 Nutrition in the camp

Nutrition programmes in the camp are provided by Goal Ethiopia in partnership with ARRA. They include blanket supplementary feeding to all children aged 6–59 months and pregnant and lactating women; management of moderate acute malnutrition through targeted supplementary feeding; management of severe acute malnutrition through the provision of outpatient therapeutic care to severely malnourished children under five years without medical complications, and treatment in stabilisation centres for children with medical complications; and community outreach activities, including the promotion of infant and young child feeding best practices (KII 16).

There are an estimated 200 severely and acutely malnourished refugee children. One driver of malnutrition in children is parents selling nutritional supplements in local markets. Efforts have been made to combat this, including nutritional awareness programmes and making selling supplements harder by opening the pouches they come in prior to distribution or requiring that empty pouches are returned, but these have largely failed to change behaviour. Actors inside the camp also point to a lack of cooperation from the woreda authorities in halting the sale of supplements in the town (selling PSNP rations is prohibited) (KII 16).

4.3 Education

4.3.1 Inside the camp

The camp has a preschool, a primary school (grades 1–7) and an adult education centre. At elementary level, instruction is given in the Afarigna language. ARRA and AHA provide educational materials for the camp's primary school. Refugee students also attend schools outside the camp including primary schools in six different kebeles, Ewiqet Chora Junior Secondary School in Asayita town, Mohamed Hanfrey High School and Samara University. Currently, 320 refugee students attend Ewiqet Chora Junior Secondary School and 58 Mohammed Hanfrey High School. Sixty refugee students have graduated from Samara University (KII 3). Few refugee students arrive with certificates that prove their grade level and educational achievements in Eritrea. The regional education bureau has set up a committee to make individual evaluations and decide the grade level within the Ethiopian curriculum, but this causes considerable frustration among refugee students, who feel they are being forced to repeat grades (KII 18).

In the camp preschool the lack of proper ventilation means that classrooms are very hot; playground equipment is old and dangerous; and there have been reports of the use of corporal punishment. There is also a lack of qualified teachers with proper training (KII 11). The quality of primary education in the camp is also low:

> Our children, having attended school for years, can't read and write. Moreover, we have been living in this camp for the last 10 years and some even longer. And yet our children are still in the elementary school. We don't know what is going on here because we don't see our children advancing in their education and passing from one grade to another. There is a shortage of books in the library too. I guess this is the problem of teachers because they do not keep the students in classes learning. We see children running and playing around in the schoolyard most of the time. Classes are packed and highly crowded; in some of the classes there are hundreds of students. There are only ten proper teachers in the camp. The rest are incentive teachers. Most of them are not qualified teachers (FGD 4).

One major problem is the lack of basic books and teaching aids. According to ARRA education coordinator, the ratio of books to students is one to 15. For refugee students attending schools outside the camps, lack of transport was mentioned as the main problem:

> We face the problem of travelling long distance. We are expected to cover the transportation cost [*bajaj* transport], which is expensive. Those of us whose parents can't afford to pay are forced to travel on foot. And you can imagine how hard and difficult this is because

> of Asayita's heat. On foot, a round trip from the camp to Ewket Chora School takes three hours. A round trip through bajaj from the camp to the school costs 20 Birr. A round trip on foot from the camp to Mohammed Hanfare high school takes two hours and bajaj costs 30 Birr/day. We are tired by the time we reach the school which affects our concentration. Some teachers call a makeup class, which we often miss because we have to either stay in the school [and thus pay for lunch] or make a second trip from the camp. Either way it is very expensive! There are some who dropped out of school because they couldn't afford to pay for transportation services (FGD 2).

The cost of school uniforms is another barrier. ARRA The refugee school stopped providing students with uniforms in 2017, and some have dropped out of school because they were unable to buy a uniform, which costs on average up to 350 Birr.

4.3.2 Education outside the camp

Around 67% of households from Asayita send their children to primary schools, resulting in a woreda gross enrolment rate of roughly 80% (Central Statistics Agency, 2012). Nine out of Asayita's 13 kebeles have full access to a primary school, but under GTP II (Growth and Transformation Plan) there are plans to extend primary education coverage to 100%. There are 29 primary schools in Asayita woreda and two secondary schools (with the second established in 2015). A third high school was planned in 2018–2019, to cover another four kebeles. According to the woreda education office, the overall primary school dropout and repetition rate in Asayita is 6% and 10% respectively (Asayita Woreda Education Bureau, 2016), although rates are far higher for girls than boys (Central Statistics Agency, 2012). The main factors in this are communities placing little value on education, parents prioritising domestic labour and animal herding, and gender discrimination against girls. Girls' education is culturally discouraged due to early marriage, often as young as nine, and the majority of female students are forced to drop out before completing primary school.

Although access to education has significantly increased in recent years, Afar still lags far behind other regions, partly due to the mismatch between the sedentary educational system and pastoral mobility. Another key challenge has been the slow implementation of the mother tongue policy. Schools in the region still teach in Amharic, a language foreign to the Afar. While the constitution mandates it and it is the preference of the regional government to use Afarigna in elementary education (grades 1–4), there is a lack of teachers able to teach in the language. In 2017, the Regional Education Bureau introduced the parallel use of Amharic and Afarigna based on students' preferences (KII 17).

The mobile school system is under-developed. There are interventions by civil society organisations such as the Afar Pastoral Development Association (APDA) and the Development Expert Centre (DEC), and in 2001 the Bureau of Education established a programme of non-formal education. In the exclusively nomadic Galfage kebele, DEC has introduced a matching fund ('two camel legs each'), where the community and the DEC together buy the camels used to transport the mobile school. However, both the coverage and quality of such schools is lower than with the formal education system (KII 14).

4.4 Protection

Activities related to refugee protection in Afar mainly focus on minimising environmental threats and threats from contact with local populations. Respondents indicated that threats are minimal, with few problems emanating from interactions between refugees and residents: indeed, both groups suggested that, when issues do arise, this is primarily the fault of the refugees (FGDs 1 and 2). Traditional mediation is used to resolve issues, alongside 'community police' recruited from among the refugees. A police station in the camp acts as an entry point into the formal justice system, but incidents rarely escalate (FGDs 1, 4, 7, 9 and 11).

There are major child protection issues in the camp around child labour, child marriage and

female genital mutiliation (FGM). In relation to child labour, refugee children are involved in the collection and resale of plastic bottles scavenged from garbage sites, as well as grass from the local area. Refugee children also feature prominently in the weekly market in Asayita town, selling cultural products produced by refugee women. One contributing factor here is the apparent breakdown of traditional Afar childcare and support mechanisms in the camp. There is a perception that refugee children are 'unruly' (KII 26), with 'aggressive' behaviour in local schools. They are also viewed by some as 'thieves', even stealing shoes from mosques, and there is a fear that they will negatively influence resident children (KII 26; FGD 8). Child marriage is a major child protection issue in the Afar region, with many parents arranging their daughters' marriages during childhood. In the case of promissory marriages, matrimony can be arranged even before birth to cement ties between families (National Committee on Traditional Practices of Ethiopia, 2008).

Ethiopia has one of the highest FGM rates in the world, and within Ethiopia the Afar region is one of the worst-affected: 91% of infant girls are believed to have been victims of FGM (Central Statistics Agency, 2016). Tackling this problem is a priority for the government, and a number of studies have shown a declining trend at national level, from 74% in 2005 to 65% in 2015 in the 15–49 age group, and from 62.1% to 47% for 15–19-year-olds (UNICEF and UNFPA, 2018). In Afar, thanks partly to a partnership between UNICEF, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and BoWCA, FGM has been criminalised, six woredas have declared abandonment of the practice, and there has been an apparent decline from 90% in 2008 to 39% in 2013.[6]

More recently there have been suggestions that rates have increased again, although there is uncertainty over the figures (KII 13). BoWCA officials at woreda and kebele level put this down to low levels of awareness and a lack of resourcing. Employees in other government departments are also prone to belittling the bureau's work:

> There is a budget problem. The leaders in the woreda administration [all men] say, 'This is enough for Kadija' [the head of the office] as if she were the office. Even DEC is called 'the Kadija office' because they give a lot of support to the office to combat gender-based violence and violation of children's right. The capital budget of the office since 2009 has been a mere 60,000 Birr. In 2017–2018 it is increased to 115,000 Birr. What can you do with this money? When asked why they allocate a very small budget to the office they would reply, 'our budget is also very small. Ask the federal government!' There is a need for attitude change. FGM is included in the regional family law but to date no one has ever been tried in a court because of FGM case. Asayita used to be the regional capital and many campaigns were made against FGM but then discontinued (KII 26).

The woreda BoWCA also suggested that any recent increases in FGM[7] might partly be down to the influence of refugees: 'We conducted a study on why FGM has revived in the region. Our finding shows that it is partly because of the impact of the refugees who are also Afar. Many people in the camp practise FGM. They also provide the service for the host communities' (KII 26). Female refugees confirm the continued practice of FGM in the camp:

> We do not get why we should abandon FGM. We have seen the consequences of not being circumcised. We have heard what Western women are doing to their men. Isn't it true that Western women even rape men? AHA gives us training.

6 It should be noted that the progress made appears to be mainly a category shift from Type 3 (infibulation) to Type 1.

7 A resurgence that it should be noted has yet to be evidenced by national surveys such as the Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey.

> They want us to abandon the practice altogether. But we believe at least the Sunna type is ok. It is our religion. It is the way of the prophet. It does not matter how much training we are given. We hear with one ear and let it go with the other ear. AHA said women who do not circumcise their daughter would get a reward. One refugee mother waited for three years. She got 3,000 Birr reward and she circumcised her daughter immediately after she got the money. It just does not work among the Afar. What we have abandoned is this seven days of tying the circumcised infant to make the FGM firm (FGD 4).

5 Institutional relationships across service delivery sectors

In terms of institutional coordination between the refugee operation and the regional and woreda-level governments, the research found both positive and negative examples. Specific examples across the sectors reviewed by this study are summarisied in Table 1.

5.1 Evidence of positive cooperation

It is notable that the large majority of respondents, both refugees and on the local government side, spoke very positively about their working relations. This desire to present a positive picture appears to be linked to regular contact with populations that are highly integrated themselves. As noted above, the local administration tolerates, and even encourages, refugees to seek work out of the camps, for which ARRA is appreciative. They are also willing to be flexible, for example allowing ARRA to use a water well in the town when the camp system was not functioning. One woreda official summarised this dynamic as follows:

> There is a lot of cooperation between refugees and host communities. Currently, for instance, the borehole of the refugees is broken and they use our boreholes. It is the same in the health and education sectors. Refugee patients get services in the clinics and hospitals of the host communities. In livelihoods, they also jointly farm. Asayita woreda has a very high potential for food production, which refugees and host communities can make use of. Refugees collect grass and sell it at the Asayita market. They produce cultural goods that they sell at the market. We celebrate religious and public holidays together. They are our people. We have the same funeral place and our children play in the same playground. (KII 4).

The close alignment of the regional political leadership with the federal government also appears to contribute to good working relations. ARRA's acceptance of de facto integration, reinforced in recent years by the pledges the government has made, includes enhancing local authorities' access to the camps, particularly at woreda level. One woreda health official stated:

> Previously there was no connection between the host and refugee health systems. Now we have started joint planning for vaccination, HIV/AIDS and UNICEF trainings for experts […] It was very difficult to access the camp. We needed a special permit but now we enter the camp easily. After all, the distinction between host and refugee is blurred, as both are Afar. They have the same clan leaders. They have the same customary court with the same verdict. It is the government and international aid agencies which have redefined them as 'refugees'. Otherwise Afar is Afar (KII 6).

Table 1 Examples of interaction and coordination between ARRA and local governments

	Positive examples	Negative examples
Education	• ARRA supports schools in four host kebeles where refugees are living. • Hundreds of refugee students attend schools in host communities (320 at Ewiqet Chora Junior High School, 58 at Mohamed Hanfrey High School and 60 graduates so far from Samara University. • Joint planning of the supply of inputs by the Ministry of Education, beginning with the design of infrastructure. • The Education Bureau supports camp schools with supervision, provision of inputs (including books) and inspection training for school directors. • The camp school is integrated into the woreda's cluster system, receiving a rating alongside other schools. • ARRA provides inputs such as photocopying machines and exercise books, pens and rulers for 14 schools outside the camps. • UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) provides educational planning training for ARRA staff every three months for four years under UNICEF's BSRP. • Joint teacher training programme for refugee and resident schools is being delivered by UNICEF. • Screening for refugee students, led by the Education Bureau. • Accelerated School Readiness for preschool is implemented both in and out of the camps in the summer, based on the experience of the Benishangul-Gumuz region. • 31 teachers (20 from refugee schools and 11 from resident schools) are supported by DEC in a three-year active learning programme in partnership with the University of Amsterdam.	• Low-quality camp education, in part associated with the refugee incentive teachers who make up half of camp teachers. This in turn relates to inadequate training that fails to meet national standards. The Woreda Education Bureau suggests restricting incentive workers in the education sector, or providing them with more rigorous training that meets national standards. • Congestion in primary schools outside the camps. The enrolment of refugee students in these schools has increased the ratio of students to classrooms to as high as 70.
Health	• There is a well-established referral system between the camp clinic and hospitals in Asayita, Dubti, Dessie and Addis Ababa. • Coordination of emergency health during epidemics such as acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) outbreaks. • The camp medical supply system uses the quarterly ordering system through Asayita hospital. • Joint training for health staff from inside and outside the camps. • Joint management of vaccination campaigns. • An agreement has been in place between the camp clinic and Asayita District Hospital since 2016 for the hospital to support refugee patient feeding. • Cooperation between the camp clinic and Asayita prison – the camp provides medicine as required, depending on availability.	• Some residents, particularly in kebeles 1 and 2 in Asayita town, attribute growing problems with the availability of medical supplies in Asayita hospital to the presence of refugees. Many are forced to go to private clinics, where there are more medical supplies, but for a price. Residents believe that refugees are wealthier, and thus should be the ones paying for medical treatment by private clinics.

Table 1 Examples of interaction and coordination between ARRA and local governments (continued)

	Positive examples	Negative examples
Nutrition	• The two woredas where the camps are located are included in the BSRP through integrated service delivery. • Seven woredas, including those with the camps, are included in the Integrated Nutrition Service, a Ministry of Health initiative. • Joint capacity-building work is ongoing, for example with a mother-to-mother nutrition group where nearly half are refugees living in the host communities.	• Local government authorities have failed to stop the sale of supplementary nutrition pouches from the camps at the weekly market in Asayita town.
Water	• Water systems inside and outside the camps are connected and used cooperatively. For example, the refugee authorities provide the camp's share to the local government in the evening because it is not used in the camp. In turn, local government authorities share water with the camp in times of need, such as in 2018 when the camp borehole ran dry. There are three boreholes, one of which is primarily for the camp and two primarily for the town of Asayita. • 100 kW reservoirs are under construction for residents and refugees. A regional water forum that includes the camp is being established to oversee this.	
Child protection	• Local authorities have conducted awareness campaigns against FGM and GBV in the camps.	• The resurgence of FGM in the region is partly attributed to its higher prevalence among refugees. • Residents perceive that mechanisms of social control are not functioning properly in the camp, in part driven by limited parental authority.

Source: Based on KIIs with officials at regional and woreda level.

In the education sector, integration is expressed in various ways, not least – as described above – in the 300-plus refugee students attending government schools. Camp schools are integrated into the school cluster system led by the Woreda Education Bureau, and are subject to the same supervision and inspection as all other schools in the woreda.[8] Refugee teachers are routinely included in training run by the regional Education Bureau, with support from UNICEF and UNHCR (KII 13), and the Bureau ensures that refugee students receive accredited documentation to prove their qualifications in both the Eritrean and Ethiopian education systems (KIIs 7 and 8). Schools in the host community benefit from some additional funding for teaching refugees, as they count towards the total number of students in the school, the basis on which the school grant is calculated.[9] As such, education officials largely view the presence of refugees positively (KII 17).

5.2 Competition over resources

Both woreda and regional government officials felt strongly that they are not allocated adequate resources through the Ethiopian government's budgetary processes, and the presence of both ARRA and the refugees exacerbates this. The refugees constitute an additional burden on services, but resources associated with them are primarily channelled through ARRA and UNHCR to implementing partners in the camps. The fact that ARRA is a federal agency able to

8 The camp schools are rated level 2 on the government's system, which runs from level 1 to level 4, the best (a rating that no school in Ethiopia receives). Out of 31 schools in Asayita woreda, ten are in level 2 and the rest level 3.

9 The school grant is provided by the World Bank-run General Education Quality Improvement Programme and, for high schools, amounts to 70 Birr per child per year.

act independently of the regional government can increase frustration, particularly in times of crisis or strained relationship between ARRA and the regional government (KII 23). Failures in communication are made more likely by the fact that the refugee operation is effectively overseen from Tigray, with ARRA's operations in Afar reporting to the zonal office in Shire. As the chief of the Asayita woreda administration put it: 'the level of integration in service delivery to the refugees and host communities needs to be improved. Organisations need to support host communities much more than they do now' (KII 4).

Tensions often appear to revolve around the expectation that 25–30% of the refugee operation should be allocated to host communities, with local government officials seeking to put pressure on ARRA to deliver more support outside the camps. There is an expectation among these officials that the CRRF will provide far more equitable support (KIIs 4 and 24). The World Bank's Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) project is highly appreciated by the woreda administration because it exclusively focuses on refugee-impacted host communities (KII 4), although some woreda officials expressed concern that, even here, ARRA has a key role to play in implementation (KII 9).

As part of the EU's RDPP, a framework for more integrated programming is being developed, referred to in the region as the Integrated Protection and Development Assistance for Eritrean Refugees and their Host Communities in Afar Region, Ethiopia (IPDA) (KII 9). This has been developed by a consortium of NGOs led by DCA, with regional governments and ARRA.

IPDA is intended to address the needs of refugees and host communities in the Afar region through integrated, innovative and multisectoral interventions. In addition to the two refugee camps, it also targets five host kebeles near Asayita camp. Regional and woreda advisory boards have been set up as part of local capacity-building and strengthening of service delivery systems, with the Woreda Advisory Board meeting every three months under the chairmanship of the woreda administrator (KII 9). While this is a promising development, the framework is focused on RDPP resources rather than taking a genuinely comprehensive approach. Given separate accountability structures for NGOs, there is a risk that this will merely encourage parallel service delivery structures, rather than strengthening government capacity.

According to one local NGO representative, the CRRF should act as an important link between the various service provider actors:

> Before, the woreda had nothing to do with refugees and ARRA is exclusively for refugees. CRRF has brought a new synergy. It also redresses the host community grievance. They refer to a 25–75% share of deliverables between the refugee and host communities. There is now a greater realisation and aspiration by the host community – the feeling that at least the 25% should be implemented, if not more (KII 11).

The CRRF could also enhance cooperation among humanitarian actors, with some indications that the IPDA framework has encouraged collaboration between OSD and Mekaneyesus in the energy sector (KII 10). The risk, however, is that, if high expectations that the CRRF will bring significant additional resources to the region are not met, this will cause considerable disappointment. Historically, the challenging environment in Afar has made NGOs reluctant to work there, and this may be a particular risk factor in the region (KII 12).

ARRA officials also indicated some unease with the newer approaches being implemented: 'Integration should start from project design and planning – before the project is implemented. The existing mode of integration is wanting. For example, we do not even have project document of UNICEF. They do not have any agreement with us.[10] We feel there is also lack of clarity regarding CRRF. As it stands, it is mixed up' (KII 3). Mekaneyesus's project was provided as an example of emerging tensions: under RDPP it is starting to expand livestock projects with

10 It should be noted that UNICEF has such national agreements and programme documents in place with ARRA.

residents, which are in demand among refugees, into the camp, but ARRA is uncomfortable with the idea because they fear livestock causing additional congestion in the camps (KII 10).

Rapid changes in the operational context following the peace deal, and improving relations between Ethiopian and Eritrea, will further complicate discussions about resourcing levels inside and outside the camps. Since the border was reopened in September 2018, there has been a large influx of Eritrean refugees into Ethiopia, although so far these have been predominantly Tigrayans travelling to camps in Shire.[11] However, one of the border crossing points (Bure) is located in Afar territory, and it is possible that there could be a further influx of Afar refugees. This would increase the resource demands of the refugee operation, as well as posing a dilemma around further investment in camp infrastructure if the likelihood of voluntary repatriation increases (KII 13). Refugees themselves appear divided on the prospects for repatriation in the near future (FGDs 1 and 2).

11 See https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/update-renewed-influx-eritrea-24-september-2018.

6 Views on integration and self-reliance

Overall, the majority of respondents in this study were positive about further integration, but there was a strong view that barriers to greater interaction would need to be removed, and exchanges increased between refugees and residents. Refugees mentioned that residents should be allowed to visit them more easily in the camp and vice versa (FGDs and IDIs in the camps). However, some refugees expressed concern that they would be more vulnerable under a more integrated system. This was based on experience, including what are seen as the discriminatory payments to incentive workers in the camps:

> There are some of us who work as incentive workers for ARRA; yet the maximum payment is limited to 700 Birr. That is not fair payment as wage workers in Asayita are paid 120 Birr per day, which is around 3,000 Birr per month. When we ask to be treated like them and be paid equal, ARRA would say 'you guys are refugees and we can't treat you the same way like Ethiopian citizens because you get aid from us as refugees'.

There was also concern that integration might result in discrimination against refugees based on clan hierarchies, with claims that some residents refer to refugees as *tefenaqay* (a derogatory term for displaced people), and would seek to exclude them from daily life. One example provided of such behaviour involved residents stealing firewood from refugee youth outside the camps.

Respondents indicated a preference for maintaining the refugee operation as a separate system focusing solely on their needs (FGD 1). Indeed, one suggested that the generally positive relations between residents and refugees were partly a function of the fact that the camps are kept separate from resident communities:

> Up until now, we have got good relationship with the community. They are never a problem to us. We go there to do our business and so far we are happy with their treatment. We believe this is due to the fact that the two communities live apart. Afar say, 'the further you stay away from a person, the more you miss him and the more you love one another'. We respect and love one another because we live in different places. So, till today, things are good and we are free to go anywhere in or outside the camp (IDI 3).

For institutional actors there is a lack of clarity about what the CRRF means, and what to expect from whom. Local government officials clearly understood the benefits of greater integration in terms of the more equitable distribution of resources inside and outside the camps (KII 18). Yet one ARRA official had a much less clear interpretation: 'it is not yet clear what CRRF really is and entails. After the May 2018 launch we take CRRF as a principle – to be customised in specific contexts, even in Berhale and Asayita. We expect CRRF to be both a framework and projects' (KII 23). Another ARRA official gave an example of a project implemented under the IPDA framework: 'Integration needs to be thought out, though. For instance, IPDA's youth centre was done in a hurry – how could integration be achieved, geographically? System integration? It is not yet clear. Is the youth centre meant for refugees only or for the host community as well? It is not clear' (KII 3).

Despite these questions, the Afar region could provide an ideal testing ground for CRRF implementation because of existing, robust integration between refugees and host communities. In comparison with other regions of Ethiopia, there is far less conflict between refugees and host communities. Local populations use resources flexibly and refugees can access services outside the camps relatively easily. As one ARRA official stated:

> Integration between refugees and host communities has already happened in the Afar region. Only 70% of the refugee population lives in the camp. The rest live in host communities who come to the camp only to receive the monthly food ration. Notwithstanding the size and the fewer resources flowing to the region, greater integration has already happened here (KII 3).

One UNHCR staff member also highlighted positive starting points for the CRRF:

> CRRF can draw on existing integrative projects, such as Mekaneyesus's project of sharecropping between refugees and host communities. This is a win-win exchange: refugee labour for access to the host land. This could serve as an entry point for CRRF. In the context of Afar, the point of departure for CRRF could be partnership with existing projects, particularly in the area of livelihoods and education (KII 1).

Existing cooperative arrangements between the refugee operation and local water systems should also make greater integration easier, with both camps in the region receiving support from woreda governments when they face water supply problems. There are also moves towards greater integration in this area with the 100 kW reservoirs under construction for host communities and refugees in Asayita woreda (KII 4). Initiatives such as these align well with the CRRF.

DCA, the lead agency of the consortium that is implementing RDPP, is also optimistic that there is a strong enabling environment for the CRRF in the Afar region:

> More than 10,000 refugees have already been integrated into the host community, which is de facto CRRF. There has been continuous inflow and outflow of refugees. Besides there is also service provision integration: refugee students attending schools in host communities beginning from grade 8; reciprocal sharing of water resources; integrated health referrals; joint child protection interventions such as the campaign against FGM, and various livelihood linkages such as market exchanges; share cropping; wage labour; petty trade; grass collection. There are factors, though, if not handled properly, could potentially harm host communities that potentially trigger conflict. Competition over limited natural resources such as land, impact on local market prices [increased living costs] and competition over limited employment opportunities, pressure on limited social and economic services available, and clan differences between refugees and host communities (KII 9).

7 Conclusions and recommendations

The refugee presence in the Afar region has a more positive tone than in other parts of Ethiopia, with little evidence of conflict or serious tensions between refugees and residents. Above all, this stems from the ethnic solidarity between refugees and host communities, reinforced by religious homogeneity as the refugees and most of the inhabitants of the Afar region are Muslims. The relatively smaller demographic size of the refugees as compared with the much larger number of refugees in the other regions might also be a factor shaping peaceful coexistence.

The fact that ARRA and the regional government are, in effect, already operating a form of local integration makes the Afar region fertile ground for CRRF implementation. Refugees living outside the camps have built extensive social networks and are pursuing self-reliant livelihoods, including sharecropping with host communities, wage labour and economic exchanges at the weekly market in Asayita town. Refugees provide host communities with cheaper consumer goods (part of the food ration), while the refugee operation, through the monthly cash distribution to refugees, injects more than one million Birr every month into the local economy, increasing refugees' purchasing power for goods and services provided by host communities.

Integration at the grassroots level is reinforced by institutional integration in service provision, most visibly in the education sector, where the camp school is integrated into the woreda cluster system and hundreds of refugee students attend elementary and high schools outside the camps. Similar trends towards more integrated and reciprocal relations are evident in the WASH and health sectors, as well as in child protection.

The picture is not entirely positive, though. The presence of refugees has put additional strain on already meagre social services in the region, a particular concern given that the Afar region is one of the most marginalised in terms of development and service provision. The strong sense of deprivation felt by local government officials needs to be situated within this broader context. It is unsurprising that expectations are high that the CRRF will usher in equity of support for refugees and residents from international agencies. For their part, refugees appear more ambivalent towards integration, with some expressing concerns about the perceived discrimination they have faced from ARRA and local communities. There are also concerns around ARRA's unilateral approach to its work and reductions in food rations in recent years.

The structural barriers of ARRA, as a federal agency working at regional level, also need more work, particularly with ARRA's operations in Afar being run from Shire; there is a similar challenge with UNHCR, which oversees the Afar operation from Mekelle. While there are good operational reasons for these accountability chains, greater and more creative efforts are required to build a stronger partnership between the refugee operation and the regional government.

Despite these challenges and concerns, there appear to be strong foundations for implementation of the CRRF in Afar. If it is be taken forward seriously, however, there needs to be a more fundamental discussion about how integrated programming can be resourced and governed through more genuinely joint frameworks. While the IPDA developed under the RDPP framework can be a useful starting point, it will need to be rooted in Ethiopian government frameworks and systems if it is to be sustainable. As has been found in the other regional studies, such a framework is not yet

in place, and there will need to be in-depth discussions both at regional and federal level if one is to be established.

More specifically, we make the following recommendations to promote the integration agenda in a more inclusive and mutually beneficial manner for all stakeholders.

Recommendations

For UNICEF

- Advocate on behalf of the Afar region to have a strong focus for CRRF implementation, perhaps piloting more significant systems alignment approaches or progressing integration in the region, building on the lessons learnt to date from the development of the IPDA.
- Seek to strengthen relations with ARRA in the region, which still claims to be uninformed on key programme documentation.
- Retain the current focus away from building infrastructure within the camps, given that the most likely outcomes for Eritrean refugees in Afar are integration or, perhaps, repatriation. As such, supporting areas outside the camps should be considered as providing support to refugees.
- In coordination with DRDIP and IPDA/RDPP, and learning lessons from their experiences, review current levels of BSRP activity outside the camps, with a view to increasing the scope of these activities as far as possible. Possible areas for intervention could include capacity-building of the Asayita district hospital or the elementary and high schools in Asayita town.
- Scale up interventions in child protection, specifically improving the safety of the camp preschool's facilities and doing more to tackle corporal punishment, child marriage and FGM. The possible resurgence of FGM in the Afar region calls for a more robust joint intervention closely integrated across refugees and residents, and involving religious authorities.
- Work with all actors in Afar to develop a common strategy for indigenising staff positions in the region wherever possible. No Afar are represented in leadership positions in the service sectors, contributing to distrust between service providers and beneficiaries.

For ARRA and UNHCR

- Ensure that the focus of upcoming CRRF discussions is on clarifying what it will deliver for whom, and redressing the imbalance between support to refugees and host communities. This should involve moving beyond the 75/25 split of support and determining much more specifically how collective resources should be allocated and delivered to respond to the needs of all communities in the region.
- Work with woreda and regional government actors to identify and respond to priority challenges across sectors, taking a problem-solving approach to CRRF implementation. Possible issues emerging from this study include:
  - Immediately addressing the contentious issue of 'undocumented refugee children'. An integrated and improved reproductive health system for refugees and host communities should be more effective than the current punitive approach, whereby children born through home delivery are refused registration.
  - Enhance the quality of healthcare through developing a joint plan to improve the availability of medical supplies and trained personnel, both inside and outside the camps. Not only do health facilities in the region suffer from the same capacity gaps as those inside the camps, they are under further strain from the refugee influx.
  - Together with WFP, devise a more effective communication strategy to dispel misconceptions around the reduction of the monthly food ration.
  - Take advantage of the government's pledges to develop plans to further promote income-generating activities that should benefit both refugees and residents, such as sharecropping and commercial goat production.
  - Work with the woreda administration to ban and enforce penalties for the sale of children's nutritional supplements by refugee parents.
  - Support moves at national level to review parallel systems for teacher recruitment, pay and training to address poor motivation among incentive teachers. If a fairer approach cannot be found, some respondents suggested excluding incentive

workers from the education sector given their lower qualification.
- Consider more flexible movement of people in and out of the camps to facilitate greater social interaction between refugees and residents.
- Consult refugees on how to make refugee bodies, particularly RCCs, more representative of their concerns and grievances.

For the federal government

- Recognise that CRRF implementation in Afar will only succeed if the major development challenges the region faces are more effectively addressed. This will entail closer cooperation between the federal government, ARRA and the regional government and, potentially, the allocation of additional resources.
- Enforce the Djibouti Declaration and adopt national educational standards, and include refugees in the national systems to benefit from established standards within IGAD Member States.
- Prioritise support to the water sector, particularly projects to improve water quality. Agro-industrial schemes on the Awash River have created a serious public health hazard, and appropriate and sustainable water quality monitoring and management measures are required. The federal government must implement the Awash Basin Water Quality Strategic Plan as a matter of urgency.
- Consider using the Afar region as a pilot for employment opportunities for refugees outside the camp, including in sugar factories and the planned industrial park. This should be combined with strong support for refugees' labour rights.
- Provide greater support for alternative service delivery models more suited to pastoralist communities, such as mobile schools and clinics.
- Provide resources to assist the Afar region to speed up implementation of the mother tongue education policy.

For the regional government and woreda administrations

- Establish a regional CRRF leadership team to provide direction to implementation of the CRRF in line with the strategic development plan for the region and the refugee-hosting woredas, and provide oversight to programmes such as RDPP and DRDIP.
- Work with ARRA to scale up existing institutional integration between service provision in WASH, health and education.
- Consider increasing the capital budget for the BoWCA to address harmful traditional practices, particularly FGM. There is a need to scale up joint awareness campaigns against such practices, both in the camps and in host communities.
- Promote refugee's labour rights, in partnership with ARRA and in line with the amended Refugee Proclamation (once endorsed).
- Provide more support to refugee-related projects that have spin-off benefits for host communities, for example joint energy and livelihood projects.

For donors

- Provide funds for projects that support the livelihood–service nexus. Asayita woreda has huge agro-pastoral potential, and joint ventures between refugees and residents are already in place. Build on existing projects, such as in sharecropping, and explore the prospects for refugee employment in government and commercial agricultural schemes, sugar factories and the proposed industrial park.
- Scale up support to projects related to the environment–energy–livelihood–service nexus. The positive multiplier effect of the conversion of *prosoposis* into an environmentally sound livelihood strategy for residents and refugees seems a particularly strong model to build on.
- Consider resourcing an integrated water system to provide safe drinking water for refugees and residents.
- Demand and incentivise greater coordination among humanitarian actors and aid agencies to minimise duplication.
- Support mobility-based alternative service delivery models in pastoralist areas, such as mobile schools and clinics. Currently, there appears to be greater government acceptance of the need for alternative models to villagisation within Afar.

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Annex 1 Interviews conducted

Table A1 In-depth individual interviews

Interview code	Date	Location	Sex	Age	Ethnicity	Status
IDI 1	30/06/18	Asayita camp	M	35	Afar	Refugee
IDI 2	30/06/18	Asayita camp	M	31	Afar	Refugee
IDI 3	30/06/18	Asayita camp	M	40	Afar	Refugee
IDI 4	30/06/18	Asayita camp	M	55	Afar	Refugee
IDI 5	01/07/18	Asayita camp	F	30	Afar	Refugee
IDI 6	01/07/18	Asayita camp	F	45	Afar	Refugee
IDI 7	01/07/18	Asayita camp	F	36	Afar	Refugee
IDI 8	01/07/18	Asayita camp	F	29	Afar	Refugee
IDI 9	02/07/18	Asayita camp	M	20	Afar	Refugee
IDI 10	02/07/18	Asayita camp	M	25	Afar	Refugee
IDI 11	02/07/18	Asayita camp	M	20	Afar	Refugee
IDI 12	02/07/18	Asayita camp	M	21	Afar	Refugee
IDI 13	03/07/18	Asayita camp	F	50	Afar	Refugee
IDI 14	03/07/18	Asayita camp	F	48	Afar	Refugee
IDI 15	03/07/18	Asayita camp	F	18	Afar	Refugee
IDI 16	03/07/18	Asayita camp	F	28	Afar	Refugee
IDI 17	04/07/18	Asayita camp	M	18	Afar	Refugee
IDI 18	04/07/18	Asayita camp	M	20	Afar	Refugee
IDI 19	04/07/18	Asayita camp	M	22	Afar	Refugee
IDI 20	04/07/18	Asayita camp	M	24	Afar	Refugee
IDI 21	04/07/18	Asayita camp	M	21	Afar	Refugee
IDI 22	04/07/18	Asayita camp	M	48	Afar	Refugee
IDI 23	04/07/18	Asayita camp	M	60	Afar	Refugee
IDI 24	04/07/18	Asayita camp	M	50	Afar	Refugee
IDI 25	05/07/18	Asayita camp	F	35	Afar	Refugee

Table A1 In-depth individual interviews (continued)

Interview code	Date	Location	Sex	Age	Ethnicity	Status
IDI 26	05/07/18	Asayita camp	F	27	Afar	Refugee
IDI 27	05/07/18	Asayita camp	F	48	Afar	Refugee
IDI 28	05/07/18	Asayita camp	F	-	Afar	Refugee
IDI 29	05/07/18	Asayita camp	F	23	Afar	Refugee
IDI 30	05/07/18	Asayita camp	F	33	Afar	Refugee
IDI 31	08/07/18	Kebele 01/ Asayita town	M	39	Afar	Resident
IDI 32	08/07/18	Kebele 01/ Asayita town	M	47	'Highlander'	Resident
IDI 33	08/07/18	Kebele 01/ Asayita town	M	50	'Highlander'	Resident
IDI 34	08/07/18	Kebele 02/ Asayita town	F	35	Afar	Resident
IDI 35	08/07/18	Kebele 02/ Asayita town	M	40	'Highlander'	Resident
IDI 36	09/07/18	Korodora kebele	M	45	Afar	Resident
IDI 37	09/07/18	Korodora kebele	F	30	Afar	Resident
IDI 38	09/07/18	Hinole kebele	M	55	Afar	Resident
IDI 39	09/07/18	Hinole kebele	F	20	Afar	Resident
IDI 40	09/07/18	Logiya town	M	35	Afar	Out of camp refugee

Table A2 Focus group discussions

Interview code	Date	Location	Description of participant	Number of participants
FGD 1	06/7/18	Asayita RC	M, Afar refugees	8
FGD 2	06/7/18	Asayita RC	M, Afar refugee students	8
FGD 3	06/7/18	Asayita RC	M, Afar refugees	8
FGD 4	07/7/18	Asayita RC	F, Afar refugees	8
FGD 5	07/7/18	Asayita RC	F, Afar refugee students	8
FGD 6	07/7/18	Asayita RC	F, Afar refugees	8
FGD 7	10/7/18	Kebele 01	M, 'Highlander', resident traders	8
FGD 8	10/7/18	Kebele 02	F, Highlander and Afar parents of Ewiqet Chora School	8
FGD 9	10/7/18	Korodora kebele	M, Afar residents	8
FGD 10	10/7/18	Korodora kebele	F, Afar residents	10
FGD 11	11/7/18	Hinole kebele	M & F Afar residents	10
FGD 12	11/7/18	Hinole kebele	M & F Afar resident students	8

Table A3 Key informant interviews

Interview code	Date	Location	Description
KII 1	28/06/18	Samara	Discussion with UNHCR staff
KII 2	29/06/18	Samara	Discussion with ARRA regional staff
KII 3	29/06/18	Asayita	Discussion with ARRA Asayita refugee camp staff
KII 4	29/06/18	Asayita	Discussion with Asayita woreda administration
KII 5	01/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with RCC leader
KII 6	09/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with Asayita woreda health office staff
KII 7	09/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with Asayita woreda education office staff
KII 8	09/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with Asayita woreda water office staff
KII 9	09/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with DCA staff
KII 10	10/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with Mekaneyesus staff
KII 11	10/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with AHA representatives
KII 12	10/07/18	Samara	Discussion with WFP staff
KII 13	11/07/18	Samara	Discussion with UNICEF staff
KII 14	11/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with DEC staff
KII 15	11/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with OSD staff
KII 16	11/07/18	Asayita	Discussion with Goal-Ethiopia staff
KII 17	12/07/18	Samara	Discussion with the regional education bureau staff
KII 18	12/07/18	Samara	Discussion with the regional Bureau of Economic Development
KII 19	13/07/18	Samara	Discussion with Regional government official
KII 20	13/07/18	Samara	Discussion with the regional DPPB staff
KII 21	14/07/18	Samara	Discussion with the regional water bureau staffs
KII 22	15/07/18	Samara	Discussion with the Regional Health Bureau
KII 23	18/07/18	Samara	Regional government official
KII 24	20/07/18	Samara	ARRA regional official
KII 25	30/07/18	Asayita	ARRA official
KII 26	30/07/18	Asayita	ARRA camp nurse
KII 27	02/08/18	Asayita	Asayita woreda women's and children's affairs office representative

Evidence.
Ideas.
Change.

ODI is an independent, global think tank, working for a sustainable and peaceful world in which every person thrives. We harness the power of evidence and ideas through research and partnership to confront challenges, develop solutions, and create change.

ODI
203 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NJ

+44 (0)20 7922 0300
info@odi.org

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