

Report

# Enhancing financial commitments to disaster risk reduction in conflict contexts

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## **About this publication**

This report is an adapted version of an internal report produced by ODI to support AFD to enhance its standing in the field of disaster risk reduction (DRR) in contexts of fragility, conflict and violence (FCV). It forms part of a broader collaboration between AFD and ODI, which included the publication of the following journal article:

Peters, K. and Peters, L.E.R. (2021) 'Terra incognita: the contribution of disaster risk reduction in unpacking the sustainability-peace nexus' *Sustainability Science*, 16:1173–1184 (<https://10.1007/S11625-021-00944-9>).

## **About the author**

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## Executive summary

Disaster and conflict risks are compounding, and contexts ranking high on conflict indices are already falling behind in meeting the 2030 global targets. This is an increasing cause of concern to development finance institutions (DFIs) and government donors. Disaster impacts are undermining existing programming, increasing demand for humanitarian assistance and setting back development and peace gains. Despite the threat of compounding disaster and conflict risks, progress on disaster risk reduction (DRR) in contexts affected by fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) remains slow, and dedicated finance is widely regarded as piecemeal and insufficient.

This report seeks to encourage DFIs and government donors to enhance their financial commitments on DRR in FCV contexts. We set out why action on DRR is necessary in FCV

contexts, and provide insight into what leading DFIs and government donors are doing in this space. We highlight some of the internal and external barriers inhibiting greater financial commitment to DRR in FCV contexts, including the disincentives which prevent engagement of Task Team Leaders (TTL) and cross-sectoral collaboration. This is countered by examples of progress, such as establishing champions of the theme, technical up-skilling and programme and investment successes. There are also encouraging signs which point towards a more positive enabling environment for future financial commitments to DRR in FCV contexts.

The report concludes by laying out a set of concrete opportunities for enhancing interest and ultimately political support and financial commitments for this nascent yet pivotal global topic.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Rationale: the need to allocate finance to disaster risk reduction in contexts affected by fragility, conflict and violence

Natural hazard-related disasters (‘disasters’) are an increasing cause for concern for multilateral and bilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) and government donors in contexts of fragility, conflict and violence (FCV). Short- and long-term disaster impacts are undermining existing programming, increasing demand for humanitarian assistance and setting back development and peace gains (Peters, 2019). There is increasing understanding and recognition that disaster and conflict risks are compounding (GFDRR, 2020; UNDRR, 2019); that the disaster risk governance institutions, capacities and finance required to meet basic protection needs are lacking across many contexts contending with issues of violence and armed conflict (Peters, 2019); and that contexts ranking high on conflict indices are already falling behind in meeting the global targets outlined in the Sustainable Development Goals and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015; Peters et al. forthcoming). By way of an example, the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) has steadily increased its funding for disaster risk reduction (DRR) in FCV contexts, amounting to \$100 million since 2007 (GFDRR, 2020).

Governments are also noticing this intersection of risk and the need for dedicated finance to enhance understanding of the links and DRR programming approaches in FCV contexts. Germany, for example, has invested explicitly in enhancing the evidence base on the intersection of disasters and

conflict, and is working in collaboration with ODI to develop policy advice on the application of DRR to conflict contexts (see Peters, 2019). Switzerland has been actively integrating DRR across its portfolio in FCV contexts, while Agence Française de Développement (AFD) has undertaken a process of internal reflection to better understand the barriers to and opportunities for enhancing investment on DRR in conflict contexts, and working more closely across disaster, peace and conflict technical specialists. In some of the most positive progress over recent years, GFDRR has included action on disaster risk management in conflict contexts in its latest strategy (GFDRR, 2020), and is working in collaboration with sectoral specialists at the World Bank to attach DRR components to existing investment portfolios in conflict contexts (more below).

Despite these positive signs of DFI and government donor interest in the topic, dedicated finance on DRR in FCV contexts remains insufficient and piecemeal. While analysis reveals that official development assistance (ODA) for DRR grew in 2019, overall volumes remain low and highly concentrated in a few (relatively peaceful) recipient countries (Development Initiatives, 2021). Moreover, the examples outlined above are outliers rather than representative of the way DFIs and government donors are treating the threat of compounding disaster and conflict risks. Shifting the narrative and the nature of DFI investment portfolios and donor government programmes towards tackling disaster risk in conflict contexts will not take place by chance; despite repeated calls (see Harris et al., 2013; Peters, 2019), change is not forthcoming. We need to better understand why hesitancy remains in allocating and mobilising finance.

A paper in 2017 (Peters, 2017) sought to better understand the perceptions and actions of the main government donors and multilaterals on the intersection of disasters and conflict, and more specifically why there seemed to be reluctance within the DRR community to explore ways to extend DRR programming and allocation of finance to contexts which also contend with issues of FCV. Why, despite data showing that 58% of disaster deaths occur in the top 20 fragile states (Peters and Budimir, 2016: 5), do such contexts not receive more investment to enhance disaster resilience capabilities?

Since then, academics (Siddiqi, 2018), think tanks (Peters, 2019) and operational agencies have sought to extend thinking and action on disaster resilience in conflict contexts, but little has been written about the potential for substantial scale-up in financial commitments. This is in contrast to emerging attention on scaling up investment in FCV contexts through climate funds (Hardaway, 2021), where arguments largely adopt the narrative that more needs to be done to direct climate finance to FCV contexts, to better reflect patterns of vulnerability.

From a DRR perspective, since the 2017 report no further insights have been garnered into the perceptions of DFIs and government donors towards financing and programming DRR in FCV contexts. As a result, it remains unknown whether the barriers identified in 2017 still exist (see Box 1).

This report shows that purposefully designed strategic change processes will need to be devised and actioned within DFIs and government donors in order to secure dedicated finance to address disaster risks in FCV contexts. This paper is a starting point, laying out opportunities that could be exploited to do just that.

## **1.2 The end goal: a distinct financial commitment on disaster risk reduction in conflict contexts**

This report outlines opportunities for DFIs and government donors to enhance their financial commitments on DRR in contexts affected by FCV. It sets out why action on DRR is necessary in conflict contexts, and provides insight into what leading DFIs and government donors are doing in this space. We highlight some of the internal and external barriers inhibiting greater financial commitment to DRR in FCV contexts, including the disincentives which prevent engagement of Task Team Leaders (TTL) and cross-sectoral collaboration. This is countered by examples of progress, such as establishing champions of the theme, technical up-skilling and programme and investment successes. There are also encouraging signs which point towards a more positive enabling environment for future financial commitments to DRR in FCV contexts.

The report concludes by laying out a set of concrete opportunities for enhancing interest and ultimately political support and financial commitments for this nascent yet pivotal topic. First, a set of quick wins are presented which build on existing processes and aim to begin to change current incentive structures to make financial commitments on DRR in conflict contexts a rational and more desirable option. In the medium term, foundational groundwork is required to build the evidence base to demonstrate the added value of a focus on the DRR–conflict intersection, and to set up an accountability framework that could be used over the longer term. We share ideas on how this can be achieved. Finally, opportunities are identified for establishing a longer-term process wherein DFIs and government donors can articulate the value



proposition of DRR in FCV contexts and the return on investment and/or ODA, and craft a position paper on the theme.

Each of the three stages will require internal commitment and championing of the theme, as well as research and advisory work and expertise on change management. Collaborative processes with key technical and policy-oriented staff will need to

be in place to ensure the narrative and framing of financial commitments in DRR in conflict contexts adequately reflects the distinct voice of the donor and/or bank. For DFIs this process provides an opportunity to develop a distinct ‘offer’ to clients, and to become a preferred partner for investments that help achieve the SDGs and related international commitments, such as the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015).

### Box 1 Barriers to allocating finance for disaster risk reduction in conflict contexts

The following barriers were identified in Peters (2017) as inhibiting the allocation of funds by DFIs and government donors to DRR in FCV contexts:

- Departments being bound by sectoral specialisms which prevent a more holistic approach to risk management.
- Little explicit recognition of conflict as a driver of vulnerability to disaster risk.
- Limited capacity and funding on the part of the primary National Disaster Management Authorities (NDMAs) to operationalise DRR, let alone in extremely difficult sub-national contexts where armed conflict is present.
- The politics associated with sub-national and cross-border conflict are seen as outside the remit of NDMAs and DRR stakeholders.
- A lack of ideas for logical alternative entry points and approaches besides those conventionally used by DRR practitioners, which could be better suited to conflict contexts.
- Prioritisation of peace and stability over DRR in conflict-affected areas.
- Limited published evidence that DRR can be a convenor for peace.
- Practical limitations around the operational safety of DRR implementing agencies working in conflict-affected contexts.
- Lack of practical guidance on how to make DRR investments and programmes conflict-sensitive.
- Lack of funding explicitly dedicated to addressing disaster risks, specifically ex-ante action, in conflict contexts.

Source: Peters (2017)

### 1.2.1 Research parameters and terminology

This report is a continuation of the investigation which began in 2017 (see Peters, 2017), offering observations about some of the barriers, incentives, key actors and internal and external enabling factors that could influence the potential for greater financial commitment on DRR in FCV contexts. The DFIs and government donors studied for this report are intentionally selective and far from exhaustive. It has been repeatedly cited anecdotally in donor coordination and finance meetings that the following DFIs and government donors are interested in furthering the topic:<sup>1</sup> Australia, France, Germany, GFDRR, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the World Bank. We focused on a subset of these and conducted interviews in early 2021 on past, current and future allocation and mobilisation of DRR funding to FCV contexts, and ongoing change processes offering opportunities for strengthening engagement in this theme. The subset of DFIs and government donors researched are (in alphabetical order): AFD, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, GFDRR, GIZ, Switzerland and the World Bank.

This report uses the term ‘DFI and government donors’ as shorthand to refer to the subset of actors noted above who provide a mixture of grants, loans, technical assistance and donations. As this report does not seek to analyse financing flows we use terms related to DRR finance/funds to refer broadly to funds with the explicit purpose of enhancing DRR outcomes. This includes, but is not limited to, ODA reported against the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System with the purpose code and marker for DRR (Development Initiatives, 2021).

Finally, we use the overarching terms ‘fragility, conflict and violence’ to refer to the entire continuum of conflict conditions, from interpersonal violence through to international armed conflict, and everything in between. As has been noted elsewhere (see Siddiqi, 2018; Peters, 2019), a more substantive evidence base on the differences for DRR outcomes in varying FCV contexts is required before any further nuancing can be achieved. Readers should note that, for brevity, ‘conflict contexts’ is also used in this report to refer to this range of FCV conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> Although Japan has typically been one of the main advocates and funders to DRR programming, and to funding for the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), we have not commented on their portfolio here. This is because their focus has largely been on traditional themes such as resilient infrastructure, and less on the social aspects of risk management, particularly in contexts where issues of violence and conflict drive increased exposure and vulnerability to natural hazard-related disasters.

## 2 Common barriers to allocating finance for disaster risk reduction in conflict contexts

DFIs and government donors have long allocated finance to different aspects of the disaster risk management cycle in contexts affected by FCV, although the focus has tended to be on disaster response, and more recently on preparedness (Peters and Budimir, 2016). Much less has been allocated to risk mitigation or reduction or the overarching disaster risk governance systems that are required to enable countries to manage disaster risk independently (Peters, 2019). Moreover, the complexities that different and changing types of FCV contexts present to achieving DRR outcomes remain woefully underexplored (Siddiqi, 2018). This is an area that warrants further research.

There has been growing recognition of compound and cascading risks (UNDRR, 2019) among DFIs and government donors, and with this, some have taken the opportunity to explore the intersection of natural hazards and conflict risks. Most notable has been the increased focus over recent years on the effects of climate-related disasters exacerbating conflict and security risks, and increasing the humanitarian caseload (see Peters et al., 2020). Such topics were discussed at the highest levels throughout 2020, including at the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly (Peters and Dupar, 2020).<sup>2</sup>

Although it was beyond the scope of this research to explore disaster–conflict

intersections among all DFIs and government donors, it is clear that most continue to maintain siloed approaches to the management of risks and subsequently their allocation of finance. As explored below, many of the hesitations and barriers to taking a more proactive approach to working on disaster resilience in conflict contexts identified in Peters (2017) (see Box 1) remain today.

### 2.1 Commonly cited barriers

Awareness and understanding of DRR is often limited to a specifically designated DRR expert, and in some cases sectoral specialists. Within governments, expertise on DRR is typically limited to selected individuals, preventing civil servants from understanding the potential value of risk reduction and prevention work. This in turn reduces opportunities to develop the support required to scale up the mobilisation of funds, political commitment and action on DRR more broadly, let alone DRR in FCV contexts.

For DFIs, which design projects on the basis of partner governments' requests, the low level of demand from clients (recipient governments) to integrate DRR into sectoral programmes is a notable barrier. This reflects wider challenges associated with the sectorisation of loans and programming. In addition, disaster risk management in recipient countries is often itself nascent and/or stuck in a cycle of high

<sup>2</sup> The thematic link between disasters and conflict, and issues of security, are beyond the scope of this work but are mentioned here as they provide important context.

and increasing disaster risk and repeated need for humanitarian assistance. This skews client demand away from an integrated approach to DRR, which in turn influences how TTLs design investments. It is widely regarded as challenging to move beyond classical sectoral investments (infrastructure, health, education), especially – though not only – in conflict-affected contexts: DRR is regarded as a ‘love to see, but not urgent’ topic.

Related to the above, for the majority of high-intensity protracted crisis contexts, national progress on DRR is lagging, for a range of different reasons (see Peters et al., forthcoming). The Sahel and West Africa are a particular cause for concern as progress on the Sendai Framework and the African Union Programme of Action is well behind schedule – including in achieving Target E to have local to national DRR strategies in place, the 2020 deadline for which has already passed (see Peters et al., forthcoming). The foundational disaster risk governance structures required to tackle current let alone future disaster risk are not in place, and in many countries NDMA hold little sway in government discussions with DFIs.

Many DFIs and government donors (including the UK), have investment and spending targets focused on a set of core themes outlined within their policy and investment strategies. With a finite amount of money to invest (linked to annual multilateral contributions or in some cases a percentage of Gross National Income – as in the UK), and because funds are commonly under the control of a specific department or sector, many interviewees reported that these targets act as a disincentive to cross-departmental and cross-sectoral working. This can often mean work on disasters (disaster preparedness, risk reduction and prevention) and work on conflict (peacebuilding, conflict resolution, stabilisation) is led by separate departments or teams, and ultimately segregated with few incentives

to bridge the gaps – particularly where funding is fiercely protected.

At present, the incentives for sectoral TTLs to consider DRR within their investment portfolios are weak compared to other pressures. There are strong perceptions that integrating DRR will add to already complex project and investment designs, creating additional work without sufficient financial or technical support, and therefore limiting returns. In addition, the climate and DRR cadres have traditionally operated separately with few internal incentives to collaborate; although there are internal restructuring processes within many governments designed to better combine DRR and climate expertise and programme design given that the majority of DRR projects are connected to climate change adaptation in some way, and vice-versa.

It can be the case that disaster risk management-related activities are taking place within sectoral teams but are not framed explicitly as DRR-related, and are not tagged or documented accordingly. Thus, it is not always clear whether those fund allocations align with DFI or government donor strategies on DRR, where they exist.

Finally, even where sectoral experts understand the need to take issues of climate change, hazard profiles and disaster risk into consideration within their designs, such considerations are largely confined to hardware adjustments, rather than the software, such as community engagement, that is critical to DRR. Interviews revealed that there is little interest in expanding design processes to include these ‘soft’ DRR processes. Enhancing understanding of the value of climate change adaptation and DRR to sectoral hardware and climate mitigation projects in terms of long-term sustainability would be useful, and would enable the development of a well-rounded portfolio on climate change adaptation and mitigation.

## 3 A more enabling environment is emerging

Despite the barriers – none of which are unsurmountable – there is reason to be hopeful: the research identified a more enabling environment for dedicated discussions on the disaster–conflict nexus; test cases of small DRR fund allocations attached to sectoral programmes which are delivering positive outcomes for disaster resilience in conflict contexts; and integrated risk analysis tools are bringing together data on hazards, violence and conflict.

Part of the shift lies in a broader move within DFIs and government donors to better understand the complexity of intersecting risks, whether this is framed as risk-informed development (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019), the development–humanitarian–peace nexus (Caparini and Reagan, 2019), or other terms related to compound and complex risk (UNDRR, 2019). There has also been a drive to better understand how hazards, shocks and stresses interact, and the subsequent impact for the design and delivery of financial allocations, be they through loans, grants or technical assistance.

It is worth noting that the DRR experts interviewed working within DFIs and government donors believe that there may be a lot more DRR work going on than is formally recognised or has been documented here. This is because (as interviewees stated) ‘good TTLs’, for example designing infrastructure investments, should be taking hazards into account – and may well be, without labelling this DRR. If processes are established to catalogue and document those positive examples and to tag them as DRR, they could then be shared

as good practice, learnt from and embedded into future investment design processes.

### 3.1 What are DFIs and government donors doing on this theme?

Outlined below are illustrative examples of positive progress in Germany, GFDRR and the World Bank, Switzerland and AFD on the disaster–conflict nexus.

### 3.2 Developing tools and empirical research: Germany

In 2018–2019 the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) invested in research with ODI on DRR in conflict contexts, documenting the disaster–conflict interface in contexts including Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia and Lebanon (see Box 2). Since then, Germany has been exploring different ways of pursuing DRR in fragile contexts, from the entry point of disasters and the entry point of conflict – aided by the fact that, within Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and BMZ, disaster and conflict experts are housed under the same division. For example, Peace and Conflict Analysis, a standardised contextual analysis tool used primarily to explore peace and conflict-related issues to inform programme and project design at the country level, has been broadened to include disaster risk. This updated tool was employed most recently in assessments in Nepal and Lebanon (GIZ interview, March 2021).

## Box 2 ‘When disasters and conflict collide’

The project ‘When disasters and conflict collide: uncovering the truth’<sup>3</sup> was a collaboration between BMZ, GIZ and ODI.

The aim of the project was to generate an evidence base to help answer the question ‘what types of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) actions are viable and appropriate in fragile and conflict-affected contexts?’, and to influence the remaining implementation of the Sendai Framework – and ultimately the outcomes of Agenda 2030.

Core project deliverables included a series of high-profile closed-door and public events at global and regional DRR ministerial conferences including in Asia (Peters, 2018), Africa and the Arab region (Peters and Peters, 2018), four original case studies – in Afghanistan (Mena et al., 2019), Chad (Peters et al., 2019a), Colombia (Siddiqi et al., 2019) and Lebanon (Peters et al., 2019b), technical contributions to the Global Assessment Report 2019 (UNDRR, 2019), a review of DRR strategies for their inclusion of issues of conflict (Peters et al., 2019c), and a review of the secondary literature on the disaster-conflict nexus (Peters et al., 2019d).

The work culminated in the publication of a flagship report (Peters, 2019) detailing policy opportunities, evidence gaps and practical recommendations for advancing DRR in FCV contexts. The United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, Mami Mizutori, commended ODI’s influential evidence-based research and lent her support to the agenda. Through engagement with the Regional Ministerial Conferences, the project helped inform regional policy dialogue in Africa, the Arab region and Asia, and successfully ensured that declarations and regional DRR plans recognised and included the intersection of disaster and conflict risk. For example, inclusion of this intersection is now explicit in the Africa Regional DRR Strategy and the Tunis Declaration. In Asia, the topic has been picked up by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), which introduced a new workstream on disasters and conflict to its intergovernmental Regional Consultative Committee in 2020.

The project was also highly successful in raising visibility for the topic. Through a three-part podcast series,<sup>4</sup> documentary videos and multimedia content the project was also able to bring the issue to a wider audience. For example, the social media explainer was watched by more than 2.5 million people.

Source: ODI (2020)

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3 For the project reports, see <https://odi.org/en/about/our-work/when-disasters-and-conflict-collide-uncovering-the-truth/>. For the long-form website, see <https://odi.org/en/about/features/when-disasters-and-conflict-collide/>.

4 The podcast series is available here: <https://odi.org/en/insights/multimedia/podcast-series-when-disasters-and-conflict-collide/>.

At the project level, GIZ (as an implementing entity)<sup>5</sup> has been trying to better differentiate between projects that work ‘in conflict’ (meaning conflict is present in the project site, but addressing these dynamics is not an intended outcome of the project) and those that work ‘on conflict’ (as a developmental challenge to be addressed) – the difference being whether changes to conflict outcomes are a direct intention of a DRR project (GIZ interview, March 2021; Mena et al., 2019). Project coordinators are already mandated to adopt Do No Harm approaches as a minimum, and some aim to work ‘on conflict’ by overcoming siloes between those working on DRR, peace and conflict, under the framing of the humanitarian–development–peace nexus – a theme Germany is championing more broadly, including through its engagement as the Co-Chair of the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)<sup>6</sup> (GIZ interview, March 2021).

Further collaboration across the disaster–conflict space is anticipated. For example, as part of its 2030 strategy, BMZ have clustered and prioritised a set of partner countries where conflict and peace are a challenge. If a DRR programme or project is located in one of these countries then it will be increasingly necessary to respond to calls internally to articulate how DRR can contribute to positive outcomes such as peace and sustainable development within that country (GIZ interview, March 2021). In the future, empirical research will be undertaken to articulate and substantiate how DRR has been positioned within this new framework, and what successes and lessons

can be garnered and shared for enhancing dual outcomes for disaster resilience and peace.

Discussions are also ongoing in Germany to better integrate DRR within the climate change, peace and conflict and food security and development sections. Possible windows of opportunity are through BMZ’s new health section, and the social protection section, both of which have been attracting attention due to the pandemic (GIZ interview, March 2021). It is worth noting that biological hazards and epidemic risks are part of the Sendai Framework, so there is a natural policy overlap here.

Efforts are also under way to elucidate the links with those working on governance, given that risk governance is central to effective disaster risk management – as articulated in BMZ’s Comprehensive Risk Management approach (BMZ, 2019). Internal capacity building is also ongoing to ensure that sectoral specialists working on infrastructure, urbanisation and city planning understand the ‘un-naturalness’ of disasters (GIZ interview, March 2021). Lastly, BMZ provides a funding line called Transitional Development Assistance (TDA) which is designed to provide a hinge between humanitarian action and longer-term development cooperation (BMZ, 2020). TDA is intended to support post-disaster reconstruction, disaster risk management and issues of peace and social cohesion. This could provide a useful entry point for working, not only on these issues individually, but also together, in order to promote a more comprehensive approach to risk management.

5 For more information, see [www.giz.de/en/workingwithgiz/134.html](http://www.giz.de/en/workingwithgiz/134.html).

6 For more information, see [www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/incaf-network.html](http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/incaf-network.html).

### 3.3 Working with Technical Team Leaders: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

The World Bank and GFDRR have made significant progress on being more explicit about the disaster–conflict intersection in their latest strategy documents; working with sectoral TTLs to integrate DRR into World Bank investments in conflict contexts; designing and trailing integrated risk analysis which combines conflict and disaster data; and raising visibility for the intersection of disaster and conflict risk internally and externally.

First, the previous GFDRR Strategy 2018–2021 (GFDRR, 2017) had just one mention of the term ‘conflict’. This was in the context of recognising the need to support countries to assess the impact of disasters, and to work on disaster recovery in contexts affected by fragility and conflict. The latest GFDRR Strategy for 2021–2025 (GFDRR, 2021) now includes 29 mentions of the term ‘conflict’. The strategy makes explicit the need for GFDRR’s activities to be ‘responsive to the challenges faced by countries afflicted with fragility, conflict and violence, given the intersectionality of conflict and disaster risks in a growing number of countries’ (GFDRR, 2021: 5). The mutually reinforcing nature of disaster and conflict risks is outlined, as are the increased vulnerabilities to disaster risk in conflict contexts, and the need for adapted disaster risk management approaches in conflict contexts given the additional complexities related to access, communication, protection and capacity. Conflict, violence and fragility are also explicitly listed as one of a number of cross-cutting priority areas.

Second, GFDRR launched the Disaster Risk Management-Fragility, Conflict and Violence Nexus Initiative in 2018 to mobilise finance for DRR in conflict settings (GFDRR, 2020). As part of

the initiative, closer collaboration with the World Bank Group’s Fragility, Conflict and Violence group were established.

Third, with funding from BMZ, GFDRR has been offering World Bank TTLs the opportunity to expand activities in conflict contexts by providing additional financial resources to integrate disaster risk management interventions. There has been a particularly successful collaboration with technical staff from Social Global Practice who work on issues of social cohesion in FCV contexts (GFDRR interview, March 2021). While the funding provides incentive for TTLs, and raises awareness of the need and value of DRR mainstreaming, the selection of successful applications is based on criteria which intentionally aim to incentivise working across disciplines. For example, to be eligible for the funding it has to be demonstrated that FCV and disaster risk management specialists will work together in design and delivery (GFDRR interview, March 2021).

Fourth, under the framing of compound risks, GFDRR and the World Bank are taking forward work to better understand and support investments that deal with hazards, shocks and stresses in a more integrated manner. For example, newly designed projects in Somalia aim to address recovery within a conflict setting from multiple crises, including floods, droughts and locust infestations, and more recently with Covid-19 now also included (GFDRR interview, March 2021). They have also been seeking to build capacity to find solutions to disaster–conflict situations, providing operational support and training on the nexus (GFDRR, 2020).

Fifth, GFDRR have been trialling a new methodology for integrated risk analysis bringing together data on a range of vulnerabilities



which explicitly include both natural hazards and issues of FCV, in an attempt to develop more comprehensive multi-hazard risk analysis to inform investment design and delivery (GFDRR interview, March 2021; GFDRR, 2020). Related to this, visibility for the intersection of conflict and disaster risk has been actively raised through technical workshops on conflict risk monitoring (held in June 2021), convened by the World Bank and the German Federal Foreign Office. The workshops aimed to explore new methods for redefining conflict (beyond the normative focus on battle deaths), towards a conceptualisation of conflict and crisis as an outcome variable, and with this greater focus on the typology of different conflict outcomes, indicators and metrics for violence and conflict, as well as new methods for risk monitoring. As a complement to this work, time was dedicated to understanding the intersection of climate change, disaster and conflict risk, and the implications for risk assessments, analysis and prevention and mitigation approaches.

Finally, in an effort to continue the momentum for collaborative working across conflict, sectoral and DRR specialists, informal TTL champions for the disaster–conflict theme have been identified, and a series of videos are being recorded to inspire others to integrate disaster–conflict risks into their project designs (GFDRR interview, March 2021).

### **3.4 Integrating disaster risk reduction across a portfolio: Switzerland**

Positive examples of progress were evident within the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Switzerland has a notable and long-standing record of providing support for DRR

activities in collaboration with governments and UN and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and more recently has been exploring ways to better understand how intersecting risks play out in highly fragile settings.

Switzerland’s International Cooperation Strategy 2021–2024 (FDFA, 2020), for example, encourages synergies across four priority topics in FCV contexts: DRR, food security, protection and water, sanitation and hygiene. As part of this ambition, Switzerland has begun joint training to increase its technical specialists’ knowledge of each of the themes and work better together to develop joint responses (Switzerland interview, March 2021). DRR, for example, has been incorporated into SDC’s intersecting risk approaches in Afghanistan, Haiti and Chad (Switzerland interview, March 2021).

With regard to Chad, there are examples of DRR being pursued through initiatives on natural resource management and the restoration of degraded land. These initiatives are providing protection against flooding and drought, and in turn reportedly contributing to peaceful coexistence between refugees and host communities (Switzerland interview, March 2021; Daszkiewicz, 2020).

In an effort to integrate DRR across its portfolio, SDC uses standardised contextual analysis tools across all departments, which encourage the systematic integration of climate, environmental and DRR issues into development cooperation and humanitarian aid. For example, SDC has a Climate, Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction Integration Guide (CEDRIG)<sup>7</sup> that aims to systematically integrate climate, environment and DRR considerations across all its development and

7 For more information, see [www.cedrig.org/](http://www.cedrig.org/)

humanitarian work (Switzerland interview, March 2021). As part of the process, CEDRIG also aims to identify whether interventions risk contributing to or exacerbating greenhouse gas emissions, environmental degradation or hazard-related disaster risks.

Similarly, standardised tools derived from the conflict and peace cadre are being systematically used, such as Do No Harm (FDFA, 2021). Do No Harm is a long-standing approach and one of the OECD principles, to which SDC adheres (FDFA, 2021). The approach aims to ensure considerations of violent and non-violent conflict, the distribution of power and resources and the intended and unintentional impacts of external interventions are considered within the design of interventions – with the aim of mitigating any possible negative impacts at the local level.

Switzerland is continuing to encourage DRR to be seen as a development and a humanitarian issue, and as such ensuring it is central to its exploration of the humanitarian–development–peace nexus (Caparini and Reagan, 2019). SDC is also considering proposing the triple nexus as a possible theme of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction 2022. If taken forward, this would provide an explicit space within the global disasters forum to discuss DRR links with humanitarian and peace work.<sup>8</sup> As part of this ambition, SDC sees a useful entry point for more targeted work on DRR through the protection agenda, including in Humanitarian Response Plans and in displacement settings (Switzerland interview, March 2021). This is a theme other agencies prominent in the field of human mobility, displacement and humanitarian protection are increasingly interested in, including the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Danish Refugee Council.

Finally, as with most DFIs and government donors, SDC reported that there are likely to be many funding allocations not labelled as DRR which do in fact contribute to risk reduction and mitigation, including in FCV contexts. Finding ways to document these could be invaluable to a better understanding of the true nature of the DRR portfolio, including in FCV contexts.

### **3.5 Laying the groundwork for internal advocacy on the DRR–conflict nexus: AFD**

In 2020 AFD commissioned ODI to produce an internal report presenting the findings of a short study into the current and possible future avenues for enhancing its financing commitments on DRR in FCV contexts (this report is an adapted version of that original work). This commission in itself demonstrates an interest, albeit among DRR specialists within AFD, and a desire to expand awareness and allocate finance for DRR in FCV contexts, both within the Fragility, Conflict and Crisis Department – where DRR sits – and within sectoral teams.

The study found evidence of AFD allocating finance for DRR in FCV contexts; capacity-building efforts aiming to enhance staff understanding of DRR; and notable support from some senior staff to advance this agenda. The study also identified several gaps in AFD’s understanding of its own DRR portfolio, and a reluctance to integrate DRR into sectoral projects.

To start with the positives, there was evidence of AFD allocating finance to DRR in FCV contexts. For example, AFD has seen successes in DRR in some high-risk countries. In Haiti, for example, a

<sup>8</sup> For more information, see [www.undrr.org/event/seventh-session-global-platform-disaster-risk-reduction-gp2022](http://www.undrr.org/event/seventh-session-global-platform-disaster-risk-reduction-gp2022).

contingency grant was awarded in 2019 to civil society organisations to implement DRR and response activities (AFD interview, March 2021). AFD reports that this funding has been particularly useful in responding to Covid-19-related needs in a timely and effective manner, aided by the fact that the project was already operational and could easily be adapted to the pandemic threat. In 2020, AFD and Danida awarded a €13 million grant to help local communities and institutions in Lebanon to improve their capacities to deal with flood risk, through Solidarités International and the Lebanese and French Red Cross (AFD interview, March 2021). Here again AFD reports project successes, namely the involvement of local to national Lebanese authorities in project design and delivery. The main outcome was the provision of a budget that has been used to finance part of the response to the Beirut explosion. In Madagascar in 2019 and Mauritius in 2020 (noting that these are less severe contexts from a conflict perspective), contingency loans have been provided and utilised by the authorities to implement DRR institutional reforms, and to finance government responses to floods and epidemics (AFD interview, March 2021). In 2021, AFD launched an appraisal for a loan responding to a request from the Indian government to address risks in Himachal Pradesh, focusing on disaster prevention by strengthening institutional disaster response capabilities (AFD interview, March 2021).

The above examples derive from the DRR portfolio, but in an attempt to increase staff knowledge and capacity on DRR, in December 2019 AFD conducted its first-ever training dedicated specifically to DRR. Subsequent training took place in 2020 and March 2021 (AFD interview, March 2021). In the latter, over 20 participants took part, roughly half from technical departments and half from geographical

departments. Feedback from participants has been positive, and further training is planned (AFD interview, March 2021).

Although these efforts have been piecemeal, there is interest in integrating disaster risk issues into broader peace and conflict financing allocations and programme design. This has been evident from the support shown by the Head of the Fragility, Conflict and Crisis Department – in which the DRR thematic work sits. This could provide a useful starting point to trial how best to pursue integration within an AFD department, and if successful used as an illustration for other departments. Any successes would also be valuable beyond AFD; they could provide much-needed empirical examples of bringing together the disaster–peace cadre, and working towards joint disaster resilience and peace outcomes. This is a notable gap in the evidence base, as documented in an AFD-commissioned article (see Peters and Peters, 2021), and something currently lacking in the global discourse on the triple nexus. Recognition of the potential value of working with conflict specialists and peacebuilding experts has been similarly noted by GFDRR. The GFDRR Strategy 2021–2025 (GFDRR, 2020) outlines the ambition to strengthen partnerships between agencies and actors working on DRR and those working on peacebuilding at the national, regional and global scale.

Finally, the internal AFD report revealed a number of overarching barriers to advancing DRR within AFD. These included:

- Generally low but also variable levels of awareness of and interest in DRR in other sectoral teams, with some evidence that this is improving.
- Limited tagging of investments as DRR, even when some are eligible, preventing a comprehensive understanding of the DRR portfolio.

- Few incentives to mainstream DRR and little appetite within sectoral TTLs to integrate a ‘new’ topic.
- Low levels of demand from partner governments to include DRR in sectoral investments.
- A tendency for sectoral TTLs to focus on hardware (infrastructural investments) rather than relatively low-cost software (such as community engagement).

Tailored recommendations on how to overcome these barriers to progress have been documented in the ODI commissioned report, and adapted versions of those recommendations are outlined in Section 4 of this report.

### **3.6 An opportunity to pursue: the UK**

Finally, while we did not conduct interviews with the UK government it is worth noting that the UK has undergone significant change through 2020/2021 with the establishment of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and budget reviews in early 2021. Unfortunately, disaster risk and its relationship to conflict and security do not feature explicitly in the 2021 Integrated Review, which sets out FCDO priorities to 2025 (UK Government, 2021). The former Department for International Development

(DFID) invested heavily in humanitarian disaster response, climate change adaptation and new forms of financing such as InsuResilience, adaptive social protection and others, but did so focused more on poverty reduction, climate change and the policy hook of the Paris Agreement, while less explicitly using the discourse of DRR or the Sendai Framework as a guiding policy framework. The dominance of using climate change and resilience as the main framing is likely to continue given the UK’s hosting of COP26 in Glasgow in 2021. However, the FCDO would be well-placed to reconsider the UK government’s mobilisation of financing for DRR, both as a means to reduce the humanitarian caseload over the long term and as part of its growing support to the Centre for Disaster Protection, among other initiatives on risk financing. There would also be value in analysing more closely the current allocation of financing given that, in 2019, the UK was the second largest donor to DRR, providing \$399 million (according to OECD DAC coding of DRR), a fourfold increase from 2018 (Development Initiatives, 2021). Consideration could also be given to the links between disaster, peace and diplomacy, and the FCDO’s ambition to enhance soft power through international relations, within which disaster and crisis routinely provide critical diplomatic moments.

## 4 Recommendations for enhancing financial commitments to disaster risk reduction in conflict contexts

Outlined below are a set of ideas for enhancing DRR financing commitments in FCV contexts, organised temporally around quick wins, medium-term and long-term engagement. None of the ideas below is particularly easy, in the sense that all change processes require time, engaged and dedicated champions, and buy-in from across a spectrum of key decision-makers. It is nonetheless hoped that these ideas prove useful in beginning the process of devising a longer-term and more detailed plan of action for enhancing financing commitments on DRR in FCV contexts by DFIs and government donors.

### 4.1 Build on existing processes: quick wins

The baseline for each DFI and government donor will vary greatly, influenced by the level of awareness of and organisational commitment to achieving disaster resilience, historical and current investment and programme portfolios on issues of disaster risk and conflict risk, the presence of internal champions on DRR in FCV contexts, and the specific organisational structures which enable or inhibit new topics to be championed and advanced. The suggestions below will therefore need to be tailored to each institutional and organisational context. The overall focus for the quick wins is to begin to change incentives through a set of relatively easy, short-term and low-resource actions, including a Working Group to champion increased financial allocations on DRR in FCV contexts; making clear links to the existing DFI and government donor strategy;

devising an internal influencing strategy; and increasing knowledge and awareness of the topic among staff. The following will be necessary:

**Each DFI and government donor should establish an internal Working Group comprising internal and external champions willing to support the change processes required to increase allocation and mobilisation of finance for DRR in FCV contexts.**

Depending on the maturity of conversations on this theme within DFIs and government donors, identifying internal champions could range from an individual DRR expert leading the way and seeking authorisation from their line manager to actively reach out to see who else from within their department or team is willing to champion the topic, through to the establishment of an informal or formal Working Group and convening regular meetings to discuss progress and identify opportunities and entry points for enhancing financing commitments to DRR in FCV contexts.

The Working Group should seek to establish links with the existing informal 'group of champions' of DRR experts who actively seek to promote this theme, including around the UNDRR-convened regional and global DRR platforms, Understanding Risk conference and Fragility Forum. The informal group of champions to date includes representatives from ODI, GFDRR, the World Bank, Germany, International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and networks such as the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR).

DFI and government donor champions of the theme could consider raising the topic of achieving financing commitments for DRR in FCV contexts within existing networks of wealth alliances such as the OECD Resilience Group, OECD INCAF – collaborating with Germany in its role as Co-Chair, and the International Development Finance Club (IDFC)<sup>9</sup> – for the latter, using the entry point of aligning finance with attainment of the SDGs and climate agenda. Other options include raising awareness in the UN Financing for Development<sup>10</sup> agenda, and related financing discussions as part of the annual UN convening cycle, including the next (76th) UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)<sup>11</sup> and the ECOSOC Humanitarian Affairs Segment (HAS).

**Establish a clear link between action and financing on DRR in FCV contexts and existing DFI/government donor strategies.**

The Working Group should articulate the relevance and contribution of fund allocation on DRR in FCV contexts, in relation to the DFI and government donor’s current strategy and policy priorities, making clear how any increased financial commitment could directly contribute to achieving those existing ambitions. A short paper should be drafted to elucidate the links, seeking inputs from as many willing stakeholders as possible – to raise visibility for the theme internally and garner support from sectoral TTLs and geographic departments/Country Offices.

**Develop an internal influencing strategy which details a plan for how the recommendations in this report are going to be implemented, by whom, when and what resources are going to be required.**

The Working Group should devise an internal influencing strategy to identify which recommendations from this report – and others identified as relevant to the DFI and government donor in question – should be prioritised, by whom, when, and what resources are going to be required to do so. The Working Group will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the strategy and conducting routine monitoring of progress to generate a sense of accountability and help prevent the topic falling off the agenda in the event of staff turnover.

**Make it easy to build individual staff members’ technical knowledge of DRR in FCV contexts by providing summaries of relevant investments and programmes, and a repository of key literature.**

A repository of literature, videos, podcasts and other resources could be created on the intranet. Under the direction of the Working Group and the DRR team, this should be regularly updated as new publications and monitoring and evaluation reports are released. If it is difficult to keep the repository live and engaging, this could be outsourced to an external agency, such as ODI. If further interest develops, a short newsletter on what other DFIs and government donors are doing on the theme could be produced and shared with the growing cadre of DRR champions.

9 For more information, see [www.idfc.org/](http://www.idfc.org/).

10 For more information, see [www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/general-assembly/general-assembly-financing-for-development.html](http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/general-assembly/general-assembly-financing-for-development.html).

11 For more information, see [www.un.org/ecosoc/en/home](http://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/home).

Over time, specific opportunities can be offered to internal DRR champions, for example secondments for TTLs to go to other DFIs or government donors to focus specifically on how the integration of DRR into sectoral grant, loan and programme design can be achieved. This would also offer staff the opportunity to expand their professional networks.

**Show what can be done by learning from others and lightly ‘benchmarking’ against them – including learning how to get the technical language right when pitching the topic to TTLs.**

Collaboration with an external partner such as ODI would offer opportunities to bring in external experts to present the latest insights and evidence on DRR in conflict contexts, and updates on what other DFIs and government donors are doing on this theme. This will help ensure that staff are regularly updated on the latest evidence on the intersection between disasters and conflict, and provide a degree of external credibility. The format could include lunchtime seminars/webinars and quarterly briefings on the latest evidence on DRR-conflict links, or even a podcast series. A series of six sessions could be convened to start with, outlining the foundational elements of DRR in conflict contexts, followed by an internal questionnaire to solicit ideas from attendees on future topics.

To help inspire TTLs, it could be useful to bring in highly regarded sectoral specialists and external TTLs such as from the World Bank, African Development Bank or Asian Development Bank, to share their experiences of integrating DRR into their own investment portfolios. TTLs should be encouraged to share an honest account of their initial hesitancy, experiences and positive lessons on integrating

DRR into investments in conflict contexts. It will be important to ensure that they convey the technical and pragmatic implications of integrating disaster risk into grant and loan design, and the importance of ‘software’ aspects such as community stakeholder engagement. The World Bank and GFDRR are producing a series of videos with TTLs, highlighting investments in DRR in conflict contexts, and why the intersection is important. These videos could be shown as part of existing DRR training within DFIs and government donors, and ideally as part of broader sectoral training.

#### **4.2 Foundational groundwork: medium-term**

The pace at which the quick wins are achieved will vary greatly among DFIs and government donors, though it is not necessary for all to be achieved before moving onto pursuing the medium-term groundwork detailed here. The overall focus for the medium term is to better understand the true portfolio of fund allocation and mobilisation for DRR in FCV contexts within DFIs and government donors; pilot new financing mechanisms to build an evidence base that is specific to the DFI and government donor in question; and to formalise champions of the theme into a global network. To build this foundational groundwork it will be necessary to:

**Undertake a portfolio review to identify where DRR in FCV contexts is actually happening, even if it is not labelled as such. Explore options for enhancing the tagging of DRR fund allocations being channelled to FCV contexts.**

Anecdotal evidence points to the portfolio of DRR financing in FCV contexts being much higher than is currently documented. All DFIs and government donors should therefore undertake

a portfolio review to identify those funding commitments and flows – those under the remit of the DRR team and investments/programmes where budgets are held by other departments and teams (peacebuilding, water and sanitation, infrastructure, etc.).

The review should analyse not only budget allocations, but also the nature of those financing commitments being adopted, for example, to establish whether and how natural hazards or risk management is being taken into account.

If funding or time is limited, a subset of major grants, loans and programmes could be identified and assessed to better understand the extent to which disaster risk is already taken into account in design, beginning with the DFI/government donor's priority sectors (where there is greater political interest in achieving success). The findings would constitute an informal baseline to track future progress and uptake of DRR-conflict across the DFI/government donor's portfolio.

Finally, most DFIs and government donors have processes in place to tag financial commitments to specific sectors or themes (as with the OCED coding and tags). Consideration should be given by the DRR team as to whether that tagging is happening systematically, and what incentives could be offered to enhance tagging, to put in place a means to review changes to funding allocations over time. Existing methods for tagging and tracking disaster-related expenditure could be adapted here, such as DRR Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (PEIR) or insights from the new Inter-Agency and Expert Group (IAEG) on Disaster-related Statistics (UN ECOSOC, 2021).

The portfolio review may also reveal innovative projects/investments on DRR-conflict that

are worth showcasing internally, and which can be used for external advocacy material to demonstrate the DFI/government donor's maturity on this theme – such as the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction 2022, the Understanding Risk conference and the World Bank's Fragility Forum.

**Pilot projects that have the potential to reveal novel insights about the possible links between investment outcomes on DRR, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Accompany this with active learning processes to document what works and what requires adjustment.**

Where good networks have been established between those working on DRR and those working on issues of conflict and peace, jointly designed projects and interventions should be trialled which intentionally seek to achieve disaster resilience and peace outcomes (see Peters, 2019). Any such efforts should be accompanied by learning processes which document the steps taken, lessons learnt and opportunities for improvement. Such insights would be invaluable internally for the DFI and government donor in question, and externally for the global community, given how little exists on disaster-conflict-peace collaborations to date. For some DFIs or government donors this may be best pitched as a trial in 'triple nexus' programming, while for others it may be more politically expedient to use the framing of 'resilience' or tackling 'compound risks'.

Where there is interest and appetite to do more on DRR within sectoral programmes, existing fund allocations could be targeted for a 'bolt-on' DRR component – similar to the process GFDRR used when engaging with the World Bank sectoral teams (see Section 3.3). This would



require specifically designated funding to be set aside to incentivise integration – and thus for DFIs and government donors where funding is difficult to secure, this may be a long-term goal. Adjoining this with an accompaniment process – wherein the process is documented for the purpose of harnessing learning – would also be valuable and provide real-time insights into what is working and what is not, in relation to the bolt-on of DRR onto existing projects.

**Bring in new stakeholders and formalise the existing group of champions into a global ‘Network on Disaster Risk Reduction in Contexts of Violence, Conflict and Fragility’.**

The existing ‘group of champions’ should actively seek to identify new collaborators to support the theme. This could entail simply designating different members of the Working Group to routinely reach out to new staff to enlist their support, or a formalised process wherein a stakeholder mapping is conducted to better understand the points of leverage, key actors, barriers and constraints to enhancing financing commitments on DRR in FCV contexts.

As a minimum, banks and donors should consider conducting a rapid scoping of departments, Country Offices and sectoral specialists, as well as gauging understanding, buy-in and willingness to consider hazard-related issues as part of conflict programming and fund allocation. This will help inform a set of priority sectors/ Country Offices to target. For example, for AFD, given the prominence of AFD investments in infrastructure, agriculture and rural development, and the relative ease with which it is possible to integrate DRR into loan designs, these sectors may be a useful starting point for targeting internal advocacy on DRR.

There is a need to formalise the existing group of champions into a global ‘Network on Disaster Risk Reduction in Contexts of Violence, Conflict and Fragility’, managed by a Secretariat and overseen by an Advisory Board (see Peters, 2019). As a minimum, this should involve convening interested actors to share ideas, knowledge and evidence on how to pursue DRR in conflict contexts, with a dedicated sub-group for DFIs and government donors; to differentiate what financial commitments and mobilisation of funds could entail for different types of finance including loans, grants, technical assistance and others. The Secretariat would be mandated to organise and maintain the network, including a quarterly newsletter, an annual conference and online presence. The newsletter could share funding opportunities, tools and methodologies for joint risk assessments, relevant upcoming events, job opportunities and new research on the topic. The online presence could include a dedicated web space within existing platforms such as PreventionWeb, ALNAP or the Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN). A Terms of Reference for the Community of Practice should include the ambition to chaperone and mobilise lesson sharing, policy engagement, financial commitments and technical support on DRR in contexts of FCV, across DFIs, government and non-government actors.

**Establish an annual international conference: ‘Action agenda on disasters, conflict and peace’.**

DFIs and government donors should jointly fund an annual ‘Action agenda on disasters, conflict and peace’ conference, to provide space for sharing lessons, ideas and expertise across DFIs, government, non-government, academic and private sector actors (see Peters, 2019). Making

the conference a dedicated day ahead of the World Bank's Fragility Forum, the Understanding Risk conference or the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction could serve to link it to the existing DRR convening cycle. Preceding the annual Global Platform conference, Regional DRR Platforms and Ministerial Conferences are already convened, and these could be used as an opportunity to extend the conversation to attending delegations from Ministries of Finance. Events should be organised to share new insights and financing innovations on DRR in conflict contexts, with specific discussions about regional investment opportunities linked with regional banks, foundations and prominent regional donors.

### 4.3 Institutional change processes: long-term engagement

Given that all DFIs and government donors are at an embryonic stage in the allocation and mobilisation of finance for DRR in conflict contexts, all require a long-term process to help articulate the value proposition of DRR in FCV contexts to their portfolios; assess the impact of different levels of integration on reputational risk; influence upcoming strategy and/or policy development processes; and develop a distinct position or offer on this theme. Each of these actions will require expertise on change management, original research and policy advisory work, and a series of collaborative processes with key technical and political staff to ensure the narrative and framing adequately reflects their distinct contribution to the agenda. To achieve this, it will be necessary to:

**Articulate the return on investment, informed by an evaluation of the DFI/government donor portfolio in relation to the sustainability of financing commitments over the past 5–10 years relative to their inclusion of DRR.**

DFIs and government donors should commission an evaluation to assess the impact that disaster risk in FCV contexts has had on their investments/programmes and ODA portfolio over the past 5–10 years. Such an assessment could help show where effective integration of disaster risks has contributed to the sustainability of outcomes achieved (e.g. in infrastructure, health, energy), and where stronger integration of hazard and risk profiles could have increased the quality of intervention and programme design. This should inform the articulation of a clear return on investment, and be used as material in internal (and external) advocacy processes which seek to make the argument to increase financial commitments on DRR in FCV contexts.

**Develop a future scenarios paper that assesses the potential positive, negative and neutral impacts on a DFI/government donor's reputation (related to the quality and sustainability of its financing commitments) as a result of different levels of DRR integration.**

A future scenarios paper should be produced assessing the potential positive, negative and neutral impacts on the DFI/government donor's reputation as a result of different levels of DRR integration. The reputational risks to be assessed will vary depending on the remit of the DFI/government donor, and the governance arrangements and accountability and transparency mechanisms in place. For example, for some accountability to taxpayers will need to be assessed and the impact of publicity on preventable disaster deaths in FCV contexts, while for others accountability to a Board of Directors will be more impactful where investment decisions are deemed unsustainable or failing to take sufficient account of known natural hazards. A range of metrics will thus need to be devised related to the quality and sustainability

of investments and decision-making processes, which should inform the future scenarios paper. The scenarios presented should range from light-touch consideration of hazard profiles in investment and programme design through to fully mainstreamed DRR across all stages of the investment and programming process.

**Design an influencing strategy to inform the current and future strategy and/or policy development processes, to make the case for DRR in FCV to become a part of future financing commitments.**

Each DFI and government donor undergoes regular reviews of their existing strategies and policies, and although each operate to a different timeframe, most will be reviewed – presenting clear advocacy opportunities – between now and 2030. Existing evidence on how disasters can undermine progress across the SDGs (e.g. UNDRR, 2019; UN, n.d.) will be useful material to showcase within any strategy or policy review process. To be successful, many interviewees also pointed to the need to raise awareness within senior management teams that attainment of the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015) targets is directly linked to the monitoring and reporting processes of several SDG targets and indicators; thus, there are co-benefits for dedicating funds to achieving DRR outcomes. Devising an influencing strategy for what types of information will be required at pivotal points in any future strategy or policy design process will be necessary, and that information prepared and presented in an accessible and influential format by members of the Working Group.

**Develop and publish a clear articulation of the DFI/government donor’s own distinct position on the topic and the unique offering to clients, and in doing so demonstrate clear thought leadership in this space.**

Further research is required to explore financing commitments to DRR in FCV contexts from those donors who ranked highest in ODA allocations for DRR in 2019, including the International Development Association (IDA) – part of the World Bank, the European Union and the UK (Development Initiatives, 2021). Once more is known about the true value and nature of DRR financing commitments across each DFI and government donor portfolio (see the medium- and long-term recommendations), it will be possible to consider what the DFI/government donor’s distinct contribution to the DRR-conflict agenda could look like, and how it can best be framed and nuanced. Any framing of DRR in FCV contexts should have a distinct DFI/government donor voice. For DFIs, a document should be created which describes their pitch, i.e. the offer clients that other DFIs currently do not provide, and details of the potential return on investments – thus offering the opportunity to develop a distinct ‘offer’ to clients/governments, and to become a preferred partner for loans. For government donors, the document might describe their policy position on the theme and how this contributes to their national policy agenda, or how their contribution will seek to address a clear developmental challenge or humanitarian need. Different iterations of this paper/framing will need to be developed, including for internal (specifically targeting TTLs) and external (targeting clients) stakeholders.

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