Stakeholders and leadership

Complex social problems such as disaster risk need a diverse group of stakeholders at different scales to undertake the many varied DRM functions. Progress on managing risk will require a clear articulation and division of responsibilities across government, the private sector and civil society, as well as recognition that the incentives are different for each group of stakeholders.

Lead authors: Emily Wilkinson and Amy Kirbyshire

Government:

Delivering development and protecting citizens

Governments have a responsibility to lead in the protection of citizens: as direct providers of DRM goods and services such as flood defence, early warning systems and insurance, as regulators of private sector activity, as promoters of collective action and as coordinators of multi-stakeholder activity.



National government

The enabling actor



Responsibility

National government has a moral duty and often a legal one to protect citizens from harm caused by natural hazards. According to the HFA: 'each State has the primary responsibility for its own sustainable development and for taking effective measures to reduce disaster risk, including for the protection of people on its territory, infrastructure and other national assets from the impact of disaster.'163



Development lost

Disasters can destabilise the economy of a country, reduce economic growth and strip back development gains:

- Globally, economic losses from disasters (2004) cost topped \$1 trillion from 2000 to 2010, and grew at a faster rate than GDP per capita in 200% OECD countries over the same period.¹⁶⁴ of its GDP; the
- In larger economies, such as Bangladesh, the loss of 3–5% of GDP every three to five years has a heavy cumulative impact country's GDP.¹ on development.¹⁶⁶



Investments to protect affected by disasters:

THE SICHUAN earthquake 7,000

Public assets such as schools and hospitals are

- Cyclone Nargis destroyed or badly damaged more than 4,000 schools (over 50%) in the affected areas.16
- Hurricane Katrina destroyed 11 community health centres (facilities that treat patients regardless of insurance/payment status) and seriously damaged another 80, causing damage costing more than \$65 million.¹⁶

Local government

The principal implementing actor

Responsibility



national government is responsible for but the remaining

172,000 km falls under the



\$

THE EL SALVADOR

(1985) earthquake

destroyed assets

equal to 27% of

ational GDP and

158% of total

annual governmer

Political support lost

responding to disaster.

Elections can be won or lost depending on how local government is perceived to have responded to disaster:

Decentralisation transfers responsibility for key

DRM activities to local governments.

• New Zealand has highly devolved

and coordination mechanism

governance: local governments have

primary responsibility for DRM under a centralised national legal framework

supplemented by regional bodies.¹⁶⁹

DRM-relevant legal responsibilities include

controlling construction in hazard-prone

the environment and preparing for and

areas, providing basic services, protecting

• Between 1976 and 2007, 40% of countries with democratically elected governments replaced their leaders in any two-year period. In countries that experienced a major earthquake this figure rose to 91%.17

Annual budgets to protect

 Municipal government budgets are quickly eroded by responding to disasters, and this affects all other planned investments.

Business:

Protecting profit and delivering livelihoods

The business case for investment in DRM includes reducing direct exposure of core operations, limiting indirect exposure of supply chains and markets, and taking advantage of business opportunities. Smaller enterprises face significant challenges in preparing for and responding to disasters. Many will not have insurance, so disasters result in loss not only of profit but also of family income, employment and livelihoods.



Bia business

The key actor in avoiding the creation of new risks



+

Unilever reports

climate-related

\$300 million

affect shipping routes

extreme cold closes

factories and flooding

Fropical cyclones

Responsibility

• Private investment determines risk; in most economies 70-85% of all investment is private.¹⁷³

Recovery of damaged business infrastructure is not guaranteed

 Prior to the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake, the port of Kobe was the world's sixth busiest. Despite massive investment in reconstruction and efforts to improve competitiveness, by 2010 it had fallen to 47th place.¹⁷⁴



product revenue from the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami.¹⁷ Global supply chains: The same event led to

a 20% drop in vehicle production in Thailand. The Chao Phrava floods of 2011 closed 451 Japanese factories in Thailand, as well as others in Malaysia, North America and Japan itself.17

Opportunities for investment

Technology development: Private construction company Mori Building has successfully invested in earthquake-resistant housing developments in Japan, where for 92% of businesses earthquake resistance is the most important criterion when choosing new offices.178



change adaptation is

\$100 billion

a year until 2050, representing a for business.179



SMEs and micro-enterprises

Protecting livelihoods and ensuring employment



Responsibility

• Small businesses provide income and employment and form the backbone of community resilience to disaster. Formal micro, small and medium-sized enterprises employ more than one-third of the population, both globally and within developing economies.

• Fewer than one in six small businesses has

business continuity plans in place.¹⁸⁰





(Le



Lacking contingency plans

• There are few incentives for insurance in fast-growing markets; in China only 3% of properties are insured against earthquakes, 5% against typhoons and floods.¹⁸¹

Lack of diversification magnifies disaster impact Farmers are reliant on fragile natural resources and affected by variable rains.

• When drought hit Kenya in 2011, communities had little to rely on compensation schemes were unable to cope and livelihoods were destroyed.¹⁸²



MEXICAN FISHERMEN who invested in risk

\$35,000 hit three years later.183

Limited coping capacity


• A single disaster can wipe out large parts of a single small or mediumsized business.

Civil society:

Representing communities and the most vulnerable people The poor are often the most vulnerable to disasters as they lack private assets to protect themselves and recover from disaster, and are often excluded from government DRM programmes. The civil society case for prioritising DRM is based on the role it can play in supporting the most vulnerable people and protecting development programmes.

What's at stake?

In some countries the percentage of the population at risk of natural hazards is extremely high:184



Civil society is in the front line of risk reduction, preparedness and response



PREPAREDNESS AND PLANNING Communities in the northwest of Nicaragua, with the support of Oxfam GB, are drawing up risk maps and emergency plans. As the plans are based on the National Risk Management Plan, local emergency committees can receive funding from the national government for DRM.¹⁸⁶

ORGANISED FIRST RESPONDERS The 1985 Mexico City earthquake prompted an unprecedented spontaneous collective response from civil society.187

It gives voice to the most vulnerable


Ensuring emergency aid reaches the poorest and most vulnerable After an earthquake hit a remote region of Morocco in 2005, the El Manal Association for women's activities mobilised women and youth to facilitate emergency response, working together with other NGOs to prioritise needs according to vulnerability.¹⁹⁰



Ensuring that the vulnerable are represented in risk management plans The Evangelical Association of Malawi represents a consortium of NGOs working stakeholders and communities in a range of government forums, including the government's technical committee on social protection and disaster management.¹⁹¹

The challenge: Why leadership is lacking on DRM

Given the impacts and interests, DRM might be expected to be a high priority, but this is not the case. Stakeholders vary in their capacities and their ability to influence decision-making and resource allocation, in large part due to the different degrees of power (economic, social and political) they hold.



LACK OF DEMAND

The benefits of DRM are hard

for citizens to perceive, making

policy reform unlikely, as governments usually respond

to political pressure.



ADDITIONAL COSTS AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS When upfront costs are high, governments and companies will often focus on short-run financial goals, rather than on potential long-term benefits of reduced risks. The added cost of safe construction in hazard-prone areas is estimated at 5-10% of the total cost of building.¹⁹²



LOW VISIBILITY Less visible DRM activities are likely to be neglected, such as environmental protection and enforcement, building inspections, and risk assessment and planning processes.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Acknowledge differences in governance contexts and trajectories:

 The post-2015 framework on DRR should articulate a set of principles or standards that states are expected to adhere to, although the specific institutional arrangements through which they achieve them should be defined by the existing governance context of each country.

Take advantage of policy windows:

While timeframes and targets are important for ensuring that progress is achieved in a timely manner, plans of action should be devised that accommodate a range of different futures – plans that allow stakeholders to take advantage of policy windows when they arise. In some countries, planning processes may be well-defined; in others, they may require more flexibility to account for 'unknowns' in future governance challenges.



MISMATCH OF TIMESCALES The benefits of public investment in DRM will not be visible quickly. Political terms are often for 4–6 years, less in many countries, so benefits may not be observed during a politician's term in office especially when hazards are infrequent.



LACK OF INFORMATION

The complexity of disaster risk, the myriad of policy options available and the uncertainty surrounding the relative effectiveness of different strategies lead to procrastination, with groups delaying making a decision when faced with ambiguous choices.



LACK OF EXPERIENCE The benefits of DRM are more likely to be underestimated when people and governments have no experience of dealing with specific hazards.



COMPETING PRIORITIES Even in places that have experienced a recent disaster other problems may take centre stage, such as law and order.

Focus on linkages and relationships between and across scales of governance:

• Greater monitoring and accountability are required at the sub-national level, to capture differentiated levels of progress within a country. More disaggregated data is needed on the effectiveness of actions that link stakeholders across scales of governance. This will help inform national and international knowledge and understanding of why particular regions lag behind and identify those that require more concentrated support.

Encourage local innovation:

 Greater flexibility is needed to encourage local solutions and ones that take into account different risk perceptions, and to incorporate these as the starting point for DRM. The development of more flexible and culturally appropriate risk reduction approaches and behavioural change processes at the local level should be a core feature of the post-2015 framework on DRR.

How stakeholders and leadership is featured in the HFA

The HFA places emphasis on decentralisation of government responsibilities and resources. It is more explicit than previous policy documents on the need to assign greater responsibility to local governments for DRR. It urges governments to 'recognise the importance and specificity of local risk patterns and trends, [and] decentralise responsibilities and resources for disaster risk reduction to relevant subnational or local authorities, as appropriate' (p. 6).

Para 15 (i): 'National institutional and legislative frameworks: (a) Support the creation and strengthening of national integrated disaster risk reduction mechanisms, such as multi sectoral national platforms, with designated responsibilities at the national through to the local levels to facilitate coordination across sectors. National platforms should also facilitate coordination across sectors, including by maintaining a broad based dialogue at national and regional levels for promoting awareness among the relevant sectors.'

How stakeholders and leadership is included in statements and consultations on the successor to the HFA

Mid-Term Review

- 'A significant element of concern observed throughout the Review
 was that in several countries it is not clear who "owns" disaster
 risk reduction, and therefore it is hard to grasp who is in charge of
 what at the national level. This in turn leads to serious questions of
 institutional overlap, coordination, and ultimately accountability.
 National-level coordination for disaster risk reduction was mentioned
 by developing and donor countries alike, suggesting that it is not
 necessarily linked to the availability of resources but is more likely
 a function of the inherent multi-disciplinary nature of disaster risk
 reduction. Initial data from the 2009–2011 HFA Monitor indicates
 ... major coordination challenges where disaster risk reduction
 responsibilities were distributed across sectoral bodies. ... (p. 43)
- 'The link between HFA Priority for Action 4 ... and Priority for Action 1 ... is critical to ensure a holistic and strategic approach to reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience. However, ... governance arrangements do not facilitate integrated management of risk drivers, especially when responsibilities for critical issues such as environment policy, social protection mechanisms, disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, land tenure and rural development policy, housing, and urban development policy are entrusted to different governmental entities.' (p. 44)'

 'Implementation of the HFA at local level, or lack thereof, and the capacity of governments to coordinate it with other efforts, such as socio-economic development plans at local level, were also raised consistently throughout the Mid-Term Review ... Institutional structures are often put in place but are not connected to local and community processes.' (p.46)

Elements Paper

- 'Effective risk management requires action from a variety of actors
 of local, national, regional, and global as well of a public and
 private nature. Given the varied nature and scale of action, legally
 binding instruments and policy instruments, while necessary, are
 per se, neither sufficient nor suitable to provide detailed regulation
 and guidance. Indeed they need to be complemented and articulated
 by voluntary and explicit commitments and actions by stakeholder
 groups such as communities, civil society organisations, local
 governments, parliamentarians, business, and science which want
 to assume the leadership and responsibility and thus contribute
 positively to managing the risk inherent to development. These
 commitments, often discrete and unnoticed, are emerging and deserve
 full appreciation and recognition as a significant contribution to the
 post-2015 framework for disaster risk reduction.' (pp. 4–5)
- 'Public policies on risk management need to ... incorporate actions not only by national and local governments but also by civil society, the private sector, the science and academic sector and others. Such a governance approach would reflect the increasing prevalence of innovative and networked partnerships and alliances between different sectors, as effective means to address development challenges.' (p. 7)

Chair's Summary

- 'Disasters happen locally and solutions are to be found locally. This
 does not relieve national governments of their responsibilities to
 establish a framework and enabling environment for local action.
 However, municipalities and local authorities are in unique positions
 to lead and create opportunities for local partnerships and to take
 risk-informed decisions that protect the continued potential for
 economic and social development.' (p. 2)
- '... reinforced national institutions and inclusive coordination mechanisms at national and local levels are key elements of risk governance.' (p. 3)
- 'Participants also called for action to narrow gaps between the scientific community and organisations responsible for implementing disaster risk reduction through the development of collaborative means and methodologies.' (p. 4)

RECOMMENDED READING

Analysis of disaster risk governance through a composite index and four case studies:

Wilkinson, E., Comba, E. and Peters, K. (2014) *Disaster risk governance: unlocking progress and reducing risk*. New York: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Public sector institutions and policy choices involved in managing disaster risk: Handmer, J. and Dovers, S. (2007) *Handbook of disaster and emergency policies and institutions*. London: Earthscan.

A review of literature on disaster governance and emerging research themes:

Tierney, K. (2012) *Disaster governance: social, political and economic dimensions.* Annual Review of Environment and Resources 37, 341–363.

Incentive structures and influences on government provision of DRM:

Wilkinson, E. (2012) *Transforming disaster risk management: a political economy approach*. ODI Background Note. London: Overseas Development Institute.

The role of the private sector in adaptation and rationale for publicprivate partnerships:

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (2010) Business leadership on climate change adaptation: Encouraging engagement and action. London: PricewaterhouseCoopers.