



Drivers of change in gender norms

An annotated bibliography

Rachel Marcus and Ella Page with Rebecca Calder and Catriona Foley

Key messages

- This annotated bibliography highlights selected texts on drivers of change in gender norms.
- It summarises some texts that outline recent thinking on social norms and that apply this analysis to understanding why inequitable gender norms persist and when they change.
- It concentrates on large-scale drivers of gender norm change, such as economic change, education, communications, legal change, social and political mobilisation and conflict, rather than on project-based experience.
- In general, the articles show that processes of change in gender norms and relations have typically been driven by several factors simultaneously. Of these, education, economic change, exposure to new ideas and political and social mobilisation have often been the most critical.
- The bibliography also highlights some texts discussing processes of backlash against egalitarian gender norms.

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1 Overview

This annotated bibliography aims to highlight key literature on drivers of change in gender norms and practices. It therefore focuses principally on broad trends and large-scale processes, rather than on evaluations of programmes. It covers a range of material: conceptual pieces, reports of literature reviews, studies based on large-scale surveys, in-depth qualitative research and combinations of all of these. Several of the papers draw on several decades of engagement with a particular locality and thus examine the drivers of changing gender relations using a long-term perspective (e.g. Hossain, 2011; Jackson, 2012; Chant, 2002)).

In addition to literature on drivers of change, the annotated bibliography also summarises key papers that apply recent developments in social norms theory to understanding and changing discriminatory gender norms. It includes some literature on masculinities, in which there are important insights on the factors behind changing gender norms.

This work was undertaken as part of a research programme on Transforming the Lives of Girls and Young Women. There is limited literature on the drivers of change in gender norms as they affect girls. As broader changes in gender norms have significant implications for adolescent girls – both currently and in terms of their aspirations and future opportunities – this bibliography primarily highlights this broader literature.

A growing body of evidence explores the relationship between girls' wellbeing and various factors including access to and control over assets, girls' education level and maternal and paternal education. This literature is well summarised in Huda and Calder (2013)¹, and we do not repeat it here. For this bibliography, we have prioritised papers that focus explicitly on change processes, with the majority discussing empirical evidence of change over time, rather than cross-sectional associations between – for example – female asset ownership and girls' wellbeing, or male education levels and levels of domestic violence. An understanding of these associations is an important complement to any analysis of change processes.

This annotated bibliography grew out of background work on understanding drivers of change in gender norms and is now being made publicly available. It is necessarily selective – it does not attempt to include all relevant literature. Rather, we have selected papers that provide a good overview of the issues concerned, or that make important conceptual points grounded in analysis of changing gender norms and dynamics in particular locations. The papers in this bibliography were obtained through literature searching based on keywords, searching of outputs by authors known to have written on change in gender norms or relations and snowballing of references cited in articles with a strong focus on drivers of change. For areas where only a few authors have examined a particular issue, or where their discussion of drivers of change is particularly compelling, we have included more than one paper by particular authors.

Wherever possible, this annotated bibliography highlights materials that are freely available via the internet, so readers can follow sources up easily. These include working papers, reports, open access journal articles and papers made available via gateways such as academia.edu. Because of the difficulty in accessing books many readers experience, particularly in developing countries, this collection does not include books or book chapters, except where these are available online. Articles available only via subscription are included only where we could find no open access material discussing similar issues or where key points and concepts are presented most clearly in the original articles.

Other than papers discussing social norm theory, few of the papers examined frame the discussion in terms of social norm change, although they often do in fact discuss changing gender norms. Since a widespread change

¹ Huda, K. And Calder, R (2013) The State of Evidence on Adolescent Girls, Development Pathways/ DFID and Girl Hub

in attitudes or in behaviour is often reflective of shifts in norms, we include papers that discuss changes in gender relations as well as papers that are explicitly framed as addressing norms. A challenge for a collection of this kind is that many papers discuss processes of norm change obliquely: they are not the central focus. In general, we have included only papers with a significant focus on processes of norm change. The number of entries in each section reflects the availability of relevant literature rather than the importance of particular drivers. Some themes, such as the role of economic change as a driver of gender norms, have attracted far more attention than others, such as the ways in which legal change or communications lead to norm change, thus the annotated bibliography reflects a larger number of these papers. In some areas, such as education, there is established evidence that secondary or higher education is associated with a greater degree of norm change, but very little analysis of the pathways by means of which these changes occur.

The drivers examined here do not only lead to positive change in gender relations; some also provoke resistance and backlash. The selected papers address both positive change towards greater gender equality and situations where discriminatory gender norms have remained, or hardened. However, because the overall orientation of the programme relates to identifying factors that underpin greater gender justice for adolescent girls, the majority of the papers focus on positive change. We have tried to include material from several regions in the discussion of each change driver, but this has not always been easy, as many analyses are regionally clustered. For example, there is much analysis of economic change as a driver of gender norms in South Asia, and many analyses of backlash and resistance to change focus on Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa.

One major gap relates to material examining the impacts of demographic change, urbanisation and technological change (other than information and communication technologies (ICTs)) on gender norms. While some analyses of changing gender norms discuss these issues as drivers of change (particularly the 2012 World Development Report, summarised in Section 3), we found no papers that discussed them in detail, so we do not have a specific section on these issues.

2 Understanding social norm change

This section highlights some key recent articles that summarise advances in thinking about social norms. It concludes with selected articles that reveal insights into the maintenance of gender norms. The first four articles are based on a body of work that incorporates insights from social convention theory and from game theory, and draw substantially on the work of Gerry Mackie and Christina Bicchieri, who have driven forward understanding of social norms in collaboration with the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). These papers introduce key concepts in current social norms research, such as a distinction between descriptive norms (what people do) and injunctive norms (what people believe they and others should do), and the related ideas of empirical and normative expectations, and the idea that a 'critical mass' of people is needed to shift social norms. They also highlight the importance of 'reference groups' – the people whose opinions and activities matter in convincing others to change behaviour and attitudes. These are followed by UNICEF's (2013) report on female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), which outlines some key social norms concepts and applies them to processes of change and persistence in relation to FGM/C. The article by Raymond et al. (2013) brings insights from social movement theory to illustrate two key strategies used by social movements – reframing existing norms and providing new norms. It also reflects on the role of external forces as motivators for change.

Mackie, G. and LeJeune, J. (2009) 'Social Dynamics of Abandonment of Harmful Practices: A New Look at the Theory'. Special Series on Social Norms and Harmful Practices. Innocenti Working Paper 2009-06. Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. Available at <http://bit.ly/1pWuMoX>

This paper applies social convention theory and game theory to footbinding in China and FGM/C, and argues that these practices can be ended only by whole communities coordinating on its abandonment, thereby solving the potential problem of marriageability if relatively few people abandon the practice: the aim is thus to shift from an equilibrium where everyone cuts (in the case of FGM/C) to one where nobody does.

Mackie and LeJeune suggest this is achieved where an initial core group, called the critical mass, recruits others through organised diffusion, until a large enough proportion of the community, referred to as the 'tipping point', is ready to abandon a practice; for this abandonment to take place, public declarations are necessary. They also suggest overcoming self-enforcing beliefs surrounding the practice requires credible new information, including about the feasibility and desirability of attaining the uncut alternative. One important approach can be making explicit the fundamental moral norm of loving one's children and wanting the best for them, from which point alternative ways of doing so can be discussed.

The paper gives examples of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Senegal, Ethiopia and Egypt that have coordinated abandonment of FGM/C, in some cases by recruiting a core group of people opposed to and prepared to abandon the practice, who then diffuse a new norm about the value of not cutting and/or organise public declarations that they have abandoned the practice. They argue that, in the case of Tostan (Senegal), participatory human rights education has been a key factor underpinning abandonment. With health education alone, medicalisation of the practice is still consistent with the fundamental moral norm of doing the best for one's daughter, since medicalisation reduces health complications while still enabling the daughter to marry. The introduction of broad deliberations about human rights transforms the process. Making the fundamental moral norm explicit justifies why a social norm should be revised – so it can better realise the underlying

fundamental norm (in the case of FGM/C to do the best for one's daughter). Participatory human rights education provides a justificatory framework and enables individuals to embrace the good, rather than rejecting the bad.

Paluck, E. L. and Ball, E., with Poynton, C. and Siedloff, S. (2010) 'Social Norms Marketing Aimed at Gender-Based Violence: A Literature Review and Critical Assessment'. New York: IRC. Available at <http://bit.ly/1qQcy3w>

This paper draws on recent developments in social norm theory to outline how social marketing techniques can be used to change social norms. Social norms marketing conveys messages aimed at convincing its audience that relevant community members will consider certain attitudes and behaviour 'normal' (typical or desirable). Messages carrying information or attempting to change perceptions of social norms – attitudes and behaviour considered acceptable or normal – (e.g. 'Men in this community believe in treating women with respect!') can thus be distinguished from marketing aimed at changing individual attitudes (e.g. 'Women are worthy of respect!') or individual beliefs (e.g. 'Beating a woman does not prove your authority over her!'), although many campaigns do both. The paper distinguishes between descriptive social norms – statements of what people do (e.g. 'In this group men beat their wives') – and injunctive social norms for particular groups – what they should or should not do (e.g. 'In our group it is not acceptable for men to beat their wives').

Social norms marketing attempts to shape and consistently activate positive social norms that apply to the community in question, or to discourage certain attitudes and behaviour by spreading the idea that they are not considered typical or desirable by the community. Examples include billboards featuring community members with a slogan proclaiming, 'Men in this community don't believe in rape.'

The paper makes the case for a social norm marketing approach to gender-based violence, based on the significance of dysfunctional social norms that perpetuate gendered power inequalities and gendered abuse, the low cost of mass media campaigns compared with face-to-face individual or group training or counselling sessions, for example, and the more limited institutional capacity required as compared with legal initiatives or widespread initiatives in the health, judiciary or policing sectors.

The success of efforts to shift social norms depends on whether the norm is descriptive or injunctive, the kind of social group to which the norm applies, the extent to which (different groups of) people conform to the norm, whether the norm is misperceived or whether there is private dissent with regard to the norm. Norms have the strongest influence on behaviour when they are perceived to be widely accepted, when they describe a group valued by the individual and when they are relevant to the context in which the individual is acting.

Contexts that feature a certain amount of discrepancy between group members' private attitudes and the prevailing group norms present fertile opportunities for attempts to shift social norms. For example, when many neighbours privately wish they could help women who are abused by their husbands but do not because they think others would scold them for getting involved in the 'private business' of their neighbours, a public campaign that emphasises widespread support for getting involved should have a large effect, because people are already willing to enact the behaviour (e.g. to encourage their neighbour to go to the local women's centre/report the abuse to the police). On the other hand, when there is no private support for norm change, or when a dominant authority such as a powerful church leader or local state authority enforces the norm, attempts to shift social norms are more challenging.

Where there is strong support for a practice, a social norms marketing approach could start with the message that some people in the community believe X (e.g. early marriage, FGM/C, treating girls worse than boys) is wrong. This can help those who privately believe something is wrong not to undertake that practice. Mackie (1996) argues that publicising dissenting views on footbinding in China was the first step to eliminating it. Paluck et al also suggest that opinion polls that show limited support for a practice and organising platforms for people to speak out against a practice could be effective, since these 'license' a new norm.

The current academic consensus is that interventions would be wisest to target injunctive norms, since descriptive norms act like magnets whereas injunctive norms act like bans. New norms must then replace old norms, since weakening a norm leaves a void. Many domestic abuse interventions, for example, use

programming that seeks to disrupt dysfunctional ideas about what is typical or desirable in a relationship and then follow this with skills training and relationship modelling to provide couples with a model of healthy relationship strategies. Norms campaigns can make it easier for people to accept new norms by ‘channelling’ individuals into opportunities to act on the new norm, for example via a hotline that links people to services.

Edutainment is a common approach of social marketing campaigns, and is argued to be particularly effective when popular or desirable characters that the target group can identify with or aspire to be like deliver the messages. The paper discusses insights from evaluations of three programmes with edutainment components: South Africa’s Soul City programme, Somos Diferentes, Somos Iguales in Nicaragua and Program H in Brazil, Mexico and India. Paluck and Ball conclude that awareness messages should be accompanied by strong injunctive norms messages communicating that an influential or relevant social group does not approve of the behaviour. Otherwise, campaigns can give the message that certain behaviour is common and normal.

Bicchieri, C. and Mercier, H. (2014) ‘Norms and Beliefs: How Change Occurs’. *The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 63: 60-82. Available at <http://bit.ly/1xqvS39>

In this paper Bicchieri and Mercier lay out Bicchieri’s concepts of empirical and normative expectations. Empirical expectations (what we expect others to do) are always important, since in their absence we may be tempted to disobey social norms, especially those that demand behaviour that could conflict with self-interest. Norms of cooperation, reciprocity and fairness, for example, may lose their grip when we are faced with widespread transgressions. In this case, the force of the norm is greatly diminished. Even when widely followed, social norms may require the further belief that others think we ought to obey them, and may be prepared to punish our transgression. Such normative expectations always accompany social norms, and are usually consistent with our empirical expectations of widespread compliance.

The paper then discusses the contexts in which laws are likely to bring about change in social norms. Bicchieri and Mercier argue that the question of whether laws bring about social change hinges on factors such as legitimacy, procedural fairness and how the law is originated and enforced. People who view the law as legitimate are more likely to comply with it, even when it contradicts their interests. A legitimate law is not just one that ensues from a legitimate, recognised authority. It must also be the case that the procedures through which authorities make decisions are seen as fair, that the law is consistently enforced and that the enforcers are perceived as honest. Bicchieri and Mercier further suggest that, where people have an opportunity to contribute to the law-making process, they are more likely to abide by it. Overall, they suggest the most important factor in determining successful enforcement is a shared sense that the existing legal arrangements are roughly consistent with social norms and not so distant from them as to lose credibility. They cite examples of laws on polygamy in Senegal and Gabon, on inheritance rights in Ghana and on gun control in Colombia, which were all framed in such a way as to build support for the change by adopting a mid-way position between the existing situation and what many saw as ideal. Drawing on Kahan’s (2000) discussion of ‘gentle nudges’ and ‘hard shoves’ (in relation to legal penalties), they argue that milder penalties for violations of laws on sticky social norms are often much more effective, and enforceable, thus leading to a progressive condemnation and abandonment of the ‘sticky norm’.

Discussions and deliberations can also play a critical role in changing normative expectations. However, the most common hindrance to a candid discussion of the norm is the existence of norms that dictate how one should talk about norms. An exogenous element is thus often required to challenge normative beliefs, either to challenge the normative beliefs themselves or at least to question the normative beliefs that regulate how the targeted normative beliefs are discussed. A respected and trusted leader may be able to convince people to change. But in many cases it is not possible to rely on trust: people have to be *convinced* they should change their mind. The authors discuss different strategies for convincing people, including addressing core beliefs directly and focusing on peripheral beliefs that are associated with the key norm people wish to change. A key element is to avoid antagonising listeners, who may then ‘shut down’ and be unreceptive to further arguments.

Mackie, G., Moneti, F., Denny, E. and Shakya, H. (2012) ‘What Are Social Norms. How Are They Measured?’ UNICEF/ UCSD Centre on Global Justice Project Cooperation Agreement Working Paper 1. San Diego, CA: University of California. Available at <http://bit.ly/1o8gf8c>

The paper presents some definitions of key concepts in social norm theory and their intellectual history. These include **the reference group or network** (the community whose opinions matter), **descriptive norms** (what most people do) and **injunctive norms** (what the majority of people think others should do) and **pluralistic ignorance** (when people have mistaken beliefs about what others think). Norms may be held in place because of sanctions and rewards (as argued in Cialdini’s work) and/ or because they are perceived as legitimate (as additionally argued by Bicchieri).

Mackie et al. outline a distinction between social, legal and moral norms. Social norms are based on social conventions, legal norms are enforced by state institutions and moral norms are based on widely shared and fundamental beliefs about what is right (e.g. ‘Do not kill’). They note that religious norms are distinctive in that they are inspired by reference to divine command but that otherwise they function as do social, legal and moral norms.

The paper summarises some of the recent theoretical developments in social norm research, giving particular attention to the work of Cristina Bicchieri, who has collaborated with UNICEF and Gerry Mackie in recent years to run a course on social norms for UNICEF staff. The conceptual approaches they use draw primarily on game theory and on social psychological studies of conformity, particularly social convention theory.

The second part of the paper provides guidance on ways of researching and measuring social norms, including ways of making use of existing data and suggested questions for identifying social norms.

UNICEF (UN Children’s Fund) (2013) ‘Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting: A Statistical Exploration’. New York: UNICEF.

This report presents UNICEF thinking on processes of change in social norms related to FGM/C. It draws on the work of Cristina Bicchieri and Gerry Mackie and provides a summary of insights derived from their work. It defines key terms in current social norms discourse, such as empirical and normative expectations, reference groups and pluralistic ignorance, illustrating them with examples related to FGM/C continuation or abandonment. The report draws on the work of Ylva Herlund and Bettina Shell-Duncan to categorise the range of relationships between behaviour and attitude change with respect to FGM/C:

Behaviour	Attitude towards the practice		
	Thinks FGM/C should continue	Undecided	Thinks FGM/C should stop
Adherent of FGM/C	Willing adherent		Reluctant adherent
Undecided		Contemplator	
Abandon FGM/C	Reluctant abandoner		Willing abandoner

Although the discussion of drivers of change is implicit, rather than detailed, the report indicates that processes that involve exposure to new information and to possible alternatives, deliberation within the social group, organised diffusion and public declarations or other manifestations of commitment to a new social rule seem most likely to lead to FGM/C abandonment. This is based on analysis of the central role of processes that create a sense that change is possible and that others are changing too (and thus girls will not be unmarriedable if not cut), rather than analysis of the effectiveness of different policy approaches.

The report explores the relationship between various socio-demographic variables and FGM/C and notes the association between urban residence and lower levels of FGM/C, suggesting this may reflect exposure to other ethnic groups that do not practise FGM/C and less risk of ostracism for not practising FGM/C in urban communities. The fact that more educated mothers are less likely to have their daughters cut may reflect exposure to alternative ideas concerning FGM/C through expanded social networks and changing normative expectations.

The paper discusses how survey data (especially Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) and Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data) can yield insights into the extent and processes of social norm change, by illuminating discrepancies between attitudes and practices, and gives examples of the use of survey data to examine the effects of interventions, such as legal change. It also highlights some of the challenges of using survey data to explore issues of norm change on complex social phenomena such as FGM/C. It then uses DHS and MICS data to show changing patterns of attitudes towards and prevalence of FGM/C.

Raymond, L., Weldon, L., Kelly, D., Arriaga, X. and Clark, A.M. (2013) 'Norm-Based Strategies for Institutional Change to Address Intractable Problems'. *Political Research Quarterly* 67: 197-211. Available at <http://bit.ly/1mJl0lb>

This paper provides a detailed review of insights from literature on processes of social norm change and from literature on social movement theory. It identifies and describes two norm-based strategies for institutional change to address intractable social problems. In both strategies, advocates 'foreground' and criticise norms supporting the institutional *status quo* before either promoting an alternative existing norm via normative reframing of the issue or creating and promoting an entirely new norm via normative innovation to build support for new institutional arrangements.

People can sometimes change norms through contestation and argument – processes intrinsic to discursive politics. For example, human rights activists attempt to transform practice through publicly failing to conform to accepted norms and advocating new and unconventional practices by disrupting 'the logic of appropriateness' (Sikkink, 2011) – accepted norms about how things should be done. People seeking to weaken a norm outline the ways in which it is unreasonable, harmful, inconsistent with other norms or inappropriately applied to a particular issue. However, even weakened norms persist unless alternatives are offered. Therefore, successful norm change requires pairing a weakened norm with organised promotion of a new norm. This may either be a reframing of an existing norm or an entirely new norm. Activists can attempt to reframe a norm by drawing on other widely agreed norms, such as human rights, justice or fairness, to argue for change. The environmental justice movement can be seen as attempting this in its foregrounding of equity issues in discussions of climate change.

When norms cannot be reframed, an alternative is to attack and change the norm itself and create a new rule of behaviour to replace the problematic norm. Raymond et al. argue deliberation is an important and often unrecognised element of the process of creation of new norms. They suggest that, in the early stages of norm changing, focusing on injunctive aspects (how things should be done, how they should change) is often a priority; later, the focus should be on disseminating descriptive norms – what people actually do.

When policies challenge norms that are more foundational (i.e. connected to a wider range of other norms), they are more likely to encounter resistance. External motivations such as legal change or the requirement to change policies and practices (as on violence against women) in order to obtain political or economic advantages (as, e.g., with processes of European Union (EU) accession) can lead to norm change that is sustained after the external motivation is no longer relevant. Often, a combination of external and internal motivations (related to processes of deliberating and social mobilisation) is most effective in changing norms, as Boyle and Corl (2010) have found with respect to FGM/C.

The authors conclude that, although these are not the only strategies for norm change, there is empirical evidence of their success, and they offer new strategies for institutional change.

3 Understanding gender norms

This section moves from analysis of social norms in general to a more specific focus on the processes by means of which discriminatory gender norms are maintained and the structures that underlie them. Kandiyoti's (1988) paper puts a spotlight on the structures and processes that maintain gender inequality. Several papers (e.g. Keleher and Franklin, 2008; Muñoz Boudet et al., 2012; Sen et al., 2007) use concepts from recent social norm analysis and social convention theory as well as this longer-standing tradition and examine how social norms reflect underlying social structures. Muñoz Boudet et al. (2012) introduce the concept of gender norms bending and relaxing, where gender ideals remain intact but practices have changed. Using different language, and drawing on an ethnographic study of Zambia's Copperbelt, Evans (2014) argues that presumptions about cultural expectations play a key role in facilitating or constraining change in gendered behaviour. She suggests such changes are more likely where men and women are exposed to more egalitarian models – in adulthood or childhood – rather than being motivated by abstract ideas of gender equality, and where people do not fear social disapproval for failing to conform to gender stereotypes. Barker's (2000) paper focuses on the factors that lead men to become gender-equitable, and highlights the importance of gender-equitable role models, particularly for adolescent boys and young men growing up.

Kandiyoti, D. (1988) 'Bargaining with Patriarchy'. *Gender and Society* 2(3) (Special Issue to Honour Jessie Bernard): 274-290.

In this paper, Kandiyoti examines women's strategies and mechanisms for coping with the operations of patriarchy in different sociocultural contexts and reveals the potential for breakdown, collapse and change in these systems as crisis points occur and new socioeconomic relationships are constructed. She argues women's strategies for dealing with patriarchy are informed by a concrete set of constraints imposed by the patriarchal structure in any particular context. These strategies are termed 'patriarchal bargains', which determine gender norms and relations as well as the possibilities for change and resistance in each situation.

She outlines contexts of 'classic patriarchy' – patrilocal extended households where a senior man is in control of the family, including younger men. Women expect, over time, to be able to exercise power based on their status as mothers of sons and mothers-in-law, a situation whereby older women have gains to make from the subordination of younger women. Kandiyoti argues this system leads women to maximise their own life chances through collusion in, and reproduction of, their own subordination – the 'patriarchal bargain'.

Kandiyoti sees the breakdown of classic patriarchy as being a consequence of strained economic conditions where 'the necessity of every household member's contribution to survival turns men's economic protection of women into a myth'. This may result in increased freedoms for young women but high costs for women caught in the middle of social change where they lack empowering alternatives to the patriarchal system. Kandiyoti's analysis argues that increased conservatism and modesty may be a consequence of women working outside the home who may still require elements of protection from men – although different contexts require different strategies and bargains and are created through complex personal and political struggles.

Muñoz Boudot, A.M., Pettesch, P. and Turk, C., with Thumala, A. (2012) 'On Norms And Agency. Conversations with Women and Men about Gender Equality in 20 Countries'. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at <http://bit.ly/1jGGobQ>

This report – a background study for the 2012 World Development Report – is based on discussions with 4,000 people in 20 countries, most of them low- or middle-income, though two European countries are included. Despite increases in gender equality, significant gender disparities are evident in these countries: intra-

household allocations of time, responsibilities and power are unequally distributed among men and women. The authors found that, ‘behind the progress towards gender equality and persistent gender gaps lies an almost universal set of factors embedded in social and gender norms’, and argue that ‘women’s and men’s opportunities and actions are determined as much by social norms—including gender roles and beliefs about their abilities and capacities—as by the conditions of the communities and countries they live in.’

The analysis is grounded in sociological theories of gender, social norms and analysis of empowerment.

Social norms hold power hold via emotional control (Elster 1989), social expectations (Bicchieri 2006), and prescription (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), as well as internal commitment (Alexander 2003). In many cases, particularly with gender norms, the joint presence of at least two of these forces makes the norm more binding. As Bicchieri (2006) suggests, individuals prefer to conform to the norm due to the belief that other people will also conform, to the point that a collective agreement is created between normative beliefs and behavior. How people believe they should behave, what their behavior is, and how society expects them to behave are all faces of the same system that enforces a norm.

Muñoz Boudet et al. suggest social norms play a central role in the relation between people’s agency and the opportunities their communities provide. Social norms can either help or hinder an individual’s capacity to take advantage of available opportunities. Gender norms, in particular, have not changed greatly, partly because they are widely held and practised in daily life, because they often represent the interests of power holders and because they instil unconscious learned biases about gender differences that make it easier to conform to long-standing norms than to new ones. However, everyday practices also include different forms of resistance to – and flexibility about – ideal gender roles. Negotiation and resistance to gender norms are evident across the countries studied.

Increased agency allows women to move from complete compliance with constraining and unequal gender norms to questioning such norms in the face of potential opportunities – to changing their aspirations as well as their ability to seek and achieve desired outcomes. In a more enabling environment, which not only creates more opportunities but also changes the individual’s capacity to aspire to access them, normative change is more likely. For example, women’s economic participation has the potential to alter traditional definitions of gender roles, duties and responsibilities, but it can also change the main components of both men’s and women’s identities. Education, employment and family formation are the primary areas where women see their agency and ability to decide expanding.

Norms bend, relax, evolve and change. Norms relax where people (men and women) challenge or cross boundaries of traditional gender roles or conduct, but their actions are not recognised as a legitimate and acceptable norm. They are assuming new roles or responsibilities, but are not setting a new standard.

People do not always notice subtly shifting forces, so often the process goes unrecognised; in other cases, norms change by much more active struggle. However, changes are contested: backlashes are common and the change is uneven. Movement in one area does not always mean movement in other areas or for everyone. As the dominant sex, men can more easily flout or champion norms to suit their interests as long as that challenge does not aim at breaking the basis of their own male identity. By contrast, gender power relations put women at a decided disadvantage if their interests require breaking a gender norm or holding their partner to account.

In some locales (particularly in urban areas) and among younger age groups, participants described relaxation of gender norms where the structure of opportunities that increase women’s access to jobs does not curtail men’s opportunities and occurs along with other changes, such as improvements in public institutions. Economic roles for women often creep into their domestic role and, in some places, younger men even take on some narrow domestic responsibilities. However, the pace of change is slow relative to that of change in contextual factors. Gender norms are being contested, bent and relaxed, but not necessarily broken fully and changed. Younger people may delay compliance to a later point in time, but the norms and the expectations around them do not change. Violence and the threat of violence or abuse play a role in reinforcing the *status quo* and in discouraging women’s efforts to challenge existing expectations and norms.

The most powerful results in terms of norms evolving towards gender equality and resulting in greater agency lie in the expansion of education for girls (and women). However, they remain more constrained by household

preferences and strict gender roles in terms of how many years they can attend school and which fields they can study in. Younger generations of women are also demanding more control over marriage and childbearing than older generations, and they are participating more and more in these decisions. The structure of opportunities and the social pressures surrounding them do not always allow their aspirations to materialise, but often they achieve a middle point.

Women's aspirations need to be accompanied by opportunities to realise them and interventions that facilitate the accumulation of assets and capabilities. To become a reality, then, empowerment requires a combination of factors. Individual attempts to change norms may often fail, especially if they try to reallocate power.

See also review/summary at: <http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=13856>

Keleher, H. and Franklin, L. (2008) 'Changing Gendered Norms about Women and Girls at the Level of Household and Community: A Review of the Evidence'. *Global Public Health: An International Journal for Research, Policy and Practice* 3(S1): 42-57.

This article is based on an extensive review of materials that address the question, 'What is the effectiveness of household and community-level strategies and interventions in changing gender norms?' Although its focus is mostly programmatic rather than on the structural drivers of change, we have included it in this collection as it succinctly and clearly conceptualises the relationship between gender norms and social institutions:

Gender norms are powerful, pervasive values and attitudes, about gender-based social roles and behaviours that are deeply embedded in social structures. Gender norms manifest at various levels, including within households and families, communities, neighbourhoods, and wider society. They ensure the maintenance of social order, punishing or sanctioning deviance from those norms, interacting to produce outcomes which are frequently inequitable, and dynamics that are often risky for women and girls. Risks include violence against women and girls, discrimination, denial of education, illiteracy, poverty, economic and social injustice, honour killings, sexual assault and rape, female foeticide, subordination and exploitation, restrictions on women's physical mobility and education, and political disenfranchisement.

Dominant forms of masculinity operationalize gendered power relations, but also sustain male risk-taking behaviours that impact on women, including street and sexual violence, unsafe sexual practices and misogyny, denial of women's rights (Karlsson and Karkara 2004), support for men to have multiple partners, or to maintain control over the behaviour of their female partners (Pulerwitz et al. 2004). Norms are perpetuated by social traditions that govern and constrain behaviours of both women and men, and by social institutions that produce laws and codes of conduct that maintain gender inequities.

The paper also has a useful typology of interventions across a spectrum of downstream activities, focused on individual and household-level change, midstream activities aimed at community level, such as social norm marketing and community development, and upstream activities aimed at changing the broader policy and institutional environment.

Downstream strategies, including the provision of basic primary health care, are increasingly recognised as critical in addressing specific issues such as violence against women and general efforts to raise women's social status. However, social change occurs when downstream and midstream programmes are conducted in the context of broader systemic (upstream) efforts to increase gender equity. Keleher and Franklin conclude:

All areas addressed in this review demonstrate that the status of women and girls and their opportunities are dependent on protective upstream legislation, to increase access to education to reduce all types of violence, and to protect women and girls from discrimination and exploitation in labour markets. Strategies for increasing the levels of education of girls, or raising their access to health services, will have little or no effect on lessening the gender gap between men and women, whether rich or poor, if they are not embedded in human rights frameworks that affirm, guide, and monitor violations of equal and universal rights.

Sen, G., Ostlin, P. and George, A. (2007) 'Unequal, Unfair, Ineffective and Inefficient. Gender Inequity in Health: Why It Exists and How We Can Change It'. Final Report to the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health. Women and Gender Equity Knowledge Network. Available at <http://bit.ly/1qxNCpX>

Section 5 of this report neatly summarises thinking on social norms broadly and gender norms specifically. Unlike the literature derived primarily from social psychology and game theory, it is explicit about the relationship between gender norms, social stratification and the maintenance of male dominance. It also discusses the reasons why subordinated groups (in this case women and girls) comply with discriminatory gender norms. It applies these insights to an analysis of continued gender inequalities in health, with a particular focus on how gender norms affect issues related to sexuality and reproductive health.

The authors argue that what a group, community or organisation views as normal is shaped by its values and practices. These in turn are governed by the structure of its social relations, including, importantly, relationships of power that evolve historically in response to many factors, some structural and others being the actions of people themselves through social movements and collective learning. In turn, social norms govern people's behaviour, although in every context there will be those who adhere to and others who rebel against accepted codes of behaviour.

Norms are vital determinants of social stratification, as they reflect and reproduce relations that empower some groups of people with material resources, authority and entitlements while marginalising and subordinating others by normalising shame, inequality, indifference or invisibility. 'It is important to note that these norms reflect and reproduce underlying gendered relations of power, and that is fundamentally what makes them difficult to alter or transform' (Sen et al., 2006).

They may be formal or informal. Formal norms are those where rules and sanctions are guaranteed through formal processes that are usually but not always official. They may be written and enforceable, possibly through legal recourse or arbitration. They can be associated therefore with organisations of the state, market or civil society. They include economic and political institutions, legal systems and cultural and social institutions with formal rules and procedures. Informal social norms, on the other hand, represent evolved practices with stable rules of behaviour that are outside the formal system. Acceptable behaviour may be governed through a set of known sanctions or through powerful processes of internalisation without recourse to sanctions. When considering norms referring to gender, such processes of internalisation may be as strong as actual sanctions, and can serve to recruit women themselves into norms of gender inequality (Sen et al., 2006).

Not only do those who stand to gain from norms defend them, but also those whom they marginalise may support them, inadvertently or even at times strategically. Women may support norms that limit their mobility, reduce their life chances, stigmatise and violate them and subordinate them within power relations. A number of factors may be acting simultaneously to explain this apparent paradox. Women may simply give in if they have no choice because sanctions are too strong, and submission may buy peace or even survival. This is especially true in areas involving physical mobility, sexuality or reproduction. They may support oppressive norms because this gives them status despite being painful or dangerous, or may not consider them oppressive. For example, in some contexts women view female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) as a means of achieving cleanliness and purity rather than as mutilation and disfigurement.

Women may also tolerate loss of control and agency because they trade this off against economic support, especially if their 'fallback position' is weak. Women submit to negative norms because it assures their integration into social networks that may be crucial to their own survival and that of their children. Some practices, such as segregation during menstruation or post-partum, may actually give them much-needed rest, although they may be stigmatising and carry risks to health. Women may themselves internalise, believe in and enforce the norms that relegate them to secondary and subordinate status, especially if they hold a promise of improvement in status with age. Socially marginalised women may also support gender-inegalitarian norms as an expression of defiance against the larger society or in solidarity with their community.

Changing social norms can evoke backlash, particularly if widespread cultural change occurs simultaneously, leading to marginalisation of particular social groups. For example, in Costa Rica, changing social norms that

support women's entry into the formal labour market are disturbing men's economic entitlements and social status; it is also men who express more concern about 'family breakdown' (Chant, 2002).

Evans, A. (2014, forthcoming) 'Theorising Asymmetric Flexibility in Gender Divisions of Labour: A Zambian Case Study'. Working Paper. London: LSE.

This paper seeks to explain why gender divisions of domestic labour are so unequal on the Zambian Copperbelt by exploring the role of men's and women's interests and the extent of their exposure to more egalitarian models of gender divisions of labour. Evans explores the way social norms naturalise inequalitarian gender divisions of labour and outlines two possible mechanisms:

- **The role of self-interest:** Because care work is widely understood as a 'feminine' activity, men and women perceive it as being in their self-interest to gain social respect by complying with these cultural expectations; if women prioritise respect above other desires (such as for a shorter working day) then women may perceive it as in their self-interest to perform care work.
- **Lack of exposure to egalitarian alternatives:** Women regard gender status inequalities and divisions of labour as 'natural' and unalterable, perhaps because of limited exposure to more egalitarian alternatives.

Although these two mechanisms would operate differently and have distinct policy implications, many studies find empirical support for both. This may be because, in practice, they are difficult to distinguish empirically, or because they are not mutually exclusive. Evans cites Bolzendahl and Myers (2004: 783), who argue that 'these two processes [interests and exposure] interact in a cyclical fashion such that exposure causes a redefinition of interest structures and changes in life circumstances, which may in turn lead to further exposure.' Drawing on Bolzendahl and Myers (2004), Evans then raises the question of the types of exposure that are most influential in changing gender norms, distinguishing formative exposure to counter-stereotypical behaviour; exposure in adulthood; and exposure to abstract ideas of equality. She finds evidence of empirical support for all three, but less from abstract presentations of the value of gender equality (e.g. via radio programmes) without opportunities for critical discussion and reflection.

Evans also argues that macro processes of social and economic change and individual psychologies are connected via 'presumptions about cultural expectations': individual assumptions about the gender stereotypes endorsed and enforced by others in their society. These stereotypes may be either descriptive (e.g. women *are* naturally better at care work) or prescriptive (women *should* perform care work). A man may privately critique gender stereotypes prescribing inequitable divisions of labour yet conform because of self-interested concerns about how others will perceive and treat him.

The paper then applies these concepts to gender divisions of labour on the Zambian Copperbelt. Evans finds prolonged exposure to gender flexibility rather than exposure to abstract ideas of equality has played a greater role in shifting perceptions of gender-appropriate behaviour for men. She then connects these changes in individual psychologies to macro-level variables - people's presumptions about cultural expectations and the background context of worsening economic security. In this context, the social and economic importance of being and staying married also limited many women's interest in arguing for the redistribution of domestic tasks, since they perceived that this might encourage their husbands to be unfaithful or to leave them. However, change was occurring where men and women were exposed to less stereotyped divisions of labour and did not perceive that they would face social disapproval.

Gender flexibility in childhood is often driven by parents, and reflects household composition: where there are few or no girls, boys typically learn to undertake stereotypically feminine tasks and may continue to undertake some of these tasks in adulthood. Where girls outnumber boys, their parents generally see less need for gender flexibility, since girls share work among themselves, thereby reducing the individual burden. Emphasising the role of economic and emotional security, Evans comments that, if girls' household status is insecure (such as if they are fostered by their extended family), they are often very reluctant to complain. Even in natal families, some adolescents do not push for change, knowing that parents are likely to resist breaking with cultural expectations - which clashes with their interest in peace at home.

In adulthood, women without exposure to men performing care work often privately expressed resentment about women's sole responsibility for this, but appeared resigned to their fate, as they had no evidence that this tradition was likely to change. By contrast, women who had grown up sharing care work with brothers were commonly more optimistic about social change, and had different presumptions about cultural expectations compared with women without this exposure. Evans also noted some change in gender divisions of labour as a result of exposure in adulthood: for example, some male migrants from rural areas had started to share care work on seeing other men doing so in town, although they might conceal this from their peers in the village. Class differences affected the extent to which changes in domestic work were visible, and men's views of the acceptability of engaging in it: in some poorer households where such work took place outside at a tap, men were embarrassed to be seen washing dishes etc., while in better-off households their involvement in cooking, dishwashing, laundry or washing of children could be concealed. Both men and women seemed more inclined to query *prescriptive* stereotypes (that women should perform care work) if they were already sceptical of *descriptive* gender stereotypes (that there are significant differences between men and women). Such critiques were much more common among those exposed to gender flexibility (either in terms of men doing women's work or vice versa). Evans argues that this suggests interventions would be more likely to encourage redistribution of domestic labour if they enhanced people's confidence in the possibility of social change. Instead of suggesting men *should* do more care work – as per typical interventions in Kitwe – it might be more efficacious to signal that such practices *are* becoming more common.

Barker, G. (2000) 'Gender Equitable Boys in a Gender Inequitable World: Reflections from Qualitative Research and Program Development with Young Men in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil'. *Sexual and Relationship Therapy* 15(3): 263-282.

This paper reports the results of a year-long qualitative research project in Rio de Janeiro with a group of 25 young men aged 15-25. Participants lived in a low-income area of Rio and are described as largely socialised into the hegemonic masculinity of Brazil, which is characterised by the 'activity' of men and passivity of women, along with limited male involvement in reproductive health and child care, a sense of male entitlement to sex and tolerance of violence against women. The men involved in the study had extensive knowledge and interaction with *comandos* (gangs) and family members or friends who were involved. They also nearly universally reported exposure to violence within the home and had a low level of educational attainment.

The research describes a series of traits in male behaviour and attitudes as gender-equitable, in other words men who 1) are respectful and equitable in their relationships, 2) seek to be involved fathers, 3) assume some responsibilities for reproductive health issues and 4) do not use and are opposed to violence against women. The research reveals none of the participants achieved all these characteristics at all times. A minority of men consistently displaying a greater degree of gender-equitable behaviour were identified and interviewed in depth on three occasions in an attempt to identify the factors that may explain their more gender-equitable attitudes.

The authors consider more gender-equitable men as having a greater ability to reflect on their past and identify the costs of the prevailing forms of masculinity, and to express remorse for violence. Most had constructed a coherent life narrative of being different to the men around them – whom they saw as violent and holding double standards around relationships with women.

Families that offered involved and nurturing role models emerged as an important factor in achieving a more gender-equitable identity. For example, one participant described how his close relationship with his gay uncle caused him to question his views about what acceptable behaviour for men was. Having a family that reacted to male violence by expelling a perpetrator was also important in shaping gender-equitable attitudes by showing such violence was not acceptable. Belonging to an alternative peer group that reinforced a more gender-equitable version of masculinity helped young men navigate the version of gender inequality presented by media and public policy in Brazil.

The research suggests no single factor led individuals to adopt more gender-equitable identities; instead, a mesh of interacting variables is at work. The authors note a series of implications for programme development, education and social work professionals that stress young men's need for space to explore and reflect on the negative impacts of violence and masculinities, the possibilities of mentoring and the need to promote the existence of more gender-equitable men in the community.

4 Multiple drivers of change

The papers in this section all discuss the role of multiple drivers of change in gender norms. They are based either on literature reviews of evidence on gender norm change or on long-term observation of change in gender norms in particular communities. Reflecting the fact that it is usually multiple factors that drive change in gender relations simultaneously, and they often interact, this section has the most entries. This section starts with a summary of the 2012 World Development Report (WDR), which pulls together evidence concerning the significance different drivers of change in gender relations. The most significant drivers of change vary considerably between contexts and over time, but economic change, education and exposure to new ideas via the media or other communication processes are particularly common. Greene et al. (2011) consider drivers of change with respect to masculinity, and find similar forces have driven changes in expectations of men's and boys' roles and behaviour as have driven changes in the expectations of women and girls. They highlight the ways norms of male behaviour are strongly shaped by the expectation of differently positioned female actors, giving an example from Bangladesh of the influence of mothers of adult sons on norms concerning the treatment and behaviour of their daughter-in-laws, and thus on young husbands' and wives' experiences of marriage.

The papers by Kabeer et al., Jackson, Rao, and Chung et al. outline the significance of different drivers of change in different contexts. Rao, Jackson and Chung et al. highlight the importance of economic change, and, in the case of South Korea (Chung et al., 2007), urbanisation and greater freedom to act outside prescribed models of social behaviour in urban areas. Kabeer et al. (2011) also suggest exposure to new ideas through migration and increased access to media has played an important role in leading change, and Jackson (2012) locates change within the broader context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, migration and the process of independent state formation, which in Zimbabwe involved armed struggle. These papers also highlight the role of education as a driver of change, although, as Jackson points out, ironically, increased investment in girls' education is not necessarily driven by empowerment goals, but by the perceived demands of marriage markets. Jackson's and Rao's papers are part of a collection on the changing nature of marriage and, although they do not focus specifically on child marriage issues, are helpful for understanding the broader processes that change the contexts in which decisions about adolescent girls' marriages are made. The final paper in this section (Seguino, 2007) draws on the World Values Survey to discuss trends in gender-equitable and gender-inequitable norms, and indicates some of the main factors statistically associated with egalitarian gender norms, such as education and income/wealth, although this is not a linear relationship, with the most egalitarian attitudes globally among the middle class.

World Bank (2011) *Gender Equality and Development. World Development Report 2012*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at <http://bit.ly/1pEs9ts>

The WDR conceptual framework distinguishes two main sets of factors that interact together to produce gender (in)equality outcomes: key institutions such as markets, households and formal and informal institutions; and gendered opportunities, agency and endowments.

The WDR attempts to distinguish areas of gender inequality that are likely to diminish with income growth from those that are unlikely to do so, and to understand how and where policy can be effective in addressing 'sticky' areas of gender inequality. It suggests social norms are typically most resilient in areas that directly affect power or control. Those who would lose power under a change in the social norm actively resist change, and those who would gain often are too weak to impose change. The resilience of dysfunctional social norms may also stem from the difficulty of the potential gainers to commit credibly to compensate the losers after the change is made.

Significant improvements in gender equality often reflect the lifting of single barriers. For example, the increase in gender parity in education observed over the past decade reflects effective action addressing *single barriers*, whether stemming from households, markets or institutions; in the ‘stickier’ areas of gender inequality, lifting multiple barriers simultaneously is likely to be necessary. Reforms such as service delivery improvements, information provision and the creation of networks can reduce the bindingness of social norms by affecting the costs and benefits of compliance.

Key insights/evidence on what helps shift social norms and practices towards greater gender equality include:

Role of assets. There is a growing body of evidence on the relationship between female asset ownership and women’s empowerment. The WDR presents evidence indicating women’s asset ownership is associated with lower levels of domestic violence and women’s earnings (rather than simply household assets or wealth) are associated with greater decision-making power; personal assets also play a key role in enabling women to leave a marriage, to cope with shocks and to invest and expand earnings and economic opportunities. However, improvements in women’s economic position can also challenge social norms on women’s role in the household and society and lead to an increase in some forms of domestic violence or threats of such violence, particularly in the short term.

Globalisation and economic change. The WDR summarises the growing body of evidence on the relationship between women’s economic activity and empowerment – much of it based on women’s involvement in formal sector manufacturing in South and South East Asia and on analysis of women’s involvement in export-oriented agriculture. Based on this evidence, it argues ‘expand economic opportunities, and human capital investments in girls will increase. Markets can affect private household decisions, even with slow-moving social norms.’

Greater economic opportunities for women and girls can also promote women’s exercise of agency by broadening their networks – from mostly kin-related networks – and thus expanding their sources of information and support. The increased physical mobility that often comes with employment puts women in contact with a new set of individuals at work and in other places. This, in turn, contributes to changing gender norms and relations. However, where information flows associated with globalisation are perceived as leading to pressure to adopt ‘western’ social norms, there can be backlash. For example, the WDR cites evidence of more conservative attitudes in Jordan to women working outside the home among younger men than among middle-aged men. The WDR also highlights factors that limit women’s capacity to benefit from globalisation, including male appropriation of technology and norms concerning care as a female responsibility.

Migration. Migration can be associated with changing gender norms (as in the case of adolescent girls’ and young women’s large-scale migration into manufacturing industries in South East Asia and Bangladesh. However, in other cases, migrant communities conserve older social norms, even where these have shifted in their location of origin.

Technological change. The WDR largely discusses the implications of technological change for gender relations via two routes: its impacts on economic opportunities and its impacts on exposure to information. There is some evidence of expanding opportunities in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector in India leading to greater investment in girls’ education and changing norms about unmarried and married women’s employment outside the home. Evidence from Brazil and India also indicates changes in gender norms (concerning fertility, gender-based violence and mobility) related to exposure to cable television.

Legal change. There is a substantial discussion of the potential contribution of legal change to gender equality, although less discussion of the barriers to accessing legal justice that many disadvantaged people of both genders face. The WDR highlights the role of laws that increase control over income and assets in increasing women’s position, bargaining power and exit options within their household. It also argues improvements in the legal status of girls can also, by increasing their value, induce other changes, and cites evidence indicating reforms to inheritance laws in India have resulted in delays in marriage for girls, more education (increasing the number of years of schooling by an average of 11-25%) and lower dowry payments.

Public investment. The report makes a strong case for public investment – in health, education and water and sanitation – as a route towards gender equality. For example, expanding access to secondary schooling has helped shift norms in favour of both boys’ and girls’ attendance.

Education. In some contexts, education is strongly associated with greater decision-making power. ‘In South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, women with more education are not as likely to have to ask their husbands or family for permission to seek medical care. Education gives them more freedom than earnings.’

Political mobilisation. The WDR also highlights the transformative role of women’s collective agency – in both formal settings and informal associations – which both depends on and determines their individual agency. Mandating quotas for political representation has also help shift norms concerning women’s leadership capacity – for example in India. There is evidence this has helped girls increase their aspirations and led to changed perceptions of the value of girls’ education.

Access to information. Drawing on social norms theory, the WDR argues inegalitarian norms sometimes persist because of misinformation, either about the costs of adhering to a norm or about the extent to which others are doing so. It argues that, sometimes, simply providing more information is the key to shifting sticky norms. For example, Indian villagers’ exposure to women political leaders led to less gender stereotypical views within households and concerning the effectiveness of male and female leaders.

On some issues/in some contexts, **urbanisation and demographic change** have been important factors. For example, in South Korea the formally most skewed sex ratio in Asia has now normalised, largely as a result of a change in social values associated with urbanisation. By contrast, increasing gender parity in education has played a much greater role in increases in women’s labour force participation in Latin America.

Greene, M., Robles, O. and Pawlak, P. (2011) ‘Masculinities, Social Change and Development’. WDR 2012 Background Paper. Available at <http://bit.ly/1mFXg2r>

This paper considers how gender roles and expectations affect men, how changes occur and the process of change, as well as how policy can catalyse these changes.

Men and boys worldwide internalise the pressure to live up to rigid ideals about how they should act and feel as men. This performance of hegemonic masculinity – the prevailing measure of masculinity by which men assess themselves and others – varies widely and is contextually specific and shaped by intersecting factors like class and the economic context, such as patterns of trade and investment. These ideals often include ideas that men should take risks; be tough, independent providers; be heterosexual; and have multiple sexual partners in order to be ‘real men’. Dominant masculinities shape men’s relationships with women, children and other men, and it is important to understand the social pressure and expectations boys and men face.

After a consideration of the impact of these norms on health, family formation, schooling and education and employment, the report considers the process of change in gender norms and expectations. Norms are lived and perpetuated by everyone in a society, including mothers, wives, sisters and daughters, who shape men’s compliance with gender norms and can act to hold up hegemonic masculinity. For example, research from Bangladesh shows lingering commitment of mothers-in-law to a traditional view of daughter-in-laws’ roles (Schuler et al., 2008), which has an impact on acceptable roles for men. The major factors involved in change seem to be as follows:

Development. As economic conditions change, so do norms around work, as economies become less agricultural and more people attend school and move to live in cities. But many gender inequalities do not change, because of interrelated policies, formal and informal institutions and markets that impede these social changes.

Globalisation. Access to information, advertising and television can expose men and women to new and varied ideals of gender roles and expectations.

External crisis. A major political, social or natural disaster can create the conditions for national dialogue and catalyse change. For example, in Nicaragua, Hurricane Mitch in 1998 created the conditions for a national dialogue on domestic violence, led by non-governmental organisation (NGO) Puntos de Encuentro, with the slogan ‘Violence against Women Is a Disaster that Men Can Prevent.’

Community activism for social change. A wide variety of social organising with the aim of changing gender norms has taken place. Using combinations of the media, collective organising and information provision, this has led to acknowledgements of men's unique needs and vulnerabilities as well moves away from violence. Where men's role as fathers has been promoted, men seem willing to expand the role. For example, men in Chile are now largely present at the birth of their children – a significant change in a short period of time.

Policy and legal change. Although changes in norms can be difficult to trace back to legal change, they can provide a space for increased gender equality. An example is the efforts of Scandinavian countries to use employment policy and law to give men the opportunity to be more involved in family life. More integrated approaches of this attitude to men and boys in policy are needed in addition to existing small-scale programmes.

Kabeer, N., Khan, A. and Adlparvar, N. (2011) 'Afghan Values or Women's Rights? Gendered Narratives about Continuity and Change in Urban Afghanistan'. Working Paper 387. Brighton: IDS. Available at <http://bit.ly/1lwIDPE>

This qualitative study with 12 low-income Hazara women in Kabul, who had all taken loans from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), explores the different factors that led to changing perceptions concerning gender equality, norms and gender relations. Kabeer et al. emphasise the diversity of perspectives among the women they studied. They draw on Moghadam (2002), who emphasises the importance of recognising Afghan women might hold a variety of different positions with regard to Afghan traditions and values: some may find security and status within the accepted boundaries of the family; others seek to challenge the public-private distinction in both open and hidden ways. Kabeer et al. suggest the varied perspectives of the women they interviewed indicate a larger societal transition from 'doxa', where only one interpretation of culture was possible, to 'discourse', where competing interpretations have come into view (Bourdieu, 1977).

While some of the women interviewed espoused conservative gender norms, they were adapting their practices to current circumstances. Thus, for example, almost all the women studied worked for income – but stressed, for example, that they went out only with husbands' permission and often accompanied by a child. Some women regarded the idea of equality with men as a direct contravention of their basic beliefs: how was it possible for women to go out of the house without their husband's permission? Others appeared to welcome the emergence of the new rights discourse as a force for restraining male power and making men more accountable for their actions. They 'questioned the apparent monopoly that men appeared to enjoy in terms of rights and the absence of any mechanism within the traditional moral economy to restrain the misuse of their privileges'.

For the women in this study, having been a refugee in Iran and television were two important influences in terms of changing attitudes. Many of the interviewees saw Iran as a potential model for Afghanistan – a predominantly Muslim country where women's right to education and to work were supported and not impeded, and where the state intervened to protect their rights – for example in instances of domestic violence. As one stated, 'Iran is really good from this point of view. You can't put pressure on women. Here they look on women as a slave.' One of the interviewees also noted that she had learnt to value her daughters after being in Iran and that the birth of girls was equally celebrated.

Television had also exposed people to new discourses on women's rights (largely via programmes supported by the international community, but also via religious channels that promoted different interpretations of Islam), and to different ways of doing things in different countries. Compared with migration and television, taking microloans from NGOs generally seemed to have less effect on gender norms. Given the resilience of patriarchal constraints on women's lives, it is not surprising microfinance does not appear to have had any dramatic impacts on women's lives; however, it has contributed to some subtle shifts in agency. For example, some of the women were using the proceeds from their investments to send daughters to school; others spoke of their social networks expanding through visiting the NGO office or in the course of their business activities. Being the conduit through which loans entered the household and the easing of economic constraints (where this occurred) had also led in some cases to greater respect from husbands.

Jackson, C. (2012) 'Introduction: Marriage, Gender Relations and Social Change'. *The Journal of Development Studies* 48(1): 1-9.

Is the rising age at marriage driven by improving education of girls, in an 'empowering' virtuous circle? Summarising evidence from anthropological studies discussing these issues in more detail (see entries on Jackson and Rao below), Jackson argues that, in South Asian dowry systems, competitive marriage markets favour literate girls, thus marital social mobility is an important motivation for the education of girls, and therefore produces a rising marriage age. The education of girls is not necessarily motivated by progressive gender ideas, such as a parental desire to equip girls for employment, but by a desire to improve their chances of making a good match. Other elements of modernity – such as the increasing frequency and scale of migration and socioeconomic polarisation – intensify the need for education with intensified marital competition. The rising age of marriage can also reflect an increasing difficulty of attaining marriage. Jackson (2012) below argues that, among Zimbabwean Shona women, the rising age at marriage is connected to women's desire to marry employed men, in a context in which male employment is limited, and thus the difficulty for men of meeting this marriageability criterion.

As well as socioeconomic polarisation, migration and women's agency as factors influencing age at marriage, Desai and Andrist (2010) emphasise cultural drivers. They show how Indian families are torn between status attainment through idealised gender performance (of modesty, gender segregation and early marriage), and through performances of modernity, where education and later marriage is emphasised. These are shifting cultural scripts rather than simply shifting material calculi, and stress the continuing importance of families rather than individuals in decision making about marriage.

Cross-country evidence suggests that, when households get richer, the position of women within them deteriorates for some time until household incomes reach quite high levels. Insofar as rising household incomes are based predominantly on rising male incomes, gender equity within those households suffers in the short and medium term. Perverse gender effects of rising household incomes also derive from the fact that marriage is the most significant, and sometimes sole, moment of social mobility for women in poor communities. Where marriage is arranged, the perceived imperative of girls marrying up may be intensified for parents of girls in circumstances of low fertility and growing social differentiation, and thereby deepen daughter aversion.

Norms and gender ideals cannot be relied on to predict actual gender relations in particular marriages, because women can act up and against gender ideologies and make creative use of ambiguous and contradictory elements of gender ideologies. Jackson argues conjugality should be seen as an arena for agency and influence that can either mitigate or deepen wellbeing or disadvantage in wider social relations, rather than assuming marriage is automatically a site of women's oppression or viewing it simply in 'contractualist' terms. Nor does it simply reflect gender relations external to households, but is better seen an institution that mediates social change and gender inequality.

Rao, N. (2012) 'Breadwinners and Homemakers: Migration and Changing Conjugal Expectations in Rural Bangladesh'. *Journal of Development Studies* 48(1): 26-40.

This paper draws on fieldwork in a poor rural area located close to Dhaka and discusses changing gender norms in a context of substantial overseas migration. Unlike many earlier accounts, which tended to view marital relationships in a rather reductionist fashion (related to bargaining power or the pressure of patriarchal social norms), this paper foregrounds the role of emotions and affection and explores how these interplay with changing social norms. Rather than interpreting this in terms of domination and subordination, both male and female agency needs to be recognised in the process of redefining conjugal norms and spaces. Both ultimately seek to build a relationship of emotional interdependence as well as material security.

Rao argues that togetherness, more than autonomy or independence, is central to conjugal relations. Rather than being 'cultural dopes', women find personal meaning in particular ways of relating and investing in their marital relationships (Kabeer, 2000: 33). Their agency is directed towards supporting their husbands in accomplishing broader social goals, of expanding networks, prestige and symbolic capital within the community, rather than necessarily fulfilling their personal needs, as her identity is ultimately linked to his

success (Rasheed, 2008). The desire for social status and respectability ultimately leads to increasing conformity with cultural ideals of male providers and dependent spouses; migration appears to have solidified this, as many of the men who had worked in Middle Eastern countries had adopted more conservative gender norms – in part reflecting the examples they had seen in the Middle East, in part because their earnings facilitated their reassertion of gender norms that valued female seclusion.

Indeed, Rao argues ‘for men, control over women, their mobility and fertility, appears to compensate for the lack of control over their work and the production processes and the insecurities of their public, working life. Male status in these new terms is enhanced by the “performance” of control and adoption of authoritative stances as evinced in the increasing confinement of women (Chopra et al., 2004).’ Furthermore, while employment does lead to substantial control over incomes and decision making, it is (generally) low paid and insufficient for an independent life. It does not lead to emotional happiness when women’s economic activity is devalued and considered a loss of status for both themselves and their husbands. In a situation where men can potentially earn much higher incomes and women are confined to low-wage activities, it is thus unsurprising if women’s discourses too reflect a desire to quit the workforce and focus on their domestic responsibilities, in support of their husband’s enterprise.

Although gender norms do not favour young unmarried women’s employment, this is nonetheless widespread (particularly in communities such as this that are within commuting distance of Dhaka). To ensure the reputation of unmarried migrant women remains intact so they can be honourably married, strategies for policing and control have been developed, including staying together in groups, commuting from the village and being accompanied by a father or a brother. Yet these young women exercise considerable agency in their personal lives, especially in the choice of a spouse, seeking more equal conjugal relations and to be treated as complete social citizens at home and in the workplace.

By contrast, for married women, the need to support and look after the family and children is paramount. Long-term security for them is bound with their families, and earning a wage does not necessarily guarantee the exercise of choices in relation to one’s life. Such women want a household based on joint contributions and cooperation, but, with the expansion of overseas work opportunities, this is no longer a given.

More than contributing to economic autonomy, educational skills are increasingly valued in the marriage market, as they enable young women to better manage domestic affairs in the absence of their husbands, in addition to assuming responsibility for household chores and caring for both parents and children. Female literacy is rising, but most girls drop out before completing secondary education, since it would entail marrying a better-educated husband with a higher dowry demand, which only a few can afford.

This analysis highlights the limitations of development strategies that overestimate the role of employment, wages and control over assets in women’s empowerment and do not recognise the more subtle and less tangible pathways of influence and assertion within marriage that are related to love and companionship. It also highlights the various levels at which choices are made, and the complexities of balancing individual emotions and social norms.

Jackson, C. (2012) ‘Conjuality as Social Change: A Zimbabwean Case’. *Journal of Development Studies* 48(1): 41-54.

This paper critiques the contractual/bargaining model of household relations (which posits that the relative bargaining power of women and men within marriage effectively determine gender relations) as too reductionist. A strong demand for women in labour markets improves their ability to survive outside marriage and thus their breakdown position, but this does not translate directly into improved intra-household power. Plus, there are plenty of examples of strongly patriarchal contexts, in terms of laws, norms, rights and rules, where wives nonetheless exert considerable power within marriage. Intra-household gender relations are not a microcosm of societal gender relations, and the balance of power between spouses cannot simply be read off from ‘breakdown positions’: marriage is a social relationship that may either deepen or diminish the effects of wider patriarchal environments. Both women and men actively ‘structure’ their own marriages and the institution of marriage through actions that are only partly patterned by norms, and not necessarily by a rigid

set of determining rules. Jackson shows how the cumulative actions and choices of women, over a number of decades, have changed the character of marriage in ways that reflect their gendered preferences and interests.

Jackson's study in two Shona communities in Zimbabwe found women overwhelmingly saw themselves as more autonomous than in the past. Marriage had largely become a matter of open choice, with women preferring employed spouses; the decline in bridewealth (in part a consequence of colonial legislation) put women in a strong position with regard to rights to retain children, freedom to divorce and the potential to benefit as a wife from resources that would otherwise have been transferred to her father over a period of years; financial transactions that once occurred between the family of the wife and of the husband had become first an exchange between the husband as an individual and (largely) the wife's father as an individual and then a largely symbolic exchange in many marriages, with the resources that used to go to the wife's father commanded by the wife. Control of remittances has also played an important role. Men used to send their remittances to their parents, but since the 1980s wives have captured the right to receive and control remittances – and separate residence makes wives' claims on remittances stronger. By contrast, the HIV/AIDS epidemic may have contradictory effects; on the one hand an intensified male concern for sexual control within marriage and a shoring-up of traditional marriage, and on the other a female experience that women in informal unions felt more able to insist on safe sex than married women (Muzvidziwa, 2001).

Ultimately, women hoped for conjugal cooperation on more favourable terms, rather than complete autonomy. In this patrilineal context, where women resided with their husbands and their husbands' parents controlled their labour, women were increasingly negotiating to set up separate households, which would enable them to avoid quarrels focused on mother-in-law problems, domestic labour exploitation and joint farm production. They expressed strong preferences for having their own household because of the autonomy it conferred, and despite the recognised disadvantages, seen as the increased difficulty of meeting food needs and (to a lesser extent) domestic labour.

This analysis suggests the demise of paternal patriarchy has been an unintended consequence of the creation of a Rhodesian, and then Zimbabwean, state. Jackson argues that this is a process in which women have taken an active part, by undermining lineage relations, relative to conjugal relations, and by reshaping the content of conjugality in ways that strengthen their autonomy. At the same time, a shift from a father's control to a husband's control offers greater room for manoeuvre towards personal autonomy. Husbands have a much greater dependence on wives than fathers do on daughters, and this offers scope for greater influence and power in conjugal relations. It is thus important to understand men's breakdown position – material, sociocultural and emotional – when marriage fails as much as that of women.

Chung, W. and Das Gupta, M. (2007) 'Why Is Son Preference Declining in South Korea? The Role of Development and Public Policy, and the Implications for China and India'. Policy Research Working Paper 4373. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at <http://bit.ly/1BJI7cS>

Until a few years ago, South Korea appeared to epitomise the pattern of rising sex ratios at birth (fewer girls than boys), despite dramatic increases in levels of education, industrialisation and urbanisation, as well as in women's education and participation in the formal labour force. Since the mid-1990s, however, sex ratios at birth in South Korea have shown a steady decline, setting a new trend in Asia.

Chung and Das Gupta argue development has altered son preference primarily through setting in motion changes at the societal – rather than the individual – level. Son preference is inversely related to individual socioeconomic status, but the overwhelming factor underlying the reduction in son preference is changing social norms concerning the necessity of having a son cutting across all socioeconomic groups. They suggest son preference has declined in South Korea primarily as a result of ideational change triggered by changes in underlying social and economic conditions, in a process analogous to the way social and economic change have led to ideational change that has, in turn, altered fertility behaviour. The felt need to have sons has declined sharply across all age groups and socioeconomic groups in the population. The decline in the intensity of son preference began among the educated professional urban elites, and spread quickly across the rest of the population. This follows the pattern put forward in studies of the collective adoption of new ideas: a slow start,

initiated by those with the greater exposure to new information, and then a snowballing of adoption through the population.

Chung and Das Gupta suggest a combination of industrialisation and urbanisation set in motion changes that led to a reduction in son preference. With the advent of industrialisation, increasing proportions of the population became able to earn a living independent of their position in the family. Increasing proportions of people also obtained formal education, which further reduced their dependence on the family and also exposed them to new ways of thinking. In urban areas, people typically have less contact with members of their lineage: urban residents live and work in the more diverse and impersonal settings of apartment blocks and office complexes. This reduces pressures to conform to traditional expectations of filial duty. The greater physical mobility associated with non-agrarian life means sons may no longer be near their parents to help care for them. At the same time, married daughters may live near their parents, unlike in rural areas, where married women typically leave their natural village, with lineage exogamy typically synonymous with village exogamy. Whether urban parents derive support from a child comes to depend less on formal rules based on the gender and birth order of the child and more on who lives in the same city and the strength of the parent–child relationship. This reduces the gap between the value of daughters and sons to their parents. Female education and employment further enhance the potential value of daughters, especially when they are not completely cut off from their parents, as in rural areas. Finally, as growing proportions of the population have retirement savings, they are less dependent on financial support from their children, although this does not reduce the need for sons to support them in their afterlife. Decades of cumulative social change associated with these trends seem to have relaxed the pressure to bear sons. These changes have occurred despite pronatalist and conservative government policies that, until the 1980s, promoted traditional family and gender relations, through legislation and other policies.

Chung and Das Gupta argue the approach taken by the Indian and Chinese governments – focusing heavily on interventions that seek to alter societal norms and accelerate the process of diffusion of new values rather than relying only on measures such as increasing female education – is likely to be effective. They note that, in China and India, public policies have sought to lead changes in social norms, whereas in South Korea public policies sought to prevent changes in social norms, and speculate that, without these countervailing public policies, son preference may have declined in South Korea before it reached such high levels of development.

Seguino, S. (2007) 'Plus Ça Change? Evidence on Global Trends in Gender Norms and Stereotypes'. *Feminist Economics* 13(2): 1-28. Available at <http://bit.ly/1iRx7D0>

This paper starts by examining the relationship between material and social/psychological structures that maintain gender equality and their relative malleability. Seguino argues that two pivotal targets stand out in the struggle for gender equality: the gender division of labour that structures control over material resources and the psychological/social system that creates gendered personalities and behaviour, based on ideologies and norms ('social definitions') that legitimate the *status quo*.

She argues that key strategies for change in relation to material resources are women's access to paid employment and equal pay, contributing to greater gender income equality. To change social and psychological aspects of gender inequality, gender ideologies and norms must change, and this is likely to be facilitated by women's entry into leadership positions in different parts of society (such as academia, religious organisations and legislative positions). Drawing on Chafetz (1999), she suggests women providing role models through leadership positions and using power to promote changed gender norms is likely to be a slower route to gender equality than strategies that change women's control of resources.

Seguino then reviews some of the macro-level literature on the relationship between economic change and a shift in gender norms, and finds that, overall, economic development is associated with a shift towards more egalitarian gender norms, although there are exceptions, such as in high-income Gulf states. Periods of economic growth can result in increased income to fund social spending and safety nets, and permit women to enlarge their share of employment and managerial slots. Such conditions can promote gender equity without a frontal assault on norms and stereotypes that might provoke male resistance and backlash. By contrast, periods of economic crisis may in fact exacerbate gender tensions, as, by limiting men's income-generating possibilities, they undermining masculine 'male breadwinner' norms.

In the second part of the paper, Seguino examines three rounds of data up to 2001 from the World Values Survey on the degree of adherence to norms and stereotypes about the gender division of labour, gendered power and men's and women's relative right to access to resources and opportunities. She finds that, in most contexts, men hold more gender-inequitable views than women, and the size of the gap in attitudes is statistically significant. Over time, the proportion of men and women holding more gender-equitable attitudes has increased, although this varies by indicator and region. For example, while globally the proportion of men who responded that, where jobs are scarce, men have more right to them than women has decreased, two regions of slow growth and economic crisis (Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia)² diverge from this trend. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of men who believed men had a greater right to scarce jobs increased by 10 percentage points between 1990 and 2000, whereas the proportion of women who held this view declined. Responses to the survey in Asia in 2000 also showed an increase in the proportion of women who believed men had a greater right to scarce jobs compared with responses in 1990. This may reflect women's disproportionate vulnerability to job loss during the economic crisis and may have led to a resurgence and reacceptance of patriarchal norms by both men and women.

Over the three rounds of data, there has been a decline globally in the belief that boys deserve a university education more than girls – although it is notable that low percentages of both women and men held this view across both rounds and regions. Between 1995 and 2000, the percentage of men and women who believed men made better political leaders fell slightly, but the gender gap in attitudes did not diminish over this time period. In an econometric analysis of factors that affect trends in the World Values Survey indicators, Seguino finds that gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the extent of women's involvement in economic activity have the strongest influence on the gender equity attitudes measured. She also finds discriminatory attitudes to be more common among the richest and poorest socioeconomic groups and less common among the middle classes.

² The paper does not specify particular regions of Asia.

5 Economic change

The impact of structural economic change, and in particular the entry of large numbers of women into the labour market, is one of the areas of gender relations that has received most academic attention. This section summarises two overview articles – Kabeer (2013), which is based on empirical analysis of paid work and women’s empowerment in three countries, and Kabeer (2008), which is an in-depth survey of evidence from a range of contexts. These highlight the transformative effects of paid work (and secondary education that facilitates it), while pointing out that labour force participation is not costless – both because of poor working conditions, the double burden of domestic and paid work many women face, and because, in some contexts, working women are subject to gossip and rumours concerning their reputations (a point also made by Hossain, 2011). These reactions to large-scale labour force entry indicate that gender norms may be bending but have not fully changed in all contexts to accommodate new gender roles and ideologies. The nature of shifts in gender relations and the degree of norm change vary considerably by context, depending on the strength of ideologies concerning women’s role as homemakers and on the local malleability of gender divisions of labour. Newman’s (2001) article shows that, in Ecuador, women working led to some shifts in norms concerning gender divisions of household labour. Kabeer’s and Hossain’s articles (and Evans, 2014, in Section 3) indicate that this has more rarely been the case among working women in the Bangladesh garment industry and in Zambia’s Copperbelt.

The next two papers (by Jensen) report on an experimental programme in India that facilitated young women’s recruitment into relatively well-paid ‘white collar’ work in outsourced back office work. They found the availability of this opportunity had a significant impact on parents’ willingness to invest in daughters’ education and on young women’s aspirations for delayed marriage and childbearing. Finally, Kabeer (1998) reviews the evidence concerning the role of microfinance as a large-scale development intervention, which has been highly controversial in terms of both poverty reduction and gender impacts. Based on her interviews with women microfinance recipients, she finds that, in addition to the empowerment effects perceived by women recipients, microfinance is associated with changed views concerning the value of girls’ education.

Kabeer, N., with Assaad, R., Darkwah, A., Mahmud, S., Sholkamy, H., Tasneem, S. and Tsikata, D. and statistical support from Sulaiman, M. (2013) ‘Paid Work, Women’s Empowerment and Inclusive Growth: Transforming the Structures of Constraint’. New York: UN Women. Available at <http://bit.ly/1mFXxSP>

This paper synthesises the findings from literature reviews and from surveys in Ghana, Bangladesh and Egypt that investigated the circumstances under which women’s access to valued economic resources was likely to be empowering. The conceptual framework for this study ‘took the capacity for choice and agency as central to its understanding of women’s empowerment, but recognised that this capacity was exercised within the “gendered structures of constraint”: the limits imposed by the structural distribution of rules, norms, resources and responsibilities that served to position different groups of women and men within the broader social hierarchies of their societies.’

It found that, in all three countries, formal employment has had the most transformative impact on women’s lives, followed by education, particularly secondary education. In Egypt informal self-employment outside the home, in Ghana non-agricultural self-employment and in Bangladesh involvement in informal paid work were also associated with positive empowerment effects. In Bangladesh, more than in the other countries, membership of organisations was also associated with empowerment – these were typically non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that explicitly promoted women’s organisation and association.

However, empowerment through paid work is not a costless process, given the various constraints women must negotiate in order to engage in such work. There was little evidence that the working women in our sample received much support from their families in their efforts to reconcile their paid work responsibilities with their unpaid domestic responsibilities. Women working outside the home in both Bangladesh and Egypt were more likely to feel stressed and under pressure than those working within the home, whereas women working outside the home in Bangladesh and Ghana were more likely than the rest to face abuse. Furthermore, given the very low levels of collective action women in all three samples reported, it is evident that engagement in paid work in these contexts has not led to organised efforts by women to improve their conditions of work or to address the gender-specific constraints that curtail their choice of work.

The study does not directly explore social norms. However, the Bangladesh case study found that ‘of those who voted, women in outside employment, both formal and informal, were more likely to vote according to their own decision. There were very low levels of participation in other forms of electoral activity, with women in formal employment most likely to report such activity.’ The Bangladesh research team also found ‘change in attitudes over time, with the majority of women in each work category expressing indifference to the sex of the child, and a few expressing preference for daughters. Women in formal employment were somewhat less likely than the rest to express a preference for sons and somewhat more likely to express indifference.’ NGO members were more likely than non-members to express a preference for sons. (The report does not discuss why this should be.) It also found routine television watching appeared to have a largely positive correlation with women’s empowerment, suggesting the importance of exposure to new ideas. Significant differences in empowerment were found in different locations, indicating local norms and opportunity structures continue to play an important role in differentiating women’s capacity for agency and choice across the country.

Given that the form of work – formal employment – that contributes most consistently to empowering women to exercise greater voice and agency within their household and community has been on the decline in the shift to market-oriented strategies, the authors recommend a two-pronged approach: 1) replicate some of the more desirable aspects of formal employment in the informal economy; and 2) extend the regulatory framework to bring increasing numbers of workers into the formal economy.

Kabeer makes a number of recommendations related to removing legal discrimination against women, removing regulatory obstacles that can have a disproportionately negative impact on women, enhancing women’s capacity to engage in labour markets (e.g. through enhancing childcare provision) and improving social protection of informal sector workers.

Kabeer, N. (2008) ‘Paid Work, Women’s Empowerment and Gender Justice: Critical Pathways of Social Change’. Brighton: IDS. Available at <http://bit.ly/1vwbHeM>

This background paper for the Pathways of Women’s Empowerment project uses a framework based on Fraser (1997). It distinguishes three arenas where women – regardless of their place in the socioeconomic hierarchy – may wish to make justice claims: decision making, access to and control over resources and recognition of women as human beings of equal worth to men (which would lead to the elimination of domestic violence, for example). Drawing on this, it uses a conceptualisation of empowerment as encompassing women’s sense of self-worth and social identity; their willingness and ability to question their subordinate status and identity; their capacity to exercise strategic control over their own lives and to renegotiate their relationships with others who matter to them; and their ability to participate on equal terms with men in reshaping the societies in which they live in ways that contribute to a more just and democratic distribution of power and possibilities. It also makes the important point that ‘there is [...] no straightforward relationship between individual empowerment and pathways to social transformation.’

The paper summarises insights from previous research on the relationship between paid work and women’s empowerment. For example, Hoodfar’s (1997) research in low-income Cairo found women worked both because one income was not enough and because it provided security if their marriage failed and led to greater respect from their husbands. Lee (1998) found that young, mostly unmarried, women in Shenzhen worked because of both household poverty and a desire to escape from parental controls and to expand their horizons. Beneria and Roldan’s (1987) study of home-based workers in Mexico City found that, while they had to work

if they wanted to achieve a basic standard of living or education for their children, they also wanted to work to secure a minimum degree of autonomy and control over their lives.

Many evaluations of women's paid work have focused on young women in export manufacturing. How far engaging in this work is seen as contributing to empowerment varies: in studies by Kung (1983), Salaff (1981) and Greenhalgh (1985) in Hong Kong and Taiwan, parents exercised control over when, where and for how long their daughters would work, whereas in Wolf's (1992) study in Central Java, Indonesia, young women often took up jobs in defiance of parents' wishes and retained control over their own wages. Overall, studies of young factory workers have tended to stress their enhanced sense of self-determination; their greater role in making strategic decisions about their lives, including when and whom (but not necessarily whether) to marry; the translation of their status from economic liability to their parents to economic asset; and escape from the surveillance of family and kin, often through migration to other areas or even other countries.

While there is considerable divergence about the implications of work undertaken outside the home, there is much greater convergence in the view that work undertaken within the home is least likely to effect any significant changes in power relations, either within the family or outside it. It is considered more compatible with, and hence more easily subsumed within, the unpaid domestic tasks women perform within the household, and provides fewer opportunities for expanding women's social networks or exposure to new ideas. The empowering potential of home-based work depends both on the size of earnings (Beneria and Roldan, 1987) and the extent of women's control over them (Kantor, 2003). In both cases, earnings influence the extent to which women are seen as having value in the family, by themselves and by other family members, and can enhance their ability to exercise voice in family matters. In addition, women who earn well and reasonably regularly can more credibly threaten to opt out of abusive relationships within the family than those who continue to be largely dependent on the earnings of dominant family members.

Turning to other forms of income, Kabeer summarises studies – Adato and Mindek (2000) in Mexico and Suarez et al. (1997) in Brazil – that found limited changes in decision making as a result of conditional cash transfers. She concludes that, overall,

Studies of microfinance have reported a variety of positive impacts, including increased asset ownership by women; greater mobility in the public domain; a greater say in household decision-making, including in more strategic decisions relating, for instance, to reproductive behaviour and the purchase of major assets; renegotiation of abusive relationships; greater freedom to visit and receive their own family members; and (according to Murthy et al. 2005) an increased willingness to allow adolescent daughters the same freedoms they allow their sons (Holvoet 2005; Kabeer 2001a; Hashemi et al. 1996; Schuler et al. 1996). These impacts tended to be stronger in households where women's economic contributions were more significant (Hashemi et al. 1996).

Finally, Kabeer notes that much of this literature comes from a few countries in Asia and Latin America. There is also a disproportionate focus on women's waged work in export-oriented sectors, particularly in manufacturing but much less about the impacts of the other more widely prevalent forms of wage labour in which women work. The literature focuses principally on women's empowerment in the domestic domain and pays far less attention to the processes by which they become empowered as workers and citizens.

Hossain, N. (2011) 'Exports, Equity, and Empowerment: The Effects of Readymade Garments Manufacturing Employment on Gender Equality in Bangladesh'. WDR 2012 Background Paper. Available at <http://bit.ly/1qggtDn>

This paper focuses on the ready-made garment industry, which employs approximately 2 million people in Bangladesh. Garment work has led to increased female mobility, changing norms concerning dress and a feminisation of public space – with large numbers of young women travelling to work in the garment sector. This shift in the use of public space has also been fuelled by the significant expansion in primary and secondary school-age girls travelling to school. Interpretations of the meaning of *purdah* have thus shifted somewhat in this context, with women working in the garment sector interpreting *purdah* as a state of mind rather than a series of restrictions on physical mobility and dress.

Despite the hardships women working in the ready-made garment industry experience (poor pay, unsafe working conditions, sexual harassment, physical and verbal abuse, criticism and suspicion of their morals), garments work has meant a meaningful expansion of women's and girls' agency, in which wages have played a central role. The evidence on how far garment workers retain control of their income indicates a range of arrangements, in strategically negotiated 'patriarchal bargains'. This said, without male protectors, women can be extremely vulnerable. This ensures a form of male power that to some extent overshadows the empowerment potential of earning money: 'the limits to women's empowerment through individual economic means are set within the structures of what remains a patriarchal society with powerful institutions of male privilege.' At the same time, 'there is ample room for negotiation and manoeuvre within those structures, partly because men's attitudes also adapt.'

The qualitative literature reviewed by Hossain indicates varied impacts, with decision making over resources shifting in some households but little change in others. Beyond this, factory work has been an opportunity to learn more about the world beyond the confines of the village; to work in a modern, fast-changing sector, connected to the rest of the world and prominently alluded to by governments and the media; to make friends and form associations beyond immediate kin groups; and to have and exercise choice in relation to romantic relationships and marriage (Dannecker, 1999; Kabeer, 2000; Kibria, 1998).

The garment industry is likely to be only one factor that has reshaped calculi with regard to investment in girls, and has contributed to increased education enrolment of girls. Rather, more respectable white collar jobs for women, including non-governmental organisation (NGO), private sector and public sector employment, have all become considerably more realistic options for young women with education in the 2000s, and it is likely that these have played a greater role in shifting calculi in favour of girls' education, although less socially valued garment work remains a fallback option, particularly for girls with lower levels of education.

Other than the women's movement, with its focus on political and collective forms of empowerment, most other actors engaged in gender and development activity in Bangladesh retain an emphasis on individual, principally economic, empowerment. The experience of the transformations wrought by the garment industry points to both positive gains and limitations of reliance on economic empowerment alone.

Newman, C. (2001) 'Gender, Time Use, and Change: Impacts of Agricultural Export Employment in Ecuador'. Washington, DC: World Bank Development Research Group Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. Available at <http://bit.ly/1pHi1CM>

This study is one of few that finds a change in gender divisions of household labour: most studies have found this to be an area of gender relations that is strongly resilient to change.

Newman studied time use patterns of married men and women in an area with significant employment in the cut flowers industry in Ecuador and found that married men in the treatment group (i.e. husbands of women flower workers) spent double the time on housework compared with the control group, and this was clearly related to women's increased participation in the labour force. This seems to be related to lower relative wage differences between men and women in the flower industry, although this is not tested directly. Men in better-off households participated less in housework, although Newman does not discuss the reasons for this.

Newman also found women, especially married women, in the treatment group did less housework than women in the control group. Household characteristics, particularly the ratio of female to male members and the number of children, were important determinants of both men's and women's housework.

Jensen, R. (2010) 'Economic Opportunities and Gender Differences in Human Capital: Experimental Evidence for India'. Working Paper 16021. Cambridge: MA, NBER. Available at <http://bit.ly/1o8h5BT>

Jensen reports on a three-year experiment in which recruitment services for the Indian business process outsourcing industry (e.g. call centres, data processing) were provided in villages within commuting distance of Delhi. These jobs are well paid by local standards and have good prospects for salary increase over time; in

addition, such jobs are considered safe, clean and thus potentially less stigmatising (in contexts where social norms do not favour women working outside the home) than other work. This industry disproportionately recruits young unmarried women with fluency in English and who have completed secondary schooling.

Jensen found girls aged 5-15 in villages that received the recruiting services were 3-5 percentage points more likely to be in school and experienced an increase in Body Mass Index, reflecting greater nutrition and/or medical care. However, there was no net gain in height. For boys, there was no change on any of these measures. That parents were able to increase investments in girls without decreasing investment in boys suggests poverty and credit constraints may not be as important as 'demand constraints' in limiting investment in girls – that is, parents may be providing little to girls not because they cannot afford to but because they expect low returns.

They found receiving recruitment services was not associated with change on two measures of empowerment – independent decision making over the use of money and being able to visit friends/ family or to go out to the market without permission.

Jensen, R. (2012) 'Do Labor Market Opportunities Affect Young Women's Work and Family Decisions? Experimental Evidence from India'. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127: 753-792.

This paper draws on the same experiment and dataset as the previous article and explores impacts on marriage. It finds young women in treatment villages were significantly less likely to get married or have children during this period, choosing instead to enter the labour market or obtain more schooling or post-school training: women from treatment villages aged 15-21 at baseline, the peak age range for marriage and the initiation of childbearing in rural India, were 5-6 percentage points less likely to get married or to have given birth over the three-year period in which business recruiting services were provided. Women also report wanting to have fewer children (0.35 per woman) and to work more steadily throughout their lifetime, consistent with increased aspirations for a career.

Kabeer, N. (1998) 'Money Can't Buy Me Love? Re-evaluating Gender, Credit and Empowerment in Rural Bangladesh'. Discussion Paper 363. Brighton: IDS. Available at <http://bit.ly/TMscag>

This paper summarises findings from studies carried out in Bangladesh in the 1990s concerning the effects of microfinance on women's empowerment. It argues that some of the negative findings (e.g. by Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1994; 1996) – for example that men 'appropriate' women's loans – conflate management of the money and decision making about its use, and that the measures of empowerment used in some other studies finding negative impacts (e.g. accounting knowledge) give little insight. Some of these studies also associate credit receipt with increased levels of domestic violence. By contrast, another set of studies, such as Hashemi et al. (1996) and Schuler et al. (1996), find positive effects in terms of reduced domestic violence and improved status of women within the household resulting from women increasing household incomes, particularly where they use at least a portion of the loans themselves.

Kabeer suggests these differences may partially reflect methodological issues: the positive evaluations are 'backed up by a quantitative indication of their incidence and significance while the negative findings tend to rely far more on secondary literature, speculation and field observation to interpret their quantitative findings'. Second, the negative interpretations focus on processes of loan use, while the positive evaluations focus more on outcomes. Kabeer argues some of the indicators of empowerment used in the 'positive' evaluations reflect more closely rural Bangladeshi women's lived experiences, allowing for joint (rather than female-only) decision making as an indicator of empowerment; others, however, reflect organisational priorities of the credit-giving organisations, such as legal knowledge or registered ownership of housing. None of the studies she examines reflected women's own perspectives on what loan use meant to them.

Reporting on her own qualitative research with women borrowers (from an organisation that gave loans to individuals rather than via a group guarantee) in two districts of Bangladesh, Kabeer finds that 'access to loans have given women the opportunity to make what many described as a "proper" economic contribution to the

household, either by taking up an income earning activity for the first time or else turning a previously small-scale, low-productivity activity into a viable business venture or even, in a small minority of cases, simply by having brought in a loan'. Many women attached considerable value to their 'new identities as bearers of valued economic resources and their consequent enhanced sense of self-worth'. Rather than viewing the additional work as problematic, they appreciated it, both for its contribution to improving their household's economic position and for the changes in identity it led to. They felt bringing in money and/or running successful businesses had enhanced the respect they were shown in the household; in the majority of cases where women mentioned domestic violence or intra-household tension, it had lessened. Where conflict and contestation over household management had increased, it had not involved increased domestic violence.

Some of the women borrowers had registered assets in their own or their daughters' names; some were also using proceeds to invest in girls' education. While prevailing social norms had – in the past – seen education as unimportant for girls, attitudes were changing, and girls' rates of school enrolment were higher among female borrower households than in households without a woman borrower.

Kabeer suggests that, in addition to listening to women's voices on what loans mean to them, some of the differences between her findings and the more negative evaluations discussed above reflect the size of loans available through the organisation she studied (the Small Enterprises Development Project), and the poverty-oriented lending of organisations such as BRAC and Grameen and the more relaxed and flexible loan repayment terms, which may have contributed to the reduction in household tensions. Finally, she concludes that development interventions – whether focused on women or men – should not be judged only on their empowerment potential – particularly when this is defined by outsiders rather than those the interventions are intended to help. 'If purposive interventions can help to direct resources to women, thereby overcoming past barriers which have led to the suppression of their entrepreneurial potential, then they must be welcomed on grounds of efficiency and equity.'

6 Migration

The papers in this section identify three key sets of processes through which migration affects gender norms. Where men migrate leaving their wives behind, women often take on a wider range of gender roles and increased decision-making power (Jolly and Reeves, 2005; Lopez-Ekra et al., 2011), although how far this takes place depends on family structure. Pessar (2005) shows that, among wives of Latin American men who have migrated, women's decision-making autonomy and mobility can frequently be constrained by in-laws.

A second process by means of which migration leads to change in gender norms is through exposure to new ideas. Kabeer et al. (2011) in Section 4 show how exposure to different gender relations and ideologies in Iran led some Afghan women and men to hold more egalitarian ideas about gender on their return. However, exposure to more conservative interpretations of religion can contribute to pressures to adopt less egalitarian models (Jolly and Reeves, 2005; Rao, 2012, in Section 4).

Discussing young women's independent migration, the final papers in this section – Murphy (2008) and Temin et al. (2013) show norms concerning appropriate behaviour for adolescent girls and young women affect how likely they are to be able to migrate for work. However, once knowledge of work opportunities is established, views can shift rapidly and such migration become commonplace. Both Murphy and Temin et al. also show the remittances young women send have shifted perceptions concerning the value of sons and daughters.

Lopez-Ekra, S., Aghazarm, C., Kötter, H. and Mollard, B. (2011) 'The Impact of Remittances on Gender Roles and Opportunities for Children in Recipient Families: Research from the International Organization for Migration'. *Gender & Development* 19(1): 69-80.

This paper draws on International Organization for Migration (IOM) research on gender and labour migration in Asia and on remittances in Moldova, Egypt, Angola and Guatemala. The authors demonstrate that the impacts of migration are complex and have both positive and negative effects on gender roles. Gender influences who migrates and the amount of remittances and frequency with which they are sent home, how that money is then used and how it affects family relations.

Recent data indicate that, globally, women send around the same amount of remittances as men and tend to send money more regularly and for longer periods. Men, by contrast, may send more money initially because of their access to higher-paid skilled employment, but have a tendency to stop sending after a few months. Women who send remittances can experience greater influence and power in their family and community, which can lead to increased self-esteem. This can lead to an increased role in household decision making, particularly on how the money they send home is spent, which, in turn, can influence gender norms by demonstrating women's capabilities. However, research by Guzman et al. (2007) in Ghana found women lost household decision-making power when they became migrants because of physical absence from the home.

Who receives remittances also depends on gender. Men tend to remit mostly to their wives. Research from Bangladesh shows women who receive remittances in their own name experience the highest gains in living standards, and are able to pay for children's education, medical expense and consumer goods, becoming *de facto* heads of the household; even where the husband still made the decisions from afar wives tended to be much more involved in those decisions. Women may also begin to represent the household within the wider community, which can challenge norms around women's role in public life. In cases where women have migrated, the IOM research shows few husbands take over a wife's responsibilities, instead delegating them to other female family members and grandmothers in particular.

Not all experiences are positive, however. The IOM study suggests women's control over remittances is influenced by household structure and age, so women who live with in-laws or are young may find decisions are taken on her behalf. The Bangladesh study found that those who did not receive remittances in their own name were vulnerable to poverty and exploitation by family members and the community.

Any change in power balance and gender norms may also be temporary. In Bangladesh, the IOM research found dissatisfaction among returning male migrants about poor employment opportunities or their wife's new roles in the household – which sometimes led to violence. One woman said,

I am used to making the decision about when to buy the monthly rations. And I don't always ask him about it. If I don't, he gets mad and beats me, He also gets mad that I go out late afternoon to chat with other women who have become my good friends while he was away. I don't understand why I have to stop doing this. I am not doing anything wrong (Debnath and Selim 2009: 142).

Pessar, P. (2005) 'Women, Gender, and International Migration across and beyond the Americas: Inequalities and Limited Empowerment'. Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico City, 30 November-2 December. Available at <http://bit.ly/VCV3j9>

Women have made up the majority of internal migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean for over 50 years, primarily in response to changes in the labour market and internalisation of labour, and are typically in stereotypical 'women's work' such as factory and care work.

Women's migration is linked to gains in terms of empowerment and more egalitarian household relationships. In Latin America and the Caribbean, migrant women often have more control over personal and household expenditure and mobility; research by Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) found a direct relationship between the pattern of family migration and how gender relations and domestic work were negotiated. In instances of 'stage migration', when men migrated first and resided abroad for years before their wives joined them, the men learnt household tasks and were more willing to assist their spouses when the two were reunited in the US. However, when the family emigrated together, the man generally expected his wife to replicate pre-existing gender practices. Women may also be more reluctant to return to their country of origin for reasons including decreased ability to participate in the community, less access to waged employment and better-quality education for children.

The impact of male migration on gender norms can vary. Women left behind may have to take on more responsibilities as household head in a husband's absence. On the other hand, outmigration may reinforce existing gender ideologies where women become more closely controlled by a husband's family or are prevented from taking on work outside the home.


A case study of Guatemalan refugees displaced into Mexico in the 1980s demonstrates women's struggle for participation in public life and towards more equal gender relations. Pessar discusses how life in the refugee camps initially made women much more dependent on their male spouses as their access to waged employment was severely curtailed. However, as momentum gathered around women's rights and the need for women's voices to be heard in policy and decision making, work with women refugees moved beyond small economic projects and into a more feminist model of participation and consciousness of equality. However, when negotiations began for the return of refugees to Guatemala, male leaders and male interests predominated, with gains in women's status often not maintained. For example, although there is a formal provision in the agreements for shared ownership of land, the vast majority of returnees have failed to honour this. The author notes that certain gains do remain, particularly around violence and spatial mobility. One 30-year-old returnee put it like this:

In the old days when a couple married the woman became the property of the man. In this way he dominated all the decisions because he was the head of the household. And that's what we were taught from the time we were little; but the situation changes ... In exile the women learned they had equal rights to men. There's no difference. Before we never practiced this, women were treated like animals ... Now

when I earn money I don't put in in my pocket like my father did. I bring it to the house and my wife and I decide together how to spend it (Evaristo López Calmo, Chaculá).

Jolly, S. and Reeves, H (2005) 'Gender and Migration Overview Report'. Sussex: BRIDGE, IDS. Available at <http://bit.ly/1xqwRQM>

This report considers both the gendered causes and the impacts of migration and their contradictory effects. Connections are illustrated in the diagram below:



The decision to migrate is made in response to a combination of economic, social and political factors. In addition to the need to make money, it may occur to join a spouse or to escape constraining gender norms, or may be forced by trafficking or displacement. The impact of gender norms on migration is complex and, depending on the context, norms can encourage some groups of women to migrate and other to stay put. For example, women may migrate because of the need to support a family, as a rite of passage or for marriage. They may also find it is more acceptable for them to migrate short distances and that they are under pressure to send money home. Some women and girls migrate to escape violence, social pressure or stigma and discrimination. For example, lesbian, gay and transgender people may migrate to countries with more progressive legislation or to escape violence.

Migration may challenge traditional gender roles – absence of one spouse may leave the other spouse with both greater decision-making power and a greater burden of responsibility and labour. Where men migrate from rural to urban areas, women are left with a greater burden of agricultural labour, but at the same time may have more control over how crops and any revenue are used. Women may gain economic independence, confidence and greater freedom through migration, and men may take on new roles and care for children, as one Nicaraguan man explained:

My wife goes twice a week to sell things. I'm a builder and don't have a stable job. While she travels I have to take charge of all the housework and the children (Avellan, 2003: 34).

Migration may also entrench gender roles, particularly where men maintain a high level of control over family finances in their absence or where women left behind live with relatives. One study of two villages in Pakistan (Lefebvre, 1990) showed that men returning from the Middle East held a stricter idea of *purdah* and, with their earnings, could keep women indoors and limit their mobility when they had previously been required to work.

The reports states that there has been a focus on the economic impacts of migration in international policy and in the work of international agencies, and this focus needs to be expanded to include social and gender equality concerns. There needs to be both a focus on collecting better data on migration flows and an effort to provide examples of practical ways to achieve and maintain the positive impacts of migration on gender relations.

Murphy, R (2008) 'The Impact of Socio-Cultural Norms on Women's Experiences of Migration and the Implications for Development'. SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper 17. Migration and Development: Future Directions for Research and Policy, New York, 28 February-1 March. Available at <http://bit.ly/1rdt2LE>

Murphy notes that there has been little systematic study of the effects of migration on social norms.

Migration not only underpins normative change that facilitates women's direct participation in migration, but also provides women with the information, connections and resources that enable them to exercise greater agency with regard to other aspects of their family life. Even for women who do not migrate, simply knowing about the existence of an exit option may increase their bargaining power.

She cites some evidence from China concerning changing gender norms, which found migrants from rural areas had stronger son preference than long-term urban residents (Li et al., 2006). Li et al. noted that some migrants had adopted the view that parents must rely on their own savings rather than on sons for their old age care, a perspective that may in the longer term erode son preference (2005; 2006a). Migration may also precipitate a change from virilocal to neo-local post-marriage residence patterns, which could help dilute son preference; this is because, if parents recognise that neither sons nor daughters are likely to be by their side in their old age, then the sex of their child may matter less. Finally, some qualitative evidence from rural China suggests migration possibilities for young women and their resulting remittances may cause parents to value daughters more (Yan, 2003).

Temin, M., Montgomery, M., Engebretsen, S. and Barker, K. (2013) 'Girls on the Move: Adolescent Girls & Migration in the Developing World. A GIRLS COUNT Report'. New York: Population Council. Available at <http://bit.ly/1pJfeco>

A substantial percentage of urban adolescent girls are recent migrants, and most come from other towns and cities rather than rural areas. Girls migrate for a number of reasons, from the limited prospects and the 'drudgery' of agricultural work, to seeking education or an apprenticeship for enhanced economic opportunities. Sometimes, it is seen as a rite of passage or as an escape route, or may occur to join a husband.

Gender norms about sons' and daughters' long-term contribution to families influence parents' reactions to migration. For example, in the Philippines, many parents prefer sending daughters away for secondary school because they anticipate greater long-term financial support from migrant daughters than from sons (DeGraff and Bils-borrow 2003, cited in Lundberg and Wuermli, 2012). In other places, girls have a harder time gaining parental approval for migration because parents think girls have lower earning potential than boys and are more vulnerable.

Typically, girls and their families share the decision making around girls' migration, particularly where girls are contributing to meeting a family need. Norms around freedom of movement and migration can limit parents' support for daughters' migration plans. However, these are often eroded where demonstrable benefits from migration are apparent. In Indonesia, for example, this occurred through awareness of the peer networks formed by migrant girls, the perception of factory work as 'clean, light and modern' and knowledge that living away from the village would increase a girls' value on the marriage market.

Adolescent girls who move for marriage are particularly vulnerable. Research in India (Santhya et al., 2008) showed that fewer than 20% of young married girls in rural India reported having friends in their natal village, and social norms may prevent free movement within the village, increasing girls' social isolation and susceptibility to gender-based violence. However, migrant girls who move for reasons other than marriage tend to marry later than peers at home, as in many contexts migration to attend school is seen as an acceptable alternative to marriage. Migration can also give girls more control over the timing of their marriage, and exposure to new ideas about marriage. When migrant girls return to rural areas to live, they often criticise social arrangements they find overly restrictive, especially those that constrain female voice and influence.

Migration can provide opportunities for education and skill building that are not available at home, and some are able combine domestic work and schooling. However, the lack of parents as a support network may explain

the gap in education between urban and migrant girls, and research has found that girls living with a relative other than a mother or father are more likely to drop out (Guo and Duan, 2008).

Work is a major part of migrant girls' lives and is a site of both risk and reward. Girls frequently work in low-wage industries and can be exposed to unsafe working conditions and high levels of control and abuse. Remittances adolescent girls send to their families can contribute to families' development by financing siblings' school fees or domestic or agricultural inputs. Familial appreciation of these remittances can encourage girls to continue working in exploitative conditions.

Migrant girls can be role models and catalysts for social change. The report suggests measures that make it easier for migrant girls to meet each other and mentors, that make urban services 'migrant girl-friendly' and that ensure girls have the information they need before they migrate can make sure they reach their potential.

7 Education

This section summarises insights from key overview papers exploring the relationship between education and social norm change. Although there is substantial evidence of statistical associations between education levels and attitude change on various gender and social issues (e.g. desired family size, support for female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), support for gender equality), there is limited analysis of how education changes attitudes and norms, particularly in contexts where educational practices and curricula actually reinforce gender stereotypes – although Lloyd and Young (2009) suggest this is likely to be related to exposure to new ideas and the formation of new peer networks. The first two papers (Malhotra et al., 2003; Lloyd and Young, 2009) provide an overview of evidence on the relationship between increased levels of female education and gender equality. Malhotra et al. show that, despite strong claims, the evidence for education being associated with increased decision-making power is mixed and contradictory, although it is stronger for secondary than for primary education. It is, however, associated with increased mobility and freedom of movement (a finding echoed in Petesch (2012) in Section 11), and there is some evidence of more egalitarian divisions of labour in families where girls remain in school in their mid-teens (Lloyd and Young, 2009). Malhotra et al. raise concerns about the limitations of education as a sole strategy for challenging gender norms, particularly where education is poor in quality and involves little critical reflection, or where entrenched gender inequalities mean girls are educated principally with an eye to future marriage markets. Stromquist (2006) echoes these, paying particular attention to how formal education reinforces the gender *status quo*, although she makes some suggestions that formal education could challenge rather than perpetuate gender stereotypes.

The following three papers explore the dynamics of gender norm change through education. Schuler (2007) finds that, in rural Bangladesh, increased levels of girls' education has been one of a constellation of factors (including increased employment opportunities for educated women and better health care) that have shifted perceptions of gender roles and have led to increased acceptability of women's competence and of women playing a more active role in decision making. Studying Samburu pastoralists in northern Kenya, Lesogorol (2008) suggests educated girls are adopting changed attitudes towards sexuality in particular, and are much more likely to reject both traditional systems of regulating sexual relationship in adolescence and practices such as early marriage. This has led to perceptions of educated girls as arrogant and promiscuous, and Lesogorol notes increased social division between educated and uneducated girls, although in practice they are principally engaged in the same economic activities. Evans (2014), in a study based in Zambia's Copperbelt, challenges a growing orthodox that single-sex schools are necessarily more empowering to girls, and examines how participation in co-educational schooling can lead to the adoption of more gender-egalitarian attitudes among both girls and boys, which they carry forward to adulthood. The gender-egalitarian potential of co-education is affected by the extent of stereotyped educational management and classroom practices. Role models who challenge gender stereotypes within the family or in wider society are also important, both for co-educated and for single-sex educated students.

Malhotra, A., Pande, R. and Grown, C. (2003) 'Impact of Investments in Female Education on Gender Equality'. New York: ICRW. Available at <http://bit.ly/1qgv5ge>

Key findings related to education and social norms are as follows:

Female education may or may not lead to women having increased decision-making power in the family; the positive relationship is more evident in settings where the family structure is less patriarchal and employment opportunities are favourable to women. Of the studies reviewed, five found a positive impact on women's decision-making power, six found no or negative relationships and five found conditional relationships.

- Female education is consistently associated with increased mobility and freedom of movement for women (seven of the eight studies examined found a positive impact).
- Girls' secondary education is more consistently and strongly associated with increased decision-making and mobility for women than primary schooling.
- Evidence on the effect of female education on women's time allocations to domestic work is inconclusive because of the limited number of studies examining this relationship. The studies examined show mixed results, with some finding a reduction in time devoted to domestic work among more educated women (e.g. in Pakistan) or among women in the labour force (Bangladesh) and others finding little impact (e.g. in Ecuador).
- Evidence from a limited number of studies suggests female education may have little or no influence on gender equality in social structures, primarily because of the strength of gender norms and hierarchies.

In a study in two states in India (Rajasthan and Maharashtra) (Vlassoff, 1992; 1997; 1994) found the effect of women's education on gender relations to be minimal because of the power of gender ideology and practice, lack of economic opportunities for women and the largely irrelevant content and poor quality of education. In fact, for Maharashtra, Vlassoff argues that greater prosperity, modernisation and more widespread education for girls have actually reinforced patriarchal structures by defining an economically dependent role for women relative to their husbands. Moreover, it is only in theory that education is seen as a means of financial independence for girls; in practice, girls are educated to secure a husband, not to get a job. Drawing on Mason's (1998) study of five countries in Asia, they conclude that, while education is a generally a good investment for empowering women, an attack on the most restrictive traditions in specific communities may be necessary before programmes to enhance women's education can hope to empower them significantly.

More generally, the authors note that the definition of education used in many of the studies considered is limiting: education is typically measured only in terms of the years or level of formal schooling. There is little discussion of the content or quality of education and how these may affect the relationship between female education and women's lives or gender inequality. Thus, where studies show no beneficial effect of education on an outcome, it may not be education *per se* that is not of benefit to women, but rather the flawed quality or content of that education. The literature from the fields of education and from social demography has also emphasised the importance of the process of education, specifically the process of going to school, being outside of a constraining home environment, being exposed to new ideas and being socialised in a non-family situation. All these are hypothesised to empower women to improve their own lives and health. However, the empirical evidence does not explore these key aspects of the empowering power of education.

The paper also reviews the substantial literature on the relationship between education and women's economic participation, and the much more limited literature on its relationship with political participation.

Lloyd, C. and Young, J. (2009) 'New Lessons: The Power of Educating Adolescent Girls'. New York: Population Council. Available at <http://bit.ly/1jGJhti>

This report summarises some of the social and empowerment effects of adolescent girls' education. It does not directly discuss how education may lead to greater change in gender norms, although it notes that school allows both boys and girls to focus on their own development and learning, to interact with peers and form social networks and to explore and prepare for a broader range of possibilities for life as an adult. Some of the data presented on the social impacts of education imply changes in social norms.

Time use. Girls who remain students at ages 15-16 work many fewer daily hours in domestic (non-market household) work than those who are not enrolled (Lloyd et al., 2008). Although female students continue to carry a heavier domestic workload, spend time at home with family members rather than peers and enjoy less leisure time than male students, these gender differences are small compared with the gender differences in time use that exist among adolescents who are not in school (ibid.).

Implications for children's health and education. Many of the well-documented social returns from girls' schooling are realised after girls leave school, marry and have families. Recent reviews of various research studies provide a long list of the many ways mothers' education can benefit them and their children: through

safer health and hygiene practices, more time and resources for children's health and education, more exposure to information that can be used to support children in various ways, better child nutrition, the use of contraceptives leading to smaller family size, improved household incomes through greater labour force participation and earnings, greater bargaining power within the household and greater ability to act on preferences for investment in children (Grown et al., 2005; Herz and Sperling, 2004; Rihani et al., 2006; World Bank, 2007).

It is not always clear how much schooling, or what level of schooling, must be attained for significant benefits to occur, and to what extent the benefits are dependent on a certain number of years of exposure to school or to certain levels of learning.

Lloyd and Young also cite analysis by Bledsoe (1990) from Sierra Leone, which suggests the act of wearing a school uniform connotes that a girl is still a child, in a protected period of learning and (generally) sexually unavailable. This may be one way in which the rise of female secondary schooling is leading to later marriage.

Schuler, S.R. (2007) 'Rural Bangladesh: Sound Policies, Evolving Gender Norms, and Family Strategies' in M. Lewis and M. Lockheed (eds) *Exclusion, Gender and Education: Case Studies from the Developing World*. Washington, DC: CGD. Available at <http://bit.ly/1mR6gqh>

Based on interviews conducted with 212 women, men and girls in rural Bangladesh, Schuler notes a significant shift in perceptions of women and gender roles. Women are perceived to be changing and becoming 'better educated, better informed, more daring, and more resourceful than they used to be'. The positive valuation of women who were able to talk persuasively, work outside the home and interact in the public sphere is striking in light of traditional gender norms, which valued – and continue to value – submissiveness, modesty and female seclusion.

These changes were perceived as a response both to economic, environmental and social stresses and to opportunities, such as microcredit, health and family planning services and education. Education was identified particularly frequently as a key factor leading to the emergence of 'smart women'. A substantial minority of parents (particularly those without sons) saw investing in girls' education as a strategic investment, as the daughters would then support them – a shift in a context where only social support from sons had been considered accepted. Educating girls was also seen as helpful in securing 'better' husbands in the marriage market – including less violent men. Because educated girls are more likely to secure well-paid jobs, they are less likely to require a dowry; this education is driving changes in norms concerning demands for dowry.

More broadly, Schuler identifies the emergence of a norm that girls should be sent to school. As one young woman said, 'My father thought it was unnecessary for girls to read and write, but in my case he did not object [...] none of my peers were sitting idle at home, so I also went to school.' Norms related to education and early marriage are in flux, and, while significant shifts have taken place, fears that increased education may undermine a girls' marriage prospects are still common. This said, there is clear evidence from Schuler's study that ideas of what makes a good wife and daughter-in-law, and how important it is for married women to support themselves in case something goes wrong in their marriage, are increasing demand for female education, as scholarships bring girls' education within reach of lower economic groups and the marriage market shifts in favour of brides with more education. Increased education among young brides is also influencing how people think about the desirable age of marriage. Schuler concludes by cautioning that these positive shifts are likely to be sustained only if there continue to be employment opportunities for educated young women.

Stromquist, N. (2006) 'Gender, Education and the Possibility of Transformative Knowledge'. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education* 36(2): 145-161. Available at <http://bit.ly/1AsAV22>

Although formal schooling may provide knowledge that reinforces rather than challenges the gendered nature of society, women's acquisition of intellectual skills and habits is conducive to social change. The power to reflect, calculate, analyse, draw conclusions and see beyond the immediate environment has helped many

women analyse their realities and subsequently devise means to transform their lives, if not societies. This helps explain why so many women leaders have higher-than-average levels of education. A vast literature finds educated women are more able than non-educated women to make informed decisions pertaining to marriage, family size and child health and better prepared to join the labour market and engage in political participation.

At the same time, education often leaves untouched some fundamental gender ideologies and practices in educated women and men. To be transformative, education must not only provide knowledge about the conditions of one's subordination but also give the emotional support and political skills to visualise and implement social change. Stromquist argues such knowledge is unlikely to be disseminated by the public school system with the same intensity as in educational spaces outside formal schooling, for a variety of reasons. These include underfunding of educational systems (related to global economic inequalities) and patriarchal and class interests that are served by education systems that ration access to good jobs, and provide only limited challenge to ideologies of male superiority.

This said, spaces for the transformation of gender do exist within formal educational systems, although promises often go unfulfilled. One potential site of change is through the presence of gender in international education politics and commitments such as the Education For All (EFA) Initiative and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), although these commitments have not translated into higher education budgets and teachers' salaries. Schools themselves are an important site in the creation of young people's gendered identities. When schools offer a more equitable gender environment, through steps like ensuring female representation in school leadership and administration and in teaching traditionally male-stereotyped subjects like science and physical education, they can build more positive gendered expectations. Teachers also need to be trained in gender and hold a personal commitment to using non-sexist materials to avoid reproducing norms of masculinity and femininity in the classroom.

Stromquist also makes a strong case for the importance of informal education and posits that transformative messages tend to have greater impact on adult women than on girls, as adults have experienced more situations of gender disadvantage throughout their lives. She sees gender-aware informal education for adults as crucial to challenging gender norms and stereotypes, and suggests it is through such processes that women are most likely to be able to organise to challenge gender inequality.

Lesogorol, C. (2008) 'Setting Themselves Apart: Education, Capabilities, and Sexuality among Samburu Women in Kenya'. *Anthropological Quarterly* 81(3): 551-577. Available at <http://bit.ly/1pTR4Mi>

This article examines how formal secondary education, which has been available for only a few decades in Samburu communities in northern Kenya, challenges many cultural norms. As a result, schoolgirls are adopting values, beliefs and practices in conflict with those of both their elders and their uneducated peers.

Lesogorol summarises evidence and arguments on the developmental role of girls' education, noting that, by enhancing women's human capital and capabilities, education is assumed to result in greater empowerment of women with the potential to transform gender relations (Sen, 1999), by increasing their awareness and capabilities and their possibilities for economic independence and allowing them to exercise more choice and voice in their lives. She raises the paradox of how this occurs, given that curricula are gender-stereotyped and often emphasise girls' future domestic roles.

She found that people in the communities studied drew a distinction between 'home girls' (non-educated) and schoolgirls. Educated women argued that, although school girls tended to be physically weaker and less knowledgeable about livestock management than home girls, this was more than offset by the more valuable knowledge girls learnt at school. This went beyond basic literacy skills to encompass issues such as hygiene and child care practices, greater awareness of the wider world and knowledge of health care centres, churches and markets. Many educated interviewees saw themselves as having attained a level of sophistication unobtainable by uneducated girls. However, this sophistication is also deployed in negative stereotypes of educated girls as arrogant, disrespectful and promiscuous. In part, this reflects a wish on the part of many secondary schoolgirls to postpone marriage until they have completed their studies and to select their own

husbands, thus challenging the norm of early, arranged marriage. Negative stereotypes of educated girls are bolstered by the visibility of schoolgirl pregnancy (although pregnancy among non school-going adolescents is also on the rise as abortion becomes less frequent), which is leading some parents to circumcise their girls early.

Lesogorol concludes that changes in the level of women's economic independence remain largely symbolic as most women, whether or not they have attended school, are engaged in petty trade and the livestock economy. She argues the modern life girls are being prepared for in school remains elusive, although this may not be the case for girls currently in secondary school, who may be able to access greater economic opportunities. While traditional norms around gender and sexuality are relatively unchanged, there may be greater scope for girls and women to challenge norms of sexuality and gender roles, particularly if the state acts to enforce existing laws against female circumcision and early marriage. Finally, one consequence of the boundaries that have emerged between educated and uneducated girls and women may be the weakening of the possibility of collective action to change gender norms.

Evans, A. (2014) 'Co-education and the Erosion of Gender Stereotypes in the Zambian Copperbelt'. *Gender & Development* 22(1): 75-90. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13552074.2014.889346>

Drawing on qualitative research carried out over a year in the Zambian Copperbelt that examined how people come to espouse gender equality, this article explores the roles of different types of schooling: single-sex and co-educational. Several empirical studies from different parts of Africa have suggested single-sex schooling is typically more empowering to girls. Based on observation and interviews in Kitwe, Zambia, Evans challenges this view.

Evans's male and female respondents found co-education had led girls, boys, men and women who had experienced it to reject stereotypes of men as being more intelligent and higher in status. Co-educated boys, girl, men and women also argued they were more able to relate to people of the other gender as people, rather than viewing them in sexualised terms and/or assuming that their capabilities were related to their gender. This was confirmed by people who had experienced both single-sex and co-educational schooling and by people who had attended single-sex schools and who had found the transition to working in mixed gender environments challenging.

While a minority of co-educated boys mentioned earlier discomfort about being surpassed academically by high-achieving girls, since this unsettled prevailing stereotypes, Evans found unease waned over time. She suggest co-educated boys' acceptance of female educational attainment, in contrast with the dismissal of isolated examples of female achievement by single-sex educated boys, suggests gender stereotypes only wane in the face of a critical mass of evidence that challenges them, such as through prolonged exposure to girls' displays of equal competence. As one of her respondents, a married male teacher put it,

It was through co-educational school [...] I saw that girls can do what boys can do. It changed me in a way; I started looking at boys and girls as the same. I used to look at them as people who are unable but after knowing that they can compete with me, we are only different in sex, I started giving them respect. It changed me in the way I was perceiving them.

Girls attending co-educational high schools also argued they learnt to stand up for themselves and to deal with intimidation by boys, which they considered useful skills to carry forward to future workplaces. They also felt that seeing they were boys' academic equals gave them confidence in their own abilities, as a 15-year-old girl student put it: 'I realised that, OK if I can beat them in certain subjects then I can also be a leader, then I can do anything that boys can do.'

Schools, both single-sex and co-educational, operate in a broader environment where girls are generally expected to undertake more chores, and where violence may undermine students' capacity to learn. Equally, where teachers perpetuate gender stereotypes, the potential of co-education to undermine gender stereotypes is unlikely to be realised.

Evans argues that, in addition to co-education, gender norms are affected by divisions of labour and values espoused in one's family environment, how egalitarian schools are in their classroom management, assignment of chores and labour market possibilities. Individual psychology is also important: for some students, the effect of co-education is sufficient to challenge gender stereotypes; others need role models to believe women can fulfil tasks seen as masculine.

8 Communications

Surprisingly few studies probe the way increased access to communications has led to changes in gender norms.³ Most studies are more concerned with gendered inequalities in access to media and information and communication technologies (ICTs), rather than their effects. Plan International's (2010) study of the impact of access to ICT and media on girls gives an overview of some of the ways increased access to communications can help shift gender norms. Several country case studies find that the spread of television has had a positive impact on attitudes towards gender equality (Jensen and Oster, 2007) or on proxies for attitudes to gender equality, such as desired family size (La Ferrera et al., 2008). La Ferrera et al.'s case study of Brazil also shows the importance of portraying messages and content that resonate with audiences. The case study of BBC World Service Trust's Afghan Woman's Hour (2009) shows a small shift in gender-equitable attitudes. Kabeer et al. (2011) in Section 4 also find increased access to television and radio to influence gender norms among low-income Afghan women – with both pro-gender equality government broadcasts and more conservative radio broadcasts having an influence. Pulerwitz et al. (2010) discuss the implications of a wider range of communications approaches; in addition to media-based messaging, they argue programmes that provide opportunities for dialogue and reflection can play an important role in shifting gender norms.

Plan International (2010) 'Because I'm a Girl. Digital and Urban Frontiers: Girls in a Changing Landscape'. Working: Plan International. Available at <http://bit.ly/1xczajc>

This summary focuses on the ICT section of the report, which looks at the benefits of communication technologies for adolescent girls. It examines how they use and adapt technologies to improve their lives, by opening up opportunities for learning, networking, campaigning and personal development, as well as the barriers and dangers girls face when accessing these technologies. Rather than highlighting evidence of norm change, the study highlights changes, which, over time, have the potential to change gender norms.

Being in charge of new tools and technologies is often seen as a 'male' domain, particularly where the use and ownership of this technology are associated with a high social status. Women generally have less access to technology than men: in Asia, women make up 22% of all internet users, in Latin America 38% and in the Middle East only 6%. This pattern is repeated for adolescent girls, with girls keen to use technology but having less access than their brother and male peers, partly because of different expectation of what girls and boys need. For example, in Indonesia, girls and young women aged 15-24 are half as likely to use the internet as boys the same age, but make up a fast growing group of users. Gender stereotypes can also affect girls' access to computers in schools where ICT skills are often seen as less necessary for girls, and lead to their getting less time on computers and less encouragement by teachers.

Findings from Plan's Cohort study 'Real Lives, Real Choices' reveal mobile phones to be the most frequently available technology, although access varies from country to country. For example, no participating families in rural Togo had heard of the internet or had regular access to mobile phones, whereas participants in the urban slums of Brazil had regular access to both mobile phones and the internet, with a larger proportion of boys appearing to have regular access to mobile phones. The finding also show how parents' perceptions of the need to protect girls from violence and harassment can limit girls' opportunities, for example by not allowing girls to take ICT courses outside their community.

³ This was one motivation for a systematic review of the impact of communication programmes on gender norms, carried out by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI): Marcus, R. and Page, E. (2014) 'Changing Discriminatory Gender Norms Affecting Adolescent Girls Through Communication Activities: A Review of Evidence'. London: ODI.

ICTs can provide building blocks that contribute to challenging existing gender norms and expectations of girls' behaviour:

- **Keeping in touch:** Access to a mobile phone can allow young women to socialise and make contact with the outside world in contexts where they experience reduced mobility.
- **Accessing information:** Adolescent girls have used ICTs to access advice and information around topics that are frequently kept from them, including sexuality, puberty and HIV. For example, Learning about Living in Nigeria uses mobile phones to teach teenagers about sexuality and HIV prevention, using an interactive e-learning tool with cartoons and a MyQuestion service. The service is very popular, with over 10,000 questions received in the first two months.
- **Building skills and access future economic opportunities:** Girls need access to ICTs in order to develop the skills to use them, which are increasingly important for education and economic opportunities. For example, more and more new jobs will require IT skills and access to information such as market prices, banking and ways to be better connected to build businesses.
- **Participating in civil affairs:** ICTs offer an opportunity for girls to campaign and communicate with others. For example, Plan's child media programme Esma3oona (Hear Us Out) broadcasts children's discussions of issues like child abuse, gender equality and education. Initiatives like Take Back the Tech use technology to raise awareness and take action on violence against women.
- **Building self-esteem:** An evaluation of the gender impacts of the WorldLinks (IT) project in Ghana, Senegal, Mauritania and Uganda found 95% of girls had increased their self-esteem and felt less dependent on male relatives.
- **Keeping safe:** Girls and women report that mobile phones in particular make them feel safe. A Cherie Blair Foundation Study found nine out of ten women reported feeling safer because of their mobile phone. Communication technology can also put girls at risk of sexual exploitation.

There can be resistance among communities to women's use and ownership of mobile phones. The report gives an example of a project designed to improve the literacy rate for girls in rural Pakistan that has overcome this resistance. By demonstrating that the messages the girls received were culturally appropriate, and that the participants were doing better in school, resistance began to soften.

Jensen, R. and Oster, E. (2007) 'The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women's Status in India'. Working Paper 13305. Cambridge, MA: NBER. Available at <http://bit.ly/1pJfI7R>

This paper explores the effect of the introduction of cable television on gender attitudes in rural India. Using a three-year individual-level panel dataset, Jensen and Oster find the introduction of cable television is associated with significant increases in women's reported autonomy (e.g. the ability to go out without permission and to participate in household decision making), decreases in the reported acceptability of domestic violence and decreases in reported son preference. They also find increases in female school enrolment and decreased dropout⁴ and decreases in fertility (primarily via increased birth spacing). The effects are large, equivalent in some cases to about five years of education, and move gender attitudes of individuals in rural areas much closer to those in urban areas (between 45% and 70% of the difference between rural and urban areas disappeared within two years of cable introduction). Consistent with other work on the effects of media exposure, Jensen and Oster found these changes in attitudes took place very quickly: the average village has cable for only six or seven months before being surveyed again.

Jensen and Oster further found the effects of cable were largest in areas with initially more unequal attitudes towards women – that is, those for whom cable is providing information most different from their current way of life. Although certainly not conclusive, this evidence is consistent with a model in which television changes the weight individuals put on the behaviour of their immediate peer group in forming their attitudes. These changes may reflect the significant differences in gender relations depicted on popular Indian soap operas compared with those typical for rural areas. Anthropological studies, such as Scrase (2002) and Johnson (2001), found both men and women attributed changing gender relations to the coming of television: they cite

⁴ There were also increases in male school enrolment and decreases in dropout, but these were smaller.

Johnson (2001) 'Since TV has come to our village, women are doing less work than before. They only want to watch TV. So we [men] have to do more work. Many times I help my wife clean the house.'

While the gains for girls may reflect an improvement in women's status (either parents valuing girls more highly or adult women becoming more influential in household decision making about their children's education), they may also arise through other mechanisms. For example, television may provide information that causes parents to update their beliefs about the returns to schooling, more so for girls than for boys (e.g. Jensen, 2007, finds students in the Dominican Republic who watch television have higher perceived returns to education than children who do not watch).

The effects estimated in this paper may be larger than what we would expect to see if cable were introduced more widely. Although pre-existing trends in attitudes are controlled for, it is possible that television is introduced first into areas that are most receptive to changing their gender attitudes. Thus, the effect of further introduction may be smaller, or slower. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the effect estimated here, even much smaller effects could still have the potential to make a significant difference for women in India.

La Ferrera, E., Chong, A. and Duryea, S. (2008) 'Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from Brazil'. Working Paper 172. Durham, NC: BREAD, Duke University. Available at <http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/working/172>

This paper examines the effect of three decades of expansion of commercial television on fertility patterns in Brazil, where the total fertility rate declined from 6.3 in 1960 to 2.3 in 2000. The only other developing country comparable in size to have experienced such a sharp and generalised decline is China, where the decline was the result of deliberate government policy. In Brazil, no population control policy has been enacted, and for a time advertising of contraceptive methods was illegal. While changes to the structure of the Brazilian economy have contributed to this change, this paper explores the role of television soap operas in shaping individual preferences towards fewer births.

One group, Rede Globo, has a virtual monopoly over the production of Brazilian soap operas. Content analysis of 115 novellas aired by Globo in the two time slots with the highest audience between 1965 and 1999 reveals 72% of the main female characters (aged 50 or below) had no children and 21% had only one child. This is in marked contrast with the prevalent fertility rates in Brazilian society over the same period. Recurrent themes in Globo soap operas include criticism of religious and traditional values including machismo, consumption of luxurious goods, portrayal of wealthy families, display of new lifestyles, circulation of modern ideas such as female emancipation in the work sphere, female pursuit of pleasure and love even if through adultery, display of homosexuality and emphasis on individualism (Fadul, 1999; Rios-Neto, 2001). Through portrayal of a very specific model of family: small, beautiful, white, healthy, urban, middle and upper-middle class and consumerist, novellas have been a powerful medium through which the small family has been idealised. This may have created a preference for fewer children and greater sensitivity to the opportunity costs of raising children, and contributed to shifting norms and expectations around ideal family size and lifestyles.

Using Census data for the period 1970-1991, La Ferrera et al. find areas reached by the Globo signal had significantly lower fertility, measured as the number of children born alive for women aged 15-49. Using individual data for the period 1980-1991, Globo coverage is associated with a decrease in the probability of giving birth of 6 percentage points, which is 6% of the mean. The magnitude of this effect is comparable with that associated with an increase of two years in women's education. The (negative) effect of Globo exposure is stronger for households with lower education and wealth, which are relatively less likely to get information from written sources or to interact with peers with small families. The effect of Globo coverage is insignificant for women aged 15-24, and is quantitatively larger and significant for women aged 25-34 (a decrease of 8% of the mean probability of giving birth for this age group) and for women aged 35-44 (a decrease of 11% of the mean). This is consistent with the demographic literature on Brazil, which has highlighted how the decline in fertility owed mostly to stopping having children and not to delayed first births.

La Ferrera et al. then examine the relative effect of viewing any television and of viewing Globo soap operas. Evidence from patterns of naming of children suggests parents living in areas reached by Globo are significantly more likely to name their children after the name of the main characters of novellas aired in the

year in which the children were born, indicating the influence of these soap operas. Examining patterns of fertility in areas covered by another network – Sistema Brasileiro de Televisão (SBT) – they find exposure to SBT does not significantly affect fertility patterns. This may be because SBT broadcasts programmes that are imported from Mexico and the US and are generally not perceived as realistic portraits of Brazilian society. Globo soap operas, by contrast, are made in Brazil, have high technical quality and thus may have had greater potential to shift norms about gender, family size and lifestyles.

BBC World Service Trust (2009) ‘Impact of the BBC World Service Trust’s Programme The Afghan Woman’s Hour – Results from a National Survey in Afghanistan’.
Available at <http://bbc.in/1kaOycv>

Afghan Woman’s Hour was first broadcast in January 2005. Produced by the BBC World Service Trust, it aims to encourage women’s participation in politics and governance, explore new ideas and find solutions to their problems and raise debate and discussion between women and men. The project’s framework combines a psychological model of women’s empowerment, which emphasises awareness of the resources and factors that hinder or enhance efforts to achieve goals and a more community-based approach with a focus on voice.

The programme is put together by around 20 female journalists around Afghanistan, who conduct interviews and record music segments, producing 100 episodes a year using a magazine format. Programme segments cover women and work, women in parliament, testimonials and ‘Music from Our Village’, with Afghan women performing songs or music. The segments are designed to give examples of women in different situations and real-life experiences in order to help women think about their own situation.

Quantitative research took place with a national sample of Afghan adults aged 15 or over in 2007. Researchers found a high level of awareness of the programme among men and women and that a good proportion (42%) of men who were aware of the programme listened once a week or more. The research also found listeners were talking about what they had heard: over half of listeners (56%) reported they had talked with someone regarding something they had heard on Afghan Women’s Hour, demonstrating that the programme was generating thought and discussion among listeners on women’s issues. The research showed increased critical awareness and problem-solving skills along with increased capacity to express voice in all-female groups. Women’s aspirations outside the domestic realm remained limited and there was little evidence of women’s leadership.

The research also looked at the impact that the intensity of listenership had on respondents’ attitudes towards gender equality. A higher proportion of regular listeners supported gender equality (33%); 24% of non-listeners supported gender equality. Regular listeners also have a more positive attitude to women in public life, and showed a slightly lower level of fear towards the prospect of contacting a member of parliament, as the role and its responsibilities are more familiar to them.

Pulerwitz, J., Michaelis, A., Verma, R. and Weiss, E. (2010) ‘Addressing Gender Dynamics and Engaging Men in HIV Programs. Lessons Learnt from Horizons Research’. *Public Health Reports* 125: 282-292. Available at <http://1.usa.gov/1pWvL8D>

This paper brings together 10 studies carried out in Asia, Africa and Latin America from 1997 to 2007 as part of the Horizons programme. These studies show a significant association between support for inequitable gender norms and HIV risk factors, such as partner violence and reduced condom use. Pulerwitz et al. draw on these studies to show long-term strategies based on ongoing discussions of manhood, masculinity and gender norms can lead to increased awareness of existing inequalities and promote sustainable change.

The research shows it is critical to engage men as partners and facilitate critical reflection on gender inequalities in order to change gender norms in communities and for men to take on more proactive roles in health care. In Brazil, Program H combined group education sessions that included role-plays, brainstorming exercises, discussion and individual reflection with a social marketing campaign in order to encourage young men to reflect on how they act as men. In India, a modified version of the intervention led to a significant reduction in support for inequitable gender norms, as one man put it:

After the session of gender and discussions with the peer leaders, I realized the importance of my wife. Slowly, slowly I started discussing with her, started helping with her work, and this has created more love and affection. I started respecting her and one day she requested me to keep away from my girlfriends [...] I have accepted it.

On a population level, research has shown that young people with the highest exposure to media products like *Sexto Sentido*, a television soap opera broadcast in Nicaragua that includes characters who model gender-equitable relationships and behaviour, are significantly more likely than others to agree there is no justification for a man to hit his wife.

The research also found that equitable and inequitable gender norms may coexist, which demonstrates that some aspects on norms and behaviours are easier to change than others. For example, in Nicaragua, there was an overall move towards more equitable norms but some did not change. At the end of the intervention, there was less support for the statement, 'Women who carry condoms are easy', but the perception that men should have greater control over sexual relations did not change.

9 Political and social mobilisation

It has been challenging to locate analyses of political and social mobilisation as a driver of gender norm change, rather than of mobilisation aimed at changing laws or policies. This may reflect the fact that most write-ups of successful mobilisation focus on specific campaigns rather than more diffuse processes of norm change. The first two papers in this section (Weldon and Htun, 2013; Htun and Weldon, 2010) examine the relationship between social and political mobilisation around gender issues, social norm change and enactment of gender-egalitarian laws and policies. The 2010 paper distinguishes between issues and finds mobilisation around what they term ‘doctrinal issues’ (typically issues related to family relations and sexuality, and often subject to religious doctrine) has generally led to less governmental action than that around issues of political and economic equality, such as equal pay or quotas for political representation. The 2013 paper discusses what motivates governments to implement progressive laws on domestic violence and argues autonomous women’s movements have played a key role in creating a constituency in favour of change. They also identify a tipping point where sufficient states in a region have adopted anti-domestic violence legislation that such legislation is seen as a norm and many others follow suit in order to appear in keeping with regional norms.

Drawing on evidence from India, Beaman et al.’s (2012) paper shows that, where women are in positions of local political leadership, this can increase girls’ aspirations and parents’ aspirations for their daughters, and in this case led to increased investment in girls’ education and more egalitarian time use patterns. This study indicates the importance of role models of women in leadership positions in shifting cultural expectations concerning gender relations.

The final two papers in this section discuss how processes of social mobilisation change women’s perceptions of acceptable models of gender relations and catalyse a process of broader social change. Grabe et al. (2014) discuss the processes by means of which women’s empowerment-focused development organisations in Nicaragua and Tanzania initiated processes of reflection that led to women making changes within their own families and working together for broader change in their communities. In a more practice-oriented article, Michau (2012) provides an overview of what social mobilisation is (and is not) and, with a particular focus on domestic violence, argues for a social norms marketing approach to behaviour change.

Weldon, S.L. and Htun, M. (2013) ‘Feminist Mobilisation and Progressive Policy Change: Why Governments Take Action to Combat Violence against Women’. *Gender & Development* 21(2): 231-247.

Based on analysis of a dataset of 70 countries over 1975-2005, Weldon and Htun find a strong, autonomous feminist movement is both substantively and statistically significant as a predictor of government action to redress violence against women. Other things being equal, the countries with the strongest feminist movements have more comprehensive policies on violence against women than those with weaker or non-existent movements. The strongest feminist movements are associated with an additional area of policy action on violence against women. For example, they can make the difference between having a critical legal reform or funding for shelters or training for the police, and not having it. They also found an interactive effect between international norms and autonomous feminist mobilisation, particularly in later periods. International norms and autonomous feminist mobilisation magnified the effect of one another. International treaties alter the expectations of domestic actors and strengthen and even spark domestic mobilisation (Simmons, 2009).

These effects are strongest in autonomous feminist organisations (rather than women’s wings of political parties or trade unions). When women are organised within broader political institutions, ‘women’s issues’ such as violence against women or equal pay are commonly perceived as being of importance ‘only’ to women, and arguing for their relevance in relation to a defined set of priorities is made much more difficult.

This pattern confirms prior quantitative and qualitative evidence, showing movements are critical catalysts for policy development (Htun and Weldon, 2012). Women's status agencies (machineries), international norms and other factors further strengthen feminist efforts. Movements work within and across national borders and demand the creation of new institutions to encode their ideas and to advance feminist interests.

Htun and Weldon find international and especially regional measures of the presence of an international norm make governments more likely to adopt or expand their policies redressing violence against women after these tipping points. Tipping points reflect the moment at which a given behaviour or commitment is seen as 'the norm' by the group in question, usually around the time the norm is adopted by about one-third of states in the system. They trace this with reference to accession to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women (CEDAW) and policies on violence against women. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was limited discourse on violence against women in global fora. By 2005, however, international norms on violence in general, and CEDAW in particular, were well established in global civil society, and were often invoked in discussions of domestic politics. Weldon and Htun find no visible effects of CEDAW on violence against women policy in 1975 or 1985, but clear linkages were discernable in 2005.

Policy diffusion tends to occur between states in the same region, especially (but not exclusively) among those with similar characteristics (such as language) and who have regular contacts in other inter-governmental political and economic organisations. This occurs both through processes of elite learning and emulation of other nations and through connections in civil society, such as connections through transnational activists. Through these connections, elites learn lessons from other countries and activists, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) take ideas from nearby countries and press for government action. Movements in one country tend to emulate successful movements in neighbouring countries (with varying degrees of success), even when there are important differences in the history and character of regimes in the region. Such neighbourhood effects in the international system are likely to be closely related to the impact of regional agreements. Weldon and Htun find that, even taking into account the effects of CEDAW, a country is more likely to adopt progressive policies on violence against women when other countries in the same region do.

Autonomous movements communicate the social perspectives of marginalised groups, transform social practice and change public opinion. They drive sweeping policy change by prompting voters, civic leaders and activists to pressure policymakers to respond to their demands and by influencing policymakers who become sympathetic to the movement's goals. These effects of autonomous organising are more important for influencing progressive policy change than the presence of women legislators, the impact of political parties or national wealth. 'Autonomous feminist organising ensures that words become deeds.'

Htun, M. and Weldon, S.L. (2010) 'When Do Governments Promote Women's Rights? A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Sex Equality.' *Perspectives on Politics* 8(1): 207-216.

Htun and Weldon argue many scholars explain the introduction of sex equality policies as the outcome of women's mobilisation, of women as agents in policymaking and of a supportive political context. However,

[...] few theories confront the fact that gender equality policies have been adopted when women's presence in politics is low (or non-existent) and when women's movements in civil society are weak. For example, the governments most active in addressing violence against women are not those with the largest proportion of women. Dictatorships from the Middle East to Latin America embraced progressive family law reform policies without pressure from women's groups. What's more, politically active women have mobilised to oppose sex equality policies such as equal rights amendments in national constitutions, reproductive rights, parental leave and even gender quotas.

Htun and Weldon argue understanding governments' motivations for adopting different sex equality policies differs by policy area and therefore disaggregating within these policies is crucial. They argue policies affecting gender norms may affect women as a 'status group', as in the case of violence against women, or may be primarily class-based, as with provisions to extend parental leave. 'Gender policy issues that challenge religious doctrine or codified cultural traditions, such as abortion and family law, invoke ecclesiastical opposition that other policies, such as workplace equality or gender quotas, generally do not.' However, what

challenges religious or cultural traditions in one context does not necessarily in another – for example, abortion is what they term a ‘doctrinal issue’ (i.e. an issue seen as of concern to the dominant religion) in Ireland and Italy but not in Korea or Japan. The distinction between doctrinal and non-doctrinal issues (those that are not of concern to the dominant religion or not challenging key elements of traditional social organisation) helps us understand why states may be active in pushing through gender equality reforms in some areas and not in others. ‘Uganda, for example, has pushed women into power with its 30 percent reserved seat policy but has been unable to reform laws to grant women co-ownership rights with men over land. The first policy is agnostic on clan power while the second presents it with a sharp challenge.’

Other key issues that help explain the adoption or non-adoption of different gender equality policies and the different issues around which feminist organisation have mobilised include variation in state capacity, institutional legacies, degree of vulnerability to international pressure and degree of democracy. There are definite paradoxes and complexities related to the degree of democracy and women’s mobilisation in terms of the implications for gender-egalitarian norm change:

The more democratic a country is, the more developed its civil society and the more open the government to autonomous organising. Women’s groups, especially grassroots or working class women’s movements will have greater influence. Yet democracy unleashes complex processes. At the same time that it empowers some women’s groups, it may also strengthen religious groups opposed to change.

Authoritarian regimes have less-developed or non-existent civil societies. Government elites have more control over decision-making so the ideology and preferences of the party in power directly shape outcomes. On the other hand, elite women and other progressive reformers may have privileged access to power under autocracies. This may lead to surprising advances in women’s rights under otherwise conservative governments.

Beaman, L., Duflo, E., Pande, R. and Topalova, P. (2012) ‘Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India’. *Science* 335(6068): 582-586.

Exploiting a randomised natural experiment in India, Beaman et al. show female leadership influences adolescent girls’ career aspirations and educational attainment. A 1993 law reserved leadership positions for women in randomly selected village councils. This led to a dramatic increase in the proportion of elected local leaders who are female – from under 5% in 1992 to over 40% by 2000.

The authors conducted 8,453 surveys of adolescents aged 11-15 and their parents in 495 villages in West Bengal. Compared with villages never reserved for a female leader, in villages assigned to a female leader for two election cycles the gender gap in aspirations closed by 25% in parents and 32% in adolescents. Specifically, adolescent girls in villages with female leaders in two election cycles were more likely to want to marry after age 18, less likely to want to be a housewife or have their occupation determined by their in-laws and more likely to want a job requiring education. Parents were less likely to believe in-laws should determine girls’ occupations. The gender gap in adolescent educational attainment was erased and the gender gap in time spent on household chores closed by 18 minutes, reflecting girls spending less time on these activities.

They found no evidence of changes in young women’s labour market opportunities or of women leaders investing differentially in infrastructure benefiting girls and young women, suggesting the impact of women leaders primarily reflects a role model effect. These effects were considerably stronger in villages that had had female leaders twice, indicating that being exposed to a female leader once was insufficient to start shifting gender norms and aspirations of and for girls.

Grabe, S., Dutt, A. and Dworkin, S. (2014) ‘Women’s Community Mobilization and Wellbeing: Gendered Resistance to Social Inequalities in Nicaragua and Tanzania’. *Journal of Community Psychology* 42(4): 370-397.

This article discusses how women-focused community mobilisation in Nicaragua and Tanzania led women to challenge injustices and inequalities and dominant gender norms concerning the nature of gender relations,

intimate partner violence and women's participation in community decision making. These organisations catalysed a process of 'conscientisation', whereby participants reflected on the circumstances that constrained their lives and through dialogue identified potential areas where change could begin.

In Nicaragua, the organisation studied, Xochitl Acalt, facilitated women's rights workshops, which led to conscientisation and also helped women gain land titles, which several women saw had changed their bargaining power within their household. Women's individual recognition of personal oppression, which started with these workshops, led to a process of confronting individual and structural oppression that ultimately led to ideological and community-wide empowerment. As a result, 'the transformation of power structures, in part, enabled women to overcome longstanding barriers in their relationships and community by interrupting gender norms and restructuring power relations'.

In northern Tanzania, the community mobilisation process supported by the Maasai Women's Development Organisation had enabled women to claim their legal rights to register land in their name. One further concrete result of this was that, as landowners, women were now formally able to participate in community meetings and to represent both themselves and other women. In so doing, they were able to challenge cultural norms surrounding power and decision making at the community level in a manner that could shift conditions of justice among women more broadly.

Michau, L. (2012) 'Community Mobilization: Preventing Partner Violence by Changing Social Norms'. Paper for Expert Group Meeting on Prevention of Violence against Women and Girls, Bangkok, 17-20 September. Available at <http://bit.ly/1o4hJAr>

Community mobilisation is a complex and strategic intertwining of awareness raising, small group work, edutainment and more, which works to enable community members as leaders in changing entrenched social norms. This paper outlines the key elements of community mobilisation in the context of partner violence prevention as follows:

Community mobilisation is ...	Community mobilisation is not ...
Systematic and long-term programming	<i>Ad hoc</i> , one-off activities in short-term projects
Fostering alternative social norms	Transferring information and facts
Complex and multi-faceted	A singular strategy
A struggle for social justice	A technical quick-fix
About fostering activism	About implementing activities or training
Involving a critical mass of individuals, groups and institutions	Possible with few individuals or groups
Stimulating critical thinking	Transmitting simple messages
Holistic and inclusive	Limited to specific individuals or groups
Benefits-based	Punitive
Focused on core drivers	Focused on manifestations of violence
Iterative and organic	Linear and predictable
Community-led organisation	Expert-focused

The paper argues strongly for a social justice perspective: without this, action to prevent partner violence becomes

[...] impersonal, technical quick fix or packaging information into simple messages. Efforts devoid of a social justice lens become short-term projects rather than sustained movements, enacted by individuals who are personally invested in bringing about a change in her/his community. Therefore, community mobilization approaches that are technically strong from a public health perspective, yet lack a social justice framework, will fall short.

Michau argues community mobilisation for preventing partner violence, in particular, requires a reorientation of how organisations view, treat and partner with communities. Authentic collaboration with communities can be a struggle for organisations that are used to being in the role of expert. In a quality community mobilisation approach, communities are no longer the implementers but are engaged as people first, leading the process with their own strengths, struggles and ideas. Michau also argues men and male norms are critical to an effective social norm change approach, and the language and understanding surrounding community

mobilisation must reflect the inclusive nature of this work. Following Heise (2011) and Paluck et al. (2010), she recommends a focus on injunctive social norms.

The paper then outlines various strategies for community mobilisation (e.g. edutainment, community conversation etc.) and provides an overview of Raising Voices' Sasa approach. Michau discusses some of the difficulties with rigorous evaluation of community mobilisation processes, and raises concerns as to whether randomised control trials can effectively capture changes and dynamics. In particular, evaluation must take into account the long-term nature of social norm change and not judge initiatives as failures based on limited evidence of short-term impact. Michau then proposes a tool for tracking the impacts of community mobilisation on social norm change.

10 Legal change

It has been surprisingly difficult to find studies that examine the impact of legal reforms on the attitudes and values elements of gender norms. We therefore include some papers that principally report on changes in practice, although it is not always clear from these how far changes reflect fear of prosecution and how far they are in accordance with attitudinal change.

Readers interested in the relationship between legal change and gender norm change are advised to start with Bicchieri and Mercier (2014) in Section 3, who argue the question of whether laws bring about social change hinges on factors such as legitimacy, procedural fairness and how the law is originated and enforced. People who view the law as legitimate are more likely to comply with it even when it contradicts their interests. They also argue that, to be effective, laws must be more or less in step with social norms, so they can nudge behaviour in a desired direction. If they are too divergent from social norms they are likely simply to be ignored.

Shell-Duncan et al. (2013) make similar points. They note a range of responses to Senegal's anti-female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) law, ranging from, on the one hand, driving the practice underground, to sadness and muted protest about the 'criminalisation of culture' to, on the other hand, the positive boost the law has given to anti-FGM/C mobilisation and shifting perceptions among some groups concerning the acceptability of the practice. A key point several of the papers in this section make (Shell-Duncan et al., 2013; Kiss et al., 2012) is that, where laws are out of step with social norms, additional communication and social mobilisation efforts are necessary to change those norms.

Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2013) provide an overview of a database with details of women's legal rights (particularly related to economic issues) over 50 years. The papers by Hallward-Driemeier et al., Deininger et al. (2010) and Kiss et al. (2012) also provide insights into the effects of specific legal changes. In Ethiopia, the passage of a new family law which allowed women to work without husbands' permission led to increased numbers of women working (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2013); the passage of India's Hindu Code Bill in Karnataka state was associated with an increased likelihood of daughters inheriting land and may have contributed to an increasing age at marriage and girls staying in school for longer. Kiss et al.'s study shows some of the limitations of legal change in tackling domestic violence: affected women tend to rely on their social networks and community structures rather than violence-specific services. The authors argue legal change must be complemented with more sustained action to tackle deep-rooted gender inequalities that form a context in which violence is acceptable.

Hallward-Driemeier, M., Hasan, T. and Bogdana-Rusu, A. (2013) 'Women's Legal Rights over 50 Years. What Is the Impact of Reform?' Policy Research Working Paper 6617. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at <http://bit.ly/1jGKaBT>

This study uses a newly compiled database of women's property rights and legal capacity covering 100 countries over 50 years to test for the impact of legal reforms on employment, health and education outcomes for women and girls. The database demonstrates gender gaps in the ability to access and own property, sign legal documents in one's own name and have equality or non-discrimination as a guiding principle of the country's Constitution. In the initial period, 75 countries had gender gaps in at least one of these areas and often multiple ones. By 2010, 57 countries had made reforms that had strengthened women's economic rights, including 28 countries that had eliminated all of the constraints monitored here. In both cross-sectional analysis and within countries over time, the removal of gender gaps in rights is associated with greater participation of women in the labour force, greater movement out of agricultural employment, higher rates of

women in wage employment, lower adolescent fertility, lower maternal and infant mortality and higher female educational enrolment.

The authors cite a case study from Ethiopia where changes in the family law were associated with a substantial shift in women's economic activities (Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo, 2013). As of 2000, Ethiopia requires both spouses' consent in managing marital property and enables women to work outside the home without needing permission from their spouse, and has raised the minimum marriage age for women. The reform, which is now applicable across the country, was initially rolled out in selected regions and cities. Using two nationally representative household surveys, one in 2000 just before the reform and one five years later, Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo (2013) find women's participation in occupations that require work outside the home, full-time hours and higher skills rose more where the reform had been enacted (controlling for time and location effects).

Deininger, K., Goyal, A. and Nagarajan, H. (2010) 'Inheritance Law Reform and Women's Access to Capital: Evidence from India's Hindu Succession Act'. Policy Research Working Paper 5338. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at <http://bit.ly/1z5uVwe>

In 2005, India amended inheritance legislation nationally to eliminate gender discrimination. Two states – Maharashtra and Karnataka – had already made similar changes in 1994. This study examines the effects of these changes to inheritance law in these states. Deininger et al. found the amendment to the law significantly increased women's likelihood of inheriting land, although it did not fully eliminate underlying inequalities. The effect of the law became stronger over time, perhaps reflecting better dissemination and awareness of it.

Deininger et al.'s analysis indicates that the legal amendment in Karnataka and Maharashtra may also have contributed to a higher mean age of marriage for women and increased schooling among girls. Specifically, girls born after the changed inheritance regime came into force had a mean 0.3 years more elementary schooling than those born before, and the mean age of marriage for girls whose fathers died after 1994 increased by 0.5 years. This suggests the Act led to a genuine improvement in women's socioeconomic status, rather than a substitution away from human capital to physical capital transfers by parents to their daughters following the legislative amendment. The amendment had no significant effects on boys' education.

Shell-Duncan, B., Herlund, Y., Wander, K. and Moreau, A. (2013) 'Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting in Senegal'. *Law & Society Review* 47(4): 803-835.

There are divergent views on the potential effects of legislation on the practice of FGM/C. Supporters of legislation argue there is a generally deterrent impact; others contest legislation can be perceived as coercive and detrimental to local efforts to end the practice.

This article reports on a three-year long study carried out in Senegal examining the impact of 1999 legislation that made it a crime to carry out FGM/C or to encourage anybody else to do so. Shell-Duncan et al. analyse responses to the banning of FGM/C according to theory in the 'law and economics' and 'law and society' traditions. Their findings accord with propositions from both schools of thought. Consistent with 'law and economics' perspectives, which predict the costs (economic or other, e.g. imprisonment, humiliation), they found people who had abandoned FGM/C or were actively considering abandoning it had greater fear of prosecution than those who supported the practice. Shell-Duncan et al. suggest this is consistent with one of the claims of the 'law and society' tradition: that, where laws are out of step with social norms, legal sanctions hold little sway. They suggest this implies that, where support for FGM/C is more-or-less unanimous, the law will have little deterrent effect, but where there are active debates and divergent opinions about FGM/C, legislation can give added strength to those in favour of abandonment. Where the law is out of step with social norms, other activities that change the cultural context are necessary for it to catalyse change in behaviour.

They found mass law enforcement was not necessary to generate widespread fear of prosecution, and the fear generated by knowledge of the law had led to a range of responses and emotional reactions. A small number of respondents reported abandoning FGM/C following media broadcasts. Some reported being sad about being

forced to abandon a valued cultural practice and viewed themselves as powerless in the face of the law; for others the law did not change practices but generated anxiety about the prospect of prosecution. Other responded to the threat of legal sanctions by taking the practice underground – for these people legal norms ran counter to the prevalent social norms. For others, the legal sanctions strengthened their anti-FGM/C position. Study communities did not protest in response to the law. However, researchers identified a deep resentment among some respondents about the ‘criminalisation of culture’. This said, fear of prosecution led residents in the study communities to welcome the Tostan community development programme into their village and has given extra strength to the position of people who favour abandonment.

Kiss, L., d’Oliveira, A.F., Zimmerman, C., Heise, L., Schraiber, L.B. and Watts, C. (2012) ‘Brazilian Policy Responses to Violence against Women: Government Strategy and the Help-Seeking Behaviours of Women Who Experience Violence’. *Health and Human Rights* 14(1). Available at <http://bit.ly/1otDHvc>

Over the past 30 years, countries have translated international instruments, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women (CEDAW), into national legislation on violence against women. This article explores how policy and legislation on violence against women has shaped women’s responses to violence in Brazil, and whether these strategies are supporting women.

Brazil ratified CEDAW in 1984, included constitutional provisions for formal gender equality in 1988 and in 2002 incorporated CEDAW into national law. In 2006, the Maria da Penha Law, which specifically addresses domestic violence, was adopted, representing a major change from a context in which violence against women was not recognised as a crime. The law specifically defines violence against women as a violation of human rights and lays the foundations for the implementation and strengthening of multidisciplinary networks for formal support for women who experience violence, including legal aid, social services and health and psychological support.

A significant gap persists between gender equality as stated in the law and as experienced through social norms and institutions, which translates into slow-moving policy. A 2000 World Health Organization (WHO) survey established the prevalence of intimate partner violence as 27.7% São Paulo and 33.8% in the rural region of Zona da Mata Pernambucana. Approximately one-third of these women (30.9% and 33.2%) had also experienced sexual violence and the majority (84% and 87%) had suffered emotional violence. A minority of respondents believed physical violence by a partner was acceptable (13.8% in São Paulo and 39.4% in Zona de Mata Pernambucana). Many of had controlling partners: 45.3% in São Paulo and 40.9% in Zona da Mata Pernambucana had partners who tried to keep them from seeing their friends.

The survey found women’s responses to violence were highly reliant on social networks: most women talked to family, friends and neighbours, who were often the only resource they used to deal with the violence they had experienced. When women sought help outside their networks they tended to use services non-specific to violence against women, including the police, health workers and priests. Women did not frequently seek formal support, because of feelings of shame, guilt or attachment to the partner or relationship. Women also tended to minimize the importance of their experience of violence and dismiss potential formal help. This suggests community norms continue to act to keep violence invisible and may mean women tolerate abuse and have this tolerance reinforced by friends and family.

The article raises questions about the limitations of international legal standards in achieving change on domestic violence and suggests states need to undertake wider and more locally informed strategies to increase awareness and prevention of and protection against violence to ensure maximum use of available services. This will involve reaching informal networks – for example through social marketing and community-based interventions that promote gender-equitable norms and behaviour within communities and sensitise women to sources of formal support. More sustained change in social institutions and structures to promote greater gender equality throughout society is also a vital complement to legal change. Finally, the article suggests further research is needed to measure the impact of communication of the law on violence against women, which has taken place widely on the television and the radio.

11 Conflict

This section highlights several cross-country studies (Byrne, 1996; El Bushra and Sahl, 2005; Justino, 2012; Narayan and Petesch, 2010; Petesch, 2012; USAID, 2000) that have examined the implications of conflict for change in gender norms and relations. These studies all highlight shifts towards more egalitarian norms that have occurred during conflict, with women and girls taking on stereotypically masculine labour market activities, experiencing greater mobility and often having a greater role in decision making. However, they also point out these gains are not always sustained after the end of conflict, as absent men have not necessarily been through the same norm change processes. Furthermore, women and girls do not necessarily view additional economic responsibilities as empowering or positive gains. Focusing on how potential gains can be consolidated, Petesch argues inclusive local market opportunities can provide stepping-stones for both men and women to reach higher status and more secure economic positions.

Justino's paper shows increased economic participation during conflict is usually associated with an increased say in household decision making. Several of the papers in this section also highlight the role of women and girls' engagement in combat as a driver of changed norms (e.g. Coulter, 2008; El Bushra and Sahl, 2005; USAID, 2000; see also Bennett et al., 2011, in Section 4). Typically, however, any such shifts are precarious and not sustained after the end of hostilities, and have sometimes been associated with backlash (Byrne, 1996; El Bushra and Sahl, 2005).

Four papers focus particularly on the contexts in which conflict-related changes in gender relations can be sustained. Narayan and Petesch's chapter and Buvinic et al. (2012) suggest post-conflict settlements often create a context in which new, more gender-sensitive institutional structures could be developed. A critical constellation of factors appears to be an organised constituency of women who can push for reform in civic and political institutions together with men who are supportive of changed gender norms (Petesch, 2012). The US Agency for International Development's (USAID's) (2000) study highlights the types of post-conflict contexts and scenarios in which women's organisations are most likely to achieve such change.

El Bushra, J. and Sahl, I. (2005) *Cycles of Violence. Gender Relations and Armed Conflict*. London: ACORD. Available at <http://bit.ly/1qgxbwN>

This book draws on detailed qualitative case studies of the experiences of war in Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Angola and Mali to build an in-depth consideration of the links between war and social change and what this means for development research and practice. A section of the report focuses on the impact of conflict on gender norms and ideologies.

The research consistently found men and women had made changes to the organisation of economic roles within the household, with more employment opportunities and economic activities for women alongside a reduction in male employment that some men experienced as a distressing loss of their masculinity. The researchers found that, although few women wanted to go back to pre-conflict days, they sometimes stated that they were over-burdened and that their new livelihood activities increased risks to their safety.

Changes in economic roles can have impacts on established social and gender norms. Respondents often noted changes in marriage practices, although there was no consistent pattern in what these changes meant. In Uganda and Rwanda, there seems to be increased freedom in decision making about marriage and stronger property rights for women – and yet in Uganda women were criticised for exercising these new freedoms and for more casual attitudes to sex and relationships.

The research found changes in gender roles had not translated into changes in gender ideologies and idealised versions of masculinity and femininity. For example, in Rwanda, the demographic gender imbalance means many women will not marry, yet high social status continues to be associated with marriage and many women feel they have lost their respected status as a woman. The research also found variable change in women's decision-making power: women may take on more decision-making power in the household and become more engaged in political and community life but the change is not consistent and local governments still tend to be dominated by men and women continue to have little influence beyond the household. In Eritrea, for instance, female ex-combatants found their role in the conflict had little effect on gender ideologies. Conversely, conservative views on women's dress and behaviour seem to have been reinforced after the war, leaving vulnerable women ex-combatants isolated, impoverished and unsupported.

The research shows the importance of the inclusion of men, and the need for public debate around the social transformation that is desired in post-conflict societies. The authors argue strong political commitment is essential to overcome barriers to change in gender norms and ideologies.

Byrne, B. (1996) 'Gender, Conflict and Development Volume I: Overview'. Report 34. Brighton: BRIDGE. Available at <http://bit.ly/1z7zB4Q>

In conflict situations, gender identities often become intensely politicised, leading to the reforming and restating of gender identities, legal reforms and changes in employment patterns, propaganda and cultural discourse, as well as the socialisation of children. Most commonly, in situations of militarisation, traditional gender ideals are stressed: men's 'masculinity' is called on to encourage them to take up arms in defence of their country, ethnic group or political cause – and in defence of 'their' women. Women can become the bearers of the culture the men are fighting to defend, and thus what is 'feminine' and appropriate behaviour for women may be redefined. At the same time, it often becomes impossible for women and men to effectively play out their conventionally accepted role under conflict, for example as breadwinners and protectors of families or as caring wives and mothers.

Each conflict will have very different effects on men and women, gender relations and the gendered balance of power and gender ideologies. The effects of conflict depend on gender relations prior to the conflict, which are in turn influenced by the cultural, political and economic make-up of the country. They also differ according to the origins and nature of the conflict: a civil war waged as a liberation struggle will affect gender relations in a different way from one based on ethnic divisions. Both will differ from inter-state tension.

Case study material (from Volume II) demonstrates that, because gender ideologies and relations are in flux during conflict, there are transformative possibilities for women in conflict situations, as well as the possibility for recourse to renewed conservatism surrounding gender relations. For example, national liberation struggles do not necessarily form the basis for transformative outcomes for women, at least not in obvious ways, often leading to disillusionment among women fighters and activists. In post-liberation states, women may find themselves under pressure to revert to more conventionally defined female roles as, for example, in the case of Eritrea. Equally, in ethnic or other conflicts where challenging gender norms is not an explicit focus (e.g. Rwanda), the impact of conflict may give rise to situations where there are possibilities for strategic gains in women's rights and bargaining power, for example over land rights.

In some struggles, a new image of womanhood is developed, that of fighter. In Eritrea, there was a strong ideology of equality within the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, with women participating in the fighting and men taking on equal responsibility for those tasks, such as cooking, cleaning and fuel wood and water provision, that had been formerly considered the preserve of women. Nevertheless, even when women fight, it is unlikely the ideological importance of their role as mothers is totally relinquished, not least by the women themselves.

As gender identities are always contested, the end of conflict often raises further questions about which gender identities will have primacy. Often, the exigencies of war mean women are forced to go beyond their culturally prescribed roles, and may benefit from changes in the gender division of labour and responsibility and control of resources, despite increased workloads. Such changes may have a liberating effect for women and result in

changes in gender ideologies. But they can also have social costs, such as challenges in reintegrating into the community.

In situations where a liberating army has promoted gender equality, there may be a reassertion of more polarised gender identities after the conflict. The new identities promoted may become a focal point in the general conflict over the allocation of resources in influence in a newly reconstituted state. Women have a large stake in struggles over gender ideology after the official end of the conflict and will act either to reassert their traditional positions or to attempt to forge new roles and identities for themselves.

Petes, P. (2012) 'The Clash of Violent Conflict, Good Jobs, and Gender Norms in Four Economies'. WDR 2013 Background Paper. Available at <http://bit.ly/1IMRb41>

This study draws on a large qualitative dataset from 24 communities in Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan and West Bank and Gaza to explore the impact of violent conflict on gender norms and men's and women's perceptions of agency and empowerment as women attempt to help their communities to recover from conflict. It highlights the high level of interdependence between men and women's agency. The researchers used a data collection tool called Ladder of Power and Freedom, alongside other qualitative research techniques, to gather data on the trends and factors shaping men's and women's perceptions of empowerment.

The researchers found strong differences between men's and women's perceptions of the empowerment of their own gender using the Ladder of Power and Freedom. Women are more likely to report a sense of being empowered and in control of their lives, which they attribute to increased decision making in their domestic roles. Men reported downward mobility and a loss of control and authority, largely linked to local economic conditions and the types of employment to which they had access.

Gender norms are key determinants of men's and women's perceptions of which jobs are desirable and acceptable for which sex. Men both have access to considerably more of the jobs locally considered 'good' jobs that pay well, are reliable and have high status, and also more access to 'bad' jobs, which tend to be more physical, risky and unreliable and may be illegal or involve a risk to reputation. Women have sole access to only 9% of the good jobs identified by focus group participants across the research sites. These tended to be home-based activities like preparing foods and tending to small livestock and vegetable gardens.

Women describe how moving up the ladder of power and freedom requires them to constantly challenge gender norms and carefully balance old and new norms. Conflict seems to provide women with more scope for exercising agency. In Sudan, interviewees explained girls attending school and women working for wages were new in the village and were valued, but that women were not able to do jobs that required mixing with men. In all the study countries, gender norms are at their strictest and most unequal for those with little power and freedom, and at their most relaxed for those at the top with great power and freedom. For example, educated or professional women in the West Bank and Gaza were described as less constrained by norms of restricted mobility and were able to move freely, thus were considered to be more highly positioned on the Ladder of Power and Freedom. A focus group of men from a neighbourhood of Hebron explained that professional women's greater freedom to move about in public was a result of their education and knowledge of how to conduct themselves in public in ways that would not compromise family honour. In Afghanistan, rural women with jobs in embroidery and tailoring were seen as experiencing raised status as a result of their increased mobility. Women's working lives can drive changes in empowerment and enable them to claim increased agency, but with limited change in their caretaking roles.

Conflict weakens the functioning of social institutions but does not necessarily reshape them to serve everyone's interests or give people the scope to reshape them. The research found men often point to women's gains as the cause of their own loss of power and are frustrated. However, in Liberia and Gaza, more lasting shifts in gender norms had occurred. For example, in Gaza, relaxed gender norms mean women perceive that they now have more voice and control. By contrast, men feel stifled by the local economic conditions – a central determinant of their perceptions of their own empowerment. Men express concerns in a number of spheres about women's changing roles, such as jealousy if women have work and men do not. Another man from an urban area argued that the lack of public safety for women was a troubling consequence of the

transition underway in gender norms: ‘Women have just started entering society, so the man is still trying to maintain his control.’

In Liberia, the study found women had obtained a relatively high level of power and status in their communities. They were serving as local elected leaders in six of the nine communities visited, which indicates a powerful shift in gender norms concerning women’s leadership roles. Many focus groups in Liberia mentioned Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as an inspirational figure and role model, and their activism has spread beyond the local level to reshape institutions and as such build sustainable change. In Tewor, a Gazan border town, women work in large numbers and hold positions in the town leadership and men seem at ease with and welcoming of women’s new roles. Men and women both say they are optimistic about the future and young women report they are taking decisions on family size and engaging in economic life without the participation of their spouse.

The researchers conclude that, where women are able to turn times of shock into opportunity and change, and to push for reform in civic and political institutions, and where men are supportive, permanent changes in gender norms are possible. They argue that inclusive local market opportunities can provide stepping-stones for both man and women to reach higher status and more secure economic positions.

Narayan, D. and Petesch, P. (eds) (2010) *Rising from the Ashes of Conflict*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at <http://bit.ly/1k5qkFZ>

This book draws on the 10-year World Bank study, *Moving Out of Poverty*, which looks at the perspectives of poor people who have moved out of poverty in more than 500 communities in 15 countries and uses both qualitative and quantitative research methods. This work focuses on Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka as countries that have been affected by conflict. It shows a mixed picture, with comparable levels of mobility out of poverty in both conflict-affected and non-conflict-affected communities, with fewer conflict-affected communities experiencing very low rates of mobility. At the same time, conflict has also restricted access to education and brought about poor economic conditions. The impact of conflict on the economic opportunities and social position of women varied considerably across the different study contexts.

The Philippines case study illustrates both positive and negative aspects of women’s increased participation in the labour market. Where economic conditions forced early marriage and led to increased earning responsibilities for women, respondents experienced increased responsibilities and labour market participation as a burden rather than as a form of liberation. However, women have benefited from taking on roles in traditionally male domains, such as farming. Furthermore, because they are perceived as less of a threat, women may experience greater mobility. As one respondent in the Philippines expressed it, ‘during conflict, only the women are allowed to go out and coordinate with their neighbours about the evacuation [...] Women at this time are freer than men.’

Greater participation in the labour market has not automatically translated into higher social or political status for women. Female focus group discussants explained their role in community decision making remained heavily limited, despite roles in informal associations that have increased women’s voice and empowered some to reject early marriage.

Communities with more empowered women experienced more rapid recovery and poverty reduction in the wake of conflict, whereas women in deeply exclusionary contexts required ongoing support from external partners to produce and maintain change in their role and community norms. In Indonesia, there was more success for community-driven development programmes that supported local recovery initiatives that grassroots groups that included women and marginalised groups chose and managed. In the Philippines, sustaining positive change for women depended on economic opportunities in their communities and the rebuilding of infrastructure such as electricity and power systems that reduced women’s domestic burdens and as such enabled continued participation in labour markets.

In Afghanistan, the research found that, despite the high level of segregation and confinement of women to the household, slight, but perceptible, changes are occurring as a result of a more egalitarian Constitution,

increased access to health and education services and participatory institutions at the local level that have emerged in the wake of conflict. Community development councils for women have been set up as part of the National Solidarity Programme, and women have learnt to make community decisions and gained influence and confidence in the public sphere, gradually instituting a new set of gender values in Afghan society.

Justino, P. (2012) 'Women Working for Recovery: The Impact of Female Employment on Family and Community Welfare after Conflict'. New York: UN Women. Available at <http://bit.ly/1uvKTwb>

This paper uses the limited existing quantitative data from Bosnia Herzegovina, Colombia, Kosovo, Nepal, Tajikistan and Timor Leste to analyse two questions around the impact of violent conflict on women:

1. How does violent conflict change the roles women take on in their households and communities?
2. How do changes in female roles during conflict affect women's status after the conflict and the capacity of households and communities to recover?

Across the case study countries, the analysis shows women participate more actively in labour markets during and immediately after conflict. However, women often face substantial limitations, both in the type of employment available to them – typically low-skilled informal sector or family labour – and in the level of income received. This increase in labour market participation does not correspond with a reduction in other obligations and responsibilities, and so exacerbates vulnerability, particularly for female-headed households.

Increases in women's labour force participation in conflict-affected areas can be associated with increases in household and community welfare, measured in terms of per capita consumption. Benefits are more significant where women are employed in better-paid jobs, but in some case studies there were positive impacts even from low-status jobs. Data from Colombia, Timor Leste and Nepal (but not Tajikistan) show a positive relationship between women's new roles in the labour market and involvement in household decision making. In many cases, women's gains are eroded post-conflict as they remain vulnerable to changing economic conditions and face pressure to return to more traditional roles.

More sophisticated data analysis is needed to identify the complex linkages and mechanisms shaping the relationship between conflict, gender roles and economic recovery alongside the increased use of gender indicators, as well as empirical research on men and women's responses to change in conflict-affected communities.

USAID (US Agency for International Development) (2000) 'Intrastate Conflict and Gender'. Information Bulletin 9. Washington, DC: Office of Women and Development, USAID. Available at <http://bit.ly/1iVI5bC>

This report is based on a two-year investigation of gender issues in post-conflict societies led by USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE). CDIE carried out an extensive review of the literature and conducted fieldwork in six countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala and Rwanda. Main findings were as follows:

Conflict transformed gender relations both during and after the conflict. In the face of extreme hardships, traditional roles were adapted to meet the new realities imposed by the conflict. Women assumed greater economic responsibilities as heads of households. Women took on the responsibility of caring for the many children left orphaned or abandoned during the conflict. Domestic violence against women increased as a result of the stress, trauma and social disorder that emerged during and following the conflict.

In all case study countries, women's participation in the labour force increased during the course of the conflict. However, when ex-combatants returned home to their communities, women were often the first to lose their jobs during the post-conflict transition.

The political impact of conflict created opportunities for women to increase their public roles and responsibilities. In the absence of men, women took on leadership roles in both civic and political institutions. Women took an exceptionally active and visible role in peace processes and reconciliation efforts. Following

brief periods of disenfranchisement after the signing of the peace accords, women dramatically increased their participation in the post-conflict political arena. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador and Georgia, the number of women parliamentarians increased, along with the number of women holding positions in national ministries.

CDIE cites four broad factors that contributed to the growth of women's organisations: 1) collapse of the traditional social order and increased participation of women in public life; 2) disillusionment with the return of the *status quo* despite formal commitments to gender equity; 3) political space created by transitional governments; and 4) international donor assistance.

The emergence of women's organisations during the period of post-conflict transition enhanced women's empowerment as individuals and as groups. Women's organisations provided assistance to women across sectors to help them rebuild their lives, their families and their communities. Economically, women's organisations developed income-generating activities that enabled some women to become self-reliant and self-confident. Politically, women became empowered through civic education and participation in government at various levels. These efforts raised gender awareness at the community level and in national political life.

Buvinic, M., Das Gupta, M., Casabonne, U. and Verwimp, P. (2012) 'Violent Conflict and Gender Inequality: An Overview'. *World Bank Research Observer* 28(1): 110-138. Available at <http://bit.ly/1ows4nh>

The gendered impacts of conflict are evident in both the immediate impact on men and women (first-round impacts) and the way gendered inequality shapes adaptive and indirect responses (second-round impacts). Second-round impacts include changes in patterns of marriage and fertility influenced by demographic changes, reallocation of labour to deal with lower household income, changes in assets and labour markets and decision making around children's health and education.

Experiences of violence are often linked to positive changes in civic and political engagement from women and other members of excluded groups. For example, in Sierra Leone, Bellow and Miguel (2006; 2009) found people living in households that had experienced mortality, injury or displacement as a result of war were more likely to be politically active and engaged in community projects. Post-conflict reconstruction often leads to the emergence of women's networks and organisations, which frequently engage in integrating a gendered perspective and women's representation into post-conflict institutions. For example, in Haiti, Liberia, Nicaragua and Sierra Leone, transitional governments introduced female staffing and women's service within the police force as a result of lobbying from women's groups.

The 'added worker' effect, where women join the workforce to help households deal with income shocks, was strong in industrial countries during the World Wars and Great Depression but has become less important over time as women's labour market position has improved. In developing countries, evidence suggests shocks do translate to added workers. For example, in Rwanda, Schindler (2012) found increased labour intensity among teenage girls and women in districts with low sex ratios. Research in Colombia also found increased labour force participation among forcibly displaced women (Calderon et al., 2011).

People who participate in, or live through, a period of violent conflict often receive less education and experience a decline in productivity and earnings. However, it is unclear which impacts are most persistent, which disproportionately affect poorer people and how local institutions and policies can mitigate negative impacts. Particularly little is known about what factors make some individuals and households more resilient to conflict and how gender roles and inequalities affect families' coping mechanisms. This reflects a focus in the gender and conflict literature on sexual and gender-based violence. There is a need for a new focus on how the responses of households to violent conflict shape and are shaped by gender inequalities.

Coulter, C. (2008) 'Female Fighters in the Sierra Leone War: Challenging the Assumptions?' *Feminist Review* 88(1): 54-73. Available at <http://bit.ly/1skzPUM>

This article seeks to provide an alternative to the normative view of men as violent perpetrators of conflict and women as active peacemakers by acknowledging that women are agents who make choices, even though

hierarchical structures and context restrict these. The authors argue that, by focusing on women solely as victims, their full range of social and political roles and how local communities may have interpreted these roles has been concealed.

Women are often regarded as inherently more peaceful than men, even though they have shown themselves capable of committing acts of violence and genocide. Local communities often describe female fighters as colder and more violent than their male counterparts, a view that researchers have often interpreted as being a result of women breaking social norms and conventions and transgressing gender norms (Barth, 2002; Farr, 2002; McKay and Mazurana, 2004). In their work on girl soldiers, McKay and Mazurana (2004) found girls in fighting forces had been forced to violate taboos more fully than boys. The perception of women as naturally more peaceful or innocent has been manipulated and exploited by groups whose female members have become spies, smugglers or killers, as in the case of veiled women who became Chechen suicide bombers because they were not seen as a threat.

Long-term research in Sierra Leone reveals that many women actively participated in armed conflict, and details women's experiences as rape victims, looters, mothers, lovers and fighters in conflict. Involvement with armed forces has given women an alternative to local traditional gender norms: individual female fighters report feeling empowered when they had a gun, although for others it was an ambivalent and uncomfortable experience because they were expected to kill, and female combatants who hesitated to kill were often raped as a punishment. Becoming a fighter could improve conditions for women abducted into militias, giving them increased access to food and loot, and a step up in the group hierarchy.

Coulter cites Brett and Spechts' (2004) research with girls in fighting forces, which noted that girls often gave domestic violence or abuse as their reason for joining armed groups. The qualities these girls possessed – strength, independence, courage, persistence and character – are not desired characteristics of femininity in northern Sierra Leone, as they are seen as wild in contrast with a submissive and domesticated ideal.

12 Backlash and resistance to changing gender norms

Consistent with our focus in this bibliography on large-scale norm change, we focus here on studies that conceptualise or discuss backlash at the broad, societal level, rather than analyses of project-inspired backlash. The majority of studies focus on Latin America or the Middle East. Alvarez Minte's (2013) paper provides an overview of the literature on resistance to gender equality and backlash, drawing on both high- and lower-income contexts. It makes brief reference to the role of organised religious and political interests in resisting women's reproductive rights in Latin America, a theme Amuchástegui et al. (2010) and Guzman et al. (2012) then discuss in more detail. Guzman et al. show the positions espoused by religious conservatives who reject gender equality can be out of step with social norms. Despite this, the strong political influence of these interests can lead to blocking of or mobilisation against pro-gender equality policies. The papers by Balchin (2010) and the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) summary (2012) also discuss the role of religion in backlash against gender equality, bringing in examples from other regions as well as Latin America.

Silberschmidt's (2001) article, which discusses male disempowerment in East Africa, provides an example of backlash against changes in gender relations that have been principally driven by economic change, interacting with government attempts to promote gender equality. The focus in this article is on male societal responses to their perceived disempowerment, rather than backlash by organised political and religious actors. Likewise, Chant (2002) discusses male and female reactions to changes in gender relations emanating from both economic change and equal rights legislation. These changes have evoked some resistance, particularly from men who – like those Silberschmidt interviewed – feel disempowered by these changes. In the Guanacaste region of Costa Rica where Chant's research took place, this disempowerment is framed largely in terms of concerns about family breakdown. In addition, Chant shows how resistance to change in gender relations is related to age, with much more egalitarian views among younger men and women, and class, with changing gender relations affecting low-income men most.

Alvarez Minte, G. (2013) 'Conservative Backlashes to Women's Bodily Integrity in Latin America: The Cases of Mexico and Chile'. Available at <http://bit.ly/110q3EO>

This paper, the text of a presentation that appears to excerpted from the author's PhD thesis, provides a very clear overview of the main ways backlash to social change occurs, and the specific forces that have contributed to a growing backlash against greater gender equality. Alvarez Minte reviews a wide range of literature that draws on social psychology and social movements theory, and analyses backlashes in both high-income countries (e.g. against the extension of civil rights in the US) and lower-income contexts. She draws on Mansbridge and Shames (2008) and conceptualises backlashes as a 'reaction of those in power to the push towards social change and challenges to entrenched power structures by a group disadvantaged by the status quo', that is, a resistance of those in power to declining power. She then provides an overview of key works on backlash against gender equality and/or feminism. She cites Oakley and Mitchell's (1997), who see the backlash against gender equality as a reaction to the economic and social changes of the 20th century and a nostalgia for the unequal gender relations that prevailed prior to such changes, and Connell's (2005) analysis of pro-patriarchal backlash: which he sees as driven by the fact some men are benefiting from the 'patriarchal dividend' and by social changes that might threaten their masculine identity, leading to an ideological defence of male supremacy.

The paper then discusses the institutional forms that backlash takes and distinguishes two main types:

1. **Vested interest groups:** Because feminism challenges structures of privilege, the success of feminist social movements threatens some groups with a privileged position in the economy or society. These groups are likely to be religious and from economic sectors, composed of elites with common class interests that funnel resources to counter-movements.
2. **Voluntary associations:** These groups organise because new economic and structural patterns may disrupt the social and occupational status of members of the same social category as the members of the movement they oppose.

Movements resisting change often take several years to emerge. This might give the impression that public opinion is changing or reversing, but they can represent a consolidation of diffuse opposition that was always present. Alvarez Minte draws on Chafetz and Dworkin's (1987) study, which also found that, among vested interests, religions have provided support for anti-feminist movements, and sometimes this support is overt, like lobbying and exerting political pressures. Voluntary associations arise after the most public demands of feminism are answered, and tend not to emerge strongly as long as vested interests groups, especially economically based ones, are able to resist change through political institutions. The common ideological base of these counter-movements relies on a traditional view of the family and women's role within it – that also has class and status dimensions – while patriotism and religion often shape its rhetoric. Connell (2005) makes similar arguments, noting that men's explicit backlash or conservative movements do not have great influence, but nationalistic, ethnic, religious and/or economic movements that incorporate men's interests are more relevant. Connell further argues that neo-conservative politics can function as masculine politics because of the powerful role of the state in gender relations, and because of the role of conservative men as cultural authorities and managers of key institutions such as religious organisations and transnational media conglomerates. Discussing the appeal of anti-feminist movements to some women, Alvarez Minte cites Chafetz (1988), who argues that many women do not feel coerced and do not perceive the system as fundamentally inequitable, but rather as legitimate. This perception is maintained by gender ideologies that have created and support a gender division of labour that is often based on economic inequalities.

Alvarez Minte then focuses specifically on Latin America and on the backlash against gender equality and specifically women's reproductive rights. Summarising literature on the region, she argues that ideals of femininity and masculinity have historically been shaped by motherhood and machismo and have created a gender order where the control of people's bodies is at the centre of gender identities. Increasing involvement of women in paid work has contributed to a weakening of these gender ideologies, but this change has been slow and associated with both resistance and backlash. While men still have an advantage over women in most domains, some feel they are losing out because of perceived or actual advances in women's situation and resist the changes. Some of this resistance is manifested in men prohibiting women from participating in the labour force; withdrawing financial support; not assuming parental responsibilities; and using violence against women, children and older people. Although the control of women's sexuality and reproduction is long-standing, the past decades have seen the emergence of a conservative religious opposition to women's reproductive rights and to limited implementation of laws prohibiting domestic violence.

Amuchástegui, A., Cruz, G., Aldaz, E. and Mejía, M.C. (2010) 'Politics, Religion and Gender Equality in Contemporary Mexico: Women's Sexuality and Reproductive Rights in a Contested Secular State'. *Third World Quarterly* 31(6): 989-1005.

Amuchástegui et al. argue that, in the past two decades in Mexico, gender equality has become a political battlefield. It is not, however, women's economic and social rights – access to jobs, education or land – that have provoked intense debate, but their sexual and reproductive autonomy that seems to have been particularly contentious. As the feminist movement has advanced women's human rights, conservative sectors allied with the Catholic Church have opposed such moves by defending a hetero-normative model of 'the family' as the entity deserving protection by society and state, often at odds with critical components of women's rights. This article explores the complexities of the interaction between politics, religion and gender equality in contemporary Mexico, by analysing recent developments in public debate, legal changes and implementation of government policies, focusing on two 'instrumental cases', both of which followed in part from Mexico's commitment to implement agreements on reproductive rights made at the Cairo Conference on Population in 1994 and the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995: laws on emergency contraception and the

decriminalisation of abortion in Mexico City, which was followed by a massive campaign to re-criminalise abortion across a large number of Mexican states in 2009.

The authors examine the way conservative politicians allied with the Catholic Church mobilised against the provision of emergency contraception in the period, with the church threatening to excommunicate women who used emergency contraception. Ultimately, the law and policy on emergency contraception were supported by the majority of the population and were upheld, despite there being a conservative government and president who presented himself as a Catholic in power. By contrast, when in 2007 Mexico City decriminalised abortion and the Supreme Court upheld this as legal, 17 other Mexican states passed constitutional legislation to enable them to re-criminalise abortion. The authors suggest this was possible because the party in power appealed to conservative interests for electoral reasons, although this may simultaneously have alienated women voters. In this case, the anti-abortion rights backlash was driven by a combination of conviction (among the Catholic hierarchy and Catholic-identifying public figures) and resistance to the substance of gender equality, and by political calculation. Beyond these specific issues, these battles are contesting the secular nature of the Mexican state.

Guzman, V., Seibert, U. and Staab, S. (2012) 'Democracy in the Country but Not in the Home? Religion, Politics and Women's Rights in Chile'. *Third World Quarterly* 31(6): 971-988.

With the return to democracy in Chile in 1989, emancipatory movements and a more pluralist civil society pushed for policies that address gender and social inequalities and strengthen women's citizenship. At the same time, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church has asserted its role as a moral authority – building on its opposition to military rule – and fervently opposed the fulfilment of key women's rights demands, such as divorce legislation, sexual education and greater reproductive and sexual rights. While Chile is still predominantly Catholic, the country has witnessed a diversification of religious belongings as well as the emergence of more varied positions within different faiths. Over the past 20 years, this has led to repeated confrontations and tensions between conservative and progressive currents of thought across and within social movements, political coalitions and religious organisations over family and sexuality issues. This article examines the role of religious actors in resisting change in norms and policy over sex education in schools and access to emergency contraception in Chile.

After the return to democracy, the Concertación coalition government of the 1990s was composed of members with different views on issues such as abortion and divorce. It acted in a politically unstable and unpredictable environment where conservative sectors and rightist parties maintained important veto powers, and where the Catholic Church played a major legitimising role for the newly elected democratic coalition. During this period, Concertación's response to the demands of progressive social movements was slow and timid. In the 2000s, two consecutive secular, socialist governments (those of Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet) were less willing to accept the influence of Catholic actors on policymaking. As a result, religious actors reconfigured their alliances and deployed new strategies and discourses in opposition to policies perceived to be contrary to religious doctrine. In addition to long-standing ties to political parties related to its role in opposing authoritarian rule, the church has selectively allied with right-wing political interests on 'moral issues', and has also funded think-tanks, educational institutions, civil society organisations and nurturing relationships with politically and economically well-connected individuals.

Although the church's official stance on issues of sexuality, reproduction and the family is increasingly out of tune with social reality and norms, conservative religious leaders continue to wield power over the policymaking process. For example, despite widespread public support for a change in the law on divorce, legislation on this issue was delayed for 14 years until a (rather restrictive) law was passed in 2004. Abortion remains illegal, and its discussion beyond question even under the comparatively woman-friendly government of Michelle Bachelet, although opinion polls showed broad public support for therapeutic abortion and in cases of rape. Guzman et al. describe how religious interests mobilised to undermine a government school sex education programme, which had been initiated to help combat the high rate of teenage pregnancy, and waged a four-year (ultimately unsuccessful) battle against the provision of emergency contraception through the public health system. They also show the diversity of religious actors, several of which (including the

evangelical churches) were more supportive of these areas of women's rights, and as such were more in step with prevailing social norms.

Balchin, C. (2010) 'Towards a Future without Religious Fundamentalisms: Analysing Religious Fundamentalist Strategies and Feminist Responses'. Toronto: AWID.
Available at <http://bit.ly/1lz6JbA>

Balchin's study of religious fundamentalisms and gender across the world indicates a fundamentalist turn in all major religions (Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism), as well as other religious approaches and traditions that oppose them. This rise in fundamentalism contributed to and is an expression of a backlash against changing gender norms. Balchin suggests widespread economic and political disenfranchisement give rise to contexts in which religious movements inspire feelings of hope and certainty. Feminism and rights-based interpretations of religion, on the other hand, by their very nature reject the old certainties and embrace the opportunity for change. Political ideologies that reject absolutism and instead embrace pluralism, diversity and contextual variations similarly do not respond to the nostalgia for certainty. Thus, rising self-reported religiosity tends to be associated with conservative rather than egalitarian interpretations of religion. In this context, 'religion has proved to be a highly effective mobilizing tool for discriminatory forces that seek social and political power, so a rise in religious practice may open a door to a rise in fundamentalisms'.

These trends have been compounded by political parties, which have been opportunist in allying with fundamentalist movements, and strategic entry of religious fundamentalists into party politics to promote conservative agendas. External support in some regions has also contributed to fundamentalist movements' rise (e.g. in Afghanistan). Balchin also suggests rights-based activists within the main religions have been slower and much less visible in articulating a human rights (and more woman-friendly) interpretation of religious doctrine.

Religion, as a moral code, also offers a space to articulate concerns about social problems. Given the weak position of rights-based religious interpretations and of political alternatives to authoritarianism in many contexts, the space is opened up for these concerns to be articulated through a highly conservative lens, which is more favourable to a fundamentalist vision.

Balchin argues religious fundamentalism seems to be reacting to the increasing social, legal and moral recognition and emancipation women have acquired in recent decades and growing rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning and intersex individuals. However, religious fundamentalisms are not passive or purely reactive movements but proactively seek to exist and expand themselves. One of the key arenas where fundamentalist discourses have been active is in relation to the family, gender roles and morality (referring often to sexual conduct, particularly of women, but also issues of probity and non-engagement in corruption). Balchin's research with women's rights activists in all parts of the world indicates that 'blaming social problems on a decline in morality or on disintegration of the family' and presenting gender roles as natural have been major strategies of religious fundamentalist movements, as has emphasising (a conservative interpretation of) religion as a major aspect of national identity. In addition to chiming with contemporary concerns and challenges to traditional masculinity resulting from economic and political dislocations, this emphasis on the patriarchal family is strategic as, in the eyes of conservatives, it may help prevent challenges to the fundamentalist order from future generations.

Just like organisations aiming to promote progressive gender norms, religious fundamentalists use modern communications technologies (such as the internet, cable television, satellite technology) to promote their messages, as well as face-to-face mobilisation of young people. Particular areas of contestation have been gender-based violence (which religious conservatives claim women should tolerate because it is God's will), sex education and broader mobilisation in favour of patriarchal (male-headed) families and against homosexuality.

ICAN (International Civil Society Action Network) (2012) 'What the Women Say: MENA/Asia Women's Rights, Peace and Security Forum Key Findings'. Brief 5. Available at <http://bit.ly/1rXqvD3>

This briefing draws on a forum organised by the International Civil Society Action Network on Rights, Peace and Security, with nearly 50 women representing 12 countries in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. It reports on a growing backlash against egalitarian gender norms, and outlines some of the key forms this takes. Discussants in the forum argued that:

Extremism is systematic, spreading and supported by regional actors. The suppression of women is integral to this ideology, and the indigenous history of women's roles and status in society is being erased. Islamists and extremists are attempting to paint women's rights issues as 'western' influences that do not adhere to the region's culture and tradition, whereas in many countries the regressive ideologies that target women's role, visibility and status are more recent and alien.

Patriarchy and conservatism are pervasive but the demand for basic rights and equality is also strong. Politically, even the secular parties who claim to uphold women's rights often lack commitment and exclude women from decision making. Meanwhile, Islamist political groups are better organised and well funded and have strong grassroots networks. They provide charitable services to address basic health, nutritional and social needs. However, they have no commitment to civil liberties and are promoting a regressive message on the rights of women and minorities.

Gender-based violence has become pervasive across the region and militarisation heightens vulnerability. Women are routinely targeted and discriminated against because of their gender. Restrictions on women's movement is rising, forcing many to be chaperoned. In some countries, those who experience sexual assault often face the wrath of their families for bringing shame, and some become victims of so-called 'honour killings', while increased militarisation, as in Egypt and Syria, has heightened women's exposure to sexual violence at the hands of non-state militias and state security forces. These new security risks feed the narrative that men should protect women and keep them out of the public arena.

Women are among the most legally vulnerable. Conservative interpretations of Sharia law will threaten to increase their discrimination. Laws that discriminate against women remain on the books. Even where legal protections exist, they are often not implemented properly. Meanwhile, particular proposals to base women's rights (among other rights) on Islamic Sharia law are of immense concern to women seeking legal guarantees for equal rights.

Freedom of expression is seriously challenged and undermining progress towards democratisation. Positive messaging on women's rights and status in mainstream media as well as social media is essential. Freedom of speech remains a major challenge for some countries; in others, self-censorship is on the rise and reflective of a harsh environment. Meanwhile, the media either is state-controlled or serves the interests of groups promoting regressive messages, which have unfettered access to satellite and national media. Negative depictions of women keep those who advocate progressive or alternative views out of the media. Too often, the women who do appear are adherents to the most conservative views. Although internet penetration is limited and censorship is rising in some countries, this still provides the most free and accessible space for addressing and discussing human rights and equality issues. This provides an opportunity to widen public outreach and information on women's rights, status and contributions to society, and to challenge negative stereotypes and intolerance.

Silberschmidt, M. (2001) 'Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa: Implications for Male Identity and Sexual Behavior'. *World Development* 29(4): 657-671.

Silberschmidt's analysis of male disempowerment in rural Kenya and urban Tanzania draws on long-term fieldwork in Kenya supplemented by a year's research in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania). She argues that increasing economic pressures have led to more hardship and changing norms and values, which have in turn weakened the material basis of male autonomy. Many men cannot fulfil expected male roles as heads of household and

breadwinners, and as a result suffer from feelings of inadequacy and lack of self-esteem, as well as contempt from women, who feel they now have additional responsibilities. Men still espouse the view that they are heads of households and have the right to 'correct' (beat) women and children, but complain that women 'have forgotten' that men 'are the masters'. Women, on the other hand, have taken on increased economic roles, consistent with a cultural image of strong and entrepreneurial women providing for their children; with this shift in roles has come new self-confidence. Silberschmidt argues that, in Kisii (Kenya), this shift has been accompanied by an increase in 'gender antagonism' and more conflictual gender relations, with a perception of increased domestic violence (including killing of spouses), rumours of women poisoning men and witch hunts. In this atmosphere of conflictual gender relations, men who assisted their wives (e.g. with farming) were subject to ridicule and exclusion from the company of other men.

In the low-income areas of Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) Silberschmidt studied, family structures were changing in response to economic disempowerment of men, with most men unable to fulfil their ascribed roles as breadwinners, people increasingly living in temporary unions and female-headed households increasingly common. These new household forms were fraught with tensions and negotiations over co-habitation arrangements and obligations towards couples' children. In this context of tense gender relations, drinking relationships between men often took precedence over the marital relationships and obligations, and aggressions and violence between men and women were very common. While economic disempowerment was a key driver of change in gender relations, and a cause of dissatisfaction, men also viewed government attempts to promote gender equality as emasculating, and 'blamed the government for interfering in people's internal affairs by advocating equal rights'.

Silberschmidt argues that, although the main axis of patriarchal power is still the overall subordination of women and dominance of men, economic conditions have seriously undermined the normative order of patriarchy, both in rural Kisii and in urban Dar-es-Salaam, giving rising to feelings of uncertainty among men in particular. With a majority of men being left with a patriarchal ideology bereft of its legitimising activities and often reduced to 'figureheads of households', unable to fulfil their normative responsibilities, men's authority has come under threat and, most importantly, so has their identity and sense of self-esteem. In this context, with no visible means to change their economic status, many men appear to resort to exaggerated domination of and physical violence against women. In this way, men may translate their economic subordination into a culturally valued symbolic expression. As one man put it, 'if you cannot be a successful breadwinner you can be a successful seducer'. Although other factors (such as the weakening of traditional social controls on sexuality as a result of large-scale adoption of Christianity during the colonial period) have affected norms concerning sexual behaviour, Silberschmidt suggests that, in this context of economic disempowerment, men draw on norms and values that give positive connotations to male sexual activity (within and outside marriage) to enhance self-esteem and masculinity. Among men, these norms condone or positively value aggressive sexual behaviour and involvement with multiple partners.

Chant, S. (2002) 'Families on the Verge of Breakdown? Views on Contemporary Trends in Family Life in Guanacaste, Costa Rica'. *Journal of Developing Societies* 18: 109-148.

Drawing on group interviews with 176 low- and middle-income men and women in Guanacaste province of Costa Rica, Chant explores how far media, government and church preoccupations with family breakdown are mirrored among grassroots concerns. Although the model of a nuclear family with a male breadwinner has never described the variety of family forms in Costa Rica, the proportion of households conforming to this model fell from around a half to a third between the 1970s and the 1990s. During this time, there was growing incidence of lone motherhood and female-headed households, linked with falling levels of legal marriage, rising numbers of out-of-wedlock births, greater rates of divorce and separation and mounting involvement of women in the historically male preserve of family breadwinning. Between 1980 and 1995, the share of the workforce made up by women rose from 23% to 31%. The share of agriculture in the economy has declined and mounting emphasis on agro-exports has been associated with increased casualisation, seasonal unemployment and temporary migration of men in search of work. Simultaneously, significant growth in the share of the labour force in services (from 30% to 53% between 1960 and 2000) has favoured women.

Guanacaste has lower levels of formal marriage, a higher level of out-of-wedlock births and above-average levels of male outmigration compared with other regions of Costa Rica. Male underemployment and periodic outmigration have, in turn, been associated with considerable instability in household composition and livelihoods, including long-standing tendencies for men to desert their spouses and children and/or to engage in heavy drinking and multiple sexual relations. These are widely attributed to the economic and physical hardships of migration and the psychological and emotional stresses on couples engendered by frequent and/or prolonged periods of separation. More broadly, increased entry of women into the workforce and growing access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) and television are seen as depriving children of control and guidance and contributing to social problems such as violence and drug abuse.

In addition to these structural factors, from the 1970s onwards advocacy by women's organisations contributed to a shift in government policies, with considerable legislation, policies and programmes to promote gender equality, prohibit domestic violence and corporal punishment of children and provide financial support for poor families, many of which are female-headed. This includes mandating men to support children financially in the case of household break-up. A combination of growing economic independence among women and a more supportive policy environment has made it easier for women to leave spouses who are violent or who are perceived as not pulling their weight economically. Taken together with economic changes and a policy environment that promotes the rights of women and children, decisions within and about their families are perceived to be increasingly out of men's hands.

Among the households interviewed, social changes, including changed gender relations, the rise of women working, increased access to ICTs and increased state regulation of family life, have led to concerns about the loss of control over children and youth, the lack of time for parent-child communication and declining 'family values'. While changes in these aspects of family life were almost universally viewed in a negative light, however, views on changes in gender relations were more divided. Typically, middle-aged and older men were highly critical of changing gender divisions of labour and of government efforts to promote gender equality, which they often expressed in terms of anxieties about control of families, as in this example:

One doesn't even know who's running the home [...] Well, but, yes, yes, yes [...] the head of the family, the axis of the family is the man, he is the head, but what is happening is that there are men who are not playing this role, and the head of the household is the woman, right?

Low-income men were doubly affected by structural changes in the economy and in gender relations and felt less needed and appreciated by their wives and children, and that they had less say and authority in the home. As one middle-aged interviewee put it,

When a father abandons his role of breadwinner, or when he cannot provide enough to fulfil [sic] his children's needs, it becomes difficult for him to be respected by his children as a figure of authority.

These changes were often labelled 'family breakdown', but this seems to be a misrecognition of what is taking place – Chant suggests that, in fact, the key issue at stake is men's perceived loss of power in domestic units, not the dissolution of domestic units.

Women of the same age groups were more positive about changing gender relations, though they were aware men were finding it difficult to adjust to the new scenario. Women saw the family as strengthened by their increased employment opportunities and their enhanced entitlement to property following relationship break-up. This said, Chant notes that 15 years of research in this region indicates few women abandoning their relationships unless their spouses give up searching for work altogether, are violent towards them or are repeatedly unfaithful.

Younger people generally held much more egalitarian views and decried *machista* ideas, such as the view that a woman's place is in the home looking after children, indicating that there may be a generational shift in norms concerning gender relations and family life. Although for older men a strong sense of 'breakdown' prevails, largely as a result of changes in gender that are making men's own roles in families less assured than in the past, among younger age groups, and particularly among women, many contemporary transitions – towards greater flexibility, equality, openness, permissiveness and sharing – are seen as embodying prospects for enriching family life.



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Overseas Development Institute
203 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NJ
Tel +44 (0)20 7922 0300
Fax +44 (0)20 7922 0399