# Securing communities and transforming policing cultures

A desk study of community policing in Jamaica

Victoria Chambers

May 2014

Report

Securing communities and transforming policing cultures

A desk study of community policing in Jamaica

Victoria Chambers

Key messages

- Community policing in Jamaica has been developing since the 1990s but become more actively operationalised since 2008

- All JCF officers are meant to operate within the philosophy of community policing but in reality it is largely seen as the preserve of the Community Safety and Security Branch (CSSB).

- While there is general agreement that the objectives of community policing are to reduce crime and improve police-community relations, there are different understandings regarding how these objectives are best achieved.

- Some early indications suggest that crime is reducing and police-community relations are improving, though it is difficult to attribute this to community policing.

- Community policing is also yet to transform policing culture in Jamaica, which remains primarily paramilitary in nature.

Acknowledgements

Table of contents

Boxes

Abbreviations

ACP	Assistant Commissioner of Police
CBO	Community-based Organisation
COMET	Community Empowerment and Transformation
CPI	Community Policing Initiative
CPO	Community Policy Officer
CRU	Community Relations Unit
CSJP	Citizen Security and Justice Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSSB	Community Safety and Security Branch
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
GoJ	Government of Jamaica
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IBTCI	International Business & Technical Consultants Inc.
IPO	International Police Officer
JCF	Jamaican Constabulary Force
JLP	Jamaica Labour Party
JNCVS	Jamaican National Crime Victimisation Survey
JSIF	Jamaica Social Innovation Fund
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MNS	Ministry of National Security
MP	Member of Parliament
MSI	Management Systems International
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation

ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PERF	Police Executive Research Forum
PIJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
PMI	Peace Management Initiative
PNP	People's National Party
SDC	Social Development Committee
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNODC	UN Development Programme
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development

Executive summary

This case study examines the latest iteration of community policing implemented in Jamaica since 2008/2009 by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). It is part of ODI's [Securing Communities project](), which aims to examine different models of community policing around the world, to understand their diversity of objectives, approaches and methods, and what this might mean for those who aim to support community policing.

The Jamaica case study offers a unique context *vis-à-vis* the other case studies under the Securing Communities project, due to the high levels of urban violent crime affecting the country which present distinct challenges for community policing. In addition, it is a valuable example of a community policing programme which has been a formal state-led process, but has taken place in a security and justice arena that has received significant support from multiple donors.

Community policing in Jamaica has been shaped by a number of contextual factors including, in particular, high levels of violent crime which have been fuelled by socio-economic problems and the historical nexus between crime, corruption and a political culture of patronage. This has encouraged the continuation of paramilitary styles of policing that emerged from histories of slavery and colonialism and has perpetuated a deep mistrust in the police among many community members, especially in the urban communities most affected by crime. High levels of violent crime and police corruption have weakened police-community relations and meant that reliance on informal security structures has become engrained in local cultures of protection.

It was in an attempt to grapple with the high levels of violent crime in Jamaica's inner-city communities, that the country's internal security forces began to experiment with community policing in the 1990s in order to build trust between the community and the police as a means of addressing the root causes of crime and thus to reduce criminal violence. However, while there have been various attempts to implement community policing since the early 1990s, and community policing was accepted as the overall philosophy of the JCF, these attempts were limited to pilots in particular communities of Jamaica and it was not until 2008/09 that there was a concerted effort to ensure the widespread application of the JCF's community policing approach.

While community policing is supposed to be a force-wide philosophy and not a specialist function in the JCF, in practices, this has not been the case. Instead, it has largely been carried out by dedicated Community Security and Safety Branch (CSSB) officers who work in close collaboration with residents of the communities they are posted to, with a stated remit to concentrate on 'proactive, practical problem-solving'.

Although there is a broad consensus among the main stakeholders on the underlying objectives of community policing – crime reduction and improving police-community relations – different actors place varying emphasis on how to achieve them. Communities, for instance, focus on accountability for police behaviour while the police focus on intelligence collection. In addition, while all stakeholders might agree on the imperative to reduce crime, they also operate with some differences in terms of what 'crime' is perceived to mean. These variations in the objectives of community policing play an important role in how community policing is operationalised.

Although initial survey data suggests that violent crime has been reducing in Jamaica since 2010 and that there has been some improvement in police-community relations, it is extremely difficult to attribute any tangible progress in these indicators to community policing specifically. Community policing is just one pillar of a multifaceted national public sector reform strategy which has been ongoing since the 1990s and there are likely to be other factors that also help to explain these overall reductions in crime.

Institutionalising community policing in Jamaica faces a number of challenges. First, despite formally being a force-wide philosophy, community policing has remained primarily the reserve of the CSSB, and has not yet

brought about the force-wide behavioural change necessary to alter the dominant culture of the JCF. Second, the significant costs borne by donors in funding community policing in Jamaica raises serious questions about the sustainability of community policing in the long term. Third, the progress which can be made in crime reduction and improving police-community relations through improvement in policing will continue to be frustrated until urgent reforms to address the inefficiencies of the justice sector are also undertaken, given the interconnectedness of these sectors.

For external actors looking to engage in community policing, this case study reveals a need for realism about what community policing can achieve in a context with the levels of institutionalised violence of Jamaica. Changing the culture of police forces is never a straightforward process; it is particularly challenging in a context in which extreme levels of violence incentivise the continuation of long-hold cultures of paramilitarism. While community policing has demonstrated some degree of success in some Communities in improving safety, it has thus far proved far from a panacea.

1 Introduction

Donors often consider Jamaica's experience of community policing is an example for Caribbean governments wishing to improve the security of citizens in urban areas. However, a closer look at Jamaica's experience indicates that the effects of community policing have in practice been mixed. Indeed, although the Jamaican government and the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) have officially adopted the ideology of a community-based policing approach, in reality senior political and institutional support to implement the strategy has been limited. And while the process appears to have been state-led, in reality the formal process is seen as having been driven to a large degree by external actors and implemented in tandem with donor funding cycles. The objectives ascribed to community policing are also mixed – including both crime reduction and improving police–community relations – with varying weight placed on intelligence collection and accountability for police behaviour.

This case study aims to understand the model of community policing that has developed in Jamaica and why it has evolved in the manner that it has. Since the 1990s, multiple internal and external institutional reform processes have been undertaken in the Jamaican security and justice sectors. Some of these have taken place as part of development partner-funded programmes; some have had, to varying degrees, explicit components related to community policing. The focus here is on the community-based policing model as the JCF has implemented it since 2008, following recommendations made in the 2008 Strategic Review to develop and roll out community policing (MNS, 2008a).[1] However, it is important to note there have been earlier iterations of community policing, albeit less comprehensive or focused in particular communities. We cannot cover these here.

The findings of this study will assist in building an understanding of how community policing develops under certain contexts, and what the opportunities, merits and risks are of supporting community policing in a range of countries. Drawing on the analytical framework set out in an earlier mapping (see Denney and Jenkins, 2013), this case study identifies a number of factors that have played a role in shaping how community policing has developed (see Box 1).

---

[1] This report uses the terms 'community-based policing' and 'community policing' interchangeably.

- Experience of conflict or emergency;
- Social cleavages and inequalities; and
- Cultures of protection and dispute resolution.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the methods used in conducting the case study research and Section 3 then unpacks the contextual features that have shaped community policing in Jamaica. Section 4 details the development of community policing, its role within the policing structure and what community policing looks like today. Section 5 examines the various objectives different actors ascribe to community policing, before Section 6 moves to a consideration of the effects of community policing. Finally, Section 7 points to a number of the challenges facing community policing in Jamaica.

2 Methods

This case study was carried out within the framework of the ODI Securing Communities Project.[2] The aim of the overall project is to map the diversity of community policing practices in a range of country contexts to understand the various forms and what factors shape them. The research draws on case studies across a varied selection of countries.[3] ODI identified Jamaica as offering a valuable example of a state-led community policing programme that was likely to be of interest to the broader international community of practice working on community policing issues. Importantly, this case study ensures coverage of community policing experience in Latin America and the Caribbean. Jamaica also offers a unique context *vis-à-vis* the other case studies under the Securing Communities Project, given its high levels of urban violent crime, presenting some distinct challenges for community policing, which multiple donors have been seeking to support (including DFID, the European Union (EU), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID)).

The case study was undertaken as a desk-based review of academic, policy and grey literature supplemented by key informant interviews. While every effort was made to ensure the objectivity of the research, the limited availability of literature, as well as the limitations of desk-based methods of analysis, means the study has definite limits, which are important to point out. These weaknesses undoubtedly affect our ability to give a complete picture of community policing in Jamaica and prevent us from addressing some issues in depth.

The literature reviewed for the study focused primarily on formal government policy and strategy documents, donor evaluations and progress reports of programmes including community policing, non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports, as well as published perception studies and academic papers. However, there is limited availability of literature looking specifically at community policing in Jamaica from the perspective of the urban population. As a result, the analysis draws less on the voices of residents of urban areas where community policing is implemented. The absence of the use of primary in-country research compounds this, so the study lacks access to local community views on community policing. Furthermore, the small literature that does exist on community policing in Jamaica tends to focus heavily on specific urban areas in which the populations face acute lack of socioeconomic opportunities and particularly high levels of crime. This bias towards 'problem communities' skews the picture of Jamaican society more broadly.

In addition to the reviews of the academic and grey literature, seven telephone interviews were conducted with a range of relevant stakeholders (see list of the interviewees in Annex 1). Interviewees were selected to include people with particular knowledge of, or insights into, community policing in Jamaica, including representatives from the donor and international policing communities, academia and civil society organisations (CSOs). Although efforts were made to triangulate the information extracted from telephone interviews with other sources (including data, literature and other informant interviews), this was not always possible.

Despite these limitations, this short case study offers a snapshot of how community policing, in its latest form, has developed in Jamaica, the factors that have influenced this development, what its various objectives are and what the initial effects and ongoing challenges might be. It is hoped that this will contribute to building a fuller understanding of the multiplicity of forms of community policing and how the unique contexts in which they develop shape these.

---

[2] The Securing Communities Project is funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) Accountable Grant with ODI, and sits within the Governance Flagship. It focuses on providing an evidence base to support more effective strategies for strengthening the provision of public goods and services in transition contexts, particularly poor, conflict-affected or conflict-vulnerable countries.
[3] Two case studies have been published, on Ethiopia and Timor-Leste, and a case study of Sri Lanka will be undertaken in mid-2014.

3 Context

The very different contexts in which community policing has emerged helps explain, at least in part, how and why it has developed in the diverse ways it has (Denney and Jenkins, 2013). Each context will be shaped by processes such as state formation, political ideology, histories of conflict, state presence, state–society relations, social cleavages and cultures of dispute resolution (ibid.: 24-31). This section examines some of the relevant contextual factors that have influenced the development of community policing in Jamaica.

3.1 History of state formation

Jamaica is an island country situated in the Caribbean Sea, the fifth largest of the Greater Antilles Islands. Before coming under English (and later British) rule in 1655, it was a Spanish colony, known as Santiago, from 1509, and, despite initial resistance from the Spanish, it remained part of the British colonial empire until its independence in 1962. During 300 years of British rule, Jamaica's demographic make-up changed drastically as the island grew into a thriving plantation economy, dependent on the use of imported slave labour.

As is the experience of many colonised states, prior to independence security policy in Jamaica was concerned primarily with the protection of the colonial state, its political administration and the commercial interests of the ruling elite (Harriot, 2000; 2009a). The JCF was established in 1867, in particular to address threats local rebellions by the 'masses' posed to the economic and political classes. Modelled on British policing practices in Ireland during that period, the JCF was designed to be paramilitary in nature, imposing control on the masses by force rather than consent (Goffe, 2004; GoJ, 1935). Article 3 of the Constabulary Force Act (1935), still in force today, states that the JCF 'shall be partially under Military Organization and Discipline' (GoJ, 1935, Art. 3 s2(b)).

The country's policing structure has been shaped by this heritage, and its policing style has been characterised by a culture of brutality and impunity rather than protection of the rights of citizens (Amnesty International, 2011; Goffe, 2004; Harriott, 2000; 2009a; Uildriks, 2009). Since independence, Community residents, in particular the urban poor, who live in particularly crime-prone neighbourhoods, have been subjected to this paramilitary style of law enforcement.

Although Jamaica may have inherited a set of formal structures of government from the British, these were far from rooted in democratic practices, and at independence the country faced the challenge of democratising these institutions. This was particularly true of policing in Jamaica, whose institutional model was more reminiscent of the Irish model of 'policing by control' than of the English model of 'policing by consent' (Harriott, 2000). As a result, at independence Jamaica faced the challenge of democratising these institutions. Yet the literature emphasises that Jamaica's style of policing remains paramilitary in nature, focused on protecting the interests of the political elites, something Harriott (2009) defines as 'political policing' (AI, 2011; Harriot 2000; 2001; 2009a; Leslie 2010).

In contemporary Jamaica, the protection of citizens and property, and maintenance of law and order, still falls under the responsibility of Jamaica's police force, the JCF. The JCF is overseen by the Ministry of National Security (MNS),[4] which is responsible for setting JCF strategy (JCF, 2012a; JCF and USAID 2008). The JCF consists of a number of operational branches, including a Mobile Reserve Unit, which is described as a paramilitary organisation by the JCF (MNS, 2008b). The literature emphasises Jamaica's paramilitary style of policing, focused on protecting the interests of the political elites, something Harriott (2009a) defines as

---

[4] The Ministry of Security and Justice was divided into two separate ministries in 2003.

'political policing' (Amnesty International, 2011; Harriott, 2000; 2001; 2009a; Leslie, 2010). The acknowledged 'militaristic' culture of the JCF is at odds with a philosophy of policing based on consent rather than control, and presents enormous challenges for the introduction of a community policing approach whose foundations are based on partnerships, problem solving and accountability to citizens (ICTBI, 2012; MNS, 2008a).

3.2 State–society relations and role of the police

Although the British accorded Jamaica some level of locally elected representation from the 1880s, it was not until the 1940s that Jamaica gained a significant degree of local political control, following the emergence of an organised labour movement (and anti-colonial movement). During this period, two of Jamaica's main political parties, the People's National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), were formed. The creation of these political parties, with sharp ideologically differences, set the stage for Jamaica's post-independence political landscape. From the 1940s until the early 1970s, politics was characterised by competitive contests between the parties' two founding leaders, and loyal party support by activists resulted in the division of inner-city Communities into distinct political camps. Political competition became embedded in patronage networks and Jamaican politicians were complicit in encouraging these divisions, diverting resources (jobs, contracts, land and housing) to urban inner-city enclaves where their supporters lived, and arming local street networks, or gangs, to intimidate their political opponents and to protect their political supporters (Harriott, 2000; Leslie, 2010).

However, from the mid-1970s onwards, this antagonistic political competition degenerated and there was a notable increase in violence in urban areas. In some Communities, known as 'garrisons', the entire electorate voted for the same candidate because of both loyalty to their political patrons and intimidation by gangs loyal to politicians (Leslie, 2010). In return for delivering votes to politicians, gang leaders (known as dons) were given relatively free rein to impose their informal rule of law over their Communities. This encouraged a mutually dependent relationship between political parties and gangs, in which politicians became complicit in their activities, and in organised crime networks, in return for political and financial support the gangs could help deliver.

By the late 1970s, political parties had close relations with gangs who shared their political allegiance. In the increasingly polarised political environment of the Cold War in the late-1970s, allegiances were formed between political parties and police officers who shared the same political ideologies. These shared political allegiances helped create links between police officers and gangs of the same political ideology (Harriott, 2000). However, as political patronage declined from the 1980s onwards, dons' relationships with political parties/patrons became less important to them. The weakening of political party control led to a fragmentation of informal urban leadership and increased competition between gangs and their leadership for access to alternative economic opportunities (Harriott, 2000; Leslie, 2010). More recently, the growth of the informal economy and an increase in the social organisation of criminal activities, such as protection rackets and drug trafficking, have formed the basis for the relationship between the police and gangs and have given rise to increasing levels of corruption within the police force (Harriott, 2000; Leslie, 2010). Although the police are much less politicised today, shared political affiliations still provide a channel through which alliances can be made between police officers and gangs (Harriott, 2000; 2009a; Leslie, 2010). There is extensive evidence that a number of police officers at all levels are involved to varying degrees in corrupt activities – from having links to international criminal networks and being involved in the drug trade[5] and protection rackets, to interfering in the judicial and criminal investigation process (Goffe, 2004; Harriott, 2000; 2009a; Uildriks, 2009). For example, the Jamaican prime minister fought a request from the US in 2009 to extradite an extremely powerful Jamaican 'don', Christopher 'Dudus' Coke, to the US. Dudus was the don of Tivoli Garden, where Prime Minister Bruce Golding was MP, and allegations of Golding's protection of the don eventually led to his resignation in 2012. This has led to a deep mistrust in the police among many community members (Harriott, 2000), especially in the urban communities most affected by these activities. There is an informal rule and saying in poor urban communities, ('informer fi dead', that crimes must not be reported to the police because, when informants report incidents, for the most part this information finds its way back to the dons and informants are killed.

---

[5] Uildriks (2009) cites one insider source as estimating that up to 80% of JCF police management are implicated in the drugs trade.

This nexus between crime, corruption and a political culture of patronage in many deprived inner-city communities in Jamaica fuelled a rapid escalation of first political and then social violence as changing political allegiances and structures of criminality were accompanied by a changing structure of violence. While crime rates in Jamaica remained fairly constant between 1995 and 2005, the homicide rate increased from 31.7 murders per 100,000 inhabitants to 62.4 (UNODC, 2011: 106). In 2009, Jamaica recorded a rate of 61.6 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, the highest rate in the Caribbean (ibid.: 106).

3.3 Urban violence and social cleavages

Jamaica has experienced increases in levels of violent crime in the past four decades, which are unprecedented both regionally and globally; violent crime has increased dramatically as a percentage of total crime in Jamaica, rising from only 10% in 1974 to 43% in 1996 (Harriott, 2000: 9, cited in Leslie, 2010). From a rate of only 8.2 murders per 100,000 people in 1970, Jamaica's homicide rate increased to 34 murders per 100,000 in 2000 and 62.4 in 2005 (Harriott, 2001: 57; UNODC, 2011: 106), when the country experienced an acute upsurge in violence. Although the murder rate per 100,000 people had decreased in 2006 to 49.7, by 2009 it had increased again to 61.6 and in 2010 stood at 52.1 (UNODC, 2011: 106).

Even when political violence decreased in the 1980s and 1990s, the levels of violent crime in Jamaica's inner-city neighbourhoods continued to spiral in the late 1990s and early 2000s (UNDP, 2012). This has been driven by a dire lack of socioeconomic opportunities, as demonstrated by chronic long-term unemployment, poverty and poor educational opportunities, which has led to poor, jobless, young men with few opportunities developing 'alternate opportunity structures' (Harriott, 2001: 60). In the most deprived areas, this includes membership of criminal street gangs and illicit criminal networks, which thrived in the weak governance environment of the 1980s and 1990s. This has been a key factor in the increasing level of violent crimes, which have become endemic in some communities.

It is important to note that, while on average violent crime has increased across the country, not all communities have been affected to the same extent; estimates indicate that the majority of violent crime is concentrated in just 4-5% of the island (Uildriks, 2009). Moreover, it is important to highlight that there is large variation in the extent to which urban – inner-city or not – communities are involved in criminal activities and connected to organised crime networks. In short, while they do exist, 'garrison' Communities are not the norm in urban Jamaica. However, it is fair to say that the victims of violent crimes live overwhelmingly in poor urban areas and that violent crime disproportionally affects poor male youth, who are the both the main perpetrators and the victims of violent crime (Amnesty International, 2011; Harriott, 2001; Leslie, 2010; Uildriks, 2009; 97). A persistent lack of socioeconomic opportunities (high school dropout rates and high levels of unemployment) has generated an environment in which levels of violent crime have become endemic, and further compounded by street gangs and illicit criminal networks, which have attracted young men with few other opportunities (Harriott, 2000; 2001). Even when political violence decreased in the 1980s and 1990s, levels of violent crime in Jamaica's inner-city neighbourhoods continued to spiral in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Harriott, 2001; 2002; 2009a; Leslie, 2010; UNDP, 2012; USAID 2012).

From the perspective of the police, high levels of urban violence and homicides have been and continue to be used to justify the use of force as a key element of daily policing (such as the regular deployment of the mobile reserve forces – the armed wing of the JCF) and use of firearms, at times resulting in civilian casualties (GoJ, undated; JCF and USAID, 2008; MNS, 2008a; UNDP, 2012; 2013). The Caribbean Human Development Report (2012) reports that, between 2000 and 2009, 1,748 citizens died as a result of use of force by police, raising concerns that these are more than just the result of shootouts with gunmen, and also owe to summary police shootings (UNDP, 2012: 134). Uildriks (2009: 100) goes further, stating that 'no-one doubts […] that a substantial number [of shootings by police] involve summary executions', and credits the police with being responsible for 10% of all killings in Jamaica in recent years. He also suggests some of these killings are organised and orchestrated from within state institutions themselves. This has served to further undermine the local population's trust in the police.

3.4 Informal protection structures

The inability of the state security and justice services to extend protection to those living in high crime-affected urban areas combines with the presence of formidable informal leadership structures (such as street/criminal gangs, 'corner defence crews' and 'dons' (see Box 2). In reality, in high crime-affected communities, these informal structures are key security actors and are a source of both protection and fear for different parts of the community. While CSOs argue that not all of these informal structures are involved in criminal activities, many of them are. Indeed, during the late 1990s-early 2000s, powerful dons dominated governance in some of Jamaica's urban areas, in allegiance with, and protected by, both political and security actors (Harriott, 2000; Leslie, 2010).

Box 2: Informal authority structures

Informal authority structures exist in most urban areas in Jamaica. The types, purpose, organisational and leadership structures and activities of these groups are highly differentiated. In addition, the relationship between them and their links with criminal networks/activities and politics are very complex, and the topic of a number of in-depth studies (see, for example, Harriott, 2000; Leslie, 2010).

- **Gangs:** Given the lack of a definition that adequately describes these informal structures, for the purposes of this study we use the word 'gangs' to describe them. However, we make no assumption concerning the extent to which gangs are or are not involved in delinquent behaviour, criminal activity or international crime networks.
- **Dons** are gang leaders. There are 'big dons' and 'corner dons'. The former control larger gangs at the Community level (including 'garrison Communities') and are typically more closely linked to organised crime networks. By contrast, corner dons are the leaders of smaller, street gangs that operate within a section of a Community and are not necessarily connected to organised crime networks (GoJ, 2009: 84).
- **Political garrisons** were historically Communities in which the electorate voted overwhelmingly for a particular political party (GoJ, 2006: 95).

By the late 1990s/early 2000s, many of these informal structures were functioning like shadow states, with the implicit support of political actors (at both the local and the national level). In practice, many of these informal leadership structures supplied many of the community's basic needs (such as food, electricity and schooling) and protected them from rival gangs and the excesses of the paramilitary policing style (Amnesty International, 2011; GoJ, 2009; Harriott, 2000; Leslie, 2010; UNDP, 2012). With respect to security in communities, this has created a complex relationship where the local population does not always consider street gangs criminals, and may instead view them as legitimate providers of security. This is exacerbated by at least perceptions of high levels of corruption that are thought to exist at multiple levels within the Jamaican police force, which further serves to increase reliance on these informal protection structures (IBCTI, 2012). The large role these informal structures play in particularly high crime-affected communities means they are inevitably an important consideration in developing community policing strategies. They are both strongly utilised mechanisms for security but also problematic drivers of insecurity for local citizens.

In a context with such high levels of violent crime, reflecting deep-rooted socioeconomic problems, and compounded by high levels of police corruption, reliance on informal security structures can become engrained in local cultures of protection. For example, despite the fact that 92% of Jamaicans surveyed in 2012 indicated that gangs make their neighbourhood less safe,[6] (LAPOP, 2013: 163), in a 2008 household perception survey,[7] when asked what good or positive things the don does, 43% of respondents said he either 'provides security', 'fights crime', 'enforces peace', 'resolves conflict' or 'keeps order' (GoJ, 2009: 84). Apart from security,

---

[6] In response to the question, 'Some say that gangs provide protection for the neighbourhoods in which they operate. Do you believe gangs make these neighbourhoods safer or less safe?'
[7] A household perception survey was carried out in December 2008 in 11 communities on the behalf of the government of Jamaica as part of the assessment of Community Security & Transformation Programmes in Jamaica.

respondents also identified the provision of social welfare services as being a good or positive thing the don does; 54% of those surveyed said the don 'supports children back to school', 'distributes jobs', 'supports the community' and 'organises treats and dances' (ibid.). Where security continues to be a major preoccupation of the local urban population, despite the fact that Community residents perceive the police to be the key providers of this public service, they may still revert to informal structures such as gangs to provide security and order. As a strongly utilised mechanism for security in high crime-affected communities, these informal structures are a reality in the urban security landscape and therefore are stakeholders in community policing strategies, despite the uncomfortable dilemma this presents for the Jamaican government, national security agencies and international development partners.

3.5 Police–community relations

As a result of the factors catalogued above, relations between the Jamaican police force and the inner-city communities they serve have historically been extremely poor. Despite ongoing government attempts to remedy this, the current state of relations is seen as underlined by a high level of distrust and fear on both sides (GoJ, 2006; IBCTI 2012; MNS, 2008a; 2008b). In 2008, the National Security Policy itself noted that 'over the decades, the police-community relationship has broken down and an unhealthy mutual distrust prevails, with the frequent cry of "we want justice" coming from citizens' (GoJ, 2006: iii).

As described above, Jamaica is characterised by an environment in which criminal structures, political power and state machinery are intertwined and which has been subject to a protracted period of economic decay and extraordinarily high levels of criminality and violence. In this context, citizen views of the police are complex.

On the one hand, the local population sees the police as incapable of providing citizens with basic levels of security and justice, and thus as not providing the protection from violence they sorely need (Harriott, 2000). In some cases, this encourages people to rely instead on the informal protection structures gangs provide. Both police and gangs, however, are complicit in the deterioration of the security landscape. Gangs are obviously providers of both security and insecurity. In some cases, there is a degree of social tolerance for 'undemocratic' policing methods, precisely to deal with the high levels of violence that confront Jamaican society (Harriott, 2009a: 126). Yet a reliance on hard-line policing tactics by the JCF has also led to numerous instances of police brutality, as well as complicity with criminal networks in some cases (Uildriks, 2009). This undermines trust in the police and can result in low reporting of crime, and has contributed to a perpetuation of violence and impunity for violence within urban high crime-affected communities. Harriott (2009a) argues that the need for protection from both rival gangs and police, combined with the economic dependency of Jamaica's urban poor on informal leadership structures and criminal networks/activities, has exposed them to a sub-culture of violence in which violence as a means of settling conflict has become institutionalised. This is an assessment supported by the MNS in its own analysis of the security situation. The National Security Policy concedes that 'Jamaica has spawned a culture of violence in its most negative form, which is abhorrent to its values and stands in the way of every kind of social progress […] and [have led to] the breakdown of social mores [and] to a widespread disrespect for the Rule of Law and the value of human life' (GoJ, 2006: iii). These contextual features have fundamentally shaped the development of community policing approaches in Jamaica, and continue to shape how community policing operates and is perceived by different stakeholders.

4 Development of community policing

Community policing in Jamaica has been under development since the early 1990s. Its evolution has involved key policies and programmes within the JCF, but also pilot programmes and, crucially, funding from the international community. As a result, community policing in Jamaica has been a mixed process of state- and donor-led initiatives.

Community policing was adopted as an official policy within the JCF in the mid-1990s. More substance was given to the approach in the early 2000s when the JCF redefined community policing as not just one policy of many, but as the philosophy of the JCF adopted by all officers (JCF, 2008: viii). However, it was only in 2008, following the JCF's adoption of recommendations[8] proposed by a strategic review of the institution, commissioned by the MNS (2008a), that there was a concerted effort to ensure its widespread application. Elements of community policing have existed for many years in Jamaica (although not as a sustained programme). Since the creation of the JCF in 1865, for instance, locally employed police officers have been embedded in rural communities as a key part of Jamaica's policing structure. In urban areas, the concept of improving police–community relations had for several decades been encompassed under the umbrella of the JCF Community Relations Unit (CRU), which was charged with building good public relations with the local community (Harriott, 2000; JCF, 1994).

During the 1990s, in an attempt to grapple with the high and increasing levels of violent crime in Jamaica's inner-city communities, the JCF began to experiment with support to community policing projects with the intention of building trust between the community and the police, through joint projects that addressed local issues and the root causes of crime. This included initiatives like those in the communities of Gold Street and Brown's Town in 1996, which reportedly registered some levels of success (GoJ, 2009; JCF and USAID, 2008). However, these initiatives were isolated pilots often driven by specific individuals (within the JCF or civil society) or donor programmes, in particular communities with little follow-up.

Community policing became a priority policy initiative when the Government of Jamaica (GoJ), with support from international development partners, embarked on a wider national public sector reform process in the late 1990s, including a number of programmes intended to modernise and reform the JCF. In 1998, there were calls to further promote community policing, and the JCF redefined community policing as a philosophy and organisational strategy. The first pilot, involving significant resource allocation in Grants Pen, was introduced and implemented from 2002 to 2005 by the USAID-financed Community Policing Initiative (CPI), in collaboration with the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). Ultimately, however, it was found not to be a suitable model for community policing in Jamaica in terms of success or replicability (JCF and USAID, 2008).

It is important to note that, although by 2005 all the key national security bodies had adopted community policing as strategic policy, and it was thus 'operational' on paper, the necessary structures and institutions to implement the philosophy in practice, let alone to achieve sustained behaviour change, were not yet in place. The JCF made efforts to rectify this by taking steps to develop a model for the widespread application of community policing. In 2006, a Community, Safety and Security Policy was adopted, which included elaboration of community safety plans, and a Community Safety and Security Branch (CSSB) was created with the objective of formalising and institutionalising community policing within the JCF. From 2006 onwards,

---

[8] The JCF strategic review 2008 recommended the community-based policing model be developed and rolled out (Rec. 3.5), and include involving community/organisation 'institutionalised partnerships working with agencies in support of participatory policing' (Rec. 3.6) (JCF and USAID, 2008).

training workshops on community policing were held for all JCF divisional staff and departmental management, and by 2008 a Community Policing Training Manual had been published. In addition, media campaigns were undertaken to publicise the use of community policing among the general public.

A number of assessments of Jamaica's earlier experiments with community policing initiatives carried out at the initiative of both the Jamaican government and donors (JCF and USAID, 2008; GoJ, 2009; USAID, 2008) informed the rollout of community policing from 2008/09. From within the JCF, the process of developing and rolling out the model was driven by the assistant commissioner of police (ACP) responsible for community policing. This post, held by an international police officer (IPO), had been created in 2006 following the arrival of a British officer as deputy commissioner of police.[9]

The community policing programme this study focuses on was officially launched in 2008 and first implemented in 38 of the 57 Communities across Jamaica (see Box 3) (JCF, 2012b).

> ### Box 3: Police organisation of service delivery to Communities
>
> In Jamaica, the geographical boundaries public agencies use to define the areas in which they deliver services vary.[10] However, the Communities identified by the Social Development Committee (SDC) – which is charged with developing community governance structures in Jamaica – are broadly recognised by most public service providers, including the police.
>
> A Community (as a defined by the SDC) is a geographical area that groups together people based on common ownership or sharing of social, economic and cultural facilities. Subsets of a Community are known as districts.
>
> Police services in Jamaica are delivered to five police areas, which are divided into nineteen divisions. Police 'divisions' follow parish boundaries except for in the parishes of Kingston, St Catherine and St Andrew, which are subdivided again. These 'divisions' are then divided up into police communities.
>
> SDC defines each Community by geographical boundaries[11] and, although policing Communities are often the same as SDC Communities this is not always the case. Not all Communities have a police station and so sometimes a police station will cover several Communities.
>
> When the term Community is used in this report, it refers specifically to a geographically defined policing area and the residents who live within it.
>
> *Source: PIJ (undated).*

Each of the country's 19 police divisions designated two Communities for inclusion in the first phase of the rollout, and from each of these two dedicated police officers were identified for assignment to the CSSB (see Box 3 for a description of the administrative zones in Jamaica). The criteria for the selection of these areas required that they be 'troubled' Communities, but also ones in which police officers were still able to operate. This was important, as gang violence in Jamaica has made policing a dangerous task in some Communities. A second requirement was the pre-existing presence of social agencies, such as the SDC or other social programmes, which were for the most part financed by donors.[12] The implementation of community policing was undertaken in close collaboration with the local community (including representatives of local government, NGOs, local residents of the Community in question etc.). By the end of 2011, formal community policing

---

[9] Reportedly, Mark Sheild's acceptance of the role of Deputy Police Commissioner was conditional on the parallel appointment of four international ACPs, each responsible for one of four key pillars he considered essential for a modern effective police force – Community Policing, Firearms, Corruption and Crime. He specifically requested that these posts be held by IPOs to ensure these four key pillars were led by senior ranking officers with sufficient experience, influence and seniority to drive change from above.

[10] Administratively, Jamaica is divided up into three counties, which are divided into fourteen regions, officially known as parishes. Each parish includes a major town, known as its capital. Politically, Jamaica is divided up into sixty constituencies. There are at least two constituencies in each parish.

[11] Community boundaries are delineated by the SDC and can be formed by natural features (rivers, lakes etc.) or marked by man-made features (bridges, roads, water tanks etc.). Communities marked by the latter often follow civil or administrative boundaries (parishes, constituency or policing boundaries).

[12] For example, donor programmes such as the DFID-funded Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP), the Jamaica Social Innovation Fund (JSIF), and the USAID-funded Community Empowerment and Transformation project (COMET).

structures had been rolled out in 360 Communities and more than 9,000 police had been trained in community policing methods, including all divisions and department management teams (JCF, 2012b).[13]

While formally community policing in Jamaica appears to have been a state-led process, the presence of international actors in the security and justice arena since the early 1990s has influenced the development of community policing. The development of the 2008/09 implementation model was strongly influenced by contracted technical advisors (both external and internal) and IPOs. Moreover, the rollout of community policing across the island has received significant financial input from development partners (primarily UNDP), USAID the EU and DFID). While the Jamaican government has funded the salaries of the dedicated community police officers attached to the CSSB and part of the IPOs' salaries – a not insubstantial investment – the lion's share of IPO salaries and community policing activities and equipment are funded through donor programmes.

---

[13] The SDC have identified 783 communities in Jamaica in total and although these are not always commensurate with policing Communities, this gives a sense of overall coverage.

Figure 1: Different stages of community policing development (domestic and external)

JCF / Government initatives

Donor support

JCF initiates CBP practices (i.e. Gold Street, Brown's Town) — 1993

JCF reform and modernisation programme begins — 1998

CBP redefined as a philosophy — 2000

2001 — IADB funds Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP)

2002

Grants Pen CBP pilot

CBP training included in basic training — 2004

USAID funds Community Policing Initiative (CPI) (includes - support to Grants PEN)

USAID funds Peace and Prosperity Project (PPP)

2005 — Appointment of an International Police Officer as Deputy Commissioner of Police

Creation of the CSSB | Community Safety and Security Policy adopted — 2006 — 2006 — Appointment of an IPO as Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of Community Policing

JCF/USAID assessment of community security and transformation programmes — 2007 — 2007

Establishment of Community Security initiative (CSI) – joint initiative between Office of Prime Minister and Ministry of National Security

DFID supports Community Security Initiative (CSI)

COMET programme (USAID funded)

2006 - 2008 focuses on three pilot communities.

2008 — 2008

Publication of the Strategic review of the JCF — 2009 — 2009

DFID supports JCF Reform

2008 - 2012 change of focus to support roll out of JCF CBP programme

Roll-out of JCF CBP programme

2011

2012 — DFID funds Community Security and Justice Programme (CSJP)

2014

4.1 What does community policing look like?

What then, does community policing in Jamaica specifically involve, and how does it manifest itself in the various levels of the policing structure? The adoption of community policing as a philosophy within the JCF implies it is the responsibility of all police personnel, in collaboration with other key actors (the general public, elected officials, the business community, government agencies and the media – together referred to as the Big 6 in the JCF's manual on community policing). To this end, community policing has been integrated into the planning and development of the JCF at all levels (national, divisional and local) and responsibility for its implementation lies with senior management and leadership. At Headquarter Command, the commissioner of police, assisted by his deputy commissioners, sets JCF policies and strategic objectives that, at least in theory, reflect the philosophy of community policing. A superintendent heads up the CSSB, which sits within the Services Operational Branch, and has primary departmental authority for community policing. In practice, however, operational responsibility for community policing rests at a decentralised level with the country's 180 police divisions. Divisional commanders and managers are responsible for oversight and technical support to ensure all stakeholders (i.e. local representatives of the aforementioned Big 6) have an input into the development of divisional plans and all police officers have the time and opportunity to address the underlying causes of crime, fear of crime and disorder in the community (JCF, 2008).

In order to operationalise the community policing philosophy, the JCF advocates the practice of nine principles referred to as the 'Nine Ps'[14] (JCF, 2008). These are depicted in the community-based policing wheel in Figure 2 below. While the force are required to apply these principles as a whole, dedicated community police officers (CPOs) are assigned specific roles for community policing areas (Communities) allocated by their police divisions. Typically, two CPOs are assigned to each Community, and they wear civilian clothes rather than police uniforms. In addition to general policing duties, dedicated CPOs, who are members of the CSSB, are expected to work in close collaboration with residents of the community and other stakeholders with a stated remit to concentrate on 'proactive, practical problem-solving' in their areas (JCF, 2008). Women are well represented within the ranks of the CSSB.

While community policing is supposed to be a force-wide philosophy and not a specialist function in the JCF, in reality, as community policing has been operationalised, this has not been the case. Instead, it has largely been carried out by dedicated CSSB officers and it is the role of those CPOs that we focus on here.

---

[14] Philosophy, Personalised, Policing, Patrol, Permanent, Place, Proactive, Partnership and Problem solving.

Figure 2: Community-based policing wheel

"Police and Citizens working in partnership to tackle problems of crime and disorder for safer communities."

Source: JCF 2008

4.2 Activities of CSSB officers

Typically, CPOs are expected to become embedded in local communities through a variety of mechanisms; they regularly attend everyday community events (such as participating in church services and sporting events), undertake foot, rather than vehicle, patrols and engage proactively with citizens (JCF, 2008; 2012a; 2012b). This aims to allow them to better relate to the community and their needs, and to facilitate a more respectful rapport with Community residents. For example, CPOs might organise regular meetings in which local community members come together to discuss community safety and security issues, such as drawing attention to abusive behaviour. The JCF 2012 Annual Report notes that the CSSB engaged with nearly 250,000 citizens in 2012 through attendance of such meetings, although civil society advocates interviewed largely viewed these events as 'community relations spin' rather than genuine community engagement exercises (JCF, 2012a).

Two of the main mechanisms through which CPOs implement community policing are the running of national police youth clubs and the provision of support to neighbourhood watch schemes. Both institutions existed prior to the advent of the most recent iteration of community policy, but the CPOs have supported and built on these earlier foundations. Furthermore, CPOs also work in partnership with community-based organisations (CBOs) to support local infrastructure and economic development projects such as the building of community centres, public spaces, basketball courts etc. within the Community.

Finally, CPOs are involved in both educating and informing the local community. They make regular school visits and engage in public relations and media campaigns (such as billboards on buses etc.) as a means of educating communities about the role they can play in building safer communities.

5 What are community policing's objectives?

There is now a formal nationwide community policing strategy in Jamaica, and some consensus among key stakeholders around its overall objectives, focused on the reduction of violent crime and the improvement of relationships and trust between the police and local populations. Yet this consensus should not be overstated. In reality, it masks a much greater diversity in how key actors involved understand community policing's objectives and how they are to be achieved. For instance, while the JCF views crime reduction as being achieved through improving intelligence collection in order to apprehend criminals and thus reduce violence crime, CSOs indicate that residents of local communities perceive the reduction of crimes committed by the police, such as police shootings, as a key part of reducing crime. Moreover, while all stakeholders widely consider crime reduction an objective of community policing, there is not always agreement on what constitutes a crime. Some interviewees revealed that some communities see police brutality and shootings as the most apparent 'crime' in their neighbourhood, whereas the police focus on the criminal behaviour of gangs, which may incidentally be viewed as sources of protection for some members of the community. Another commonly understood objective of community policing in Jamaica, shared by all actors, is its mission to improve relationships and build trust between the police and community members. However, there are nuances, both within and between the various groups, concerning assumptions behind how improved trust is articulated, how it will be achieved and what it will look like.

Below, we consider what the literature and key informant interviews revealed regarding the objectives key stakeholders ascribed to community policing. These are the dominant themes emerging from each stakeholder group that we were able to glean in research and do not suggest these stakeholder groups are uniform in how they see the objectives of community policing. There are undoubtedly variations within these groups, for instance in relation to gender, age, class, location etc., that our research was not able to capture in great detail.

5.1 Ministry of National Security

The underlying objective of community policing from the perspective of the MNS, on behalf of the Jamaican government, is to increase the public's trust in the police and improve the public's cooperation in preventing crime and disorder. This is set out in Jamaica's National Security Policy, which cites violent crime and dismantling of organised criminal networks as Jamaica's first strategic security goal (GoJ, 2006: 39). The full implementation of community policing is considered a key element in contributing to the achievement of this goal, as it is seen to contribute to the creation of an effective police force (ibid.: 39). In its 2008 strategic review of the JCF, the MNS explicitly states that overcoming distrust of the police by the public and improving the police's public image are essential to improving public reporting of crimes and thus improving the police's investigative efforts (MNS, 2008a: 4). It should be noted that the language of various official documents that outline Jamaica's community policing strategy draws heavily on Western best practice and academic discourse and has been influenced by donor programmes.

These objectives are to be achieved through a number of strategies, including the establishment of neighbourhood watch groups by the JCF. These are viewed as a means of both improving collaboration between Community actors (including community groups, private sector corporations and the local police force) and increasing the collection of reliable intelligence from the Community. Together, this will provide the police with the means of dismantling illicit networks, thus reducing crime. This approach of improving police–community relations and collecting better intelligence is considered essential to 'stimulate and promote social renewal,

responsible citizenship and peaceful co-existence in communities' through the capacity to 'transform garrison communities' (MNS, 2008a: 40).

However, it is important to note here that the underlying assumption is that the existence of criminal networks (and their illegal trade in narcotics and arms) is the major contributing factor to the high levels of violence in the country (MNS, 2008a: 39). While the National Security Policy deals elsewhere with police corruption (under Goal 2: Strengthen the Justice System and Promote Respect for the Rule of Law), it does not specifically refer to community policing as a means of addressing this issue. Thus, the MNS does not explicitly see community policing as being about improving police behaviour or increasing police accountability to citizens. While the National Security Policy recommended a strategic view of the JCF, it did not specifically refer to issues of extrajudicial killings as a national security issue, and in fact it recommended under Strategic Security Goal 2 that security agencies enforce a 'zero tolerance approach' to public order and rule of law (ibid.: 48). This may be in conflict with the partnership building and participatory policing objectives espoused in official JCF documentation and by CSOs.

5.2 Jamaican Constabulary Force

In its community policing training manual, the JCF defines community policing as both an overall philosophy and a strategic style of policing in which police officers 'establish partnership and collaboration with community residents, local community organizations, local churches and service agencies to identify and address the causes of disorder, crime and violence, and fear of crime' (JCF, 2008: 9, 14). The official JCF documentation indicates that community policing aims to improve partnerships between the police and communities in order to create a new dynamic of 'policing by consent' that is participatory in nature (ibid.: 10).

However, commentary and assessments of community policing initiatives undertaken by donors and the Jamaican government, as well as interviews with international observers and representatives from Jamaica's main donors and the Peace Management Initiative (PMI), indicate that JCF staff force-wide have a much narrower understanding of the objectives of community policing (GoJ, 2006; JCF and USAID, 2008). This narrower understanding is concerned primarily with improving information flows between the community and the police in order to improve reporting of crime, intelligence gathering and, ultimately, crime control. This more restricted perspective within the JCF effectively reduces community policing to the gathering of 'criminal intelligence' (JCF and USAID, 2008; Uildriks, 2009) and remains rooted in a traditional policing approach concerned with the apprehension of criminals, rather than the broader prevention of crime. Harriott (2009: 140) argues that community policing initiatives are likely to run into difficulties if the JCF values only crime control, as 'accountability to and power sharing with the community is unlikely to be promoted'. Representatives from PMI echo this, noting that the narrow concentration on crime reporting, which often involves cultivating police informants, undermines the participatory element of community policing. This draws attention to the fact that such an approach is quite different from the concepts of joint problem solving, community priority setting and community policing plans espoused in official documents.

It is important to note, however, that a number of interviewees differentiated between the CSSB officers and the JCF more broadly. It was felt that the CSSB officers had, in some instances, achieved improved relationships with their Communities and were committed to improving the reputation of the JCF. There is a danger that community policing becomes siloised within the JCF – seen to be operational because there are CSSB officers in place but not actually changing the broader JCF culture or approach to policing. This is supported by a review undertaken by the PERF, which indicated that, while there is internal recognition within the JCF that community policing is beneficial for crime prevention, it is largely viewed as a 'programme' rather than a central pillar of policing and crime control (MNS, 2008b). In addition, at least half of our interviewees indicated that community policing was often viewed within the JCF either as 'a public relations issue' or as a form of social work.[15] In the Jamaican context, where a strong paramilitary policing culture prevails, there is a strong suggestion that, apart from dedicated CSSB officers, JCF staff more broadly feel unconcerned by the community policing agenda and

---

[15] The fact that some JCF operational units do not see community policing as their role at all and equate it with the work of public relations is exemplified in the following quote from a JCF officer (relayed by an interviewee): 'When we finish shooting, someone else will come and do the PR.'

either do not consider it as 'real policing' or view it as 'soft' policing (IBTCI, 2012: 37). In practice, this means there are likely to be a variety of meanings attributed to community policing within the police force.

5.3 Civil society and community voices

A representative from PMI suggested that, while 'Community' residents perceive that the underlying objective of community policing is similar to that of the police – to reduce levels of violent crime – the Community is also particularly concerned with curtailing police abuse and extrajudicial killings – which it also views as crimes. In fact, this can be as much of a concern to Community residents as the criminal activities of informal structures, which may provide some degree of protection to some members of the Community. Community members see community policing as a way of increasing their trust and confidence in the police force, through the development of a form of a policing that is more effective, accords them more respect and protects their rights (Goffe, 2004).

Thus, a primary objective of community policing for community members is to reduce police shootings and misuse of force – which are viewed as a key part of the 'crime' that community policing should be reducing. Addressing such crimes perpetrated by the police is seen as a way to demonstrate police respect for citizens, as a precursor to increasing citizen trust in the police. A philosophy of community policing based on the assumption that 'community members want to live in a 'crime-free and safe community' is therefore problematic in a context in which the actors do not have the same definition of crime (JCF, 2008: 10).

5.4 Donors

Representatives from international donor agencies interviewed typically reported that community policing was a way of reducing crime through a form of remedial policing, as opposed to law enforcement, which reflects joint efforts and collaboration between police, civil society and communities. USAID, which has been involved closely in the rollout of community policing since 2008 through the COMET project, notes that 'community based policing is based on the concept that crime can be most effectively addressed through partnership between the police and the community they serve' (JCF and USAID, 2008: 1).[16]

Broadly speaking, international donors (such as DFID, USAID and UNDP) perceive community policing as a means of improving police behaviour (to curb human rights abuses and decrease extra-judicial killings) and information flows between the police and the community (as a means of tackling criminality, organised crime networks and criminal gang activity). This has similarities with the objectives of the MNS, the JCF and community voices, but combines a focus on tackling criminality with improving police behaviour. Donors also go further, assuming that improved police–community relations will empower citizens by encouraging them to take responsibility for reducing crime. This, it is assumed, will not only prevent crime but also contribute to a strengthening of state–society relations – an objective not apparent in the discourse of other key stakeholders.

Community policing in Jamaica is thus largely oriented towards two clear goals – crime reduction and improved police–community relations – but the key stakeholders involved each emphasise different aspects of these goals, or see their achievement as following different logics. This is important in understanding how community policing plays out and the slightly different directions those involved might be pushing in.

---

[16] COMET was financed by USAID and implemented by Coffey subsidiary Management Systems International (MSI) between 2006 and 2010. The objective of the project was to strengthen the capacity of the JCF to undertake community policing throughout the country.

6 What is the effect of the community policing practice?

Given that the main focus of this paper has been on the latest iteration of community policing in Jamaica – the 2008/09 rollout within the JCF – determining its effects is difficult. Five years is a short timeframe in which to institutionalise a new philosophy and practice, let alone to achieve measurable changes in crime, safety and police–community relations. This is particularly true when a force has functioned for decades within a culture of command and control, as has been the case in Jamaica, which has reinforced behaviour and attitudes that run counter to the proposed reforms (GoJ, 2006; MNS, 2008a).

Moreover, while there has been an independent evaluation of the USAID-funded COMET project (IBTCI, 2012), one component of which involved supporting Jamaica's 2008/09 rollout of community policing, there has not been a comprehensive review of Jamaica's experience of community policing more broadly. There are also a number of earlier assessments of community policing carried out by the Jamaican government and USAID in conjunction with the JCF that examine earlier iterations of community policing, and we draw on these here where relevant (GoJ, 2009; JCF and USAID, 2008).

Finally, attributing any tangible progress in crime reduction and improvements in police–community relations to community policing is extremely difficult. Community policing is just one pillar of a multifaceted national public sector reform strategy that has been ongoing since the 1990s in an attempt to modernise national security bodies, including the JCF. Differentiating between the role community policing has played in contributing to any marked progress and that of other reform processes and socioeconomic and political factors is a challenge this desk-based study cannot address.

With these constraints in mind, this section first assesses the extent to which community policing can be said to have been implemented in Jamaica, before considering achievements against the two main objectives of community policing – crime reduction and improved police–community relations.

6.1 Community policing as a practice and culture

An independent evaluation of the COMET project, which supported the JCF's widespread application of community policing from 2008 to 2012, found that the principles of community policing had been broadly operationalised and accepted within the force (IBTCI, 2012). Evidence cited in support of this assessment included the fact that members of the force surveyed understood community policing principles, and stated that community policing was integrated in the police college curriculum and training modules and that the JCF had organised its own community policing training course (ibid.). At an operational level, the evaluation noted that divisional units considered community policing when deploying officers (in particular in hard-to-reach Communities) and that community policing activities contributed to shaping operational procedures through the inclusion of CSSB officers in weekly division meetings. In addition, it was noted that the CSSB had substantial capacity, with 200 designated community policing officers based in divisions around the force, who were active in the school safety programme, neighbourhood watch groups and police youth clubs (ibid.: 14-16). This was supported by Community residents surveyed in eight communities who noted a 'greater presence, greater patrol, and greater engagement with the police, and felt that it had made them feel more comfortable talking with

members of the Force in their community and more respected by the JCF that police their community' (ibid.: 16).[17]

However, the evaluation also drew attention to the varying levels of community policing capacity within different stations and the uneven nature to which it had been operationalised force-wide (IBTCI, 2012: 16, 17, 37). For example, it noted that 10 out of 19 community policing leadership positions remained unfilled, a situation some commanders attributed to the low prioritisation of community policing within the force (ibid.: 15), it also noted 'a good number of officers are yet to be convinced that it is a better way of policing' (ibid.: 37). The evaluation report also underlined the JCF's overreliance on the CSSB for community policing capacity, highlighting a need to further develop community policing within the rest of the force by building partnerships with local actors and accountability to the public (ibid.: x, 37).

The findings of the COMET evaluation were echoed by donor representatives (from IADB and USAID), current and former IPOs within the JCF, the PMI and academic experts interviewed as part of this study. In particular, there was recognition that, broadly speaking, the 2008/09 community policing initiative had been implemented – in terms of structures being put in place – but the extent to which it had been applied in practice within Communities varied and in many cases remained limited. In addition, it was recognised that community policing was implemented almost solely by CSSB officers, suggesting it had not been accepted more broadly as the overall JCF philosophy.

This would indicate that there has been a genuine attempt in Jamaica to implement institutional reforms to ensure policies and strategies for community policing are translated into action in practice. In other words, community policing has 'function as well as form' (Andrews, 2012). Concrete actions have been taken to ensure community policing is implemented in Communities (i.e. structures have been put in place, community policing training has been incorporated into mainstream practice, staff capacity has been built up and new ways of working have been introduced). However, crucially, this has not yet brought about the force-wide behavioural change necessary to alter the dominant culture of the JCF and for community policing to become the genuine philosophy of the entire force. Until this happens, community policing cannot be translated into the country-wide initiative the JCF defines it as being.

6.2 Has community policing had an impact in terms of crime prevention and control?

There is evidence that violent crime has been steadily declining in Jamaica since 2010, including murder, shootings and robberies (LAPOP, 2013: 155). After a high point of 61.6 homicides per 100,000 people in 2009, Jamaica's homicide rate decreased in 2010 to 52.1 per 100,000 (UNODC, 2011: 104). Table 1 sets out reductions in violent crime incidents achieved since 2009, following the rollout of the latest iteration of community policing in Jamaica (IBTCI, 2012: 19).

Table 1: Reductions in crime following the latest iteration of community policing

Crime type	Incidence in 2009	Incidence in 2011
Murder	1,683	1,133
Shootings	1,666	1,343
Robberies	3,024	2,544

Source: IBTCI (2012: 19).

A number of recent surveys indicate that these reductions in violent crime have also been accompanied by improved public perceptions of security. The Jamaica public perception survey carried out as part of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer showed that, while Jamaican citizens' sense of security declined between 2006

---

[17] Community residents surveyed were asked, 'How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your community in the past 2 years.'

and 2010, there has been an improvement in perceptions of safety since 2010 (LAPOP, 2013: 97).[18] Perception surveys carried out by the COMET evaluation in 2012 also found growing perceptions that crime was reducing in Communities: 68% of Jamaicans in the eight Communities surveyed strongly agreed that there was less crime in their communities compared with a few years previously (IBTCI, 2012: 19).[19]

While it is difficult to assess the extent to which community policing has contributed to this decline in violent crime and improved perceptions of security, a survey carried out as part of the COMET evaluation found 94% of JCF members surveyed believed that 'communities feel safer as a result of community policing' (IBTCI, 2012: 19). However, the COMET evaluation also noted that, in interviews, representatives of CSOs were more critical of the JCF, 'with some characterising the community policing effort as a public relations exercise' (ibid.: 21). Academic experts, IPOs, donor staff and civil society representatives interviewed for this research also indicated that, while community policing has been successful in reducing homicides in some specific Communities (for instance Montego Bay)[20] and has prevented demonstrations in Communities that have a tendency to turn violent,[21] other factors were considered more likely to explain overall reductions in crime at the national level.

For instance, a defining event that appears to have been a major turning point in the fight against violent crime in Jamaica, and thus may help explain reductions in crime since 2009, was the extradition of Christopher 'Dudus' Coke, one of Jamaica's most powerful dons, who presided over a garrison Community, Tivoli Gardens, to the US in 2010. The Jamaican government stalled for nine months before signing the order and issuing a warrant for his arrest (Schwartz, 2011). Once the political decision had been taken to extradite him, the attempt to bring him into custody took several weeks, precipitating the deaths of nearly 80 citizens and leading to a state of emergency being declared in Kingston as the Tivoli Gardens Community took up arms to prevent his capture (Amnesty International, 2011). In the end, however, this event was as a game changer. Before his arrest, police were unable to enter some Communities in Kingston; following his extradition, gang activity and animosity reduced dramatically and interviewees indicated that, according to police sources, murder rates halved almost overnight (Schwartz, 2011).

Interviewees also cited the suppression of gangs by the police and the intervention of CSOs such as PMI in violence prevention activities as measures that may deserve more credit than community policing in reducing crime in particular areas.[22] Finally, the influence of individual efforts on the part of lone senior officers was also noted as being a key contributor to bringing about peace in troubled Communities.[23] It is thus difficult to apportion credit to the various factors, including community policing, that may have played a role in the improvements in security witnessed in Jamaica since 2009.

6.3 Has community policing improved police–citizen relations?

As Section 3 of this report noted, trust and confidence in the police have been historically low in Jamaica, with police–citizen relations seen as being underlined by a high level of distrust and fear on both sides (GoJ, 2006;

---

[18] The Jamaica survey sampled 1,500 people. The sample was designed to be representative of the Jamaica's voting age population in terms of its gender, age and geographical distribution. Data were collected in 2012 with support by the University of the West Indies, Kingston.

[19] International Business & Technical Consultants Inc. (IBTCI) commissioned MSI to carry out two surveys of 400 Community members and 150 JCF personnel in eight Communities as part of their evaluation of the USAID-funded COMET project. Purposive sampling was used to select the Communities, in each of which at least 50 community members and 19 members of the JCF were surveyed. Communities were selected on the basis of i) the length of community policing implementation (where the JCF indicated there had been relatively early and late introduction of community policing) and ii) the need for a socioeconomically diverse set of Communities across Jamaica. While the selection focused on inner-city areas that are the most challenging for increasing safety and security, with six Communities selected from these areas, the more prosperous Red Hills and Rock Hall Communities were also chosen since community policing is relevant to all Communities in Jamaica, not just inner-city areas. The eight Communities selected were: Flanker, Russia, Tredeger Park, Mountain View, Vineyard Town, Franklyn Town, Red Hills, and Rock Hall.

[20] An expert informant provided anecdotal evidence of an incident in which, following the arrival of CSSB officers in one Community within Montego Bay, homicide rates reportedly dropped; at the end of their postings, the community petitioned the police force for them to be allowed to stay.

[21] For example, the usual response of local populations when faced with Community problems such as service delivery issues (i.e. with water or sanitation provision) is to protest. However, the presence of CSSB officers has reportedly, in some cases, been able to pre-empt this, as they attempt to solve the problems before they get out of hand.

[22] For example, a civil society representative interviewed attributed the halving of murder rates in August Town over the previous five years directly to a 'peace treaty' PMI negotiated between four or five 'corner crews' in the area. The CSSB officers attended the community meetings that were part of the 'peace treaty' agreement. The gang leaders did not treat these meetings very seriously, however, and wanted to be paid for attending them as they felt they should be rewarded for being good. In the end, only one gang representative has continued to attend the meetings, although other civil society members have ensured that these community meetings have continued. They are attended by the justice of the peace, police representatives and citizens offering leadership within the community, such as from football clubs.

[23] The case of a senior superintendent who had negotiated a 'peace treaty' between warring dons in Kingston Central was given as an example here.

IBCTI 2012; MNS, 2008a; 2008b). Improving relationships and trust between the police and local populations is a key objective of community policing, shared by all actors, as set out earlier in this paper.

The 2012 LAPOP survey noted that, following a decline in confidence in the police force between 2006 and 2010, Jamaica recorded a significant increase between 2010 and 2012 (the most recent year for which survey results are available) (LAPOP, 2013: 179). This is the highest level of trust in six years (ibid.: 179). This is supported by the UNDP 2012 Caribbean Development Report, which found that, in 2010, 64.8% of the population surveyed agreed with the statement 'the police force deserves my support' and 68.5% believed the police were competent (2012: 111). In addition, when asked, 82.7% of Jamaicans surveyed as part of the LAPOP survey believed the police were doing either a good or a fair job.[24] These findings were supported by the key informant interviews conducted for this study, which referred to perception and victimisation surveys indicating that public confidence in the police and police–community relations more broadly had improved since 2010.

However, as with the reduction in violent crime, it is challenging to attribute these results to community policing alone. For example, despite the results of these perception surveys, the COMET evaluation found community policing initiatives had not had much success in increasing citizen participation in community security, and in building sustainable partnerships between police and local communities through working with civil society' (IBTCI, 2012). This underscores that the results of community policing vary greatly between Communities.

There is also evidence that the willingness of the community to report crimes is improving. Although the COMET evaluation did not specifically ask this question, the results from the Community survey carried out indicated that 73% of respondents said they felt more comfortable talking to and engaging with the police (IBTCI, 2012: 16). The evaluation also notes that, in comparison with earlier opinion surveys (such as the Jamaican National Crime Victimisation Survey (JNCVS) and LAPOP, 2010), their results indicate a trend towards greater engagement with the police (ibid.). The UNDP 2012 Caribbean Human Development Report also indicates that 60.9% of victims of violent crime in Jamaica report to the police. This adheres with sentiments expressed during interviews for this study, suggesting there had been increases in crime reporting. Rates of higher reporting would tend to indicate Community members are more confident the police will act on their testimony and this testimony will be kept confidential, suggesting an increase in citizen trust in the police.

However, it is important to note that both the interviews undertaken for this study and the findings of the COMET evaluation (IBTCI, 2012) highlight the extremely varied impact of community policing on police–community relations. While all key groups of stakeholders interviewed (donors, civil society, academics and IPOs) gave anecdotal evidence of isolated successes that had taken place in particular Communities, they also noted this was limited and not widespread. In particular, interviewees from the donor community, as well as representatives from civil society and the police force, perceived there to be important variations between public perceptions of different policing units (CSSB officers, regular local officers and external police units). While residents in some Communities perceived CSSB officers as well liked, this perception did not necessarily extend to other units of the JCF.[25] This underlines not only that there are likely to be important variations in how community policing is perceived in Communities across Jamaica, but also that perceptions will vary depending on which part of the police Communities are referring to. Interviewees suggested the greatest mistrust was of the national-level police institution – rather than police at station level. This is supported by a 2010 opinion survey that found the police ranked last in terms of public trust out of 11 other public institutions (UNDP, 2012: 158).

Urban Communities in Jamaica are not homogenous, but 'vary in social structures and political traditions', which have shaped how their perceptions and attitudes towards the security forces have developed over time (Harriott, 2000: 94-95). The COMET evaluation indicated that young urban residents (male and female) were

---

[24] Of the Jamaicans surveyed as part of the Jamaica LAPOP survey in 2012, 38.4% said they felt the police were doing a good job; 44.3% said they felt the police were doing a fair job; and only 17.3% said they felt the police were doing a poor job (LAPOP, 2013: 189).
[25] One interviewee indicated that they perceived a greater degree of nuancing in the way CPOs approach and prioritise law enforcement compared with other police officers, and indicated that this had created empathy between the CPOs and residents in particular Communities. For example, during the state of emergency following the extradition of 'Dudus' Coke, some CPOs were reportedly more respectful and less heavy-handed in their application of the law than regular police officers, as evidence by more lenient practices, such as support to the granting of licenses for social gatherings, which are seen as important to the Community for the building of social capital (e.g. 'night sessions' – dance parties for which the organisers have to request a licence) and overlooking minor infringements of the law, such as those that enable income-generating activities, including street vending and the sale of food and drinks at social events.

more critical of the police than other age groups, particularly with regard to use of force by the police, corruption within the JCF and lack of respect shown to them by officers (IBTCI, 2012: 20). It is important to recognise, therefore, that police–citizen relationships in Jamaica are not straightforward but very complex, with variations between Communities, within Communities and between the different parts of the JCF (LAPOP, 2013: 93).

Indications from various perception surveys that citizen trust in the police is increasing (IBTCI, 2012; LAPOP, 2013; UNDP, 2012) is perhaps surprising, as this sits alongside the uncomfortable reality that the police in Jamaica continue to use hard-line policing methods. Indeed, instances of human rights abuses by the police, in particular police shootings and extra-judicial killings, remain high and appear to be getting worse. Amnesty International, for instance, has been vocal in drawing attention to the rising number of police killings (263 in 2009 and 320 in 2010) and the impunity faced by those responsible owing to continued corruption, flawed investigations and a failing justice system (Amnesty International, 2011: 9). This suggests police–community relations may be improving in a context in which police use of force remains excessive, and may in fact be getting worse. The UNDP Human Development Report (2012: 158) refers to survey findings that 65.1% of Jamaican respondents support a reliance on the military to control crime – one of the highest levels of support in the Caribbean region. This may indicate that community members tolerate highly militarised responses to the insecurity they face. This poses important challenges for community policing.

6.4 Other effects

Some additional effects of community policing are worth noting here.

First, in some areas, one of the achievements of community policing has been its capacity to reduce animosity *between* members of different Communities and therefore improve relations between community members themselves. In the context of an urban environment, in which Communities have been divided for decades, bringing them together and enabling them to overcome antagonism can be seen as a significant improvement. These positive experiences, such as the experience of Tel Aviv, a gangland area in Southside (Kingston), were typically seen to be the result of good working partnerships and coordination between the JCF and a number of different agencies (e.g. the CSJP, the MNS, the SDC, local government and the Jamaica social fund). They were also facilitated by other reform processes such as the anti-gang strategy, which have facilitated and supported the presence of the police in these communities.

Second, the JCF reports that, since the introduction of community policing, collection of crime data has improved, including because police stations have been able to open for the first time in some Communities. Prior to the implementation of community policing, there was no previous history of police presence in some Communities and there was thus an absence of data collection for these areas. In this context, crime statistics were collected only at the division level. Community policing has thus allowed for wider reporting that can be captured in national databases, enabling a better understanding of the security challenges facing the country.

7 What challenges does the community policing practice face?

A number of challenges potentially limit the effectiveness of community policing in Jamaica. These relate to more fundamental structural constraints in Jamaican society, as well as practical limitations faced in implementing community policing. While there are undoubtedly other challenges not captured here, the three most apparent are dealt with below.

7.1 Commitment and resistance to reforms

All of the country's national security agencies have adopted Community policing as an official strategy as a means of reducing levels of violence and improving the quality of policing. However, while this has led to policy formulation, and implementation plans being put in place, in reality the commitment to substantive behaviour change has been limited.

Despite the panoply of reforms that have been implemented as part of efforts to modernise the JCF, Uildriks (2009: 99-100) argues the force remains characterised by a pervasive lack of institutional integrity and continues to function with impunity. Moreover, Harriott (2009) notes that transforming the JCF remains highly challenging, given strong internal resistance to change. Within the JCF are powerful internal disincentives to change, such as lucrative opportunities for corruption (attractive to poorly paid officers) (Harriott, 2009: 124-125). In addition, there is a pervasive and dominant culture of hard policing that is hard to go against (ibid.). This is exacerbated by pressure from some local populations on the police to produce results, given the high levels of violent crime and fear faced (ibid.). This can lead to some degree of acceptance of 'dirty' police methods, thus reducing apparent demand for police accountability (ibid.). The jubilant response of the public to the verdicts in the 2005 Kraal trial, in which JCF Senior Superintendent Reneto Adams was found not guilty of the murder of four citizens in 2003, highlights the presence of public support for violent police tactics in some cases (Uildriks, 2009: 96).[26] Uildriks (2009: 101) notes 'large segments of the Jamaican population now consider police brutality and killings justified in the light of the violence certain areas endure'.

A further factor limiting the transformation of community policing from proclaimed philosophy into routine practice is the fact that community policing is seen within the JCF to be the reserve of the CSSB and thus not a matter for police more broadly (IBCTI, 2012). Uildriks (2009: 113) argues that some in JCF management are insincere about 'implementing' reforms in community policing, noting that, 'as insiders will tell you, in spite of rhetoric to the contrary, JCF management do not really believe in community policing […] it is not regarded as a method that is likely to work'. The interviews undertaken for this research, as well as available reports, agree broadly with this suggestion, indicating that police cultures remain largely unconvinced about the potential for community policing to tackle crime effectively, and, as a result, not all its principles are applied in full (GoJ, 2009; Harriott, 2000; 2009a; ICBTI, 2012; UNDP, 2012). Getting serious uptake of community policing across the JCF is made more difficult by the fact that its operational units tend to work in silos. A lack of communication between the CSSB and other JCF units also works to undermine the activities of CSSB officers. For example, despite some improvements, CPOs are still not always informed in advance of raids being undertaken by other units of the JCF within the Communities where they work. Opportunities for complementary ways of working, whereby CSSB and other JCF units link up to allow the latter to exploit the former's knowledge of the local context, have not yet been sufficiently explored.

---

[26] Scotland Yard was in charge of the investigation against Reneto Adams and Uildriks argued that few in Jamaica doubted his guilt.

Finally, capacity within the police force remains an issue. While in recent years the force has begun to attract candidates of a higher educational level than in the past (which the JCF attribute to its improved image as a result of its anti-corruption efforts), many of the 9,000 plus police personnel were recruited in an earlier period prior to the reform measures, and efforts to improve their professional conduct are still underway (JCF, 2012b). Moreover, while all police officers now receive training in community policing as part of their basic training, outside of the police academy most new officers are not assigned to general policing duties before being integrated into specialised squads and so officers gain no on-the-job experience of community policing unless then are posted to general duties or the CSSB.

7.2 Funding of community-based policing

Community policing initiatives have been jointly funded by GoJ and international donors. Yet, while the relevant government agencies and bodies have adopted a community policing policy and fund the salaries of the police officers responsible for operationalising it, donors drive and fund implementation efforts, including the development of strategies, policies and implementation plans (Uildriks, 2009). External actors can of course play a role in facilitating reform processes, but this needs to be accompanied by an internalisation or ownership of the process within the JCF and the government, which has not been the case to date (Harriott, 2009a). Moreover, if donor funding to community policing ceased, it is unclear what alternative funding from domestic sources would be forthcoming, although the police may continue to refer to community policing in policies.

The dependence of community policing on donor funding also creates a number of practical issues. An interviewee noted that lack of coordination between development partners had often led to programmes working at cross-purposes (with donors, for instance, using different methods and indicators of measuring results, creating confusion) and in isolation from 'policing' and the police themselves. Furthermore, donor programme evaluation procedures are often seen as largely 'tick box' exercises, rather than genuine attempts to reflect on the relevance and results of programming. Despite some programmes not achieving their stated objectives, final reports are not seen as being open about these failures. In part, a lack of acknowledgement of failures means senior police officers are provided with no real incentives for substantively implementing community policing.

7.3 Limited capacity of the justice system

An underlying problem that has an impact on attempts to modernise policing methods and reform the JCF in favour of community policing is the highly inefficient nature of the Jamaican justice system. Although perception surveys indicate the judiciary enjoys greater public trust than the police, with 46.2% of Jamaicans surveyed indicating they had faith in the justice system versus just 48% who expressed faith in the police[27] (LAPOP, 2013: 184), the inefficient justice system is highlighted as a threat to national security in Jamaica's national security policy, as it undermines confidence in the system and threatens the rule of law (GoJ, 2006: 9).

The Jamaican justice system has been described as slow and ineffective (GoJ, 2006) and characterised by delays in processing cases, which leads to a tremendous case backlog (400,000 in 2013), which ultimately denies justice to those awaiting it (Campbell, 2013). In addition, the justice sector suffers from serious issues of underfunding. In the 2014 budget, while the MNS was allocated a budget of approximately JMD 50 billion, while the Ministry of Justice was allocated just JMD 5.4 billion (Barnes, 2014). Conviction rates are also exceedingly low – for example at around just 5% for homicides according to a recent report (Campbell, 2013). Weak court management is compounded by persistent allegations of corruption, in the form of intimidation of witnesses and jurors, evidence tampering, money laundering and corrupt attorneys (Uildriks, 2009: 99).

For as long as the justice sector remains under-reformed, the achievements of police reforms and community policing will remain limited. Without a reliable justice system to detain and prosecute suspected criminals, the ability of the police to deal with criminals according to the rule of law, and for citizens to trust the police will resolve the matters they bring to them, is constrained.

---

[27] It should also be noted that the police often perform poorly in such perception surveys – not necessarily because they are the most corrupt, inefficient or capable institution, but because they are among the most visible of the state's institutions citizens interact with on a regular basis, in a way that is not true, for instance, of the courts, military etc.

8 Conclusions

Community policing in Jamaica has been shaped by a number of contextual factors in Jamaican society, including, in particular, high levels of violent crime that encourage the continuation of historically embedded paramilitary styles of policing that have emerged from histories of slavery and colonialism. While there have been various attempts to implement community policing since the early 1990s, when community policing was accepted as the overall philosophy of the JCF, these attempts have often been limited to pilots in particular Communities. It is only since 2008/09 that the latest iteration of community policing has been rolled out, and it is this process this case study has sought to capture.

Broadly speaking, the objectives of community policing have been two-fold: to reduce crime and to improve police–community relations. GoJ, the JCF, the international donor community and community voices within Jamaica largely agree on these objectives. However, beneath this broad consensus, each of these actors places different emphasis on how to achieve them. For instance, the JCF focuses on how improved relations with Communities can help facilitate intelligence gathering to assist in apprehending criminals; community and donor voices focus on how improving relationships can be facilitated by a more accountable police force less prone to excessive use of force. In addition, while all stakeholders might agree on the imperative to reduce crime, they also operate with some differences in terms of what 'crime' is perceived to mean. Some Communities associate crime with human rights abuses and extra-judicial killings by the police as much as crimes committed by gangs. Such variations in the objectives of community policing are likely to play an important role in how community policing is operationalised and the support it receives from different stakeholders.

While it is still too early to conclusively determine the effects of 2008/09 implementation of community policing, some initial survey data suggest violent crime has been reducing – although police shootings have increased. In addition, some Communities have witnessed improved police–community relations, demonstrated by perception surveys as well as higher rates of crime reporting. However, these improvements in safety are difficult to attribute solely to community policing, and it is likely that a number of other factors, such as the extradition of 'Dudus' Coke and other reform processes ongoing in the country, including action against gangs and anti-corruption efforts, are also playing a role. This emphasises the extent to which violence of this scale requires coordinated efforts and multiple strategies to be effective, with community policing likely only one part of this. Moreover, indications of improvements in police–community relations must also be taken with some degree of caution – as there is also substantial evidence of ongoing mutual distrust between them.

Further institutionalising community policing in Jamaica also faces a number of challenges. First and foremost, it is clear that, although community policing is formally the force-wide philosophy of the JCF, in practice it is yet to genuinely take root. Community policing is largely seen within the JCF to be the reserve of the CSSB, and as a result not of concern to other police officers. This perception limits its ability to create behaviour change in the rest of the police force. Second, while GoJ and international donors jointly fund community policing in Jamaica, GoJ's contribution is limited, with significant costs borne by donors. This raises serious questions about the sustainability of community policing in the long term. Third, in order for community policing to be able to effectively achieve its objectives of reducing crime and improving police–community relations, there is an urgent need for reforms to the justice sector, which currently hampers the criminal justice process. Without this, the inefficiencies of the justice sector will frustrate any improvements in policing.

Given the above, this case study reveals a need for realism about what community policing can achieve in a context with the levels of institutionalised violence of Jamaica. Changing the culture of police forces is never a straightforward process; it is particularly challenging in a context in which extreme levels of violence incentivise the continuation of long-hold cultures of paramilitarism. While community policing has demonstrated some degree of success in some Communities in improving safety, it has thus far proved far from a panacea.

References

Aitkenhead, D. (2012) 'The British Officer Who Changed Policing in Jamaica', *The Guardian*, 7 June.

Amnesty international (2011) 'Jamaica, a Long Road to Justice: Human Rights Violations under the State of Emergency'. London: Amnesty International.

Andrews, M. (2012) *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development. Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Barnes, G. (2014) 'Gov't Presents Budget of $539.35 Billion', 3 April, http://jis.gov.jm/govt-presents-budget-539-35-billion/

Bennett, R.R. and Schaefer Morabito, M. (2004) 'Determinants of Constables' Perceptions of Community Support in Three Developing Nations', in *Police Quarterly* 6(10): 1-32.

Campbell, E. (2013) 'Jamaica's Justice System under US Criticism'. *The Jamaica Gleaner*, 13 March.

Clark, K.E. (2009) 'Predatory Politics? An Assessment of Jamaica's Civil War, 1990-2000'. Thesis submitted to the University of Arizona.

Comunidad Segura (2007) 'A Year of Peace, the Jamaican Grants Pen Community Policing Example', 23 January, http://www.comunidadesegura.org/?q=en/node/31590

Crime Prevention and Community Safety Unit (2010) 'National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (NCPCSS)'. Kingston: MNS.

Denney, L. and Jenkins, S. (2013) 'Securing Communities: The What and How of Community Policing'. Background Paper. London: ODI.

Goffe, S. (2004) 'Watching the Watchdogs: A Jamaican NGO's Experience with Lobbying for Policing Oversight and Accountability'. Independent Complaints Directorate Conference for Policing Oversight and Accountability, Johannesburg, 26-29 January.

GoJ (Government of Jamaica) (1935) 'The Constabulary Force Act' last amended in 2007

GoJ (Government of Jamaica) (2006) 'National Security Policy: Towards a Secure and Prosperous Nation'. Kingston: GoJ.

GoJ (Government of Jamaica) (2009) 'Assessment of Community Security and Transformation Programmes in Jamaica'. Kingston: GoJ.

Harriott, A. (2000) *Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: Problems of Reforming Ex-Colonial Constabularies*. Kingston: The University of West Indies Press.

Harriott, A. (2001) 'The Crisis of Public Safety in Jamaica and the Prospects for Change'. Kingston: UNODC.

Harriott, A. (2002) 'Crime Trends in the Caribbean and Responses'. Report for UNODC.

Harriott, A. (2009a) 'Police Transformation and International Cooperation – The Jamaican Experience', in N. Uildriks (eds) *Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, Security and Human Rights in Latin America.* Plymouth: Lexington Books.

Harriott, A. (2009b) 'Controlling Violent Crime: Models and Policy Options'. The Grace Kennedy Foundation Lecture, Kingston: Grace Kennedy Foundation.

IBTCI (International Business & Technical Consultants Inc.) (2012) 'Community Empowerment and Transformation (COMET) Program'. Final Evaluation, 19 December.

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2010) 'Responses to Information Requests. Jamaica: Structure and Hierarchy of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF)'. Ottawa: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada.

JCF (Jamaica Constabulary Force) (1994) 'Annual Report 1994'. Kingston: JCF.

JCF (Jamaica Constabulary Force) (2008) 'Community Policing Training Manual: Building Safer Communities through Partnership'. Kingston: JCF.

JCF (Jamaica Constabulary Force) and USAID (US Agency for International Development) (2008) 'Jamaica – Community-based Policing Assessment'. March. Kingston: JCF and USAID.

JCF (Jamaica Constabulary Force) (2011) 'Appendix A to Force Orders 3337 dated 19 May 2011'. Kingston: JCF.

JCF (Jamaica Constabulary Force) (2012a) 'Annual Report 2012'. Kingston: JCF.

JCF (Jamaica Constabulary Force) (2012b) 'Strategic Review Implementation Progress Report'. Kingston: JCF.

Jamaica Defence Force (2006) 'Strategic Defence Review A Transformed JDF Enhancing Jamaica's Security 2006'. Kingston: Jamaica Defence Force.

Jamaica Observer (2014) 'USAID Rolls Out Phase 2 of Citizen Security Project', 16 January, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/USAID-rolls-out-phase-2-of-citizen-security-project_15788972

LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project) (2013) 'Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and the Americas 2012'. Nashville, TN: LAPOP.

Leslie, G. (2010) 'Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica'. SAS Occasional Paper. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

Manning, G. (2008) 'Grants Pen Residents Say Policing Model Failed', *The Jamaica Gleaner,* 18 May.

MNS (Ministry of National Security) (2008a) 'A New Era of Policing in Jamaica: Transforming the JCF. The Report of the JCF Strategic Review Panel'. Kingston: MNS.

MNS (Ministry of National Security) (2008b) 'A New Era of Policing in Jamaica: Transforming the JCF'. Appendices to the Report of the JCF Strategic Review Panel. Kingston: MNS.

MNS (Ministry of National Security) (2012) 'Crime Prevention and Community Safety Programme Mapping'. Kingston: MNS.

MSI (Management Systems International) (2011) 'Transforming Communities and Empowering Citizens in Jamaica'. Washington, DC: MSI.

MSI (Management Systems International) (2013) 'USAID/Jamaica Documentary Highlights Best Practice in Community-Based Policing', January, http://www.msiworldwide.com/2013/01/usaidjamaica-documentary-highlights-best-practice-in-community-based-policing/

PIJ (Planning Institute of Jamaica) (2009a) 'Medium-term Socio-economic Policy Framework 2009-2012'. Kingston: PIJ.

PIJ (Planning Institute of Jamaica) (2009b) 'National Security & Correctional Services 2009-2030' Kingston: PIJ.

PIJ (Planning Institute of Jamaica) (2009) 'Vision 2030 Jamaica, National Development Plan'. Kingston: PIJ.

PIJ (Planning Institute of Jamaica) (2013) 'Medium-term Socio-economic Policy Framework 2012-2015'. Kingston: PIJ.

PIJ (Planning Institute of Jamaica) (undated) 'Spatial Boundaries of Jamaica'. Kingston: PIJ.

RJR News (2010) 'Violence Flares again in Flankers, St. James', 15 January, http://rjrnewsonline.com/local/violence-flares-again-in-flankers-st-james

Schwartz, M. (2011) 'A Massacre in Jamaica'. *The New Yorker*, 12 December.

The Jamaica Gleaner (2008) 'Flankers Residents Praise Efforts of Mobile Reserve', 7 March, http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20080307/news/news7.html

The Jamaica Gleaner (2009) 'Editorial – Making Straw Men of JCF "Imports"', 9 November, http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20091109/cleisure/cleisure1.html

The Jamaica Observer (2003) 'Community Policing Project Launched in Grants Pen', 12 March http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/40916_Community-policing-project-launched-in-Grants-Pen

Uildriks, N. (2009) 'International Police Assistance in Jamaica under Escalated Violence and Institutionalised Non-integrity', in N. Uildriks (eds) *Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, Security and Human Rights in Latin America*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.

UNDP (UN Development Programme) (2012) *Caribbean Human Development Report*: *Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security* Kingston: UNDP.

UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime) (2011) *Global Study on Homicide 2011: Trends, Contexts, Data*. Vienna: UNODC.

USAID (US Agency for International Development) Jamaica (2009) 'Jamaica Community-based Policing Assistance Progress Report April 2009'. Kingston: USAID.

USAID (US Agency for International Development) Jamaica (2008) 'COMET Final Report (Gap/Needs Analysis) Community Based Policing'. Kingston: USAID.

USAID (US Agency for International Development) Jamaica (2010) 'Country Assistance Strategy 2010-2014'. Kingston: USAID.

USAID (US Agency for International Development) Jamaica (2013) 'COMET: Community Empowerment and Transformation Video'. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xw9FBxBucaM

ODI is the UK's leading
independent think tank on
international development
and humanitarian issues.

Our mission is to inspire and
inform policy and practice
which lead to the reduction
of poverty, the alleviation of
suffering and the achievement
of sustainable livelihoods.

We do this by locking together
high-quality applied research,
practical policy advice and
policy-focused dissemination
and debate.

We work with partners in
the public and private sectors,
in both developing and
developed countries.

Cover image: BBC World Service