# Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development

How LRRD can become a practically useful concept for assistance in difficult places

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Acknowledgements

Contents

1 Introduction

Policymakers and aid actors have been grappling for decades with questions of how to better support vulnerable people affected by protracted or recurrent crises, and how to create a more seamless fit between short-term life-saving interventions and long-term efforts to reduce chronic poverty or vulnerability. The idea of linking relief and development, and later 'linking relief, rehabilitation and development' (LRRD), seems intuitively simple, but there has been much debate about how it should be defined conceptually, how to put it into practice and the implications this has for the aid architecture. While understanding of LRRD has become increasingly sophisticated, evidenced by the growing amount of literature on the topic,[1] the concept has been put into practice only to a very limited extent. With the current shift of attention towards 'resilience', there has however been renewed interest in the concept of LRRD. Many see the current focus and political interest that the concept of resilience commands as the best opportunity yet to operationalise the links between relief and development.

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has established a special funding instrument[2] for transitional development assistance (TDA) to provide aid in countries where a transition from predominantly emergency aid to more longer-term development is aimed for, in protracted crises and countries in conflict or at high risk of disasters (BMZ, 2013b). Interventions being financed by this or similar budget titles will have to deal with the range of needs, from acute crisis to structural vulnerability, which are the subject of LRRD. This paper has been commissioned by BMZ to look at the challenges to the practical implementation of LRRD, the extent to which these challenges have been overcome and how the concept could be most usefully employed today. It is significant, we argue, that such an analysis originates from a development agency[3] rather than a humanitarian one. This paper finds that the practical uptake and impact of the ideas contained in LRRD could be transformed if it were no longer thought of as linking different kinds of aid, but rather as providing support holistically across a wide spectrum of circumstances and needs.

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1 For an overview of the literature see for example Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994); Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005); Harmer and Macrae (2004); Steets (2011); Otto and Weingärtner (2013).

2 TDA is a funding instrument within BMZ's development assistance, but it is also a strategy and a programmatic concept that is valid beyond the budget title.

3 German governmental assistance is delivered by two ministries. Development assistance (including transitional development assistance) is under BMZ, whilst emergency relief is under the German Federal Foreign Office (AA).

2 Why do we need to think about LRRD?

2.1 A short history of the LRRD concept

The roots of the current debate on LRRD can be traced back to the food security crises in Africa in the 1980s. Much of the initial thinking was informed by the context of natural disasters and focused largely on risk reduction efforts (Christoplos, 2006). Underlying the initial conceptualisation of LRRD was a linear one-way transition from a phase of relief to a phase of development – the 'continuum' model. According to this thinking, 'links' mainly entailed applying exit strategies to prepare the ground for the next aid phase. Crises were seen as 'outliers' disturbing the 'normal' development path. This early period of thinking about LRRD was driven by preoccupations that remain strong today: the perceived increase in the frequency and intensity of disasters, the increased need for emergency relief and the strain this was putting on aid budgets (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994). Throughout the 1990s, this 'linear' conceptualisation of LRRD was adapted to respond to the challenges of what were then known as complex political emergencies.

Permeating this initial analysis was a perception that emergencies were costly, 'disrupting' or 'displacing' development and demanding long periods of rehabilitation (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994). The idea put forward was that 'linking' relief and development could help address some of these challenges: 'better "development" can reduce the need for emergency relief; better "relief" can contribute to development; and better "rehabilitation" can ease the transition between the two' (*ibid.*). The link in this model was arguably more analytical than empirical, seeking to highlight that development was insensitive to crisis and that emergency aid was short-term in nature and insensitive to the interventions that followed it. This early thinking already pointed to a need to do more than worry about how two forms of aid were linked, but to reform assistance along the whole spectrum.

Analysts like Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994), Longhurst (1994) and Duffield (1994) challenged the idea of a 'linear' LRRD model, and the concept of an aid 'continuum' was slowly replaced by the 'contiguum'[4] model over the 1990s. Even so, linear thinking about LRRD has continued to permeate most subsequent policy discussions and formulations (*ibid.*; Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005). The term 'LRRD' implicitly implies linearity by focusing on movement from one stage to another in one direction, rather than emphasising different ways of working that may require movements in 'both' directions and between all of the different stages.

The key EC Communications[5] on LRRD (EC, 1996; EC, 2001) clearly demonstrate the pitfalls of this linear approach. While the first Communication in 1996 embraces the linearity of the concept (though with a cautionary footnote highlighting that the term 'contiguum' may be more appropriate), the second Communication of 2001, while in principle accepting the need to apply different instruments simultaneously, nevertheless continues to emphasise that filling the 'gaps' and avoiding 'grey zones'[6] in international assistance would lead to better aid (EC, 2001).[7] Naturally, the remedies proposed centred mainly around increasing coherence and coordination among the different actors involved. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid of 2007 reaffirms the commitment to LRRD, and with it the need to smooth transitions and ensure better links between different

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4   The 'continuum model' commonly refers to a sequential understanding of the transition from relief to development, whereas the 'contiguum model' implies that all instruments (whether relief, rehabilitation or development) may be appropriate simultaneously.

5   A 'Communication' is a European Commission policy document.

6   A 'grey zone' in this context refers most commonly to the presumed funding gap that exists between humanitarian and development assistance in protracted crises.

7   See also Cisp and Voice (2001).

forms of assistance (EC, 2007). However, in this focus on the 'grey zone' in aid delivery the concern was for better links in order to 'fill the gaps', rather than the way in which either relief or development assistance actually worked. More significantly, it did not address the fundamental problem that development assistance is frequently absent in protracted crises, leaving it unclear what relief should actually be linking to. The EC Communication on Resilience (EC, 2012), although not using the language of LRRD, did identify a need for investment in a kind of development assistance (i.e. resilience-building) in protracted crises, even if it did not specifically diagnose the problem of its current absence.

The so-called 'second generation' of LRRD approaches (Harmer and Macrae, 2004) of the late 1990s, and in particular after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, has shifted the focus to linking assistance more closely to political and security objectives in fragile states, and the discourse around stabilisation and early recovery (see *ibid*.; Bailey et al., 2009). Donors have introduced 'whole of government' approaches, where different departments (political, security, economic), as well as those responsible for development and humanitarian policy, work more closely together, at times through common funding instruments such as the UK's Conflict Pool. The prospect that assistance could now be more intimately tied to political and security goals has raised challenges not only with regard to LRRD (and the application of humanitarian principles when linking humanitarian and development assistance) but also with regard to a perceived erosion of the distinction between security and foreign policy and aid. This has fundamentally changed the arguments traditionally driving the LRRD debate, from a focus on how to better address needs in recurrent crises to the political motivations behind aid allocation (Harmer and Macrae, 2004; Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005).

Many of the challenges identified in the decades-long LRRD debate persist today. While there have been some changes in the way that relief is delivered and conceptualised – for example through cash transfers and a stronger focus on exit strategies and sustainability – there have been fewer changes in the way development assistance is being provided and targeted in protracted crises, and bureaucratic and bifurcated institutional arrangements remain in place.

2.2 Inter-relations between different concepts

The recent comeback of LRRD owes something to a number of different yet interrelated debates, which are briefly summarised below.[8]

Resilience. Many see the renewed interest and political capital behind the concept of 'resilience' as the best opportunity yet to achieve progress on LRRD. Much of the discourse on resilience is about it bringing together development and humanitarian actors (and others), which makes LRRD one of the means of achieving the overall goal of resilience. (The concept of resilience is broader, not only encompassing people in crises but also those vulnerable to crises.) Resilience may also provide a good entry point for integrated programming and dialogue across different sectors (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013). Oxfam (2013: 5), for example, notes that 'building resilience will mean breaking down the barriers between humanitarian and development approaches more fundamentally than ever before. Responses to humanitarian and economic crises need to be brought together with responses to foster long-term development', a view echoed in almost all writing on resilience. (See Levine and Mosel (2014) for a fuller discussion of resilience in difficult places, which is the core principle of BMZ's TDA strategy.)

The concept of resilience also stresses the need to reform both relief and development assistance so that they can work more closely together in the same countries. Hence, a focus on resilience could provide an opportunity to a) reform development assistance and make sure that it is deployed more often in protracted crises and pays attention to the most vulnerable; and b) reform humanitarian aid so that it emphasises the need for longer-term and joint planning strategies with the development side beyond just exit strategies (e.g. multi-year humanitarian funding).[9] There is a frequently stated belief that aid for building resilience can prevent crises and

8 This section highlights only some of the related debates which the authors feel are most important in relation to LRRD. See Otto and Weingärtner (2013) for a more comprehensive overview.

9 DFID has introduced four-year multi-annual humanitarian funding, and discussions are under way towards introducing multi-annual CAPs.

reduce the need for emergency relief,[10] though credible evidence for the probable future impact of international aid for resilience-building on the needs and costs of humanitarian relief has not been produced to substantiate this. Resilience *in* crises, as opposed to resilience to crises, is not yet high enough on the agenda. Resilience could provide new impetus for thinking differently about aid in crises, bringing about a new focus on how development aid links to emergency aid and how emergency aid links to development (what we describe below as 'two-way LRRD'). Lastly, whereas LRRD refers to links between kinds of aid, the concept of 'resilience' refers directly to the lives and capacities of people in situations prone to crises. This ought to help shift the focus of discussion away from how 'we' organise 'our' aid, and towards the lives of people suffering from crises.

Rights-based approaches. Rights-based approaches that focus on duty-bearers' responsibilities and people's ability to claim their rights, rather than their needs, have been identified by some analysts as more promising avenues for practical applications of the LRRD approach (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005; Slim, 2000; Christoplos, 2006). Such approaches can provide a framework for linking relief and development by shifting the focus to underlying problems, such as the denial of rights and freedoms that is often at the root of vulnerability and poverty. However, while they provide a welcome focus on governance, they presuppose the existence of functioning national or local state institutions both willing and able to take up their responsibilities for their citizens' welfare. If these conditions are present then a protracted crisis is unlikely, since such crises are typically a symptom of weak or contested governance or an absence of political interest in citizens' needs.[11] These approaches can however be useful in emphasising the importance of changing local institutional relationships and links between people and the state (Christoplos, 2006).

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). The close association between LRRD and disasters present at the beginning of the debate in the 1980s has recently come back to

the fore with the prominence regained by the concept of DRR in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe and the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005 – and with increasing recognition of the likely consequences of climate change. The relevance of LRRD to DRR lies in the call for the integration of more disaster risk reduction measures in development assistance (so-called DRR 'mainstreaming'). DRR has usually been used with a largely technical focus, with less attention to the political, social and economic aspects underpinning repeated crises.[12] The concept is also almost entirely applied to natural disasters, though some donors, such as DFID, are also beginning to use the term DRR or 'disaster resilience' in conflict settings (DFID, 2012). The concept of DRR and its focus on different risk reduction measures – while seeking to reform the way development assistance works by making it more risk sensitive – still tends to see crises as independently determined ('stochastic'), rather than created at least in part by the conditions in a society. Many who have been critical of this politically blind approach are hoping that resilience will serve as a way of keeping a focus on risk reduction in development, but within a stronger understanding of vulnerability.

Early recovery was introduced as part of the humanitarian reform process in 2005, and 'early recovery clusters' were set up within the emergency response architecture. The concept is mainly promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the designated cluster lead, which defines early recovery as a 'multidimensional process guided by development principles that begins in a humanitarian setting, and seeks to build on humanitarian programmes and catalyse sustainable development opportunities' (UNDP, 2008). Conceptually it is unclear whether early recovery applies to 'developmental relief' (i.e. making relief more 'developmental') or to 'rehabilitation'. In practice the concept has been used mainly in relief programming. It focuses on applying development principles early on in an intervention, as well as ensuring appropriate exit strategies for handing over to national institutions and organisations. The emphasis is not on reforming the way relief and development actors work in practice. The concept is an administrative creation of the aid bureaucracy, not a new analytical

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10 EC (2013) goes even further than hoping for this as an outcome by stating that the 'determinant of success [of the Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries] will be a reduction in humanitarian needs'.

11 This parallels Amartya Sen's oft-quoted observation that famines do not occur in democracies where there is a free press (e.g. Sen (1993), among many others).

12 For an in-depth analysis of disasters and risk from a politically informed perspective of vulnerability, Wisner et al. (2003) remains essential reading.

tool. As a result it has been criticised for being too vague to be usefully applied to situations on the ground, and as such provides little by way of meaningful conceptual or practical guidance for the application of LRRD (Bailey, 2011).

Rehabilitation. Much of the early literature on LRRD assigned 'rehabilitation' a special function not limited to repairing the physical or economic damage wrought by crises. Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994), for example, highlight that 'rehabilitation' provides an opportunity for 'more than a return to the status quo'. The EC defines rehabilitation as 'an overall, dynamic and intermediate strategy of institutional reform and reinforcement, of reconstruction and improvement of infrastructure and services, supporting the initiatives and actions of the populations concerned, in the political, economic and social domains, and aimed towards the resumption of sustainable development'. Rehabilitation was initially very much seen as the 'bridge' between relief and development (EC, 1996): not just a placeholder 'in the middle', but an approach that had a different content than either relief or development, focused on rebuilding structures and institutions in a better way.

While there are many other definitions of rehabilitation in the literature – and there is still considerable confusion surrounding the concept – one common element is the 'strategic dimension of rehabilitation' (Dieci, 2006), which requires 'the attention of a variety of actors with different mandates' and a 'combination of different types of intervention'. The rehabilitation 'phase' was thus seen as a special opportunity to engage in 'development' in more transformative ways because the 'system' may be in a state of flux or fragility that can be capitalised on. It is a 'window of opportunity' – rather than a particular set of needs that people have during that particular 'phase'. The idea of rehabilitation becomes more difficult to apply to protracted crises, as there is not just one 'window' after a crisis but several 'windows' that may open or close, depending on the nature of the crisis/crises. (Re)-establishing institutions is also a fundamentally different task in crisis settings than in non-crisis environments. Rehabilitation is thus not a separate 'phase' distinct from other 'phases', nor is it a 'bridge' between two kinds of aid. Instead, it could more usefully be seen as a particular kind of development within the development 'phase', which takes into account the opportunities for substantive transformation that may open up before, during or after crises. These ideas have since been picked up in Build Back Better approaches, though there is a similar lack of common understanding about the extent

to which this should be a technical or political process, and how short- and longer-term approaches should fit together to achieve the objectives of 'building back better' (Fan, 2013).

Connectedness was included in the seven OECD DAC criteria for evaluating aid in complex emergencies (OECD DAC, 1999). The term originally referred only to emergency programming (i.e. projects) and stressed the need 'to ensure that activities of a short term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account' (ALNAP, 2006). It grew out of a concern that emergency aid could undermine longer-term structures and would need to hand over to government or other aid actors as soon as possible. The term is hence less about a gap than about 'pre-transitioning' or 'pre-linking' from relief to whatever comes afterwards. Unlike the term 'LRRD', which can refer to 'two-way links' (the way relief links to development assistance and development assistance links to relief), connectedness has been used to designate a 'one-sided link' – namely the need to link emergency aid more closely to longer-term goals and structures.

There is a dearth of writing about what to do with the concept of 'connectedness'. There is only one set of guidelines for the practical application of the term (ALNAP, 2006), which suggests using it in evaluations to give more attention to the concepts of sustainability, partnerships and local ownership. ALNAP stresses in its guide that evaluators should look specifically at the nature of partnerships between international and national NGOs, how they came about and how they were supported. It emphasises that developing links and capacity is important (whether with local organisations or local or national governments at all levels of 'civil society'). Connectedness in this sense – even though conceptually different from LRRD – becomes an important part of thinking about links between relief and development, as well as between development and relief.

2.3 Challenges to the implementation of LRRD and how they have been addressed

The most fundamental challenge to operationalising 'LRRD' remains reconciling the fundamentally different institutional cultures, assumptions, values, structures and

ways of working that characterise the 'humanitarian' and the 'development' 'communities'. Macrae (2012) describes how the divide has been created by two fundamentally different paradigms. Development assistance in the immediate post-colonial period was mainly delivered through governments and aimed at strengthening them. As awareness grew in the 1980s that governments were often unable or unwilling to provide for their citizens, the aid architecture became increasingly bifurcated: humanitarian aid was mainly aimed at saving the lives of *individuals*, and had to work *around* recalcitrant governments to do this, while development assistance was aimed at supporting *systems* and institutions and was delivered primarily *through* governments (Macrae, 2012). This fundamental distinction around who or what a particular kind of aid is for and how it is to be delivered creates obstacles to changing the way in which relief and development assistance is carried out. It may also explain the difficulties aid actors face in deploying development assistance in conflict settings where there is often no governmental structure to work with. Different donor countries' institutional arrangements, including the German aid architecture, where BMZ focuses on 'development cooperation' and the German Foreign Office on 'emergency relief', mirror this understanding of aid.

The practical application of 'LRRD' also raises questions regarding the independence and neutrality of humanitarian aid, in particular in the wake of moves towards greater UN integration (Metcalfe et al., 2011) and the increased politicisation of aid since 9/11 (Harmer and Macrae, 2004). Many humanitarian actors would still insist that not working with state institutions (and development actors whose responsibility it is to build the capacity of local institutions) is the best way to safeguard humanitarian principles in conflict. However, as analysts such as Macrae (2012) argue, working with state institutions does not mean ditching humanitarian principles but taking highly pragmatic, context-specific decisions on whether working with local institutions is in the interests of the most vulnerable. As Collinson and Elhawary (2012) point out, 'humanitarian space' has always been deeply political and hence strong political and context analysis has always been necessary, particularly by humanitarians, in order to safeguard humanitarian principles. Working with colleagues from the development 'side' could, as several donors and aid agencies interviewed for this study pointed out, in effect help both humanitarians and development

actors divide tasks more easily and make decisions in a politically informed way.

A third challenge to operationalising LRRD has been the lack of clarity about the problems the concept is actually trying to address. There are no agreed definitions of what the concept or any of its components – relief, rehabilitation and development – mean, or where each component starts or ends (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013). This raises the question of what its components ('R-R-D') are actually trying to link up to, and whether the concept actually refers to a 'bridge' between relief and development, and if so what kind. It is also unclear whether the concept refers to a linear transition (as its name seems to imply) or whether it refers to non-linear, unpredictable phases that overlap. As Steets (2011: 3) highlights, the concept has been used with varying emphasis to mean one of three things: 1) the early application of development principles in emergency settings; 2) a 'smooth transition' from emergency aid and sustainable interventions on the ground; and 3) the integration of prevention and DRR elements in development cooperation.

LRRD could be taken to refer to either a bureaucratic or structural issue (e.g. a funding mechanism), a programmatic mechanism (a particular kind of programme content) or a modality (i.e. an exit strategy or the way in which assistance is delivered). The commonly held idea of a temporal funding gap between a 'humanitarian' and a 'developmental' phase has proven untenable (Steets, 2011). Instead, there is some evidence that a funding gap exists for recovery activities and strong evidence that fragile states or states in protracted crises do not receive sufficient development support (*ibid*.). The fundamental problem of reforming the way development assistance is delivered in emergencies and protracted crises has yet to be addressed – a challenge recognised in the establishment of TDA.

A fourth challenge has been that LRRD refers solely to the way *we* organise *our* aid, rather than the needs the aid is supposed to address. While much has been written about the various concepts of LRRD, the biggest lacuna in the literature and research is in looking at what LRRD actually means for people on the ground, and how they can best be supported (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005). In this sense LRRD has been about 'our' solutions contributing to 'their' LRRD', i.e. the links that people themselves make with the institutions (formal or informal) and organisations that affect their daily lives (Christoplos, 2006).

2.4 Why is LRRD back on the agenda?

Much of the LRRD debate has been driven by humanitarian actors (as is the case with resilience). The concept has never become a central preoccupation of development assistance. This has consistently reinforced the 'one-way' linearity of the concept, as the key preoccupation has been about links from relief to development ('when do I hand over what to whom – and how?'), rather than about how to do better development in circumstances where extreme needs are entrenched. The concept has thus mainly been used to think about exit strategies.

Efforts to link relief and development did not work in the past because in effect the model was set up to address the wrong problem: crises continued to be perceived as outliers rather than the norm, and LRRD only made sense in a world where sudden natural disasters were disturbing 'normal' developmental progress (Macrae, 2012). Development assistance was absent in protracted crises and was not targeted to the people most vulnerable to crises. This was despite the fact that some of the scholarship on LRRD in the 1990s already pointed to 'emergency as norm' (Maxwell, 1994) and a 'crisis in developmentalism', whereby the normative concept of development is unable to deal with 'permanent emergencies' (Duffield, 1994). Links between vulnerability and deep structural inequalities in societies were not acknowledged and disasters were seen as 'unfortunate' events rather than 'symptomatic of poverty and political crises' (Macrae, 2012).

Fundamentally, LRRD, in its 'one-sided' or 'linear' interpretation, was the wrong solution to a still persistent problem: how do we programme development assistance in contexts of recurrent or protracted crises in fragile and often also conflict-affected states, where needs are extreme and constantly shifting in a non-

linear way. Rather than tackling this problem the concept of LRRD was used to focus much more on linking different kinds of aid and how to address the presumed 'gap' between them.

We argue that the fundamental issue of LRRD is *not* to find a new category or funding mechanism to put in the 'middle', but to find a *different way* of thinking about development in protracted crises and how to target those most vulnerable to falling into crisis. Many of the same problems are also part of the discourse of 'resilience'. This different way of working would mean that development 'instruments' need to become more flexible and adaptable in order to engage with routine unpredictability and crises, and people's changing and diverse needs.

A reinterpretation of the concept of LRRD is needed. This 'new' model would essentially not be about linking different kinds of aid, but about finding a different model of long-term engagement that can deal with protracted and recurrent crises as part of normality. Rather than thinking of people transitioning out of crises, we need to think of LRRD in terms of 'two-way LRRD' where overlaps, links or transitions at both 'ends' (the 'relief' and the 'development' side) go in both directions; and more crucially, a new holistic approach is taken to giving support across the entire spectrum from short term to long-term (or 'relief to development'). As discussed below, such a model would have to fundamentally reform the way both humanitarian aid and development programming work. This presents profound challenges to the programme planning, management and evaluation tools currently in use.

In the rest of this paper, we thus use the term 'LRRD' in its common usage, and specifically use 'two-way LRRD' for our proposed understanding of the concept. The intention is not to introduce new jargon, but merely to highlight the limited way that 'LRRD' is currently thought about.

3 What are others thinking and doing with regard to LRRD?

The concept of LRRD is used much less today than it was in the 1980s or 1990s, though it has recently seen a resurgence among mostly European donors in the context of 'operationalising resilience'. In North America similar issues are addressed under the concept 'developmental relief' or 'relief-development' (Steets, 2011). LRRD was adopted as one of the 23 principles for Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) in 2003.

The major driving force behind the continued use of LRRD as an organising concept of aid remains the European Union. The Commission has highlighted ways of practically applying LRRD in various Communications over the years, mainly around coherence, coordination and joint planning and analysis (cf EC, 1996, 2001, 2007), and in 2012 the European Parliament also published a policy briefing on LRRD (European Parliament, 2012). In 2011, the Commission designed a 'Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF)' for 'transition situations', which has been applied as a planning tool to guide analysis supporting the SHARE initiative.[13] EU initiatives on LRRD are particularly prominent in the field of food security, where the SHARE and AGIR[14] initiatives are seen as a way of improving humanitarian and development interaction, though these initiatives are quite new and few practical successes can be discerned.[15] The US has grappled with similar challenges in operationalising LRRD due to institutional, conceptual and operational hurdles (Koddenbrock, 2009).

There is no lack of policy commitment to LRRD (the EC and many European donors including the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Ireland have either explicitly committed to, or expressed an interest in, using the concept to inform their aid strategies), and several donor countries have commissioned studies or reviews on the 'state of the art' of LRRD. A much longer discussion on LRRD can be found in these studies (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013; Steets, 2011; Lassila, 2009; Swiss Red Cross, 2010).

For many donors, commitments to LRRD have been renewed under the overall framework of resilience programming, with LRRD often a key principle in operationalising resilience. Interviewees for this study, however, noted that this did not mean that they were doing anything differently; instead, they saw 'resilience' as a useful way of engaging with other donors and with their own ministers to promote LRRD thinking.

New instruments have helped to make humanitarian funding in particular more flexible and longer-term: several donors are looking at multi-year funding options (e.g. the EC and DFID), or multi-year commitments with yearly renewals of grants (Danida). Some donors are moving away from project grants altogether in favour of strategic partnership agreements (Danida and DFID) which allow partners greater flexibility in funding and programming cycles. There are some specific budget lines for LRRD, such as the European Instrument for Stability, Norway's gap budget line and USAID's Transition Initiatives.[16] The use of the term 'transitional' in BMZ's TDA implies that it is also seen as relatively short- to medium-term assistance designed to link to longer-term development aid. Other donors have increased the flexibility of existing funds by pooling resources or adapting the eligibility criteria for funds such as the Dutch Stability Fund, the Danish Stabilisation Fund and Canada's Peace and Security Fund, or have set aside a specific share of humanitarian or development funds for recovery (Steets, 2011: 30). Otto and Weingärtner (2013) find that flexibility within already allocated

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13 The EC initiative on 'Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience' (SHARE) is a joint humanitarian–development programme that started in response to the 2011 Horn of Africa food crisis.

14 The Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR) is promoting resilience by creating synergies between emergency aid and longer-term development in response to chronic food insecurity in the Sahel.

15 For a full overview of EU initiatives in the field of LRRD see Otto and Weingärtner (2013).

16 For a full overview and detailed description of the available funds, see Steets (2011: 28ff).

funds or mechanisms, such as USAID's 'crisis modifiers',[17] seems to work better than flexibility in the use of different or new funding mechanisms.

Very few specific tools or guidelines have been developed for LRRD (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013). This is particularly surprising given the longevity of the concept and the ample theoretical discussions that the concept has inspired since the 1980s. The lack of a link between theory and practice was highlighted by evaluations of 'LRRD programmes' after the Indian Ocean tsunami (Goyder et al., 2006; Brusset et al., 2006; Ternström et al., 2006) which found little evidence that LRRD as a principle had driven programming in practice. LRRD policies were seen as 'too vague and disconnected from practice to make any tangible difference' (Christoplos, 2006: 36).

In interviews donors stressed that coordination between humanitarian and development actors, as well as joint planning and coordination, were working better at the field level than at headquarters. Several donors have established joint humanitarian and development offices; for example, FAO emergency offices are now part of the office of the development representative, and SIDA has joint humanitarian and development teams in some fragile states (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 36). Although ECHO and DEVCO remain separate institutions, both in Brussels and in country, there have been attempts in the last two years to bring the two together for analysis and planning purposes.[18]

There has also been some progress in efforts to decentralise planning, analysis and responsibility for fund allocation to the country level. DFID, for example, manages both humanitarian and development budgets at country level, and decision-making is fully decentralised. DG ECHO has decentralised planning and implementation of programmes to its 44 country and six regional offices, though funding decisions are still taken in Brussels (Steets, 2011). The Australian government has also decentralised many of its programme management functions to the country level, including financial and programming authority (*ibid*.). In some countries, such as Indonesia, Australia is funding 'facilities' rather than projects, with decisions about how funds are used fully located at the country level. The 'Poverty Reduction Support Facility' in Indonesia sets the overall goal, e.g. 'to support the Indonesian government in social protection', but leaves open the different components by which this will be achieved to adapt to changing contexts, needs and partnerships at country level.[19]

There remain very limited examples of interventions which are explicitly designed and spoken of as a practical application of LRRD. (There is a parallel here with resilience, in that much good policy formulation and programming may go on which actually reflects the principles of LRRD, but makes no explicit reference to LRRD or connectedness theory.) LRRD has also remained very much a humanitarian concept for many donors, and as such many of the perspectives and approaches have only limited relevance to a re-interpretation of the concept of LRRD with a focus on changing the way development assistance works in protracted crises

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17 A 'crisis modifier' allows for the injection of additional funds should a crisis occur.

18 As one observer noted, this is disappointing given that the LRRD debate has been going on for more than two decades, and the two offices in Brussels are within walking distance of each other.

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19 For more information see http://www.grminternational.com/projects/poverty_reduction_support_facility.

4 Characteristics of countries targeted for TDA and the practical implications for programming

4.1 Characteristics of target countries for TDA

Harmer and Macrae (2004) define countries in protracted crises as places where 'a significant proportion of the population is vulnerable to death, disease or disruption of their livelihoods over a long period of time'. Governance structures are usually weak, with the state unable or unwilling to adequately protect the population from these threats. FAO (2010; 2012) highlights key characteristics of protracted crises, including longevity, the presence of conflict, weak governance, unsustainable livelihoods and the breakdown of local institutions.

What does this mean for engagement in these contexts?

- There are extreme and widespread needs (where the 'normal' continuously passes emergency thresholds).
- Needs are often unpredictable and changing rapidly, with different segments of the population needing very different support at any given time.
- Insecurity is often high, as state structures are weak and contested or have broken down completely, leading to absent or weak rule of law.
- There is often deep mistrust within societies and between societies and what is left of state structures, and a high degree of politicisation of resources (including aid).

Beyond these basic characteristics, countries in protracted crises often do not share any common features or underlying factors that make them prone to crises. There are good reasons to be cautious about devising any 'blueprint' models of interventions in these particular contexts, beyond some basic principles of engagement.

4.2 Practical implications for the way assistance is delivered

Two main problems need to be tackled. First, most engagement in protracted crises has been from a humanitarian angle, with short-term goals, rather than from the development side. Development assistance has often been absent or minimal in countries suffering from protracted crises and, where present, has largely failed to target those most at risk of falling into crisis. Second, development 'instruments' are ill-equipped to deal with routine unpredictability and are not responsive enough to changing circumstances. As discussed below, current programme management and monitoring tools are geared towards measuring the achievement of predefined outcomes and outputs and penalise deviations from set project goals. Underlying causes of vulnerability and how these relate to the wider political, social and economic context in a particular setting are poorly understood and seldom targeted by programming.

A key characteristic of protracted and recurrent crises and countries in 'recovery' is that they suffer from long-term, extreme structural vulnerabilities. A fundamental question guiding interventions in 'transitions' might then be the extent to which an intervention should seek to engage in 'transformative' issues, rather than just 'restoring the status quo'. Do crises (even if protracted) present opportunities for engaging in the 'big issues' and addressing the

structural inequalities that drive vulnerabilities in these societies?

The level and quality of engagement with the state has often been presented as one of the key dilemmas at the heart of the LRRD problem, with fundamental differences in the way humanitarian and development actors approach the issue (cf Section 1.3). Particularly in protracted crises or conflict settings, where the state is often part of a conflict and unable or unwilling to provide services and protection to its citizens, deciding whether and how to engage with the state may not be easy. This has fundamental consequences for the way in which programmes are conceived, their sustainability and issues of 'ownership' and accountability to beneficiaries (Koddenbrock, 2009).

The dichotomy of either having to work through the state or work around it is however a false one, for two reasons. First, states and governments are not monoliths. Even in contexts where the state is predatory, there will usually be parts of the system or particular institutions, bureaucrats or ministries with which aid actors can work. Second, the choice is not simply between either working through the state or ignoring it. Many kinds of relationship are possible, including being supportive but challenging. The point of departure should be to focus on how best to support people's capacity to cope better in the face of crisis. In each context thorough political and institutional analysis is needed to decide whether this can be achieved best by supporting the state or by supporting people, civil society actors or other formal or informal structures, either directly or by helping them to put pressure on the state. Evaluations of the

response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami have shown that the most important LRRD links are made between affected people and the formal or informal, state or private institutions they depend on in the long term for their livelihoods and general wellbeing (Christoplos, 2006). Forging these links demands good knowledge and understanding of the local context and local institutions, as well as the political environment.

Another key problem in operationalising LRRD has been how to deal with the inevitable trade-offs when rebuilding during or after crises. Trade-offs are not only due to limited resources, but also about choices around prioritising objectives. For example, choices sometimes have to be made between meeting short- or medium-term food security or livelihood objectives through the direct delivery of basic services on the one hand and, on the other, the longer-term rehabilitation of state and governance structures, which would be achieved by supporting a gradual improvement in the capacity of state institutions to deliver those services (FAO, 2012). In terms of aid principles, there are often trade-offs to be made between adherence to 'humanitarian principles' versus others, such as the OECD DAC principles for engagement in fragile states (which have state-building as their overarching principle). There are often no easy or 'blueprint' solutions to these questions, if only because a simple appeal to the primacy of humanitarian principles must acknowledge that the characterisation of any situation as 'humanitarian' has no clear-cut criteria to rely on. Trade-offs need to be openly addressed in all programming and aid actors need to be much more realistic about the ambitions and goals that they set for themselves.

5 What would a good LRRD programme look like?

5.1 Key principles of a good LRRD programme

This paper has argued that there can never be generic programming for LRRD. Evaluation studies on LRRD (Goyder et al., 2006; Brusset et al., 2006; Ternström et al., 2006) found that the key to successful LRRD programmes is less in LRRD planning or LRRD-specific approaches, but in interventions that had strong engagement and local partnerships on the ground were best able to marry short- and long-term perspectives. A good LRRD programme, in other words, is first and foremost a good programme. However, some broad principles can be discerned.

Flexibility: In order to genuinely incorporate the unpredictability and uncertainty of crises into programming (rather than assuming that crises are 'outliers'), our 'tools' would need to become more flexible and adaptable to changing contexts. As discussed above, more and more donors are adopting the principle of 'flexibility' in their programmes. Flexibility has usually been used to refer to funding mechanisms that can 'flex' – i.e. get larger or smaller, or funding from different 'pots' can be redirected for other purposes than originally designated. Within the latter, a popular concept is that of 'crisis modifiers' or 'contingency funds', which are often part of preapproved internal risk financing arrangements in development funds, and can be used in case of an emergency to scale up funding for rapid response or early warning activities. This is however often not sufficient. Crisis modifiers or contingency budget lines allow flexibility with a limited percentage of a budget, but presuppose that the main budget should continue to be used according to the original plan – even if circumstances have changed. While multi-year, predictable funding is important, real flexibility would entail not simply changing the way programmes are *funded*, but also changing the way in which unpredictability and uncertainty are integrated into programming *itself*. This would mean integrating key

changes to both the modalities of delivery and the content of programme planning and implementation.

Real flexibility for programme content would mean encouraging and even demanding responsiveness to contextual changes, rather than discouraging or penalising modification. Donors should be holding conversations with implementing partners and actively demanding to see how the programme has adapted to changes over time. Flexibility should also be adopted at the level of impact, meaning that there would be an explicit programme objective to prepare people for an unpredictable future by giving aid that is relevant in many different scenarios; by supporting adaptive capacity (Ludi et al., 2012); and by encouraging, rather than seeking to prevent, people from using interventions to advance their own diverse objectives. This level of flexibility may demand, for example, adopting higher-level programme objectives that can be tailored to situational changes if needed. Currently, the 'effectiveness' of programmes is often defined as meeting static, predefined objectives. Input/output-based logframes struggle to deal with changes in a programme as a necessary adjustment to changing circumstances. Programme frameworks that are based on broader theories of change and higher-level objectives could allow for the flexibility necessary in recurrent crises. Australia's funding of 'facilities' instead of 'projects' in Indonesia illustrates this point well. As the goal that is to be achieved in such a 'facility' is set at a much higher level, it leaves more flexibility in terms of the different means and approaches that might be used.

Risk taking and openness to learning: A programme that is sensitive to crises and contextual changes would need to be flexible enough to test what works and what does not. This would mean investing extensively in learning to accompany a programme and monitor the effect it has while it is being implemented, point to the need for course corrections or suggest the termination of all or parts of the programme should it not be having the desired effect. Such an approach often sits uneasily with current programme cycle management.

Box 1: Learning while doing

There is a recent move towards investing in generating real-time learning either within or as an accompaniment to operational aid programmes. These learning components are designed to generate both locally specific lessons for the programme itself – which then has to be designed with sufficient flexibility to take advantage of the learning – and more general or thematic lessons for a wider audience. Good examples of programmes with inbuilt learning partnerships include some of DFID's development, multi-year humanitarian and climate change programmes,[20] and USAID's Sahel Resilience Learning Project (SAREL).

The DFID AAWAZ programme in Pakistan is arranged around a consortium of implementing partners with one research partner responsible for evidence collection and learning as an integral part of the consortium. This research partner carries out research and collects evidence, monitors implementation and progress and advises on changes based on context analysis and evidence collected. The programme is multi-year and designed in phases, with the inception phase often intended for additional research as well as trialling and testing riskier programme approaches or components. The explicit assumption underpinning this programme design is that certain programme components might change significantly or will even be discontinued after initial trial if the context changes.

Thorough context and political analysis: A genuine 'two-way LRRD' programme would require strong context analysis, including a thorough understanding of the political economy, local power relations and the structural inequalities underpinning vulnerability and poverty. For example, BMZ's 2013 policy for working in fragile contexts (BMZ, 2013a) makes conflict analysis essential (pp. 16 and 20). Strong context analysis is premised upon in-depth knowledge of and good links with local institutions and organisations

and the people who are to be the ultimate beneficiaries of aid. There would need to be a fundamental rethinking both with regard to the time that 'real' engagement and analysis takes, and the way this engagement is done.

Working with local institutions: In order to genuinely reform the way development assistance works in crises, aid actors also need to be much more open and reflective about the ways they engage with local institutions and organisations on a number of levels: the range of partners; the nature of the relationships formed; and the extent to which the relationships reflect reality on the ground. Though there are of course examples of very different practice in many countries, all too often engagement is limited to state actors or 'local NGOs', organisations created as vehicles to channel international aid. In many protracted crises, a broader perspective and understanding of the kinds of actors that are locally important and potentially useful is crucial. These may include not only different levels of the state (local, regional, mid-level bureaucrats) but also other formal and informal institutions (traditional authorities, clan structures etc.), local civil society groups (beyond national NGOs) and businesses.[21] Crucial for such engagement will be a good understanding of local power relations. Ideally, relations would be built with organisations that also take a holistic approach to working across the whole relief–development spectrum. This is however often challenging. Relationships and/or partnerships can encourage organisations to build more links with relief and development partners and donors.

As mentioned above, a wide range of possible relationships are available with both state and non-state institutions. Not all relationships need to be outright partnerships, i.e. where shared goals are pursued together, and where either organisation may sacrifice one of their goals for the sake of the other's. Meaningful relationships or collaborations to a greater or lesser degree may be more appropriate in protracted crises, particular with the state and private businesses. Guiding questions for such relationships would include:

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20 See DFID Pakistan Business Case for detailed explanation of the model. Other examples include DFID's Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters Programme (BRACED) and Building Resilient Communities in Somalia.

21 Governmental international assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, tends to see the central government as the natural partner, particularly for development assistance. Some specific funding instruments such as TDA have the flexibility to move away from this and work with local government or outside the government altogether.

- Over the long term, does the relationship bring about positive change in the lives of affected people?
- Do we understand any possible negative impacts of establishing relationships with particular institutions? Are mechanisms in place for monitoring this and could the risks be mitigated?
- To what extent are partner institutions able to serve affected people in the long term, and with what legitimacy?
- Are people's links with the institutions that are important and meaningful to them in the longer term being supported (e.g. local or central government, traditional authorities, informal structures)?

Engagement is often intended to build the capacity of the organisation: it should rather be premised on the overall goal to improve the lives of the people who have to deal with it. An assessment of whether strengthening or engaging with an organisation will contribute to improving people's lives – and in what way – would be an important first step in any analysis of how best to support that organisation.

Current approaches also focus overly on 'capacity-building' through one-off engagement and an overreliance on transferring skills. An analysis of actual constraints to functionality within organisations may find very different problems, e.g. high staff turnover in local government (see for example World Bank (2001)). In the contexts where TDA will be used, functionality should also be forward looking, supporting the adaptive capacity of organisations so they can adjust themselves to a changing future. There is an inevitable tension between working through existing processes and norms to bring change and working to challenge and transform the accepted norms which create or

Box 2: What do good LRRD projects look like?

UNICEF took the Ugandan government's Self Reliance Strategy (SRS) as a starting point and paid the set-up costs for a national microfinance institute to start working in Northern Uganda which could lend to refugees (though not exclusively, and in effect most money was lent to local government officials as they could guarantee loans with their regular salary). This helped indirectly to pay for continuity of services not only for the local population but also for refugees. This was never called an 'LRRD project', but it tackled issues from a longer-term perspective, worked within government policies (e.g. the SRS strategy), and, rather than emergency-type programming for vulnerable groups, helped provide services to all – while ensuring that refugees were included in services that had been identified as useful for them.

DANIDA supported a Public Works Programme which gave people vouchers for work with which they could get farming supplies. This was linked to a long-term national business credit programme supporting suppliers. DANIDA combined this with strong advocacy against the free distribution of seeds and tools, which was undermining attempts to develop a market that could provide a sustainable supply of agricultural inputs and services.

In several situations of displacement, NRC has set up local counselling centres to provide information and legal advice to all (refugees, IDPs, locals), including on how to tackle underlying issues such as conflict over land and how to resolve disputes constructively. The centres also help connect people to state services, livelihood opportunities (e.g. job centres and vocational training) and advice on how to access land, thereby equipping people with information and knowledge as well as connecting them with state and non-state structures.

Reintegration and Development Centres (RDCs) in South Sudan run by what was then the German Development Service (DED) established an initial focal point for returnees (returning IDPs, refugees, locals) under the overall authority of the local government. At this focal point people could get connected to local government, found information on livelihood and training opportunities (links to a government jobs database as well as to opportunities provided by other NGOs) and information on where to get access to credit and business grants, as well as the availability of local services (e.g. HIV/AIDS treatments). The project thereby encouraged greater citizen–state links and engagement, and also created a space for mutual exchange and dialogue, which enabled people to express their demand for services and allowed local government officials to hear and engage with citizens.

maintain inequality or vulnerability. There are no simple rules to determine how to manage this tension, except to stress the need to be aware of it and to make explicit and reasoned choices.

Joint analysis/planning and learning at country level: Ideally, far more people should be involved in aid planning, including academics and individuals from different parts of government, and the aspirations of the people[22] affected by crisis should be the starting point for aid planning. Decentralisation is generally seen as conducive to 'good LRRD' because it is presumed that staff will be 'closer to the ground' and have a better understanding of the local context (Steets, 2011; Otto & Weingärtner, 2013). However, decentralisation often means handing over responsibility without the power (e.g. the resources) to meet those responsibilities, allowing the central authority to absolve itself of accountability. It cannot be assumed that government staff closer to a conflict will always conduct a more impartial analysis or be aware of all the national or regional issues of concern.

Realistic programming: More clarity and a more realistic understanding about what a programme can achieve is required. In most cases, people continue with their lives regardless of the often chaotic workings of aid programmes. In this sense, a shift away from a preoccupation with the bureaucracy of the aid industry and a focus on what affected people are doing already, and how their agency and links to institutions can best be supported, would be a good step forward for the 'LRRD debate'.

Box 2 gives some illustrations of what might be regarded as good LRRD projects. None of these projects was explicitly intended to be an 'LRRD project', but they addressed structural needs in emergency or recovery situations by using short-term interventions designed from a long-term perspective. Some common characteristics can be discerned:

- Identify a real constraint and try to tackle it with as few external resources as possible, and without providing a substitute service.
- Establish links between people and long-term self-sustaining formal/informal institutions or state structures which help build longer-term relationships.

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22 These are rarely documented. See IFRC (2013) for a rare example.

- Help people to adapt – whether through the provision of information, skills or adaptive capacity.
- Respond to pressing needs with a short-term intervention which takes a longer-term perspective.
- Actively encourage synergies with other relief or development interventions, state policies or the private sector.

5.2 Can 'LRRD-ness' be evaluated?

If, as we argue, the concept of LRRD needs to be reinterpreted to mean that relief and, especially, development assistance is more closely targeted at people's needs in protracted crises, then there is no 'measure' or 'blueprint' model by which one can evaluate a project for 'LRRD-ness'. 'LRRD-ness' should not be a 'quality' of a project, but rather a way of approaching a situation. In this sense the project would be evaluated for being a good development project – i.e. one that is closely targeted at preventing the most vulnerable people from falling into crises – rather than for being good at 'LRRD'.

The key aspects that evaluators would look out for could include:

- How suitable was the programme for a situation where crises are 'normal'?
- How well has the programme met the changing needs of the most vulnerable?
- How appropriate was its design for insecure environments with a constantly changing context?
- How well did the programme consider the politicisation of aid and resources?
- How has long-term work helped in crises, for example by reducing a particular problem or risk or by supporting people so that they can cope better?
- How well has the programme encouraged links on the ground between people and institutions or organisations that support them in the longer term?
- Where only short-term aid was given, could support have been more effective if given in a longer-term way?
- How adequate were the strategy processes, the level of context and political analysis, the appropriateness of the models employed, current impact and likely future impact?

6 Practical implications of taking LRRD seriously

Changing the way that programmes work will have implications on multiple levels and across different dimensions. These include the way that BMZ currently works with different departments and ministries, as well as resource implications, changes to the levels and types of skills needed for programming and analysis, the levels of investment needed for analysis and political understanding and staffing levels.

At the strategic level

If people's changing needs in crisis situations are to be addressed in a holistic manner by the German government, it will be important to develop a single common strategy at the country level. Such a strategy must be based on a joint analysis by emergency and development actors of the interplay between chronic problems, underlying structural causes and acute vulnerabilities or needs. This country-level strategy should include an analysis of what can be done over the longer term to reduce problems, and also what will be done in the short term as and when crises occur.

There are specific issues for German assistance because the different ministries for development and emergency aid do not always work in the same countries. In such countries, analysis can draw on close cooperation and discussions with other agencies including bilateral and multilateral donors present in the country. BMZ must realise the potential of the TDA with a mandate to achieve two-way LRRD. It can be used to influence change at multiple levels:

- as a fund, to finance interventions that take a holistic two-way LRRD perspective;
- as part of a country portfolio of funds, to give a two-way LRRD perspective more prominence, encouraging joint analysis and working across the whole emergency–development spectrum;
- bringing about change within the overall German aid architecture by using TDA to encourage greater coordination between BMZ and the German Federal Foreign Office, both at the strategic and the country programme level;

- as part of BMZ's overall development cooperation, piloting good flexible modalities which can be adopted as mainstream development approaches across more and more countries; and
- within the aid sector internationally, exploiting influence with other donors (and the aid 'system' more broadly) to encourage more widespread practical application of 'two-way LRRD'. This latter objective will rely on closer direct coordination with other European donors, including potential bilateral work with strategically chosen like-minded EU member states.

One aid fund, or even one donor, cannot on its own change the international aid system. It should seek to be an agent for change, seek like-minded allies and develop a coherent strategy.

At the programme/thematic level

The TDA will hopefully be used for innovative programming, experimenting with and learning from different implementation modalities and flexible, longer-term approaches that 'track' and respond to changes in the local situation.

A key dilemma is the extent to which donors' development strategy should follow government development policy – in particular in protracted crises where the government may be a part of, or a cause of, the problem. There are no easy answers to this, but donors can at least ensure that the question has been explicitly considered and adequate justification given for the choices made.

In many crises, funding horizons are short term. Even where these are extended through the TDA or similar approaches, the time horizon may not be adequate for learning about the longer-term impacts of interventions if monitoring and evaluation is limited to project timeframes. It is essential that donors encourage and finance evaluations or studies of the change brought about by interventions years after they have ended.

Implications for the aid architecture and aid bureaucracy

Flexible long-term programming that can also respond to short-term needs demands either more flexibility in the range of programmes (from relief to development) that one fund or agency supports, or significant cooperation between different funds/organisations, such as close cooperation between partner agencies of the German Federal Foreign Office and BMZ in the field. When funding organisations through TDA, BMZ should expect them to say how they would handle crises should emergency relief be required.

Ideally, 'two-way LRRD' works with partners at the local level who can implement across the entire relief-to-development spectrum. However, it can be challenging to sustain these relationships given that different ministries tend to work with different partners, and funding continues to be bifurcated. There is a need to find ways to better sustain these relationships given current bureaucratic and financial constraints, including within the German aid architecture.

Working across the spectrum will entail collaboration with both the emergency coordination system (i.e. the cluster system) and development coordination mechanisms (e.g. budget sector working groups). Currently, there is significant 'silo-fication' in two ways: the different sector working groups and different clusters work in their own silos; and the cluster system as a whole and development cooperation as a whole do not talk to each other enough. BMZ could become a champion and advocate of greater flexibility within and between the two systems.

As has been argued throughout this paper, LRRD is not about filling a gap, but about a lack of connectedness more generally from all sides. Assistance modalities such as TDA can contribute to a solution to the 'LRRD problem' if, as its current underlying strategy implies (BMZ, 2013b), they are seen not simply as a missing link in the (one-way) chain of transition from relief to development, but as a vehicle for spanning the spectrum, in particular making links from the development side towards the relief side with the ability to complement other aid modalities. When TDA is applied in countries where other funding instruments are also being used, from either emergency or development assistance, a single coherent strategy for them all will be needed: if not,

LRRD has been on the periphery of the aid agenda for decades. There is obvious common sense in linking up shorter- and longer-term ways of assisting vulnerable people, and no one has ever argued against LRRD. Nevertheless, and despite a number of papers examining the concept, it has not succeeded in playing a significant role in shaping the way aid is planned, managed or administered. Whatever the constraints to LRRD in one-off, short-term natural disasters, this paper argues that, in difficult places, LRRD has a particular and different importance, and that one of the main constraints towards greater implementation of its principles has been that the debate has too often been held in the wrong place and with a misleading picture in mind.

Humanitarian action has worried about how to link to longer-term development, and donors have worried about how to establish mechanisms to fill the gap. In fact, the problem is less a gap between emergency and development action and more the fact that development action has too often been missing in difficult places. For difficult places, where humanitarian action is a long-term reality, concern for LRRD principles needs to be seen predominantly in development circles, and the model should be to find ways of engaging for the longer term in ways that can adapt to crises, either changing how aid is delivered, becoming more or less relief oriented according to the needs of changing circumstances, or capable of adapting to and connecting with other assistance interventions using different modalities. In order to achieve this, aid (whether from people's own government or from international agencies) needs to be guided by an overall strategy that encompasses the whole spectrum, from long-term support to immediate assistance. The call for such an overall strategy is now frequently heard by those concerned with resilience; for this reason, political support for resilience offers an opportunity for making LRRD principles meaningful and influential – if discussions are held in the right circles with a picture in mind that reflects reality on the ground.

there is a danger that there will even be the creation of a need for yet more links between different budget lines and instruments.

Relationships/partnerships

This paper has argued that relationships and partnerships should be premised on the overall goal of improving the lives of affected people. Building the capacity of a governmental or any other institution is not in itself necessarily of any benefit. This will require a degree of sophistication in monitoring and evaluation, since a simple measure of an organisation's 'capacity' will no longer be a relevant indicator of progress, except as an output, which requires a strong logical case to show that such an output will (probably) lead to some desired outcomes. It will also require ex ante ways of justifying the choice of the institutions with which relationships are made.

Tools and approaches – the 'how we work'

The need for programme management tools which can handle flexibility, risk and change has been stressed. Currently, programme tools also serve for accountability (e.g. log frames and monitoring reports). These tools are not well adapted for handling flexibility and a focus on higher-level objectives. The demands of accountability cannot be compromised, but new ways of answering them will need to be developed. This will also involve a change in the relationship between different actors in the aid system, e.g. donors will have to demand programme modification from operational agencies rather than wait to be requested by them to allow it. This has further ramifications for staffing and information links, especially for donors who currently rely on implementing partners for their knowledge of how situations are changing on the ground.

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