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# **Study on the relevance and applicability of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in Humanitarian Assistance**

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## Executive Summary

In their origins, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative aimed to tackle different problems. The Paris Declaration aimed to address a perceived disjunction between national and international development efforts and a lack of harmonisation of international aid efforts, which—combined with a lack of focus on countries' own development strategies—are an impediment to the achievement of international development targets, including the Millennium Development Goals. The Good Humanitarian Donorship agenda, in comparison, was designed specifically for donor governments and is notable insofar as the affected state does not play a significant part in its stated goals. Its central goal is to improve and bring greater uniformity to donor practices in financing and supporting humanitarian action. The agenda has little to say about country ownership or how to align national systems and policies. Rather, it stresses a commitment to a shared definition of humanitarian action, addressing a perceived lack of donor adherence to established principles, particularly needs-based resource allocation, and recognises the need to respect the *modus operandi* of partner agencies. It is the latter, rather than national governments, who are the assumed counterparts for the Good Humanitarian Donorship agenda.

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative might therefore seem, at first glance, to have little in common. There are significant areas of difference between them. Affected state ownership, alignment to host state policy priorities, as well as alignment to financing and procurements systems in order to disburse aid, are principles that in many cases are not applicable to the good donorship agenda.

Yet there are also areas of complementarity between the two agendas. They both aim to achieve long-term changes in donor behaviour, and some of the means to do this simply reflect good practice in aid management, a

preoccupation which both agendas share. This includes harmonising policies and financing objectives amongst donors, undertaking or supporting joint assessments and joint evaluations, standardising reporting requirements, the need for collective lesson learning, accountability to partners and the importance of measuring results.

The study also finds that there is scope for interaction between the Paris Declaration and Good Humanitarian Donorship in natural disaster settings, and that a more differentiated approach is warranted between these contexts and complex emergencies. A rapid humanitarian response that builds on, and does not undermine, existing good practices and structures of affected states is entirely consistent with Good Humanitarian Donorship, and is an area in need of more donor investment. In addition, affected states themselves have called for an increased role in the way international assistance is conducted.

The study concludes that the 'aid principles' landscape has become increasingly crowded in recent years, with the Paris Declaration, the Good Humanitarian Donorship agenda and the Fragile States Principles, as examples of a number of different, recently established initiatives. As a result, donors are required to work to diverse principles, sometimes in the same contexts. Greater dialogue on these issues between humanitarian and development colleagues is needed. The fact that so much international humanitarian action occurs in situations of protracted crisis or 'recovery', where elements of relief, social protection and development are combined, makes this all the more important. Rather than undermine humanitarian action, dialogue should serve to increase appreciation of the goals of Good Humanitarian Donorship and its objectives. It should also increase the opportunities to promote shared responsibility for issues such as Disaster Risk Reduction, social protection, humanitarian principles and capacity-building.



# 1. Introduction

This study comes five years after the establishment of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative. GHD is perhaps the most important step donor governments have undertaken regarding their humanitarian policy and practice, and is considered a benchmark for donor behaviour. Perhaps partly because of its perceived success in becoming embedded in donor government policy and practice, a comparison with its development cousin, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, is being discussed.

A number of donor governments recognise the possible relationship between the Paris Declaration and GHD. Work within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC) has also made this point. According to the draft proposal for a Revised Humanitarian Assessment Framework for DAC peer reviews, humanitarian action is:

*an integral part of the broader development co-operation system, which is driven, inter alia, by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Action Agenda. Alignment of the assessment framework with these commitments would enable peer review examiners to identify the extent to which coherent linkages have been forged between humanitarian and development components of aid systems.<sup>1</sup>*

The DAC's *Synthesis of Findings and Experiences from Peer Reviews* also promotes consideration of the 'synergies between the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the GHD Principles and Good Practices in order to deepen ownership of the latter beyond the humanitarian sector as well as provide a useful platform to better embed humanitarian action within broader development co-operation processes' (OECD–DAC 2008a).

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<sup>1</sup> It also notes that: 'Inevitably, the association can only be partial. In situations where the State is a party to armed conflict or has otherwise abrogated responsibilities for the safety and welfare of civilians on its territory, full association (particularly with respect to partner government ownership and alignment with national development strategies) would compromise core principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action.' See OECD–DAC (2008b).

The pairing of these agendas also stems from concerns among affected states keen for a greater say in the way international assistance is governed and conducted, including how resources are allocated and how the international system coordinates with recipient country structures.

This study attempts to identify the points of commonality and difference between the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles and those established in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, with a view to understanding the ways in which the two agendas interrelate. The progress made to date under the GHD initiative is acknowledged, and the study is not intended to steer policy-makers away from the ongoing challenges they face in operationalising GHD. While GHD has been a policy priority for more than half a decade, it is recognised that significant work remains to be done in upholding the principles and improving the practices set out within it, particularly at field level. In establishing GHD, there was a strong emphasis on humanitarian action as a distinct form of aid and a special subset of ODA. Much work has been done in the past five years within donor government ministries to stress this distinctiveness and the need to uphold the commitments made under GHD. At the same time, humanitarian action is not applied in isolation in crisis situations but as part of a broader international engagement. In acknowledging this, it is important to understand the way in which the various principles that govern international assistance interrelate, and to recognise which elements are shared and which distinct.

This desk-based study was conducted in November 2008. Commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was designed to consider the relevance and applicability of the Paris Declaration to humanitarian assistance. Representatives of participating governments were the primary interviewees for this study, along with academic and other policy experts on aid effectiveness and humanitarian donorship, as well as the humanitarian adviser at the DAC. Overall, 25 interviews were conducted, and a range of relevant literature was surveyed. The findings reflect the results of these interviews, policy documentation and academic literature, as well as the authors' own analysis. The interviewees and

references are listed as annexes, along with the Terms of Reference for the study.

It should be noted that the relationship between the Paris Declaration and GHD (or humanitarian action more broadly) has not been identified as a priority by policy-makers in the humanitarian field, and as a result there is relatively limited knowledge about the topic and its possibilities.<sup>2</sup> The study was designed to elicit *initial* responses on the issue from participating governments, and to examine the relationship from an academic perspective in order to inform the ongoing dialogue between GHD participants in Geneva, interested stakeholders in the DAC, and within donor governments. Overall, interviewees from participating governments considered the issue an important one and recognised that there are areas of complementarity in aspects of GHD and the aid effectiveness agenda. Nevertheless, all

interviewees agreed that, while humanitarian assistance can contribute to poverty reduction, this is not its primary goal. Goals are much more short-term and targeted at saving lives, relieving suffering and providing protection. Interviewees also stressed the importance of humanitarian principles in guiding humanitarian action, and the need to operate independently of the state in conflict contexts.

Given the short timeframe for this study, the authors suggest that further work including field investigation and a more detailed analysis of headquarters practices (including the relationship of multi-mandated agencies to the Paris Declaration) might be warranted. In particular, there is a need to draw out and analyse the views of field-based staff regarding the challenges they face in working under these different, and at times competing, agendas.

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<sup>2</sup> In a recent review of the Danish Government's Humanitarian Strategy, an analysis of GHD was undertaken, including a review of its relationship to the Paris Declaration - see Mowjee (2008).



## 2. Comparing the origins of the Paris Declaration and Good Humanitarian Donorship

The Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) mark the latest efforts in a series of global debates addressing the core questions of overseas development assistance (ODA)<sup>3</sup>: (i) ‘*What* is development assistance supposed to achieve?’ and (ii) ‘*How* is this to be done?’. The 2000 Millennium Declaration marked the first time that donor and recipient countries alike were able to define and collectively agree a set of goals and targets governing what aid was meant to achieve. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) proved a catalyst, rallying aid actors around mutually agreed, measurable goals. Following this, the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development attempted to tackle the modalities of how the MDGs were to be achieved (UN, 2003). This was followed by the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation and Alignment, and the more comprehensive 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration is an international agreement to which over one hundred countries committed to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators (OECD, 2005).

The Paris Declaration is the first agreement to include a set of measurable indicators, benchmarks and targets for donor agencies. It was achieved through an unprecedented degree of political participation, negotiation and acceptance. This political engagement bound the signatories to live up to their commitments, while ensuring that these goals would be prioritised in national development policy. The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action focussed on next steps, further entrenching the concepts of ownership, alignment and mutual accountability. The AAA ensured that donors were committed to working with and being responsible to a wider community of beneficiaries and stakeholders.

In 2003, following an exercise similar to that undertaken by their development colleagues, 16 OECD–DAC donor governments, along with the European Commission, established the

foundations for good donorship in the humanitarian arena. Prior to this there had been no consensus regarding how donor governments should use their influence and harmonise their procedures to improve humanitarian response. Donors’ approaches to decision-making and resource allocation have been criticised as being weakly articulated, ad hoc and uncoordinated. Driven by political interests rather than need, funding allocations have often been inequitable, unpredictable and slow, with weak mechanisms of accountability and transparency (Macrae et al, 2002). GHD has sought to address these problems by setting out a clear set of objectives, a definition of humanitarian action and a set of principles to guide its application. The representatives also agreed areas of good practice in humanitarian response. While implementation has been challenging, donors have devoted unprecedented attention to reforming humanitarian financing, and GHD has acted as an effective platform for dialogue.

The incorporation of humanitarian policy and practice into DAC peer reviews is recognised as one of the most successful elements of the initiative. The DAC is considered a neutral forum for lesson-learning and the sharing of experience on the policy and practice of humanitarian donorship. However, while knowledge of GHD in the DAC is growing, interviewees noted that appreciation of humanitarian policy and practice remains limited. In turn, humanitarians lack a good understanding of the objectives and process of the Paris Declaration.

The Paris process aims to ensure the effective delivery of development assistance by placing responsibility on partner governments and donors (see Figure 1). By improving donor performance and developing country government systems, and focussing on the *joint* delivery and management of aid, the Paris Declaration aims to put in place the conditions necessary to achieve lasting development gains, including the targets enshrined in the MDGs.

Unlike the Paris principles, which donor and recipient governments jointly drafted, GHD is designed specifically for donor governments. The central goal is to improve and harmonise donor practices, in particular with respect to

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
<sup>3</sup> The Accra Agenda for Action is an update and review of progress towards Paris Declaration targets. As such, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action are mutually supportive. Therefore, this paper will refer to the Paris Declaration as the main comparative document with respect to GHD.

the financing and support of humanitarian action. The recipient state did not figure prominently in the establishment of GHD. GHD focuses on the role of partners such as the Red Cross movement, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the UN in the delivery of assistance. While the AAA allowed for a greater level of civil society engagement, the concern remains by and large with the relationship between donors and recipients.

In some cases, the Paris Declaration and GHD are governed by different ministries. For many donors, Good Humanitarian Donorship is situated under a distinct Ministry of Foreign Affairs portfolio, and monitoring, reporting and accountability lines can be entirely separate from those of the Paris agenda.

The next section explores the similarities and distinctions in detail.

**Figure 1: The Five Pillars of the Paris Declaration** (OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness)



### 3. The Paris Declaration and GHD: similarities and differences

Whilst the Paris Declaration and GHD have similar long-term goals regarding changing donor behaviour, they set out differing means to achieve this, and have different stakeholders. Consequently, it is not possible to graft one framework onto the other, and few donors feel that this would be a desirable or useful exercise. This notwithstanding, a number of issues can be identified when comparing the two frameworks. In assessing the relevance of the Paris Declaration to GHD, as well as potential entry points for complementary action, this section uses the five key elements of the Paris Declaration framework:

- country ownership;
- aid alignment;
- aid harmonisation;
- managing for results and;
- mutual accountability.

This discussion is also presented as a matrix in Annex 1.

#### 3.1 Country ownership

The concept of national ownership is fundamental to the Paris Declaration. The most basic requirement of effective partnerships is the existence of a legitimate, responsive and accountable government, with the capacity to articulate its own development plans and priorities. These priorities include poverty reduction, as well as sector-specific and thematic strategies. Based on these strategies, the Paris Declaration commits partner countries to ‘translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets’ (OECD–DAC, 2005, para. 14). The AAA takes this one step further by requiring the active engagement of a larger base of stakeholders in the design and delivery of national development plans. These stakeholders include parliaments, civil society organisations and the private sector. The AAA also commits donors to undertake capacity-building initiatives to strengthen these institutions and actors. This assistance is to be demand-driven, with needs analysis left in the hands of partner governments. The Paris Declaration calls on at least 75% of partner countries to have operational development strategies by 2010.

As mentioned above, a noteworthy aspect of the GHD initiative is that the affected state does not play a significant part in its stated goals. There are only two references in GHD to the role of the state in humanitarian response. The first reaffirms the primary responsibility of states for the welfare of victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders; the other calls for strengthening the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises. In addition, and in contrast to the Paris Declaration, GHD points to the ‘central and unique role of the UN’ in the leadership and coordination of international humanitarian action (GHD, 2003, para. 10).

Many interviewees pointed out that GHD was designed to inform good humanitarian *donorship*. Implementing and upholding GHD, including reporting on and monitoring progress towards its stated goals, is the responsibility of donor institutions. Donor interviewees also noted that the issue of host ownership of humanitarian strategies would be problematic, particularly in conflict contexts. Guided by humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, donors argued that humanitarian assistance must be flexible and responsive and for the most part their preference is to channel support through the UN, international NGOs and the Red Cross movement, rather than through recipient government mechanisms.<sup>4</sup>

That said, it is striking that the affected state does not figure more prominently in GHD. The limited references to the role of the state reflect a long-lasting theme and ongoing challenge for international humanitarian action in conflict and other difficult political contexts. Recent humanitarian reforms have not adequately addressed this issue. Host states in many contexts were not closely involved in the implementation of the Cluster approach, for example, and there has been little differentiation between conflict-related emergencies and sudden-onset disasters, where strong and capable national authorities and disaster management structures are present (Stoddard *et al.*, 2007).

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<sup>4</sup> There are however examples, even in conflict contexts, of humanitarian agencies working with and through the state, such as health agencies working with health ministries.

As Harvey (forthcoming) argues, there is very little analysis within the humanitarian community of the actual role states play in domestic response, including institutional arrangements, the levels of public financing made available and the key actors involved. In advance of a crisis, donor decision-makers often do not have at their disposal a thorough mapping of the state's existing capacities and how they might need to be supported. As a result, decisions about whether external assistance is justified, based on the assumption that domestic capacities have been overwhelmed, are often made on the basis of inadequate information.<sup>5</sup>

It is notable, when comparing GHD to the Paris Declaration, how distinctive the humanitarian agenda is. Interviewees noted that a more differentiated approach between complex emergencies and sudden-onset and natural disasters is called for. In particular, given the consensus on the importance of Disaster Risk Reduction, and the commitments in this area made under the Hyogo Framework, the case for a stronger role for the host state is gaining ground. For example, the first of its five principles was to 'ensure that disaster risk reduction is a *national* and *local* priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation'. In addition, even in some conflict contexts states may play a strong coordinating role, as well as exercising other controls such as over access and movement of staff and goods. A recent Geneva-based GHD initiative to engage recipient states in dialogue on the challenges of delivering international humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies is a significant step towards a greater understanding of the role recipient states and other national and regional entities might play in these contexts.

### 3.2 Alignment

The Paris Declaration commits donors to align with partner country policies and procedural systems for the delivery of ODA (OECD–DAC, 2005, paras. 16–18, 21, 24, 26, 30–31). Donors are expected to modify their assistance in line with the priorities articulated by a country's poverty reduction, sectoral and thematic priorities. In addition, donors are expected to work with partner-country

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<sup>5</sup> Where donor and recipients are closely engaged on longer term development goals, however, awareness of national response capabilities tends to be more comprehensive.

Public Finance Management (PFM) and procurement systems in order to disburse their aid—and, as relevant, undertake capacity-building initiatives to strengthen these systems. Finally, it commits donors to make aid more predictable, more long-term and free from conditionalities (OECD–DAC, 2005, Indicators 7–8; Accra High-Level Forum, 2008, paras. 24–26). Like the principle of country ownership, elements of this model of alignment are not relevant to many humanitarian interventions, and the majority of donors interviewed for the study maintained that alignment with a host state's policies and strengthening its capacity, particularly in conflict contexts, was outside of the GHD initiative.<sup>6</sup>

An important lesson from Paris is that assistance provided by means of budget support is much easier for country systems to handle than project-based support, which is the primary type of assistance in humanitarian responses.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, the commitments on aid financing find some resonance with GHD principles in terms of exploring ways to ensure flexible, timely, predictable and flexible funding, and introducing longer-term funding arrangements (GHD, 2003, paras. 5, 12–13). These goals are being monitored through a series of indicators established by donors in 2005, and revised in 2007 (Development Initiatives, 2008). New multilateral funding mechanisms—the expanded Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the country-level pooled funding mechanisms (CHFs and ERFs)—are now available to donors to support

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<sup>6</sup> The concept of 'shadow alignment' has been suggested as an alternative approach to applying the harmonization and alignment agenda in 'fragile states'. Shadow alignment involves donors attempting to be compatible with national systems without requiring them to follow government priorities or policies. Possibilities include putting aid 'on-budget' but not 'through budget', working with existing administrative boundaries, and providing information to the recipient in terms that are compatible with their national systems such as the budgetary classifications and cycle. See for example, Christiansen, Karin et al. (2004) Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States: [http://www.odi.org.uk/PPPG/CAPE/publications/kc\\_development\\_effectiveness\\_fragile\\_states.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/PPPG/CAPE/publications/kc_development_effectiveness_fragile_states.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> In several cases donors have provided budget support for recovery. DFID, for example, provided 50% of its funding to the government of Pakistan in response to the earthquake in 2005 as part of its commitment to un-earmark sector budget support. In addition, non-DAC donors channel the majority of their humanitarian assistance direct to the affected state.

humanitarian action. Underpinned by GHD principles, they are designed to reduce earmarking and foster coordinated and strategic funding allocations driven by field-level decisions based on need. As such, they are intended to address many of the longstanding criticisms of humanitarian funding to the effect that bilateral grant-making by donors has at times contributed to inequitable allocations, unhealthy competition and uncoordinated aid responses (Stoddard, 2008). That said, these financing reforms remain separate from state structures and are not intended to finance government responses in any direct way.<sup>8</sup>

Many interviewees noted that predictability is challenging in the humanitarian sphere, but that the Paris Declaration definition of predictability is largely consistent with that expressed in the GHD initiative (GHD, 2003, para. 5, 11 and 12).<sup>9</sup> Some donors have established reserve funds for humanitarian response (Willits-King, 2006). These are allocated at the beginning of the year, and used when needed. A number of donors have also initiated multi-year funding agreements to improve the predictability of humanitarian funding streams in terms of volume and timing.

There are two key areas of divergence between the Paris Declaration and GHD under the goal of alignment. First is the issue of alignment to local priorities and needs. GHD's goal is to provide funding impartially, according to the needs of the affected population, based on needs assessments, rather than on nationally identified priorities. Second is the focus on implementation structures, and ensuring that development donors keep parallel ones to a minimum (OECD–DAC, 2005, para. 21). Although both the development and humanitarian communities recognise the need to keep funding flexible and predictable, the Paris Declaration strives to use existing local PFM and disbursement mechanisms to ensure maximum alignment, which in turn reinforces local ownership. Humanitarian donors continue to fund primarily through international organisations.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Although it should be noted that several recipient countries, such as China, are also donors to the CERF and to the multilateral agencies, such as WFP.

<sup>9</sup> The Paris Declaration postulates: 'Donors commit to provide indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disburse aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules' (OECD–DAC, 2005, Paragraph 25a).

<sup>10</sup> The extent to which bilateral programming attempts to source relief related supplies/expertise locally is

### 3.3 Harmonisation

The harmonisation element of the Paris Declaration aims to ensure that donor activity is coordinated in order to effectively align with partner government systems, policies and needs. It commits donors to ensure effective implementation of common arrangements for planning, funding and disbursement, monitoring and evaluation and reporting to governments on donor activities. These joint initiatives include needs assessments (e.g. post-conflict needs assessments, or PCNAs, and Joint Assessment Missions, or JAMs), planning and prioritisation tools (e.g. Transitional Results Matrices, or TRMs, and Multi-Donor Trust Funds, or MDTFs), and joint donor offices (OPM/IDL, 2008, p. vii). The Paris Declaration commits donors to simplify their procurement and disbursement procedures, and develop effective divisions of labour based on their comparative advantages. The AAA also recognises the growing influence of non-DAC donors, South–South cooperation and global and vertical funds. In addition, the AAA specifically addresses one of the main criticisms of the Paris Declaration by mandating the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) in all elements of consultation, planning, implementation and review. The final key element of the harmonisation agenda is donor commitment to effective engagement in fragile states, conceived around the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (discussed in Section 4).

The Paris Declaration comes closest to the GHD principles in seeking donor harmonisation. The spirit of coordination amongst donors and the use of joint mechanisms is prominent among the GHD principles. The GHD framework encourages donors to support Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAPs) and Consolidated Appeals (CAPs)—initiatives ostensibly aimed at increasing coordination and minimising duplication and contradictory policies (GHD, 2003, para. 14). Although devised after the establishment of GHD, the CERF and country-level pooled funding mechanisms, and donor support to the Cluster approach, also aim to enhance coordination in the response effort. Donor coordination bodies at the field level have proved to be highly effective in some contexts. Through GHD, donors also

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unknown, but would be an interesting question to examine and the general principle is in line with aid effectiveness goals.

committed to regular evaluations of donor responses and agreed on the importance of *joint* assessment missions and *joint* evaluations (although interviewees recognised this as an area needing increased attention within GHD). The ‘Village Tract Assessment’ recently undertaken in Myanmar, which was promoted by donors, offers an interesting example of attempts to combine aspects of the Paris and Accra agendas with a traditional humanitarian approach. The joint assessment was commissioned by donors, with the close involvement of the regional intergovernmental body (ASEAN) and CSOs, as well as the national authorities (Tripartite Core Group, 2008).

### 3.4 Managing for results

The Paris Declaration commits donors and partner countries to measure their progress in meeting development goals against benchmarks and targets, and developing frameworks for consistent reporting. To achieve this, the Paris Declaration commits donors to improve the statistical and analytical capacities of partner countries. Experience from implementing the Paris Declaration has shown that one of the biggest obstacles to properly understanding development results is a lack of appropriate in-country statistical information. The AAA specifically commits donors to strengthen statistical systems to better understand aid-absorptive capacity and the wider impacts of aid in recipient countries. In addition, the AAA encourages the devolution of decision-making authority to country offices.

The issue of measurable targets and benchmarks is a topic of considerable contention in the humanitarian community. Although GHD encourages donors to undertake regular evaluations and assessments of their performance (including through the DAC peer reviews), it does not set out benchmarks or criteria to qualitatively assess this (GHD, 2003, para. 22). Although collective indicators have been developed to inform GHD activities, they are not detailed or comprehensive enough to fully capture and measure performance, particularly in terms of assessing whether humanitarian assistance is delivered according to the agreed objectives and GHD guiding principles.<sup>11</sup>

At the field level, a longstanding debate exists as to whether it is possible to attribute impacts on the lives and livelihoods of beneficiaries to the workings of the international humanitarian system, and, if so, how this impact could be measured with any rigour (Hofman et al., 2004). There is a multitude of agency-based evaluations and assessments, but these use differing indicators and criteria to assess good performance, draw on varying data sources and use data of uneven quality. They are rarely drawn together to form a comprehensive picture. System-wide evaluations suffer from the same challenges, and there have been very few comprehensive sector-based system-wide assessments (ALNAP, forthcoming).

It is likely that the Paris Declaration and GHD agendas face similar challenges regarding evaluations of impact. Defining indicators to measure success is inherently political; Section 5 explores some of the lessons from both initiatives.

### 3.5 Mutual accountability

Within the framework of the Paris Declaration, donors and partner countries are committed to being accountable to each other through mutual assessments; in addition, they have agreed to be accountable to their respective citizens. The AAA offers a greater degree of clarity about what constitutes mutual assessment reviews, which are to be based ‘on country results and reporting systems complemented with available donor data and credible independence evidence’ (Accra High-Level Forum, 2008, para. 24b). In addition, the AAA addresses corruption and transparency, laying out specific commitments for donors and partner countries. Finally, the AAA also draws attention to ‘aid orphans’ and aid volatility.

Accountability in humanitarian terms has often been presented as accountability to beneficiaries, not to the host country. GHD has an explicit commitment to ensure beneficiary involvement in designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating humanitarian responses (GHD, 2003, para. 7); however, this aspect has rarely been given significant policy attention. The DAC peer reviews and other analysis suggest that donors ‘have struggled to give expression to this

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<sup>11</sup> A number of independent performance measurement initiatives have also been developed, such as DARA’s

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Humanitarian Response Index (2008) See: [http://www.daraint.org/web\\_en/hri.html?lang=en](http://www.daraint.org/web_en/hri.html?lang=en).

commitment' (OECD, 2008a, p. 16). A GHD reference group is currently pursuing a work-stream (led by France) to improve donor behaviour in this area.

Accountability has also been framed in relation to implementing partners or partner agencies, as in the paragraphs on good practice (GHD, 2003, paras. 15, 21).<sup>12</sup>

On the issues of aid orphans and aid volatility, the GHD framework encourages donors to strive to ensure that funding for new emergencies does not adversely affect financing for ongoing crises (GHD, 2003, para. 11). More recent initiatives such as CERF are partly intended to address the challenge of under-funding to forgotten emergencies.

Lastly, on the issue of transparency, the GHD initiative requests donors to develop regular and standardised reporting frameworks for humanitarian financing (GHD, 2003, para. 23). These could potentially build on the synergies and

processes institutionalised by the Paris Declaration's reporting initiatives, and those on statistical capacity-building.

### 3.6 Summary

This brief overview reveals a number of shared elements between the Paris Declaration and GHD. These include funding predictability, pooled financing, the harmonisation of donor policies, aid allocations and joint assessments and evaluations, the need for lesson learning and measuring results and standardising reporting requirements.

The areas of difference are, however, not insignificant. Host state ownership, alignment with host state policy priorities and financing and procurement systems for aid disbursement are much more problematic for humanitarian actors. Most interviewees stressed concerns regarding the possible implications of opening up GHD to these principles, particularly in conflict contexts.

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<sup>12</sup> The DAC Synthesis of Findings and Experiences from Peer Reviews stresses the need to draw on the accountability initiatives in the NGO sector to inform discussion about operationalising GHD commitments to enhanced beneficiary participation. See OECD-DAC (2008a)





## 4. Fragile States: a closer link?

In examining the relationship between the Paris Declaration and GHD, it is also worth considering the role of the Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (FSPs): whether these provide a closer link or bridging measure between the Paris Declaration and the humanitarian community, how they might serve humanitarian goals, and how they are applied in concert with the other principles guiding international aid.

Within the development community it was agreed that the Paris Declaration is only applicable beyond a specific threshold in state capacity, legitimacy and accountability. If these elements are weak or under threat the Paris Declaration cannot be applied to development cooperation. In such cases, donors are encouraged to utilise the fragile states principles, which were designed to allow development activities in difficult partnership contexts. The FSPs were also designed to ensure that humanitarian aid was not being used inappropriately to support long-term welfare needs in protracted crises (Macrae and Harmer, 2004).

Aspects of the FSPs link directly to the Paris Declaration and GHD, particularly around funding predictability, prioritising prevention and capacity-building. However, the central objectives of the FSPs are state-building and peace-building. These inevitably have implications for the humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality, a line which most development agendas often cross, but which most humanitarian agencies stay pointedly behind.<sup>13</sup> Some donors stress however that state-building and national ownership, as conceived under the fragile states agenda, is not intended just to promote central government; it can also include civil society, so there is not necessarily a direct contradiction between the neutrality of humanitarian action and the FSP emphasis on 'ownership'.

There has been much debate as to what constitutes a 'fragile state', and many different typologies exist. Despite this somewhat distracting debate, many have argued that the contexts for humanitarians and those working on fragile states are often the same. Certainly, any categorisation of a fragile state normally involves

countries with significant humanitarian caseloads. In this sense, there is a spectrum of countries to which GHD and the FSPs may apply simultaneously. In some of these contexts, development assistance is also being pursued, and the Paris Declaration might therefore also be relevant.

At times, donors may therefore be simultaneously committed to the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, the fragile states principles and the GHD initiative. This entails a difficult balancing act involving three sets of complex commitments: respecting the independence and neutrality of humanitarian action; pursuing 'state building as the central objective' of engagement with fragile states; and ensuring countries' 'ownership' over development strategies. This is a real challenge for donor governments; far from being a linear progression from 'crisis' to 'development', humanitarian, transitional and development aid may need to be applied all at once, along with the principles that govern this aid. This emphasises the point that humanitarian action does not take place in isolation in humanitarian crises, but as part of a broader sphere of international engagement.

One example is Sri Lanka, where the focus of DAC donors has been on humanitarian assistance in accordance with GHD principles. Some DAC donors are also tentatively engaged in supporting recovery and longer-term development in areas that they judge to have entered a recovery and 'post-conflict' phase. However, there is little consensus among donors over what constitutes appropriate engagement in longer-term development, reflecting differing strategic priorities and differing views of the dynamics of the conflict itself. Some are engaging mainly on the basis of fragile states principles, others more on the basis of the Paris principles. This lack of consensus is impeding donor coordination regarding early and longer-term recovery and development in areas affected by conflict (Collinson et al., forthcoming 2009).

Perhaps even more challenging is the situation in Afghanistan, where some donors are in the process of reasserting GHD principles, recognising that the shift to stabilisation measures and state-building goals has come at the price of a growing humanitarian crisis. A more positive example can

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<sup>13</sup> For further discussion, see Harvey (forthcoming).

be found in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the Congolese government has been active in identifying needs and coordinating international assistance with the OECD–DAC. The emphasis has been on stabilisation, in particular in security sector reform and infrastructure activities, but these have been mixed with humanitarian assistance, including repatriation aid for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

There are also contexts where neither the Paris Declaration nor the FSPs can be applied, at least not in the short term. Irrespective of the strength of commitments to principles of ownership, harmonisation and alignment, or to those of state-building, it is neither possible nor desirable to

pursue development goals, because a government does not exist (e.g. Somalia), is engaged in major hostilities (e.g. Sudan in Darfur, although the fragile states principles are being applied in Southern Sudan) or is accused of major violations of human rights (e.g. Zimbabwe, Myanmar and North Korea).

The FSPs are least likely to be applied where there is perhaps the greatest interplay between the Paris Declaration and GHD, namely in natural disaster settings where there is no active conflict. Here the FSPs need not play a role, unless a disaster occurs in an already fundamentally weakened state that does not have the capacity to govern or respond.

## 5. Thematic areas of complementarity

In addition to the principles guiding the Paris Declaration and GHD, some thematic areas in both sets of principles also need to be addressed. These include disaster risk reduction, social protection and capacity-building.

### 5.1 Disaster risk reduction

Nearly all of the donors interviewed identified disaster risk reduction as a potential area of joint engagement between humanitarian and development actors. The good donorship agenda encourages donors to consider long-term development goals in the planning of humanitarian activities, specifically in areas of disaster risk reduction (DRR) and early recovery (GHD, 2003, paras. 9, 12). Donors recognise that DRR requires strategic and long-term planning commitments, and at least five donor governments have already dedicated budgetary and personnel resources to specifically address DRR issues. However, implementation has been varied. The DAC *Synthesis of Findings and Experiences from Peer Reviews* finds that, while DAC members appear committed to disaster risk reduction approaches that bolster local capacities, reduce humanitarian vulnerabilities and facilitate smooth transitions to post-crisis recovery and development activities, in practice significant institutional, budgetary and operational barriers impede full realisation of these GHD commitments (OECD–DAC, 2008a).

For most donors, DRR is typically relevant to more than one department of government. Most donors have framed DRR as part of humanitarian or development activities, or both.<sup>14</sup> However, there are also cases where it spans a wider set of portfolios, prompting some donors to develop entirely new structures that create operational networks between development, humanitarian, foreign and defence policy personnel.

For the most part, development actors have attempted to address DRR issues at the national level, particularly in terms of resources and overall architecture, whereas humanitarian actors have been involved in preparedness activities and mitigation, mostly at the community level. This creates a challenge for joint, or at least harmonised, action.

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<sup>14</sup> The Hyogo framework and ISDR stress mainstreaming DRR into development planning.

Beyond the architectural challenges, the operational focus for some humanitarian donors seems to have shifted away from ‘vulnerability reduction’ to a narrower concept of ‘disaster management’. This reflects the distinctions between the humanitarian and development communities, where the latter understand vulnerability reduction in the context of climate change and argue strongly in favour of shifting the focus to long-term vulnerability reduction.

### 5.2 Social protection, service delivery and chronic vulnerability

Interventions designed to provide long-term social assistance have become an increasingly prominent part of donor government responses. In the past, humanitarian assistance and social protection were often ‘framed in opposition to each other because it is assumed that relief is state-avoiding and short-term in contrast to social protection, which has a longer-term perspective and is most appropriately delivered by the state’ (Harvey et al., 2007). The distinction is becoming blurred, however. In a number of instances, humanitarian relief operations have evolved into social protection programmes and have become embedded in local contexts (ODI, 2007).

Donor governments are exploring hybrid responses which aim to support longer-term social welfare needs. For example, Irish Aid’s humanitarian division has effectively created—through local consultation—a response to healthcare in Liberia by which the agency supports its partners to run primary health care services and establish health delivery systems. The intention is to transfer the system once the Liberian Health Ministry has the capacity to manage it independently. Funding for the project is allocated on a two-year basis, longer than is usual for most humanitarian donors, but less than is expected in the Paris/Accra commitments. In another example, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been supporting NGOs in the DRC through two-year funding cycles. These programmes have focussed on a mix of activities including facilitating IDP return, awareness-raising on sexual violence and the provision of legal aid. The multi-donor Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia is another example of the interaction between humanitarian and developmental actors in social protection programming in humanitarian contexts, alongside the affected state (Sharp,

Brown, and Teshome, 2006). Cash transfers—an innovative social protection mechanism—are also seen as having the ‘potential to help reduce people’s vulnerability to disasters, and enhance their resilience in the face of shocks’ (ODI, 2007, p. 29). This can potentially reduce the need for relief assistance. Furthermore, cash is a flexible tool which can be stepped up during times of crisis to help people cope with disasters.

These experiences, together with a substantial base of existing research, highlight the need to engage both development and humanitarian actors in planning social protection activities.<sup>15</sup>

### 5.3 Capacity-building

Capacity-building has long been an issue in humanitarian fora, though the humanitarian community has expended very little effort in the past towards developing indigenous response capacity for emergencies (WDR, 2004). Major donors include in their policy statements the goals of expanding local capacities to prevent, mitigate and respond to crises, but most of the actual programmes that they fund focus on the first two functions alone. Some interviewees suggested that capacity-building is more of a development imperative and should be done through development cooperation mechanisms, but the majority argued that humanitarian action could do much more to promote capacity-building—and that, for the most part, donors had fallen short of their GHD goal (General Principle 8).<sup>16</sup> This issue

has been increasingly raised since the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) called for ‘fundamental reorientation from *supplying* aid to *supporting* and *facilitating* communities’ own relief and recovery priorities’ (TEC, 2006).

In comparison, the Paris Declaration has a close focus on building the capacity of partner countries. Dialogue on capacity-building is proceeding (e.g. the Bonn workshop on capacity-building of national disaster management in October 2008), but with no representation from the humanitarian side. GHD could learn several lessons in building state capacity from the Paris Declaration. In particular, this would involve the improvement of national systems and the active engagement of local stakeholders—not only in enhancing skills in fundraising, advocacy, organisational development and administrative management, but also in programme implementation. Flexible funding arrangements to build the capacity of national and civil society actors are also important. This may not be possible in conflict contexts, but it should be possible in natural disaster contexts—particularly where natural hazards are recurrent. In addition, in all contexts donors can play an important role in strengthening an affected state’s awareness of and commitment to humanitarian principles, as part of their capacity-building efforts. Respect for humanitarian principles should be seen as a precondition for donors supporting national responses more directly (Collinson et al., 2009 forthcoming).<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> See Darcy (2004); DFID (2006); Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2007); Harvey *et al.* (2007).

<sup>16</sup> Perhaps not surprisingly, no collective indicators have been developed to measure performance against this goal.

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<sup>17</sup> A forthcoming UNICEF policy review, ‘Strengthening National Capacity Development for Emergency Preparedness and Response’, might be a useful initiative to examine and develop lessons learned.

## 6. Addressing the challenges: lessons from Paris and Stockholm

There is limited value in grafting the Paris Declaration directly onto GHD—or vice-versa—and complementarity might be limited to specific areas. There are, however, several procedural and practical lessons that GHD stakeholders could glean from the Paris and Accra processes, which might strengthen their own work in implementing GHD.

While both the agendas are voluntary, the Paris Declaration is significant for its targets and indicators of progress and overall performance; in this sense, it is a different document from GHD. Defining these targets proved to be an intensely difficult and politicised process. However, the resulting framework enabled all parties to focus on a commonly accepted set of goals that are measured nationally and monitored internationally. GHD donor representatives noted that, while indicators exist, they do not provide a means of assessing progress against all of the GHD principles.<sup>18</sup> In addition to the technical and political challenges that a more comprehensive set of indicators might pose, there is also concern that bureaucracies may become caught up in the process of trying to achieve the targets, which become an end in themselves, rather than the broader goals behind them. A balance needs to be struck. GHD stakeholders may be able to benefit from a process similar to the Paris Declaration—if done correctly, and with adequate resources—given the political uptake required across governments to ensure that commitments are met.<sup>19</sup>

In comparing the uptake of the Paris Declaration versus that of GHD, it is important to consider the relationship of these two agendas to the DAC. The DAC is acknowledged as the focal point for global debates around trends in ODA and for establishing

norms in donor behaviour. The importance of the DAC taking on a peer review role for humanitarian action is recognised, but knowledge of GHD and humanitarian policy more broadly remains limited within the DAC, and is not generally incorporated into the ongoing discussions and work of the Secretariat. In turn, knowledge of the Paris Declaration in Geneva is equally limited, though most interviewees agreed that increased dialogue between Geneva and Paris would be beneficial.

GHD representatives have sought to raise the profile of their humanitarian commitments through engagement with development and other relevant ministries in donor capitals. In contrast, the DAC's political leverage has enabled it to push the Paris Declaration high up the agendas of governments. By engaging with the DAC, it may be possible to move GHD higher up the list of priorities for aid donors.

Finally, the majority of interviewees highlighted that *partnerships* are key to both agendas. This emphasis on partnership begs the question of how multi-mandated agencies handle their responsibilities in upholding Paris and GHD, in line with the commitments of those who finance them. The World Food Programme, for example, has recognised in its Strategic Plan (2008–2011) the need to emphasise 'national ownership and priorities in line with the widely-recognised principles' of the Paris Declaration; at the same time, the Plan also notes that its activities are to be carried out 'in conformity ... with Good Humanitarian Donorship' (WFP, 2008). It therefore seems important for donors to consider the way they operationalise these agendas for their own purposes, as well as to guide their implementing partners.

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<sup>18</sup> There have been two primary efforts to develop collective indicators for the GHD initiative: the development of 'impact' indicators as part of the DRC country pilot, and agreement to a set of global collective indicators established in 2005 and revised in 2007. See also independent initiatives such as DARA's HRI: [http://www.daraint.org/web\\_en/hri.html?lang=en](http://www.daraint.org/web_en/hri.html?lang=en).

<sup>19</sup> See Graves and Wheeler (2006) for a more detailed discussion on lessons from the aid effectiveness agenda on overcoming obstacles to improved collective donor performance.



## 7. Conclusion

This study highlights the broad commonalities and differences between the Paris Declaration and GHD. It finds that it would be difficult, and arguably not appropriate, to align the two agendas, largely due to the distinctive objectives and principles that govern humanitarian aid in conflict contexts. However, there are shared principles and areas of good practice in aid management, and important lessons could be learned on both sides. These include issues of harmonising policies and financing objectives amongst donors, undertaking joint donor assessments and joint evaluations, collective lesson learning, standardising reporting requirements and measuring results. There are also thematic areas of shared interest and responsibility, such as DRR and capacity-building, which humanitarians would do well to pursue more systematically with their development colleagues. This would be entirely consistent with the goals of GHD.

Stepping back from this more academic analysis, however, the study found that there is a tension between those donors that see this process of mutual learning as a policy priority, and those that see the Paris agenda on aid effectiveness as posing a threat to humanitarian action and the principles that guide it. It is evident that incentives for identifying and building commonality between GHD and the Paris principles remain weak, partly because the aid architecture in many donor governments is bifurcated and responsibilities for development and humanitarian action are often separated between different ministries, and in some cases different budgetary envelopes within the same agencies. Complicating matters further, aid diplomacy for development and humanitarian action is divided between Paris and Geneva.

Despite these difficulties, the findings of this study would support a dialogue on

operationalising the differing ‘aid principles’ among development and humanitarian stakeholders. The fact that so much humanitarian action occurs in situations of protracted crisis—where humanitarian, fragile states and development principles are being applied—makes this all the more important. Arguably, there is a contradiction for donor governments (and perhaps more importantly their implementing partners) in attempting to align with government policy where the government is party to a conflict or in situations of poor governance, and attempting to administer aid that is delivered in a neutral and independent manner. It is difficult to overcome these contradictions without jeopardising one goal or the other. Donors (and their partners) are required to uphold complex principles, with some shared and some distinct elements. This creates a complex aid dynamic in some of the most difficult, insecure and needy environments.

In addition, the case for a stronger role for the host government in natural disaster situations where the concerned state is not considered partial, including both national ownership and capacity-building, is clearly gaining ground, particularly as their pivotal role in DRR, made explicit in the Hyogo Framework, is increasingly recognised. This suggests that a more differentiated approach between complex emergencies, sudden-onset and natural disasters is called for in the way in which GHD and Paris principles are operationalised in these contexts.

Overall, the paper finds that there needs to be a greater appreciation between the stakeholders as to what each commitment represents, how they relate to each other and how they are being implemented. Rather than undermine humanitarian action, this should serve to enhance appreciation of the goals of good humanitarian donorship and its unique objectives.





## Annex 1: Mapping the relationship between GHD and the Paris Declaration/Accra Agenda for Action

This matrix explores the relationship between the Paris and Accra agendas and the GHD initiative. A number of GHD Principles do not find a common connection into the framework set up by the Paris/Accra plans; in particular, GHD Principles and Good Practice paras. 1–5, 10, 17 and 19. Also, the Paris and Accra initiatives include specific targets and indicators for all principles, whereas the GHD has a selected number, primarily related to the good practices in donor financing.

Paris	Accra	GHD
<b>Ownership</b>		
<p><b>Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partner governments create national development strategies through consultative process;</li> <li>• National development strategies have prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets.</li> </ul> <p>Key Target:</p> <p><b>At least 75% of partner countries</b> have operational development strategies.</p>	<p><b>Broaden country-level policy dialogue on development</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partner governments work more closely with parliaments and local authorities;</li> <li>• Donors will support capacity building of all development actors—parliaments, central and local governments, CSOs, research institutes, media and the private sector;</li> <li>• Both parties ensure that development policies and programmes are designed and implemented in ways consistent with their agreed international commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability and environmental sustainability.</li> <li>• Developing countries must identify needs to strengthen capacity and deliver services at all levels. Donors will strengthen their own capacity and skills to be more responsive to developing countries’ needs.</li> </ul>	<p><b>GHD makes no commitment to partner country ownership of the response effort, but makes the following commitments:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities</u> to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners. (General principle #8)</li> <li>• Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, <u>adequate involvement of beneficiaries</u> in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response. (General principle #7)</li> </ul>

Paris	Accra	GHD
<b>Alignment</b>		
<p><b>Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures.</b></p> <p><u>Policy Alignment</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aid Flows are aligned to national priorities as reflected in partner country budgets;</li> <li>• Donor capacity-development support provided through coordinated programmes consistent with partners’ national development strategies;</li> <li>• Aid is more predictable and untied.</li> </ul> <p><u>Systems Alignment</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partner country Public Financial Management (PFM) systems and procurement systems adhere to good practices, or government has reform processes active to achieve this goal;</li> <li>• Reducing the number of parallel project implementation structures;</li> <li>• Where use of country systems is not feasible, donors will establish additional safeguards and measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine country systems and procedures;</li> <li>• Donors will adopt harmonised performance assessment frameworks to ensure uniformity in indicators of analysis for implementation.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Strengthen and use developing country systems to the maximum extent possible.</b></p> <p><u>Policy Alignment</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donors reaffirm Paris commitments to support partner country priorities by increasing the predictability of aid flows;</li> <li>• Accra reaffirms that developing countries will lead in determining the optimal roles of donors in supporting their development efforts at national, regional and sectoral levels. Donors will respect developing countries’ priorities, ensuring that new arrangements on the division of labour will not result in individual developing countries receiving less aid;</li> <li>• Donors reaffirm their intent to untie aid to the ‘maximum extent’.</li> <li>• Donors must develop and share transparent plans for using country systems in all forms of development assistance; provide staff guidance on how these systems can be used; and ensure that internal incentives encourage their use.</li> </ul> <p><b>Aid predictability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partner countries and donors are committed to making aid more transparent. Developing countries will facilitate parliamentary oversight by implementing greater transparency in public financial management, including public disclosure of</li> </ul>	<p><b>GHD makes no commitment to aligning with the host state policies and systems, but commits to aid being allocated according to need, as well as improving the flexibility and predictability of funding:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of <u>needs assessments</u> (General principle #6)</li> <li>• strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs (General principle #5)</li> <li>• Donors are committed to exploring how to reduce, enhance the flexibility of, earmark, and introduce longer-term funding arrangements. (Good practice #13)</li> </ul> <p><b>Predictability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donors are committed to ensuring that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises. (Good practice #11)</li> <li>• Donors are also further committed to ensuring predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations. (#12)</li> <li>• Donors commit to contributing responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals. (#14)</li> </ul>

<p>Key Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All donors use partner country PFM systems;</li> <li>• 2/3<sup>rd</sup> reduction in % of aid to public sector disbursed outside partner country PFM systems;</li> <li>• At least 85% of aid flows based on budget needs of partner countries;</li> <li>• PFM and Procurement - Partner countries move up one measure on CPIA index;</li> <li>• 50% of technical assistance in line with national development strategies;</li> <li>• Halve the proportion of un-disbursed scheduled aid per financial year.</li> </ul>	<p>revenues, budgets, expenditures, procurement and audits. Donors will publicly disclose regular, detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and, when available, results of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit by developing countries;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developing countries will strengthen budget planning processes for managing domestic and external resources and will improve the linkages between expenditures and results over the medium term;</li> <li>• Accra commits donors to provide full and timely information on annual commitments and actual disbursements so that developing countries are in a position to accurately record all aid flows in their budget estimates and their accounting systems;</li> <li>• Accra also commits Donors to provide developing countries with regular and timely information on their rolling three- to five-year forward expenditure and/or implementation plans, with at least indicative resource allocations that developing countries can integrate in their medium-term planning and macroeconomic frameworks.</li> </ul> <p><u>Systems Alignment</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donors reaffirm the use country systems as the first option for aid programmes in support of activities managed by the public sector;</li> <li>• Donors will promote the use of local and regional procurement by ensuring that their procurement procedures are transparent and allow local and regional firms to compete;</li> </ul>	
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Paris	Accra	GHD
<b>Harmonisation</b>		
<p><b>Donors' actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implement common arrangements for planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting to government on donor activities and aid flows;</li> <li>• Donors commit to work together to reduce the number of separate, duplicative, missions to the field and diagnostic reviews, and promote joint training to share lessons learnt and build a community of practice;</li> <li>• Donors commit to maximising their comparative advantage when engaged in division of labour;</li> <li>• Donors and partner governments commit to initiating reform procedures and strengthening incentives—including for recruitment, appraisal and training—for management and staff.</li> </ul> <p><b>Aid effectiveness in Fragile States</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donors commit to harmonising their activities based on upstream analysis, joint assessments, joint strategies, co-ordination of political engagement; and practical initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offices;</li> <li>• Align to the maximum extent possible behind central government-led strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accra recognises the activities of non-DAC donors (southern, middle income, foundations, and private sector actors), and encourages them to align their development assistance to the PDP;</li> <li>• Accra specifically encourages the participation of Civil Society Organisations, and commits donors and partner governments to i) improve co-ordination of CSO efforts with government programmes, ii) enhance CSO accountability for results, and iii) improve information on CSO activities;</li> </ul> <p>Accra incorporates the <b>Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accra commits donors and developing countries to work to and agree on a set of realistic peace- and state-building objectives that address the root causes of conflict and fragility. Accra further commits all stakeholders to ensure the <u>protection and participation of women</u>. This process will be informed by international dialogue between partners and donors on these objectives as prerequisites for development;</li> <li>• Donors will provide demand-driven, tailored and co-ordinated capacity-development support for core state functions and for early and sustained recovery. They will work with developing countries to design interim measures that are appropriately sequenced</li> </ul>	<p><b>GHD commits donors to promote a number of best-practices and standards, as well as to support coordinated strategic planning and financing mechanisms - which ostensibly minimises duplication.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, <u>adequate involvement of beneficiaries</u> in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response. (#7)</li> <li>• Donors commit to actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies. (Good practice #14)</li> <li>• Donors commit to promote the use of internationally accepted standards of best practice, including: Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief. (Good practice #16)</li> <li>• Furthermore, donors also commit to support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. (Good practice #20)</li> </ul>

<p>or, if that is not possible, donors should make maximum use of country, regional, sector or non-government systems.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Avoid activities that undermine national institution building, such as bypassing national budget processes or setting high salaries for local staff.</li> <li>• Use an appropriate mix of aid instruments, including support for recurrent financing, particularly for countries in promising but high-risk transitions.</li> </ul> <p>Paris makes key mention of harmonising donor-activity on environmental projects in light of impending crises related to Climate Change, desertification, and loss of bio-diversity. In particular, Paris aims to strengthen donor and partner-country work on Environmental Impacts Assessments, and strategic environmental assessments.</p> <p>Key Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 66% of aid flows are provided in the context of programme-based approaches;</li> <li>• 40% of donor missions to the field are joint;</li> <li>• 66% of country-analysis is joint</li> </ul>	<p>and that lead to sustainable local institutions;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donors will work on flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities, on a pooled basis where appropriate, to i) bridge humanitarian, recovery and longer-term development phases, and ii) support stabilisation, inclusive peace building, and the building of capable, accountable and responsive states. In collaboration with developing countries, donors will foster partnerships with the UN System, international financial institutions and other donors;</li> <li>• At country level and on <u>a voluntary basis</u>, donors and developing countries will monitor implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, and will share results as part of progress reports on implementing the Paris Declaration.</li> </ul>	
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Paris	Accra	GHD
<b>Managing for Results</b>		
<p><b>Managing resources and improving decision-making for results</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen the linkages between national development strategies and annual and multi-annual budget processes;</li> <li>Donors are committed to linking country programming and resources to results, and aligning them with effective partner country performance assessment frameworks;</li> <li>Donors must ensure that the introduction of performance indicators are consistent with partners' national development strategies;</li> <li>Donors must help build the capacity of partner countries' results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks;</li> <li>Donors must harmonise their own monitoring requirements until they can rely more extensively on partner countries' statistical, monitoring and evaluation systems.</li> </ul> <p>Key Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduce the proportion of countries without transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks by one-third.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing countries will strengthen the quality of policy design, implementation and assessment by improving information systems, including, as appropriate, disaggregating data by sex, region and socioeconomic status.</li> <li>Developing countries and donors will work together to better co-ordinate and link the various sources of information, including national statistical systems, budgeting, planning, monitoring and country-led evaluations of policy performance;</li> <li>Donors will align their monitoring with country information systems, and support, invest, and strengthen developing countries' national statistical capacity and information systems, including those for managing aid.</li> <li>Donors will be 'encouraged' to delegate sufficient authority to country offices.</li> </ul>	<p><b>There are no strong linkages to GHD here, although the following areas of good practice have some commonality to the goals of Paris and Accra</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response. (General principle #7)</li> <li>Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are <u>supportive of recovery and long-term development</u>, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities. (General principle #9)</li> <li>Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action. (Good practice #21)</li> <li>Donors encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance. (Good practice #22)</li> <li>Donors also commit to a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting. (Good practice #23)</li> </ul>

Paris	Accra	GHD
<b>Mutual Accountability</b>		
<p><b>Donors and partners are accountable for development results</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partner countries are committed to strengthening the appropriate parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets, and to incorporate the participation of a ‘broad range of development partners’ when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies;</li> <li>Donors commit to providing timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows;</li> <li>Partner countries and donors jointly commit to assessing country-level mechanisms on mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness.</li> </ul> <p>Key Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All partner countries have mutual assessment reviews in place.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><u>Mutual Assessment Reviews</u> will be based on country results reporting and information systems complemented with available donor data and credible independent evidence. They will draw on emerging good practice with stronger parliamentary scrutiny and citizen engagement. With them we will hold each other accountable for mutually agreed results in keeping with country development and aid policies;</li> <li>Both donors and partner countries will have to address <u>corruption</u> comprehensively. Developing countries in particular will address corruption by improving systems of investigation, legal redress, accountability and transparency in the use of public funds. Donors will take steps in their own countries to combat corruption by individuals or corporations and to track, freeze, and recover illegally acquired assets.</li> <li>Donors and developing countries will regularly make public all <u>conditions</u> linked to disbursements;</li> <li>All stakeholders will work together to review and document good practice on conditionality;</li> </ul>	<p><b>Under the GHD framework, donors and implementing partners are also striving for accountability, and like Paris the means to measure these goals are not well developed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Donors request implementing humanitarian organisations to be committed to <u>promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness</u> in implementing humanitarian action. (Good practice #15)</li> <li>Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action. (Good practice #21)</li> <li>Donors encourage <u>regular evaluations of international responses</u> to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance. (Good practice #22)</li> <li>Donors also commit to a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting. (Good practice #23)</li> </ul>





## Annex 2: List of interviewees

Emile Adriaensens, Minister Counsellor, Permanent Representation of Belgium to the United Nations Office and Specialized Agencies, Geneva

Tiffany Babington, Multilateral Programme Manager, Global Group, New Zealand Agency for International Development

Nicolas Baudouin, Desk Officer, Unit for Humanitarian Policy and Monitoring, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, France

Herbert Beck, First Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Germany to the Office of the United Nations, Geneva

David Booth, Research Fellow, Poverty and Public Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute

Helen Bryer, Humanitarian Institutions and Policy, DFID

Simon Burrall, Research Fellow, Aid Architecture, Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure, Overseas Development Institute

Isabelle Combes, Head of Section for Policy, Strategy and Capacity, ECHO

Daniel Coppard, Independent consultant

Steve Darvill, Humanitarian Aid Adviser, DAC, OECD

Anna Dorney, Policy Adviser – Disaster Risk Reduction, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)

Susan Eckey, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Norway

Nick Highton, Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute

Vishal Kapur, Senior Policy Advisor, Humanitarian Assistance Directorate, Sectors & Global Partnerships Branch (SGPB), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Donal Kenneally, Deputy Director of the Irish Aid Humanitarian and Recovery Section, IrishAid

Maaïke van Koldam, Deputy Head, Humanitarian Aid Division, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nance Kyloh, USAID representative, Geneva Mission

Mikael Lindvall, Deputy Director, Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Issues, Security Policy Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Suzanne Loughlin, Afghanistan Programme Manager, New Zealand Agency for International Development

Neil McFarlane, Counsellor (Development), Australian Permanent Mission, Geneva

Anita Menghetti, USAID

Tasneem Mowjee, Independent consultant

Hauge Sigvald Tomin, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Norway

Cecilie Wathne, Research Officer, Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure (CAPE), Overseas Development Institute

Peter Zwart, Rural Economic Development Advisor, Strategy, Evaluation and Advisory Group, New Zealand Agency for International Development

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## Annex 4: Terms of Reference

### Terms of Reference for an Assessment of the Relevance and Applicability of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in Humanitarian Assistance

1. Currently there is a debate on whether to promote closer alignment between the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the work carried out within the framework of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).

2. According to the OECD–DAC report, *Humanitarian Aid in DAC Peer Reviews: A Synthesis of Findings and Experiences (2006–2007)*, the DAC and GHD reference Group ‘should consider articulating the synergies between the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the GHD Principles and Good Practices in order to deepen ownership of the latter beyond the humanitarian sector as well as provide a useful platform to better embed humanitarian action within broader development co-operation processes’.

3. Similarly, the OECD–DAC’s proposal for a Revised Humanitarian Assessment Framework for DAC Peer Reviews states: ‘Alignment of the assessment framework with these commitments (i.e. the Paris Declaration and the Accra Action Agenda – *our add.*) would enable peer review examiners to identify the extent to which coherent linkages have been forged between humanitarian and development components of aid systems. Inevitably, the association can only be partial. In situations where the State is a party to armed conflict or has otherwise abrogated responsibilities for the safety and welfare of civilians on its territory, full association (particularly with respect to partner government ownership and alignment with national development strategies) would compromise core principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action.’

4. Humanitarian assistance is and should remain a life-saving activity. It is based on the humanitarian imperative and is not intended to be part of poverty reduction programmes or any other development agenda. If humanitarian assistance also can serve to strengthen other development initiatives, as a by-product of actions to save lives or reduce suffering, that is of course to be welcomed. Where possible, we should strive for

synergies—but not allow this to become a goal in itself for humanitarian action.

5. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) requests of the Humanitarian Policy Group that an assessment be made of the relevance and applicability of the Paris Declaration in humanitarian assistance. What are the advantages, and what are the constraints?

6. The assessment should include an assessment of the relevance and applicability of core concepts in the Declaration, such as “ownership”, “harmonisation”, “alignment”, “results” and “mutual accountability”. To what extent would an “alignment” of terms and concepts between DAC and GHD be useful?

7. The assessment should seek to highlight areas where alignment would be warranted, as well as those areas where humanitarian principles or other constraints should caution against such alignment.

8. The assessment undertaken will be a desk study, combined with interviews with relevant stakeholders, such as the OECD–DAC secretariat.

9. The paper will be approximately 20 pages in length (6,000—8,000 words), with a short Executive Summary outlining the findings.

10. A first draft will be presented to the MFA by 1 December 2008 and circulated by the authors for comment to relevant interviewees during the week beginning 1 December. Comments will be incorporated and a final draft will be submitted to the MFA the week beginning 5 January 2009.

11. A presentation of the final result will be made for GHD members in Geneva and at the DAC in Paris at a date to be determined.

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