

## PRSP Monitoring in Africa

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Abbreviations .....	2
Executive Summary .....	3
Rising to the challenge of PRSP implementation .....	3
Directions in donor support .....	3
Purpose and Coverage .....	4
Status of PRSP monitoring systems in Africa .....	4
Poverty monitoring or PRSP implementation monitoring? .....	4
Key outputs of the systems .....	4
Role of the annual PRSP progress report .....	5
Institutional framework .....	5
Leadership or coordination of system .....	5
Relations with line ministries, sub-national bodies and other relevant agencies ...	6
Parliament and Cabinet .....	7
Indicators .....	7
Number of indicators .....	7
Method of selecting indicators .....	8
Relationship to PRSP priorities .....	8
Multidimensionality of poverty .....	8
Usable for policymakers? .....	8
Sources of information .....	9
Budget processes .....	10
Costing the monitoring system .....	11
Civil society involvement .....	11
Access to information .....	11
Participatory monitoring? .....	12
Research .....	12
Civil society monitoring initiatives .....	13
Donor support for monitoring systems .....	13
Bibliography .....	15
Endnotes .....	16

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## Abbreviations

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APR	Annual PRSP Progress Report
CWIQ	Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
IDS	Institute for Development Studies (Brighton)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
JSA	Joint Staff Assessment
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme (Tanzania)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
ODI	Overseas Development Institute (London)
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (Mozambique)
PEAP	Plan for the Eradication of Absolute Poverty (Uganda)
PES	Plano Economico e Social (Mozambique)
PHDR	Poverty and Human Development Report (Tanzania)
PMAU	Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit (Uganda)
PMES	Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation System (Uganda)
PMS	Poverty Monitoring System (Tanzania)
PPA	Participatory Poverty Assessment
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SPPMD	Strategic Planning and Poverty Monitoring Department (Rwanda)
SWAps	Sector Wide Approaches
ToRs	Terms of Reference
TWGs	Technical Working Groups (Tanzania)

## Executive Summary

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### Rising to the challenge of PRS implementation

Monitoring systems in Africa are increasingly reflecting PRS principles but the challenge of monitoring PRS implementation is still significant.

The proposed systems consciously build on existing systems, whilst strengthening them with selected participatory instruments and the involvement of a broader range of stakeholders. There are several specific commitments to improve the dissemination of information. Half the cases provide more scope for civil society involvement in the monitoring system through providing space for CSOs as regular interlocutors at specific events or as working group members on a more regular basis.

The 'missing middle' identified by Booth and Lucas (ODI, 2002) in I-PRSPs and early full PRSPs is gradually being addressed: most systems appear to have given considerable attention to intermediate indicators. In many cases indicators have been chosen in consultation with sectors or other stakeholders and generally reflect PRS priorities (with the exception of governance in some cases), although many will need to be revisited and streamlined in the near future. Most systems have yet to establish clear 'monitoring chains' whereby it is possible to track change through the stages of input–output–outcome–impact. Systems are also still weighted towards monitoring final poverty impacts with an emphasis on technical as opposed to strategic criteria for monitoring PRS implementation. Some confusion still exists over how to combine poverty monitoring and PRS monitoring within a common system.

Governments generally identify the sources of data to be used in tracking specific indicators, but the provision of baseline figures for these indicators is still erratic. The systems all intend to draw on a number of types of data - including surveys/censuses, routine data, and participatory data – although feeding these into policymaking in an integrated and usable format remains a challenge. Dissemination of key outputs such as annual impact reports is improving with two examples of good practice (Tanzania, Uganda). Most countries have plans to strengthen their routine data systems, although the efficacy of these plans may be open to question. There is some use of 'light' instruments (instruments that require less time to conduct than, for instance a full household survey and allow for quicker analysis of results) to complement more traditional surveys, although some governments are reluctant to introduce new instruments because of cost and capacity constraints.

In most cases, the monitoring system's institutional arrangements are not yet functioning. There are a number of issues with the proposed frameworks, including duplication of functions and the capacity of key agencies/ departments. Even in the cases of Tanzania and Uganda where the system is functioning, there is still work to be done in embedding links between agencies. There is early evidence of an (imperfect) link between monitoring systems and budget processes, though much remains to be done to strengthen this.<sup>1</sup> Cabinets and parliaments have a formal role in some systems.

### Directions in donor support

Donors are beginning to support national PRS monitoring systems, both in terms of stepping back from determining the content of systems and through better coordinated support to these systems. Although donors do exert considerable influence on the choice or number of indicators, the variation in indicator choice (and the fact that these systems reflect the MDGs rather weakly) suggests that national as opposed to international considerations are prevalent.

In all countries, tensions remain between PRS monitoring systems and monitoring/reporting requirements for donor instruments such as SWAps or direct budget support. In Ethiopia and Rwanda PRS provides donors with a selection of indicators that can be used for performance assessment purposes, although it is not yet clear whether donors will use these indicators.

In a few cases, donors are coordinating their support for monitoring systems through pooled funds. In other cases, there is room for improvement in donor coordination, with examples of duplication and overlap in donor efforts.

## Purpose and coverage

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This synthesis note has been produced by the PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project. This note covers PRS and poverty monitoring systems in eight African countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). In all eight countries, a full PRSP has been drafted and a Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) has gone to the WB/IMF Boards.

This note was researched from the UK, drawing on publicly available information, consultants' reports and DFID's own knowledge base (see Bibliography). The note addresses key questions as highlighted in Booth and Lucas's paper on PRS monitoring systems (ODI, 2002). It was commissioned to feed into a DFID workshop on PRS monitoring in Africa. Please see annexed Matrix 1 (Indicators) and Matrix 2 (Key features of PRS Monitoring Systems) for supplementary information.

## Status of PRS monitoring systems in Africa

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In all eight countries, the PRSP outlines a monitoring and evaluation system for monitoring implementation. Ghana, Mozambique and Malawi have drafted separate, more detailed plans for monitoring, but these are not yet operational; Tanzania and Uganda's separate plans are operational. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Zambia have not yet drafted more detailed separate plans.<sup>2</sup>

### Key details of draft or operational monitoring systems<sup>3</sup>

- Ghana – GPRS Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (draft, October 2002). Not yet operational.
- Malawi – The National Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (NMEP) was outlined in a proposal of May 2002. Not yet operational.
- Mozambique – PARPA Monitoring and Evaluation System (PARPA M&E) was outlined in a publication of December 2001. Not yet operational.
- Tanzania – Poverty Monitoring Master Plan (PMMP) was published December 2001 establishing the Poverty Monitoring System (PMS). Operational.
- Uganda – Document outlining the Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation System (PMES) was published June 2002. Operational.

### Poverty monitoring or PRS implementation monitoring?

Monitoring poverty outcomes is only one part of monitoring PRS implementation. Additional elements may include monitoring the implementation of one-off policy commitments; monitoring allocation and expenditure of resources; or monitoring intermediate indicators such as numbers of health posts or numbers of vaccinations. Most of the monitoring systems outlined in PRSPs (Ethiopia, Zambia, Rwanda) address input monitoring and process/intermediate monitoring, but are noticeably weighted towards the monitoring of final poverty impacts.

Some systems do appear to be evolving to incorporate broader concerns (Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique). Mozambique, for instance, is developing a PARPA monitoring system that includes poverty monitoring, the monitoring of processes and sector results, and the monitoring of inputs. Uganda and Tanzania's PRSPs outline monitoring systems that focus on both poverty and PRS implementation, although the subsequent operational systems are almost exclusively poverty monitoring systems.

### Key outputs of the systems

Observers have some concerns about the extent to which existing monitoring and reporting systems can be adapted to suit PRS demands, but are equally wary of efforts to build new PRS monitoring systems. For the most part, these systems consciously build on existing monitoring and reporting systems while supplementing them (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda). In Mozambique, for example, the proposed system 'on the one hand is based on the further refinement of existing monitoring procedures of the State Budget and the annual political and economic plan (PES), and on the other hand adds new statistical tools for tracking PARPA outcomes' (Mozambique Joint Donor Review, 2002). In Rwanda, the monitoring system is building on some existing systems but new ones are also being created (for instance, for budget monitoring). It remains to be seen how well these systems will function in practice.

Key outputs are usually quarterly reports on budgetary and implementation issues, and annual reports on progress towards poverty reduction targets.

#### **Key outputs from Mozambique's PARPA M&E system**

- Quarterly reports (using existing *quarterly* Balance of Plano Economico e Social (PES) amended to reflect PARPA indicators)
- Annual Report (as annex to *annual* Balance of PES)
- Annual Impact Report (new output outlining progress on impact indicators)

#### **Key outputs from Tanzania's Poverty Monitoring System**

- Annual Report on Poverty and Human Development (PHDR) and a popular version
- Reports on surveys, studies and analyses
- Updates on Tanzania's Socio Economic Database
- Policy Briefings
- Annually updated Poverty Monitoring Master Plan
- Seminars and workshops

### **Role of the annual PRSP progress report**

In some cases, the Annual PRSP Progress Report (APR) required by the IFIs and other donors is well integrated into the monitoring system. In the case of Ethiopia and Malawi, this annual progress report will be the key (and perhaps only) annual output for monitoring PRS progress. In Uganda and Tanzania, annual impact reports will feed into the PRS progress report but the latter will be produced outside the formal poverty monitoring system. Ghana's Annual Progress Report will report on movements in all significant indicators but it is not clear that this will meet the requirements of the PRSP Progress Report. In Rwanda, the first annual progress report is just being drafted; it will report primarily on actions taken and some budgetary indicators, rather than poverty data.

## **Institutional framework**

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### **Leadership or coordination of system**

The complex relationships between relevant actors engaged in monitoring are managed in a variety of ways. Most PRSs or monitoring plans contain useful diagrams that provide a representation of the institutional framework for monitoring PRS implementation. The key differences between these institutional structures lie in the power accorded to the various bodies – this is difficult to analyse from the information in official documents.

In most cases, there is an official central secretariat, monitoring unit, or coordinating body with some degree of oversight or leadership. This focal point may be a small unit in the Ministry of Finance (as in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zambia). In other cases, a whole department is designated as responsible and no further sub-unit has been specified (the Strategic Planning and Poverty Monitoring Department (SPPMD) in Rwanda, the National Economic Council in Malawi). Relations between these departments and key ministries are crucial, particularly relations with the ministry of finance. In Rwanda, there has been strong emphasis on clarifying the role of SPPMD in PRS implementation, as a precursor to developing a monitoring system.

### Uganda's PMAU

The Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit (PMAU) was central in the development of the PEAP and PEAP/PRSP Progress Reports, and leads on mainstreaming poverty issues into the budget and sector planning. There is a tight link between poverty monitoring and analysis, and policy development. PMAU has operated very effectively as the linchpin on which the whole poverty monitoring effort depends. It also acts as a secretariat for the Poverty Monitoring Network and has helped facilitate dialogue between the GoU and NGOs. It needs to work more closely with sectoral planning and budgeting authorities. The Poverty Monitoring Network (representing a range of stakeholders) oversees implementation of the PMES.

Source: IDS/T&B Consult, 2002

In Mozambique and Tanzania responsibility for coordination falls on a body with a broader membership, including non-governmental actors. In Tanzania, for instance, the Poverty Monitoring Steering Committee has broad membership of several types of stakeholder. Under the Steering Committee is the Technical Committee, supported by the Poverty Monitoring Secretariat in the Vice President's Office which has responsibility for coordinating the whole system but is not 'empowered' as the equivalent unit is in Uganda.

In some systems there are problems of duplication of functions and responsibilities (Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique and Malawi). In Mozambique, for instance, the 'functions of the multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder Poverty Observatory overlap with functions of the multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder Committee for the Coordination of Consultations' (IDS/T&B Consult, 2002) – there is scope for collapsing the two bodies. Similarly in Ghana there is apparent duplication of functions: the M&E Division of the National Development Planning Commission will implement the M&E strategy, while the Ministry of Economic Planning and Regional Cooperation will monitor its implementation of the M&E strategy.

### Relations with line ministries, sub-national bodies and other relevant agencies

Some monitoring systems are organised around discrete units established at various levels of government (Zambia, Malawi). In Zambia, for instance, the proposed monitoring system relies heavily on the information-producing abilities of statistical units in line ministries and district/provincial level Development Coordinating Committees. It is noteworthy that Ghana's original M&E plan (outlined in its PRS) also relied heavily on Planning and Coordination Units at district and regional level; however the current strategy notes that their capacity to deliver reliable information is not sufficiently developed and that the focus should be on delivering information to these units rather than extracting information from them.

Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda have specified institutional roles for non-governmental stakeholders in their poverty monitoring plans. Although the PMAU in the Ugandan MoF provides a focal point for monitoring activity, the Poverty Monitoring Network represents a variety of stakeholders who use and provide information in the monitoring process. In Ghana, the National Inter-Agency Poverty Monitoring Groups are thematic, multi-stakeholder groups which will review performance in relevant areas.

Tanzania's system relies on four Technical Working Groups (Surveys and Census; Routine Data; Research and Analysis; and Dissemination, Sensitisation and Advocacy) to build relationships between actors. The TWGs have broad and overlapping membership<sup>4</sup>; ToRs for each group are set out in the PMMP, as are important links between groups.

### Opinion on Tanzania's institutional framework

**IDS/T&B Consult:** 'No empowered secretariat is visualised, however, and there is a seemingly deliberate effort to disperse initiative and authority away from any single centre. The Ministry of Finance appears as one actor among several, in spite of its lead role in the MTEF and PRS processes. As argued in the Tanzania chapter of the Institutionalisation Study, the Tanzanian proposals could be seen as cumbersome, and pose the risk of a vacuum of authority and initiative. A more specific danger is that the opportunities that may arise for beginning to stimulate and then "feed" new information demands arising from the MTEF process will be missed. A final question is whether, despite being more open and inclusive in principle, the network arrangement will in practice be more conducive to engaging with stakeholders from the wider society, and campaigning organisations in particular.'

**Evans/van Diesen:** 'The result [of an early consultation process on the monitoring framework] is a framework which is ambitious but has a strong national identity and embraces different institutional actors and poverty strategy processes within a comprehensive system. There have been criticisms of the institutional framework, with some arguing that it is unnecessarily complicated and cumbersome in a way that is typical of compromise solutions. Yet there is a strong feeling particularly amongst Government stakeholders that this is a workable framework that makes appropriate use of the existing capacity and mandate of various organisations.'

Coordination with sub-national bodies usually needs to be clarified (Mozambique, Ethiopia, Tanzania). The JSA of Ethiopia’s PRS noted the need to link impressive central data collection and analysis systems with the monitoring of inputs, outputs and outcomes at *woreda* [local government] level. The PRS also puts heavy emphasis on improving information flow towards the centre but makes little reference to improving information flows from the centre. In Tanzania, there are ambitious plans to roll out the M&E system through the Local Government Reform Programme. At present, the LGRP is adopting a sub-set of PRS indicators.<sup>5</sup> However, progress with the LGRP is slow in general, and the PMS in practice is a rather top-down system.

**Parliament and Cabinet**

The functional role of Parliament in these monitoring systems is often unclear although Cabinet is usually given formal oversight and some reports are produced for the President’s Office or Cabinet. Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Mozambique specify some kind of link between PRS monitoring and Parliament, but the extent of this link varies. For instance, Ghana’s Parliament will receive monthly reports in the proposed system and representatives of certain sub-committees will sit on the M&E technical committee. In Tanzania, the Dissemination, Sensitisation and Advocacy Working Group will ensure that civil society monitoring inputs are disseminated to Parliament.

**Mozambique’s Parliament**

A system has been established by law for Parliament to play a role in the monitoring of the PARPA, allowing for discussion and for holding the Government accountable, i.e. by giving parliament the competence to call ministers before parliament to report on the progress of PARPA. The first presentation and discussion in Parliament was held in March 2002 and it is planned that such events will take place regularly. However, no Parliament committee has been established to focus specifically on the PARPA. Rather, work related to PARPA objectives and activities is divided among three existing committees.

Source: IDS/T&B Consult, 2002

**Indicators**

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For a complete list of core indicators from PRS monitoring documents, please see ‘Matrix I – Indicators’. The following draws on both PRSs and separate monitoring system documents.

**Number of indicators**

Most of the monitoring systems outlined focus on a core set of indicators, whilst also specifying a much broader set of indicators to be monitored. In most cases, revisiting and streamlining these indicators would be a useful step. However, the number of these indicators varies considerably – see table below.

Country	Approximate numbers of indicators
Ethiopia	22 indicators + 9 performance indicators
Ghana	52 indicators
Malawi	70 indicators (more in technical document) (18 core)
Mozambique*	50 indicators
Rwanda*	50 indicators + 7 indicators linked to MDGs + 13 performance assessment indicators
Tanzania	Core set of 60 indicators
Uganda	100 indicators (30 core)
Zambia	250 indicators (45 core)

\* - in these countries, the list of indicators is currently being revisited and may be refined. In Rwanda, it appears that this list does not have any real status within the policy system.

## Method of selecting indicators

The documents suggest that indicators have been chosen through a variety of methods and for a variety of reasons. There was usually a degree of consultation within government and with consultants (and sometimes beyond to other stakeholders) though in some cases it appears that governments took a pragmatic approach of using indicators already tracked for existing reporting requirements. Some PRSs (Rwanda, Tanzania) also based their choice on whether there was sufficient data likely to be available, and the cost of monitoring the indicator. In most cases there is little indication of how the 'long' list of indicators was then prioritised into a 'core' list – where there is detail, it was the responsibility of consultants and the MoF (Ethiopia), or materialised after a national consultation exercise (Zambia).

None of these systems took the MDGs as a starting point, although some make reference to them and in many cases the choice of indicators and targets covers the same general ground as the 'core' MDGs. It is not clear from the documentation how far donors influenced the choice of indicators, but anecdotal evidence suggests that donors are one source of a pressure to proliferate indicators (governmental bodies and NGOs are another source of pressure).

### **Tanzania: MDG Monitoring**

Tanzania produced a first progress report on progress towards the MDGs in 2001. However, there are challenges to be faced in integrating MDGs into the national policy framework and national poverty monitoring system. Whereas most of the goals and targets are already incorporated in the policy framework and the monitoring system, some remain to be addressed. This is particularly the case, for example, with MDGs that address environmental sustainability. There are two important factors: the difference in time-horizon between PRS and MDG indicators, and avoiding the proliferation of monitoring processes. The GoT has commissioned some analytical work to address this issue, and the next Poverty and Human Development Report and the next PRSP Progress Report will document progress towards the MDGs as part of overall progress reporting.

Tanzania PRSP Progress Report November 2002

## Relationship to PRS priorities

For the most part, indicators reflect the priority areas of the PRSs. In Mozambique and Tanzania, the monitoring system sets out indicators for all the priority areas, including governance and justice (Mozambique) and extreme vulnerability (Tanzania). Uganda's indicators correspond to outcome targets that have been agreed for each sector. In some cases, however, there are difficulties in translating priority policy areas into measurable indicators (Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia). The JSA of Ethiopia's PRS, for instance, states that priority areas of private investment, food security and employment are not well represented in the indicators.

## Multidimensionality of poverty

The multidimensionality of poverty is handled with varying degrees of sensitivity. All countries cover income or consumption poverty, education and health (including nutrition and/or food security) indicators as part of their set of core indicators. Access to safe water is a recurring theme highlighted in most documents. Tanzania includes indicators that attempt to capture vulnerability. Gender and environment dimensions of poverty are not systematically captured in indicators, although some countries take care to disaggregate literacy and school enrolment data by gender. Although some countries (e.g. Malawi) track governance indicators (such as the crime rate and the warden/prisoner ratio) in their 'long' list of indicators, few countries have given it prominence in the core set of indicators.

## Usable for policymakers?

To be fully effective and usable for policymakers, indicators need to be tangible, discrete (not overlapping) and SMART - Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound. To be strategically meaningful they also need to be clearly specified in terms of input, output, outcome, and impact.

Baselines are also important for assessing change, but are proving to be somewhat problematic. In half the countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda), baselines are provided for a reasonable number of the core indicators, though not all. Tanzania has only just been able to set baselines for some indicators because of the publication of the 2000/01 Household Budget Survey. In other countries the provision of baselines is more erratic. In Malawi, for instance, the core indicators have no baselines and in Mozambique only about half the indicators have baselines. However, it is worth noting that Uganda's 2000 PRS did not provide baselines for its indicators – these have only been provided in its PMES, produced after the second iteration of its PRS.



It is apparent that full PRSs have gone some way in outlining input, output, outcome and impact indicators.<sup>6</sup> Many specify their definitions of these categories (Malawi), provide justifications as to why each is important (Ethiopia), and note each indicator's type (Mozambique). Matrix I provides more information on the types of indicators specified by each country, but it is worth noting that different countries use different definitions of indicator types and may add a further category on performance assessment indicators that they intend to be used for donor purposes as well as governmental purposes (Ethiopia, Rwanda).

Booth and Lucas (2002) stressed the difficulty of the 'missing middle', or the lack of indicators to track implementation of policy and the relationship between inputs and final outcomes. The 'middle' is no longer missing, as can be seen from the number of intermediate indicators evident in Matrix I, but there remain a number of weaknesses. Primarily, there is little evidence of attention to the monitoring chain as outlined in Booth and Lucas (2002), which means that information produced to track indicators may not provide policymakers with the information that they need to explain changes and thus adjust policy. In most cases, although a number of different types of indicator may be listed for a specific sector, the 'chain' connecting them is not made explicit. For example, in Malawi's case a key final impact indicator is the maternal mortality rate but there are no intermediate indicators that would allow policymakers to track progress towards/explain movements in the MMR (such as number of primary health centres with trained birth attendants/midwives, number of attended births, number of births taking place in hospitals/clinics, or the percentage of STD). There are, however, several output indicators such as number of physicians/nurses/health assistants trained. This has also been noted as an issue in Tanzania and Malawi, and is likely to be highlighted elsewhere as monitoring plans are implemented.

The Uganda PMES states that it will be concerned with the 'whole chain of conditions that are the means to achieving the objectives of the PEAP and monitoring the outputs and the outcomes.' See box below for one example of the way that monitoring data has influenced policy and resource allocations.

#### **Uganda: Monitoring Chain in the Water Sector**

In Uganda, there is a strong correlation between access to safe water (an intermediate outcome) and reductions in infant mortality (a final outcome), which suggests that more money should be invested in the water sector (an input). However, a PMAU study in 2002 revealed that investment of more money had not resulted in more water point sources (outputs) that would give access to safe water. It was therefore questioned whether additional inputs to the water sector would represent value for money. The study was influential in the decision that the water sector would need further reform before more money would be invested. In this case, the key data for the policymakers was not final or intermediate outcome data, but input/output ratios.

Source: Lars Moller, personal communication October 2002

## **Sources of information**

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PRSs and monitoring plans generally make clear the sorts of information that can be expected to be obtained from different sorts of agencies, and furthermore link specific indicators with the source of the information to track them. Nearly all countries provide a table linking core indicators with sources of information. Malawi's key indicator table is an average example (shown overleaf, drawn from PRS).<sup>7</sup> Most other countries provide similar tables. It is worth noting that documents do not usually address in any detail the quality of the data produced by these different instruments.

In all countries, monitoring systems will draw on a variety of types of official data in examining poverty impacts. All the systems note the importance of surveys and censuses, routine data, and qualitative or participatory data. Although in most cases the weight is on the surveys, several countries have introduced new participatory monitoring tools. Ghana's PRS notes participatory monitoring and evaluation as a key feature of the system – the National Economic Dialogue and PPA as well as civil society's own assessments of impact. Other countries also intend to draw on the inputs to the PRS consultation process as a source of qualitative data (Ethiopia).

The relative weight given to these different instruments varies, as do the quality of links between them. In evolving systems (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Zambia), the relatively preliminary nature of the monitoring plans is one reason why these links are not well articulated. Even in countries with somewhat more advanced monitoring systems there is a need to clarify how these qualitative data will be combined and integrated with quantitative data for policy making at different levels (Malawi, Mozambique). In Mozambique, the emphasis is firmly on official quantitative data and proposals for qualitative and participatory monitoring need to be more fully developed. Tanzania and Uganda are farther advanced in establishing the links between these different types of data, but challenges remain in both systems. In Uganda, for instance, the PMES stresses the integration of surveys and PPAs and states ways that they shall relate, but notes that it is almost impossible to integrate data sets from different sources at present.<sup>8</sup>

## Malawi's Key Monitoring Indicators

Area/Sector	Indicator	Indicator Type	Sources of data
<b>Overall</b>	Consumption	Impact	IHS, QUIM
	GDP per capita	Impact	National income statistics
	Nutrition status Morbidity Mortality Life expectancy	Outcome	DHS, IHS administrative records, QUIM
	Composite Welfare Index	Outcome, Output and Impact	All sources
<b>Agriculture</b>	Food production Cash crop production Animal production	Outcome	Crop estimates, NSSA, PPI
<b>Health</b>	Access to potable water Access to sanitation Access to health services	Output	DHS, IHS, QUIM
	Total fertility rate HIV infection	Outcome	IHS, Administrative records
<b>Education</b>	Education Literacy rate	Impact	IHS
	Net enrolment Education attainments	Outcome	Administrative data and IHS

Countries are making more use of 'lighter' monitoring instruments as their monitoring plans develop – instruments that deliver useful interim data without being as time-intensive as, for instance, a full-scale household survey.<sup>9</sup> Malawi, Mozambique and Rwanda all institutionalise light instruments in their monitoring plans, while Ghana indicates that it will use small impact assessment in the current year. In evolving systems, such as in Ethiopia and Zambia, the emphasis is firmly on large scale surveys with no indication that lighter instruments were considered.

However, in Uganda and Tanzania lighter instruments have not been so popular. In Tanzania, the lighter instrument CWIQ was considered but discarded because stakeholders felt that the information could be gathered from elsewhere. However, CWIQ remains an option should the multi-year survey programme not come about. Uganda also considered<sup>10</sup> the possibility of introducing more 'light' instruments into its monitoring system, but noted the survey unit was already overstretched without additional light surveys. It was decided that the second national PPA would not be 'naïve' but would be guided by prior analysis on key bottlenecks.

Most of the PRS documents and monitoring plans also recognize the need to strengthen the quality of routine or administrative data (Rwanda and Zambia are the only exceptions). Most contain plans to strengthen the quality of routine data, although the efficacy of these plans may be open to question.

## Budget processes

There is some attention to input monitoring and evidence of growing links between monitoring and budget processes, although there is much to be done to strengthen these links. Several PRSs note that they will track the share of the budget that goes towards priority PRS sectors such as education and health and some have defined targets. All the PRSs note the importance of expenditure tracking, but the proposed link between this information and other data is not well elucidated in those countries without a developed monitoring system (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Zambia). However, the World Bank and IMF recently highlighted Zambia as an example of a public expenditure review process that is in fact well-linked to the PRS (World Bank & IMF 2002).

In those countries that have a (draft) monitoring system (Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda), the link is better specified but remains highly imperfect in practice. In Malawi, for instance, the proposed monitoring strategy states that existing public financial management systems (such as the Integrated Financial Management Integration System, under the direction of the Treasury) will need to be brought under the control of the National Steering Committee. In Uganda, the poverty monitoring secretariat is located in the Ministry of Finance Planning and Development, with relatively close links between monitoring and resource allocation.

### **Mozambique – Links between poverty monitoring and the budget**

Monitoring of budget execution is presented as one of three central monitoring processes in both the PRS and the PARPA M&E system. The main instruments for this purpose are the quarterly budget reports and other budget reports prepared by MPF, as well as Sector Expenditure Reviews.

A commissioned report states, 'In spite of recent government efforts to improve reporting, most donors continue to find existing monitoring efforts of the state budget too rudimentary and without sufficient transparency with regard to budget execution and public expenditure tracking. Although quarterly budget executions verify resource allocation, links between allocation of funds and attainment of targets/results continue to be weak.'

Source: IDS/T&B Consult, 2002

### **Tanzania – Links between poverty monitoring and the budget**

- A commissioned report on the PMMP stated: 'The PMMP recognises the importance of linking system outputs with the resource allocation process, but does not specify a formal framework for doing so.' (Evans/van Diesen, 2002)
- The Tanzanian Poverty Reduction Budget Support Mid-Year Review (May 02) stated: 'The monitoring processes that occur simultaneously during the year (namely the poverty monitoring, expenditure tracking, service delivery and routine M&E that culminate in the PRS progress report) need better coordination with the budget process.'
- The recent Poverty and Human Development Report (October 2002) includes an analysis of expenditure in some sectors, bringing PER and poverty monitoring closer together.

### **Costing the monitoring system**

Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania have tried to cost the monitoring system, but other countries have not. The Malawi system provides preliminary costings which amount to £1.6 for financial year 2002/03. The Tanzanian system outlines preliminary costings, which amount to £1.45 million for the first year and just under £1 million for subsequent years. Preliminary costings for Ghana's proposed system stand at £2.9 million for the period until 2004.

## **Civil society involvement**

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### **Access to information**

Access to information by stakeholders is a prime prerequisite for participatory monitoring of PRS implementation. Most PRSs or monitoring plans<sup>11</sup> make an explicit commitment to improve accessibility and dissemination of information, although in some cases the mechanism is left somewhat unclear. For instance, Malawi's PRS states that civil society will be used to disseminate information.

Tanzania and Uganda are once again taking the lead in disseminating information to civil society. In Uganda, public reporting of findings from statistical and non-statistical sources is well established, including the two-yearly Poverty Status Reports and other outputs of PMAU. The Poverty Forum is a public forum held periodically where government and civil society actors and the general public debate issues arising from the PPA research. Tanzania's recent experience is outlined in the box below.

### **Access to information in Tanzania**

Membership of the Technical Working Groups in Tanzania's PMS provides a means for civil society to access relevant information. The PMMP stresses dissemination as a key element, as is apparent in the creation of the Dissemination, Sensitisation and Advocacy Technical Working Group. The first Poverty Policy Week was held recently: of the 350 participants, half were from civil society. During the week various reports on poverty and PRS progress were launched and discussed, including the poverty analysis of the Household Budget Survey, a simplified guide to Poverty Monitoring (also in Kiswahili), the draft Tanzania Poverty and Human Development report, the re-launching of TSED and a discussion of PRS progress.

Sources: Evans/van Diesen, 2002

## Participatory monitoring?

Although participatory data gathering exercises and access to information are important parts of the picture, participatory monitoring goes beyond this.

There are two levels to distinguish. First of all, the official system might accept civil society inputs when civil society produces them (and may or may not commit to using them in its own outputs). Secondly, the system might include civil society members more effectively, either as interlocutors at specific events or as committee members on a more regular basis.

In Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, and Zambia, there is little institutionalisation of participatory monitoring of PRS implementation. Plans go only so far as to state that civil society will be important and that organisations can contribute their own impact assessments.<sup>12</sup>

In the remainder of cases, there are attempts to provide roles for civil society organisations as interlocutors at specific events or as members of monitoring committees. In some cases (Uganda, Malawi) the institutional details of this are mostly unclear. In Mozambique and Tanzania, there are clear structures where civil society is given a role to play. However, CSO take-up of these roles is erratic at best, for a variety of reasons.

### Participatory monitoring in Mozambique

Mozambique's M&E strategy assigns at least nine different sorts of roles and responsibilities to civil society actors and institutions, and makes it clear that civil society would have roles to play as both members of the Observatory and as interlocutors with the Observatory. However, few civil society actors are aware of the details of the M&E strategy, and none (except possibly the Mozambique Debt Group) had been party to discussions with GoM about it or played any role in formulating it. At present there are no institutional structures for the participation of civil society in MPF-led policy processes and only weak linkages between the GoM institutions involved in PARPA monitoring and the civil society institutions whose involvement is proposed. There appear to be a number of issues linked to the functioning of the Observatory which have not yet been clarified, including the mechanisms for bringing on board civil society organisations and researchers.

Source: IDS/T&B Consult, 2002

In Tanzania, the institutional structure gives CSOs and research organisations a central role in several levels of the system, including the Poverty Monitoring Steering Committee and all four Technical Working Groups. The institute REPOA (Research on Poverty Alleviation) manages funds and provides the secretariat function for the Research and Analysis Working Group, for instance. The process of preparing the PPA has also become highly inclusive – see box below. However, there is a need for more systematic participation by CSOs. 'Although invited to participate, few CSOs were actually engaged in the drafting of the PMMP and few are currently sitting in the Technical Working Groups.'

### Tanzania: Institutional Arrangements behind the PPA

'The aim of the PPA is to improve policymakers' understanding of poverty and the outcome of pro-poor actions, and facilitate constructive engagement by civil society in pro-poor policymaking processes. A PPA Stakeholders Workshop in March 2001 recommended that while the process should be executed by a Government agency, in this case Planning, it should be implemented by a consortium of implementing partners drawn from non-profit academic and research institutions, national and international NGOs. The same stakeholders recommended that the Lead Implementing Partner should be a national non-profit research or academic institution. Following this decision, and after some delays, applications were invited from institutions interested in contributing to the Consortium. The contributions sought included offers of funding, technical assistance, staff contributions in-kind, dissemination and advocacy support. Eventually 13 implementing partners were selected. This group recently underwent training in participatory policy research. Fieldwork is expected to begin in March 2002 with results available for dissemination by January 2003.'

Source: Evans/van Diesen, 2002

## Research

In Tanzania and Ethiopia, the role of research is addressed, with some indication of government's intention to support independent research (see box overleaf). In other cases, the role of research is left unclear.

### **Tanzania: Research and Analysis**

The PMMP states: 'The government is aware of the dangers involved in investing full ownership and control of research and analysis within a single/lead agency model. Hence a conscious choice was made for a more pluralistic and dynamic engagement in poverty-focused research.' The multi-stakeholder Research and Analysis Working Group is a key means of linking research and evaluation with the main monitoring outputs of the PMS. It is responsible for the coordination of a research and analysis work programme that will investigate the reasons behind poverty trends, assess questions of causality and impact, and test the assumptions underlying the PRS. This group is coordinated by the President's Office – Planning and Privatisation, with the research organisation REPOA (Research on Poverty Alleviation) performing the secretariat function.

Sources: Evans/van Diesen, 2002

### **Civil society monitoring initiatives**

Civil society organisations often face severe capacity constraints in engaging with the PRS process, and it may be difficult for them to make a commitment to ongoing or systematic monitoring work. However, there are a number of interesting initiatives either working on building capacity to monitor or actually monitoring PRS implementation. In most cases, the official documents do not reference these efforts, but more information is available from consultants' reports and other sources. Mozambique's CSOs are involved in a variety of ways, as seen below.

- Mozambique Debt Group intends to participate in PARPA reviews and evaluations, produce a simplified version of the PARPA document, and produce an 'Indicative Guide to PARPA Monitoring,' among other PARPA-related activities.
- LINK NGO Forum proposes to work first on raising awareness of the PARPA among the public and civil society and then to promote civil society monitoring of it.
- Action Aid is already working to strengthen district planning processes and participatory approaches in three pilot districts, and sees this as opening spaces and creating capacities for PARPA monitoring at District level.

### **Donor support for monitoring systems**

Donors are beginning to support national PRS monitoring systems, both in terms of allowing national space for determining the content of the systems and through better coordinated support of the systems.

As an example of this, indicators have been chosen on a national basis in all cases. Although it may well be that donors had considerable influence over the choice or number of indicators, the variation in indicator choice (and the fact that these systems reflect the MDGs rather weakly) suggests that national as opposed to international influences are prevalent. Several PRSs state that indicators are drawn from those already used to monitor sector performance or are based on national consultations.

In all countries, tensions remain between PRS monitoring systems and monitoring/reporting requirements for donor instruments such as SWAPs or direct budget support. The provision of direct budget support is heavily conditioned and usually leads to an increase in the number and frequency of donor reviews.<sup>13</sup> In Ethiopia and Rwanda the PRS provides donors with a selection of indicators that can be used for performance assessment purposes. In both cases, it is not yet clear that donors will use these indicators; however, recent SPA Action Learning Missions have provided a basis for continuing discussion. In Mozambique, donors have recently agreed that the GoM should propose a PARPA monitoring system that can provide a framework for donors to assess performance and make decisions about general budget support.

### **Tanzania – PMS and performance assessment**

In Tanzania, donors and the government have recently enhanced the Poverty Monitoring System to ensure that it can meet the performance assessment needs of donors providing direct budget support. This has meant negotiating a new list of indicators (not targets) for performance assessment. This is based in part on the list contained in the PMMP, but also draws on methodological comments on the indicators contained in the last Poverty and Human Development Report, as well as the MDGs and submissions from various ministries.

A number of criteria were used to determine the new indicators, including a clear link to the PRS, and no extra cost incurred (i.e. no new data collection). The new list of 60 indicators is longer than the original list of 39 indicators, but only 30 of these will be reported annually. Collection and reporting of data will continue to take place through the Poverty Monitoring System.

In a few cases, donors are coordinating their support for monitoring systems through pooled funds, although there is scope for strengthening coordination. In Burkina Faso, for instance, five donors are coordinating support for monitoring implementation of the PRS in the context of budget support. In Tanzania, donors are providing support to the PMS through a joint financing mechanism that pools donor funds with Government funds.

In other cases, there is room for improvement in donor coordination, with overlapping initiatives and some gaps in assistance. Mozambique provides an example, as shown below.

#### **Donor support for M&E in Mozambique**

'A number of initiatives for strengthening M&E systems or capacities have been identified, related either directly or indirectly to the PARPA M&E system. There is still scope for a better co-ordination between the G-10 Group and other donors of support to central level institutions as regards M&E and the PARPA. Most donor support is focusing on strengthening Government capacity at central level and with a focus on quantitative data gathering, whereas the need for further dialogue and subsequent funding seems to be in the area of independent, qualitative and participatory monitoring. It was further observed by the academics that bilateral development agencies have fallen behind the World Bank and IMF in making their documents, monitoring and evaluation reports and other consultancy outputs available via their web sites. These are considered a rich source of poverty-related information, which, again, could be given wider dissemination and use.'

Source: IDS/T&B Consult, 2002

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## Endnotes

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- 1 See, for instance, recent work on results-oriented expenditure study: 'Results Oriented Expenditure Management' John Roberts and Tim Williamson, ODI (ongoing).
- 2 In Rwanda (2001), a consultant drew up a poverty monitoring and information system – this loosely informed the monitoring chapter of the PRSP but has not really been adopted.
- 3 Where these countries are referred to, the reference is to this system rather than the PRSP unless otherwise stated.
- 4 It is worth noting that overlapping membership of the groups has proved burdensome for individuals from quite early in the process.
- 5 Plus other indicators relevant to local government performance.
- 6 See matrix 1. See also budget processes section on page 10 for more on input indicators.
- 7 However, a recent CABS review noted with concern 'the lack of concrete progress in the elaboration of a work-plan and timetable for the various data acquisition activities necessary to prepare for the first MPRS Annual Report in February 2003.'
- 8 It is likely that this attention to the integration of surveys and participatory data is partially a result of a workshop in May/June 2001 convened by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics and the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP). This workshop brought together a small team of users and producers of poverty monitoring data. A major theme was the need to analytically link survey work and participatory work more closely.
- 9 Results from the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ), for instance, can be analysed in 48 hours, which is a significant factor in policy making processes.
- 10 In the 2001 workshop, *ibid.*
- 11 With the exception of Zambia. Zambia's PRS simply states that NGOs will have 'an important role' in monitoring, collecting information and analysing data.
- 12 Note that this lack of official space does not mean that civil society is not active – in Zambia, for instance, the umbrella group Civil Society for Poverty Reduction is involved in monitoring.
- 13 Draft note on long term partnerships, PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project.