

Education aid in fragile states: Delivering it effectively

Overview

This paper develops a framework for assessing the effectiveness of education aid in fragile states and uses it to evaluate examples of education support from across a range of fragile contexts. It begins by identifying three aspects of effectiveness based on the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States – coordination, state building, and ‘do no harm’ – and reviews the literature to find out what the issues and obstacles are to achieving these in the education sector. It then goes on to examine five approaches to delivering aid in fragile states (sector-wide approach, trust fund, social fund, UN-led approach, global fund), analyses how these have impacted on education sector outcomes, and identifies what can be learned about the effective delivery of education aid from each of these approaches.

Some general conclusions about how the international community can improve the effectiveness of education aid in fragile states are presented below. A summary of the main findings arising from the analysis of the five approaches can be found in the last section of this paper.

Coordinating stakeholders

Getting stakeholders behind a joint planning process is probably the area over which donors have the most control, but even so there are only partial examples of success. The most effective approaches are in situations where the international community develops and supports national government capacity to lead a sector or sub-sector process which allows broad stakeholder involvement (including national and local level, and state and non state actors). Where donors cannot or will not work within government leadership, they can still coordinate their efforts in order, at a minimum, to share information and programming intentions. Local stakeholders, including government representatives, should be encouraged to participate in such coordina-

tion mechanisms and UNICEF may be able to take a leadership role. There are currently no agreed joint planning frameworks for these contexts, but recent work by the Fast Track Initiative and the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) is beginning to address this.

State building

The two state functions focused on here are systems for the payment and training of teachers, and mechanisms for holding schools to account. There are examples of support for teachers at national scale, including paying recurrent costs, where long term financing can be channelled through the government budget. Where donors are unwilling or unable to fund through the government budget, it may be possible to develop joint mechanisms for channelling funds through non state partners for teacher training. The review found this a partially effective approach, but short term funding cycles weakened its impact. Community-based approaches are an important mechanism for strengthening the accountability of schools to communities and local authorities, but they require complementary supply side investments to sustain their impacts over time. State accountability for the delivery of education services can be undermined if the international community exerts too much influence over sector processes.

Do no harm

Equitable access to education services and inclusive policies at the school level are crucial to long term efforts to build robust institutions in fragile states. A combination of weak government capacity, limited geographical access, and contended curriculum, makes it extremely challenging to tackle these issues in the education sector. One of the examples reviewed here suggests that pilot projects can be successful at the local level, but stakeholders need to work hard to get these pilot approaches integrated into

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government policy. The examples also indicate the importance of robust dialogue processes that allow for the development of long term strategies to tackle equity issues and a solid information base to monitor progress, together with ongoing efforts to understand the relationship between education and fragility. Non state actors, including international NGOs are likely to be important partners in addressing equity and access issues, but they need to act within an agreed joint approach for the sector.

Background and limitations

The impetus to support education in fragile states¹ has assumed greater momentum since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. As a result, the case has progressively been made for increases in funding and attention to the sector in these contexts (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003; Sperling, 2006; Save the Children, 2007). Drawing on the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, three aspects of effective aid are examined. These relate to coordination, state building and do no harm (OECD DAC, April 2007). There are challenges to each of these aspects of effectiveness when investing in education in fragile states. The relative success of efforts to overcome these is the focus of this paper.

The literature reviewed here is mainly drawn from analytic work conducted by international aid organisations, and is beset by methodological challenges that relate to definitional issues and lack of country case study comparability. Despite its limitations, there is enough available, particularly derived from recent DAC sponsored work (Rose and Greeley, 2006; DAC Fragile States Group, September 2006), to merit this research exercise. The paper does not claim to be exhaustive as there are other approaches, including general budget support, forms of project support, and humanitarian aid which are not specifically dealt with here. Finally, as DAC principle 6 reminds us, important though a focus on the education sector might be in fragile states, it cannot stand alone and needs to be looked at within a wider mix of development, diplomatic and security responses.

What are the obstacles to the effective delivery of education aid in fragile states?

This section of the paper takes each of the aspects of effectiveness identified above, defines them, and examines what some of the obstacles are to achieving them when investing in the education sector. Research questions are then developed on the basis of this analysis.

Coordination

DAC Principle 7 is to agree practical coordination mechanisms between international actors. It further suggests that where possible, international actors should work together with reformers in government and civil society to develop shared analysis and priorities. All aid to fragile states faces coordination challenges (ODI, December 2004) and aid to educa-

tion is no exception to this picture (Sommers, 2004). In southern Sudan, for example, failure of international actors to coordinate their efforts during the civil war left a legacy of disconnected systems, with different curricula and different pay scales for teachers. The reasons for these difficulties in coordination of stakeholders in the education sector include weak host government leadership, projectised donor interventions that bypass government systems and fail to build local accountability structures, lack of agreed standards,² and International NGOs which resist coordination by the UN. Can key stakeholders be brought together in support of a joint planning framework for the education sector?

State building

DAC principle 3 is to focus on state building as a central objective, including improving governance and capacity in core service delivery functions. In the education sector, this is challenging for several reasons: two will be focused on here. First, government revenues frequently dry up, so teacher wages (usually representing a large proportion of public expenditure) may either not be paid at all or may be paid erratically. Teachers start to leak out of the system, or take second jobs to make ends meet so the quality of the system seriously suffers (Rose and Greeley, 2007). Second, the accountability of schools to the state is likely to weaken because of the lack of capacity (and in some cases access) of government officials to monitor the system, or because civil society and community organisations cease to function due to lack of resources (DAC Fragile States Group, September 2006). Can state capacity and governance be developed to enable teachers to be paid and trained, and to strengthen the accountability of schools to the state?

Do no harm

DAC principle 8 states that the international community should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution building.³ Education is frequently identified as an important positive force with respect to institution building (Tawil and Harley, 2004), but there are also instances of the state using the education system for political or ideological ends and this can seriously undermine state building (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Smith and Vaux, 2003; World Bank, 2005). This can happen if curriculum content or access to education is skewed in ways that privilege one group over another. Examples of this are the Sri Lankan conflict, the roots of which partly lay in a change in the medium of instruction in schools; the use of ethnic quotas in pre-genocide Rwanda; and education provision skewed along ethnic lines in Burundi as a driver of the conflict (World Bank, 2005; Obura, 2003; Jackson, 2000). While tools exist for analysing the sector from this perspective (DFID, 2002; USAID, 2006), they are not always jointly deployed. Can the state be supported to promote equitable access to education services and to implement policies that tackle exclusion at school level?

Can these obstacles be overcome?

This section describes five different approaches to delivering aid in fragile states (Leader and Colenso, 2005), summarises the impact of each approach on the education sector, and uses independent evaluation material to analyse what has been learned from each example with respect to the three research questions posed above. The approaches and country examples are summarised in the table opposite. The extent to which an approach is located within a government-led framework has been included as an important context variable. The selection of the four country examples was guided by what the wider literature says about effective approaches in different types of fragile state contexts, and the existence of independent evaluation of how an approach impacted on the education sector in a particular context. The Fast Track Initiative has not been independently evaluated at country level, but its potential importance merits inclusion in this paper.

Approach	Example
SWAp (Working within a government-led framework)	Nepal EFA
Trust Fund (Working towards a government-led framework)	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
Social Fund (Working alongside a government-led framework)	Yemen Social Fund for Development
UN-led joint approach (Working outside a government-led framework)	UNICEF in Somalia
Global funds and partnerships (Working within a global framework)	The Fast Track Initiative

Sector-wide approach (Working within a government framework) – Education for All (EFA) in Nepal

One approach to delivering aid in fragile states is to channel external funding through government systems using sector budget support which finances that sector within a broader government-led framework (subject to donor preconditions being met). It has been suggested that sector budget support may be more attractive to donors in fragile states than, for example, general budget support because it can be used even if overall policy, budgetary and institutional frameworks are sub-optimal (Leader and Colenso, 2005).

Box 1: Nepal EFA and education progress

- Net primary school enrolment rate risen from 84.2% to 86.8%
- Net primary enrolment for girls up from 78% to 83.4%
- Increase in number of trained teachers from 38% to 45%
- Number of children completing five years of primary education increased from 76.2% to 79.1%

The case of EFA in Nepal illustrates how a sub-sector education programme can be developed and implemented with government officials even in the midst of the serious armed conflict between government forces and Maoists. At the time the programme was agreed in 2004, only between 10 and 20% of Nepal’s territory was within government control (Berry et al, 2004). The programme focuses on pre-primary, primary education and adult literacy. Funding is pooled by several partners, including the Finish, Danish and Norwegian development agencies (FINNIDA, DANIDA and NORAD), DFID and World Bank. Approximately 25% of the government’s annual budget is provided from this fund – typically in the region of \$40 million per annum. Box 1 summarises

some of the main indicators of progress in the sector that have been associated with this programme to date.⁴ While gains have been relatively modest, it is impressive that they have been achieved in the midst of armed conflict. A conflict sensitive review in 2006 identified some key lessons for effective coordination and delivery of education aid (Vaux et al, 2006).

Coordination EFA provided a platform for bringing government and others together, but more needs to be done to encourage involvement of a wider range of stakeholders, especially civil society, in genuine consultation; to review processes and to put government firmly in the lead on the EFA process.

State building Pooled donor funding was channelled through government systems and enabled the ministry to maintain teacher salaries whilst also investing in non-recurrent expenditure such as support for school management committees. However, donors have an undue influence and this undermines government ownership and accountability for the sector.

Do no harm The approach helped to tackle exclusion and get resources down to the school and local level (a key driver of the conflict), but more needs to be done to encourage debate about long term strategies for tackling challenges to equity and inclusion notably overcrowding, allocation of teachers, examination failure and language of instruction.

Box 2: Lessons from Nepal

- *Coordination* Involve a wider range of stakeholders, especially civil society. Government needs to be in the lead.
- *State building* Pooled funding can help maintain teacher salaries and other spending. However, donors can have undue influence which may undermine government ownership and accountability.
- *Do no harm* Delivering resources to schools and the local level helped tackle exclusion – a key driver of the conflict. More needs to be done to tackle overcrowding, allocation of teachers, examination failure and language of instruction.

Trust Fund (Working towards a government-led framework) – The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)

Multi donor Trust funds (MDTFs) are funds established to support development-related activities or programmes, frequently with administration by the World Bank, but sometimes by the UN, and with one

Box 3: Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund and education progress

- Pays for salaries of approximately 100,000 teachers – equivalent to US\$109 million per annum
- Enrolment of children in Grades 1–12 increased across the country from 3.1 million in 2002 to just over 5 million in 2006
- Enrolment of girls more than doubled over same period (from 839,000 to 1.75 million)

or more donors also contributing. MDTFs behave in a similar way to budget support and can achieve similar objectives, but there is greater fiduciary protection. MDTFs are a common financing modality in post conflict reconstruction and, in a recent major review of experience, are reported to have generated positive externalities related to aid effectiveness and state capacity building (Scanteam/Norway, February 2007).

In Afghanistan, after the international community intervened to oust the Taliban in 2001, it was clear that large scale assistance would be needed to address the physical damage and the years of neglect that the country had suffered. (DANIDA, 2005, OXFAM 2006). The ARTF was set up in March 2002 to serve as a coordinated financing mechanism for the transitional government's recurrent budget (the Recurrent Cost Window) and priority reconstruction programmes and projects identified by Government (the Investment Window). Since commencing operation, the ARTF has successfully mobilised US\$1.45 billion in grant contributions from 25 donors. It is the primary instrument for external financing of the civilian operating budget. Box 3 summarises some progress on key educational indicators associated with the ARTF.⁵ While gains in enrolment have been impressive, there are still as many as 2.5 million school-age children out of school and many more of these are girls than boys. There has also been much more success at getting children back into primary education than other levels.

The following lessons are from the ARTF experience.

Coordination Within the overarching framework for coordination provided by the Trust Fund, it was important to mobilise stakeholders around a national sector strategy – weak ministry capacity to take a lead meant that aid agencies had to take a lead themselves, with much support off the core budget.

State building Prioritising recurrent salary expend-

iture and systems for paying teacher salaries was a crucial underpinning of efforts to rebuild service delivery systems and was a key strength of the Trust Fund approach to supporting the Transitional government. The investment window has been used to fund the National Solidarity Programme, an important vehicle for supporting community efforts to build new schools, and renovate existing ones.

Do no harm Demand for education was far higher than anticipated when the government launched its back to school campaign in 2002. There remains great disparity in enrolment between boys and girls and there are significant regional disparities. In Kabul, the rate of enrolment is 81% of all girls of primary school age, whereas in other provinces (especially the south) it can be as low as 15%. Getting a solid information base on progress is a major challenge.

Social funds (Working alongside a government-led framework) – The Yemen Social Fund for Development (YSFD)

Social funds are generally multi-sectoral programmes that provide financing (usually grants) for small-scale public investments targeted at meeting the needs of communities, and at contributing to social capital and development at the local level. They are usually implemented through community based approaches, which involve beneficiaries in their identification, design and/or management (Slaymaker and Christiansen, 2005). Social funds have been employed in a range of fragile state settings and it has been claimed that they can bridge the gap between humanitarian and development responses (Manor, 2007).

Yemen is one of the lowest ranked countries on the Human Development Index and suffers from institutional weaknesses that limit its capacity to guarantee effective, efficient and equitable delivery of social services (ESA & ERM, 2007). The Yemen Social Fund for Development (YSFD), which was established in 1997, was designed to improve access to basic social services for low income groups, and also to provide an example of an effective, efficient, and transparent institutional mechanism for providing social services in Yemen. The third phase of the YSFD (2005–2008) is supported by 15 donor agencies who contribute a total of US\$300 million. In addition, the International Development Association (IDA) provides US\$60 million; borrower contributes US\$40 million.⁶ Over 50%

Box 4: Lessons from Afghanistan

- **Coordination** Mobilise stakeholders around a national sector strategy. A weak ministry led to aid agencies taking the lead, with much support off the core budget.
- **State building** Paying salaries helped rebuild service delivery systems and was a key strength of the Trust Fund approach to supporting the Transitional government. The investment window helped support community efforts to renovate and build schools.
- **Do no harm** Demand for education was high. There remains great disparity in enrolment between boys and girls and there are significant regional disparities. In Kabul, the rate of enrolment is 81% of all girls of primary school age, whereas in other provinces (especially the south) it can be as low as 15%. Getting a solid information base on progress is a major challenge.

Box 5: Yemen Social Fund for Development and education progress

- Contributed to building 12,978 classrooms since 1997
- Number of students enrolled associated with YSFD investments has increased by 38%
- Increase in enrolment of girls in rural areas particularly impressive – up by 122% in rural areas since 1997
- Drop out rates relatively low (2% for males and 3% for females)
- Pupil/teacher ratio has increased from 29 to 50 between 2003 and 2006

of the investment to date has been absorbed by the primary education sub-sector. Progress in primary school access associated with the YSFD has been generally positive as box 5 shows.

Lessons from the Yemen SFD include:

Coordination YSFD was very successful at responding to community level demands for projects (the majority in the education sector) but evaluation points to a need to focus on fewer agreed policy development outcomes rather than on a range of inputs and to limit the tendency of donors to earmark financing for particular sectors or sub-sectors.

State building Sustainability of YSFD inputs was an issue as can be seen in the rise in the pupil/teacher ratio – this is due to constraints at the central level, in relation to financial flows to decentralised levels, weak public financial management, and a lack of civil service reform. Capacity building in the Ministry of Education is essential to remedy these deficiencies.

Do no harm YSFD has been an excellent vehicle for piloting policies, such as those targeting girl’s education and building local structures of accountability at community level through the establishment of parent councils. The challenge now is for the Ministry of Education and YSFD to jointly identify how the benefits of the pilots can be adapted for take up on a nation-wide basis. The multi-sectoral work the YSFD was also identified as an area which could lead to targeted work with the Ministry of Education.

Box 6: Lessons from Yemen

- **Coordination** YSFD responded well to community demands for projects but the evaluation highlighted the need to focus on outcomes rather than inputs and to limit donors’ earmarking of funds.
- **State building** The Government had an unreformed civil service and weak financial management systems, as a result YSFD inputs were not sustainable. Capacity building in Ministry of Education is needed to put this right.
- **Do no harm** YSFD has helped pilot approaches, such as those targeting girl’s education and building local structures of accountability at community level through the establishment of parent councils. The challenge now is to scale up the pilots.

UN-led joint approach (Working outside of a government framework) – UNICEF in Somalia

The previous approaches depend on at least some government capacity and willingness to provide a framework for coordination and delivery of sectoral inputs. What about situations where there is either no central government with which to work (either because its capacity has been destroyed, or because the aid relationship has broken down entirely)? In the education sector, UNICEF is increasingly regarded by many donors as a preferred partner in these situations and there are ongoing efforts to further enhance the capacity of UNICEF to play these roles more systematically.⁷

Box 7: Education progress in Somalia – from 2005 baseline report

- 13% of girls enrolled in primary schools and 20% of boys
- 1,712 operational primary schools in Somalia up from 600 at the start of the civil war. There has been an average increase of 28% in primary school enrolment over the past three years (2003/2004 data)

In Somalia, there has been no effective functioning government since the fall of Said Barre in 1991. Civil unrest is a major obstacle to development in Somalia. As box 7 shows, progress in the education sector to date has been modest, although from an initially very low base (UNICEF, April 2005). UNICEF has been active in Somalia since 1992 and has a presence in each of the three zones – North West, North East and Central Southern (UNICEF, April 2005). UNICEF focuses on primary education (both formal and alternative), with a particular remit for girls’ education. A number of other international actors are also active in the education sector.⁸ Stakeholders are generally part of the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB). The following lessons can be drawn from the experience of UNICEF Somalia (Sen et al, 2002).

Coordination The Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) consisted of some of the main stakeholders in the sector and UNICEF was a key player in the education group. It coordinated programmes, facilitated the sharing of information, and formulated guidelines for programming. However, its location in Kenya led to only limited coordination on the ground. The absence of Somali organisations from the SACB also decreased its relevance.

State building UNICEF took a strategic view and was instrumental in the training of 6,500 primary school teachers across all three zones and the development of primary textbooks written in the Somali language. It also supported the establishment of school committees. In Somaliland, a system of community managed, government aided primary schools provided for teacher salaries through a mixture of community and government funding. Short term funding cycles made it difficult for UNICEF to support its partners in institution building.

Do no harm UNICEF, because of its size and reach, was reported to be one of the most successful international agencies working in Somalia when it came to

Box 8: Lessons from Somalia

- **Coordination** The Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was a potentially key coordination mechanism. However, its location in Kenya led to only limited coordination on the ground and the absence of Somali organisations reduced its relevance.
- **State building** UNICEF helped train 6,500 primary school teachers, developed Somali textbooks and supported the establishment of school committees. However, short term funding cycles made it difficult for UNICEF to support its partners in institution building.
- **Do no harm** UNICEF understood the social and political complexities of working effectively in Somalia and the risks of unintended consequences. Cost sharing was found to be potentially undermining equity goals, and UNICEF was advised to develop social targeting mechanisms in the context of efforts to achieve universal coverage.

understanding the socio-political nuances of working effectively and minimising the risk of creating unintended consequences. Cost sharing was found to be potentially undermining equity goals, and UNICEF was advised to develop social targeting mechanisms in the context of efforts to achieve universal coverage.

Global funds and partnerships (working within a global framework) – The Fast Track Initiative and Fragile States

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) provides a global framework for the coordination of international inputs into the education sector. The initiative, including a fund, is managed by the World Bank. It is designed to channel additional financing through the catalytic fund to those countries which have a satisfactory plan but which are deemed under-funded by in-country partners.⁹ Eligible countries need to have a sector plan, which is endorsed by donors in country, and that is judged in relation to eligibility criteria set out in the FTI's indicative framework (which defines benchmarks for inputs, outputs and policies¹⁰). The Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) is designed to build planning capacity in advance of catalytic funding. Although the FTI already supports some fragile states, it is generally oriented towards 'good performers'. The impact of the FTI at country level in fragile states has not been specifically evaluated.

The FTI commissioned a Task Team in 2006 to look at whether and how the FTI should increase its support for education in fragile states (FTI, 2005). The report indicated that the FTI could potentially add further value in three areas: coordination of donor efforts, capacity building for development of plans, and increased funding. However, significant changes would need to be made to its approach if it was to make a difference in fragile states where government systems cannot be used. The EPDF was recommended as the channel for financing to fragile states and four pilot countries were originally proposed (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Burundi, and southern Sudan) and two others subsequently added (Somalia and Comoros).¹¹ More recently, the Fragile States Task team has been developing a 'progressive framework' to help guide prioritisation of education support in fragile states (FTI, 2007).

The lessons from the experience of FTI include:

Coordination There is little appetite amongst FTI partners for revisiting the indicative framework to orient it towards fragile states. The proposed 'progressive' framework has the potential to focus the efforts of FTI partners on aspects of state building in different fragility contexts. The FTI ultimately depends for coordination on functioning national level processes.

State building Increasing finance for programming through the catalytic fund would require significant additional funds for education to be mobilised from the international community – it is unclear what level of political commitment there is for this or for making the funding available over a longer time period. The EPDF could add value in terms of capacity building but only if the rules are changed to allow proposals to be made by agencies other than the World Bank.

Do no harm Where fragile states do gain endorsement, caution should be exercised in rapidly scaling up investment until the capacity of the system to deliver increased resources has been adequately assessed and structures are set up on the ground through which to channel resources and monitor their impact on the sector.

Conclusions: Can education aid be delivered effectively in fragile states?

The analysis presented in this paper shows how wide the range of fragile states is, and consequently how difficult it is to generalise across these diverse development settings. A one size fits all approach will not work and each of the approaches reviewed has both strengths and weaknesses. The Fragile States principle relating to the mix and sequencing of aid instruments is therefore relevant here (DAC principle 9). Also, as already pointed out, the possible range of options goes beyond those analysed in this paper. The main findings with respect to each of the examples can be summarised as follows.

SWAp – working within a government-led framework. The Nepal Education for All programme (a partial SWAp) was a relatively effective way to coordinate, deliver and monitor support for primary and adult education, even in the midst of armed conflict. The Nepal example indicates the importance of finding ways to channel financing through government systems that can reach the local level and supporting ministry efforts to take a lead in the sector. A long term strategy needs to be put in place to tackle issues of equity and inclusion.

Trust fund – working towards a government-led framework. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) helped stabilise the education sector by paying recurrent costs of teachers in an immediate post crisis situation. The Afghanistan example indicates the importance of investing in early efforts to build ministry capacity to enable them to take a leadership role in planning, managing and monitoring the sector, and of donors channelling financing as far as possible through the sector budget. Equity, access and inclusion goals are made challenging by a lack of reliable information and security problems, especially in the southern provinces.

Box 9: Lessons from the Fast Track Initiative

- **Coordination** Have a flexible approach to coordination. There is little appetite amongst FTI partners to re-orient the indicative framework towards fragile states. The proposed 'progressive' framework could help focus FTI partners on aspects of state building in fragile states.
- **State building** Focus on building capacity before seeking larger-scale funding. The FTI tends to focus on under-funded good performers and is not well-placed to work in fragile states. The EPDF could help build capacity in these situations and prepare the ground for more substantial funding through the government but only if the rules are changed to allow proposals to be made by agencies other than the World Bank.
- **Do no harm** Where fragile states are being supported, scaled-up investment should only take place when the education system has the capacity to manage increased resources.

Social fund – working alongside a government-led framework. The Yemen Social Fund for Development (YSFD) was effective at building on community demand for education and has also made an important contribution to an improved gender balance in primary education. However, the Yemen example shows that unless the demand-side inputs are complemented by a prioritised supply-side plan for the sector, they will not result in education systems development. A close working relationship with the line ministry is therefore crucial. The YSFD had good results from pilot efforts to improve girl's access to primary education, but these pilots have not yet been taken to scale.

UN-led joint approach – working outside a government-led framework. In Somalia, UNICEF was able to work across all three regions and was reasonably effective at building partnerships for the development of education programmes even in the absence of functioning government structures. The effectiveness of the UNICEF programme was undermined by a weak coordination mechanism, divorced from local stakeholders, and short term funding cycles which made it sometimes difficult to support partners in institution building. Efforts to tackle equity and inclusion issues were partly undermined by a cost sharing approach, but UNICEF was found to be generally effective

at understanding the socio-political context for its work on education.

Global funds and partnerships – working within a global framework. The FTI can be no substitute for a country-led process, but a newly proposed 'progressive' framework could be helpful in getting stakeholders to coordinate around a combination of state building and education objectives. More work is needed to mobilise increased financing for fragile states through the FTI, if it is to make a major contribution to the support and payment of teachers and governance of schools. The extent to which the FTI can have an impact on goals of equitable access and inclusion will ultimately depend on functioning systems for monitoring impact and channelling resources at country level.

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<http://www.ineesite.org/default.asp>

Fast Track Initiative, Fragile States Task Team
<http://www.fasttrackinitiative.org/content.asp?ContentId=1038>

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Endnotes

1. Fragile states are countries where there is a lack of political commitment and/or weak capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies. The nearest to an agreed list of fragile states is one produced by DFID for its policy paper in 2005 based on rankings in the World Bank Country and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).
2. The International Network for Education in Emergencies has developed minimum standards in an attempt to address this. They can be accessed at: <http://inesite.org/page.asp?pid=1240>
3. The principles focus on bypassing national budgets, but this has been adapted slightly here for the education sector.
4. Impacts are taken from an internal DFID briefing note and based on 2006 data, with a 2004 baseline for comparison.
5. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/o,,contentMDK:21289161~menuPK:3266877~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html> (World Bank website).
6. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/o,,contentMDK:21256373~menuPK:3266877~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html>
7. The Dutch Development Agency and DFID have agreed to fund UNICEF to improve their response in fragile states. In addition, UNICEF has made a request to the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to create a humanitarian cluster for education which will be jointly led by Save the Children UK and UNICEF.
8. These include UNESCO, WFP, UNHCR, the EC, the World Bank, USAID, and NGOs.
9. According to the 2006 FTI Status report, as of 2006, there were 14 countries receiving catalytic funding (seven of these are classified as fragile states by DFID), and the fund had attracted a total of \$231 million since 2003.
10. FTI indicative framework at: <http://www.fasttrackinitiative.org/library/FrameworkNOV04.pdf>
11. The results of these pilots have not been reported fully yet, although there was a preliminary presentation to the Technical Committee in October 2006. http://www1.worldbank.org/education/efafti/documents/Brussels/Presentation_on_FS.pdf