

Diversity in donorship: Field lessons

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Introduction

This Working Paper is part of an ongoing project by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) on *Diversity in Donorship*. The HPG report *Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid* (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005) established a number of core findings. In particular, it found that more donor governments are involved in humanitarian action than ever before. Donors who are not members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have accounted for sizeable portions of official humanitarian financing, and while they are engaging in a growing number of countries, resources are being concentrated in a specific few. The substance of these donors' policies, including the definition of humanitarian aid they use, can differ among non-DAC donors, and compared to the approach of DAC donors. The findings from the study were based on an examination of policy, institutional and financing issues from a headquarters perspective, as well as the relationship of operational agencies to this diverse range of donors.

A second phase of research, *Diversity in Donorship: Field Lessons*, will focus on practice in the field, involving a critical examination of non-DAC donor practices in an operational setting. This research has never been done before, either for development assistance or humanitarian action, and so it should fill a significant gap in knowledge and contribute to a better understanding of how the diverse policy drivers for humanitarian action are playing out in relation to crisis response. The previous study made clear the importance of capturing these trends from the perspective of recipient countries and those receiving humanitarian assistance. This work will also contribute to a better understanding of how these donors work with the affected state and the rest of the international community.

This Working Paper is based on research conducted in preparation for the field work. It updates and expands upon recent policy initiatives and approaches of key non-DAC donors since the 2005 study, focusing on new developments. As such, it assumes a high level of knowledge; those interested in a more in-depth examination of the history of these donors' humanitarian engagement should

refer to the 2005 report and its corresponding case studies on Central Europe, the Gulf States and Asia.

The methodology for this paper involved analysis of relevant primary and secondary literature, the collection of financing data from online tracking systems and approximately 25 interviews with officials from the UN, international organisations and donor governments. It focuses on eight particularly important non-DAC donor governments: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Turkey, South Korea, India and China. Other countries, such as South Africa, some new European Union (EU) states and Russia, are also discussed. The term 'non-DAC' rather than 'new' or 'emerging' is used because many of these donors have long histories of aid donorship. While these donors represent an extremely diverse group, they have in common the fact that they remain largely (although not entirely) outside the key fora where international humanitarian aid policy and practice are discussed and debated.

Section 1 presents volumes of official humanitarian assistance from non-DAC donors as compared with DAC donors for the years 2000 to 2006. Recipient countries, types and purposes of aid, the channels for disbursement and bilateral and multilateral preferences are analysed. Trends in DAC and non-DAC donor humanitarian financing are discussed. To address the variability in non-DAC donors' giving patterns year on year and get an overall picture, most of the figures presented cover a seven-year period, 2000–2006.

Section 2 looks at the geographic spread of the recipient countries and regions, and at the drivers of non-DAC aid. It also looks at issues facing donors trying to balance the donor and recipient experience, as well as challenges to the 'development consensus' posed by some donors' approaches. Section 3 examines the engagement of non-DAC donors with the international humanitarian policy arena, seeking to understand how broader trends in the policy environment relate to non-DAC donor participation. Section 4 offers a detailed look at non-DAC donors' partnerships with international aid bodies such as the UN, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and the DAC, and Section 5 presents some tentative conclusions.

1. Financing trends in non-DAC donorship

1.1 Challenges in analysing non-DAC expenditures

As highlighted in HPG's 2005 study, analysing the aid expenditure of non-DAC donors is a difficult business. The two major sources of data on global international humanitarian assistance, the DAC and the Financial Tracking System of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (FTS), each has advantages and limitations, and neither provides a fully accurate picture. The data collected by the DAC is guided by agreed definitions and common criteria, meaning that it is more reliable and comparable over time. But while the DAC collects data on the Official Humanitarian Assistance (OHA) of its 22 member countries, as well as the Official Development Assistance (ODA) of DAC members and eight OECD DAC observer countries, it does not record the contributions of other non-DAC countries. For this reason, FTS is the only real source of data on humanitarian financing trends in non-DAC countries.

FTS includes all reported contributions from non-DAC states, and has the added benefits of being produced in real time, and allowing detailed disaggregation by aid type, channel and recipient country. Because it relies on donors reporting donations, FTS most often leads to underestimates as some contributions are not reported for a given year or emergency. Non-DAC donors in particular are less likely to report to FTS, either because they do not have incentives to do so or because they are unfamiliar with the reporting mechanism. Under-reporting may also be particularly common in non-DAC donor states because spending is spread across different ministries and budgets and consolidated reports are not produced (whereas DAC states are required to produce centralised reports). FTS can also produce overestimates, when donors provide inflated self-valuations of in-kind contributions.

Thus, the following analysis is based on *reported* contributions only. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some cases, the FTS database could differ greatly from other official sources, especially at detailed levels. As one example, Turkey has claimed that it provided \$250 million for humanitarian aid in 2005, but its contribution was listed on FTS as only

\$78 million. States' humanitarian assistance may not be captured where it is an integrated part of other activities, such as security-related activities, loans to governments or spending on social assistance in fragile states or long-term crises. Some monies to multilateral funds, such as the African Development Bank, the IMF emergency fund and the OPEC Fund, are also recognised by FTS as official contributions. When analysing expenditures by recipient countries, donors' unearmarked allocations to UN agencies and NGOs may not be counted if the agency fails to report to FTS the country in which the contribution was spent.

Despite these caveats, broad trends can be detected over time and across years. According to UN officials, reporting rates have improved in recent years as the system has become more visible and its benefits to donors more tangible; this is a possible bias to consider when determining whether amounts of non-DAC funding have increased.

1.2 Overview of non-DAC donor financing, 2000–2006

As Figure 1 shows, non-DAC aid reported to FTS has accounted for a small but not insignificant portion of overall official humanitarian aid in recent years.¹ From 2000 to 2006, non-DAC contributions accounted for between 2% and 14% of all government contributions reported to FTS.²

As Figure 2 shows, non-DAC contributions represented an unusually large portion of overall contributions in 2001 – 14%. It is important to note that approximately 81% of these non-DAC contributions (\$407 million out of \$502 million) were from one donor, Saudi Arabia. As in the 2005 paper, the figures here omit a 2001 contribution by Saudi Arabia to the occupied Palestinian territories of approximately \$250 million, which appears to have been reported twice to FTS.

¹ This analysis looks only at government contributions, as well as monies from the European Commission.

² The 2005 study concluded that non-DAC contributions accounted for between 1% and 12% of total official humanitarian assistance between 1999 and 2004. That analysis, although it also used FTS figures, was based on a limited set of 22 non-DAC countries, whereas the analysis here includes all states' contributions.

Figure 1: Total humanitarian aid, DAC and non-DAC states, 2000-2006 (Source: FTS)





Figure 2: Non-DAC contributions as a percent of all government contributions, 2000-2006 (Source: FTS)



As Table 1 shows, DAC members still comprise the majority of the top humanitarian donors. Several non-DAC members are significant donors, however, and a few DAC members – New Zealand, Austria, Greece and Portugal – do not rank amongst the top 24 overall contributors.

1.3 Major non-DAC donors


Although Saudi Arabia is the non-DAC donor with the largest contributions reported to FTS over the non-DAC states' percentage of whole period, it is

notable that, even when Saudi Arabia's contributions are excluded for all years 2000 to 2006 (thus omitting the anomalous 2001 contribution), one sees an overall upward trend in humanitarian assistance (see Figure 3). However, 2006 saw a sizeable decrease in the overall percentage of non-DAC humanitarian aid. To what extent this signals a new trend, is a result of decreased incentives to report in 2006 or is simply reflective of the general variability of non-DAC aid levels, is difficult to say.

Table 1: Humanitarian aid from donor states plus the European Commission, 2000–2006 (Source: FTS)

| Donor (* indicates non-DAC donor) | Amount (US\$m) |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| United States | 12,182 |
| European Commission | 4,350 |
| United Kingdom | 2,212 |
| Japan | 2,116 |
| Netherlands | 1,398 |
| Sweden | 1,308 |
| Germany | 1,190 |
| Norway | 1,185 |
| Canada | 1,036 |
| Switzerland | 1,034 |
| Denmark | 866 |
| *Saudi Arabia | 786 |
| Italy | 568 |
| France | 446 |
| Australia | 423 |
| Ireland | 392 |
| * South Korea | 383 |
| Finland | 361 |
| Belgium | 308 |
| Spain | 257 |
| * United Arab Emirates | 236 |
| * Turkey | 108 |
| Luxembourg | 89 |
| * Russia | 85 |

Figure 3: Non-DAC contributions, minus Saudi Arabia, as a percent of all government contributions, 2000-2006 (Source: FTS)



From 2000 to 2006, as seen in Figure 4, the largest humanitarian contributions reported to FTS from non-DAC states were, in order, from Saudi

Arabia (which represents the 12th largest donor overall), South Korea, the UAE, Turkey, Russia, China, Kuwait, Qatar, India and South Africa.

Figure 4: Total humanitarian aid of top ten non-DAC states, 2000–2006





Figure 5: Selection of major non-DAC's reported contributions, 2000–2006



It is notable that four of the top ten non-DAC humanitarian donors – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar – are Gulf States. Saudi Arabia’s position as the largest non-DAC donor is based largely on the 2001 contribution, but even excluding this it would still be the most significant non-DAC donor, albeit closer to the number two position. It is also notable that, despite the fast-growing economies and expanding global profiles

of China and India, neither has yet to become a major donor to international humanitarian response; each is, in the words of some observers, ‘punching under its weight’. India and China provided an average of 0.3% of total international humanitarian assistance per year from 2000–2006, with spikes in 2005 due to the tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake. Eastern European states also continued to provide small amounts of assistance

overall. South Africa continues to vary considerably in the amount it reports to FTS, ranging from no reported contributions in 2002 to \$13 million in 2006. Such variability is a common feature among the major non-DAC donors, as shown in Figure 5.

1.4 The role of the tsunami and the CERF

In 2005, all non-DAC governments' reported humanitarian assistance levels increased significantly compared with previous years (see Figure 1). This was largely due to the response to the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which constituted 25% of all contributions for 2005. For non-DAC donors, tsunami-related contributions comprised an even larger part of total 2005 figures, 47%. The devastating aftermath of the tsunami was a worldwide event, and many countries responded that had never previously provided international humanitarian aid. Many small, developing countries, some of them physically far from the event, such as Azerbaijan and Mali, contributed. As Figure 5 shows, tsunami-related contributions resulted in a twofold increase in the total number of non-DAC donors, from 41 in 2004 to 83 in 2005. China responded extremely strongly to the tsunami. It reported contributions of \$62 million, representing 79% of its total reported contributions for the entire period 2000–2006.

Despite a stable trend in the number of non-DAC donors reporting to FTS each year from 2000 to 2004 (an average of 42, with a range of only 37 to 45), the number of non-DAC donors reporting to FTS in 2006 (56) was substantially higher than the 2000–2004 average. While the tsunami accounted for the majority of new donors in 2005, only a handful of these first-timers contributed again in 2006: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Iran, Kazakhstan and the Philippines. Meanwhile, several new donors emerged: Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Bahrain, Grenada, Indonesia and Trinidad and Tobago. Most of these first-time donors contributed to the UN Central Emergency Fund (CERF) and/or the Lebanon crisis in the summer of 2006. The Republic of Congo, Sudan and Lebanon also reported contributions to humanitarian responses in their own countries for the first time in 2006.

A likely explanation for these trends is that the tsunami increased the profile of the international humanitarian 'system', and in particular the coordination and reporting mechanisms of the UN

(specifically FTS). The UN staff managing and advocating for the CERF capitalised on this attention by offering a simple way to give to international response efforts that may have been especially attractive for relatively small or new donor states.³ As one UN representative commented: 'Post-tsunami, small donors have stayed on the scene by giving small amounts to the CERF. They have found this a more comfortable, easier, standardised administrative mechanism' than giving directly to UN agencies. As of July 2007, FTS had reported contributions from 48 non-DAC states (this number could increase by the end of 2007 if pledges from an additional eight countries are converted into contributions). Although 48 is more than twice the 22-strong DAC, this remains a relatively small proportion of the approximately 170 non-DAC states in the world. That said, these 48 countries are a highly diverse group, which speaks to the universality of humanitarian response.

1.5 Gulf States funding patterns

It is worth examining the financing trends of the Gulf States⁴ in more detail, for several reasons. There are broad political and cultural similarities among countries in the Gulf that make it appropriate to consider them as a group. Most importantly, four of the top 10 non-DAC donors are from the region, and several demonstrate increased interest and activity in humanitarian assistance.

There is evidence that these countries have increased the consistency with which they report to FTS in the past two to three years. As highlighted in the 2005 report, there is considerable variation year-on-year in where and how these states channel humanitarian aid; to address this variability the figures below cover a five-year period, from 2002–2006. Like other countries, the Gulf States have a tendency to focus their aid on states in their region and those with religious and cultural similarities.

³ The CERF was approved by consensus by the UN General Assembly on 15 December 2005. This is in contrast to other humanitarian reform efforts, which were not initially subject to GA discussion and approval.

⁴ Included are contributions from Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the OPEC Fund. Although the IDB and OPEC Fund include some non-Gulf states, their primary donors are from the Gulf and thus they were included. The two entities together comprise about 1–2% of the total aid for the whole period.

This has not changed greatly in the past four years. From 2002–2006, as seen in Figure 7, the largest reported recipients of Gulf humanitarian aid were the occupied Palestinian territories, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and Sudan.

In 2005, however, a substantial portion (40%) of total reported Gulf humanitarian aid went to the Indian Ocean tsunami response. About 42% of this, or \$47 million, was specified for a particular country: 58% went to Indonesia, 31% to Sri Lanka and the rest in very small amounts to the Maldives, Thailand, Somalia and India. The remainder of the tsunami funds, \$63 million, were ‘unallocated’, with most channelled via these states’ Red Crescent societies.

In 2006, 60% of all Gulf aid went to Lebanon, responding to the large-scale displacement and destruction caused by bombardments by Israel. This could be said to continue a trend (observed in the 2005 paper) whereby Gulf States focus on one or two high-profile crises per year: Palestine in 2001, Afghanistan in 2002, Iraq in 2003, Palestine again in

2004, the tsunami and Pakistan in 2005 and Lebanon in 2006. (Many of these crises, Lebanon included, prompted large responses from Western donors too, of course.) More significantly, in the past three years the Gulf States have shown a concerted willingness to fund outside their traditional regions of interest. As Figure 8 shows, they reported almost five times as much aid to these regions in 2004–2006 than they did in 2001–2003.

In the past five years, the trend has continued whereby a majority of Gulf aid was channelled either bilaterally (from government to government) or through national Red Crescent societies. Similarly, although it is still rare for the Gulf States to use the UN as a channel, there are signs that this is increasing, in particular with the UN Relief and Works Agency (to the occupied Palestinian territories), WFP and UNICEF. In 2006, for example, the Gulf States contributed \$26 million to WFP, a fivefold increase from an average of \$5 million over the previous four years (albeit with a range from \$700,000 to \$12 million). These trends are further discussed in the partnership section, below.

Figure 6: Number of non-DAC donor countries, 2000-2007




Figure 7: Top ten recipients of Gulf States' humanitarian aid, 2002–2006





Figure 8: Gulf State humanitarian aid to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, 2000–2006



2. Drivers of aid and geographic spread

2.1 Explaining trends in contributions and recipient countries

Looking at reported figures, there is little evidence as yet that non-DAC contributions are becoming more standardised or predictable in terms of recipient countries, thus affirming the conclusions of the 2005 paper. Some of this unpredictability is due to the lack of a regularised budget and pattern of allocation, while in some cases it may reflect the unpredictable nature of humanitarian crises themselves. The variability in reported contributions may also reflect a lack of reporting in some years, and decisions to focus resources on only one or two crises. Many non-DAC donors have only small amounts of funding available for humanitarian response, and as such they may be more interested in high-profile global crises, or crises in which they have particular political or strategic interests. There is also a general focus on sudden-onset emergencies as opposed to longer-term protracted crises, with the exception of oPT and Darfur.

Although DAC donors are also mindful of political concerns, many have made formal commitments, via the DAC, the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative and other fora, to fund according to needs-based criteria, and have shown more interest in crises in strategically less important countries, such as the DRC, Uganda and states in West Africa. The new EU states, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia, are asked to meet set requirements for EU membership, including that a certain percentage of their humanitarian financing is given directly to ECHO. This ensures a degree of predictability in the aid programmes of these states, although aid spending continues to grow only slowly, and according to interviewees no significant expansion is expected.

As we have seen, increased engagement with international humanitarian actors is also evident in the Gulf States. It is important to recognise that this engagement is part of a consistent, long-term project. The Gulf States are beginning to realise that they can do this and maintain their visibility and dominance in certain contexts. Their expanding geographic reach is to an extent a reflection of their past history as aid donors, explored in the Gulf background paper to the 2005 report. One UN representative working with the Gulf States

commented that, in expanding their reach, ‘they are trying to make a point: “don’t think of us as non-traditional donors”. Rather, “we have always provided aid, now it’s time to work with international partners to reach farther, have more impact, and get recognition”’. In particular, observers note that Saudi Arabia, while it continues to respond very favourably to operations in Islamic countries, now has sufficient flexibility to support operations in other countries, albeit at a lower level. As noted in the 2005 paper, another driver for some Gulf States’ aid is a desire to give to the home countries of their significant migrant worker populations.

In contrast to the Gulf States, China and India seem less ready to be bound by international expectations of their assistance. Neither has increased its funding or participation in international humanitarian mechanisms in the past two years in ways that might be expected given their growing economies and increasingly important roles in global peace and security. China’s humanitarian aid responses in recent years have largely been driven by economic interest and a desire to be seen as a prominent, powerful international presence. These two motivations combined in the tsunami, which affected many Asian countries with which China had been strengthening political and economic ties, and where states’ contributions were featured prominently in major global media. Although China has begun to invest heavily in the economic development of many African countries, it is less clear what priority it places on contributing to international humanitarian response as defined by many Western donors, i.e. life-saving, relieving suffering or providing protection.

2.2 Balancing donor role with recipient experience

Unlike the Gulf States, non-DAC donors such as China, India and South Africa face a challenge in balancing new roles as aid donors with their experiences as aid recipients. Moreover, despite rapid economic growth many Chinese and Indians still live in poverty; in democratic India at least, this could lead to a backlash against expanded aid donorship and demands to justify aid expenditures. While these domestic pressures are relevant in determining India’s overall aid programmes, they did not noticeably dampen enthusiasm for India’s

role as a donor after the tsunami, when it rejected offers of assistance and in turn offered other countries aid. It did so in part to fulfil its vision of being a strong wealthy country amongst its poorer neighbours, many of whom it felt obliged to assist. Nonetheless, the ‘soft’ rewards of international humanitarian assistance may simply not be deemed adequate incentive for engagement. Thus, while China became the first ever recipient of WFP food aid to ‘graduate’ from recipient to donor status, in 2005, the Chinese government does not appear to attach particular importance to this new role. In 2006, China ranked 42nd among WFP donors. While WFP has kept an office in Beijing, it has found it difficult to develop relations with the government.

Recent recipient countries may wish to preserve their ‘developing country’ status for a host of political reasons, including the desire to be perceived as a leader among the G77, the Non-Aligned Movement and other groupings. They also may wish to resist pressure to meet commitments made by developed countries to give 0.7% of GDP as official development assistance. Several interviewees noted that India saw itself as a recipient country when it signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005.⁵ South Africa similarly resists being perceived as a donor, preferring to see itself as an implementing partner, acting through multilateral channels such

as the African Union and New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

2.3 Challenges posed to the development consensus

At the DAC itself, as well as within the World Bank and among states heavily involved in debt relief, such as the UK, there is considerable speculation and worry regarding the role of countries that have not signed up to some of the principles that govern aid within the DAC. In particular, concerns have been noted in regard to China (and India, to a lesser extent) in undermining debt relief and sustainability efforts. In its involvement in Africa in particular, China has been seen as not abiding by DAC principles, mainly the principle of recipient country ownership, and the necessity for donors to harmonise and coordinate their actions. It is argued that China’s offers of sizeable loans to countries such as Nigeria, Chad, Mozambique, Angola and Ghana could undermine the debt relief process. The low conditionality on these loans may postpone adjustments in terms of governance, capacity and transparency deemed necessary in the West. For example, when Chad reneged on a World Bank policy package governing oil extraction, China offered an alternative financial package, undermining international efforts to direct government resources to social welfare rather than security.

⁵ Initial versions of the Paris Declaration distinguished between donor and recipient countries, but the final version (signed by 108 nations) does not. See OECD DAC website and OECD, ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability’, Paris, 28 February–2 March 2005.

3. Non-DAC donors and international humanitarian policy

3.1 Two important trends: multilateralism and the protection of civilians

Non-DAC donors' geographic expansion and interest in major crises has coincided with a shift towards multilateralism within the humanitarian system. Over the past two or three years, major humanitarian reform efforts have been launched aimed at increasing the effectiveness, predictability and sustainability of response. These have included the CERF, increasing use of common funds at the country level (such as pilots of Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) in Sudan and the DRC, and Emergency Response Funds in six countries) and efforts to strengthen the role of Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) in-country.

Most of these humanitarian reform efforts are proceeding without significant input from non-DAC states. The principles underpinning reforms of humanitarian financing were set out in 2003/2004 in the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, an arrangement between the major humanitarian donors in the DAC. CHF, the push towards the Cluster Approach to coordinating humanitarian action and the strengthening of HCs have all been the work of a core group of DAC states, or the UN itself. The Cluster Approach has not been comprehensively debated by UN member states, and some have strongly resisted it.⁶ Although the CERF has a goal of securing contributions from all 192 UN members, and has enjoyed strong levels of participation and endorsement, there are concerns that this may not be sustained.

Although UN-led humanitarian reform efforts have provided opportunities for engaging non-DAC states, they have also faced ongoing challenges around visibility, trust, and perceptions that the UN is operating under Western steerage and vision. Tensions have emerged, in particular, around civilian protection and states' responsibilities in this area. Although the UN General Assembly endorsed the concept of the Responsibility to Protect in 2005,

whereby the international community accepted limitations on state sovereignty in cases of severe human rights abuse, there is deep disquiet over its implications within the G77, where it is seen as potentially justifying interference or even invasion by powerful Western states. Although not directly related to humanitarian action, this is an important subtext as non-DAC donors decide how and when they want to engage with the international system.

3.2 Engagement with the international 'system'

There are increasing signs that non-DAC donors, notably the Gulf States, are keen to engage with the multilateral humanitarian 'system'. However, it seems they are not yet sure what they would like to contribute in terms of policy direction. These states, and others such as Turkey and South Korea, are seeking to promote themselves as aid donors, are taking a more proactive role in international donor conferences (such as those during the Lebanon crisis) and are hosting more general international conferences (such as the Dubai International Humanitarian Aid and Development conference and exhibition (DIHAD)). South Korea, traditionally focused on bilateral aid to the North, has shown signs of interest in the multilateral humanitarian system. (Seoul's increased contributions to the CERF, WHO, UNICEF and WFP may have come at the right moment in 2006 as it sought to bolster Ban Ki-Moon's bid for the post of UN Secretary-General.)

The UAE and South Korea joined the OCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG) in 2006, and have now paid their \$300,000 annual contribution, but it remains to be seen how far they will seek to direct or influence debates. Clearly, joining the ODSG is a large commitment, and there must be important motivations for doing so, albeit these have not been made clear. Turkey and Russia may also seek to join the ODSG. Saudi Arabia too may be moving towards more multilateral approaches. Given the size of Saudi oil revenues and Riyadh's political significance in the region and beyond, this could have an especially significant impact. The decision to contribute \$50,000 to the CERF per year for the next 20 years is striking in this regard, although the relatively minuscule size of the contribution may indicate that the Saudi government remains sceptical of international mechanisms and is withholding full participation. Some DAC donors –

⁶ See comments by Egypt in General Assembly June 2007 consultations, voicing support for a review before it endorsed the cluster approach. See also Abby Stoddard et al., *Cluster Approach Evaluation Report*, November 2007.

the US, Switzerland, Sweden – have welcomed and indeed facilitated non-DAC participation in the ODSG in order to widen its scope, reinforce the apolitical nature of humanitarian action and clarify non-DAC misperceptions about UN humanitarian action, and in particular the UN's

coordination role. Others in the DAC have expressed concern that the ODSG risks becoming a broader governmental forum, potentially introducing political questions into what has been a close-knit and technically focused support body.

4. Partnerships

In past two or three years, increased rhetorical emphasis has been placed on the need for diversity in donorship. This is reflected in speeches and visits to the Gulf by senior officials from UNHCR, WFP and OCHA; efforts by the CERF to engage non-traditional donor countries; and the work of academics and civil society interests (see, for instance, Slim (2006), which argues for closer consideration of an ‘informal’, largely non-Western international humanitarian systems that co-exists with the ‘mainly Western-funded humanitarian system’). A number of factors lie behind this new emphasis., including the implications for humanitarian action in Islamic countries of the US-led ‘war on terror’, a recognition of the increasing economic and political power of China, India and the Gulf States, the need for increased humanitarian funding in the face of multiple large-scale crises and a more general realisation that the principles of humanitarian response (universal, neutral, apolitical) are better served by the involvement of a more diverse range of donors.

4.1 United Nations

The main UN humanitarian agencies – WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR – have each increased their outreach to non-DAC states in the past five years, in particular in the Gulf. They face different challenges in doing so; by virtue of their relatively less ‘political’ areas of response (food and children), WFP and UNICEF have perhaps achieved more than UNHCR (whose concern with refugees and, increasingly, IDPs is more sensitive politically). WFP and UNICEF (along with OCHA) have established representation in the Gulf, and all three organisations have seen an increase in funds from the Gulf States. Several interviewees reported that WFP had the best-developed strategy and approach in this area. According to representatives, while there remains an ambivalence among Gulf States about UN and international coordination mechanisms, there is also a recognition that it is not just the UN that needs to engage better, but the Gulf States themselves. Other non-DAC states, including China and Russia, have sought to increase their engagement with UN humanitarian response by contributing supplies, though the kind of long-term, formal arrangements agencies such as UNICEF require poses important challenges.

For WFP, increased engagement with the Gulf States is part of a broader effort to increase its donor base. The number of donors to WFP has grown, from 57 in 2001 to 97 in 2006. The extent of WFP’s dependence on a small group of major donors has also declined: in 2002, the ten largest donors provided 90% of funding; in 2006, they accounted for 80%. The US, which until recently provided 60% of WFP’s total budget, now accounts for around 40%. While the agency acknowledges that funding high-profile crisis responses like the tsunami and Lebanon is still much easier than meeting needs in less prominent cases, a broader funding base has allowed greater flexibility, and WFP has had some success in securing donations from the Gulf States for ‘non-traditional recipients’, such as Cambodia and Ghana. WFP has also encouraged recipient countries to contribute, as has been the case recently with Sudan (to South Sudan), Kenya, Bangladesh and Malawi.

OCHA has also focused more closely on the Gulf States in recent years. On the one hand, OCHA sees itself as being in a privileged position by virtue of its coordination role and the part it plays in encouraging reporting of contributions and good donorship generally. On the other hand, it is part of the Secretariat, is seen by some as reporting to the Security Council and has a reputation for having a largely white and heavily anglophone staff. Still, OCHA seems to have made an institutional commitment to broadening the range of states involved in humanitarian donorship and policy formation, as reflected in the expansion of the ODSG.

4.2. The Red Cross/Red Crescent movement

The Gulf States in particular have very strong relationships with their national Red Crescent societies, which, as detailed in the 2005 report, function as auxiliaries of national response. Generally, however, cooperation is not very close between these national societies and the ICRC. There are signs that this relationship may be improving in limited areas; for example, in the last two years, as part of a dialogue with scholars in Islamic jurisprudence, the ICRC has organised events on Islam and humanitarian law in Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Morocco, Tanzania and

Afghanistan, with the aim of ‘broadening and deepening mutual understanding and finding common ground for protecting human dignity in armed conflicts’. The Qatari and Saudi national societies are now among the top 20 national society donors to ICRC. Since the Gulf RC societies are so well-funded already, the ICRC can mainly offer expertise, in the form of capacity-building and training in IHL dissemination. The Gulf societies may be particularly interested in partnerships with the ICRC where access is difficult, such as in Palestine and Somalia, and in situations where they find it difficult to transfer money because of regulations designed to counter international terrorism. In other cases, such as Iraq, the ICRC looks to national societies for access.

4.3 The Development Assistance Committee

Emerging donors – in the development as well as humanitarian spheres – constitute a declared priority area for the DAC. The goal of the DAC’s efforts to engage non-DACs is to try to bring them into the fold, through developing a sustainable format for dialogue. One important distinction is between non-DAC donors within the OECD and the EU states (such as Turkey, South Korea, Poland and the Czech Republic), and non-DAC ‘outreach’ donors, which are outside of these formations. The

former are much more engaged with the DAC and with the donor community generally. Non-OECD states have attracted less attention as a source of funds from within the humanitarian community.

The DAC has begun ‘special reviews’ for the Czech Republic and South Korea. These are a major mechanism by which common principles are advanced and donors, especially new donors, are encouraged to align their programmes with common goals. Non-DAC donors have yet to serve on formal DAC peer reviews. The DAC is also unlikely to expand peer reviews to the ‘outreach’ group in the immediate future, citing the sensitive and intensive nature of the process: ‘Peer reviews are a very close look at how you strategise, run your assistance programme, and touch on foreign policy issues’. The DAC has begun to institutionalise a review of humanitarian assistance within peer reviews. This is an important initiative in improving humanitarian donorship generally.

Meetings that began in the 1960s between DAC and non-DAC states have been given renewed priority. Turkey hosted the first policy dialogue with non-DAC members in October 2006, and South Korea hosted another in September 2007. Efforts are also underway to improve information and data on non-DAC aid flows through the use of questionnaires.

5. Conclusions

Although by no means conclusive, the background research conducted here reveals that most of the trends identified in the 2005 report have continued. More countries are becoming involved in international humanitarian response; many non-DAC donors concentrate resources on a few, usually sudden-onset, crises per year; and these donors show a strong preference for bilateral, particularly government-to-government, aid or channel assistance through national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies, rather than using multilateral routes. It also remains the case that non-DAC donors have broader, more complex definitions of humanitarianism, and that they remain largely under-represented in the international fora in which aid policy is shaped. In 2005, the tsunami and the CERF combined to produce a high level of engagement from many new donors, including large contributions from states that previously had limited engagement with the multilateral system. The spike in donor participation has not, however, been sustained. While the reliability of available data remains very questionable, it appears that non-DAC aid has continued to increase overall, but with continuing high levels of variability. Emerging economic powers such as China and India have not significantly increased their contributions or their engagement with multilateral mechanisms.

In the broader development arena, and especially in Africa, there are growing divides between those adhering to the 'development consensus', and those states, particularly China, following a different model of economic and political engagement. States such as India and South Africa remain ambivalent about the idea of becoming a donor nation. But the past two years have also seen evidence of deepening and sustained engagement in some non-DAC donors (mainly the Gulf States and Turkey) with the multilateral humanitarian system, and certainly vice-versa. UN agencies and OCHA have deepened their engagement with a diverse range of donors, seeking to 'build partnerships' under an umbrella of humanitarian reform that seeks as its primary goal to improve the effectiveness and predictability of response by increasing coherence and coordination.

While some non-DAC donors see advantages in closer ties to the multilateral system, in many cases they are seeking to develop their own capacity, take a different approach to working with affected states and express caution towards what they perceive as a Western-led international response system. These issues will be explored further in field-based case studies in Pakistan, Lebanon and Darfur.

Annex 1: List of interviewees

Robert Smith, Head of Financial Tracking System, OCHA

Kristina Koch, Senior Programme Officer, CERF Secretariat, OCHA

Shoko Arakaki, Head, Donor Relations, OCHA

Amjad Abbashar, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA

Sanjana Quazi, Humanitarian Policy Adviser, OCHA

Johanna Langenkamp, Head, Donor Relations and Resource Mobilization, UNHCR

May Kadlroy, Protection Assistant, UNHCR United Arab Emirates

Susana Rico, Deputy Director, Donor Relations, WFP

Georg-Friedrich Heymell, Senior Donor Relations Officer, WFP

Tarek Shayya, WFP United Arab Emirates

Gerry Dyer, Head, Humanitarian Support Unit, Emergency Operations, UNICEF

Gary Stahl, Deputy, Programme Funding Office, UNICEF

Omar Shehadeh, Regional Donor Relations Officer, UNICEF Gulf area office

Ivo Freijssen, OCHA Dubai

Charles Strickland, OCHA Dubai

Rashid Khalikov, Director, OCHA New York

Edem Wosornu, Special Assistant to the Director, OCHA New York

Kedir Awol Omar, Deputy Regional Delegate, Regional Delegation, Kuwait, ICRC

Alasdair Wardhaugh, Deputy Head of MENAD and Head of Regional Team, UK DfID

Tim Williams, Head Donor Policy and Partnerships, UK DfID

Jack Jones, Humanitarian Response, CHASE, UK DfID

Meinrad Studer, Senior Adviser, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN (Geneva)

Jens Sedemund, Policy Advisor, DAC Outreach, Peer Review and Evaluation Division, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD

Bill Garvelink, USAID

Judith Randel, Development Initiatives

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