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Livelihoods and protection in Sri Lanka

A review of DRC's Integrated Livelihoods, Protection and Emergency Response Programme in Sri Lanka

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February 2009



About the author

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About the Humanitarian Policy Group

The Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI is one of the world's leading teams of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue and debate.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank everyone at the Danish Refugee Council who supported and assisted this review. I am especially grateful to Joann Kingsley and Thiru, who provided protection expertise for the review and who carried out some of the field interviews in Trincomalee and Vavuniya respectively. I would also like to thank Poologarajah, Dinesh and Raj in Trincomalee, and Senthoran, Mactalin and Thayaharan in Vavuniya who organised my meetings and accompanied me on field visits, and for their stimulating conversations and debates on the programme. Thanks also to Charles MacFadden and Elisabeth Cossor, for spending time to explain DRC's Sri Lanka programme, and to Aracely Jiminez Anderson and Kathrine Starup in Copenhagen for their management and feedback. I am also grateful to the people in IDP camps, resettlement and relocation sites in Trincomalee and Vavuniya and key informants in Sri Lanka who generously gave their time to be interviewed. Finally, thanks to Sorcha O'Callaghan at HPG for reviewing the draft paper and applying her usual rigour to provide detailed comments and input on the protection element of this review.

Note: This report was commissioned by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) as part of a DANIDA-funded policy evaluation of DRC's programmes in three countries. The views and opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Danish Refugee Council.

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
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Acronyms

CFA	Ceasefire Agreement
CFW	Cash for Work
CBO	Community-based organisation
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
HSZ	High Security Zone
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IPA	Individual Protection Assistance
ISGA	Interim Self-Governing Authority
LTTE	Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MT	metric tonne
MFI	Micro finance Institution
NIC	National Identity Card
SLA	Sri Lankan Army
TCCS	Thrift and Credit Cooperative Society
TMVP	Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, or Tamil People's Liberation Tigers
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme

SRI LANKA DISTRICTS

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1. Introduction

This report reviews DRC livelihoods and protection programme in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. The objectives of the review were to:

- assess the overall relevance and impact of the programme on protection and livelihoods from 2006 until mid-2008; and
- provide recommendations for the future development of the programme, in particular how to sharpen and strengthen the livelihoods approach and livelihoods activities in programmes.

The review was also part of DRC's global livelihoods and protection initiative. The objective of this review is to strengthen DRC's corporate learning and understanding of how livelihood and protection approaches can be combined and mutually reinforce each other for the benefit of assisted people.

The methodology included a brief literature review, interviews with conflict-affected communities on their own responses to livelihoods and protection risks as well as the effectiveness of DRC's programmes, and interviews with DRC staff and staff from other agencies (see Annex 1 for the ToRs, Annex 2 for a description of the methodology used and Annex 3 for a list of interviewees).

On the suggestion of the DRC country team, the review focused on the Danida-funded integrated livelihood rehabilitation project, which is currently being implemented in Trincomalee and Vavuniya. These were considered two of the more stable areas in the north. Interviews were also carried out with the Jaffna team and the emergency coordinator from Kilinochchi, to get an idea of livelihoods and protection projects elsewhere in the country.

2. The nature of the crisis in north and north-east Sri Lanka

2.1 History and origins of the crisis

The conflict in Sri Lanka, which began in 1983, is between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), fighting for a Tamil homeland in the north and north-east, and the Sinhalese-dominated government, which wants to maintain the integrity of the country. The war has been called a grievance-driven ethno-political conflict (Palmer 2005). The civil war is largely fought out in the north and north-east of the country, the north being mainly populated by Tamils, and the north-east having a mix of Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim population groups. The main conflict-affected districts include Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar and Vavuniya in the north, and Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara in the east. Whilst the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the LTTE are the main military actors, there are a number of additional armed groups. A splinter group from the LTTE, the TMVP (the Tamil People's Liberation Tigers, also known as the Karuna group), came to prominence in 2004, fighting alongside GoSL troops in the east. Former commander Karuna is now in parliament. In Vavuniya, a number of paramilitary groups operate alongside government forces, making this one of the most dangerous districts for civilians in Sri Lanka (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2008).

The start of the conflict was marked by military offensives by both the LTTE and the GoSL. India became involved in 1987, following military offensives on Jaffna, and later that year an Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord was agreed and India established a peacekeeping force (IPKF). The LTTE refused to disarm, leading to renewed conflict between the IPKF and the LTTE. The IPKF quit Sri Lanka in 1990. Violent conflict continued in the 1990s, as the newly elected Sri Lankan government followed a 'war for peace' policy. This resulted in large-scale displacement, and by mid-2000 the number of IDPs was estimated at more than 1 million (Goodhand, Hulme et al. 2000; Feinstein International Center 2007; DRC 2008).

The LTTE and the GoSL signed a Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in 2002, and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was formed to monitor the

ceasefire. Many donor countries offered financial support. However, peace talks soon started to unravel: national opposition parties feared the emergence of a federalist state, while the LTTE was dissatisfied over proposed governance and reconstruction plans. The LTTE pulled out of the peace talks in 2003, and issued its own peace proposal calling for an LTTE-controlled Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) in the north and east, provoking strong resistance in the south. A further contributor to the unravelling of the peace process was the split in the LTTE because of dissatisfaction with power and resources given to Tamils in the eastern part of the island. Although the pre-existing ceasefire meant an end to large-scale militarised conflict, political violence continued and the ceasefire was broken many times by both sides (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2006).

When the Indian Ocean tsunami hit Sri Lanka in December 2004, the ceasefire was already beginning to unravel. The northern and eastern parts of the country were worst-affected by both the tsunami and the conflict. There was initial optimism that aid in response to the tsunami would facilitate the peace process, but in fact disagreements arose over how assistance should be distributed in areas under LTTE control. In 2005, the prospects of peace talks dimmed with the failure to implement the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure, which had been negotiated between the GoSL and the LTTE. The tsunami response also created tensions between communities as 'tsunami displaced' received more assistance than conflict-displaced people often living in close proximity (Goodhand and Klem 2005; Vaux 2006).

From 2005, attacks, assassinations, disappearances and bombings became increasingly frequent. A new president was elected in November 2005 (Mahinda Rajapakse), who essentially took the country back to war, resulting in a qualitative shift in GoSL war strategies from 2006. In the north, the government imposed economic restrictions on LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni and GoSL-controlled Jaffna by the closure of the A9 highway in August 2006. This led to shortages of essential items and money in the banks and an increase in the price of goods. Many agencies had to stop

rehabilitation activities as there were restrictions on the movement of construction materials. The A9 to Jaffna remains closed.

In the east, months of violence by organised gangs of Sinhala following a bomb attack in Trincomalee market in April 2006 led to the displacement of 20,000 families from villages to the west and north of Trincomalee. The closure of the Mavil Aru dam by the LTTE in July 2006, which cut villagers in GoSL areas off from their water supply, led to army operations in August against LTTE-controlled Sampur (Muttur) in Trincomalee district. Further army operations took place elsewhere in southern Trincomalee, in particular Eachchilampattu Division. Over 200,000 people, almost the entire Tamil population of southern Trincomalee, were displaced to Batticaloa (International Crisis Group 2008). GoSL attacks in the east continued in March 2007, leading to the displacement of a further 100,000 people (Human Rights Watch 2007). By this stage, most of the LTTE-controlled areas in the east had been taken by the government, but violence by the LTTE and paramilitary groups continues.

The CFA was formally abrogated in early 2008. Large military operations started in the Vanni in May, quickly bringing most of the west (Mannar) under government control. At the time of writing, most of the west and south of the Vanni is empty of civilians. The United Nations and other agencies were instructed to withdraw from the Vanni on 8 September. Bombing of Killinochchi started in May, and conflict continues at the time of writing. The LTTE, along with an estimated 400,000 civilians, is now thought to be located along a 60km stretch of the A35 road in Mullaitivu, and at the time of writing had only been accessed once by the humanitarian community, by a WFP food convoy. It is expected that some people will come out of the Vanni into Vavuniya in the coming months. The estimated number of displaced in the Vanni by the end of 2008 was 230,000 (UN 2008).

2.2 The current context

During the more than 20 years of conflict, an estimated 70,000 people have died (Feinstein International Center 2007). More than 300,000 have been displaced by fighting in 2006/07, in addition to another 200,000–250,000 made homeless by the tsunami (often from the areas currently affected by

conflict). Around 300,000 displaced remain from earlier phases of the conflict. From 2006, 18,000 Sri Lankans fled to India (Human Rights Watch 2007). Since early 2008, the conflict in the north has added another 200,000 displaced.

Displacement, return and relocation have been a feature of the conflict in Sri Lanka throughout its 20-plus years. Many of those living in welfare centres (public or private buildings/compounds which house IDPs) in Jaffna and Vavuniya have been there, on and off, since the early to mid-1990s. Some were resettled or relocated¹ following the ceasefire in 2002. A key reason for not being able to return to areas of origin is land being declared a High Security Zone (HSZ), usually because of strategic military or economic interests. An added complexity in the east is a history of government relocation of Sinhala people in the western part of the Trincomalee, in part as a deliberate political objective of the GoSL, particularly prior to elections. This has changed the demography of the east substantially, with the proportion of Tamils declining. Similar displacement, resettlement and relocation patterns are present today after the resumption of conflict in 2006. There have been concerns about coercion by GoSL to resettle populations, as well as forced resettlement and relocation (CPA 2007), for example through a policy of reducing food and other assistance in camps. About 10,000 Tamils lost access to homes and land due to the declaration of HSZs in Sampur in Muttur in Trincomalee, and currently remain in camps. As well as restrictions on access to land, the GoSL has imposed restrictions on fishing in the north and east, for security reasons.

The current security context varies from district to district. All northern and eastern districts are affected by high levels of political violence, including abductions, disappearances and killing by all sides of the conflict. In addition, Jaffna and Vavuniya are affected by restrictions on the movement of people and goods. Military operations in the east in 2006 created large numbers of displaced people in Trincomalee and Batticaloa and in 2008 in Mannar, Killinochchi and Mullaitivu in the north. Because of the recent fighting and

¹ In Sri Lanka, the term ‘resettled’ is used for people who return to their areas of origin and relocated for those who are settled in new areas.

displacement, populations in the Vanni are currently in greatest humanitarian need and face the greatest immediate risk to their physical safety.

Political violence, including abductions, detention and disappearances, did not stop during the ceasefire, but have been steadily increasing since 2006. Between September 2006 and June 2007, an estimated 2,020 people disappeared. For the GoSL, abductions are part of the counter-insurgency operation. The emergency regulations put in place by the GoSL in 2005 mean that the security forces can detain people without charge for up to 12 months and impose restrictions on movement (Human Rights Watch 2007). For the LTTE, this is a way of eliminating rivals and recruiting fighters and a means of extortion, and for the TMVP it is a source of recruitment (Human Rights Watch 2007). Various other armed groups are also thought to be involved in extortion, in particular in Vavuniya (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2008). Whilst people in the east no longer fear LTTE attacks, continued suspicion, disappearances and killings (by government or aligned forces) are creating one of the most serious periods of political violence in Trincomalee (Lang and Knudsen 2008). In Vavuniya too, the population is experiencing increasing political violence as well as economic restrictions due to an increase in the number of army and police checkpoints (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2008).

The GoSL never ceased to function in conflict-affected areas, and is a central player in planning relief and longer-term assistance to the internally displaced. At the national level, the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Refugees (MRRR) provides assistance for the long-term displaced. In addition, the government provides 'food stamps' for the poor through the 'Samurdhi' scheme. There are several special governmental initiatives, all operating at the provincial level under the MRRR, including the North-East Emergency Reconstruction Programme (NEERP) supported by the World Bank. Amongst other things, NEERP is charged with providing cash payments to eligible resettling/relocating IDPs and refugees under the GoSL's Unified Assistance Scheme (UAS) (DRC 2006). The LTTE runs a parallel civil administration within its northern 'Vanni' territory.

Over the past two years, however, civil administration in the east has become increasingly militarised, transforming the political and military

establishment. In this context, military priorities and strategies are likely to take precedence over humanitarian ones. In addition, a culture of impunity prevails with regard to human rights abuses, in part because anti-terrorist measures and emergency rule implicate government security forces in such abuses. Government accountability is further compromised because of questions over the independence of the Human Rights Commission, established to look into abuses. In this environment, humanitarian space, in the form of respect for human rights, IHL and humanitarian principles more generally, is extremely limited.

WFP, UNHCR and UNDP are key UN actors working on livelihoods and protection. WFP provides assistance to newly displaced, resettled or relocated populations, and targeted assistance to economically affected households. UNDP has recently developed a new transition recovery programme (UNDP 2007) to support economic and social recovery in displaced, resettled and host communities in the north and east. Districts are placed in one of five scenarios, ranging from early recovery/intermittent mid-term recovery to development. Parts of Vavuniya and Trincomalee are considered suitable for mid-term recovery or development because of a perceived stable security situation, with recommended responses such as micro-credit, fisheries, micro-enterprise and community-based infrastructure. This does not correspond well with the analysis above of widespread insecurity and human rights violations.

UNHCR's protection strategy includes both protection and livelihoods activities. Protection activities include protection monitoring, addressing long-term obstacles to return, providing access to information on return areas, safeguarding the civilian and voluntary nature of IDP and returnee movements, access to justice and civil documentation and identifying individuals with special needs. UNHCR has also recently developed a relocation policy for the east, guided by the Pinheiro principles on return, restitution, compensation and relocation (UNHCR 2008). This also includes identifying livelihood gaps and the implementation of livelihoods projects (UNHCR 2008). Livelihoods assistance might for example include support for digging wells through Quick Impact Projects, the provision of grants to people with special needs, and the provision of livelihoods recovery grants to

resettled or relocated people. These projects are still in the early stages of implementation, and consequently there is little information about their effectiveness.

Access for humanitarian agencies has declined since 2006. Most restrictions were imposed by the SLA, though the LTTE designated several roads and areas as no-go zones within the Vanni. With the resumption of all-out war in 2008, most of the Vanni is now inaccessible to humanitarian agencies. In the face of a highly militarised environment, and resulting lack of humanitarian space, advocacy on human rights abuses and the humanitarian consequences is extremely difficult. There has also been little advocacy by humanitarian agencies to retain access to conflict-affected populations (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2008). There is an urgent need for concerned governments to rethink the protection of human rights in Sri Lanka. Pressure by Western governments, however, will be diluted by the increasing assistance Sri Lanka is receiving from non-Western donors (China, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia).

2.3 Livelihoods and protection

The Sri Lanka conflict has seen repeated violations of International Humanitarian Law, non-observance of the distinction between civilians and combatants, attacks on places of worship and near hospitals, and a failure to provide facilities critical to the survival of the community (Human Rights Watch 2007). This is despite the fact that Sri Lanka has signed up to Optional Protocol 2 to the Geneva conventions (which applies in situations of non-international armed conflict and provides for a distinction between civilians and combatants, and states that the authorities have a responsibility to provide for civilians, and that impartial humanitarian agencies have a right to offer assistance). The guiding principles on internal displacement are violated throughout all phases of displacement (Lang and Knudsen 2008).

Displacement is used as a tool of war by the warring parties, and civilians are used as human shields. Protection concerns also include restrictions on movement, forced return and relocation. Abductions, disappearances, killings and the forced recruitment of children is a key feature of the conflict, and constitute major protection risks.

Violence and displacement affect not only personal safety, but also social and economic lives, due to lack of mobility, restrictions on services and loss of assets, livelihoods and employment opportunities (CPA 2007). Economic restrictions create shortages and increase the prices of basic goods. In addition, restrictions imposed on fishing in the north and east affect all those involved in the industry. The imposition of High Security Zones has created severe economic hardship. Many locations open to fishermen, cattle grazers and people selling firewood are now inaccessible (International Crisis Group 2008). Much paddy land is situated in inland jungle areas, which are either in HSZs or not safe to access. There are also reports that people have to surrender their ID cards when they go into the fields (in Vavuniya), which makes them more vulnerable to arrest and detention (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2008).

There are therefore close links between livelihoods and protection in Sri Lanka, in particular in relation to risks to physical safety and freedom of movement. In some parts of the country, risks to physical safety are more acute, in particular in Jaffna, Mannar, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. These populations also face acute risks to subsistence because of widespread displacement and limited humanitarian access. In other areas, loss of assets due to displacement together with restrictions on movement and access to land and fishing grounds means that they only have limited livelihoods options. The findings of this review are therefore further analysed under physical safety, freedom of movement and means of subsistence or ability to pursue different livelihood strategies.

3. Livelihoods and protection; community responses and decision-making

3.1 Introduction

Field work for this review focused on the following livelihood, or risk, groups in Vavuniya and Trincomalee districts:

- Protracted IDPs staying in welfare centres (displaced in the mid-1990s).
- New IDPs in camps (people displaced in 2006).
- Resettled populations (people who have returned to their own land).
- Relocated populations (people who have been settled on new land).

There are large numbers of long-time IDPs in Jaffna and Vavuniya, as well as in the (formerly) LTTE-controlled Vanni. In these areas, a resettlement and relocation process has been ongoing since 2002. Trincomalee (and Batticaloa) had large numbers of newly displaced populations in 2006, and in this district a resettlement process started in 2007, followed by a relocation process. Resettlement and relocation are still ongoing in Vavuniya and Trincomalee. In early 2008, there were just over 5,000 IDPs in Trincomalee (5,719 in March, 5,065 in September), and 11,200 were resettled in Eachchilampattu, Seruvila and Mutthur (WFP 2008). In Vavuniya, there are currently 4,000 IDPs in welfare centres and 63,802 staying with host families. Around 1,500 people were relocated during 2007 and 2008, and a total of 92,019 were resettled up to October 2008.

Whilst the groups chosen for the review are those assisted by DRC, they are also some of the most vulnerable groups in terms of risks to livelihoods and protection. These groups are particularly vulnerable because, in addition to experiencing political violence, restrictions on movement, access to land, etc., they have lost assets during periods of acute conflict and displacement. Harassment by security forces is more severe in particular if people's area of origin is in former or current LTTE-controlled areas. People staying in camps or welfare centres and relocated people were generally identified by the DRC teams as being those groups with the most limited livelihood opportunities, due to limited space, land and capital.

The distinction between resettled and relocated groups is not as rigid as it appears. Resettlement villages may actually have a combination of resettled or relocated households. Alternatively, households may have been relocated in 2002, displaced again during renewed conflict and then resettled to the place of relocation. Many people have been displaced multiple times since the 1980s. In fact, it was commonly said that almost all households in the north and north-east have been displaced at least once over the past 25 years.

Most inhabitants of most villages and camps visited were Tamil. The exception was two villages in Trincomalee, which had a mixed Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim population. All had been relocated there in 1990. Tamil and Muslim families came from Muttur, having been displaced due to conflict in 1983. The Sinhala were poor people from central Sri Lanka.

3.2. Physical safety

A general climate of suspicion and fear persists in most parts of Vavuniya and Trincomalee. Fear of abduction or arrest, in particular on the part of the Tamil population, presents the most direct threat to people's physical safety. No one interviewed felt safe where they were living. Abductions have increased over the past year. In Vavuniya, in August alone, 24 people were reported missing and 19 abducted (CPA, 2008). Cases of torture were also reported, where the men were released back to their village, but unable to work due to the injuries received. An increase in military compounds, and checkpoints on the road, since the resumption of conflict in early 2008 has increased the risk of abduction associated with movement. When men travel outside of villages, camps or Welfare Centres (WC) for work, they may be subjected to sudden round-ups and arrests. Most women interviewed were afraid that, when their husband went out to work, he would not come back.

Military or security forces may enter villages at any time, but also carry out search and cordon operations, where the village is closed off for 24 hours on suspicion of LTTE activities. Search and cordon operations happen in particular when relatives are or have been visiting. The army has

photographed and/or registered every family in the WC, camps or villages, so that during search and cordon operations they can identify anyone who was not there before. The army in Muttur, Trincomalee and Vavuniya has also asked villagers to inform them when people are visiting, or when there are ‘strangers’ or ‘newcomers’ in the village.

The frequency of search and cordon operations has increased over the past year. This may be in part because the military presence has increased since the end of the ceasefire. In many villages, it was reported that new military camps have recently been established close by (e.g. in Sangarapuram, Vavuniya), with frequent army visits to the village and a consequent increase in detentions and disappearances. The closer a village is to a (former) LTTE area, the greater the suspicion. As a consequence of abuses within resettlement or relocation sites, people might leave WCs or relocation/resettlement sites and go to Vavuniya town (e.g. 20 families in Sangarapuram). For similar reasons, relocation to Kalmadu, also in Vavuniya, has been halted. Men are generally most vulnerable to abduction or arrest, but women are also affected.

In addition to abductions, threats to safety also include extortion by armed groups which exert varying degrees of control over villages and IDP camps in Vavuniya (CPA 2008). Traders, businesspeople and professionals are the favoured victims, and as a consequence many have left. Risks of abduction and extortion were said to be worst for people relocated and originating from former LTTE-controlled areas.

In Trincomalee, an added dimension posing a threat to physical safety is ethnic tension. Whilst the situation was relatively calm at the time of the review, in villages which either had a mixed ethnic composition (e.g. Sangama and Ganasapuram), or where people were close to villages containing another ethnic group, it was felt that any incident or ethnic-based attack would spoil the current calm and could lead to renewed conflict.

People interviewed reported feeling safer when the police, rather than the military or security forces, were involved in operations, as in this case those detained were more likely to be released. In some cases, people felt that security had improved with the establishment of police stations (and conversely

that security had worsened when police stations had been removed). For example, in Sangama (Trincomalee), the establishment of a small police station had improved security. In the end, however, everyone interviewed felt that they were responsible for their own security, but that there were very few actions that they could take themselves to improve their safety.

Those interviewed also did not think that there was much that international agencies could do to stop abductions or disappearances, although an ICRC and UNHCR presence did elicit some respect from the army. Agency visits in some cases increased harassment as the military would come and question villagers after the visit, but villagers and IDPs were clear that they did not want agencies to stop coming because it was felt that abuses would be worse if the agencies left completely, and because they wanted their problems to be reported to the outside world. References were made to Killinochchi, where, with the departure of all international agencies, there is little information on the human rights abuses suffered by the civilian population. There is likely to be considerable under-reporting of security concerns, as people fear revenge. Women in Sangarapuram (Vavuniya) gave as an example the abduction of a village leader nearby who had raised with the authorities the issue of two killings. In the case of international agencies, people do not report security concerns as they do not expect these agencies to do anything. Not knowing who is responsible for arrests and disappearances, particularly in Vavuniya, is an added problem. Armed groups arrive in vehicles without number-plates. This poses a problem both for the affected communities regarding where to go for information, and for humanitarian agencies in terms of advocacy.

Strategies used to protect against threats to physical safety

The strategies that people used to improve their safety in 2008 were remarkably similar to those found in Korf’s research in 2001 in Trincomalee (Korf 2003). The 2003 study, however, looked at strategies for Sinhala, Muslim as well as Tamil populations, while the current review focused mainly on Tamils. In 2008, the most common strategies were either to do as they were told by the military or to flee. If people could flee, they would go

Table 1: Livelihoods and protection strategies in 2001 and

Managing personal risk	Managing household economics	Accessing external support
<p>Minimising risk:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leaving place of residence (2001), in particular men leaving for India (2008) • Fleeing to jungle during sudden eruption of fighting (2001/2006–8) • Sending children to stay with relatives in safer areas (2001) • Sending women (and elderly) through checkpoints for marketing because men are more at risk (2001/2008) • Working in fields and travelling to markets in groups (2001/2008) • Doing ‘voluntary’ work for the military <p>Risk-taking:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collecting firewood in the jungle even though this is a risky place (2001–2008) • Trespassing in restricted fishing areas (2001; Muslims) 	<p>Securing income:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migrating for income to the Middle East (2001/2008) • Confining strategies to key income sources (2001) • Home guard employment (2001/2008, for Sinhala only) <p>Organising the family:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Handling gender roles more flexibly; women take greater role in farming, marketing (2001/2008) • Re-sizing/re-uniting family according to security and economic needs (2001) <p>Managing expenditure and investment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoiding investment in tangible assets (2001, although reported for traders and businessmen in Vavuniya) • Reduced investment in entertainment and consumption 	<p>Seeking refuge in the wider family network:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sending family members to more peaceful places in Sri Lanka (2001) <p>Alliances with power holders</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishing good relationships with government officers and military (2001/2008) • Seeking alliances with armed actors (2001/2008) • Keeping a low profile so as not to cause trouble (2001/08) <p>Satisfying claims of armed actors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Giving the necessary bribes (2001–08) • Bypassing bribes and taxation where possible (2001) <p>Qualifying for state and NGO support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forming community-based organisations to access NGO support (2001–08) • Lying to qualify for state or NGO welfare (2001–08)

Source: Adapted from Korf (2003).

to India for safety. However, this option was not available to all, as the boat to India (from Mannar) is costs 15,000–16,000 rps/person and it is risky. Men often went alone. Where restrictions were imposed on access to land, forests (for firewood and hunting) and fishing, people generally did not attempt this, although there are some exceptions, for in Katkulam (Vavuniya), where people continued with firewood collection even though this entailed considerable risks to safety (see *risk taking*, in Table 1 below). In a number of communities, groups of people carried out ‘voluntary’ work for the military (e.g. in Ithikulam and Thiramalpuram, Trincomalee; Kalmadu, Vavuniya). This was considered to contribute to improved security for the community.

People travelled in groups to markets and farms, but this was not necessarily because this was thought to reduce the risk of arrest or detention; rather it meant that if someone was arrested, the others could inform their family. When travelling to areas where there is a risk of meeting the military, many people ensure the presence of a Sinhala speaker amongst the group, as the army speaks only Sinhala, but few Tamils in the camps or villages do so. Often, only women would go to markets. Travel by bus was generally considered safer than walking or cycling. Almost everyone said that they now kept their National Identity Card with them at all times, as this is needed for any movement and access to employment and land.

In Kalmadu, the Rural Development Society, one of the main CBOs, had taken on a protective function. It had an agreement with the security forces to the effect that, if security forces arrest someone, the CBO can accompany them into detention. Secondly, if anyone has visitors from outside the village, the RDS takes responsibility for first day and then registers the outsiders with the army. This was considered to prevent search and cordon operations by the army because of suspicions about newcomers into the settlements.

Expectations for the future regarding physical safety
Almost everyone interviewed felt that the situation was very unstable. Whilst they hoped for peace, most thought that the situation could get worse or at least that it would not improve in the near future; in other words, that conflict and human rights abuses would continue. In Vavuniya, people interviewed thought that the increased military presence could pose problems in the future. They also expressed doubts about any future peace, as they thought peace would come in 2002, but conflict has now resumed. In Trincomalee, the risk of future displacement was mentioned a number of times, in particular because of the potential for a resumption of ethnic violence.

3.3. Freedom of movement

Almost everyone in the north and east has been displaced at least once during their lives, and often many times. From the 1980s displaced people have moved into WCs and camps, or stayed with host populations. Over the past 20 years, there has been considerable movement to and from welfare centres. For example, in Sitarampuram WC in Vavuniya people started arriving in 1990, while some who returned to their areas of origin in 2002 have since come back to the WC. Others went back to the Vanni to check on their land, but either found it occupied or did not have sufficient confidence in the peace process to stay. A large number of people were said to have left for India, come back, but left again in 2006. Many still have relatives in India, the Middle East or in various parts of Sri Lanka. Contact with relatives elsewhere in Sri Lanka has become much more difficult after 2006, particularly if part of the family is in GoSL-controlled and part in LTTE-controlled areas. In Vavuniya, resettlement and relocation of IDPs within the district started in 2002. In many

villages, there will be a mix of resettled and relocated people (see Box 1 below for examples in villages visited).

Box 1: Displacement and return patterns in Vavuniya and Trincomalee

People in new resettlement site in Thudduvakai, Vavuniya: There are 37 families living in the new site, and 108 in the old village nearby. All originally came from villages close by, but were displaced in 1990. Some went to India, others to Madu (in Mannar, controlled by the LTTE at that time). In 1999 the army seized control of the Madu area, and took them to a welfare centre in Vavuniya. Later that year they were resettled in Thuddavakai, but not necessarily to their village of origin as this was either occupied by 'security forces' or they did not own land. The people in the new site had bought land in 2006, when the owners left and sold their land cheaply.

Sangarampuram resettlement village, Vavuniya: Only four families are originally from Sangarampuram. Most people in the village originated from Mullaitivu, Mannar and Kilinochchi and were first displaced in 1997, but within the districts. In 2000 they came to Vavuniya, with transport being organised by GoSL to a welfare centre. They started doing farm labour in Sangarampuram, but once they saved enough money they bought one or two acres of land here from about 2004 onwards. All families came here in August 2006, having requested DRC and local partners to help with their relocation.

Thiramalpuram relocation village, Trincomalee: People were displaced because of the tsunami, and initially lived in an IDP camp close to their area of origin. They stayed there for six months, and then set up temporary shelter in adjoining area. Almost everyone originally came from Goyalapuram, but not everyone from Goyalapuram is here. They were relocated to Thiramalpuram in January 2006. The GoSL determined first a 100m then a 200m buffer zone along the coast, so some could not go back and others did not have land here before. In 2006, some people went to India, but many returned to Goyalapuram to stay with relatives and came back to Thiramalpuram after two months.

In the east, those displaced from areas close to Trincomalee in 2006 have largely returned home and were displaced only for periods of 2–3 months. Those who fled from the more southerly areas, Mutthur and Eachchilampattu, were displaced to Batticaloa for longer periods of 1–2 years, with returns to Eachchilampattu in southern Trincomalee starting in 2007. In the east, some people were relocated after the tsunami, displaced in 2006 and then resettled to their place of relocation (see Box 1 for examples in villages visited).

All aspects of movement are highly controlled in the north and east, both by GoSL and the LTTE. During periods of conflict, GoSL encourages movement out of LTTE-controlled areas in a number of ways, for example by providing buses to take people to WCs in government-controlled areas with promises of assistance and security. When violent conflict has ceased, and GoSL considers the area ‘cleared’ of the LTTE, it will organise transport to resettle or relocate IDPs. There have been some concerns that some of these movements were not voluntary.

Within GoSL areas, people need their National Identity Card for any movement outside the village (or camp), and a number of different ID cards and permits are required to move out of Jaffna and Vavuniya. Movement in and out of Jaffna has been severely restricted since 2006. Tamils need several levels of approval to leave Jaffna, including from their local GS, then the Divisional Secretary and finally the military – but only after providing ample evidence of a valid reason to go, and the police will check the destination address. This process can take up to two months and sometimes results in a negative response. Since 2008, similar restrictions have been placed on Tamils wanting to move out of Vavuniya following the establishment of the checkpoint in Medawachchi in February, which restricts movements of both people and goods. All goods have to be loaded and off-loaded at the checkpoint, which can take up to four hours, increasing the cost of goods in Vavuniya and meaning that perishable goods may be spoilt. The LTTE restricts people’s movements by requiring a pass to move anywhere within or out of LTTE-controlled areas. When conflict started in the northern part of Vavuniya, people were only given passes to go north (further into LTTE-held territory), rather than south into GoSL-held areas.

Several people were seen during field work who did not have their National Identity Card (NIC), because it was lost during displacement or taken by the military, or had not been issued after relocation or resettlement. For example, in Thudduvakai eight men were without an NIC. One whose NIC had been taken by the military had only left the village once in the time since. In such cases, it is difficult to get a new card as an application for a new NIC needs a police report. In WCs in Jaffna, only 42% of IDPs had their NIC (DRC, 2007). The most extreme case is currently in the camps in Mannar, where IDPs have to leave their NIC with the SLA or SLN when they leave on a day pass to pursue livelihood strategies.

For anyone living in the GoSL-controlled north or east, the increasing number of checkpoints cause delays in travel to markets and hinder employment, and the risk of arrest and abduction has reduced the number of such journeys undertaken. Relocation villages are often far from markets (about 30km in Vavuniya), which presents difficulties if people want to sell perishable goods such as vegetables and milk. Most people, however, continued to go to markets and look for work out of necessity. In addition, in many places visited the army had imposed a curfew prohibiting any movement at night. This poses problems particularly for paddy farming, which at harvest time requires work in the farm at night. It also affects fishing, as this too is normally done at night. As mentioned above, the army closely monitors any movement in and out of villages. During search and cordon operations the military closes off the village for at least 24 hours, preventing people from going out to work or farm.

The GoSL restricts fishing in all areas of the north and east, due to the suspected presence of the ‘Sea Tigers’ and GoSL navy operations. Fishing restrictions can change daily and are unpredictable. For example, in Jaffna there are restrictions on the types of boats that can be used, the number of people that can fish at any one time, the distance that fishermen are allowed to travel and the hours during which fishing is allowed. Similar restrictions apply in Trincomalee. In Eachchilampattu, fishermen are now only allowed to fish up to 3km from the coast, from 3 am to 6 pm, and on some days fishing is not allowed at all (WFP 2008).

Travel to farms is also restricted in a number of ways. This applies mainly to paddy farms, which are

often located far from villages. Such farms may be in High Security Zones (which are often in the most fertile land) or the area may be unsafe.

3.4 Livelihoods strategies and links with protection

Background to livelihoods in the north and east of Sri Lanka

Traditionally, livelihoods in the north-east varied by geographical area, for example people in coastal areas (mainly Tamils and Muslims) relied mostly on fishing and rice (paddy farming), and people in inland areas, mainly Sinhala, are more dependent on small-scale agriculture, paddy farming and commercial crop production. Casual labour and petty trading were also common, and households may own small amounts of livestock. Large stock such as buffalo and cattle were owned by few. Forest resources were also important (wild fruits, animals, firewood and timber). Remittances formed an important source of income, in particular for Tamil and Muslim communities.

Conditions during the previous conflict period were remarkably similar to those of today. Livelihood strategies were limited due to insecurity, robbery and theft, restrictions on trade and economic blockades. For example, in contested GoSL-held Tamil or mixed areas exporting cash crops was difficult and agricultural inputs were limited because of economic blockades. Fishing was limited because GoSL security forces imposed limits on when boats could go out, at what time, and limited the capacity of outboard motors. In LTTE-controlled areas, livelihood options declined because of economic blockades, limited freedom of movement, increases in the prices of basic goods and decreases in the availability of basic services (such as health). People in all conflict-affected areas were afraid to cultivate their paddy fields outside the village, and reluctant to engage in new agricultural activities or invest in economic activities for fear of having to flee again or losing the investment to taxation by rebels. By the late 1990s, people had retreated into subsistence and small-scale group-based economic activities as a result of conflict, and experienced a decline in market-based activities (Goodhand, Hulme et al. 2000; Korf 2003) (also see Table 1).

The ceasefire improved both security and livelihoods by allowing increased mobility within and outside of conflict-affected areas, and the economic embargo on the north was lifted. Some IDPs returned to their home villages, but livelihoods were still fragile. Large numbers of IDPs remained in welfare centres, because they were reluctant to return to their land because of landmines, because for some their land was in High Security Zones, or because they had developed new livelihoods in areas of displacement. In addition, there were few job opportunities, local prices were high and government services were poor. In December 2004, many conflict-affected people were also hit by the tsunami, resulting in deaths, loss of productive and household assets and displacement.

Impact of increased hostilities and economic restrictions

There are a number of implications for livelihoods resulting from the increased hostilities between Tamil and Sinhala since 2006, and from the restrictions on movement of goods into Jaffna and Vavuniya.

Economic relations, whether labour or markets, between Sinhala and Tamil have largely ceased in the past two years. For example, IDPs in Sitamparapuram WC in Vavuniya used to work on neighbouring Sinhala farms, and Sinhala came to the WC to trade. Now these activities have stopped. This means that opportunities for farm labour are reduced as Tamil IDPs can only work on neighbouring Tamil farms. In Sangama in Trincomalee, a Tamil family reported that they only went to Tamil areas for work, which similarly reduced work opportunities. The market in Trincomalee has split into two, one for Tamils and one for Sinhala. The prices in the Tamil market were reported to be higher.

In Ithikulam, Trincomalee, relations between Tamil villagers and people in a neighbouring Muslim village were also volatile. Conflict between the two villages has a long history, and now the Tamils accuse the Muslims of stealing their assets whilst they were displaced. They have to go to the Muslim village to buy goods, and do not feel safe doing so. Although their welfare centre cards have not yet been replaced by NIC cards, thus far travel by bus has been safe.

The *economic restrictions* imposed on Jaffna by the closure of the A9 in 2006, and on Vavuniya by the Medawachchi checkpoint in early 2008, also have significant impacts on people's livelihoods. The only land route to Jaffna is the A9, which has been closed since August 2006. For Jaffna, all imported goods have to be transported by sea or air, which has increased the price of food, construction materials and other basic goods. A recent survey by SC-UK in Jaffna showed that the impact of the blockade led to severe reductions in income from fishing, agricultural sales, casual labour and construction. The cost of a minimum food basket had more than doubled. People's coping strategies included the sale of assets, taking out loans and greater reliance on remittances (SC-UK 2007). There is also little employment for skilled labour as the inputs for work such as carpentry and masonry are not available. The high cost of food also affected the quantity of food aid provided by the GoSL department of resettlement and disaster relief. As the rations are set in terms of its financial value, the higher the cost of food the lower the ration. This applies to both Jaffna and Vavuniya.

Vavuniya used to be the economic transit point between the north and south of Sri Lanka, and trade and business was therefore a major livelihood strategy, with associated opportunities for casual labour. The establishment of the Medawachchi checkpoint close to Vavuniya in February 2008 stopped all direct movement into and out of Vavuniya. The price of all commodities has increased as a consequence. Construction materials are still coming in, but this takes time and is more expensive. The increase in cost is largely because of the additional cost incurred by traders from having to off-load and load all goods at the checkpoint. In addition, the import of rice from Kilinochchi has almost stopped due to stricter controls at the Omanthai checkpoint, which used to be the frontier with LTTE-controlled territory. According to farmers in Sangarapuram, the reasons for the price increases in the district are: war – the big producing areas used to be Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, the price of fertilizer has gone up, and so has the cost of labour. Several people interviewed also reported that, for the same reason, the rent for paddy land had increased (3,000 rps/acre last year, 8,000 rps now). Farmers are also investing less because of insecurity, thus further reducing opportunities for farm labour. There is also less work in town,

because businessmen are less willing to invest, inputs are more costly and many traders have left because of extortion by armed actors.

Current livelihood strategies

The current livelihood strategies of IDPs, resettled and relocated populations are remarkably similar, mainly consisting of poorly remunerated and uncertain activities. Most IDPs, resettled and relocated people have lost their assets, limiting their livelihood strategies. This includes cattle and other livestock. Livestock used to be a form of saving as well as a source of food, but very few now make a living from livestock. Many fisherman lost their fishing boats during the conflict, and those previously affected by the tsunami might have lost their fishing boats and equipment twice.

The extent of the risks that people face in carrying out their livelihood strategies depends on whether there are checkpoints on the way to farms or towns for work, and the proximity of military compounds or other armed groups to the village or camp. The types of strategies for the different population groups examined for this review are indicated in Table 2 below. The information found during this brief review is consistent with the findings of a recent WFP food security assessment amongst resettled populations in Trincomalee (WFP 2008), and that of protracted IDPs in Jaffna (DRC 2007), where the main income sources were found to be daily labour, fishing and farming, and to a lesser extent petty trade and small businesses.

As can be seen from Table 2, *wage labour* is by far the most common income-earning strategy. This was usually farm labour during the cultivation period/rainy season and construction work during the dry season. Farm labour on irrigated farms is available all year round. However, other labour opportunities mentioned included domestic labour (Sitarampuram WC in Vavuniya, Cultural Hall camp in Trincomalee), as well as masonry, painting and driving in Kalmadu (Vavuniya). Some masons went to Trincomalee and Batticaloa to build houses after the tsunami. In most cases, people could find 10–15 days' work/person/month, and in few cases more than one family member would go to find work outside of the settlement. Reported wages for men were always higher than for women: 500–700 rps/day for men and 200–300/day for women (in one case, Thudduvakai, women earned 500/day for

farm labour).² As mentioned above, the availability of labour is reduced because of increased hostilities between ethnic groups and higher costs of inputs and materials for both agriculture and construction.

In all cases, people either engaged in *home gardening* or *larger-scale agriculture*. Home gardening is generally done in the $\frac{1}{4}$ - or $\frac{1}{2}$ -acre plots around the house, and can consist of cultivation of a number of different crops, often a range of vegetables, pulses and fruits. These are consumed and sold. In some cases, seeds were provided by NGOs, but were also purchased in nearby markets. One resettlement village was visited, Sangarampuram (Vavuniya), where some households had 1–2 acres of land each. Shortage of water was a key constraint to increasing production and therefore income. In Kalmadu (Vavuniya), the soil was unsuitable for rain-fed agriculture (clay soil), and there is a lack of water to irrigate land during the dry season.

Few people have access to *paddy land for rice cultivation*, either because they are in HSZs or because travelling far from the village is unsafe. Even where paddy land was accessible, e.g. in Ithikulam, Trincomalee, production was expected to be low because of the curfew which prevented work at night. Some used to rent land for cultivation, but particularly in Vavuniya the cost of this has increased beyond most people's capacity.

Few people have opportunities to earn an income from *fishing*. Only one resettlement village was visited where people engaged in fishing, and Tamil families were not doing so now because of the restrictions placed upon it. According to one family,

only Tamils face questions, harassment and requests for ID cards. They were afraid to go fishing with other (ethnic) communities as they thought that, in case of an incident, they would be killed.

Petty trading or small shops are another common form of income generation, usually when people have been established in a particular location for some time. In most places visited, however, there were only one or two small shops. For example, one family in Sangama (Trincomalee) had a shop but found that sales were much reduced compared to before 2006. Petty trading also includes mobile vending businesses, including vegetables and snacks.

Firewood collection used to be a common income-earning strategy, but few people now engage in it unless they have to. It is either unsafe (e.g. Katkulam, Vavuniya; Thiramalpuram, Trincomalee) or is within the high security zone (e.g. in Ithikulam). In Katkulam, the army was reported to be attacking men collecting firewood, but they continue with this activity because there is so little other work. This kind of abuse was reported to be increasing. Similarly in Thiramalpuram, Trincomalee, people continued to collect firewood despite the risks. *Wild food collection* is very rare; for example hunting and honey collection. In one village, Thudduvakai, two families had members that went hunting, but in general this was considered too dangerous. Sometimes the army rounds people up in forest areas. An example of livelihood strategies for people relocated because of the tsunami and displaced briefly due to conflict in Trincomalee is shown in Table 3 below.

² At the time of the visit, the exchange rate was 102 rupees to the US dollar.

Table 2: Sources of income for different population groups

Protracted IDPs	New IDPs	Resettled			Relocated	
		<i>Limited land</i>	<i>1-2 acres of land</i>	<i>Recently resettled</i>	<i>Relocated > 1 year ago</i>	<i>Newly relocated</i>
Wage labour	Wage labour	Wage labour	Agriculture	Pawning jewellery	Wage labour	Wage labour
Home gardening	Sale of jewellery	Brick making*	Paddy cultivation	Labour (mainly for NGOs)	Small business	Firewood collection
Firewood collection	Petty trading	Home gardening	Wage labour		Home gardening	
		Livestock (chickens)	Remittances		Farming rented land	
		Small business (shops/petty trade)**	Livestock (cattle)		Remittances	
		Remittances			Firewood collection	
		Hunting				
		Inland fishing during dry season				

*only in Thudduvakai, Vavuniya / ** in Sangama, Trincomalee

Table 3: Livelihood strategies for relocated people in Thiramalpuram, Trincomalee

Livelihood strategies	
1. Cultivation/home gardening	Home gardening is an important activity for women. Would need to spend 50 rps/day on vegetables otherwise. Also can share with other families.
2. Labour	Construction in village. Permanent housing is currently being built. Farm labour just started in advance of rainy season, preparing the paddy fields. Work opportunities have decreased since 2006. They are also afraid to leave the village due to fear of harassment/attack from security forces. Some men have been shot.
3. Small business	Grinding/packaging rice and selling in small quantities. Two small shops in the village.
4. Firewood	Men mostly. In some cases, men and women go together to collect firewood, but men take it to the market (women cannot ride bicycle). Afraid to go into the jungle to collect firewood. Go in groups, and always take Sinhala speaker, who can talk to the military.

Families receiving *remittances* comprised between 6% and 20% of households in Vavuniya, and they may receive money every three months or so. Migration to the Middle East has been a livelihood strategy for many years. In Vavuniya, people are using banks to transfer money, but in Trincomalee, regular checking of bank accounts by the military has meant that people have resorted to using illegal money transfer mechanisms. Understandably, few remittances were reported in places visited in Trincomalee. In Vavuniya, people also experienced problems with the military checking bank accounts, but apparently the amounts of money transferred to families in the villages were small (10,000–15,000 rps at a time); amounts over 100,000 rps lead to questioning.

It was mostly new IDPs or returnees that either *sold or pawned jewellery*. The IDPs in cultural hall camp in Trincomalee said that they had to pawn their jewellery because they had expenditures that they did not have before they were displaced (e.g. firewood, coconut) and could not get access to loans. Recently resettled people in Ithikulam, Trincomalee, reported that they had to pawn their jewellery to buy seeds. They were not able to look for work outside of the village, because they had to spend time preparing their farms and rehabilitating their village, and had no other income earning strategies immediately after resettlement, as cattle were lost, fruit trees destroyed and fishing grounds and forest rendered inaccessible. Labour was limited to working on construction of latrines (for which DRC is paying). Table 4 indicates how limited opportunities are in these first months after resettlement. People in Ithikulam prioritised preparing their land for cultivation, but even though this is a key livelihood strategy for resettled populations the curfew restricting work at night will limit production. The WFP returnee assessment found that, of returnees who had been in their village of origin for six months or more, 52% had been able to cultivate part of their paddy fields, but the yield was much lower than normal (0.47 MT/ha rather than 4.5 MT/ha).

Food aid provides a major source of food for IDPs, resettled and relocated populations. There are three types of food aid provision. New IDPs receive the highest ration, which is provided by WFP (the planned ration should provide about 1,900 kcals/person/day). Protracted IDPs receive a ration

Table 4: Livelihood strategies of recent returnees in Ithikulam, Trincomalee

<i>Livelihood strategies before displacement</i>	<i>Livelihood strategies shortly after return</i>
1. Farming; rice and other crops	Food aid/other assistance
2. Cattle	Pawning jewellery
3. Fishing	Labour (mainly for NGOs on construction)
4. Brick making	
5. Labour/firewood collection	
6. Sale of fruit	

through the Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief, and the poor (in any part of the country) receive ‘food stamps’ through the Samurdhi scheme, aimed at people living below the poverty line. The reduction in government food rations resulting from an increase in food prices is indicated in Table 5. Similar issues were reported in Katkulam and Kalmadu (relocation sites in Vavuniya). In a DRC survey in the welfare centres in Jaffna, IDPs reported that the ration lasted only ten days in 2007.

Table 5: Changes in government food rations as result of increasing food prices (kg for family of 5/month)

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>Last year</i>	<i>Now</i>
Rice	19	9.5
Wheat flour	0	5.5
Sugar	6	4
Rice flour	0	1
Dhal	9.5	0

WFP also provides food aid to resettled and relocated populations for six months, although following the survey in Trincomalee, this may change to 12 months (WFP, 2008). Resettlement and relocation villages in Vavuniya reported getting

a government ration, even though they had been settled in the village for more than six months. They expected the government ration to stop six months after receiving a government grant. The grant referred to was the due to be provided through the Unified Assistance Scheme for resettled and relocated populations. No one interviewed had received this grant. Neither had they received government compensation for destruction of property, loss of land, etc.

There is a large proportion of *female-headed households*, and these are particularly vulnerable both to food insecurity and protection threats. Female-headed households often had lower incomes due to fewer wage earning members in the family. A DRC survey in Jaffna amongst protracted displaced in welfare centres showed that 24% of households were female-headed (DRC, 2007). Amongst Trincomalee returnees, 82% of female-headed households had poor food access (based on income sources), compared to 59% for male-headed households (WFP, 2008). Female-headed households relied more often on borrowing and more female- than male-headed households were considered at ‘risk to life’ because of the adoption of damaging coping strategies (for example reducing meal sizes and number of meals, purchases on credit and sales of assets). Box 2 provides a case history of one female-headed household.

Box 2: Protection and livelihoods for a female-headed household

X came from Vavuniya, and was displaced in 1990 as a result of military operations. Since then, she has been displaced many times until she came to Kidaichchoori Welfare Centre in Vavuniya in 1998. She came to Kalmadu relocation village in 2007. Her husband was killed in 2006 by unidentified gunmen and she now lives with her father and only child (four years old). She is also looking after a son (14) and a daughter (seven) of her elder sister, whose husband was killed in 2006 in the jungle whilst herding cattle. Since her husband died, she has been supported by her father who is 67, and earns a living doing labour work and some home gardening.

X’s monthly income is less than 1,000 rps from the sale of vegetables from her home garden. She paid to have a well dug by pawning her jewellery at the bank, so that she can do continuous gardening (i.e. three seasons). She also receives the government food stamp allocation of 810 rps. Her father got a 20,000 rps grant from FORUT, and the family now has five chickens, four goats and a cow, but she has not made any income from this yet. She has applied for government compensation (100,000 rps) and is still waiting to receive it (50,000 on her account, and 50,000 on her child’s).

4. DRC Programme

4.1 Description of the DRC programme

DRC's involvement in Sri Lanka began in 1998 with the secondment of an international training adviser to a local NGO partner. The following year, DRC established an independent project in support of rehabilitation and capacity-building activities for returnee communities. Since the 2002 ceasefire, DRC has expanded its activities from government-controlled areas in two districts to widespread coverage of both government- and LTTE-controlled areas in the six current districts of operation: Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Jaffna.

The programme at first consisted mainly of a Danida-funded integrated livelihood rehabilitation and capacity-building project aimed at resettled and relocated populations, with the main focus areas being Mannar, Vavuniya and Trincomalee. Between 2002 and 2005, the project consisted of support for infrastructure, capacity-building of CBOs and income generation via a revolving loan scheme. In 2003, DRC Sri Lanka began integrating IDP and refugee 'protection' into its core programme. The strategy was two-fold:

1. to help IDP and returnee communities understand their rights; and
2. to develop and implement strategies towards realising those rights.

DRC also responded in a limited way to the tsunami in 2004. The current integrated programme (2006–08) also includes a protection component, and an increased focus on social mobilisation, home gardening and agricultural support. Emergency relief (both food and non-food assistance) was added in 2006, due to the large-scale displacement associated with the resumption of conflict, for example in Kilinochchi and Trincomalee. From 2007, therefore, the main target groups were IDP families and host populations affected by renewed conflict in 2006, and IDPs and refugees returning to their former villages or relocating to new communities. The integrated programme is carried out in a number of focal villages; currently 15 in Trincomalee and seven in Vavuniya. The protection component of the programme covers entire districts. Whilst the

integrated programme is implemented with local partners, the relief component is directly implemented by DRC.

From 2002 to 2005, income generation was done through a revolving loan scheme, but this was suspended in 2006 for a number of reasons. The main one was renewed conflict and displacement. Even beforehand, not everyone was able to meet the 95% on-time repayment requirement, and thus the aim of 99% recovery could not be achieved. With displacement, loan defaults increased. An additional reason was that funds were deposited in banks used by TRO, which is considered to have close links with the LTTE.

Income-generating projects other than agricultural support have not yet resumed following the suspension of the revolving loans. Income support beyond agriculture is only planned in a limited number of relocation or resettlement sites, in part because of limited DRC capacity in livelihoods programming and in part because a number of other agencies are also providing this support. For example in Vavuniya, DRC is working in seven focal villages, but only planning income generation in three (two resettlement communities and one relocation community). In Trincomalee, whilst DRC has been working in six resettlement villages in Eachchilampattu, other agencies will be doing longer-term livelihoods work.

An office was opened in Jaffna early 2007 to undertake protection and emergency activities funded by UNHCR. In 2008, DRC also extended UNHCR-funded protection activities in Mannar. With renewed conflict and displacement in 2007/2008, emergency activities were scaled up. In 2008, DRC is on a 50/50 basis – rehabilitation/recovery and emergency activities, with protection integrated into both.

Programme objectives for the integrated programme (2006–08) were as follows:

Overall Programme Objective:

The protection and promotion of durable solutions to displacement problems in Sri Lanka on the basis of humanitarian principles and human rights.

Immediate Objectives:

1. Addressing short-term essential needs of IDP families displaced by renewed conflict in the five DRC districts of operation, plus Jaffna and Anuradhapura.
2. The resettlement/relocation and establishment of sustainable livelihoods for 4,000 IDP and refugee families in 45 communities in north-east Sri Lanka is supported using a flexible integrated assistance package that includes basic infrastructure, income-generation support and community mobilisation and capacity development.
3. Values, policies and capacities contributing to the protection of people's rights in five conflict-affected districts of north-east Sri Lanka are promoted through community-level awareness raising, training of key stakeholders and duty-bearing authorities, and direct advocacy.

The first objective was added in 2007, to address short-term needs for those newly displaced by conflict. In 2008, the objective was changed to addressing the needs of both long- and short-term displaced in the six main DRC districts. For the second objective, income generation was changed to livelihood support in 2008. Activities under each of these objectives include:

Addressing needs of short- and long-term IDPs

- Food and non-food assistance for IDP families, including the distribution of complementary foods, household start-up packs, kitchen sets and hygiene kits.
- Provision of temporary shelters for new IDPs.

Establishment of sustainable livelihoods for resettled and relocated populations

- *Infrastructure rehabilitation*: e.g. site clearance and rehabilitation/construction of roads, multi-purpose halls, pre-schools, wells and latrines.

- *Economic rehabilitation/income generation*: e.g. rehabilitation of basic economic infrastructure (irrigation networks etc.), revolving loans (but not since 2006), inputs for home gardening and ad hoc income generation activities for vulnerable individuals or groups.
- *CBO capacity-building*: training in social mobilisation, human rights and advocacy, and creation of informal/formal CBO 'federations' for addressing common needs.
- *Partner NGO capacity-building*: training in technical, financial, managerial and organisational aspects and capacity support for partners' senior and field staff.

Protection of people's rights

- *Protection and human rights*: protection outreach and training interventions at both community and duty-bearer levels, protection monitoring in response to increased human rights violations (from 2008).
- *Advocacy*: speaking out at national and international level for the rights of conflict affected populations, actively soliciting complementary support for DRC communities from other international and local sources, participating in regional (e.g. NGO consortia) and national-level advocacy fora.

The UNHCR-funded protection project in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Mannar links with emergency activities in Jaffna and the Vanni (Kilinochchi/Mullaitivu). In this case, objectives include:

- Improve living standards of IDPs: water, sanitation, civil documentation, shelter, physical security, health, education.
- Inform IDPs and returnees of their rights and facilitate access to remedies in particular for SGBV, violations of child rights and physical security.
- Inform IDPs of their right to voluntary and safe return.
- Strengthen the capacity of government, NGOs and communities to promote the protection of vulnerable individuals.
- Provide networks for monitoring, reporting and advocating on protection issues, subject to do no harm principles.

Protection in both projects includes training and awareness-raising, for example on issues of common concern such as civil documentation. Other issues might include prevention of alcohol abuse, SGBV, health and hygiene promotion, HIV/AIDS awareness and property rights (including restitution and compensation).

4.2 Relevance

Concepts of livelihoods and protection

In discussion with DRC staff, livelihood support was generally considered in terms of income generation. The provision of financial assets, however, is just one way of supporting livelihoods. Support for agricultural and physical assets is also a component of DRC's work, for example through the provision of home gardening kits and providing support with infrastructure such as housing, water supply and roads. However, if using the livelihoods framework to guide the programme, support for livelihoods should also include analysing and supporting the 'policies, institutions and processes' that influence livelihoods. In Sri Lanka, this might include support for institutions such as markets, microfinance institutions, remittance systems and governance (formal and informal), or influencing government and agency policies (e.g. on assistance, relocation and compensation). DRC does some of this through its community mobilisation and training of duty bearers, and via its protection monitoring and advocacy work. Therefore, whilst DRC Sri Lanka uses a narrow concept of livelihoods, in reality its projects touch on many elements of livelihoods. Widening the concept of livelihoods and developing more explicit links to protection would lead to a more coherent strategy. This is discussed in more detail below.

DRC Sri Lanka also tends to view supporting livelihoods more as a rehabilitation or development activity, which is reflected in the objective of achieving sustainable livelihoods. In both Trincomalee and Vavuniya, where the integrated programme is currently being implemented, the increasing incidence of threats to physical safety, economic restrictions and ethnic tension mean that achieving sustainable livelihoods will be difficult, if not impossible. For sustainable livelihoods, people need a minimum level of security, freedom of movement, access to land and markets. However, this does not mean that people should not be

assisted with livelihood support interventions to maximise their production and income-generating opportunities. In practice, DRC also implements a range of emergency livelihoods activities for IDPs in Jaffna and Kilinochchi, for example cash for work (CFW), the provision of materials for income generation and home gardening. This shows a recognition that livelihood support can be done in a range of emergency and rehabilitation contexts. This broad view of livelihood support needs to be adopted at national level in the DRC programme.

In protection, DRC is putting its broad definition of protection into practice: 'all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, namely human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law' (IASC). DRC takes a rights-based approach, which consists of informing IDP/returnee populations of their rights and training duty-bearers. In areas where risks to physical safety are acute, the approach includes placing a particular emphasis on ensuring the safety of civilians from acute harm. In the UNHCR-funded protection project in Jaffna and the Vanni, the provision of assistance is part of the protection project, and the two are thus explicitly linked. Monitoring and advocacy are important protection activities carried out by DRC, and include not only advocacy on sensitive issues of killings and abductions at national level through the protection working group, but also advocacy on food security of IDPs (or access to food aid), meetings with government officials to address tensions between IDPs and hosts, in particular in relation to land, or on issues relating to the voluntary nature of return. These are also livelihood support activities (addressing policies), illustrating the implicit links between livelihoods and protection in DRC's programme. In the Individual Protection Assistance project, protection and livelihoods are explicitly linked as households that experience protection risks are often provided with livelihoods assistance.

Livelihoods and protection strategy and approaches

DRC's programme in Sri Lanka is an integrated livelihood rehabilitation and capacity-building programme with a protection component, but livelihoods and protection projects appear to be largely implemented in parallel rather than being part of an integrated strategy. It is clear, however, that many of the causes of livelihoods and

protection risks are the same in the north and east of Sri Lanka, and many of the programme elements are linked in practice.

In terms of the programme overall, combining meeting immediate needs, livelihood support and protection is both appropriate and relevant. A large part of the population in the north and east is experiencing high levels of political violence, limited freedom of movement and in some cases acute risks to physical safety. The emphasis on protection within all programme areas is therefore highly relevant. Similarly, the need to meet immediate needs among IDPs is clear, as is the need to assist relocated and resettled populations to re-establish their livelihoods. In Sri Lanka therefore, all three components of DRC's assistance framework exist simultaneously: acute crisis, protracted conflict and displacement, and durable solutions.

However, relocated and resettled populations also have humanitarian needs, in part because of ongoing protection risks and also because, on arrival in the village, they are not able to meet their basic needs. IDP populations, whether new or protracted, may not be able to meet their basic needs through the provision of traditional relief measures, and need livelihood support to meet some of these needs. To some extent, DRC already recognises this, by providing emergency livelihood support to some IDPs, and relief to newly resettled or relocated populations, but this should become an explicit part of DRC's strategy in all areas of operation.

Livelihoods and protection could be better integrated by taking protection risks (or rights violations) as a starting point, so projects should be targeted at those population groups or households facing the greatest protection risks. The UNHCR-funded project in Jaffna and the Vanni already does this to some extent, as this is a protection project which includes an assistance component, some of which covers emergency livelihoods assistance. However, the objectives of providing livelihoods assistance could perhaps be more closely linked to protection. In other words, livelihoods assistance aims to meet basic needs, support livelihoods and reduce the adoption of strategies that entail risks to personal safety. The IPA project, targeted at households facing protection risks, is a good

example of livelihoods assistance to address the consequences of these risks.

In Vavuniya and Trincomalee, with the exception of IPA, livelihoods and protection are not as closely linked, even though the programme has both components. In relocation and resettlement communities, the starting point tended to be livelihoods recovery needs, rather than protection risks. More could be done to focus this work on those communities facing the greatest protection risks, which in many cases are relocated communities. These communities faced the greatest livelihoods and protection risks, as they have less access to land, poor water sources, are further from markets, receive less assistance and are more subject to harassment. Current plans for livelihoods assistance in Trincomalee mainly target villagers who were displaced for only short periods. It is understood, however, that DRC cannot exclusively focus on these communities, as the initial identification is usually done by District Government, which also specifies that agencies need to work in Muslim and Sinhala, as well as Tamil, communities. Also in Trincomalee, some villages with mixed Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim populations (who were relocated in 1990) were selected as a peace-building initiative, rather than on the basis of current risk or need (although within the villages the most vulnerable were targeted for assistance).

Livelihoods and protection could also be better linked at the level of advocacy, whether local or national: in other words, **linking micro and macro** issues in both livelihoods and protection. Advocacy work is currently done under protection, which in many cases also deals with food security and livelihoods issues. A good example is DRC's food security monitoring, as part of protection monitoring, in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, and lobbying of WFP to improve its assistance. Information from protection monitoring in this case was used both locally and nationally to lobby WFP. Others have been mentioned above, and include meetings with the government to address tension over land between IDPs and hosts. In the integrated rehabilitation and capacity-building project, where livelihoods needs predominate, linking programming with advocacy is not so well developed, but livelihoods and protection risks are closely linked, in particular as limited freedom of

movement restricts access to land, markets, and fishing grounds. Linking livelihoods consequences to protection concerns could also be used for advocacy in this case. This would require strengthening protection monitoring in these areas, and including some livelihoods-related protection issues in the Participatory Rural Appraisal exercises done in communities selected for the integrated programme.

Analytical tools and links with programming

There have been no overall assessments of the livelihoods or protection situation in any of the districts. Given the current political climate, it will be difficult to get government permission to carry out a formal protection assessment, and thus the initial analysis of protection risks faced by different groups in conflict-affected areas will need to be done on the basis of secondary information, key informant interviews and the knowledge of national and experienced international staff. The self-assessment tool developed for this review was particularly useful in capturing the knowledge of staff on livelihoods and protection risks.

Assessments have, however, been done for particular groups, for example a DRC assessment of protracted IDPs in welfare centres in Jaffna, and an inter-agency, WFP-led food security assessment of resettled populations in Trincomalee, in which DRC participated. Both these assessments were highly effective in eliciting a response. The Jaffna assessment immediately led to funding for the protection project. This is now given as an example of one of DRC's most successful projects by both DRC and others (e.g. UNHCR). The assessment in Trincomalee led to the decision to extend food distribution for resettled populations from six months to a year. These assessments have tended to focus more on needs than rights or protection risks. The assessment in Jaffna did however include a protection component, in particular protection incidents in the past 18 months (mainly security checks and domestic violence), as well as available services to improve security. As the Trincomalee assessment was led by WFP, it focused on food security and the needs of returnees. DRC should consider participating in, or initiating, an assessment of the impact of increased political violence and economic restrictions in Vavuniya, to

highlight the impact of these changes.³ As survey reports need to be approved by the government, highlighting impact in terms of livelihoods or humanitarian needs, even if these result from protection risks, is a sensible practical approach.

DRC takes a rights-based, rather than needs-based, approach in its protection monitoring within communities. This includes both protection issues that affect groups of people, as well as issues affecting individuals. The former may include information on the provision of assistance and services, or issues facing groups on the basis of ethnicity or gender. The latter may include cases of disappearance, detention, SGBV, forced recruitment, land disputes or extreme vulnerability. In most cases, both will be referred to the relevant agencies or authorities, with the exception of EVI, to which DRC might respond itself. DRC also conducts IDP profiling, where more in-depth information is needed for humanitarian response or for advocacy. Both the protection monitoring and IDP profiling gather information on food security and livelihoods as part of the assessment of protection issues, and thus protection monitoring and assessment are linked to livelihoods as well as protection responses.

In Trincomalee and Vavuniya, DRC also does protection monitoring, but protection monitoring reports indicate that this is less detailed for protection risks facing communities rather than individuals. In resettled and relocated populations, DRC also carries out Participatory Rural Appraisal exercises together with local partners to discuss common and individual problems, and this is used to determine priority interventions. This however focuses on socio-economic and infrastructural needs. Issues of security for the community as a whole, as well as the risks associated with different livelihood strategies, could easily be added as a discussion point. This might also lead to community suggestions on how to address some of these issues, whether through projects or advocacy.

³ Note that ICRC is already planning such an assessment, and that OCHA has asked Oxfam to provide a position paper. DRC should link with these assessments, or at least make use of the findings to plan its programmes.

Adaptation to changing needs and risks

Over the past three years, DRC has appropriately rebalanced its programme and objectives to include a greater proportion of emergency assistance, in particular by establishing operations in Jaffna, re-establishing operations in Mannar and shifting from rehabilitation to emergency approaches in Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee. This is reflected in changes in objectives to include the needs of new and long-term displaced. The suspension of the revolving loans project, in the face of renewed conflict and displacement, was also appropriate.

In Kilinochchi the shift to emergency programming, in 2006, was in part based on changes in needs, but also because rehabilitation programming became more difficult with restrictions on moving construction materials into LTTE-held areas. Emergency projects in Kilinochchi focus on temporary shelter, latrines, complementary foods and NFI distribution and CFW. Protection activities focus more on protection monitoring, and training on documentation, hygiene promotion, alcohol abuse and technical knowledge. In Trincomalee too, the focus in 2006 was mainly on assisting newly displaced populations, and in 2007, when resettlement started, the provision of resettled and relocated populations. Rehabilitation projects in Eachchilampattu were halted in late 2006, when the population was displaced during GoSL aerial bombardment. In Vavuniya, however, the increased incidence of protection threats and economic restrictions over the past year has not yet led to changes in objectives or programme strategy. Apart from shifting to emergency programming in north Vavuniya in 2006, the programme in other parts of the province has remained essentially the same. Projects will need to be redesigned to take into account these new risks, which needs to include strengthening of protection activities, and incorporating some emergency projects in its programme, as well as lowering expectations to achieve sustainable livelihoods.

Given the rapidly changing context, it is recommended that DRC establishes a quarterly or half-yearly review of most affected communities in order to ensure that it retains the correct balance between relief and livelihoods activities.

Coordination

Due to limited time, coordination mechanisms were not specifically included in this review. However, from interviews with DRC it is apparent that DRC participates in coordination mechanisms where these are in place. For example, DRC participates in protection working groups at national level (being one of the main protection actors), and in monthly meetings held by the government to coordinate NGO activities in Trincomalee. Protection monitoring frequently leads to referral to other agencies, if these are providing the relevant service. Advocacy is often done jointly with other agencies. Coordination of livelihoods activities is poor, however, as UNDP and FAO have limited capacity on the ground. DRC in Trincomalee felt that coordination between agencies was poor, in particular in relation to developing a common strategy for working with relocated communities. On the other hand, the joint assessment led by WFP in Eachchilampattu is a good example of inter-agency coordination. DRC also works closely with WFP in determining the need for complementary food packages.

UNDP in Vavuniya reported that no livelihoods coordination meeting had taken place in Vavuniya for the past ten months because of renewed conflict in the Vanni. Although DRC in Vavuniya was better known for its protection activities (mainly in the Vanni), OCHA, UNDP and UNHCR all felt that DRC also had a particular role to play in providing livelihood support, because of the links between protection and livelihoods (UNHCR), the need for an agency to take a lead on livelihoods programming (OCHA) and because of its particular role in working in transitional contexts (UNDP).

DRC generally tries to fill gaps in assistance when deciding what activities to include in its integrated programme. In some cases, however, many agencies end up working in the same resettlement or relocation site and beneficiaries themselves (e.g. in Ithikulam) indicated that it would be more effective for one agency to provide all livelihoods assistance. In the case of Ithikulam, FAO provided some seeds, ICRC was going to provide livelihoods recovery grants and DRC home gardening packages. In both Vavuniya and Trincomalee, DRC might have provided home gardening packages but another agency was due to provide longer-term livelihood support. Lack of coordination was also apparent in

different agency practices to either provide livelihood recovery grants or loans. This is more a reflection of the lack of overall coordination of livelihoods activities rather than any failing on the part of DRC. DRC's strength is in having the flexibility to adapt its activities to fill gaps in assistance. However, DRC could benefit from learning more about the livelihoods projects of other agencies, in particular in Trincomalee where Oxfam and ICRC have well-developed livelihoods projects.

4.3 Effectiveness and impact of DRC's projects

Addressing the needs of short- and long-term displaced; Humanitarian Relief; food and non-food items

DRC provides a number of relief packages to IDP populations, as well as to some resettled/relocated populations. This includes basic family start-up packages (including mats, mosquito nets, clothes, buckets), kitchen sets, baby kits (including soap, Panadol, mosquito nets), hygiene kits and complementary food packages. The complementary foods are used for different purposes in different parts of Sri Lanka. For example:

- In the Vanni, it was used to meet the basic needs of the newly displaced when WFP was facing difficulties in providing adequate rations quickly.
- In Trincomalee, it has been provided as part of the return package to help people meet immediate needs, as well as to newly displaced people, to fill gaps in assistance.
- In Jaffna, complementary foods have been provided to protracted displaced populations in 2007 to supplement the government ration, which was justified because protracted IDPs experienced an increase in the price of basic goods and reduced income-earning opportunities. In 2008, complementary foods were provided to the Samurdhi (the poor) in Jaffna; these people were amongst the most food-insecure, but were not included in the WFP distribution.

The distribution of relief items has therefore not been restricted to addressing the needs of the short- and long-term displaced, but has (appropriately)

been based on an assessment of need in different population groups.

Effectiveness

A general constraint in all areas, but particularly in the north, is that at checkpoints goods have to be unloaded and loaded, which increases time spent and cost. Movement of some goods into LTTE-held areas is restricted, for example construction materials and cooking pots. In addition, to move any goods into the north, permission is needed from the Commissioner-General of Essential Goods (CGES), and this can take at least a month to secure. In Kilinochchi, DRC has so far been able to distribute packages in the quantities planned. This highlights the importance of keeping emergency stocks. In Jaffna, all goods have to be transported by sea or air. The distribution to welfare centres in 2007 was planned for April, but did not take place until August. For the next distribution DRC tendered locally, and local traders were able to provide the goods more quickly; the procurement process took only six weeks. Another constraint is that complementary food packages currently contain 15 items, and DRC tenders for each. It may be possible to reduce the number of items in the ration if the purpose can be clearly defined, e.g. to assist newly displaced in or coming from Kilinochchi.

In the two places visited where people received DRC complementary foods (Cultural Hall camp and Ithikulam resettlement village, Trincomalee), this was one of the most welcome forms of assistance. In Ithikulam, women considered hygiene kits to be the most useful form of assistance. Distribution was generally thought to be fair, with only a few individuals missed from distribution lists because they had recently returned from India. In Cultural Hall camp, people preferred in-kind to cash distributions to meet food and basic non-food needs because of the cost and distance involved in travelling to markets.

Impact

Impact in terms of meeting the needs of short- and long-term displaced is likely to be limited for complementary food provision, as the package is intended to last for 4–6 weeks. The impact of distributions of non-food items is likely to be longer-lasting. Impact will vary according to the beneficiary group. For newly displaced populations, the

distribution is likely to be a key contributor to meeting acute needs. In situations of protracted displacement and/or with regard to those suffering long-term economic constraints (e.g. the Samurdhi), people will essentially be in the same situation after the 4–6-week ration is finished.⁴ The protracted displaced in Vavuniya were not included in the project, although given recent restrictions this needs to be reconsidered. In this case, relief should be combined with emergency livelihood support, such as CFW and income generation support (e.g. provision of materials or cash for small business/trade, home gardening). Advocacy should be included, e.g. for the provision of WFP food aid, inclusion in the government social welfare scheme (the Samurdhi) as well as adjustments in government rations. Meeting the immediate needs of resettled and relocated populations was not included in the objectives, but distribution of relief to these groups would have assisted them not only in meeting their immediate needs, but also in re-establishing their livelihoods.

Establishing sustainable livelihoods for IDP and refugee families

Livelihood support consisted of infrastructure rehabilitation (including economic infrastructure such as irrigation networks), home gardening, CBO capacity-building and partner NGO capacity-building. The main target groups are resettled and relocated populations, although as mentioned above some emergency livelihoods assistance is also provided to new and protracted IDPs. This section focuses on the former, as no visits to IDP populations who received emergency livelihoods assistance were made.

Home gardening

DRC provides a home gardening kit which contains eight different kinds of seeds for vegetables and pulses, as well as seedlings for 14 different kinds of fruit trees and six tools. These are usually distributed to resettled or relocated populations in the second phase of programming after arrival on

⁴ Note that the impact beyond meeting immediate needs could not be established as complementary foods were only provided to protracted displaced in Jaffna and this area was not visited. It is possible that the provision of complementary foods, released income that could be invested in starting livelihoods activities.

the site (the first phase being complementary foods/hygiene kits, shelter and water and sanitation). People interviewed mostly considered the distribution to be fair and, except for some cases in 2006, it arrived in time for planting. Distribution was therefore effective in getting the right quantities of seeds to communities at the right time. Effectiveness in some locations, however, was limited because of poor water supplies, particularly in relocation sites, and poor soil, which in one case (Kalmadu) meant that only 50% of people benefited from the home gardening packages. Wells may only be sufficient for a few people to cultivate year-round (for example in Thiramalpuram, for only seven families). In some places, gardens were destroyed by goats and cows belonging to neighbouring villagers.

Criteria for inclusion are availability of land and water, as well as willingness to cultivate. In some communities this caused resentment as there were people who were willing, but who did not have access to adequate water or were renting houses and thus did not own the land. Government employees are excluded in Trincomalee, for example those employed as home guards in the mixed ethnic villages. Eligible households who were excluded included people who arrived after the distribution or who had no documents. Distribution of home gardening kits was therefore not always effective in reaching the most vulnerable within communities. Vulnerable households may need additional support in obtaining access to land and water, and the project also needs to be linked with the documentation project.

Those who were able to produce vegetables from their home garden used them both as a source of food and income. Sale was mainly within the village, although some were able to sell greater quantities in local markets. Local sales were considered safe in some places, whereas in others (e.g. Katkulam) sale in town was considered easier than in neighbouring villages, because in the towns ‘there are people there who look after them’, and who can get information to their relatives if something goes wrong.

Effectiveness was improved with the provision of training in agricultural techniques. According to farmers in Sangarapuram, higher yields were achieved with fewer inputs. Agricultural instructors

from the GoSL Agricultural Services Department act as resource people for training. Training includes planting methods (distance between seedlings, cultivation in lines, etc.), composting and, in Thiramalpuram, beneficiaries were also shown the nearby demonstration farm. Agricultural training was almost always mentioned as one of the most useful trainings done by DRC. This was particularly the case for people who had been displaced a long time ago, and who had spent long times in welfare centres before being resettled or relocated, and thus either did not have experience of home gardening, or had not done it for a long time.

Other support for agriculture included improving water supply (often only common wells were possible due to limited ground water supplies) and in Mangayootha, Trincomalee, DRC has established a training farm, where 15 people have plots on the farm at any one time. The farm will also be used to produce seedlings. Knowing about the demonstration farm meant that people felt they could go back there if they needed advice.

For those who have both land and water, home gardening was therefore an effective form of food and income provision. On the one hand, it reduces the need to travel to markets to buy food, and on the other hand, if access to markets is safe (or can be made safe) the produce can also be sold. Efforts to support production through home gardening should therefore continue to be supported and strengthened, through additional provision of water where possible, and ensuring that the most vulnerable are included in the project.

Infrastructure

Infrastructure rehabilitation was also a key form of livelihood support, in a number of ways. DRC pays for road rehabilitation and construction of shelter and latrines, which for many was the main source of income when they first arrived at the new site. CFW should therefore be considered an explicit objective of infrastructure provision too. This would mean making sure that the most food-insecure or the poorest have access to this work and/or that at least one family member from each family gained an income, rather than selection on the basis of willingness, as is currently the case, or a combination of these two criteria. The roads that were rehabilitated improved access to markets and security. In several sites visited, interviewees

mentioned that the road had improved security because it was possible to see people coming from a distance. This reduced abductions, as it was easier to abduct people when villages were surrounded by jungle.

Capacity-building and social mobilisation

This consists of CBO capacity-building and a community volunteer project. Most communities visited had at least a Rural Development Society (usually RDS and women's RDS), the exception being recently resettled populations. The RDS is a government-recognised organisation. An RDS would usually have existed before displacement. If communities were displaced together, it may have continued to function, but in some cases people were scattered to different locations. Upon return, the RDS therefore needs to be re-established. In relocation communities, the community might fall under the neighbouring RDS, but this depends on how well the new community is accepted. In some cases, NGOs had already encouraged IDPs to form self-help groups in the welfare centres (a precursor to setting up a savings society).

DRC assists in the re-establishment of the RDS, and often in the creation of additional CBOs, in particular women's groups. All families are asked to join, although not necessarily 'newcomers' to the village (as for example in Sangama, Trincomalee). An executive committee is elected from all the members. The creation of a CBO is necessary in order to access assistance, whether from government or from humanitarian organisations. Communities often also had women's groups, youth groups, children's committees and 'pally' committees for Muslims, dealing mostly with religious issues.

In Thiramalpuram, the main roles of the RDS were said to be:

- Land registration.
- Voluntary work.
- Supporting infrastructure work
- Facilitating the work of other organisations

One of the main purposes of women's groups was reported to be organising cleaning in the village, cultural events and savings schemes. Savings and loans schemes may be started informally amongst women (i.e. without outside support), but to access

loans people have to be part of a savings scheme. In Ithikulam (Trincomalee), the main benefit of having a women's group was said to be savings activities, and being able to discuss 'women's issues'. However, for the women this was not a current priority as they had only just returned to the village. In Sangarampuram (Vavuniya), the function of the women's RDC was said to be dealing with violations and domestic violence, and managing a revolving loan fund.

In Ganasapuram (a majority-Tamil but also Muslim and Sinhala community in Trincomalee), the benefits and risks of being in the CBO were summarised as follows:

- Fewer problems between ethnic groups because they now communicate on a regular basis.
- Ethnic tensions rose during 2006, but problems were resolved internally.
- A forum for addressing problems, e.g. goats eating crops in gardens.

CBOs may therefore also fulfil a protective function. In Sangama (the other mixed ethnic village visited), the CBO helped bring people together. Note, however, that this co-existence is fragile and in both villages people also said that, in the event of any ethnic incident, relations would quickly deteriorate. People preferred to live amongst their own ethnic group, as witnessed by the change in ethnic composition over time, and those that stayed in communities where they were the minority did so because they had nowhere else to go. The protective role of the RDS in Kalmadu (Vavuniya) was mentioned in section 2.2, where the RDS was able to liaise with the army and take initial responsibility for allowing visitors to stay. In addition, DRC was able to continue working with the same groups at home and when people were displaced from northern Vavuniya to Kilinochchi. At present, however, the main objective of social mobilisation, from DRC's perspective, appears to be preparation for livelihoods and other assistance activities. People join because it means they can access assistance. Given that these groups can also perform an important protection function, the protection activities of the CBOs should be supported.

CBO members receive a large number of different trainings from DRC, including:

- Human Rights, women's rights and child rights
- Documentation
- Agriculture
- Livestock management
- Water management
- Health
- Special needs
- Disaster management
- Savings schemes
- Advocacy
- Financial management
- Administrative management

In interviews with the RDS and other community groups, documentation and agriculture training were considered the most useful forms of training. Health training was also mentioned as being particularly useful. The section on protection below describes in more detail the effectiveness of the documentation training. Having training done by the relevant government departments also meant that people knew where to go with particular issues or to seek advice. In Sangama, the example was given that, when people did not have water, they went directly to the water board to complain.

In addition to working with CBOs, DRC also has a system of community volunteers (who are paid about 4,000 rps/month), which organise village meetings on a regular basis and provide ongoing training in particular on home gardening, health awareness and livestock development. They also receive training in protection and could potentially play a greater role in facilitating discussions around the more sensitive protection issues.

Impact on the establishment of sustainable livelihoods

In the current environment of limited freedom of movement, and therefore limited access to markets, land and employment, as well as increasing economic restrictions, sustainable livelihoods are impossible to achieve. In this context, livelihood support can assist people in meeting their basic needs and maximise the potential from the limited livelihoods options available.

Home gardening, or agriculture, is one of the few safe livelihood strategies open to relocated and resettled populations, and DRC's support for this

strategy increased production, which provided both a source of food and income. In addition, this support reduced the need to undertake strategies which might entail risks to personal safety. With more attention to reach the most vulnerable, the impact of this activity could be improved. The rehabilitation of roads improved people's income and safety and access to markets. CBO capacity-building was also an important livelihoods activity, in particular the training that CBOs received. It also enabled communities to access assistance, whether from DRC or others. More could be done, however, to build on the protective aspect of community organisations, in particular by building on and supporting strategies that communities are already using themselves to improve their personal safety. Protection activities are discussed later in this report.

DRC's current livelihoods activities, however, directly support only one of the livelihood strategies (home gardening) used by relocated or resettled populations and therefore the impact on livelihoods overall is likely to be limited. Other strategies which could be supported include wage labour, petty trading and small businesses, as well as livestock production. This could be done both by supporting these strategies directly, through the provision of grants or loans, and indirectly, by supporting access to markets, land, government services and through influencing policies. These are described in more detail below.

Alternative livelihoods activities

Seed vouchers and fairs

In all places visited, seeds were also available on the market and in many places people had also bought seeds themselves. For example in Ithikulam, people bought maize, vegetable and groundnut seeds and some had bought paddy seeds (even though ICRC had committed to providing these). In Sangarampuram, people bought seeds to give themselves more variety and greater quantities of seed (they were cultivating 1–2 acres rather than small home gardening plots). As seeds appear to be locally available, it may be possible to provide them through voucher and fairs projects. Such projects bring together local traders and farmers as sellers, and other farmers as beneficiaries (who are given vouchers). This not only allows people to choose the local seeds they want to plant, but also provides

income for farmers who have seeds, and promotes trade. Bringing traders into a new resettlement or relocation area might also have an impact on transport facilities (a common problem in new returnee sites).

Cash grants and loans for livelihood recovery

DRC staff in Trincomalee and Vavuniya is very keen to start some form of income generation or livelihoods assistance in addition to home gardening activities. There are plans to provide community grants of around 450,000 rupees to CBOs, which will then be used as a revolving loan within communities. The difference with the RLF previously implemented is that there are no rigid criteria for selection, and there is a grace period if people face difficulties in repaying their loan. The project would also be closely linked with a government MFI. In Vavuniya, a dairy project similar to that supported by Oxfam, has been proposed, which needs not only access to loans, but also technical support through the department of animal production, and marketing support through the establishment of a dairy cooperative.

DRC staff is reluctant to provide cash grants directly to households, as this is not considered a sustainable form of livelihood support. A further reason for this reluctance is that it is thought that people would not spend the cash on livelihoods assets. This is in contrast to other agencies which provide grants directly to households for livelihood recovery (including Oxfam, UNHCR, and ICRC), often shortly after being relocated or resettled. DRC Sri Lanka's reluctance to give cash grants to households is surprising as cash grants have been provided by DRC in other contexts (for example in Chechnya). The advantages of grants versus loans are summarised in Table 6.

There is already much experience of providing cash grants in Sri Lanka in response to the tsunami, which DRC can build on. Cash grants were provided both to meet basic needs and for livelihood recovery. Problems experienced with cash grants in the tsunami appeared mainly related to targeting rather than the provision of grants per se. A review of tsunami experiences recommended partnerships between grant-giving agencies and MFIs, assistance to MFIs to develop appropriate insurance packages

Table 6: Advantages and disadvantages of grants and loans

	Grants/Vouchers	Loans
Advantages	<p>Reaches the poorest</p> <p>Quick</p> <p>Can be directed towards the purchase of particular livelihoods assets (vouchers)</p> <p>Helps recover assets and thereby ability to get loans in the long term</p>	<p>Potential to be sustainable, as “community capital” is created.</p> <p>Builds on local strategies. Many communities started savings societies by themselves but this is also encouraged by DRC and other agencies</p>
Disadvantages	<p>Does not generate funds for the community on an on-going basis</p> <p>Difficult to target in IDP contexts?</p> <p>Negatively affects credit culture</p> <p>Lack of clients may put micro-finance companies out of business</p>	<p>Poorest unlikely to have access to loans</p> <p>Slow, needs a lot of training, both in livestock management and finance, record keeping etc. Therefore more costly to administer</p> <p>Risky in an unstable environment. People may not be able to repay loans due to sudden changes in their circumstances (abduction of family members, displacement).</p> <p>Protection concerns if loans only provided to section of the community to start with, or only better off have access. Better off may be linked to ethnicity (Sinhala) in some contexts</p> <p>Potential to increase feelings of despair when failure (this was a key finding in DRC’s programmes in Chechnya).</p>

in cases of loan default following disaster and to provide non-financial business development services (Aheeyar 2006).

Encouraging saving, and supporting access to loans, can be seen as supporting local coping strategies, as many communities will start saving societies on their own initiative. For example in Thiramalpuram (Trincomalee), several people formed a savings society, using self-help groups to start with. Families received a 10,000 rps loan through the society, and pay 3,000 rps interest/year. The loans have been used to set up small shops, mobile businesses (selling vegetables/fish), while some are buying food. Those who save, however, are only able to do so by reducing their other expenses or food intake. In Katkulam (Vavuniya), women’s groups had already started a savings society on their own initiative, collecting money from small groups of

households. One group has saved 8,000 rps but have not decided on how to allocate loans. In Sangarampuram (Vavuniya), one of the villages considered by DRC for loans, CHA gave a loan to

WRDS of 210,000 rps in January 2007. According to the women’s group, it has so far been successful in allocating and recovering the loans. So far, 40 loans have been provided:

1. 32 loans of 5,000 rps
2. eight loans of 10,000 rps
3. one loan of 20,000 rps

Everyone received a loan at least once, and everyone has been able to pay back their loan.

In all cases, the livelihoods activities initiated with the loan, whether small businesses/shops,

livestock or crop production, are yielding very little income, and people are not able to pay back the loans with the profits from these businesses. Most have to do wage labour to pay back the loans. An inability to pay back loans, when obtained via formal lending institutions, can lead to serious consequences. According to a CPA report on Vavuniya, some farmers have reportedly taken out loans to be able to cultivate land, but are now unable to pay back due to the heavy military presence and insecurity. A number of Thrift and Credit Cooperative Societies have begun litigation against these farmers in an attempt to recover their loans. Seventy-five cases from the Kalmadu area alone are pending in the courts (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2008).

There are a number of additional constraints to implementing a loans project in the current environment, whether directly or indirectly via a CBO (as recommended by DRC):

- Some people are not able to meet their basic needs, and require assistance to help meet these needs at the same time as, or before, developing their livelihoods. Ongoing political violence creates new vulnerable families. These people are unlikely to be able to access loans.
- Limited freedom of movement and economic restrictions restrict livelihoods opportunities and the likelihood that people will be able to pay back loans.
- Linking loans with cattle-rearing has a number of additional concerns. The Oxfam project has had to make adjustments to cope with the increase in checkpoints and military control. Demand may also go down as the cost of living increases.

Other agencies have provided cash grants for livelihood recovery, usually in the region of 25,000 rps and specifying what can be bought; in most cases, this will be livelihoods assets such as chickens, goats or cows, or investments in shops or trade. Some agencies have combined cash grants and loans in their approach, either providing cash grants to the most vulnerable families and loans to others, or providing grants to everyone in resettlement/relocation and facilitating access to loans later. Box 3 gives some examples.

In the current context, a number of criteria have to be applied in providing loans: the loan has to reach

the most vulnerable, or alternative forms of assistance need to be provided; there must be recognition of the risk of loan defaults; and the loan must be accompanied by technical support and support for marketing. Rather than focusing on a single livelihood activity (e.g. dairy), DRC should support a range of livelihood activities, based on close consultation with the community to make sure that activities are safe. One option would be to provide a certain level of cash grant to everyone (ideally the same as that provided by other agencies), and at the same time supporting savings societies, so that people can obtain loans later as an additional investment in their livelihoods. Assistance with loans could include promoting links with established micro-finance institutions, as is done by Oxfam in Trincomalee. In addition, technical assistance could be provided to the micro-finance institution, to incorporate conflict-related risks into its projects. An example of this is provided in Table 7.

Table 7: Modules for training of on micro-finance and conflict related risks

Module	Contents
MFI preparedness	Key issues to address in conflict; preparing a risk profile and response plan in case of renewed displacement, abduction of household members, deterioration in security which affects people's to repay loans.
Client preparedness	How clients manage their finances, and their coping strategies. Ways in which an MFI provides for its clients (savings, credit, insurance) and how these can be used to reduce vulnerability.
Rapid response	How can MFIs respond to new emergencies (e.g. large-scale displacement), or provide new services in response to the consequences of conflict-related risks.
Livelihoods	Explore issues of economic support during ongoing conflict or political violence. Explore different kinds of interventions.

Adapted from: Adams 2007

Box 3: Combining cash grants and loans for conflict affected people in Sri Lanka

In 2006, Oxfam in Trincomalee started assistance to returnees with a cash grant of 25,000 rps, following a study which examined whether people were able to access their farms. The grant was given to all farmers in the target villages. The grant was provided in three instalments: 1. at the time of land preparation; 2. for purchases of seeds and fertilizer (supplies were brought to the village, so that people did not have to travel, allowing people to bargain for goods); 3. Close to harvest time. The main reason for giving cash in instalments was to minimise the risk of theft. In the following year (2007), farmers were given training in home gardening, as well as additional inputs. CBOs were strengthened. In 2008, farmers were supported to produce for the market. Oxfam focuses on market gardens as a source of income, rather than paddy farming, because paddy farms may be far from the village and not safe. Farmers were given training in preparing business plans and group savings schemes, and linked communities with a number of different banks and potential purchasers of the products (e.g. supermarkets, the agricultural services department).

In Vavuniya, Oxfam piloted a dairy project in two areas, targeted at those with experience of cattle breeding or interested in getting into the dairy sector, not all of whom were poor. Livestock production is considered to be a safe intervention because it does not require travel to unsafe places or work at night. The project started by establishing a savings scheme, then bringing in hybrid grass. Those selected for the project were given one cow, worth 30,000 rps, and had to pay back 10,000 rps from the sale of milk, and the first calf; 10,000 rps was provided as a gift. Many beneficiaries preferred to give back money rather than the calf. According to FOSDOO, Oxfam's implementing partner, the most vulnerable are assisted with relief at the same time (money, food, NFI). The project also includes the establishment of a milk collection system for marketing purposes. Chilling plants need to be introduced to keep milk, as evening collection is difficult for security reasons. The cooperative society has a small vehicle to take milk from the village to the chilling plant. The project initially had problems at checkpoints, with long hold-ups and military checks on the milk. Now the military has been taught how to check the milk and the same known person from the village always takes the milk through the checkpoint.

CARE in Kilinochchi started savings and credit groups in 2002. First, a group is formed within the village, of about 25 farmers. CARE provides training, and then a loan. The group also contributes savings. However, it has been difficult to maintain the group when people are displaced, as they may be displaced to different areas and may not be able to pay back the loans, or need more time to pay them back. CARE is now supporting a combined cash grant and RLF project for IDPs and host families. RLF is for business development, and grants for livestock and production. Grants of 20,000 rps are provided to female-headed households, widows and people with a monthly income below 3,000 rps. About 10–15% of communities receive a grant. In the Vanni, CARE monitoring of this project has now stopped because of renewed conflict and displacement. Even beforehand, the project faced difficulties because of limited supplies of money in banks in LTTE-held areas and beneficiaries have faced difficulties accessing their money.

Supporting policies, institutions and processes

Many of the livelihood activities discussed or recommended above involve the provision of assets: natural (seeds), physical (water, roads, shelter), financial (grants, loans), social (community groups). The impact of these interventions will be limited in the face of limited access to land, markets, services, banks, etc. DRC can strengthen or improve access to some of these institutions directly or indirectly through influencing advocacy activities. DRC could facilitate access to markets by providing

transport (e.g. bicycles) or lobbying the district government to establish public transport to resettlement and relocation sites. Similarly, DRC could negotiate with the local authorities to allow easy passage through checkpoints (as done in the Oxfam dairy project). Possibilities for group marketing should also be considered, whereby one person in the village cooperative is responsible for taking goods to and from the market. Other activities might involve facilitating access to MFIs, or strengthening local government at the divisional

level to provide agricultural services. Advocacy activity might include taking part in developing a relocation policy, including adequate access to land, water, etc, and then encouraging the government to meet its responsibilities. It may also include ensuring that entitlements to assistance, whether through government schemes or international agencies are met. Much of this would in fact mean taking a more deliberate rights-based approach to livelihoods support, and thus is closely linked with DRC's protection activities.

Protection of people's rights

There are six components in the protection project:

1. Protection monitoring: including assessments, referral and follow-up
2. Training and awareness rising on documentation: including National Identity Cards (NICs), birth, death and marriage certificates and land deeds.
3. Practical protection training for CBOs, IDP committees or other community representatives: advocacy, human rights, guiding principles on internal displacement.
4. Awareness-raising by organising events on children's day, women's day, refugee day.
5. Duty-bearer training: training of government officials on protection-related topics, including human rights and IDP rights.
6. Individual protection assistance (IPA): assistance for individual vulnerable cases.

Protection activities are done in the districts as a whole, rather than being targeted at the focal villages in the integrated programme. However, in Vavuniya, protection field officers reported that most cases were outside of the focal villages and they assumed that this was because DRC was providing assistance to these communities already. By far the most appreciated activities were documentation training and Individual Protection Assistance. The effectiveness of each activity is discussed in turn below.

Protection monitoring, referral, and advocacy⁵

In DRC's programme, protection monitoring has a number of objectives:

- Assessing general protection trends in a range of locations.
- Closely monitoring protection issues in locations identified as particularly vulnerable.
- Identifying, documenting and following up on individual protection cases.

Protection monitoring includes gathering information on direct protection threats to people's personal safety, such as killings, disappearances and detention, but also basic needs, access to assistance (e.g. food aid, shelter) or services (health, education), documentation needs, particular concerns for women and children, social organisation within IDP communities and relations with host communities (e.g. land dispute issues), as well as the identification of IPA cases. Depending on the information obtained, either community referrals or individual referrals are made. A good example of a community referral is the one given previously on the inadequacy of food assistance to IDPs in the Vanni. If documentation is an issue which affects the entire community, or a large number of families within the community, this would lead to the implementation of DRC's documentation activity. Referral of individual cases depends on the nature of the case; suspicion of unlawful detention, separation from family members or missing family members are referred to ICRC, forced or underage recruitment may be referred to UNHCR, and IPA cases to DRC. Child protection issues are usually referred to SC-UK or the GoSL child protection services. At a local level, protection monitoring may also result in practical protection initiatives, such as dealing with alcohol abuse or domestic violence, depending on the issues identified by communities themselves.

Protection monitoring is strongest in Jaffna and the Vanni, but is also included in the Vavuniya and Trincomalee programmes. Information gathered in the latter is more limited, however. In Vavuniya, protection monitoring reports indicate that general information on the protection situation is usually limited to the summaries of number of people killed, rather than an analysis of protection trends. Reports from Vavuniya do not cover issues such as the increase in checkpoints, establishment of military compounds close to villages and consequent

⁵ This section is based on interviews with DRC staff rather than information gathered during field work

restrictions on movement and access to food and other basic goods. Some of this information is included in protection monitoring reports from Trincomalee. A first step in Trincomalee and Vavuniya is more systematic and expanded protection monitoring and reporting, which will require increased capacity in the form of an additional international protection advisor.

Protection monitoring information is also used for advocacy, at district, national and international level. Advocacy on issues related to political violence is difficult at local level. For example, the military exerts control over many aspects of local government, and e.g. restrictions on movement or economic restrictions are national security measures, and in many cases government, paramilitary groups or the LTTE are implicated in abductions. However, in Trincomalee, these issues as well as issues related to restrictions on movement are reported in coordination meetings. At local level, therefore, advocacy may include meetings with government and aid officials to address inadequacies or constraints in providing assistance, or with government officials to highlight problems of children dropping out of school, and meetings with local government officials on tensions over land between IDPs and hosts. In Jaffna, DRC concerns over pressure on IDPs to return to their areas of origin led to inter-agency discussions with the District Government, as a result of which a range of services were provided.

At national level, DRC participates in the IDP Protection Working Group and its Advocacy Task Force on all protection issues. The majority of advocacy activities are currently focused on the Vanni due to the urgency of the human rights and humanitarian situation and the fact that DRC is the only protection agency working there. The protection advisor has prepared a number of briefing notes on the situation in the Vanni, including one together with the protection advocacy task force to the UN resident coordinator, which was subsequently forwarded to John Holmes, the UN USG for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. A briefing note was also prepared for the IDP protection working group, which was also sent to the UN Special Representative on Human Rights and the protection cluster in Geneva. With the assistance of DRC Copenhagen, Sri Lanka was put on the agenda for discussion at the global

protection cluster meeting. Likewise, DRC managed to get a section on the situation in Sri Lanka into the NGO statement presented at UNHCR EXCOM in October 2008. DRC Sri Lanka also made presentations to the donor support group in September. Advocacy to improve access to assistance is another of DRC's activities at national level, for example food assistance in the Vanni. This aspect of DRC's advocacy could be expanded to include the government's obligations to meet its responsibility for the provision of grants for livelihood recovery, and for compensation, improved targeting of Samurdhi food stamps and adjustment in food assistance in line with increased food prices.

Documentation

One protection issue commonly identified through protection monitoring is the lack of civil documentation. DRC does referrals for documentation, documentation awareness-raising and mobile clinics to assist people in getting their documents. Documentation awareness-raising usually starts with a family baseline survey, to determine how many people have which documents. If lack of documentation is an issue for the community, CBOs are then trained on the importance of documentation, and will work with families to advise on how to obtain the necessary supporting documents for birth certificates, NICs, etc, for example where records may be found if they are not in government registers. If considered necessary, DRC will support mobile clinics by the District and Divisional authorities to enable people to get their documents immediately. In other cases, DRC may assist people in filling in the registration forms and hand them over to the relevant government departments. In Vavuniya last year, DRC conducted mobile clinics in 40 villages.

NICs are needed for all movement, and access to food aid, health care and education. The NICs are also needed to obtain a marriage certificate, and marital status needs to be changed on the NIC. This is important for men, as they are less likely to be arrested when married. A birth certificate is needed in turn to get the NIC, as well as for school enrolment, marriage and to own land. Land deeds are necessary for return and for the construction of houses, wells etc on the land.

Without exception, DRC's civil documentation work was one of the most appreciated DRC projects. In Thiramalpuram, the RDS reported that after the awareness training on documentation, they were able to get their birth certificate and marriage certificate and those without land deeds got registered. In addition, two people who lost their NIC were able to get replacements. In Thudduvakai, everyone applied for their documents after receiving the training and they particularly mentioned the DRC mobile clinics to get birth certificates. However, some people still do not have an NIC card, having received training in 2006. A number of people were seen during this review that either did not yet have their NIC cards, or had them taken away. Increased follow-up by DRC with the authorities could assist with these cases. In sensitive cases (for example if NICs have been taken by the military) this may need the involvement of an international protection advisor.

Individual Protection Assistance

Protection monitoring includes the identification of vulnerable individuals, and the IPA programme includes the identification of appropriate interventions to meet their needs. This project covers all districts, with anticipated 30–40 beneficiaries per district. DRC's guidelines give the following criteria for inclusion in the project: single-headed household, disability, serious medical or nutritional condition, extreme poverty, high number of dependents, single elderly, and SGBV survivor. In reality, many of these criteria are linked: e.g., female-headed households are often amongst the extremely poor and may be in an extreme nutritional condition. Types of assistance can include travel and food allowances for medical assistance, prosthetic limbs, wheelchairs etc for the disabled, livelihood support (e.g. home gardening kits, seeds, sewing machines, animal husbandry, vocational training, inputs for small shops). The cost can vary between 5,000 and 15,000 rps. In some cases, group-based assistance may be provided, for example sewing machines for a group of widows. The aim is to provide assistance that has a longer-term impact, complemented with other protection strategies such as capacity-building and community training in advocacy.

This is a small component of the project in Trincomalee and Vavuniya at the moment, but has proved to be highly popular both with protection

staff and communities. Few IPA cases were seen during the review, however, because the majority were in villages not included in the Integrated Rehabilitation Programme. Findings from this review, however, indicate that many vulnerable families remain in the focal villages, both due to an increase in abduction, arrest etc, but also because not everyone benefits from the home gardening/agricultural assistance provided. Whilst not all vulnerable families will require the detailed assessment needed for the IPA, they do need either to be included in existing projects or in an alternative form of assistance (see the discussion on cash grants and loans above).

Although originally intended to provide a range of different types of assistance, the assistance provided to the majority of cases has been livelihood support. The IPA cases interviewed mainly received support to set up for small business or shops. Whilst highly appreciated, these initiatives were not always successful. Small shops might not make enough profit to keep going (for example a case in Thudduvakai, Vavuniya, where a high number of sales were done on credit), or the business was not making enough income, necessitating other work to make up the difference. This indicates that some of these families may need assistance to help meet basic needs (either in-kind or cash) for some time until they are able to make a living from the new business. Many will also need training in managing a business; e.g. preparing business plans and financial management

Human rights training

In the communities visited, no one could give examples of how they had been able to use the training on human rights, and in Katkulam the team was told that people could not use information on human rights because of the current security situation. Training on child rights was considered more useful as there are referral mechanisms to deal with practical problems (within the government, as well as agencies such as Save the Children). Training on rights may be most valuable when it is linked directly to entitlements, whether services or assistance. It may also be an option to limit the human rights training to the cultural events organised by DRC (women's day, refugee day, etc), thereby relating it to cultural issues, rather than

including it as part of the more formal training of CBOs.

Duty-bearer training

Training of duty-bearing authorities is difficult in a very militarised environment. In Vavuniya, the GA refused permission for the local authorities to receive human rights training, and wanted DRC to provide more tangible activities. The DRC team in Trincomalee was able to organise one training at District Government level. Rather than training government officials on human rights, and guiding principles on internal displacement, however, district officials were used as resource people to train local officials on their responsibilities in the return process, the type of assistance IDPs and returnees are entitled to etc. Local lawyers were brought in to relate the guiding principles to Sri Lankan law. This appears to be an effective way of engaging duty-bearers, promoting the fulfilment of responsibilities and linking this to international laws or guidelines. There are also some examples in LTTE-controlled areas, where DRC has provided training to LTTE functionaries – specifically the Tamil Eelam Police, the success of which can be judged by requests for further training. Duty-bearer training of frontline government officials also took place in Killinochchi and Mannar in 2007.

From a livelihoods perspective, training of duty-bearers could also include strengthening of services, e.g. in agriculture, public transport and financial services, not only to increase the knowledge and expertise of government staff but also to facilitate the rapid establishment of services in areas of return or relocation, in particular at divisional level. An increased focus on land registration is another important area in future protection work, in the context of future return programming.

Impact on values, policies and capacities contributing to people's rights

DRC has had an impact on protection both through its protection activities and its advocacy work. There is no doubt that the civil documentation project had an impact on physical safety, and that increased freedom of movement assisted people in accessing markets, land and employment. Similarly, the IPA project was highly appreciated, but a separate evaluation is needed to determine its impact (this is

planned by DRC). This should look into the different types of vulnerable cases, and how to determine who needs relief and who needs livelihoods support.

Although the impact of monitoring and advocacy is hard to measure, DRC is in a good position to advocate on the rights of IDPs, resettled and relocated populations as it collects this information at community level. DRC has highlighted the plight of conflict-affected populations in Sri Lanka at local, national and international level. At local level, there are examples where this has influenced returns policies or the provision of assistance. Advocacy could be strengthened even further by using information from the livelihoods project. DRC is in a unique position in Sri Lanka, in having both a livelihoods and protection programme, and should therefore maximise the use of information from both.

Communities themselves, however, did not expect international agencies to be able to improve their security situation, and in some cases agency visits increased harassment by the military. This is the only example found of a counter-protective activity, but even in this case communities wanted agency visits to continue.

DRC could do more work with community groups to build on communities' own protection strategies. This is planned as part of DRC's protection strategy for 2009, including linking with psychosocial support for women and children.

Several examples were found of 'do no harm' or protection mainstreaming. Examples include working with all ethnic groups in Trincomalee, and DRC staff reported that any livelihoods projects and protection referrals are discussed with the communities or individuals involved before implementation so that any concerns can be brought up at this stage. In addition, DRC in Trincomalee has developed criteria for working in relocation sites. To integrate protection more systematically into programme design and implementation, however, it is recommended that DRC carries out protection training for all its staff and partners.

5. Cross-cutting issues

5.1 Gender

DRC's programme does not specifically target men or women, but focuses on addressing the risks and needs of IDP, resettled and relocated communities in general. Protection monitoring looks into the protection risks and concerns of both men and women, recognising that the risks experienced are different according to gender. The protection project has also responded to particular women's concerns such as domestic violence and alcohol abuse by men. Similarly, planning for livelihoods projects includes consultations with both men and women, and CBO capacity-building involves both men and women's groups. Where no women's group exists, DRC will often help to set one up. This was appreciated by some of the women's groups interviewed, as it indicated an understanding that women's concerns and problems were often different from those of men, and that they needed a separate forum to discuss their problems. Families have also been assisted with pre-schools so that it is easier for women to work. If or when income-generating activities start, attention will need to be given to appropriate activities for men and women, which may be different. Male youth have been supported with recreational activities. Women more often receive assistance through the IPA project as IPA cases are often those where the male head of household has been abducted, or arrested.

5.2 Participation

Throughout its projects, DRC aims to use a participatory approach in its work and promote accountability, for example ensuring that women and vulnerable groups participate in project design and that project activities do not ignore their needs or have unintentionally negative effects on their workloads or status within the family or community. Working with CBOs and local NGOs is another way of ensuring participation and building local capacity.

Participatory approaches were evident in all projects, in particular in monitoring and assessment. Protection monitoring included assessing the concerns facing that particular community, and interventions designed in response. Livelihoods programming starts with a Participatory Rural Appraisal to determine the appropriate responses. Implementing projects through CBOs also ensures community participation. DRC established or supported camp management committees, and in some cases facilitated re-election if the communities were considered unrepresentative by the community. Less attention is paid to ensuring the participation of vulnerable groups in livelihoods projects, in fact livelihoods assistance was not seen as an activity that necessarily needed to be targeted at the most vulnerable within communities. The most vulnerable therefore need to be included more specifically in the identification of appropriate interventions.

6. Conclusions

The current environment in Sri Lanka is one of widespread human rights abuses and continuing humanitarian need. Political violence has increased over the past two years, including in areas like Vavuniya and Trincomalee which are considered by some to be relatively stable and suitable for development. The 2002 ceasefire led to increased freedom of movement and the start of resettlement and relocation activities, which continue today. However, large numbers of people were displaced again in 2006 and 2007, with the renewal of conflict, adding to the large number of people already displaced from the previous conflict. Some of those displaced in 2006 and 2007 are returning to their areas of origin or are being relocated to new areas.

The population, in particular the Tamil population, in the north and east faces a number of livelihoods and protection risks. Political violence creates a climate of fear and restricts freedom of movement, for example for farming, trade and employment. Loss or requisition of National Identity Cards by the military also restricts movement. Access to markets is restricted due to the increasing number of checkpoints. Access to land, forest and fishing grounds is also limited due to the demarcation of High Security Zones and a number of restrictions on fishing, or because it is unsafe. In the absence of security provided by government or international actors, people developed a number of strategies to improve their safety, in particular when carrying out livelihood strategies.

Economic restrictions on the movement of goods into and out of Jaffna and Vavuniya has increased the cost of basic goods, as well as limiting the availability of inputs for construction and farming, leading to reduced work opportunities and a reduction in the rations provided by the government. Increased ethnic hostility has also restricted employment opportunities to those provided by the same ethnic group. Most were very pessimistic about the future, and expected continued conflict and/or human rights abuses.

Displaced, resettled and relocated populations are amongst the most vulnerable groups, because they not only face all the risks and restrictions described

above, but have also lost assets during displacement. In addition, in many resettlement or relocation areas, government services, such as transport, agriculture, health and education, may initially be limited. Livelihood opportunities are therefore very restricted, consisting mainly of wage labour, petty trading and small shops, some farming and limited fishing, and only a few people continued to receive remittances. Most livelihood strategies entailed some risk to protection, depending on the proximity of military compounds or other armed actors. IDPs and relocated populations were probably the most vulnerable as they had little or no land for cultivation, with relocated populations currently the most vulnerable as they receive the least assistance. DRC's plans for livelihoods programming currently include more resettlement communities, however. An increased emphasis on relocated populations is recommended.

The findings of this review show that IDPs, resettled and relocated populations experience significant risks to their livelihoods and protection, and that these risks are closely linked. This means that DRC's programme, consisting of relief, livelihood support and protection, is appropriate. IDPs, resettled and relocated populations all need various levels of relief assistance, livelihood support and protection, but DRC tends to view livelihoods assistance as appropriate for resettled and relocated populations, and relief for IDPs. Relief and livelihoods support should be incorporated in assistance for all groups, even if livelihood support is unlikely to lead to sustainable livelihoods due to the numerous restrictions that people face.

Despite protection, livelihoods and relief elements in DRC's work, this was not guided by an overall strategy linking livelihoods and protection, in terms of objectives, target groups and joined up programming. Parts of the programmes show stronger linkages than others, for example in the Integrated Protection Assistance to vulnerable individuals which sometimes provides livelihoods assistance to individuals vulnerable to protection risks, as well as the provision of assistance more generally as part of the protection project in the north. In addition, advocacy activities often dealt with livelihoods issues; for example access to food

aid, or disputes over land. A more integrated protection and livelihoods strategy could use as its starting point the targeting of both livelihoods and protection assistance to those communities and individuals facing the greatest protection risks.

Over the past two years, DRC has shifted the balance of its activities in Sri Lanka to include a greater proportion of emergency compared to rehabilitation activities, including the addition of a relief component to respond to newly displaced populations and economically affected long-term displaced, the expansion and strengthening of protection activities and the suspension of the revolving loan project. Emergency assessments in Jaffna and Trincomalee have proved very effective in eliciting or adapting responses. Only the projects in Vavuniya remain to be adapted to the changed context.

The relief component of the programme has assisted in meeting the basic needs of newly displaced populations (in Trincomalee and Kilinochchi), of economically affected protracted displaced and the poor in island communities (in Jaffna), as well as providing resettled or relocated populations with assistance immediately upon arrival. Delivery has been problematic in some cases, but distribution was generally considered to be fair. The highest impacts are likely to be in new IDPs and resettled/relocated populations, as this is either followed by other assistance (WFP food) or livelihood support and the resumption of livelihood activities. In protracted IDP situations, however, emergency livelihood support needs to be expanded to help meet basic needs combined with advocacy to improve the relief assistance or social welfare provided by WFP and the government.

In terms of specific livelihoods activities, the provision of home gardening packages was effective in that the seeds were delivered on time, but those without adequate access to good land or water did not benefit. For those that were able to produce vegetables as part of the home gardening activities, it improved their food and income sources, and is likely to have reduced risky coping strategies. Training in new agricultural techniques was also reported to increase production. In all cases, seeds were available locally, however, and people had already bought some. This makes the provision of seeds through voucher and fairs projects a more

appropriate intervention to assist production. Infrastructure development, such as roads, has also been an important form of livelihood support. It has provided a vital, often the only, source of income at the first stage of resettlement/ relocation.

CBO capacity-building was effective both in organising DRC and communal activities, enabling communities to access assistance, and establishing savings societies. CBOs also had an important protection function, either by easing ethnic tensions or through arrangements with the military to reduce harassment. Working with community groups to improve safety could be strengthened, and indeed DRC is already planning to do this. In terms of DRC's training activities, the CBO community members considered the agriculture and documentation training to be the most useful.

Much more can be done in terms of livelihood support, however, not only in terms of income generation, but also improving safe access to markets, strengthening services and advocacy for the government to meet its responsibilities with regards to livelihoods recovery grants and compensation. Much of this can be done by more closely linking protection and livelihoods activities, as access to markets may involve negotiating with the military for safe passage through checkpoints, and advocacy already involves addressing some livelihoods issues. This could be strengthened by using information from livelihoods projects as well as protection monitoring.

Targeting is a key issue in DRC's livelihoods projects. Some of the most vulnerable could not be included in the home gardening project. Similarly, planned provision of community grants to be managed as revolving loans by CBOs is unlikely to target the most vulnerable. Additional constraints to implementing this kind of income-generating project successfully include the difficulties that people may face in repaying loans in the current context. Depending on the economic and security situation of returnees/relocated populations, a combination of cash grants and enabling access to micro-finance institutions is recommended.

DRC has successfully implemented a range of protection activities, including protection monitoring, a civil documentation project, Individual Protection Assistance, human rights training of

communities and duty-bearers and advocacy. The documentation and IPA components were considered the most effective projects by beneficiary communities. Assisting people to obtain documents, such as their National Identity Card and land deeds, helps not only reduce immediate protection risks but also facilitates freedom of movement, and the ability to return/relocate and build shelter on their land. The IPA project was highly appreciated, although in the few cases seen it was not always effective in addressing vulnerability or risk as the individuals were sometimes provided with assistance to set up businesses which did not always succeed. Some vulnerable people may need relief in addition to livelihood support, and others will need some training in business management. Protection monitoring might lead directly to the activities mentioned above, or to referral to international agencies or the government for assistance or services. It is also used for advocacy at local, national and international level on issues ranging from adequate access to assistance and return issues or land disputes. Whilst the impact of advocacy is hard to measure, it is clear that DRC is one of the key protection actors in Sri Lanka and is able to raise protection issues at different levels, credibly advocate for a response, as well as respond to them directly.

The findings of this review show that there are clear links between livelihoods and protection not only in terms of the risks that people face, but also in the programmes that DRC carries out. In the Sri Lanka programme, these links were particularly apparent in the following:

1. Assessment and monitoring

Protection monitoring and IDP profiling already include information about livelihoods as well as protection. Other analytical tools could be adapted to include both protection and livelihoods risks.

2. Integrated programming

- The protection project in the north includes the provision of assistance as one component, and livelihoods assistance is part of this. This is particularly apparent in the IPA project, where people suffering the consequences of protection risks are often assisted with livelihoods support.

- Assistance to obtain documentation needed for movement, for return, to construct toilets and shelter and to get loans.
- Production support provides a safe way of meeting basic food and income needs. People do not have to go far to farm, or travel to markets if doing so is not safe.
- Road construction improved income and access to markets and reduced abductions.
- Strengthening community groups has both a livelihoods and protective function.
- Many communities felt safer after DRC (and other agencies) started working in the area, or felt that their presence was needed so that their problems were known by the outside world.
- Livelihoods programming facilitates protection monitoring as it is not possible to do protection without having a presence for other activities.

3. ‘Do no harm’

Projects are discussed with villages, and any risks associated with projects will come up in this discussion.

Criteria regarding working in relocation sites (has to be voluntary, sphere standards – space for shelter, etc).

DRC works with different ethnic groups to reduce tensions between them.

4. Advocacy

Many protection advocacy activities also deal with livelihoods issues, including access to food aid and land issues. This could be strengthened by incorporating information gathered in DRC’s livelihoods project.

These are important steps in developing an integrated livelihoods and protection programme, but these links were not planned as such. A more specific focus on the links between livelihoods and protection within the programme could be the basis for the development of an integrated livelihoods and protection strategy. The programme can be further

strengthened by systematically including both protection risks and livelihoods risks in assessment and monitoring, making sure that the most vulnerable or those most at risk of livelihoods and protection risks are included in projects (at

household and population-group level), implementing livelihoods projects with the aim of reducing protection risks, and strengthening advocacy on government obligations for livelihood recovery and compensation.

7. Recommendations

Programme objectives and approach

- Change the first objective to: ‘addressing the immediate needs of IDPs, resettled and relocated populations’.
- Change the second objective from establishment of sustainable livelihoods for resettled and relocated populations to: ‘livelihood support for resettled, relocated and IDP populations’.
- Change programme strategy to include relief, protection and livelihoods assistance to all groups assisted by DRC.
- To develop an integrated protection and livelihoods programme, the programme strategy needs to be adapted to focus activities on those communities and individuals experiencing the greatest protection risks. This will mean expanding the coverage of relocation villages, and a greater emphasis on targeting the most vulnerable.
- An integrated livelihoods and protection strategy also needs to incorporate integrated programming, protection mainstreaming and advocacy on both livelihoods and protection risks.

Assessment and monitoring

- Carry out emergency assessments, like those in Jaffna and Trincomalee (with WFP) when risks to protection or livelihoods are becoming more severe in particular groups (e.g. in Vavuniya).
- Expand protection monitoring to include changes in freedom of movement and economic restrictions in all districts.
- Incorporate protection risks (safe access to markets, land, and work) into PRAs in the planning of the integrated programme.
- Monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the IPA projects in helping vulnerable groups in establishing livelihoods.

- Monitor the protective impact of livelihoods interventions.

Programme activities

Relief (food and non-food)

- Modify complementary food package according to the most likely objective in the coming year(s) to meet the basic needs of new IDPs.
- Expand the provision of relief to include the first stages of return/relocation.
- Provide relief to vulnerable households (e.g. families where husbands have been abducted, killed or tortured) in addition to livelihood support so they have time to establish new livelihood activities which may improve the chances of success.
- Ensure the continued stockpiling of assistance given the delays incurred, as well as the focus on local purchase of relief goods which is faster and more flexible.

Livelihood support

- Expand livelihood support to include all protracted IDP populations facing economic restrictions.
- Continue support for home gardening and agriculture for resettled and relocated populations as a safe way of food production and income generation, but put more emphasis on provision of adequate water. Additional demonstration farms to improve agricultural practices and provide access to advice on agricultural techniques.
- Consider providing seeds through a voucher and fairs scheme as a new activity for resettled/relocated populations. This brings together local traders and farmers as sellers, and other farmers as beneficiaries (who are given vouchers). It allows people to choose seeds themselves, provides income for farmers and promotes trade.

- Consider income generation from infrastructure development in the initial stages of return/relocation as an explicit part of the programme, and apply cash for work targeting principles to reach the most vulnerable, or ensure that every family participates.
- Continue and expand agricultural training of CBOs and establishing links with government agricultural services. Also consider training of government agricultural officers, and facilitate establishment of services at DS level in new resettlement or relocation sites.
- Provide cash grants for livelihood recovery as a new activity (and if necessary to meet basic needs) in the first stage of resettlement/relocation, and for vulnerable families in later stages of resettlement/relocation, if necessary.
- Support savings activities and facilitate access to micro-finance institutions at later phases of resettlement/relocation. Train micro-finance institutions to incorporate conflict-related risks into their planning.
- Encourage a range of livelihoods activities (small business, trade, livestock and agriculture); based on discussions with communities, as only they will know what is safe.
- Provide assistance with marketing, including transport (vouchers for transport, small vehicle for a community, negotiations with checkpoints to allow safe passage).

Protection

- Expand the Integrated Protection Assistance project, and include the provision of relief for some cases. Provide technical assistance if people are choosing a new livelihood activity. This project should be reviewed in more detail as only a few cases were seen.
- Continue and strengthen civil documentation work by increased follow-up if people have not been able to obtain their documents after a period.
- Remove human rights training from training of CBOs, but link with cultural events and rights to

assistance. Focus human rights training on where to get assistance and for what (together with duty-bearers if appropriate).

- Strengthen protection monitoring in Vavuniya and Trincomalee. This should include general protection trends, and closely monitor protection issues, as well as the livelihoods consequences of increasing political violence and economic restrictions. Prior to this, an assessment of the risks associated with increased protection monitoring needs to be conducted.
- Continue and/or initiate livelihoods projects in areas of greatest protection risks to facilitate protection monitoring, and protection by presence.
- Train community volunteers in facilitating discussions about protection issues during regular meetings with community members, including issues of abduction, extortion etc, as well as ‘safer’ issues such as alcoholism and domestic violence.
- Expand protection training to include all DRC staff and local partners involved in livelihoods activities (mainstreaming protection: how to analyse and minimise potential risks associated with livelihoods activities). This should include training in negotiation skills.

Advocacy

- Continue to use information from protection monitoring to advocate for better provision of assistance by international agencies, as well as influencing donors to put pressure on government. Linking protection concerns with livelihoods consequences may be a less sensitive way of presenting protection issues.
- Continue to carry out advocacy at District level, and provide additional support for DRC offices in Trincomalee and Vavuniya.
- Develop a strong position on relocation, and advocate for this in meetings with the international community and donors.
- Engage with UNDP on suitable livelihoods interventions and include IDP/returnee populations in District livelihoods plans.

- Advocate for GoSL to meet its obligations to provide livelihood recovery grants and compensation for returnees and resettled populations.

Staffing

- Recruit an emergency livelihoods specialist at national level to continue to develop and adapt strategy based on changes in the context. This post would be responsible for monitoring changes in risks to livelihoods and adapting projects accordingly. S/he would also advise on the targeting of different interventions, and assist in advocacy at national level.
- Develop livelihoods expertise at district level to support a range of livelihoods activities. This may include making arrangements with government service providers, as well as short-term consultancies on specific livelihoods activities such as training for micro-finance institutions.
- Recruit an additional international protection advisor to strengthen protection activities in Vavuniya and Trincomalee and address sensitive issues that national staff may find it difficult to deal with.

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Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

Review of the DRC IDP/Refugee Integrated Livelihood Rehabilitation, Protection and Emergency Response Programme in Sri Lanka (2006-2008)

Final Draft (as of September 26, 2008)

Purpose of the Sri Lanka Review

The review will assess the extent to which progress has been achieved in fulfilling the general objectives of the programme, with a special view to the relevance and impact of the Livelihood and Protection approach. With a focus on the present implementation of the programme, the consultant will

- assess the overall relevance and impact of the programme on protection and livelihoods since 2006 until mid-2008, and,
- provide recommendations for the future development of the programme. Particular emphasis will be given to provide field-based, practical and realistic recommendations for how to sharpen and strengthen the livelihoods approach and activities in programme. This should include suggestions for new livelihoods activities.

The focus of the review will be on analysing the livelihoods and protection context of the areas in which DRC Sri Lanka is operational, the relevance of DRC's activities, and providing recommendations for future programming in Sri Lanka, particularly in relation to livelihoods programming. To a lesser extent, the review will also analyse the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of particular livelihoods and protection activities (food security, production (agriculture and fishery), emergency response (food & non-food), protection activities).

The review of the Sri Lanka programme will feed into the DRC HQ/corporate review of the DRC Livelihoods and Protection programming (the "Livelihood & Protection Initiative 2008"), which involves the review of 4-5 country programmes (one being the Sri Lanka Programme). The objective of this review is to strengthen DRC's corporate learning and understanding of how livelihood and protection approaches can be combined and mutually reinforce

each other for the benefit of the people assisted. Reference is made to the "Process Paper – Livelihood & Protection Initiative 2008" for additional information on the corporate review.

Definitions

For the purpose of clarity the below definitions of the key concepts of "Livelihoods" and "Protection" will be applied in the review:

Livelihoods. A Livelihood 'comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with, and recover from, stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihoods opportunities for the next generation' (Chambers and Conway, 1992).

Protection. Protection is defined as "... all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, namely human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law" (IASC)

Scope of the Review

Livelihoods and protection context over the period of the current DRC Sri Lanka programme (2006-08).

- What has been the impact of the conflict on livelihoods and protection and how has this changed between 2006 and 2008 in the DRC programme area (in **brief** and from a practical perspective)?
- What are the current main risks to people's livelihoods and protection? Do these risks vary for different population groups, or in different areas (for example, return/resettlement areas compared with relocation sites, between districts)?
- What are the main livelihood strategies for different livelihoods or risk groups (groups that use similar strategies for getting food and income, and/or face similar risks; for

example: resident, displaced – new and long term, resettled, returnees, and people with special needs (women, single headed households, disabled).

- What responses have household and communities themselves used to ensure protection, protect livelihoods and basic subsistence?
- In **brief**, what have been the major influences at macro-level on people's livelihoods strategies (negative and positive), for example GoSL/LTTE policies on freedom of movement, resettlement and return, formal and informal taxation, trade, as well as the functioning of basic services and institutions (e.g. markets), changes in informal governance, local leadership roles and responsibilities, power relations between groups.

Relevance

- How are the concepts of livelihoods and protection defined and applied in the Sri Lanka context?
- Are the livelihoods and protection strategy and approaches applied by the DRC Sri Lanka programme relevant and appropriate in the Sri Lanka context?
- How does DRC Sri Lanka analyse livelihoods and protection risks?
- To what extent does the programme link livelihoods and protection in the analysis and design of the original projects, as well as in the subsequent implementation? How does the programme implementation take into account the communities' strategies and responses?
- To what extent has the DRC programme succeeded in adapting to the changing needs and protection risks ?
- Are the current livelihood activities (in particular food security, production (agriculture and fishery), emergency response (food & non-food), protection activities) relevant and appropriately responding to the present needs and protection risks? What alternative
- To what extent does the programme succeed in linking macro and micro level in the livelihoods / protection interventions?
- Does the programme succeed in the coordination with relevant partners and

stakeholders, so as to ensure relevance and avoid duplication?

Effectiveness, efficiency and impact

- Assess the extent to which the programme has progressed towards the articulated objectives during the programme period January 2006 to 2008 (time of the review), and the programme's impact, in particular focussing on food security, production (agriculture and fishery), emergency response (food & non-food), protection activities
- What have been some of the major constraints, internal and external, to effectiveness and impact?
- How can livelihoods activities more effectively and practically contribute to addressing both protection and livelihoods risks?
- How are the potential risks associated with livelihoods activities analysed, monitored and minimised? Are there any examples of protection and livelihood interventions being counter-productive or counter-protective? If so, what measures can be taken to avoid this?
- What activities and approaches have made the most positive impact in terms of protection and supporting the livelihood goals of conflict affected communities?
- Is the programme having a positive impact at policy level to secure people's protection and livelihoods?
- To what extent does the current programme link protection and livelihood? What concrete processes are required to build closer links in future programming?

Cross-cutting issues

- How is the programme taking into account Gender issues in the design and implementation of the protection and livelihoods activities? What additional practical steps could be taken?
- Are communities participating in setting priorities, implementing and monitoring/evaluating activities?

Recommendations

- Provide practical and realistic recommendations on the future development and direction of DRC SL livelihood approach and activities.
- Concrete advice on Do's and Don'ts, concerning how to enhance livelihood support and protection in the programme as two mutually reinforcing approaches;
- Provide recommendations on any necessary adjustments of programme structure, strategy, size, coverage, and activities.

Methodology

The review will be based on (A) background documents (project documents, Annual Reviews, Quarterly Reports, various policy documents (DRC Programme Handbook) et al), (B) consultations with partners and stakeholders in Sri Lanka (among these the UNHCR, ECHO, NGOs operating in same theatre, and relevant GoSL authorities) with a strong focus on the district level, (C) discussions with key DRC staff, and (D) most importantly through field visits to DRC project sites/communities for field assessment and consultations with the Sri Lankan communities. A DRC protection officer/s will be part of the review team, to allow for sufficient consultation with conflict affected communities.

Review Output

- A written debriefing note will be prepared and discussed in Sri Lanka with the team prior to the departure from Sri Lanka;
- A debriefing session will be held upon return in October (in London or by telephone) with the consultant and the Sri Lanka desk (possibly with policy advisor as well). The session will serve to discuss the review findings and recommendations and provide feed back to the DRC Sri Lanka 2009 programme proposal.
- Draft Report: The Reviewer will submit its draft report within 4 weeks (mid-November) of the end of the mission to Sri Lanka (not exceeding 30 pages plus appendices). DRC will provide comments to the draft report within two weeks of the receipt of the draft report;
- Final Report: The final report should be presented (by early December 2008) within one week after having received comments from DRC to the draft report. The final report will include issues mentioned in the above section 5, but need not follow this structure in its presentation of issues.

Annex 2 – Methods

The review made use of both livelihoods and protection frameworks for data collection and analysis.

Both primary and secondary data was collected. In each District visited, the review started with a participatory livelihoods and protection analysis with the DRC team. This exercise was also done with members of the Jaffna team, even though Jaffna was not visited. The following issues were discussed with the teams:

- What are the main livelihoods or risks groups in the district (e.g. residents (rural-fishermen, farmers, labourers) urban), IDPs in camps/with hosts, resettled, relocated populations
- What are the main livelihood strategies used by these groups?
- What do they need to be able to carry out these livelihood strategies (e.g. markets, banks, land, security)
- What are the risks associated with some of the livelihood strategies, and what has been the impact of conflict (on the assets and institutions that people need to carry out their livelihood strategies).
- What other protection risks do people face?
- How do DRC programmes address these issues?

Primary data collection consisted of agency interviews and interviews with different groups in

IDP, resettlement and relocation sites. These often included the CBOs that DRC worked with. At least two focus group discussions were held in each site; one men's group and one women's group. When possible, particular vulnerable households were interviewed, either IPA cases or women whose husband had been abducted. The interviews aimed to answer the following main questions:

1. how do communities make decisions regarding livelihoods & protection risks and how do they prioritise?
2. To what extent, and in which ways, are complementary L&P programmes relevant and appropriate (DRC & others)
3. To what extent, and in which ways, is DRC's work reducing L&P risks

Checklists covered:

- The role of CBOs
- Population movements and restrictions on movement
- Previous and current threats
- Livelihoods and protection strategies (including different livelihoods strategies and the risks associated with them, access to markets, remittances, land)
- Assistance provided (including timeliness and access to assistance)
- Most effective forms of assistance and training
- Expectations for the future

Annex 3 – People interviewed and places visited

Colombo

UNHCR protection officer
WFP Head of Programme

Trincomalee

Oxfam livelihoods programme managers
ICRC protection delegate
AHAM (DRC local partner)
TDDA (DRC local partner)

Widows group in Cultural Hall camp
Women's group in Sangara
Tamil family in Sangara
Women's group in Ganasepuram
RDS in Ithikulam
Women's group in Ithikulam
Women's group in Kilevety transit camp
RDS in Thiramalpuram
Women's group in Thiramalpuram

Vavuniya

CARE livelihood programme managers
OCHA field coordination officer
UNHCR protection officer
UNDP
ICRC ecosec delegate and deputy head of sub-delegation
FOSDOO (local partner)
Oxfam dairy project manager

Women's group in Sitamparapuram
IPA case in Sitampuram
Women's RDS Thudduvakai
RDS Thudduvakai
IPA case in Thudduvakai
Women's group in Katkulam
Men's group in Katkulam
RDS in Sangarapuram
WRDS in Sangarapuram
RDS in KAlmadu
Female headed household in KAlmadu



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ISBN 978 0 85003 851 4