



# TARGETING ETHIOPIA'S PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME (PSNP)

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## CONTENTS

<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Context and purpose of the study .....	1
1.2. Data collection methods.....	1
1.3. Selection of field sites .....	2
1.4. Timeframe of the findings .....	2
1.5. Structure of the report .....	2
<b>2. TARGETING DESIGN AND GUIDELINES .....</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1. Design.....	4
2.1.1. <i>Definition of target groups</i> .....	4
2.1.2. <i>Institutions and processes</i> .....	5
2.1.3. <i>Continuity and change: PSNP targeting and the previous relief system</i> .	6
2.2. Guidelines and training .....	8
2.2.1. <i>The Safety Net Targeting Guideline</i> .....	8
2.2.2. <i>Adaptation and local suitability of the guideline</i> .....	9
2.2.3. <i>The role of NGOs in disseminating the targeting guideline</i> .....	10
2.2.4. <i>Effectiveness of the guideline dissemination</i> .....	10
<b>3. IMPLEMENTATION: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES .....</b>	<b>12</b>
3.1. Food Security Task Forces (FSTFs).....	12
3.2. The “quota” system - needs assessment, planning figures and resource allocations .....	14
3.3. Geographical targeting within woredas.....	15
3.4. Community members’ perceptions of the targeting process.....	16
3.5. Changes in targeting practice from 2005 to 2006 .....	18
<b>4. TARGETING OUTCOMES.....</b>	<b>20</b>
4.1. Who are the beneficiaries? .....	20
4.1.1. <i>Perceived selection criteria</i> .....	20
4.2. Exclusion and inclusion.....	21
4.3. Dilution and full-family targeting.....	24
<b>5. APPEALS AND MONITORING .....</b>	<b>26</b>
5.1. Appeals .....	26
5.1.1. <i>Appeals mechanisms in theory</i> .....	26
5.1.2. <i>Appeals mechanisms in practice</i> .....	26
5.1.3. <i>Who appeals and why?</i> .....	27
5.1.4. <i>Effectiveness, efficiency and quality of the appeals process</i> .....	29
5.1.5. <i>Barriers to appeals</i> .....	31
5.2. Monitoring of targeting .....	34
5.2.1. <i>The Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)</i> .....	34
5.2.2. <i>FSCB Information Centre</i> .....	36

<b>6. KEY ISSUES</b> .....	<b>37</b>
6.1. Targeting the public works component .....	37
6.1.1. <i>Targeting effects of the wage rate</i> .....	37
6.1.2. <i>Displacement of other activities</i> .....	38
6.1.3. <i>Child labour and education</i> .....	39
6.2. Temporal targeting .....	40
6.3. Labour-poor households in an employment-based safety net .....	42
6.4. Targeting Direct Support .....	45
6.5. Integrating PW and DS Targeting .....	46
6.6. Accountability and Transparency of PSNP Targeting .....	47
6.6.1. <i>Constraints on accountability and transparency</i> .....	47
6.6.2. <i>Upward and downward accountability</i> .....	48
6.6.3. <i>Corruption and the PSNP</i> .....	49
6.6.4. <i>Political pressures on targeting</i> .....	50
6.7. Gender .....	51
6.8. HIV / AIDS.....	53
<b>7. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS</b> .....	<b>55</b>
7.1. Public Works and Direct Support targeting .....	55
7.2. Temporal targeting to support graduation .....	55
7.3. Child labour and schooling.....	56
7.4. Retargeting and the registration period.....	56
7.5. Appeals process .....	57
7.6. Monitoring: strengthening the Rapid (or Roving) Response Mechanism.....	57
7.7. Geographical targeting.....	58
7.8. Improving the PSNP's gender sensitivity .....	58
7.9. Targeting Guidelines: national framework, regional details .....	58
<b>Annexes</b> .....	<b>60</b>
References.....	60
Annex 1: List of people interviewed .....	61
Annex 2: Example of a PSNP beneficiary ID card .....	63
Annex 3: Regional variations in household structure and demography .....	64
Annex 4: Methodology .....	65

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Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors. The views expressed in the report are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the position of DFID or any other organisation.

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADA	Amhara Development Association
BoARD	(Regional) Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
CFSTF	Community Food Security Task Force
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DA	Development Agent (under MoARD)
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
DMFI	Dedebit Micro-Finance Institute
DPPC	(Federal) Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
DPPB	(Woreda / Regional) Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau
DS	Direct Support
EC	European Commission
EC	Ethiopian Calendar
EGS	Employment Generation Scheme
EOC	Ethiopian Orthodox Church
FSCB	(Federal) Food Security Coordination Bureau, MoARD
FSO	(Woreda) Food Security Office
FSTF	Food Security Task Force
GR	Gratuitous Relief
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
KFSTF	Kebele Food Security Task Force
MoARD	(Federal) Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OFSP(s)	Other Food Security Programme(s)
ORDA	Organisation for Rehabilitation and Development in Amhara
OVCs	Orphans and other Vulnerable Children
PIM	Programme Implementation Manual
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PW	Public Works
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
RRT	Rapid Response Team
RDO	(Woreda) Rural Development Office
RDIR	Reducing Dependency and Increasing Resiliency
SC-UK	Save the Children (United Kingdom)
SNNPR	Southern Nations', Nationalities' and Peoples' Region
SN(P)	Safety Net (Programme), = PSNP
ToT	Training of Trainers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WFSTF	Woreda Food Security Task Force

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This report reviews the targeting design, implementation and outcomes of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in its first year to eighteen months of operation. This period covers the whole of the first annual cycle of targeting and distribution, and the beginning of the second. The findings are based on qualitative fieldwork and a household survey in eight woredas (two in each of the four main PSNP regions), on extensive key informant interviews, and on a review of secondary sources. The study focuses on how (and how well) the targeting system is working, and on practical recommendations for improvement.

Overall, the study finds that the PSNP is (now) reaching the poor. The institutional structures for combined administrative and community targeting are in place in most areas (though not all), and are functioning with varying degrees of success. Great efforts have been made by local government and community decision makers to fulfil a very difficult task. In all the woredas visited lessons have been learned from 2005, and targeting processes for the current year are much improved. Some major misinterpretations and confusions in targeting during the first year have now been corrected. No systematic corruption or large-scale abuse of the targeting system was found.

Nevertheless, there are problems and areas for improvement. The report makes recommendations in nine areas, as summarised below.

### **1. Public Works and Direct Support targeting.**

Labour-poor households are often among the poorest, and include vulnerable groups such as female-headed households and people affected by HIV/AIDS. However, they are being disadvantaged by the current targeting system which provides free transfers (Direct Support or DS) for households with no labour at all but does not take account of labour scarcity for those who qualify for public works (PW). A minority of vulnerable households do not have enough labour to work the 5 days per household member needed to earn the full monthly transfer entitlement for their family. There are also pressures to minimise the number of DS beneficiaries, and pre-set quotas are being applied in many areas which do not match the community needs assessments.

*The report recommends:*

- Preset quotas for DS should be dropped. The number of working and non-working beneficiaries in any community should be decided by needs assessment.
- A ceiling should be set on the number of days per month an individual is required to work on the PW.
- Labour-poor households who are eligible for the PW should receive transfers for the full family, even if they cannot cover the full work allocation.
- Community task forces should have authority to grant temporary maternity and sick leave for PW beneficiaries.

### **2. Temporal targeting of public works and payments**

The seasonal timing of public works coincides with peak agricultural periods in some places, while in others the extended daily hours of physical labour are conflicting with other essential work including productive activities and women's domestic responsibilities. The timing of transfer payments is not yet predictable and reliable, and could be better synchronised with periods of need.

*The report recommends:*

- PSNP works should be planned so as to minimise disruption to other activities conducive to the self-sufficiency and welfare of beneficiaries. This includes not only farming, but also off-farm livelihood activities, domestic and childcare work, and

schooling.

- Three levels of temporal targeting should be considered when planning the work: seasonality (i.e. months of the year), days per month and hours per day.
- The PW work-day should be reduced, in areas where people are working eight hours or more.
- Continued efforts are needed to achieve regular, predictable, timely payment of transfers.
- The timing of transfer payments for DS beneficiaries should be de-linked from the public works.

### **3. Child labour and schooling**

The age-limits on PW participation are largely being adhered to: only about 8% of workers were under 18, and 3% were over 60. However, child participation could be further reduced and interruptions to school attendance among older students should also be avoided. People of 20 and older are taking advantage of the improved rural access to education, and should be supported in doing so.

*The report recommends:*

- Continued monitoring and supervision are needed to ensure that children are not employed on the PW. Easing the burden on labour-poor households will reduce the pressure to send children to the work-sites.
- Community task forces and monitoring teams should check that the timing of PW does not conflict with participants' school attendance, regardless of their age.

### **4. Retargeting and the registration period**

The transaction costs of community targeting are high, requiring a great deal of time, effort and trouble from local decision-makers especially at the kebele level and the (unpaid) community task forces. Meanwhile, the frequent re-targeting during the first year, uncertainty over selection criteria, and in some places the deregistering of beneficiaries as soon as they acquire some assets have made the safety net unpredictable and unreliable for households. A more stable guaranteed registration period is needed.

*The report recommends:*

- The requirement to re-target every six months (currently in the Programme Implementation Manual or PIM) should be dropped.
- Individual cases of appeal should be heard periodically (without waiting for a major targeting exercise), and adjustments should be made to the beneficiary list accordingly.
- Once registered, beneficiaries should be guaranteed regular transfers for a *minimum* period of one year (unless they are found to have been corruptly registered or to be abusing the system). A longer guaranteed period is under discussion.
- Beneficiaries should not be deregistered because of assets acquired on credit, until the debt is cleared.
- Woreda beneficiary data-bases should keep track of how long each household has been registered.

### **5. Appeals and grievance processes**

Errors and occasional abuses are inevitable in any targeting system: the key question is how effectively they are detected and corrected. The system for appeals and

complaints laid out in the PIM is nominally in place in most woredas, but is not functioning very effectively. Membership of the targeting and appeals bodies overlaps, so that there is no independent channel for complaints, and appeals are often passed back to the original community decision-makers. Potential beneficiaries are not well-informed about the right or process of appeal. No records of appeals are kept or passed to higher levels of government for oversight.

*The report recommends:*

- Efforts should continue to ensure that community targeting processes are transparent, participatory and well managed.
- Greater attention should be paid to raising awareness of the appeals process.
- The appeals process needs to be faster in almost all places.
- Bodies that hear appeals or complaints about targeting should have separate membership from the Food Security Task Forces, to ensure independence.
- A reporting and follow-up system for appeals is needed at the kebele, woreda and regional levels.

## **6. Monitoring**

The PSNP's formal baseline and monitoring system is not yet well established, and the federal Information Centre does not collect data types designed to monitor targeting. However, the field-visit system of the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) has proved effective in detecting major targeting problems and has the potential to be developed further. So far, the federal and regional Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) have been unable to track targeting and other facets of safety net implementation below the woreda level.

*The report recommends:*

- Federal and regional RRTs should be strengthened.
- Zonal RRTs should be established and resourced.
- The RRM should provide more substantive horizontal and vertical linkages between and across administrative layers.
- RRTs should contribute to improved reporting and record keeping on targeting and appeals, in order to strengthen transparency and accountability.
- The targeting section of the RRT field assessment checklist should be developed to encourage more systematic information-gathering, analysis and follow-up of targeting and appeals.

## **7. Geographical targeting**

Woredas are required to allocate beneficiary numbers among the kebeles under their jurisdiction, and kebele task forces then allocate numbers to communities. However, no guidance is provided on the process or criteria for doing this. In practice, woredas are taking a variety of approaches, either including all kebeles or selecting the most food insecure. Various types and combinations of information are being used to decide the quotas for each kebele, including previous years' food aid receipts, current harvest assessments, relative population estimates, and in some cases direct needs assessments.

*The report recommends:*

- Technical guidelines on geographical targeting should be developed for (and in consultation with) the woredas.

## 8. Gender

The design of the PSNP acknowledges a number of gendered aspects to the programme, relating to the different positions of men and women both as potential beneficiaries and as decision-makers in a community-based targeting system. These are considered in various sections of the report. In addition to the concerns outlined above about labour-poor households (many of whom are female-headed), key issues include the heavy workload on women PW workers and the apparent weakness of women's voice in the appeals system. The representation of women on local targeting bodies could also be improved.

*The report recommends:*

- Working hours on the PW should be reduced to enable women to combine participation in the programme with their domestic and other work.
- The number of elected women representatives on kebele and community FSTFs should be increased, and capacity-building budgets should include training and support for them.
- Gender awareness, and the specific gender issues encountered in the PSNP, should form part of ongoing training for all PSNP implementers.
- The requirement for evaluation and monitoring teams to consult women as well as men should be strengthened, and the collection and use of gender-disaggregated beneficiary information should be improved.
- Improvements to the appeals system (outlined above) should explicitly consider gender to ensure that women have fair access.
- The head of each Woreda Women's Affairs Department, as an *ex officio* member of the WFSTF, should be given a mandate and resources to monitor gender equity and women's interests within the PSNP. The Women's Affairs Department in the federal MoARD could provide advice and oversight.

## 9. National and Regional Targeting Guidelines

The targeting instructions in the PIM and the Safety Net Targeting Guideline (SNTG) are intended as a broad national framework, allowing for regional and local adaptation. Little adaptation has so far taken place. Trainees and local decision-makers often find that the examples given in the existing documents do not match their situation, or that there is insufficient detail for the types of decision they are required to make. Seasonalities, the composition and social meanings of the household as a targeting unit, community structures, and indicators of food insecurity all vary geographically and should be reflected in detailed local targeting guidelines.

*The report recommends:*

- Once decisions have been made on the recommendations in this report, a brief operational Revised Targeting Note should be produced to supplement the revised PIM. The existing SNTG will continue to be a useful training resource.
- Regional governments should then develop more detailed practical manuals on targeting adapted to their local conditions, social and cultural contexts, and capacities. Local stakeholders (woreda, kebele and community FSTFs, beneficiaries and relevant NGOs) should be involved in this process.
- Local decision-makers need continual training and support with the targeting process, to counteract staff turnover. Concise, accessible local-language versions of the key documents should be provided and kept in woreda and kebele offices.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Context and purpose of the study

This report is one of three linked reviews of the PSNP after its initial phase of operation. The other two reviews, which should be read in parallel, are:

Devereux, S., R. Sabates-Wheeler, Mulugeta and Hailemichael (2006), Trends in PSNP Transfers Within Targeted Households, and

Slater, R., S. Ashley, Mulugeta, Mengistu and Delelegne (2006), Study on Policy, Programme and Institutional Linkages.

For brevity, these reports are referred to below as the Trends report and the Linkages report respectively.

The main purpose of this targeting study is to make practical recommendations on strengthening the overall targeting procedures, based on an assessment of whether the programme is effectively targeting eligible beneficiaries, the extent to which errors or problems are occurring, the effectiveness of the appeal system, and key lessons learned so far. The focus of the study is on **how, and how well, the targeting system is working**.

## 1.2. Data collection methods

Information was collected primarily through qualitative field methods at woreda (district), kebele (sub-district or Peasant Association), village, and household levels as summarised in the table below and described in detail in Annex 4. This was supplemented with a review of secondary sources and extensive key informant interviews at regional and national level (see Annex 1 for a list of people consulted). The qualitative fieldwork was also coordinated with a household survey conducted in the same sites by the Trends team: details of the sampling and questionnaire can be found in the Trends report. All quantitative data cited below are from this household survey, unless otherwise attributed.

**Table 1: Qualitative data collection methods**

<i>Methods</i>	<i>Level / location</i>					
	National	Regional	Woreda	Kebele	Village	Household
Review of documents and data	✓	✓	✓			
Key informant interviews	✓	✓	✓	✓		
FSTF group interviews			✓	✓	✓	
Focus groups					✓	
Case studies						✓

### 1.3. Selection of field sites

Eight woredas, two in each of the four main PSNP regions, were purposively selected for the three linked studies, based on a combination of criteria including local government capacity, cash or food transfers, and implementing agency (government, NGO or WFP). In each woreda one kebele and one community were visited. The sites are not intended to be statistically representative of the regions, but they provide examples which enable us to hear the experiences and opinions of the people directly involved in implementing the safety net programme (i.e. local decision-makers, beneficiaries, and other community members). The aims of the fieldwork were to consult these people in order to gain some indicative information and insights into how the safety-net has been targeted so far; and to give them a voice in any recommendations on future changes or improvements in targeting.

The selected woredas were:

Tigray:	Enderta and Kilde Awlalo <sup>1</sup>
Amhara:	Bugna and Kalu
Oromiya:	Fedis and Chiro
SNNPR:	Boricha and Derashe



Scoring months of food shortage during fieldwork

### 1.4. Timeframe of the findings

Both the qualitative fieldwork and the household survey were carried out in May and early June, 2006. The questions put to individual respondents and key informants referred to the period since the delayed start of PSNP implementation in April 2005 - that is, a recall period of approximately one year preceding the fieldwork.

This period covers the whole of the first round of PSNP implementation in 2005 (1997 EC), and the beginning of the second round (2006, or 1998 EC). All the communities visited had completed the compilation of beneficiary lists for 2006, although the public works and transfer distribution were only just starting. Therefore, while the findings about targeting outcomes refer mostly to the first annual round of PSNP, the study was able to compare two rounds of the annual targeting process. This proved to be important, since **many confusions and errors in the first year of the new programme were improved or changed in the second round.**

### 1.5. Structure of the report

The report is broken into seven sections. **Section 2** outlines the **targeting design** of the PSNP and assesses how (and how well) this was disseminated from the federal level to local government implementers. **Section 3** presents findings from the fieldwork describing how the **institutions and processes** for targeting the PSNP have actually been operating. **Section 4** assesses how successful the targeting has been in terms of its **outcomes**: whether the programme is reaching the intended target groups and what kind of errors or problems are arising. **Section 5** examines the performance of systems for dealing with **appeals or grievances**, and for **monitoring** of targeting. **Section 6** then discusses some **key issues** arising from the study as a whole, while **Section 7**

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<sup>1</sup> This woreda is sometimes referred to by the name of its main town, Wukro.

summarises the **recommendations** made throughout the report for improving the targeting of the safety net programme.

## 2. TARGETING DESIGN AND GUIDELINES

### 2.1. Design

The targeting principles of the PSNP are set out in the Programme Implementation Manual or PIM (MoARD 2004), which is the basic reference document for implementers. This manual was prepared by a taskforce made up of technical people from federal and regional Food Security Coordination Offices (FSCB) and other departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD). It was released in December 2004, shortly before the planned start-up of the programme.<sup>2</sup> The following sections summarise those parts of the PIM which explain the targeting design of the PSNP.

#### 2.1.1. Definition of target groups

According to the PSNP Project Memorandum, “the primary targeting objective (of the PSNP) should be to guarantee **timely and adequate transfers to the most food-insecure people in the most food-insecure areas**” ((DFID Ethiopia 2005): xviii). In operational terms the PIM defines these target areas and people at woreda and household level respectively, as quoted in the box below.

##### Box 1: Definition of target areas and households

###### (a) *Chronically food insecure woredas:*

- For the purposes of the Safety Net, a woreda is considered chronically food insecure if it (a) is in one of 8 regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP, Afar, Somali, rural Harari and Dire Dawa), and (b) has been a **recipient of food aid** for a significant period, generally for at least each of the last 3 years. ...

###### (b) *Chronically food insecure households:*

- For the purposes of the Safety Net, a household is considered chronically food insecure if it is located in one of the 262 chronically food insecure woredas (as defined above);
- Has been assessed by a mix of administrative guidelines and community knowledge to have faced **continuous food shortages (usually 3 months of food gap or more) in the last 3 years and received food assistance;**
- This also includes **households that suddenly become more vulnerable** as a result of a severe loss of assets and are unable to support themselves (last 1-2 years);
- Any **household without family support and other means of social protection** and support. ...

*(extracts from PIM Section 1.4)*

Within woredas, the “Woreda Council is ... responsible for the **allocation of safety net resources to kebeles in line with size of vulnerable population** and based on the recommendations of the Woreda Food Security Task Force” (PIM Section 3.2.3). No further guidance is given on geographical targeting to kebeles and communities.

At household level, Section 4.2.2.b states that **assets, income and other sources of support** (such as remittances) should be assessed to refine the broad criteria quoted in Box 1. However, the **PIM does not set standardised indicators or thresholds**. Woreda Food Security Task Forces (WFSTFs) are empowered to “set criteria for

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<sup>2</sup> A revised version of the PIM was being finalised at the time of this study: MoARD (2006). Productive Safety Net Programme: Programme Implementation Manual Version 2. Addis Ababa, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Unless otherwise specified, all references here are to the December 2004 version, which has been the basis of implementation so far.

beneficiary selection to suit the particular conditions of the Woreda within the spirit of the general guiding points” (PIM Section 4.2.1. c).

The majority of beneficiaries are required to contribute labour to PSNP **public works (PW)**, and are entitled to 5 days’ paid work per month<sup>3</sup> per household member. Section 4.3.2. of the PIM explains that a further set of criteria should be applied to identify those who qualify for safety net support but who should not be required to participate in the public works. These households, who are eligible for **free or “direct” support (DS)**, are broadly defined as those who have no labour and no other source of support, including “some **disabled** persons”. Four further categories of people are mentioned as eligible for DS or excluded from PW:

- **sick or mentally challenged** people unable to undertake even light work;
- **pregnant** women after the sixth month;
- **lactating** women in the first ten months after child birth (Section 4.3.1.b); and
- **orphaned** teenagers (Section 4.3.2).

Surprisingly, **old age** is not mentioned as a criterion for DS eligibility, although the study found that, in practice, communities are sensibly prioritising the old and indeed consider them the most obviously eligible group for Direct Support. In principle, DS beneficiaries who are able to do light work are required to contribute to activities such as community child-care (Section 4.3.2). In practice, however, no examples of such activities were encountered during the fieldwork or key informant interviews.

**No pre-set quota or percentage of DS beneficiaries** is prescribed by the PIM. There is considerable confusion and misinterpretation around this issue, which is discussed in sections 3.2 and 6.4.

### **2.1.2. Institutions and processes**

The main responsibility for targeting of the PSNP falls on specially-constituted Food Security Task Forces (FSTFs) at woreda, kebele and community levels, supported by the Woreda and Kebele Council and Administration. The PIM suggests that FSTFs should not duplicate existing bodies, but where possible should build on the Development or Disaster Preparedness Committees which were previously responsible for targeting relief assistance. Table 2 summarises the recommended membership of the FSTFs. It shows that the FSTFs at each level include some administrative officials and *ex officio* members (people automatically included because of their position in local government or other institutions), while the kebele and community task forces also include a majority of elected members. At each level, the membership list requires at least one woman, although there is no target or directive regarding the proportion of female representatives. At woreda level, the PIM (3.2.3.ii) simply notes that “inclusion of women in the committee is encouraged”.

The prescribed process of beneficiary selection is a **combination of administrative and community targeting**, summarised in Figure 1. The sequence of steps in this figure should be read from the bottom up, starting with the community needs assessment. The whole process is in principle driven from the community level, while the administrative bodies provide guidance and supervision, and control the allocation of resources. Woreda and Kebele Councils are given the main responsibility for hearing appeals or complaints (see section 5 of this report).

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<sup>3</sup> The PSNP is operational for 6 months of the year in most woredas. Some stakeholders argue that this should be increased, particularly for non-working (DS) beneficiaries.

**Table 2: Recommended Composition of the Food Security Task Forces**

Woreda FSTF	Kebele FSTF	Community FSTF
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Head of RDO or Administration (<i>Chair</i>)</li> <li>▪ FSO representative (<i>Secretary</i>)</li> <li>▪ Finance</li> <li>▪ Natural Resource Office</li> <li>▪ Capacity Building</li> <li>▪ Agriculture and Rural Development</li> <li>▪ DPPB</li> <li>▪ Women's Affairs</li> <li>▪ NGOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Chair of Kebele Council</li> <li>▪ Member of Kebele Council</li> <li>▪ Development Agents (DAs) - one or more as available</li> </ul> <p><i>Elected representatives of:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Women (3)</li> <li>▪ Elders (1)</li> <li>▪ Youth (1)</li> </ul> <p><i>Plus (optional):</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Health Workers</li> <li>▪ Teachers</li> <li>▪ Youth associations, etc.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Representative from Kebele FSTF</li> <li>▪ DA - if available</li> </ul> <p><i>Elected representatives of:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Women (2-3)</li> <li>▪ Men (2-3)</li> <li>▪ Youth (1)</li> <li>▪ Elders (1)</li> </ul>

Source: PIM sections 3.2.3, 3.2.4, and 3.2.5.


### **2.1.3. Continuity and change: PSNP targeting and the previous relief system**

The targeting design of the PSNP, outlined above, builds on decades of Ethiopian experience in targeting emergency aid and public works programmes, and on several years of multi-agency work to develop and disseminate guidelines for the implementation of “administrative–community” targeting (DPPC 2000). The institutional structures; the key role of community representatives; the asset, income and livelihood criteria for household selection; and the division of beneficiaries between PW and DS according to their ability to work – all are very similar to the pre-existing system of targeting for the annual cycle of “emergency” relief. As mentioned above, the FSTFs are building on existing Disaster Prevention Committees, and the woredas included in the PSNP are by definition those which have previously managed food aid. In spite of the rapid staff turnover in local government posts, it is therefore highly likely that in most of the PSNP woredas some of the people involved in the targeting decisions will have substantial recent experience of a similar system. Without these continuities it is questionable whether the rapid introduction of such a huge targeted programme in so many districts would have been feasible.

Along with the advantages of continuity, there is a risk that the problems and weaknesses of the previous system may also be carried over. Such problems include a tendency to spread or dilute transfers; the variation in effectiveness of community targeting in different contexts and locations; and the difficulty of standardising or comparing the selection and needs assessment criteria in a system which based in effect on relative wealth-ranking within communities. The programme’s focus on public works also risks repeating relief experience in which labour-poor households have been relatively disadvantaged and there have been pressures to minimise the number of non-working (DS) beneficiaries.

The core change in intention between the relief system and the PSNP is a shift of emphasis to longer-term problems and longer-term solutions – in targeting terms, identifying the *chronically* poor and food insecure, and providing them with more stable and predictable transfers. It is not yet clear whether the targeting of the PSNP is sufficiently different from the previous system to achieve these changes.

**Figure 1 : Administrative - Community Targeting Process**



*Adapted / summarised from PIM*

## 2.2. Guidelines and training

### 2.2.1. The Safety Net Targeting Guideline

The need for a separate Safety Net Targeting Guideline (SNTG) was recognised following the first round of training based on the PIM in early 2005. The short sections on targeting contained in the PIM (summarised above) were felt by many, including the donor community, to be inadequate given the history of targeting in Ethiopia. Instructions on targeting criteria, procedures and institutional roles are scattered through the PIM somewhat repetitively, making it difficult to use as a training or reference document.

Unlike the PIM, the SNTG was developed by an independent consultant in close collaboration with the Federal FSCB. The guideline draws on the previous National Food Aid Targeting Guidelines (DPPC 2000) for its overall framework and its explanation of targeting methods and principles, while its specific instructions for household targeting in the PSNP are taken directly from section 4.2 of the PIM. A draft was circulated to regions for comments, and the final English version was released in August 2005. The Safety Net Team at the Federal FSCB translated the guideline from English to Amharic in time for the federal level training of trainers.

A three-day training of trainers (ToT) on targeting was given at the Federal FSCB. A total of 11 participants from Amhara (2); Oromiya (1), SNNPR (2) Tigray (2) Dire Dawa (2) and Harari (2) were trained. Unlike the PIM ToT, the targeting ToT was delivered by the independent consultant who developed the guideline. At the time of the ToT, participants had some experience of implementing the PSNP, including beneficiary targeting. The ToT provided them with an opportunity to discuss and share challenges of implementing the programme.<sup>4</sup>

The ToT participants were expected to train woreda food security/safety net coordinators and other relevant partners in their respective regions. Accordingly, 558 woreda food security coordinators and other relevant stakeholders were trained in the four regions as shown below:

**Table 3: Number of regional level trainees**

Region	Number of trainees	Location of training	Remark
Amhara	150	Dessie and Bahir Dar	Training done in two rounds
Oromiya	161	Nazareth	Training done in two rounds
SNNPR	157	Awassa	Training done in one round; parallel sessions run
Tigray	114	Axum and Mekele	Training done in two rounds
Total	558		

The regional level trainees were expected to train members of the Woreda and Kebele Food Security Taskforces; the latter drawn from each safety net PA in the woreda. Training data gathered from the four safety net regions are given below.<sup>5</sup> Gender

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<sup>4</sup> The targeting training process has been documented in Amdissa Teshome (2005). Report on Safety Net Targeting Training. Report for DFID Ethiopia, Food Security Coordination Bureau, MoARD. Some of these issues were also raised at a forum organised by Save the Children Canada for Oromiya Region in March 2006: see SC-UK/Canada (2006). Proceedings of a Forum on PSNP Implementation (for Regional, Zonal and Woreda level implementers). Bishoftu, Oromiya Region.

<sup>5</sup> For practical reasons, safety net targeting training and watershed management training were combined in some regions particularly where the audience for both trainings were the same.

disaggregated data were not available, but experience from several training sessions suggests that the number of women participants was insignificant.

The Kebele Taskforce members, the PA leader and the DA in particular, took the responsibility to sensitise the community on the safety net in general and targeting in particular. Regional records suggest that substantial numbers of community members were sensitised.

**Table 4:- Number of community members sensitised**

Region	Community members sensitised
Amhara	8,673 <sup>6</sup>
Tigray	3,060
Oromiya	7,504
SNNPR	4,000

Source: Compiled from the respective Food Security Coordination Offices

### **2.2.2. Adaptation and local suitability of the guideline**

The PSNP Targeting Guideline was developed at federal level, with comments from regional Food Security Bureaus but no input from the frontline implementers at woreda and kebele levels. In theory, there was provision for regions to adapt the guideline to their local conditions. However, given the time and resource requirements for adaptation, no attempt was actually made by any of the regions to adapt the guideline to local situations, except translations and producing shorter versions. Accordingly, immediately following the ToT at the federal FSCB, the guideline was translated to Oromiffa and Tigrigna by the respective regions. The Oromiffa translation was done with assistance of a group of NGOs including Care, CRS and Save the Children. The translated versions were used for regional and woreda level training.

#### **Box 2: Beneficiary Targeting Process at PA level (Oromiya Region)**

1. Awareness raising of kebele representatives and elders about safety net programme
2. Selection and awareness raising of community representatives who undertake the programme at kebele level
3. Briefing about the programme objectives to all kebele members
4. Introduce the criteria which can help them to target beneficiary and give them opportunity to add additional ideas
5. Create conducive condition for targeting eligible public works and direct support beneficiaries
6. Brief the community on the first targeting undertaken and post the list at central place
7. Entertain and ascertain the complaints raised and notify the community the final list of beneficiary households
8. Forward the final targeted beneficiary list to KFSTF
9. KFSTF should collect the documents from all communities; investigate how the targeting is done and give corrective advices for errors made
10. KFSTF together with kebele representatives rectify the errors created
11. Brief the kebele community about the compiled documents (list of beneficiaries) and raise awareness that they can raise complaints within 3 days
12. The KFSTF compiles the final documents, describe the targeting process and the problem encountered and then forward it to the WFSTF
13. If the submitted document has errors, return back to the kebele level and discuss and rectify it

Translated by Dabere Mengistu, Agriculture Expert at the Oromiya FSC and DPPC

<sup>6</sup> Disaggregated data are available only for Amhara:- DA=2777 and PA leaders = 5896. Amhara region also reported training 1032 woreda experts.

Two of the four main safety net regions, Tigray and Oromiya, prepared shorter versions of the guideline for community level sensitisation. The Oromiffa version reduced the guideline to a 13-point pocket size leaflet whereas the Tigrigna version was a 14-page document focusing on key issues. Box 1 is a translation of the Oromiffa pocket size leaflet.

### **2.2.3. The role of NGOs in disseminating the targeting guideline**

During the launch of the Food Security Coalition, NGOs felt they were left out of the PSNP design and implementation process. The government also considered PSNP as its sole responsibility. However, in the past year, NGO involvement in the PSNP has increased. Examples of involvement included:

- translation of the Targeting Guideline by CARE (Oromiya);
- preparation of a shortened version of the Targeting Guideline by CARE, Save the Children and CRS (Oromiya);
- support to the regional training effort by CARE (Oromiya); and
- implementation of the PSNP in selected woredas (e.g. CARE in Oromiya; WVE in SNNPR; SC-UK, FHI, and ORDA in Amhara; REST in Tigray).

Some implementing NGOs still feel that they are excluded from the process of targeting beneficiaries, and could contribute more. However, other NGOs such as ORDA and REST feel they have played an important role in targeting by virtue of being members of woreda taskforces.

NGOs have also played an important role in **advocacy** regarding the targeting of the PSNP. For example, REST has consistently argued for increasing the duration of PSNP support to 10 months for Public Works and 12 months for Direct Support. In its operational areas, it has been able to provide 8 months for Public Works and 10 months for Direct Support, which is considerably higher than other PSNP areas. Save the Children UK and other NGOs operating in Amhara lobbied for the reversal of the targeting error of excluding the “third category” - poorest of the poor - during the first year of implementation (see section 3.5 below). The regional government acknowledges this advocacy work by NGOs.

### **2.2.4. Effectiveness of the guideline dissemination**

The training process described above followed a **cascading model**. Its effectiveness should be measured by the degree to which the messages have been internalised and have led to improvement in the targeting process and outcomes on the ground.

The fieldwork for this study found that, on the whole, members of Woreda Food Security Taskforces (WFSTFs) had a reasonable understanding of the targeting principles of the PSNP, and of their roles and responsibilities as outlined in the PIM and Guideline. Evidence from the regions suggested that written copies of the targeting guideline were made available to the WFSTF and that training was cascaded properly. However, in most of the eight focus woredas copies of the guideline were difficult to find, partly because there is no system of ensuring that documents stay with the office when individuals leave.

Familiarity with the guideline and the availability of written copies tends to be weaker at kebele level, and weakest at the community (CFSTF). Copies of the guideline were difficult to find at kebele level, and entirely lacking at community level, partly because there is little or no system of record-keeping at these levels. Most members of CFSTFs are illiterate, which makes the oral dissemination of policy, and continuous back-up from the WFSTF and RRTs, particularly important for the community targeting process.

The high **staff turnover** at all levels, particularly the woreda, has reduced the effectiveness of the training and dissemination efforts. During the field work it was not uncommon for key informants to say “I have only been here (in post) for less than a month”. Staff turnover was a major complaint at all levels - bureau head, department head, team leader and expert.

In regional key informant interviews, it was widely acknowledged that the dissemination of the PIM and establishment of targeting processes was done in a hasty manner in the first year of the PSNP, and that complex issues were not fully internalised by grassroots implementers. At regional level too, instructions and policies on targeting were not always in line with the programme’s principles. For example in Amhara Region, as is widely known, the targeting criteria were ignored to the extent that the poorest households were systematically excluded: this misinterpretation has since been corrected. Various other misunderstandings or errors in the targeting system have been identified by regions and woredas during the rather chaotic first year, and in many cases efforts have been made to correct them. These will be discussed in the following sections, which document the implementation and outcomes of the PSNP targeting so far.

### 3. IMPLEMENTATION: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

#### 3.1. Food Security Task Forces (FSTFs)

Woreda, kebele, and community food security task forces (FSTFs) have been established in most, but not all of this study's field sites. Exceptions are:

- In Derashe, SNNPR, the woreda FSTF was not established until this year. Kebele and community FSTFs, which oversaw the first year's targeting process were bypassed this year and have since been disbanded.
- In Kalu, Amhara, there were no FSTFs at any level in the first year of the programme. This year, however, they have been created at the woreda, kebele and community levels.

In most cases, the composition of the woreda, kebele and community task forces (summarised in Table 5) follows the guideline set out in the PIM. Positions in the WFSTFs are *ex officio*, while the kebele and community FSTFs are a combination of elected and *ex officio* members. **Development Agents (DAs)** were active in all but one of the KFSTFs interviewed. In all four woredas where **NGOs** are involved in implementing the PSNP, they are represented on the WFSTF.

In all the woreda and kebele FSTFs interviewed (and most of the community FSTFs), there was a substantial **overlap between the membership of the task force and the woreda or kebele council**. This is in line with the PIM instructions, and is perhaps inevitable given the limited pool of local government staff and community leaders. However, it is a problem for the independence of the appeals process, as discussed in section 5 below.

**Table 5: Composition of Food Security Task Forces**

	Woreda	WFSTF	KFSTF	CFSTF
Tigray	Enderta	7/11 Council/ Cabinet 5/11 female 0 NGO	4/11 Council / Cabinet 2/11 female (none elected) 1 DA (f) 0 NGO	3/11 Council/ Cabinet 3/11 female (2 elected) 0 DA 0 NGOs
	Kilte Awlalo	7/15 Council / Cabinet 2/15 female 1/15 NGO	7/12 Council/ Cabinet 2/12 female (1 elected) 0 DA 0 NGO	6/14 Council / Cabinet 3/14 female (2 elected) 0 DA 0 NGO
SNNPR	Boricha	6/11 Council / Cabinet 0 female 1/11 NGO	6/7 Council / Cabinet 1/7 female (not elected) 1 DA (f) 0 NGO	<i>No CFSTF</i>
	Derashe	<i>established late (Nov 2005)</i> 7/13 Council / Cabinet 1/13 female 0 NGO	<i>disbanded</i> 6/8 Council / Cabinet 0 female 2 DAs 0 NGO	<i>disbanded</i> 2/7 Council / Cabinet 1/7 female (elected) 0 DA 0 NGO
Oromiya	Chiro	9/13 Council / Cabinet 2/13 female 1/13 NGO	<i>Established June 2005</i> 5/7 Council / Cabinet 1/7 female (not elected) 1 DA 0 NGO	0 Council / Cabinet 1/5 female (elected) 0 DA 0 NGO
	Fedis	5/15 Council / Cabinet 3/15 female 0 NGO	9/13 Council / Cabinet 1/13 female (not elected) 1 DA 0 NGO	<i>disbanded</i>

Amhara	Bugna	2/11 Council/ Cabinet 1/11 female 3/11 NGO	<i>combined KFSTF &amp; CFSTF</i> 17/21 Council / Cabinet 2/21 female (1 elected) 2 DAs (1f) 1 NGO (EOC)	
	Kalu	8/10 Council / Cabinet 2/10 female 0 NGO	<i>established late (Jan 2006)</i> 2/12 Council / Cabinet 4/12 female 2 DAs (1f) 0 NGOs	0 Council / Cabinet 1/5 female (not elected) 0 DAs 0 NGOs

In general there are **few women members of the woreda and kebele food security task forces, and very few in leadership positions**. However, there was at least one woman on all but one of the FSTFs at all levels. The maximum number of women in a woreda task force was 5 out of 11 total members (Enderta). In one focus woreda, Boricha, there were no women on the WFSTF: but in the same woreda, the FSTF in the selected kebele was chaired by a woman DA. (Four out of ten DAs in the selected kebeles were women, an encouraging level of gender balance). Most women task force members are there *ex officio*, by virtue of their position as local government officers (most often head of the Women's Affairs Department), or as leaders of Women's Associations. Very few women were directly elected to the kebele and community task forces. Consequently, the **low representation of women in the FSTFs reflects their position in the wider governance and professional hierarchies**. A stronger requirement, and perhaps a target number, for female elected members of the KFSTF and CFSTF might improve the representation of women's concerns in the targeting process.

"By default, the Women's Affairs office head is a member of the task force. Due to the fact that women are not [heads]... of sectoral offices, the number of women in decision-making positions is very limited."

~ WFSTF member, Bugna




**Members of kebele / sub-kebele Food Security Task Forces, Bugna Woreda, Amhara**

### 3.2. The “quota” system - needs assessment, planning figures and resource allocations

The process of deciding PSNP beneficiary numbers for each community and kebele is an iterative one in which local **estimates of need must be reconciled with finite resources** at the regional and federal levels. Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the process. Planning figures are sent down the government hierarchy, while needs assessment figures and requests are passed up the system from communities through kebeles, woredas and regions, being compiled into larger units at each stage. Decision-makers at the woreda and higher levels must then reconcile the resources requested with those available, and allocate budgets accordingly. The beneficiary lists are finalised once the resource allocations (or quotas, as they are universally called) are received. The woreda divides its quota among its kebeles, and the kebeles divide theirs among the villages. This pragmatic system, like much of the PSNP targeting system, is based on experience with relief distributions. The method and thoroughness of the local needs assessments vary according to factors such as capacity, experience and access.

Figure 2: The “quota” system



One consequence of this process is that the quotas received are almost always less than the resources requested. This causes considerable difficulties for targeting bodies, especially those in the kebele and community who are responsible for producing the list of named households who will participate in the programme. For example in Enderta Woreda (Tigray), the sampled kebele had requested resources for approximately 5,000 Public Works and 120 Direct Support beneficiaries for 2005, but received a quota of 2,500 PW and 89 DS. As the KFSTF explained:

“We made the beneficiary list before we knew the quota. First we did a study of who should get PW and who should get DS: the assessment came from the kushets [communities]. Then the quota came from the woreda, and the resources were already limited so we prioritised. We couldn’t cover all the needy. It was very difficult to distinguish between similar households.”

Various quotas and targets are also being set for the ratio of Direct Support to Public Works beneficiaries, although the PIM states clearly that this ratio should depend on needs and should not be predetermined. According to task force members in the woredas visited, instructions had been received from the regions that the proportion of DS beneficiaries in the total should be a maximum of 20% (Tigray); 15% (Amhara); or 10% (SNNPR). In the Oromiya woredas there did not appear to be a regional

instruction on this issue, but the 80:20 target (presumably carried over from the previous EGS:GR system) was still referred to in the woredas. The actual proportion of registered DS beneficiaries in each woreda is discussed in Section 6.4..

In all the field sites where a DS quota had been set, the number of people assessed by communities as eligible was higher than the quota received. Woredas and kebeles have various ways of managing this. In some, eligible households who cannot be covered by the DS quota are left out altogether. In others they are registered for PW, and then either someone else has to work in their place (as in Enderta, see box), or they actually receive the transfer without working. The latter practice is clearly against instructions, and people are reluctant to discuss it: it is therefore very difficult to assess how common it is, but it was done in at least one of our field sites. One consequence of both tactics is that the DS beneficiary lists may not accurately show how many people who are unable to work are actually being covered by the safety net.

“In this community, we identified about 200 households as eligible for DS but due to the quota only 147 [of them] are benefiting from the programme.” ~ CFSTF, Kilde Awlalo

“Some disabled and elderly people are included in the PW. They don't have household members to support them but they have relatives in the community. The community or relatives work for them, but there are complaints – people are working for themselves and for the disabled. We think these people should get DS.... This year they [the woreda] gave us a quota of 34 DS beneficiaries, but we assessed 65 who need DS, so 30 of them are on the public works programme.” ~ CFSTF, Enderta

### 3.3. Geographical targeting within woredas

As mentioned in Section 2, woredas are required to allocate PSNP resources and beneficiary numbers to kebeles, but no detailed guidance is given on how they should do this. In practice, the study found that three of the eight woredas visited selected some kebeles and excluded others, while the other five included all kebeles. In either case, woredas allocated different levels of resources to different kebeles (measured by the beneficiary numbers as a percentage of population). Factors taken into account in this allocation variously included population size; past relief receipts; natural resources; recent harvest estimates; and in some cases more detailed livelihood and food security assessments. Within the kebeles, all communities were included: again, the relative concentration of coverage depended on local assessments of food insecurity, some more detailed than others. Table 6 summarises the proportions covered at each level.

“The total number of beneficiaries in each tabia is decided through two major criteria. The first is the number of emergency beneficiaries in the past, and the second is the total production in the recent meher [main harvest] season.” ~ WFSTF, Enderta (Tigray)

“Initially the ... DPPC relief (early warning) data for 3-5 years was collected and sent to the ... region. ... Then the quota comes from the region to the woreda. Considering this information and ...resources ... (like irrigation potential, topography, soil fertility and population pressure), the woreda distributes the resource to each kebele. There is no annual need assessment disaggregated by the kebele.” ~ WFSTF, Kalu (Amhara)

Criteria for kebele targeting are “population size, extent of poverty, landholding and accessibility.” WFSTF, Boricha (SNNPR)

“To make resource distribution for all PAs in this woreda, we established some criteria ... like wealth ranking technique to identify the chronically food insecure households. We also have a long run [10 year] list of relief beneficiaries and the population size of all PAs.” ~ WFSTF, Fedis (Oromiya)

**Table 6: Geographical targeting concentrations by woreda**

		% Woreda population covered	Within woreda				Within selected kebele			
			Kebeles included		% Kebele population covered		Villages * included		% Village population covered	
			No.	%	min	max	No.	%	min	max
Enderta	2005	37%	17/17	100%	13%	to 67%	4/4	100%	41%	to 55%
	2006	-	-	-	-	-	4/4	100%	72%	to 89%
Kilte Awlalo	2005	75%	16/16	100%	33%	to 95%	3/3	100%	80%	to 80%
	2006	-	-	-	-	-	3/3	100%	57%	to 98%
Boricha	2005	8%	22/46	48%	-	-	17/17	100%	-	-
	2006	15%	42/46	91%	-	-	-	-	-	-
Derashe	2005	-	17/26	65%	-	-	7/7	100%	9%	to 14%
	2006	19%	21/26	81%	11%	to 50%	7/7	100%	18%	to 24%
Chiro	2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2006	22%	27/39	69%	6%	to 39%	9/9	100%	17%	to 31%
Fedis	2005	-	25/25	100%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2006	31%	25/27	93%	14%	to 48%	8/8	100%	7%	to 12%
Bugna	2005	27%	37/37	100%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2006	35%	37/37	100%	26%	to 50%	3/3	100%	27%	to 30%
Kalu	2005	30%	35/35	100%	8%	to 64%	5/5	100%	25%	to 38%
	2006	28%	35/35	100%	13%	to 50%	5/5	100%	-	-

\* The local definition of “village” depended on the level at which FSTFs were established and PSNP beneficiary records were kept. This level was the *kushet* in Tigray; the *gasha* in SNNPR; the *ganda* in Oromiya; and the *nus-kebele* (sub-kebele) or *got* in the Amhara woredas visited.

- data not available.

**Data sources:** Woreda FSTF / Food Security Offices; KFSTF and CFSTF interviews

In the kebeles visited by this study, the lowest percentage of the village population that CFSTFs had been required to target was 7% (in Fedis), while the highest was 98% (in Kilte Awlalo). Community targeting is generally agreed to be more successful in some cultural and governance contexts than others. The findings of this study tend to support the observation that the institutions and procedures for community targeting decisions, as well as the degree of consensus and transparency, are more highly developed in Tigray than in some other parts of Ethiopia. However, the figures above also highlight another significant factor: selecting 80% or 90% of a community is very much easier and less likely to generate conflict than selecting 10% or 20%.

### 3.4. Community members’ perceptions of the targeting process

Table 7 summarises the survey results on households’ perceptions of who had actually decided the targeting in their community. It shows a range of responses (as expected, given the observed variation in targeting institutions and process among the field sites). However, most people thought that the decisions had been made either at kebele or community level: the Kebele FSTF was the most frequently-mentioned body among both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The key role of the DAs, who may be involved in targeting both in their individual official capacity and as members of the KFSTF or CFSTF, was mentioned by 21% of beneficiaries and 13% of non-beneficiaries.

**Table 7: Perceptions of local decision-making by beneficiary category**

Who decided which households in the community would be included in the PSNP?	% of households (ranked)	
	Beneficiaries	Non-beneficiaries
Kebele Food Security Task Force	<b>52.2</b>	<b>44.7</b>
The community (we all decided together)	46.7	36.8
Kebele Council or Administration	34.2	22.1
Community Food Security Task Force	31.9	26.3
D.A.	20.7	13.2
Woreda Food Security Task Force	0.8	0.5
Woreda Council or Administration	0.3	0
Don't know	2.2	6.3

Table 8 disaggregates the same responses by region, showing that the role of the community was stronger in the Tigray and SNNPR woredas, while the KFSTF was by far the most important decision-making body in the Amhara and Oromiya sites. Across the whole sample, 78% of beneficiary households and 45% of non-beneficiaries considered that the targeting decisions made in their community were fair.

**Table 8: Perceptions of local decision-making by Region and beneficiary category**

Who decided which households in the community would be included in the PSNP?	% of households							
	Amhara		SNNPR		Oromiya		Tigray	
	Ben.	Non-ben.	Ben.	Non-ben.	Ben.	Non-ben.	Ben.	Non-ben.
Woreda Food Security Task Force	0	0	0	0	3.1	2.2	0	0
Woreda Council or Administration	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	0
The D.A.	36.6	38.3	13.1	8.2	28.6	6.5	4.2	0
Kebele Food Security Task Force	<b>90.6</b>	<b>91.5</b>	19.4	4.1	<b>97.4</b>	<b>84.8</b>	1.0	2.1
Kebele Council or Administration	36.6	14.9	35.6	16.3	54.2	34.8	10.5	22.9
Community Food Security Task Force	18.3	10.6	23.0	24.5	5.7	2.2	<b>80.6</b>	<b>66.7</b>
The community (we all decided together)	48.2	53.2	<b>60.7</b>	<b>51.0</b>	77.1	41.3	0.5	2.1
Don't know	0	0	1.0	10.2	1.0	8.7	6.8	6.3
There was no selection – everyone in the village received something	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.1

### 3.5. Changes in targeting practice from 2005 to 2006

In all the woredas and kebeles visited, local decision-makers felt that there had been improvements in targeting from the first to the second year, and that the process ran more smoothly the second time round. These improvements were variously attributed to better understanding of the PSNP principles, more involvement of community members (as in Kalu, above) and in some places specific instructions from higher levels to correct such errors as cutting family numbers, excluding the landless, or targeting the better off. Quotas were also higher in most places, making the targeting process less contentious. The most dramatic change in targeting practice was the widely-reported case of Amhara Region (summarised in the box below).

#### Amhara Region's "U-turn" on targeting

In the first year of PSNP operation (2005), Amhara Region took a policy decision to target the safety net on the "middle-class" category of households – i.e. neither the poorest nor the wealthiest, but those with some land and other assets who were likely to be able to "graduate" into food security with the support of the PSNP and OFSPs. Simultaneously, many of those excluded from the safety net, particularly the young and landless, were targeted for resettlement.

This strategy has its own logic, but is clearly contrary to the targeting priorities of the PSNP as agreed between the government and donors. In response to pressure from donors and the federal government, and in the face of rising emergency needs and a high level of complaints from excluded households, the region reversed its targeting policy for the second year's targeting. For 2006, the woredas were instructed to ensure selection of the poorest.

This experience highlights the tension within the programme between the "graduation" objective and the commitment to supporting the poorest.

The balance between administrative and community control of targeting, and the details of procedures by which households were actually selected, varied widely from place to place and also from the first to the second year.

For example, in Derashe (SNNPR) there was **little community participation** during the first PSNP targeting process (2005). The Kebele administrator, the development agent (DA) and the kebele and community FSTFs identified beneficiary households through their own knowledge about households and by interviewing key informants (e.g. village elders) to determine who should be included. Once the list was completed, there was no community verification or approval process: the names of beneficiaries it were not read out or publicly posted and there were no kebele or village meetings. Following this experience, the woreda disbanded the KFSTF and CFSTF. For the second year (2006), instead of targeting through the community and kebele task forces, the kebele chairperson and the DA called household heads from each village (*ketena*) under its jurisdiction to the kebele offices. A meeting was held in which these officials facilitated a wealth ranking based on household assets. This appears to have been a **far more participatory and community driven process** than during the first year of targeting.

Kalu (Amhara) is a further example where the community targeting process was more bottom-up and more transparent in the second year than the first. This case is described in Box 3.

### **Box 3: Targeting in Kalu: from top-down to bottom-up**

The improvements that can be made in the accountability of the targeting process are illustrated through a comparison of targeting in 2005 and 2006 in Kalu Woreda, Amhara.

#### **2005 targeting process**

There were no woreda, kebele or community FSTFs in the first year of the programme. Instead targeting in 2005 was conducted entirely by regional and woreda level administrators. As elsewhere in Amhara, households were divided into three categories according to their food security and assets and likelihood of graduating from the programme. These targeting decisions were based on a brief needs assessment and the knowledge of local administrators and key informants.

The targeting process created a great deal of confusion and anxiety, particularly among those who feared resettlement and others who thought it was an assessment for taxation.

#### **2006 targeting process**

The 2006 targeting process was as community driven and transparent as the 2005 process was top-down and opaque. Early in 2006, woreda and kebele FSTFs were created. These KFSTF in turn called community meetings at the *got* level in which villager elected a community FSTF.

In March 2006, the CFSTFs called *got*-level meetings of all households. At these meetings, task force members ranked and DAs registered all households according to their months of food insecurity. A task force member then read out the names of each household head in order and each household ranking was debated by the meeting. Based on this feedback, households were moved up or down the ranking.

Once finalised at the *got* level, the list of beneficiaries was forwarded to the kebele. The KFSTF called a general assembly meeting for discussion and confirmation of the decision made at *got* level. During this meeting, names of beneficiaries, their family size, age etc. were read out and confirmed by the general assembly. The kebele set a two day period in which appeals to the list could be heard, then passed the list of beneficiaries to the woreda FSTF for approval.

As a safeguard, the woreda FSTF established a technical committee to visit 15 of the woreda's 35 kebeles. In each of these sample kebeles, the woreda committee called a general meeting and again read out the list of beneficiaries and their details.

The woreda produced its own brief targeting guideline for community FSTFs. It also produced a registration card for all beneficiaries to identify the household and its characteristics and to track transfers.

Overall the study team's interviews revealed a strong sense of ownership and satisfaction with the 2006 targeting process, particularly when compared to the process in the previous year. As one non-beneficiary commented:

“We do not have any complaints or grievances on the targeting process done this year because our involvement was very high. Some of us even excluded ourselves from the programme during the community meeting since we are relatively better off than those targeted households.”

## 4. TARGETING OUTCOMES

### 4.1. Who are the beneficiaries?

This section aims to give some insight into what kinds of people are being included in or excluded from the PSNP, and why. It identifies types of error observed, and considers why these may be arising and how they could be minimised. It draws both on discussions held with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and decision-makers in the selected communities during the qualitative fieldwork, and on the data generated by the household survey administered by the parallel Trends in Transfers study. More statistically representative analysis of targeting accuracy in the PSNP will be produced in late 2006 by the large-scale Baseline Survey currently being implemented by IFPRI on behalf of the government. The discussion here aims to complement that work, not to second-guess its findings.

Overall, the impression from the qualitative fieldwork is that **PSNP resources are going mainly to the poor and food-insecure**,<sup>7</sup> and that considerable efforts are being made by decision-makers in local government and communities to apply the targeting guidelines as well as they can. There are, inevitably, problems, errors, and room for improvement: these are discussed in various sections of this report. In general, however, **the targeting system appears to be working fairly well**, perhaps better than might have been expected given the scale and speed of the programme start-up, and the widespread capacity constraints.

This conclusion is supported by the Trends study, which finds that PSNP beneficiaries in the focus woredas had substantially lower incomes, farmed less land, and owned a lower value of assets than non-beneficiaries. They also had less labour and higher age-based dependency ratios, and were more likely to have suffered food shortage in the past year.

The household survey also found that 70% of Direct Support beneficiary households were older-headed; 56% were female-headed; and 20% included one or more disabled person (compared to 22%, 27% and 7% respectively for the whole sample). All the Direct Support beneficiaries interviewed during the qualitative fieldwork were obviously eligible (mostly old or disabled, some breastfeeding or pregnant).

#### 4.1.1. Perceived selection criteria

Table 9 compares the reasons for the survey households' inclusion or exclusion from the PSNP, according to their own perceptions. Relative **poverty** was the most frequently reported reason for both inclusion and exclusion: 86% of beneficiary households, and 37% of non-beneficiaries, said that this criterion had been used in targeting (agreeing that the targeted households were poorer than the excluded ones). **Food access, farming assets (landholding and livestock), and off-farm income** – all valid indicators in line with the PIM and Targeting Guideline - were also among the criteria most frequently reported by both included and excluded households. However, almost 11% of the non-beneficiaries thought that **not having friends or relatives among the local decision-makers** was a reason for their exclusion. Issues of potential bias or nepotism are discussed in the appeals section, below.

**Landlessness** appears as a perceived reason both for inclusion (14.5% of beneficiary households) and for exclusion (2.6% of non-beneficiary households). The low

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<sup>7</sup> Again the clear exception is the systematic mis-targeting of better-off groups in Amhara Region in the first phase of the PSNP, which is reflected in the household survey findings (see Trends report p.26). This has now been corrected. In the Amhara woredas visited, the current targeting is focused on the poor.

percentage of the latter is encouraging: landlessness should not disqualify people from the PSNP, although the qualitative fieldwork found that in some places this had been done during the first year of implementation. In Amhara Region in particular, it has been widely acknowledged (and the fieldwork for this study confirmed) that in the first year of PSNP implementation targeting was closely linked with resettlement, and landless households were excluded on the basis that they should resettle. This misinterpretation of the PSNP principles now appears to have been corrected.

The current policy direction is towards linking the targeting of other Food Security Programmes more closely with the safety-net targeting, in order to maximise the potential for graduation (see linkages study, (Slater, Ashley et al. 2006). Care must be taken to **ensure that this linkage does not result in renewed pressure to exclude landless eligible households** from the safety net, or indeed from credit and livelihood development programmes (since non-agricultural diversification will be crucial for the achievement of food security). Other research (e.g. (Sharp, Devereux et al. 2003)) shows that many *de jure* landless people are in fact farming through share-cropping or other land access institutions, and provide a crucial labour source for households unable to farm their own land.

Beneficiaries tend to be better informed about targeting processes than non-beneficiaries. Sixteen percent of non-beneficiaries did not know why they had been excluded, compared to less than half a percent of beneficiaries who did not know why they had been included. It is not clear to what extent this is cause or effect.

## 4.2. Exclusion and inclusion

The PSNP has a **large inherent exclusion rate**, in the sense that the number of chronically food insecure people is generally agreed to be higher than the resources of the Safety Net can cover. The definition (and therefore quantification) of chronic food insecurity remains problematic, but the following parameters are relevant:

- The GoE Food Security Strategy [2002: para.16] notes that “the incidence of food poverty is ... estimated at 50% of the population; 52% in the rural areas and 37% in the urban areas.”
- 46% of rural households were found to be in food deficit <sup>8</sup> in 1995/96 (a good harvest year) (Clay, Daniel Molla et al. 1998). In the same year, official data showed that 47% of the rural population were below a national income poverty line based on 2000 kcal/day.
- The government’s Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) 2004 (Analytical Report) finds that 34% of rural households suffered some food shortage during the year.
- Even if the projected reduction in the poverty headcount to 34% by 2004/05 has been achieved, this still represents approximately 24 million people.

It is clearly unrealistic for the Safety Net to expand to such a scale. The point is that the chronically food insecure are not an easily separable minority: **the targeting of the Safety Net depends on relative need** (the prioritisation of the most food insecure) rather than identifying a clear category of people using absolute criteria. This dilemma was expressed by key informants, decision-makers and potential beneficiaries at each level of the administrative hierarchy. All the communities visited by the targeting study considered that the number of eligible people in their kebele or village was higher than the quota of Safety Net places they were allocated, making it both technically and socially difficult to divide beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries.

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<sup>8</sup> Food deficit was defined as net per capita food availability of less than 2,100 kcal per day.

**Table 9: Perceived reasons for inclusion and exclusion**

BENEFICIARIES (n = 764)			NON-BENEFICIARIES (n = 170)		
REASONS FOR INCLUSION	% HHs	Order of frequency	REASONS FOR EXCLUSION	% HHs	Order of frequency
<b>Poverty</b>					
Household is poor	86.4	1	Less poor than selected households	36.5	1
<b>Food Access or Production</b>					
Can't get enough food to eat	49.7	2	Have enough food	24.5	2
Don't produce enough food	37.1	3	-		
<b>Land</b>					
Small landholding	29.8	4	Some / enough / better quality land	15.6	4
Landless	14.5	8	Landless	2.6	10
Poor quality land	12.2	9	-		
<b>Off-Farm Income</b>					
No off-farm income, or very little	23.3	5	Household has other income	7.8	7
<b>Livestock</b>					
No livestock, or very few	17.8	6	Household owns livestock	17.2	3
<b>Labour</b>					
No labour	17.4	7	Not able to work on PSNP projects	3.1	9
<b>Remittances / Family Support</b>					
No family support or remittances	12.2	10	Receives family support or remittances	2.6	11
<b>Demographics and Health</b>					
Household head is female *	11.1	11	-		
Household head is old	8.2	12	-		
Household member(s) sick	6.5	14	-		
Household member(s) disabled	4.8	15	-		
Large family / many dependents	0.5	18	-		
<b>Linkages with Other Programmes</b>					
Received emergency aid in previous years	7.7	13	Did not receive emergency aid in previous years	10.4	6
Participating in other food security programmes	0.1	20	Not participating in OFSPs	4.7	8
No assistance from other programmes	1.3	16	-		
Member of extension package	0.8	17	-		
<b>Other Reasons</b>					
Complained about exclusion	0.3	19	No friends or relatives among decision-makers	10.9	5
			Not registered on the Kebele household list	2.1	12
			Not willing to work on PSNP projects	1	13
<b>Don't know</b>	0.3		<b>Don't know</b>	16.1	
<b>No selection</b> – everyone received something	0.4				

\* 33% of female-headed beneficiary households considered that their gender was a reason for selection

Table 10 shows that, in the household survey, 88% of beneficiaries and 70% of non-beneficiaries reported experiencing three or more months of food shortage in the preceding year. Exclusion error can be calculated in various ways, but if we define it as the proportion of the eligible population who are non-beneficiaries, these figures suggest an exclusion error of about 17% (137 / 807) within the selected communities, measured by this one indicator. Conversely, the implied inclusion error is about 12% (94 / 764 beneficiaries reported less than 3 months' food shortage).<sup>9</sup> However, it is difficult to interpret these findings as meaningful exclusion and inclusion rates, for two reasons. Firstly, the household sample is not statistically representative, particularly of non-beneficiaries.<sup>10</sup> Secondly, the food shortage indicator alone is not a satisfactory measure of food insecurity and is likely to be affected by participation in the PSNP (i.e. the safety net transfers themselves should have reduced beneficiaries' food shortage). Perhaps most significant is the fact that 89% of *all sampled households* reported some food shortage, with 84% reporting 3 months or more of food shortage. This underlines the prevalence of food insecurity, and the perception within communities that more people than the "quota" allows are in need of safety net assistance.

**Table 10: Food shortage by beneficiary category**

Household category	Months of food shortage in the preceding 12 months (number and percentage of households)		
	0 to < 3 months	3+ months	Total
PW Beneficiaries	76 12.48%	533 87.52%	609 100%
DS Beneficiaries	18 11.61%	137 88.39%	155 100%
All Beneficiaries	94 12.30%	670 87.70%	764 100%
Non-beneficiaries	59 30.10%	137 69.90%	196 100%
Total	153 15.94%	807 84.06%	960 100%

*Note: The differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households are statistically significant at the 1% level. Differences between types of beneficiary are not significant.*

*Source: Household survey*

Interestingly, participants in proportional piling discussions<sup>11</sup> about targeting in their communities **did not identify inclusion error as a significant problem**. Certainly there are cases of wrongful inclusion as well as exclusion (see appeals section), and

<sup>9</sup> The *Trends in Transfers* report applies a zero threshold for food shortage (rather than the 3 months used here) to the same data. This does not significantly alter the findings: 11% of beneficiaries and 29% of non-beneficiaries reported experiencing no food shortage at all in the previous year, compared to 12% and 30% reporting less than 3 months' shortage. [Devereux et al. 2006: 18-19]

<sup>10</sup> See Trends report for details of the sampling.

<sup>11</sup> See Annex 4 for an explanation of the methodology.

there is considerable argument within communities over which households lie just one side or the other of the threshold for registration: but in discussing the overall situation in the community, none of the beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups with whom we held this discussion said that any “food-secure” households were included in the PSNP this year. On the other hand, participants in all eight woredas said that some households who were “always food insecure” had been left out because of the limited “quota”. Their estimates of the proportion (i.e. the approximate exclusion rate) ranged from 4% in Enderta to 63% in Boricha.

In the woredas visited, the study found no evidence of deliberate exclusion on the grounds of ethnicity, caste, or gender.

### 4.3. Dilution and full-family targeting

The targeting error of “dilution” can be defined as the spreading or sharing of transfer resources among a larger number of beneficiaries than budgeted for. This, of course, reduces the amount received by each beneficiary. If there is a high degree of dilution, the impact of the assistance received at household level may be very weak. Dilution by targeting authorities is different from voluntary post-distribution sharing by beneficiaries.

Dilution is a common tendency in community-managed targeting systems, and has been a widespread feature of past relief distributions in Ethiopia (Sharp 1997). The pressure to share resources among as many people as possible, particularly given the inherent exclusion rate discussed above, is understandable. Community leaders responsible for household targeting often explain openly why and how they have done this, and consider it fairer than selecting only a few people.

However, in the PSNP there has been a concerted effort to reduce dilution in order to maximise the impact of the transfers in helping targeted households towards food security. Official policy is that households targeted for the PSNP should receive transfers for all household members (“full-family targeting”): the entitlement is calculated on the basis of 5 days’ work (or the equivalent free payment for DS) per person per month.

This study found that **dilution is still occurring, but that the FSTFs have received clear instructions to avoid it** and on the whole are trying to comply in the current round of targeting. The commonest method of dilution is by **cutting the family size** (i.e. registering an eligible household, but not counting all its members). In Boricha (SNNPR) in 2005 a flat-rate transfer of 150 Birr was given to all targeted households regardless of size: this has been corrected in 2006. Another method, particularly for public works (and previously for EGS) is by **rotating the beneficiary lists** so that each month a different group of households is given the opportunity to participate. An example of these methods is explained in the box below.

“Some households who are always food insecure are excluded from the SN due to limited quota”

- Focus group in Kalu

“24 households (about 40% of the “always food insecure”) are not included because the (resources) given from the KFSTF could not accommodate them. They are not happy with the exclusion and consider (themselves) left out. Half of them are included in the relief. They complained and were told that the KFSTF is requesting more resources for them.”

- Focus group in Chiro

"During the first targeting (in 2005), 22 and 9 individuals were targeted for PWs and DS respectively, for one month. In the next month some beneficiaries were cancelled from the list and ... others replaced them. It went on like that until the first year SNP was accomplished. Moreover, family size was not considered during the targeting process. .... What we did with regards to wage payment was, reducing the number of PW participants within the household and paying only for those individuals (not the whole family) so as to save resources and redistribute to others .... Our intention was to reach the majority of the village community so as to avoid conflict .... But the whole process created confusion and conflict within the community and the woreda administration took measures and abolished the CFSTF."

"Due to [the] quota limitation the CFSTF targeted 1 or 2 or 3 eligible individuals from each household for PW, through negotiation with targeted households ... to us it seemed fair though it was against the guidelines."

Former members of disbanded CFSTF, Derashe, SNNPR

Some indication of the extent of transfer dilution can be gained from woreda beneficiary statistics, which tend to show a lower number of people registered per household than the actual average household size. Findings from the household survey also indicate that the value of transfers received is often lower than it would be if beneficiaries were receiving an entitlement for the full family and the full distribution period. Those paid only in food received an average of 71kg per capita during the year, compared to the planned amount of 90kg (3kg x 5 days x 6 months). For those receiving cash only, the overall per capita mean was 125 Birr (a little less than \$16), compared to the planned amount of 180 Birr (6 Birr x 5 days x 6 months).

The survey data also show that the amount of transfer received does rise with household size, suggesting that the number of people to be supported was taken into account during targeting. However, the amount received varies greatly and is generally less than planned. The minimum *per capita* amount received among cash-only beneficiaries (n = 99 households) was 14 Birr (approx. \$1.70) for the year. This may be *prima facie* evidence for the extent of dilution, and certainly illustrates how tiny the value of these transfers can be if they are spread too thinly. On the other hand, it may also reflect other problems such as the delayed start and variable frequency of payments in the first year of implementation, or households working fewer days than allocated (whether through choice, or inability to provide enough labour). **Ongoing monitoring of dilution is needed.**

## 5. APPEALS AND MONITORING

### 5.1. Appeals

#### 5.1.1. Appeals mechanisms in theory

According to the PIM individuals, households and groups have the right to appeal against targeting decisions. The kebele council/cabinet is responsible for hearing 'any complaints, claims or appeals ... on the beneficiary selection process' and for taking 'appropriate corrective measures in consultation with the WFSTF.' The woreda council or cabinet, however, provides a second tier of appeal ((MoARD 2004), section 3.2.).

These principles are further developed in the Targeting Guideline, which states that the **appeals process should be 'simple and efficient'**. It should be handled in an informal manner and should not emulate a formal judicial process. Appeals should ideally be resolved at the kebele level. The appeals process should be responsive and handled in a timely manner: the targeting manual suggests that kebele and woreda cabinets/councils should review and respond to an appeal within two days and three days respectively (FSCB 2005): Section 5).

Community, kebele and woreda FSTFs also have the right to appeal to higher administrative levels if they believe that they are not receiving enough resources to cover the number of beneficiaries in their area or that existing beneficiaries are under-provisioned. According to the PIM, appeals from the community FSTF should be made to the KFSTF. The kebele task force should then verify the claim for increased resources or increased benefit numbers, then forward this on to the WFSTF for consideration. Kebele FSTF are similarly entitled to appeal to the woreda level and the woreda is entitled to appeal to the regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development. The contingency fund, which is equal to 20 percent of the base programme costs, exists largely to respond to these appeals.

#### 5.1.2. Appeals mechanisms in practice

In all woredas assessed for this appraisal, mechanisms for addressing grievances with the targeting process are formally in place. These mechanisms are functioning to various degrees of effectiveness, but **overall they are failing to provide an efficient or effective appeals structure.**

The vast majority of appeals are made to kebele and woreda officials. According to the household survey, 81 percent of those households who have made appeals made these appeals to kebele authorities and 19 percent submitted appeals to woreda authorities. Interviews and focus groups revealed that a handful of appellants approach other individuals (e.g. RRT members) and organisations (e.g. implementing NGOs) with complaints.

Although individuals are generally appealing to the right people (the kebele and woreda administration) this **does not mean that there is always a clear appeals process in place or that there is a high degree of awareness about appeals process.** In practice, appellants present complaints to kebele and woreda administrators because they are the key decision makers at the local level, not necessarily because they are aware that these officials have a mandate to address appeals. The lack of awareness of who to appeal to and how to appeal targeting decisions is revealed in the survey data: of those households that did not make an appeal about targeting, 79 percent stated that they did not complain because they either did not know who to complain to or that there was no one to whom they could complain.

In five of the eight woredas examined for this appraisal, appeals are formally handled by the kebele and woreda cabinet members, as the PIM and Targeting Guidelines recommend. Appeals are largely oral and rarely written. They tend to be made to cabinet members, usually the kebele administrator or the DA. These administrators then refer the case to kebele cabinet or community or kebele FSTF for assessment and adjudication.

In some woredas, NGOs play a role in the appeals process, particularly those NGOs that are implementing the PSNP on the ground. These appeals tend to occur during food or cash distributions when beneficiaries and NGO representatives come face to face. NGOs such as REST and ORDA, which are more actively engaged in task forces serve as conduits for complaints to woreda and regional officials. In a few cases, NGOs also provide an alternative grievance mechanism for those who either do believe they would be given a fair hearing through the formal administrative structures or who have exhausted other formal avenues of appeal.

Rapid response teams currently play a limited role in the appeals processes. RRT members report that they sometimes receive individual and group appeals related to targeting and other facets of the programme. RRTs seldom reach the kebele or community level, however, and therefore have little direct contact with potential appellants.

In three of our focus woredas, **separate appeals bodies** have been established.

- In Chiro Woreda (Oromiya), there is an appeals committee in our focus kebele, Wachu Eltoke. The three-person committee was elected by a gathering of all kebele and sub-kebele councillors in October 2005. The members elected included the security and justice officer in the kebele and two village elders (one man and one woman). The mandate of the appeals committee, according to its members, was to receive and adjudicate complaints about PSNP targeting, including allegations of nepotism or corruption.
- In Fedis Woreda (also in Oromiya) the appeals committee is a sub-committee of the KFSTF and is chaired by the kebele justice and security officer.
- In Kalu (Amhara) the woreda FSTF has established a two-person committee (one male and one female) from woreda rural development office to listen to appeals. This committee acts as a woreda RRT and visits kebeles where complaints have been raised. They call an open meeting at the kebele office in which the appellants are asked to present their cases.

### 5.1.3. *Who appeals and why?*

The PSNP is subject to several **broad types of appeals**:

1. First, there are appeals from **those who believe they are wrongly excluded** from beneficiary lists. This is the most common form of appeal. In all woredas, kebeles and villages visited there were appeals made by those who believed that they should be direct support or public works beneficiaries, but were not.
2. Second, there are appeals from those who were **selected as beneficiaries in the first targeting process, but whose names have subsequently been removed from the lists**. There are several common reasons why these households have been deselected.

In Amhara, where the regional policy changed from targeting households likely to graduate in 2005 to targeting poorer households in 2006, many middling households have now found themselves off the public works beneficiary lists. One NGO estimates that there

‘Last year I was benefiting from the programme and (now I am) excluded from this year’s safety net without changing my livelihood.’—  
appellant in Kilde Awlalo Woreda, Tigray

has been a 75 percent turnover of beneficiaries in the Amhara woredas in which it is implementing the safety net from 2005 to 2006. In these woredas, there has been a high number of complaints from de-selected households this year. This tendency is reaffirmed in the March 2006 Amhara RRT report which states: 'In some kebeles, households who are excluded due to this year targeting criteria – according to the PIM - are complaining, this includes some of the kebele leaders who have the responsibility of coordinating PSNP implementation at kebele level.'

Appeals have come from those who have been deselected from the PSNP as a result of an increase in their asset base or food security during the first year of the programme. In some cases, this improvement stems entirely from the loans they have taken from the food security programme's credit scheme. Without inclusion in the PSNP, their gains may be imperilled. As one Tigrayan household head told the appraisal team: "I have a few livestock purchased with the credit obtained from Dedebit Micro Finance Institute (DMFI). They are still not my own and belong to the institution until I settle my debt. However, I am excluded from the safety net on the assumption that I own assets."

Others have been deselected from the safety net to open up spaces for those who have successfully appealed for inclusion.

3. A third group of appellants are those who have been **rotated out of the safety net to spread PSNP resources to others** in the community (see Section 4). In Derashe Woreda, SNNPR, for instance some beneficiaries were rotated out of the direct support list each month in 2005 in an effort to target as many within the community as possible. This practice led to a high number of complaints. Out of the eight participants in the study's non-beneficiary focus group in Derashe, six had complained to the kebele administration about being rotated out of the safety net.

*In Bugna and other Amhara woredas, complaints have come from both poor and middle-level households since the poor were excluded in the first year and middle were excluded in the second.*

4. A fourth group of appellants are those who believe that they should be on **direct support, but are classified as public works beneficiaries**. As noted above, there is often pressure to minimise the number of direct support beneficiaries targeted. Some beneficiaries who should be on direct support, therefore have been classified as public works beneficiaries. In both the Tigrayan woredas explored, households without any labour were classified as public works beneficiaries with the assumption that relatives and neighbours would work on their behalf. In Shumsheha Kebele, Bugna Woreda, Amhara, the kebele officials note that around 65 public works beneficiary households have appealed to receive direct support since the safety net's inception.

5. A fifth source of appeals stems from the **partial targeting of some households**, or cutting of family numbers (see the section on dilution). Although some household heads accept partial targeting as a way to spread safety net resources across the community, some have complained to kebele and woreda officials in an effort to increase their household's allocation.

**Appeals for direct support**

'There are people who are excluded from the direct support though they are aged and weak like us. These people appealed for inclusion to the village administration by written letters. But they didn't get any response. But they cancelled some from our group and add some every time without considering those who have been complaining'

~ DS beneficiary, Derashe (SNNPR)

#### **5.1.4. Effectiveness, efficiency and quality of the appeals process**

Although there has been improvement from year one to year two, in most of the study's focus woredas formal appeals mechanisms are **not as effective or efficient as they should be**. Appellants included in the study consistently expressed their frustration and dissatisfaction with the appeals process. This lack of efficiency and effectiveness stems from the teething pains entailed in the first two years of operation, capacity constraints, limitations imposed by the indicative planning figures (quotas), and weak reporting systems.

Although the Targeting Guideline (Section 7, Box 11) does include some points on monitoring the appeals process, this is not reflected in the PIM and no system or requirement for such monitoring has been set in place. As a result there is **little incentive for local officials to track appeals and their outcomes**. Perhaps as a result of this lack of guidance, there is a **fundamental lack of records and monitoring of appeals processes** and outcomes in almost all woredas visited. Kebele and woreda officials were consistently unable to provide the research team with precise and reliable information about appeals: the numbers of people appealing, why they appealed, what number of appellants was successful, and why appeals were approved or rejected. Without these records, there is no way to track individual cases and to monitor whether certain groups are systematically excluded or favoured in the appeals process, and whether scarce resources are being fairly allocated.

##### **Collective appeals**

In most cases it is individual households that are making appeals. In several of our field sites, however, there was a tendency for **collective complaints** to be voiced to the kebele or woreda council/cabinet.

In Bugna Woreda (Amhara) landless youths who were excluded from the PSNP and 'encouraged' to resettle during the first year of the programme, complained en masse to the kebele offices.

In Chiro Woreda (Oromiya), following the first year of targeting, on several occasions groups of individuals who believed that they were entitled to inclusion in the programme banded together and descended on the kebele offices to complain. They camped in the office compound—guns on their laps—and waited for their cases to be heard.

Given the lack of records, the analysis below is based on interviews with woreda and kebele officials, focus group discussions and the qualitative household survey.

In many of our focus woredas, there has been a high rate of appeals to the safety net, particularly in the first year of the programme. Of the non-beneficiary households surveyed, 55 percent thought that their exclusion from the safety net programme was unfair. This perception was particularly prevalent in Tigray where 77 percent of non-beneficiaries surveyed thought their exclusion unfair. In Amhara, on the other hand, 33 percent of households thought that they were unfairly excluded. In SNNPR and Oromiya, this rate was 63 percent and 47 percent respectively.

**Table 11: Non-beneficiaries' perception of fairness and complaints, by Region**

Reasons	Amhara	SNNPR	Oromiya	Tigray	Total
Do you think the targeting decision was fair? [% Yes]	66.0	36.7	53.2	22.9	45.5
If NO (not fair), did you complain? [% Yes]	71.4	41.9	40.0	54.1	47.1
Successful complaints [% of all complaints]	0.0	30.8	66.7	10.0	21.2

Source: Household survey

Just under half (47 percent) of the household heads who believe that they were unfairly excluded from the PSNP have appealed.<sup>12</sup> Again there is regional variation to the likelihood of appealing. In Amhara 71 percent of these households appealed, while in SNNPR, Oromiya, and Tigray the percentages were lower (42, 40 and 54 percent respectively).

In most woredas surveyed, aspects of the appeals process appears to have improved since the first year of the PSNP. Across almost all of our focus woredas, there was a reported **decline in the number of appeals from the 2005 to the 2006 targeting process**. To an extent this decline reflects improvements in the inclusiveness and community-driven nature of the targeting process. Another key reason for the reduction in the number of appeals is the overall increase in beneficiary numbers from 2005 to 2006. As the number of beneficiaries has increased, the pool of potential appellants has correspondingly shrunk. Greater awareness of PSNP selection criteria among both officials and community members has also likely contributed to a decline in claims.

In those woredas in which criteria for beneficiary selection are clear and the process of selection is transparent and participatory, there tend to be fewer appeals. In Kalu Woreda (Amhara), for instance, there was a very high rate of appeals following 2005's top-down administrative targeting process. Greater community engagement in this year's targeting process, however, has reduced this year's appeals to a trickle (see Box 3). In Shumsheha Kebele, Bugna Woreda (Amhara) the opaqueness and directive character of targeting have contributed to high rates of appeals in both the first and second years of the programme. The kebele chairman estimated that 200 households have appealed to the kebele administration since the programmes inception. Many of these complaints (around 65) are from those seeking to be included as direct support beneficiaries.

The responsiveness of appeals mechanisms at the woreda and kebele level varies, but is generally **slower than it should be**. The Targeting Guideline suggests that kebele officials should respond to appeals within two days and that woredas should respond in three. In a few kebeles, there was a genuine effort to respond to appeals as soon as they arose, through convening special meetings of the kebele FSTF. In most cases, however, appeals are dealt with much more slowly. In some cases, they are not dealt with at all. Many

"I was a public works beneficiary last year but this year I am excluded. No one wants to accept my appeal. A person better off than me is included in the PW nevertheless I am not."

~ male household head, Kilde Awlalo (Tigray)

<sup>12</sup> The likelihood of appealing does not appear to be strongly related to the status of the household head. According to our survey data, 46.3 percent of male headed households complained, while 50 and 61.9 percent of female and elderly headed households complained. Male headed households were more likely to have a successful appeal (23.1%) than female (15.4%) or older-headed (15.4%) households.

appellants with whom the team spoke complained that they waited weeks for a response and many never received a response from the kebele or woreda officials to whom they had appealed.

The **success rate for appeals is low**. Nearly 80 percent of non-beneficiary households surveyed failed in their appeals. The success rate for appeals varies from region to region and woreda to woreda. In some woredas (e.g. Fedis and Chiro in Oromiya) kebele officials and appellants report that there is a high rate of success for justifiable claims. In these woredas, appellant households reported a 67 percent success rate for their appeals. In Fedis, for instance, according to woreda officials there have been 15 successful appeals thus far this year. In the SNNPR woredas, the reported success rate for appeals is 31 percent.

On the other hand, the success rate for appeals is much lower in Amhara and Tigray. In Tigray, the household survey reveals only a 10 percent success rate for appeals, while in Amhara none of the households interviewed succeeded in their appeals. This low success rate was confirmed through focus group discussion and interviews with woreda and kebele officials.

A significant reason for both the high number of appeals and their low success rate is **limitations placed on beneficiary numbers by the planning figures or quotas** (see section 3). Most woredas and kebele officials interviewed see these figures as a fixed cap on the number of beneficiaries, and in most places the percentage of DS recipients, in their jurisdiction. There is therefore little scope for adding additional beneficiaries to the PSNP lists once they are set. In some woredas (e.g. Bugna), kebele officials have been explicitly told by the woreda FSTF not to make any alterations to the beneficiary lists between targeting cycles. As members of one Amhara focus group explained, when they appealed for inclusion, the consistent response was *'yemin chemer, yemin lemet yelem'* (no addition, no subtraction), meaning that the quota is fixed.

**Quotas as barriers to appeals**

“We did not know how and why we are excluded, some of us have appealed to the *tabiya* (kebele) but the answer was that they know that we are not better off than others, but that the quota from the woreda is inadequate. When we went to the woreda, they said there is not sufficient quota however another programme will come (EGS) and you will be considered.”

~ appellant, Tigray

To get around this cap and to appease deserving appellants, community and kebele FSTFs create waiting lists for the programme and promise these non-beneficiaries that they will be included in the following year's lists, or in other programmes such as EGS. In some woredas, a more immediate solution is to remove existing beneficiaries from the public works and direct support lists and replace them with those whose appeals have succeeded.

### **5.1.5. Barriers to appeals**

There are a range of barriers that inhibit the efficiency and effectiveness of the appeals processes and deter individuals from appealing targeting decisions in the first place.

As highlighted above, **limited awareness of who beneficiaries can appeal to** and what can be expected from the appeals process is a fundamental barrier to fair and accessible appeals process.

In practice, the officials who handle appeals at the local level are the same people who oversee the targeting decisions in the first place: kebele and woreda administrators. These **overlapping roles** can make it difficult for such officials to act objectively as an external check on the selection process.

Although the appeals process is intended to be informal and non-judicial, in some cases an appeal often entails a **formal hearing process** in which the appellant must present their case in written format and then defend it at a meeting. This can create a significant barrier to the poorest and most socially excluded households including the elderly and female headed households—precisely those households that the direct support component of the safety net is intended to benefit. Taking a claim beyond the kebele often requires significant time and opportunity costs.

In some cases, there is significant **social pressure on individuals** not to appeal targeting decisions. In Enderta and Kilte Awlalo woredas, Tigray, appellants were told that they must provide administrators with the names of existing beneficiaries who is better off than they are if their appeal is to be considered. In Tigray's tight-knit communities, few individuals would consider putting forward names in this manner. To do so would be social suicide, as the case below illustrates.

*'When the CFSTF read out names of beneficiaries at the community meeting my name was not there and I appealed for inclusion. The assembly told me that the quota is too low to include you in the list since you are relatively better-off. Then after the meeting I went to the Tabia and presented my written appeal to the KFSTF. They read my appeal and asked me to identify any better-off individual targeted for SN programme at my Kushet. For two reasons I didn't identify First, I couldn't instantly identify a better-off individual targeted. Secondly, I didn't want to identify anyone (because it) would lead ... to unnecessary confrontation and hatred in my community. Finally, they told me to go back home and accept the decision of the community. But I didn't, rather I went to the Woreda capital and presented my written appeal again to the WFSTF. Similarly, the WFSTF told me to go back home and accept the decision of the community and told me that they don't have the right to reverse the decision of the community made at the grassroots level. That was the end of the appeal.'*

Female headed households appear to be more susceptible to social pressure and intimidation. When asked their reasons for not voicing an appeal about being excluded from the safety net, one third of female headed households agreed that it was because they were 'too frightened or intimidated to complain'. For male headed households only four percent gave this as a reason for not appealing.

In other parts of the country, the study team came across more **overt threats to persistent appellants**. In Derashe Woreda, SNNPR, appellants were told that if they appealed too hard, they would not only be excluded from the safety net, they would also be excluded from credit or fertiliser programmes. In the same woreda, individual appellants claimed that they were threatened into retracting their appeals (see box).

#### **Forced to rescind an appeal**

A 35 year old household head with nine dependants was registered to be a public works beneficiary, but was later removed from the list of beneficiaries. He said, 'I appealed to the foreman (...)and to the village chairperson for inclusion and to tell me the reason why I was deleted from the list. But they didn't listen to my complaint. I then appealed formally to the village administration. However, they accused me of being instigator of the public and said that your family will not have a chance to be considered for the programme. I felt I had no option but to challenge their decision, so I decided to appeal to the woreda rural development office formally. The rural development office reversed the decision of the village and told me to go back to the village and gave them a written letter stating I should be included in public works. But the village administrator and the foreman told me that I would be presented to the general public as an accuser of the village community and as a traitor defaming the names of the administrator and foreman as corruptors who sold the transfers of SNP. By doing so, they harassed me but didn't bring the case to the attention of the community. Because of this chronic harassment I stopped appealing further.'

In some cases, the woreda council or administration does not provide an effective second tier for appeals. Although the PIM indicates that appeals should ideally be resolved at the kebele level, there is a tendency in some of this study's focus woredas to defer entirely to community or kebele targeting decisions. In Tigray and to a lesser extent in the Amhara field sites, this has created a **circular pattern** in which individuals who complain to woreda officials are referred back to the kebele and community, and told that the woreda has 'no right to reverse the (targeting) decisions of the community.'

Local officials' implementation of the PIM and Targeting Guidelines varies and has a direct effect on the number and nature of appeals in any given location. Appeals are much less likely to arise when targeting is carried out in a transparent and community-driven manner as recommended in the PIM and Targeting Guidelines. While improvements have been made in community targeting since the first year of the programme, **efforts should continue to ensure that community targeting processes are transparent, participatory and well managed.**

Greater attention needs to be paid to **raising awareness of the appeals process**: who to appeal to, how appeals should be carried out, and how appellants can expect to be treated. This awareness raising is as important for administrators as it is for the wider public. Greater awareness should contribute to a decrease in frivolous appeals and an increase in the accountability of those who make the appeals decisions.

The **appeals process needs to be faster** in almost all places. At the moment most appeals are taking weeks and in some cases months to resolve, not the two to three days as set out in the Targeting Guideline.

As noted above, three of this study's focus woredas have established **appeals bodies** that are administratively distinct from those that supervise the targeting process. **Separating those who make targeting decisions from those who review appeals can provide a safeguard on appeals processes.** In some settings where targeting or the appeals process has been particularly fraught, it may make sense for woredas or kebeles to establish these separate appeals bodies. At a woreda level, the woreda RRT could perform this function, if it was provided with the resources and mandate. This approach has worked well in Kalu woreda, Amhara, where the number of appeals has declined and the speed and quality of response has increased. Establishing a separate appeals body is, however, not a panacea as the box below illustrates.

#### **The challenges of being an appeals committee member, Oromiya**

'Last year six household heads from one ganda appealed to us (the appeals committee). They had previously been on the safety net for two months, then they were cancelled from the list and replaced by (...) the ganda secretary, another cadre, and some other wealthy people (...). I suspect there was some bribery.' (...)

'So, I reported this case to the CARE community facilitator, who went to the woreda and stopped the grain payment to these people. The grain went back to the store.'

'The beneficiaries who were removed from the list and those who replaced them wanted to fight, so we took them all to the police station at the Woreda centre. The police locked them up for a day but then they released them all because it wasn't their fault, it was the mistake of the PA secretary. The PA secretary and the ganda secretary are still in office, nothing was done.'

'Because of this dispute, someone (I don't know who) burned down my livestock compound. My animals could have been killed, their skins were burned. (...) Yes, it's a dangerous job!

'The appeals committee was replaced by decision of the PA. I was removed from my post as kebele justice 3 months ago. I was a justice for 12 years and kebele chairman for 1 year. Now I'm outside the kebele administration.'

The role and mandate of sub-regional **rapid response teams** needs to be revisited and revised so that they operate as roving response mechanism, providing technical and other support as well as a measure of external accountability for the targeting and

appeals processes (see monitoring section).

There is a need for **more effective reporting system for appeals** at the kebele, woreda and regional levels. This reporting system need not be burdensome, but a light touch record keeping system should be in place through which local officials can track the number and character of appeals, and the outcome and the reason for the decision taken. This system would benefit from the support and oversight of the reconfigured RRTs.

## 5.2. Monitoring of targeting

### 5.2.1. *The Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)*

The **Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)** was developed to monitor the implementation of the Safety Net programme. Its objective is to 'detect problems that warrant immediate attention, and respond rapidly to resolve the problems, thus reducing any potentially serious humanitarian risks and implementation problems'. (MoARD 2005): 4.

The RRM is intended to operate at all levels of administration from federal, to regional, woreda and kebele. At each of these levels there should be a Rapid Response Team (RRT) which should undertake field visits, identify implementation problems and bottlenecks, report these to relevant policy and administrative bodies, provide guidance and technical support, and track previously identified problems and responses to them.

The RRM is not intended to create new set of government structures but should build on existing monitoring activities of the Food Security Coordination Bureau by drawing on staff from the FSCB and other relevant MoARD departments and line ministries. During RRT assessments and field visits, the teams at each level are expected to assess: targeting, execution of public work programs, payment of wages, financial management, market conditions, and institutional support.

In terms of targeting, the RRM is expected to assess and track:

- The number of people currently targeted;
- Exclusion and inclusion errors identified, and measures taken to rectify them; and
- Adherence to the targeting guideline of the programme, and reasons for deviation if any ((MoARD 2005): 1).

As designed, the RRM should provide an effective mechanism through which the PSNP's implementation and accountability at all levels can be monitored and improved. At the moment, the **RRM is carrying out valuable functions, however, its effectiveness and reach could be improved.**

Federal RRT missions have contributed to improvements in the overall implementation of the targeting process by detecting implementation problems and reporting them to the FSCB, other departments and ministries, and donors. Over the past year, Federal RRTs have conducted increasingly frequent field visits to regions and to woredas. These visits have helped to improve communication between layers of PSNP administration and helped to transfer skills to regional-level administrators.

The **Federal RRT** is supposed to be comprised of ten members which can then form four teams to carry out field-level assessments. However, in practice, there is not a fixed Federal RRT and the composition of field RRTs tends to change from mission to mission. The lack of continuity of personnel from mission to mission has implications for consistency, lesson learning and institutional memory. This situation appears to be little changed from a year ago as reported in (Gill 2005).

**Donor engagement** in Federal RRTs has provided a constructive mechanism through which the GoE and donors can work side by side in understanding challenges faced by the safety net and improving its implementation. However, as it stands, the RRT is too reliant on donor resources, personnel and impetus. There is a perception among safety net administrators and non-governmental implementing partners that the Federal RRM is sometimes seen as more of a donor requirement than as an internal monitoring and accountability process. As one well placed informant noted: ‘the RRT (field visits) would not happen without donors pushing.’

**RRTs exist in three of the four PSNP regions** surveyed, but are working to various degrees of effectiveness. In Oromiya and SNNPR, RRTs have been established and have carried out woreda-level field visits. In SNNPR, the Regional-RRT carried out four field visits in 2005, but has only managed one trip thus far this year. In Tigray, the RRT has been created and has met twice, but has yet to carry out a field visit. In Amhara, a regional RRT has not yet been established. The composition of the regional RRTs seems to follow the guidelines set out in the Technical Note. As at the federal level, however, there are difficulties in sustaining the composition of RRTs due to competing commitments and high staff turnover.

With a few exceptions, the **RRTs are not functioning below the regional level**. Of our eight focus woredas, the only functioning woreda RRT was in Chiro, Oromiya. This RRT served both as a rapid response and a technical team and appeared to be doing a reasonable job of both monitoring and supporting kebele-level processes. In Derashe woreda, SNNPR, there is an RRT on paper, but it is not functional. There were no RRTs in any of the other six woredas reviewed.

Without functioning RRTs at lower administrative levels, **the RRM has been unable to track targeting and other facets of safety net implementation at levels below the woreda**—where key targeting decisions are made and the programme is ultimately implemented. Federal and regional RRTs are unable to visit more than a handful of woredas in each field trip and are only able to spend a few days in each. They therefore have **difficulty in grounding their analysis on realities at the Kebele and sub-kebele level**.

How can the design of the RRM be strengthened and how can its implementation be improved? The RRM structure as laid out in the Technical Note and PIM makes sense. Its effectiveness would be improved, however, by a) more consistent implementation of its key elements; and b) introducing the changes suggested below.

**Strengthen federal and regional RRTs.** Although the RRM is not intended to be a rigid administrative structure, regional and federal rapid response teams should be more permanent than at present. In particular, the membership of the federal and regional RRTs should be fixed and there should be greater consistency of team membership for field trips. Federal and regional RRTs should carry out monthly rather than sporadic field visits (as set out in the PIM). In principle, the allocation of management budgets to the federal level (1% of base costs) and regional and zonal levels (a combined 2% of base costs), should provide the resources for RRTs to conduct their operations.

Permanent **Zonal RRTs should be established**. Zonal authorities already have a mandate to monitor woreda functions, including the implementation of PSNP. Lack of resources and personnel, however, has meant that they have played a limited role to date. Creating zonal RRTs would introduce a support and accountability mechanism close enough to the ground to be well informed and sensitive to the challenges of a particular area, yet distant enough to ensure that PSNP guidelines are safeguarded.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> In Tigray, the regional government has already given zonal officials a budget to follow up safety implementation.

Ensuring that these Zonal RRTs are up and running is of greater overall importance to improving the PSNP than the creation of woreda and kebele RRTs.

The RRM should provide **more substantive horizontal and vertical linkages** between and across administrative layers. Vertical linkages in that the RRM can provide the regional and federal governments with a sense of what is happening on the ground in the PSNP implementation. Horizontal in that the RRM can support lesson learning and cross-fertilisation across different kebeles, woredas and regions. At the moment the RRM is partially fulfilling its vertical role but, as noted above, is not reaching low enough to monitor and strengthen PSNP processes on the ground. The creation of Zonal RRTs should help to improve the reach of the RRM and thereby strengthen vertical linkages. Horizontal linkages could be strengthened by effective zonal RRTs, more consistency and continuity in rapid response team membership, and greater sharing of examples of best practice.

RRTs can do more to stimulate **improved reporting** and record keeping within the PSNP. To do so, RRTs at different levels need to operate as a **roving as well as rapid response mechanism**. Zonal RRTs, for instance, should systematically visit all woredas in their catchment areas on a bi-annual basis and perform spot-checks at the kebele level.<sup>14</sup> More frequent visits by team members familiar with the programme and who consistently gather analyse key data from the field, would help ensure that the field-level PSNP administrators are adhering to best practice and are seeking assistance from the RRTs when they should. By routinely collecting baseline information they should help to build a picture of changes to PSNP targeting and outcomes over time. More systematic monitoring and information gathering would help to **strengthen transparency and accountability** of safety net operations. RRT missions and reports should provide the government, donors and local people with the information and analysis needed to ensure the long-term effectiveness and accountability of the PSNP.

### **5.2.2. FSCB Information Centre**

The **Information Centre** has been running for a year and has done a good job in tracking beneficiary transfers and market prices for staple foods in a sample of 81 woredas. This data has provided RRTs with useful background for their field visits and has flagged up delays in transfers and spikes in market prices. However, more needs to be done to analyse this raw data by the Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Department and stronger links need to be established between the Federal RRTs and the Information Centre. The data types currently collected by the Information Centre are not designed to monitor targeting.

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<sup>14</sup> The Checklist for Field Assessment provides a useful framework for information gathering by RRT, but needs to be revised to encourage greater depth of understanding about targeting and appeals processes.

## 6. KEY ISSUES

### 6.1. Targeting the public works component

#### 6.1.1. Targeting effects of the wage rate

The wage rate for PSNP public works is fixed at 6 Birr per day (or 3kg grain where paid in food). This rate was determined on the basis of minimum consumption needs, rather than prevailing wage rates.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, there is an expectation that the low payment rate will discourage the less needy from participating (or in other words, act as a partial self-targeting element combined with the administrative-community targeting system). The study found that there is a **slight self-targeting effect**, in the sense that a relatively small number of people with better income-earning options are voluntarily excluding themselves from the programme.

"When I observed the type of PW activities done and the wage payment, I found out it wasn't worth working there and getting 6 Birr a day compared to what I can earn from shaping stone to sell in Mekele market, or producing and selling vegetables carrot, onion, tomato, potato, cabbage, etc). I can obtain a much better income than the Safety Net pays".

~ Non-beneficiary, Enderta

"I told the PA administrator not to call me for Safety Net meetings any more since it is a waste of time. .... I would rather work on my own farm land and obtain more than the payment I would receive from working on the PSNP".

~ Non-beneficiary, Kalu

However, the **wage rate does not attract exclusively the poorest**, despite being described in all our focus communities as well below the local market wage. In all eight woredas visited, PW beneficiaries complained that the payment of 6 Birr is too low in comparison with other employment and with the work required: nevertheless, there is strong competition for places because of the **scarcity of employment opportunities**. Market wage rates as reported by public works beneficiaries and others are shown in Table 12: it is striking that most participants compared the PW rate with urban rather than local earning opportunities, which were said to be almost non-existent. Local labour markets are highly seasonal and segmented by gender (with women systematically earning lower rates). The main **non-wage factors** which lead people to compare PW favourably to other employment are the relative reliability of PSNP employment, and the location of work-sites within walking distance of home. The location of the projects (almost always within the kebele) avoids the various costs and risks of migration, and most importantly to the beneficiaries interviewed enables them to work part-time on the public works while managing their farms and other activities in the remaining hours.

"6 Birr is not enough, but we are all fighting to be included in the 6 Birr".

~ PW beneficiary

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<sup>15</sup> "It is assumed that 6 Birr will buy the daily requirement of 3kg of grain per working day" (PIM 5.3.1).

Table 12: Local unskilled wage rates

Woreda	Local unskilled wage	Comments
Kilte Awlalo	10 Birr/day	Demand for labour is low – it's difficult to find work in the tabia. Lack of job opportunities is one reason why so many households are always food insecure. (PW beneficiaries)
Enderta	10-11 Birr/ day in Mekele	-
Boricha	8 Birr/ day	Job opportunities are scarce and irregular – Safety Net is more reliable.
Derashe	-	PW beneficiaries didn't know the wage rate for other work in the area (not usually engaged in labour market?)
Kalu	8-10 Birr in Kombolcha	To get waged employment "you have to travel 10 km to Kombolcha town. On the Safety Net we can work half a day and use the remaining time for our regular work." (PW beneficiaries)
Bugna	8-12 Birr in Lalibela	"Before, the wage rate in Lalibela town was 12-20 Birr per day – because of the SNP the market wage declined." (PW beneficiaries)
Chiro	10 Birr /day	"There is no off-farm employment in the vicinity, but a person can earn 10 Birr a day if he migrates to far-off towns. ...The PW payment is okay as there are no other alternatives." (PW beneficiaries)
Fedis	10-15 Birr / day	The type of waged work available is agricultural labour, housing (construction) and other daily labour in Haromaya and Awaday (about 2 days' travel on foot).

Source: Focus groups and key informants

As the 2004 PIM (section 4.2.1) states, summarising lessons learned from decades of public-works experience in Ethiopia, "self-targeting based on the wage-rate is not applicable since alternative employment opportunities are either non-existent or minimal, especially in chronically food-insecure areas of the country."

### 6.1.2. Displacement of other activities

In an employment-based programme such as the PSNP, the work requirement is an important *cost* to participants, which must be considered in assessing the targeting effects. Not only does the work requirement directly consume energy, thus reducing the net benefit received in calorie terms, but it may also compete for time and effort with beneficiaries' other livelihood options, with unpaid work essential to family welfare (such as childcare and food preparation), or with longer-term investments (particularly schooling). **It is crucial that the public works do not obstruct the PSNP's prime objective**, within the overall Food Security Programme, of **supporting people to achieve improved and self-sufficient livelihoods**. The timing and workload of the public works should therefore be carefully



Public works can make significant contributions to but should not obstruct households from pursuing their livelihoods

planned and monitored so that they do not block people from pursuing other income and investment options (whether on their own farms, off-farm agricultural work, or non-farm enterprise and employment). Otherwise there is a danger that the programme could actually increase the economic dependency of beneficiaries. This issue is further discussed in the Linkages report (Slater, Ashley et al. 2006).

In the SNNPR woredas it was stated in qualitative discussions that the timing of the works did not take account of the complex local farming seasons. Decision-makers cited this as a major reason for their intentional dilution and rotation of the PW targeting, so that the work required from each beneficiary household could be minimised.

### **6.1.3. Child labour and education**

In rural Ethiopia as in many other agricultural societies, children from as young as 5 or 10 are regarded as working members of the household. However, working children are not counted as potential contributors to the PSNP public works programme, firstly on welfare grounds (given the hard physical nature of the work), and secondly because of potential conflict with the key objective of achieving universal primary education. Ethiopia is a signatory to the UN Charter for the Rights of Children, which upholds “the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development”. Accordingly, the Safety Net Targeting Guideline (section 6.2) specifies a minimum age of 18 for employment on the public works.

Focus groups in our selected communities generally agreed that the youngest people working on the PSNP projects were around 16 years old, while the oldest were in their 50s. In most woredas the FSTFs reported a strict adherence to the minimum age of 18, although some beneficiaries commented that school students joined the work at weekends or after class.<sup>16</sup> Data from the household survey suggest that about **8% of individuals working on the PSNP PW were aged under 18** and 5% were under 16, while approximately 3% were said to be over 60. These are quite low rates of under-age and elderly participation, suggesting that **on the whole the policy of restricting employment to working-age adults is being adhered to**. Continued attention should be paid to maintaining this adherence and to further reducing the participation of children. Local authorities should also do their best to ensure that participation in the public works does **not interfere with beneficiaries' education**, whatever their age. This can be achieved by adjusting the timing of the works, and the number of hours required per day, to accommodate schooling along with



Children often contribute to household livelihoods (like this young farmer), but should not be employed by the PSNP.

<sup>16</sup> These two observations may not be incompatible, given the wide age-range of students attending school in rural Ethiopia. One 21-year-old beneficiary interviewed was in the 7<sup>th</sup> grade.

other productive or beneficial activities (see discussion of temporal targeting below).

## 6.2. Temporal targeting

In an employment-based safety net, temporal targeting has two separate but equally important aspects: **timing of the works, and timing of the transfer payments**. The timing of the public works implementation is a key factor affecting the displacement of other productive activities, and can be adjusted at three levels:

- *seasonality* (months of PW implementation);
- *days per month*; and
- *hours per day*.

**Seasonality** is specifically addressed in the PIM (section 4.6.1.), although it focuses exclusively on agriculture:

*“Public works must not undermine normal agricultural activity and therefore the bulk of public works projects should take place during the agricultural slack season.... Public works ... undertaken at other times of year ... should be on a reduced scale so as not to compete with the need for labour in agriculture and should be technically feasible in wet conditions.”*

**Days per month** are allocated according to family size: 5 days paid work per month are allowed for each person in a targeted household. However, no consideration is given in the targeting design of the PSNP to the number of working age adults in the family, and therefore to the number of days potentially worked by individuals (see section on labour-poor households below).

The decision on **hours per day** is left to the woreda (section 4.6.3):

*“The implementing agency in consultation with WRDO will establish ... (t)he number of hours to be worked per day and per week; ... Work can be for a full day or a half day, depending on local conditions”.*

In implementation, this varies considerably. Some woredas have decided on a half-day of work specifically to allow people time for other activities. Chiro and Boricha, for example, have set a four-hour work day for the Safety Net (based on previous EGS experience). Others – such as Bugna and Enderta – are requiring a full eight-hour day of physical labour. Beneficiaries in the latter areas complained that the day was too long. Women in particular found that it interfered with their domestic and childcare work. Beneficiaries should be consulted during the planning process about the best timing of the work in order to minimise disruption to their other productive activities. Woredas which are currently requiring a full day’s work should consider reducing the number of hours, and should adhere to work norms rather than fixed working hours.

*“Everyone works 8 hours a day on the safety net. It’s heavy for the women (because of their domestic workload), but it’s the regulation. We suggested people should come very early in the morning and finish by mid-day, to have time for other work, but the DA said no – if you’re in a hurry you won’t do good quality work, and if you don’t do 8 hours you won’t be paid. In my opinion, and many others’ opinion, it’s better to get up early (even at 5 a.m.) and finish the work by 9 or 10 according to work norms.”*


*Woman KFSTF member, Bugna*

Reducing the number of hours required per day (in places where a full day is currently compulsory) would also bring the effective wage rate more into line with minimum market wages, without increasing the amount of the transfer entitlement (which is calculated on the basis of consumption needs, as mentioned above). At present, some beneficiaries are doing a full day of hard physical labour for about half the market wage. This raises serious ethical issues about the extraction of labour from poor people, as well as making it difficult for them to pursue other activities which could

enhance their livelihoods and welfare.

Figure 3 graphs data from the questionnaire survey about the seasonality of food shortage, the months when households were working on the PSNP public works, and the months when cash and food transfers were received (see Trends report (Devereux, Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2006) for further analysis of these data). The graph shows that many beneficiary households were engaged in the public works between May and August, coinciding with peak farming periods in most areas. On timing of transfers, the graph suggests that food payments were better synchronized with the hungry season than cash payments.

**Figure 3: Timing of work, transfer payments and food shortage**



However, beneficiaries frequently complained that the PSNP payments were late in relation to the work done, and in relation to the months when they were most needed. Further discussion of this issue can be found in the Linkages report. Analysis of the household survey responses in the Trends report (p.28) also finds that “late and erratic payment” is a major problem which undermines the programme’s objective of providing regular, predictable transfers. Implementing agencies acknowledge that there have been various delays to the transfer payments in the programme’s first year: continued efforts to improve the timeliness of payments, and to ensure beneficiaries are informed about the payment schedule, are essential.

“We know the amount we received, but we don’t know in advance the time of SN transfer. What we strongly request is to get the transfer timely, if possible on a monthly basis”  
*~ DS beneficiaries, Kalu*

“We work but we do not get the wage at the proper time. We are still slaves for grain lenders and creditors.”  
*~ PW beneficiaries, Bugna*


“The payment is not on a monthly basis. We took loans and when we receive the transfer we pay them back. We cannot plan anything because we don’t know when it will come.”  
*~ PW beneficiaries, Kilte Awlalo*

“We know how much we are going to receive but we don’t know when.”  
*~ Women PW beneficiaries, Derashe*

“We received the payment [but] the major problem was delay of cash payment. Do you take your salary after two months? No, we think you take your salary exactly after 30 days – but here there are great irregularities in cash payment in return for our work. ... We don’t know when we will receive the next payment.”  
*~ PW beneficiaries, Fedis*

In Figure 4, the survey responses on months of food shortage are disaggregated by region. This shows a significantly different seasonal pattern in SNNPR and smaller variations among the other regions. In any follow-up studies, it is recommended that the timing of needs, transfers, and public works implementation should be analysed by region or by economic area.

**Figure 4: Seasonality of food shortage (March 05 to April 06), by region**



Source: Household survey

### 6.3. Labour-poor households in an employment-based safety net

As explained in Section 2, the targeting process of the PSNP separates eligible households into those with labour (who are registered for public works) and those with no labour (who are entitled to direct or free support). The PIM refers to the latter category as “labour-poor”. Those registered for PW are entitled to work for 5 days per household member monthly. There is, however, a logical flaw in this process which has become clearer during implementation: it does not consider *how much* labour the PW households have in relation to their family size. In reality, it is necessary to distinguish between two categories of household:

- the labour-*poorest*, with no able-bodied adults, who qualify for DS; and
- the labour-*poor*, who have one or more able-bodied adults and therefore qualify for PW, but who cannot provide enough work-days to earn the full family allocation because of a high ratio of non-working to working household members.

Focus groups and household interviews conducted during the qualitative fieldwork found that **labour-poor beneficiary households frequently have difficulty covering the number of workdays needed to earn the full transfer entitlement for their family**, and that in some cases the workload on individuals can reach 25 or (theoretically) 30 days per month. This is an excessive burden which falls most heavily on those least able to bear it, not only in terms of effort expended but also in terms of other livelihood activities displaced.

“The issue of family size vis-à-vis safety net transfers [is] critical. For instance, an eligible household head with many dependent family members ... is expected to work ... 25 to 30 days to obtain [enough] transfer to feed his/her family. This household head is not expected to do his/her regular agricultural work since he/she is engaged fully with the safety net. The other critical problem is again the amount of transfer he/she receives is not enough to support the family needs if the family size is above six.”

~ WFSTF, Chiro

In order to estimate the size of this labour-poor group, Table 13 cross-tabulates household size and number of able-bodied adults<sup>17</sup> for the households in the questionnaire survey. The table shows, firstly, that 145 (15%) of the surveyed households have no adult labour at all. Most of these are very small households: 77% of them have three members or fewer, while forty-seven (87%) of the 54 single-person households surveyed fell in this category. Single-person households are likely to be elderly or disabled, or both. Households in this category (the “labour-poorest”) are clearly candidates for direct support.

“For example, a woman with 5 children can cover only for five people including her, because in one month there are only 25 or 26 working days. If she works without stopping (which is impossible in our case) she can only cover for 5 individuals. Hence in this family there is one person without quota.”  
 ~ Women PW beneficiaries, Kilte Awlalo

Secondly, the shaded area of the table contains those households who have one or more adult worker(s), but are labour-poor in relation to the demands of the PSNP. Those in the lighter-shaded cells can only meet the full work requirement of 5 days per household member by working more than 15 days per able-bodied adult, while those in the darker-shaded cells must work more than 20 days per able-bodied adult. By adding the number of households in these cells, one finds that the labour-poor group are between 9% (with the 20-day threshold) and 23% (with the 15-day threshold) of households with some labour.

**Table 13: Distribution of labour-poor households**

	Number of able-bodied adults (A)												Total hhs	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11		
1	47	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	54
2	37	32	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88
3	28	40	51	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	122
4	7	28	81	11	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	129
5	7	16	93	17	3	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	143
6	1	18	59	18	5	3	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	104
7	4	12	47	25	10	7	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	109
8	5	2	35	27	9	6	4	1	0	-	-	-	-	89
9	3	1	7	18	12	13	3	0	0	1	-	-	-	58
10	4	1	5	3	9	3	2	2	0	1	1	-	-	31
11	2	2	1	0	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	11
12	0	2	3	5	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	15
13	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
16	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total hhs</b>	145	162	402	127	54	41	13	8	1	4	2	1		960 (N)

**Note:** Households in the shaded cells are labour-poor in the context of the PSNP (as defined in the text).  
 Darker shaded cells:  $(H \times 5) / A > 20$ ; lighter shaded cells:  $(H \times 5) / A > 15$ .

Source: Household survey

Different woredas have addressed this problem in different ways. In only one woreda

<sup>17</sup> Child workers are not counted in this analysis, for the reasons given in section 6.1.3.

(Kilte Awlalo) was there a policy that a household with some labour, but not enough to meet its full allocation of PW days, could be registered partly for PW and partly for DS. However, some other woredas have adopted approaches which have the same effect without necessarily being reflected in the official registration numbers for DS and PW. For example, Kalu Woreda has decided that targeted households who do not have enough labour to meet the 5-day-per-person allocation should receive transfers for the full family “irrespective of the number of days worked.... For instance if a household has 9 members and only one of [them] is capable of working for a total of 20-25 days per month, [s/he] earns for the whole family (that is 9 family members x 6 Birr x 5 working days = 270 Birr)” (Kalu WFSTF group interview).

Some participants in the fieldwork discussions were concerned that providing “free” transfers for non-working household members might counteract population control policies by encouraging larger families. However, the table demonstrates that the labour-poor households are **not necessarily the largest families**. In this sample, the majority of the labour-poor households have seven or fewer members. Many are households with only one working adult.

In light of these factors, and in line with the pragmatic solution already adopted by some woredas and some NGO implementers, it is strongly recommended that **a ceiling should be put on the number of days’ work required from any individual** in the public works programme. Woredas should be empowered to decide on this exact ceiling as well as on the other two levels of temporal targeting (months of the year, and hours per day), according to local conditions.

Households registered for PW may also become **temporarily labour-poor** due to pregnancy, sickness or injury. In principle, pregnant and breastfeeding women as well as the sick are exempt from the work requirement. The PIM (section 4.3.1) states that **pregnant women after the sixth month and nursing mothers in the first ten months after childbirth are eligible for Direct Support**. However, **this is working poorly in practice**, partly because of the timing of the beneficiary targeting and partly because of pressures to minimise “dependency” and achieve public works output targets. Women may not be pregnant at the time of registration, but fall pregnant during the implementation cycle. In several of the field sites women reported that they continue working on the PSNP even when heavily pregnant and soon after giving birth, because they fear losing their entitlement to transfers if they stop. There is also controversy about the thresholds of 6 and 10 months, with some experts arguing that the early months of pregnancy are in fact the most dangerous for women to do heavy physical work. This issue was hotly debated, for example, in the Tigray Regional Parliament.

The application of these rules varies from place to place. In Derashe (SNNPR), women PW beneficiaries stated that “pregnant women above six months and lactating women up to six months are not working in the PWs. They became DS beneficiaries until they rejoin the PWs.” In Bugna (Amhara), by contrast, all the women were being pressured to work in order to meet the development targets (see box). In other places, task force members maintained that the PIM rules on pregnant and lactating women were being applied, but beneficiaries said that they continued working because they feared losing payments or losing their place on the programme altogether. For example, one woman focus group member in Chiro said she rejoined the PW two months after giving birth

“Last year there was a different regulation. It said if a woman is 5 or 6 months pregnant and is not feeling healthy, or if she’s breastfeeding up to a year after giving birth, she should get direct support instead of working. This was good. But this year the woreda said if we give all this direct support we won’t accomplish the development work, so all the women have to work. Only those who are disabled and can’t leave their house should get direct support.”

~ KFSTF member, Bugna (Amhara)

“because if I am not working, I will not get food”. Due to the quota system, it is often difficult or impossible for Kebele and Community FSTFs to transfer a beneficiary from the PW to the DS list.

This study recommends that, in place of the current poorly-functioning rule, a system should be put in place to grant **temporary exemption from work** for PW beneficiaries who become pregnant, sick, or injured and whose households cannot cover their work allocation. This would not require transfer to DS registration. This recommendation is effectively for **paid maternity leave** (for pregnant and nursing women) and **sick leave** (for workers who become seriously ill or injured). CFSTFs should have authority to grant this period of exemption: clear guidelines on who qualifies and for what periods should be developed in consultation with the FSTFs at all levels.

#### 6.4. Targeting Direct Support

As noted in the section on targeting outcomes, the study found that **Direct Support beneficiaries in the focus communities were clearly needy and unable to work**: no cases were found or heard of where people who were able to work were wrongly registered for free assistance. However, frequent examples were raised of people who were considered by community members and decision-makers to be eligible for DS, but who had been excluded from the safety net altogether or registered for the public works. In the latter case either someone had to work in their place, or they had to attend the worksite themselves, or they simply received the transfer free but were listed under PW. The main reason given in all the woredas visited was the limitation (quota) set on DS beneficiary numbers.

**Quotas are being pre-set for the proportion of beneficiaries to be registered for Direct Support**, sometimes by the region and sometimes by the woreda (see section 3), and there is widespread pressure to minimise the number of people registered for DS in order to meet public works targets and to discourage dependency. As shown in Table 14, the actual proportion of Direct Support recipients in the total beneficiary numbers varied from 3% (Enderta) to 19% (Derashe).<sup>18</sup> In both woredas where comparative figures for 2005 and 2006 were obtained (Derashe and Kalu), the DS proportion was higher in the second year: however, it is not clear whether this is a general trend.

**Table 14: Percentage of Direct Support in total beneficiary numbers**

Woreda	2005	2006
Enderta (Tigray)	3%	-
Kilte Awlalo (Tigray)	10%	
Derashe (SNNPR)	10%	19%
Kalu (Amhara)	7%	9%
Bugna (Amhara)	-	16%

<sup>18</sup> Actual beneficiary figures by kebele, beneficiary category (PW and DS) and gender were requested from each woreda visited, in the course of WFSTF group interviews and follow-up. The format, comprehensiveness and availability of these statistics varied considerably from place to place, somewhat limiting the scope for comparative analysis.

Chiro (Oromiya)	-	7%
<p><b>Source:</b> Woreda FSTF / Food Security Offices</p> <p><b>Note:</b> In Fedis and Boricha, the breakdown by beneficiary categories was not available at the woreda level. However, in the selected kebeles within those woredas, the percentage of DS beneficiaries was 7% and 3% respectively. (Source: KFSTF interviews).</p>		

It is also not clear to what extent the DS quotas are a considered policy, and to what extent they are a carryover from the previous 80:20 “rule of thumb” balance between EGS (Employment Generation Schemes) and GR (Gratuitous Relief) in the emergency relief system, but no such rule is suggested in the PIM. The issue of pre-set quotas for DS was discussed at length during the design of the PSNP, based on prior experience with the EGS/GR system. The outcome of this discussion was the following clear statement:

‘Some communities will spend nearly all of the Safety Net resources on Public Works. However, communities with a high share of widows or female headed households will inevitably use more resources for Direct Support. For the purposes of implementation, there are **no strict criteria for the division of resources that go to Public Works or Direct Support.**’ (PIM section 2.1.)

The allocation of resources to eligible households should be **based entirely on an assessment of their need**, followed by an assessment of how much and what kind of labour they are able to contribute to the community development works.

## 6.5. Integrating PW and DS Targeting

One suggested way of more fairly distributing the workload for labour-poor households, while maintaining the principle of full-family targeting, is by integrating the present Public Works and Direct Support beneficiary categories into one beneficiary list, as illustrated in Table 15. This entails a simple assessment of each selected household’s transfer entitlement (the full number of family members) and its labour capacity (the number of able-bodied adults).

This system would result in a single beneficiary list for each community, instead of the current division into “Public Works” and “Direct Support” categories. It provides a clear and fair assessment of how much each targeted household should receive (according to need) and how much they should be required to contribute to the community development works (according to ability). It would avoid the current confusion and contention around the various “quotas” and targets being applied to the percentage of direct support beneficiaries. It also eliminates the unrealistic step in the current targeting system which requires the local decision-makers to divide households into black-and-white categories of those with and those without labour. A fairer and more realistic question is “How *much* labour does this eligible household have”?



Those being targeted for DS are needy and unable to work, but quotas are being set for the proportion of those eligible for DS

**Table 15: Illustration of an integrated (PW and DS) beneficiary list**

Household ID	Total household size a)	Number of able-bodied adults b)	Monthly transfer entitlement a) x 30 Birr	Monthly work requirement a) x 5 days, up to a maximum of b) x 15 <sup>19</sup>
001	2	0	60	0
002	4	1	120	15 (capped)
003	5	2	150	25
004	5	1	150	15 (capped)
005	6	3	180	30
006	7	2	210	30 (capped)

## 6.6. Accountability and Transparency of PSNP Targeting

Targeting processes are **accountable** when the individuals and bodies that make targeting decisions are answerable to potential beneficiaries as well as policy-makers and politicians. They are **transparent** when potential beneficiaries understand who is being targeted and why and there is no maladministration.

**The design of the safety net is intended to foster transparency and accountability** in targeting. The mix of community and administrative targeting should help to ensure community participation, ‘ownership’ and oversight over the selection of beneficiaries. It should also allow local administrators to use objective criteria to verify beneficiary lists and ensure their fairness and accuracy. The nesting hierarchy of food security task forces should support the monitoring and exchange of information about targeting processes and outcomes. While the Rapid Response Mechanism should provide an external check to the targeting process—ensuring that the right people are selected and that any targeting problems are corrected.

“We are also poor but due to limitation of the quota we are left out. We are happy that they are beneficiaries from this programme. The selection process was very clear. We knew that the selected are poorer than us.”

~ non-beneficiary, Borecha

In practice, the **transparency and accountability of PSNP targeting has differed across this study’s sample woredas**. In some woredas and kebeles targeting processes have been relatively open and accountable, and have a great deal of community buy-in. While in other woredas and kebeles, targeting processes have been more opaque, top-down and contested. In almost all cases, however, **there has been a significant improvement in the accountability and transparency of the targeting process in the second year of the programme**.

### 6.6.1. Constraints on accountability and transparency

Despite this improvement, however, a range of factors continue to constrain accountability and transparency of the targeting process:

**Capacity and staff turnover:** The recent increase in the number of Development Agents in the kebeles has boosted local capacity and expertise at a local level. However, the continued high turn-over of administrators—estimated to be as high as 80% in some of our focus woredas—impairs continuity, lesson learning and the development of institutional memory. The accountability of targeting processes suffers as a result.

<sup>19</sup> A ceiling of 15 days per month is used here for illustration purposes. The actual ceiling should be decided by the region or woreda, and may vary according to the season.

Systems are ostensibly in place to **monitor and report** progress on targeting and other facets of the PSNP. According to the PIM, kebeles and woredas should submit monthly progress reports on PSNP implementation and the regions should submit quarterly progress reports to the FFSCB. In the first year of the PSNP, however, these reports have rarely been submitted. The RRM and Information Centre were established, in part, to bolster this monitoring and reporting system. As highlighted in section 5, however, the RRM is only partially fulfilling its mandate and significant gaps remain in reporting information about the effectiveness of the PSNP on the ground to higher levels of administration.

### **6.6.2. Upward and downward accountability**

The **accountability** of key safety net administrators is **often more upward than downward**. Ethiopia's decentralised structure of government places great emphasis on participation and community contributions to development processes. However, this is counter-balanced by a tendency for top-down target setting and directive management which often skews accountability upward toward higher level authorities.

Too much downward accountability can also be problematic. Community pressure on local decision makers to spread resources is a crucial reason why PSNP resources have been diluted to increase the overall number of beneficiary households in some woredas. As a member of the Derashe WFSTF, SNNPR highlighted:

*'Another challenge we face is the high pressure from the entire community to be considered by the Safety Net. This push adversely influenced the KFSTF and CFSTF to violate the targeting guidelines and redistribute resources to those who should not be considered by the Safety Net as well as those who should. This in turn invited inappropriate inclusion and exclusion of beneficiaries'.*

The greater long-term barrier to accountable targeting is the pressure placed on local administrators to meet targets and directives sent from above. In particular, three sets of 'targets' encourage upward rather than downward accountability in targeting. These are:

- Graduation;
- Reducing 'dependency'; and
- Productive public works.

While all three of these 'targets' are long-term objectives of the PSNP, the ways in which they have been interpreted by local officials has led to both exclusion and inclusion errors in targeting.

'**Graduation**' out of food insecurity is a key goal of the overall Food Security Programme. Over time, the PSNP (in conjunction with other facets of the Food Security Programme) should enable beneficiary households to become food secure and hence graduate. The high priority placed on achieving graduation, however, has led some administrators to target with graduation in mind. In Amhara, the emphasis on graduation fundamentally skewed the 2005 targeting away from the poorest members of the region. The regional government instructed woreda and kebele officials to target households likely to graduate and to exclude many of the poorest able-bodied households so that they could be candidates for **resettlement**. These instructions were reversed in mid- 2005 and Amhara's targeting is much more pro-poor this year. However, local administrators in Amhara and elsewhere will continue to be under pressure to work toward graduation and it will be important to monitor that this pressure does not distort Safety Net targeting again.

In recent years, there has been a high profile government campaign to raise awareness of and reduce the prevalence of the **dependency** that is seen to be a

product of long-term relief. This campaign has been promulgated to the lowest levels of the state. Regional and woreda officials repeatedly raised concerns to the study team about the potential for the PSNP to foster rather than reduce dependency as the following three quotations reveal:

*'This area has been dependent on food aid for a long time. The people have become almost too lazy to work developing dangerous dependency attitude.'*

*'Before the safety net we held a series of conferences to tackle dependency. The coming of safety net is both good and bad. It is good because of the resources it brings. It is bad because it has reversed our attempt to beat dependency.'*

*'For three years we campaigned to fight dependency and we had a feeling that we were getting somewhere. These efforts are undermined by the coming of safety net. Through food security programmes and agricultural packages we focused on those hard working citizens who have a better chance of success. We were beginning to see results. [But the] Safety Net focuses on the poor thereby reversing the efforts.'*

In some of our focus woredas, local PSNP administrators face significant incentives to target in ways that minimise 'dependency'. This is a partial explanation for why the overall percentage of direct support beneficiaries is kept so low (especially in Tigray) and why there is sometimes resistance to reducing the overall labour burden of households in which there are few workers but many dependents.

The focus on **productive public works** has similarly skewed the targeting process in some cases. It is important that able-bodied Safety Net beneficiaries contribute to public works and that public works projects are of a high quality. However, local administrators are often under pressure from above to ensure that ambitious projects are completed. In some sites, this may be contributing to a selection bias away from those who cannot carry out heavy physical labour. In some woredas (e.g. Chiro in Oromiya), delays in the completion of public works have led to the withholding of benefits to both public works and direct support beneficiaries. This is intended to serve as an incentive for beneficiaries to produce high quality public works, but in practice is a form of collective punishment.



**Waiting for food distribution**

### **6.6.3. Corruption and the PSNP**

The research team found **little evidence of systematic corruption or misuse of PSNP resources** by administrators in our focus woredas. In a programme of this scale, instances of corruption are all but inevitable and during our fieldwork, we came across cases of localised corruption in all regions (including cases of nepotism in which relatively well-off kebele officials and their relatives were included on the lists of Safety Net beneficiaries) and bribery (in which potential beneficiaries are reported to have paid facilitation fees to be included on beneficiary lists). We also encountered a few cases in which Safety Net funds may have been pilfered, as the case below illustrates:

*A husband and wife between them worked 25 days for the Safety Net. But when they went to claim the funds, they were only given 20 days and told to fill in the form for only 20 days. The other five days went back somewhere which we don't know. Because of poverty the beneficiaries did not raise questions. (They were afraid of losing what benefit they have).*

There is unsurprisingly greater scope for corruption in those areas where there is low general awareness of targeting procedures and where targeting is carried out in a top-down and opaque manner. As one local administrator commented: 'there can be wrong practices, because only the woreda knows how it (targeting) is supposed to be done.' These incidents of abuse appear to have been more widespread during the 2005 targeting than during the second year's targeting.

#### Transparency of Beneficiary Lists

During the targeting process the PIM recommends that the list of proposed beneficiaries should be 'displayed in public for at least a week, in order for it to be commented upon and endorsed by the general meeting of the village residents.' Beneficiary names were reportedly posted in three of this appraisal's focus kebeles Chiro, Kilde Awlalo and Derashe), but not in the other 5 kebeles visited. In most cases, however, the names of potential beneficiaries were read out in community meetings by members of the FSTF.

#### 6.6.4. Political pressures on targeting

Large-scale programmes such as the PSNP are **political as well as economic and social resources**. In all countries whether developing or industrialised, safety net and social welfare programmes are subject to political promises and campaigns. Moreover, programmes through which resources such as credit, fertiliser, land, food or cash are allocated can be used as mechanisms for rewarding political supporters or punishing detractors.

*When one local informant was asked if targeting was used to reward or punish political support, he replied: 'why do you ask such a question when it is revealed by the sun...it is clear, as clear as day.' (Tsehay yemokew)*

The launch of the PSNP coincided with the 2005 legislative election campaign. As a result, many local administrators were unsurprisingly more preoccupied with campaigning and supervising the elections than with overseeing the start-up of the PSNP. The timing of the Safety Net's inception also made it possible for the PSNP to be used a political resource both before and after the elections.

In some of our focus woredas, both ruling and opposition parties used the Safety Net as a campaign theme. A few ruling party cadres, for instance, apparently made promises that the programme would benefit all households. In some areas, claims were also made that those who did not support the government would not be beneficiaries. As one well-placed observer in Amhara noted, before the election 'the party used the safety net to attract support from the poor and as a means to recruit cadres.' Some opposition party cadres also attempted to use the PSNP for electoral gain by agitating for people not to contribute to public works. Once targeting was complete, these cadres were also able to mobilise support from those who believed they were wrongly excluded.

In a few cases at a local level, the targeting process appears to have been used to punish known supporters of the opposition. These individuals and their relatives have been taken off PSNP beneficiary lists and in some cases have been told that they would only be reinstated if they hand over their party membership cards. The field team, however, could find **no significant evidence that entire communities or areas were being excluded for voting against the ruling party**.

As with corruption, these political uses of the PSNP targeting process appear to be **locally specific rather than pervasive or systematic**. As mentioned above, a

programme such as the PSNP will always be a political resource. Therefore, what is crucial for the long term transparency and effectiveness of the programme is that future incidents of abuse are detected through the monitoring process and that actions are swiftly taken to counter them.

## 6.7. Gender

The **PIM recognises a number of gendered aspects to the safety net**. It encourages women's participation in the FSTFs (though with no target percentages); it notes that widows and other female household heads are more likely to need direct support, and that pregnant and breastfeeding women should be exempt from the public works. It also allows for public works to be carried out on private land owned by labour-poor female-headed households. In the planning and management of the public works, it states:

“Priority should be given to activities which are designed to enable women to participate and which contribute to reducing women's regular work burden and increase access to productive assets” (Section 4.3.1); *and that*

“Each work team should have a fairly balanced composition taking into account gender, age, skill ability and strength. Women can be part of mixed teams or form their own teams. They can also be team leaders” (Section 4.6.2).

The section on HIV/AIDS (4.7.2) draws attention to the need for specific protection measures for women and girls. Finally, the brief section on process evaluation (6.2.1.) includes a question on gender in the evaluation checklist, and recommends that TORs for evaluation teams should specify the inclusion of women (as well as minority groups) among the interviewees.

In assessing the implementation of the PSNP targeting, this study consulted women as decision-makers, beneficiaries and community members. A number of gender-relevant findings have already been discussed in earlier parts of the report:

- All but two of the 21 **FSTFs** interviewed had at least one woman member; but the **women representatives are few and hardly ever in leadership roles**. This is partly due to their under-representation in local governance and professional roles, but could be mitigated by requiring a higher proportion of elected women at kebele and community level (see section 3.1).
- A high proportion of the **Development Agents**, who are taking an active role in the targeting of the PSNP, are women (40% in the sampled kebeles: see section 3.1 and 3.4).
- Female household heads who are not targeted for the PSNP are more likely to appeal than men, but their **appeals are less likely to succeed**. Those who do not appeal are much more likely than men to give **social pressure or**



**The principle that pregnant women should be provided with DS is poorly implemented in practice**

**intimidation** as a reason (section 5.1).

- **Labour-poor households (many of whom are female-headed<sup>20</sup>)** often find it difficult to cover the work-days needed to earn the full family entitlement (section 6.3).
- The principle that **pregnant women** (over 6 months) and **nursing mothers** (up to 10 months) should be provided with DS is poorly implemented in practice. A new system of temporary leave from PW is required (section 6.3). The quotation from a women’s representative in the box below highlights that this is an issue affecting the welfare of children as well as of women.

“For pregnant women, it’s very difficult. For example, there was a young woman working on the stone bunds here. She was more than 4 months pregnant, but I don’t know exactly (usually women here don’t know exactly how many months they are). She was very tired, and she was sitting on the stones. Afterwards she went home and was very ill, and she had a miscarriage. For breastfeeding women, they come with their babies on their backs and the babies are always getting sick because the women are bending and moving all the time, and they get eye problems from the strong sun and the dust.”

~ Woman KFSTF member, Bugna (Amhara)

Four of the eight woredas visited were able to provide gender-disaggregated beneficiary statistics, as summarised in Table 16. Broadly, these figures show that in all four woredas **approximately half of PW beneficiaries are women or girls. In DS the proportion of female beneficiaries** is higher in all the woredas except Enderta (where only 34% of registered DS beneficiaries were female). The gender difference between PW and DS is clearer when beneficiaries are counted by household: in Chiro, 24% of PW and 59% of DS beneficiary households were female-headed. Similarly in Bugna, 35% of PW and 73% of DS households were female-headed.<sup>21</sup> This difference is to be expected, given that female-headed households tend to be smaller and more labour-poor and to have fewer livelihood options, and reflects appropriate gender targeting of DS.

**Table 16: Gender balance of PW and DS beneficiaries, by woreda**

Woreda	Public Works			Direct Support			Total PSNP beneficiaries		
	M	F	% F	M	F	% F	M	F	% F
Enderta (2005)	18,231	22,672	55%	959	484	34%	19,190	23,156	55%
Kilte Awlalo (2005)	38,245	37,584	50%	4,299	4,505	51%	42,544	42,089	50%
Bugna (2006)	29,093	29,852	51%	3,467	7,588	69%	32,560	37,440	53%
Chiro (2006)	12,043	10,934	48%	762	1,035	58%	12,805	11,969	48%

*Source: Woreda FSTF / Food Security Offices*

*Note: Gender-disaggregated beneficiary numbers were not available from the other woredas.*

<sup>20</sup> See Trends report p.12.

<sup>21</sup> Comparable figures by household were not available from the other woredas. The household survey found that, across all eight woredas, 23% of PW beneficiary households and 56% of DS beneficiary households were female-headed (compared to 28% of the whole sample).

**Among women PW beneficiaries, one of the most frequently-raised issues was the workload.**

While the cash and food transfers from the PSNP are a much-appreciated benefit, the work itself is a *cost* to participants. The fact that half the registered PW beneficiaries are women is to be welcomed because it means that they have equal access to the programme, but it also represents a significant addition to their workload.

In focus groups, many women beneficiaries said they found it difficult to manage their essential domestic and childcare responsibilities alongside the public works, and were forced to work extremely long days.

This report therefore repeats the recommendation of the gender technical report for the 2004 PSNP design mission “that the public works component **allow women to work fewer hours than men** for the same daily wage given women’s domestic responsibilities”. ((Rogers 2004):iii) Alternative measures would be to reduce the number of hours worked per day for both women and men (as recommended above), and to allow more flexible timing to take account of participants’ other responsibilities. In this context, women’s work in nourishing and providing for the household should be valued equally with farming and other activities.

“Our workload is very heavy. We wake up very early, before the birds start to sing, to fetch water and make *enjera*. Then we go to work [PW] at about 7: 30, and stay there until 4, 5 or 6, it depends on the job. When we return home we will continue to work until midnight. The children help by collecting firewood.”

~ Women PW beneficiaries, *Kilte Awlalo (Tigray)*

“The work norm for both men and women is the same. The time allotted is also the same. Some of us with children ... suffer due to the workload and the lengthy time we are spending in the PWs. Because we are responsible for additional household activities during morning and late evening we became exhausted.”

~ Women PW beneficiaries, *Derashe (SNNPR)*

## 6.8. HIV / AIDS

The 2004 PIM (section 4.7.2) makes the following statement of intent about the inclusion of HIV/AIDS-affected households, but provides no guidance on how it should be implemented:

“It is ... essential to ensure chronically food insecure households which are affected by HIV/AIDS will benefit from SNP without being exposed to any stigma and discrimination. In addition, if a household cannot provide labour to participate in the public works because [of] illness associated with HIV/AIDS, it should be eligible to receive direct support from the SNP.”

Based on a large body of work on the socio-economic impacts of the disease, it can be stated that households affected by HIV/AIDS are likely to fall into one or more of the following categories:

- Labour-poor households<sup>22</sup>
- Elderly-headed households with children and little or no adult labour
- Child-headed households
- Households hosting orphans and other vulnerable children
- Households with chronically ill working-age adults, or who have suffered the death of working-age adults. The impact of the loss of breadwinners is self-evident.

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<sup>22</sup> For example, recent research in Tigray found that HIV/AIDS reduced households’ effective labour supply by 42% compared to non-affected households (Gebrehiwot Hailemariam Birru (2005). The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS on Smallholder farmers of Alamata District, Southern Tigray, Ethiopia. M.Sc. thesis in Agricultural Economics, Alemaya University.)

Chronic illness drains the household of both labour (due to loss of the sick person's labour plus the high demand on time and effort, usually of women and girls, of caring for sick family members) and wealth (with income and assets sacrificed to pay for medical treatment).

These are, in technical terms, sensitive but not specific indicators – in other words, they will capture virtually all HIV/AIDS-affected households, but will not distinguish them from households affected by other illnesses or misfortunes. This is exactly what is needed to ensure that affected households who are eligible on the grounds of poverty and food insecurity are included in the PSNP, without exposing them to stigma.

In the fieldwork for this study, only a handful of people were encountered who identified themselves as affected by HIV/AIDS. All were PSNP beneficiaries due to their household circumstances. It is, however, impossible to know how many others were in fact affected, not only because of the stigma and difficulty of talking about the illness but also because of the very poor diagnostic facilities in rural Ethiopia. This is an additional practical reason for not targeting by HIV status.

The household survey encountered only two child-headed households<sup>23</sup> out of the sample of 960: both were PSNP beneficiaries (Trends report p.11). Elderly-headed households<sup>24</sup> were more common (19% of the sample), and 82% of these were PSNP beneficiaries (ibid. p.13). Future rounds of the survey could provide more detailed analysis of the characteristics and beneficiary status of households and individuals who fall into the proxy indicator categories, including “grandparent households” and vulnerable children.

As a targeting policy, this report recommends that the PSNP should ensure coverage of HIV/AIDS affected households through the **proxy indicators** listed above. The programme should **improve its support to labour-poor households** (providing full-family transfers while limiting the labour requirement to a reasonable level), as discussed above. It should also continue to ensure that **only able-bodied adults are required to work**, while eligible elders and children are provided with direct support. **Chronic illness** (from whatever disease) should be specified as a criterion for direct support, and the time needed to care for the sick should be taken into account by CFSTFs in assessing the labour availability of targeted households. These measures in combination will ensure that poor and food-insecure households affected by HIV/AIDS are supported by the PSNP. The programme **should not attempt to target these households as a separate identifiable group.**

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<sup>23</sup> Households headed by children under 16 years old.

<sup>24</sup> Household heads aged 60 and over.

## 7. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

This section summarises recommendations on issues raised throughout the report, and constitutes an action list for discussion by donors and government. The recommendations are clustered according to topic, and are not necessarily in order of priority. A more detailed discussion of the issues leading to each recommendation can be found in the appropriate section of the report. Many of the recommendations made are about strengthening or ensuring practical *implementation* of the principles already stated in the PIM, rather than fundamental changes to the safety net design.

### 7.1. Public Works and Direct Support targeting

- i. Preset **quotas or targets for the proportion of beneficiaries who receive free transfers (without being required to work) should be dropped**, since the actual percentage of eligible beneficiaries who can or cannot work will inevitably vary from place to place and from time to time. The number of people on direct support in any given community should be determined by a local needs assessment. This recommendation is in line with the principles already stated in the PIM, section 2.1.
- ii. **A ceiling should be set on the total number of days per month an individual is required to work** on the PW projects. Woredas should decide an appropriate maximum number of days for their local conditions (under the guidance of the region, and in consultation with FSTFs and beneficiaries): the revised (2006) PIM suggests a ceiling of 20 days, which is effectively full-time employment. The maximum number of days per month (and hours per day) may vary according to the season, in order to free beneficiaries' time for agricultural and other productive activities.
- iii. **Labour-poor households** in the PW programme who cannot cover the full work requirement of 5 days per household member per month should **work according to their capacity (up to the agreed ceiling), while receiving transfers for the full household**. Under this system, eligible households with no labour at all will continue to receive direct support without being required to work, as before. Households with enough labour will continue to earn their transfers in full by contributing 5 days' work per month for each household member. The only change will be for the minority of beneficiary households who have some labour, but not enough to cover the full transfer entitlements of the household.
- iv. A procedure and guidelines should be set in place for CFSTFs to grant **temporary exemption from work** for registered beneficiaries who fall pregnant or seriously ill during the PSNP implementation, and who do not have enough household labour to cover their work requirement (within the agreed per-person ceiling). Criteria for temporary exemption should be clear and strict, to avoid abuse and ensure transparency. Pregnancy is the most obvious eligible condition which cannot be predicted during the annual targeting, and it is recommended that temporary exemption from hard physical labour (**maternity leave**) for **pregnant and breastfeeding women** should be introduced immediately.<sup>25</sup> Beneficiaries who are temporarily exempted from work by the CFSTF **should not lose any transfer entitlement**, and should not lose their place in the programme.

### 7.2. Temporal targeting to support graduation

- i. Implementing agencies and woredas should plan the **timing of public works**, in consultation with beneficiaries, to ensure **minimal disruption of other activities**

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- that contribute to self-sufficiency and household welfare**, thus promoting the chances of graduation. Such activities include not only farming, but also off-farm livelihood activities, domestic and childcare work, and schooling (see below).
- ii. Temporal targeting can be adjusted at **three levels: seasonality, days per month, and hours per day**. All three levels should be considered by woredas when planning the timing of public works.
  - iii. **The work-day should be reduced from a full to a half day**. This would allow more time for other productive activities which may contribute to household graduation, and would also bring the effective wage rate more in line with market wages for unskilled labour.
  - iv. Continued efforts are needed to achieve **regular, predictable, timely payment** of transfers to beneficiaries, to ensure consumption smoothing during the period of greatest need and to enable people to plan their livelihood investments and risks.
  - v. **The timing of transfer payments for DS beneficiaries should be de-linked from the public works.**

### 7.3. Child labour and schooling

- i. The targeting study did not find evidence of widespread child labour on the PSNP public works, although there are anecdotal reports that this does happen and the household survey shows a small minority of child workers. Monitoring and supervision of the PW should continue to **ensure that children are not employed**. Placing a ceiling on the per capita workload (as recommended above) will **reduce the pressure on labour-poor households to send children** to the public works.
- ii. Education is an essential investment for future livelihoods and food security. Specific guidance should be given to CFSTFs that **PW participation should not prevent or interrupt school attendance**. FSTF and RRT monitoring should include spot-check interviews with beneficiaries to identify whether and why this is happening. Flexibility in the **timing** of the works (particularly regarding the hours per day) may help to address this issue for older teenage students, and local decision-makers should therefore be instructed to **consider beneficiaries' school timetable when planning the works**.

### 7.4. Retargeting and the registration period

- i. Given the significant burden of time and trouble incurred by local decision-makers (particularly the unpaid CFSTFs) in the household targeting process, it is recommended that the **requirement to re-target after six months should be dropped**. In general, it is recommended that the instructions and procedures for household targeting should be kept as simple as possible, in order to minimise transaction costs for local decision-makers and to maximise transparency.
- ii. **Individual cases of appeal which arise between the targeting rounds**, due to alleged mistargeting or changes in household circumstances, should be heard as and when they arise, perhaps on a monthly or 2-monthly meeting schedule (frequency to be discussed with FSTFs). In order for this to function effectively, the appeals system needs to be strengthened and clarified (see recommendations below). The CFSTFs and KFSTFs also need the **authority to make minor adjustments** to the lists and the total number of beneficiaries, under the supervision of the WFSTF. Currently CFSTFs and KFSTFs report that they do not have the resources to make such adjustments because of the "quota" (resource allocation) system. The woreda contingency fund should in principle provide adequate resources for this.

- iii. Once registered, **beneficiaries should be guaranteed regular transfers for a minimum period of one year.** A longer guaranteed period is under discussion. In the meantime, one year of predictable transfers would be a major improvement over the current uncertainty reported by beneficiaries.
- iv. Beneficiaries should only be removed from the programme during the registration period if they are found to have been **wrongly registered** because of deliberate mistargeting or corruption, or in rare cases as a disciplinary measure if they are not fulfilling their obligations on the public works.
- v. Beneficiaries **should not be deregistered because of assets acquired on credit,** until the debt is cleared.
- vi. **Woreda beneficiary data-bases,** which have made impressive progress in some places, should **keep track of how long each beneficiary household has been registered.** This will facilitate longer-term monitoring of progress towards graduation and the impacts of regular, predictable safety-net transfers. It will also enable identification and monitoring of problems such as beneficiary rotation.

## 7.5. Appeals process

- i. Efforts should continue to ensure that community targeting processes are **transparent, participatory and well managed.**
- ii. Greater attention needs to be paid to **raising awareness of the appeals process:** who to appeal to, what process the appeal should follow, and how appellants can expect to be treated.
- iii. The **appeals process needs to be faster** in almost all places. At the moment most appeals are taking weeks and in some cases months to resolve, not the two to three days as set out in the Targeting Guideline.
- iv. Bodies that hear appeals or complaints about targeting should have **separate membership** from the Food Security Task Forces (woreda, kebele or community). This independent role may be filled by special committees at woreda or kebele level, by the RRTs, or in some cases by NGOs.
- v. A **more effective reporting and follow-up system for appeals** is needed at the kebele, woreda and regional levels.

## 7.6. Monitoring: strengthening the Rapid (or Roving) Response Mechanism

- i. The RRM has the potential to contribute significantly to improved monitoring of the PSNP targeting. **Federal and regional RRTs should be strengthened.** Membership should be more fixed, to provide greater continuity in field teams. Regular (perhaps monthly) field visits should replace the current sporadic schedule.
- ii. **Zonal RRTs should be established and resourced** in most regions,<sup>26</sup> with a specific mandate to monitor targeting and other aspects of PSNP implementation in the woredas. Zonal RRTs should systematically visit all PSNP woredas in their catchment areas on a regular (bi-annual?) basis, perform spot-checks on targeting at the kebele and community levels, and follow up targeting appeals.
- iii. The RRM should provide **more substantive horizontal and vertical linkages** between and across administrative layers - vertical in the sense of informing the

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<sup>26</sup> Feedback from the regional workshops suggests that this would be welcomed and useful everywhere except Tigray (where the Zones have only administrative functions, and the region is in any case smaller and more homogeneous).

regional and federal governments about PSNP implementation on the ground, and horizontal in the sense of supporting lesson learning and cross-fertilisation across different kebeles, woredas and regions.

- iv. RRTs should contribute to and support **improved reporting** and record keeping on targeting and appeals within the PSNP, in order to **strengthen transparency and accountability**. To ensure that PSNP resources are not being misused, the RRTs should investigate any allegations of corruption or socio-political bias in targeting,
- v. The relevant sections of the RRT **Checklist for Field Assessment should be further developed** to encourage more systematic information gathering, analysis and follow-up of targeting and appeals.

### 7.7. Geographical targeting

- i. **Standard technical guidance for woredas on how to allocate PSNP resources among kebeles** should be developed and included in the revised targeting guidance.

### 7.8. Improving the PSNP's gender sensitivity

- i. Working hours on the PW should be adjusted to **enable women to combine participation in the programme with their domestic and other work**, without incurring an excessive workload which is damaging to their health and to the welfare of children. Either women should be allowed to work shorter hours than men for the same payment, or working hours should be reduced for all participants (see 7.2.iii).
- ii. Efforts should be made to **increase the number of elected women representatives on kebele and community FSTFs**, perhaps by setting a target number or percentage. However, a token presence of women on the targeting bodies will not in itself have a great impact on the attention paid to gender. Women FSTF members need **training and support**: this should be included in capacity development budgets.
- iii. Ongoing training for PSNP implementers (including the dissemination of the revised PIM) should endeavour to **increase gender awareness** in general, and to ensure attention to **specific gender issues in the PSNP**.
- iv. The requirement for **evaluation and monitoring teams to consult women** as well as men should be strengthened and developed into a more detailed checklist. Continued work is also needed to improve the collection and use of **gender-disaggregated beneficiary information**.
- v. The recommended improvements to the **appeals system** (see 7.5.) should explicitly consider gender in reviewing each aspect of the appeals process, and should ensure that women have fair access.
- vi. The Head of the **Women's Affairs Department** in each PSNP woreda, who is an *ex officio* member of the WFSTF, could perhaps be given terms of reference and the necessary resources to **monitor and implement directives on gender equity and the interests of women beneficiaries** within the PSNP. The Women's Affairs Department in the federal MoARD could provide advice and oversight.

### 7.9. Targeting Guidelines: national framework, regional details

- i. Once decisions have been made on the recommendations in this report, a brief

operational **Revised Targeting Note** <sup>27</sup> should be produced to supplement the revised PIM. This will be a concise national framework document, setting out the key rules and procedures for targeting in future rounds of the PSNP.

- ii. Regional governments should then develop **more detailed practical guidance on targeting adapted to their local conditions, social and cultural contexts, and capacities**. It is recommended that this should be developed in consultation with local stakeholders (woreda, kebele and community FSTFs, beneficiaries and relevant NGOs). It should incorporate feedback and examples from these stakeholders' experience, and should include clear procedures for appeals using the channels and structures actually existing in the region.

Areas where regional and local variability requires further development of detailed targeting guidance and examples include:

- **seasonality**, in relation to hungry seasons and livelihood activities, which should affect the timing of the works and transfer payments;
  - **size and composition of households** (e.g. polygamous and larger households in some areas) <sup>28</sup>;
  - community governance and power structures, including the representation of women and minorities, which may require **adaptation of the community targeting model**; and
  - appropriate **indicators and thresholds** for identifying food insecure households, according to the livelihood and socio-economic environment.
- iii. **Continual training and back-up** are needed at woreda and kebele level, partly to counteract the institutional memory loss associated with high staff turnover. The production of **concise, accessible, local-language versions of the PIM and Targeting Guideline** (including any updates) would also help. Copies of these documents should always be available in PSNP woreda offices.

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<sup>27</sup> The existing Safety Net Targeting Guideline will continue to be a valuable training and reference resource, since it explains basic principles and methods of targeting as well as detailing specific instructions from the 2004 PIM. Therefore, a brief operational supplement is suggested rather than an overall revision of the Guideline.

<sup>28</sup> See Annex 3 for a summary table of secondary data on regional variation in household composition.

## Annexes

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## Annex 1: List of people interviewed

<b>ADDIS ABABA</b>		
<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
<b>FEDERAL GOVERNMENT</b>		
Ato Berhanu	Head of Design	FFSCB (Federal Food Security Coordination Bureau) Monitoring and Evaluation Department
Ghirma Shigute	Information Centre (SNNPR)	
Shewadeg Molla	Information Centre (Tigray)	
Dagnachew Alemu	Information Centre (Oromiya)	
Gebeyehu Bizuneh	Information Centre (Amhara)	
Mulumebet Melaku	Head	Women's Affairs Department, MoARD
<b>DONORS / UN</b>		
Judith Sandford	Safety Nets Advisor	USAID
Steve Perry	EPSP Coordinator	USAID / DPPA
John Jackson	Councillor (Development)	CIDA (Embassy of Canada)
Volli Carucci	MERET Advisor	WFP
<b>NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS</b>		
David Orth-Moore	Country Representative,	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Girma Tadesse	Project Officer, Emergency Relief	
Zelleke Shibeshi	Head, Food Security Section	
Leslie Mitchell	Country Representative	PACT
Andrew Barnes	Country Director	Food for the Hungry International (FHI)
Gashaw Belay	Emergency Relief and Development Coordinator	
Julie Burch	Country Representative	CHF
Georgia Rowe	Chief of Party (RDIR)	Save the Children, UK
Emebet Kebede	Emergency Response Manager / Advisor	
Tedla Assefa	NGO knowledge coordinator	CARE-Ethiopia
Faheem Khan	Rural Livelihood Program Coordinator	
Maria Strintzos	Head, Liaison Office	Relief Society of Tigray (REST)
Lizze Nkosi	Country Representative	Help Age International
<b>CONSULTANTS and OTHER KEY INFORMANTS</b>		
Gerry Gill	Consultant	ODI, Public Works Study
Daniel Gilligan	Research Fellow	Food Consumption and Nutrition Division, IFPRI
Catherine Dom	Consultant	Mokoro Ltd. Tigray and Amhara Decentralisation Studies
Mohammed Musa	Consultant	
Phil Sutter	Food and Livelihood Security Specialist	Technical Assistance to NGOs (TANGO)
Shawn Hayes	CIDA Gender Equality and HIV/AIDS Advisor	MoARD Extension and T-VET Dept.

<b>TIGRAY REGION</b>		
<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
Assefa Tewodros	Head	Food Security Bureau (BoARD)
Ato Belete	Head of Natural Resources	Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
Berhane Haile	Head of Agriculture	Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
W/o Frewoini	Deputy Head	Food Security and Disaster Prevention & Preparedness Division
Solomon Alemu	Head of Early Warning	Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
Yemane Solomon	Head of Planning	REST

<b>SOUTHERN NATIONS, NATIONALITIES AND PEOPLE'S REGION (SNNPR)</b>		
<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
Ato Tadele	Head	Food Security and DPP Office
Ato Beyan Ibrahim	Safety Net Expert	Food Security and Safety Net Team
Ato Molla	Team Leader	Food Security and Safety Net Team
Ato Mamo Gadebo	Head, Natural Resources	BoARD
W/o Atsedo G/Tsadik	Acting Head, Early Warning Dept.	Food Security and DPP Office
Ato Solomon Tilahun	Field Monitor	WFP
Ato Tadesse Haro	Safety Net Grants Facilitator	World Vision Ethiopia (WVE)

<b>OROMIYA REGION</b>		
<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
Obo Challa Hordoffa	Commissioner	Food Security and DPP Dept.
Dr Solomon	Head, Crop Protection and Control Dept.	BoARD
Obo Getachew Beyene	Team Leader, Socio-economic Team	Food Security and DPP Dept.

<b>AMHARA REGION (BAHR DAR)</b>		
<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
Aderaw Dagnew	Deputy Office Head	Food Security and DPP Office
Addisu Setargachew	Safety Net Coordinator	
Amare Kinde	M&E Officer	
Tafesse Kassa	Head, Safety Net and Land Access Dept.	Organisation for Rehabilitation and Development in Amhara (ORDA)
Wuletaw H/Mariam	Executive Director	
Dejene Meneliku	Programme Director	Amhara Development Association (ADA)
Solomon Tadesse	Director	SC-UK
Getenew Zewdu	Regional Programme Coordinator	

## Annex 2: Example of a PSNP beneficiary ID card

### Kalu Woreda PSNP beneficiary ID card

**የኤፍቲኤት ንግድ-ም ተጠቃሚ መታወቂያ ወረቀት**

**ኮድ** \_\_\_\_\_

ክልል፣ አማራ ዞን፣ ደቡብ ወሰን  
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<u>Safety Net Beneficiary Identification Card</u>	<u>Wage payment/SN transfer</u>																												
<p>Code _____</p> <p>Region _____ Zone _____</p> <p>Woreda _____ Kebele _____</p> <p>Got _____</p> <p>Name of the household head _____</p> <p>Sex _____ Age _____</p> <p>Family Size _____</p> <p>Number of family member working on PWS _____</p> <p>Number of family members working on other food security programs:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Beneficiaries No. <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Non-beneficiaries No. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; text-align: center;"> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Apr</th> <th>May</th> <th>Jun</th> <th>Jul</th> <th>Aug</th> <th>Sep</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>2006</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2007</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2008</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Prepared by (DA) _____ PA Administrator _____ W/FS&amp;DPPC Team Leader _____</p> <p>Name _____ Name _____ Name _____</p> <p>Signature _____ Signature _____ Signature _____</p> <p>Date _____ Date _____ Date _____</p>	Year	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	2006							2007							2008						
Year	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep																							
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2008																													

Translation by Alemtsehay Aberra

### Annex 3: Regional variations in household structure and demography

	Amhara	Tigray	SNNPR	Oromiya
<b>Household size</b>				
Mean	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.9
Minimum	1	1	1	1
Maximum	17	17	17	17
% one-person households	5.8	8.3	5.1	4.5
% households ≤ 5 members	68.3	68.8	50.6	58.9
% popn in households ≤ 5 members	50.2	50.1	31.2	43.7
<b>Household headship</b>				
% households female-headed	18.5%	27.3%	21.2%	20.3%
% households child-headed (<15)	0.04%	0.03%	0.17%	0.08%
% households elderly-headed (≥ 65)	13.1%	14.1%	8.5%	12.0%
<b>Polygamy</b>				
% married women in polygamous unions	2.2	4.7	21.9	18.3
<b>Demographic profile</b>				
% popn ≥ 65	3.9	4	3.6	3.5
Age-based dependency ratio				
overall	94.4	96.5	N/A *	103.2
old-age	7.5	7.9	N/A	7.0
youth	86.8	88.6	N/A	96.2

**Notes:**

All data are for rural populations and from the 1994 census, except polygamy rates which are for total (rural and urban) population and from the 2000 Demographic and Health Survey.

\* N/A = data not available

Data compiled by Alemtsehay Aberra

# PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME TARGETING APPRAISAL DATA COLLECTION METHODS

*Kay Sharp & Taylor Brown  
7 May 2006*

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## INTRODUCTION

### Key themes and questions (summary of Terms of Reference)

The appraisal will in general review the *design, implementation* and *outcomes* of targeting during the safety net's first year of operation. The objectives are:

To assess:

- how effectively the programme is targeting eligible beneficiaries
- the extent of targeting errors
- the effectiveness of appeals systems, and
- key lessons learned.

and to make recommendations on:

- strengthening overall targeting processes, and
- enhancing appeals systems.

The Terms of Reference can be summarised under 7 key themes:

#### 1. Guidelines, instructions and training in the safety-net targeting.

- How consistently have the guidelines been communicated to, and understood by, local decision makers?
- Are the guidelines being adapted to local circumstances?
- 

#### 2. Targeting "errors" – inclusion, exclusion, dilution, under-resourcing, misuse – and targeting success (coverage).

- How successful has the safety net been so far in reaching the intended target groups (i.e., the poorest chronically food-insecure households)?
- Who (what kinds of people) are benefiting from the Safety Net? What kinds of people are being excluded?
- What kinds of errors are occurring? On what scale? If errors are found, why are they happening? Are they systemic? Has action been taken to correct them?

#### 3. Geographical targeting within Weredas.

- Are the Weredas selecting or prioritising the poorest kebeles and villages, or are they spreading the Safety Net resources across the whole wereda?
- If they are targeting areas within the Wereda, how are they doing it?

#### 4. Public Works ↔ Direct Support targeting.

- How do the targeting process and criteria differ between Public Works and Direct Support beneficiaries?
- How are labour-poor households treated?

- Is there a quota for DS? If so, where is it coming from (who is deciding it, and how)?

#### **5. Safety net ⇔ Emergency targeting.**

- What are the differences between the targeting process and beneficiary groups under the Safety Net and previous emergency relief operations (EGS and GR)?
- If there has been emergency relief in the Wereda Kebele since the Safety Net started, how are the target (beneficiary) groups separated? What differences do people see between the beneficiaries of relief and the Safety Net?

#### **6. Appeals or complaints procedures**

- If someone disagrees with the Safety Net targeting decisions, for any reason, what can they do? (What procedures and structures are in place?)
- Are these structures and procedures working? Are errors or misuse being corrected?

#### **7. Monitoring, transparency, and accountability of targeting.**

- What monitoring systems are in place and functioning (e.g. Wereda data-base of beneficiaries; communication with the Federal Information Center; Rapid Response Teams).
- How transparent is the targeting process? Are the beneficiaries and other community members informed about the process and criteria?

*On themes 2, 6 and 7 see also the detailed questions by Taylor in Appendix 1.*

In addition, there are two cross-cutting issues: gender, and HIV/AIDS.

**Gender** will be considered under each of the themes, and throughout the data collection and analysis. The study will examine how gender concerns have been integrated in the targeting guidelines, as expressed in the PIM and other documents; the current understanding by officials and communities of this issue; the extent to which the guidelines on gender are being applied; and the reasons for any problems. The fieldwork will assess how far women are involved in the decision-making processes for targeting the Safety Net, and any gender-specific impacts on beneficiaries. This will include consideration of the targeting criteria (are women being fairly included in benefits?), and the impacts of PW participation on women. Recommendations will be made on how the PSNP can more effectively address gender issues in targeting.

**HIV/AIDS** is a growing problem in rural Ethiopia, and the affected population (both those who are ill, and those who support them or their dependents) are a particularly vulnerable group. As far as possible, the study will assess whether the Safety Net targeting is designed and functioning in such a way as to include HIV/AIDS-affected households. Examples of “proxy indicators” widely used to ensure inclusion of these households are: chronic illness; death of working-age adults; child-headed households; and elderly-headed households supporting orphans or grandchildren. Is the Safety Net supporting these people?

#### **Overview of methods**

The overall research questions outlined above require us to trace the targeting process, and to discuss the issues arising, at several levels of decision-making (as summarised in Table 1). At National and Regional levels, key informants will be interviewed and secondary data and documents will be collected. The draft checklist for Regional interviews will be found in Appendix 2. At household level, a questionnaire survey will be administered to approximately 900 households in the 8 selected Weredas (see below for sampling method). This questionnaire will be administered by the *Trends in Transfers* team, but it includes sections on targeting and linkages, in addition to questions about the use of cash and food transfers. Quantitative analysis of these data will complement our qualitative fieldwork in the same Weredas.

**Table 17: Overview of data collection methods**

Methods	Level / location					
	National	Regional	Wereda	Kebele	Village	Household
Review of documents and data	✓	✓	✓			
Key informant interviews	✓	✓	✓	✓		
FSTF group interviews			✓	✓	✓	
Focus groups					✓	
Case studies						✓
Questionnaire survey						✓

### Sampling of field sites

Eight weredas (two in each of the major PSNP Regions) have been purposively selected for fieldwork, based on a combination of criteria including local government capacity; cash or food transfers; and implementing agency (government, NGO or WFP). The selection was made by the World Bank in consultation with the Federal and Regional Food Security Bureaus. The selected Weredas are listed below, and some basic information on the PSNP in these Weredas is given in Appendix 3.

- Tigray: Enderta and Wukro
- Amhara: Bugna and Kalu
- Oromiya: Fedis and Chiro
- SNNPR: Boricha and Derashe

In each selected Wereda, the questionnaire survey will sample two kebeles, and in each kebele it will sample one village, and 60 households. The Targeting research team will go to one kebele and village from the survey sample, while the Linkages team goes to the other one, so that the sites for qualitative and survey work overlap.

In total we will therefore visit 8 communities (one in each Wereda). This sample is not intended to be statistically representative: it is a set of examples or case studies from the four Regions, to enable us to hear the experiences and opinions of the people directly involved in implementing the safety net programme (i.e. local decision-makers, beneficiaries, and other community members). The aims of the fieldwork are to consult these people in order to gain some indicative information and insights into how the safety-net has been targeted so far; and to give them a voice in any recommendations on future changes or improvements in targeting.

### Contents and purpose of this paper

This paper focuses on the instruments to be used during the “qualitative” (i.e. open-ended, exploratory, consultative) fieldwork, at Wereda, Kebele (or Tabia), village and household level (the shaded area of Table 1). It is intended as a guide and discussion document for the field researchers, and it has been developed and revised in consultation with the researchers during the first phase of fieldwork. It is a “living document” – comments and improvements from the field researchers are welcome throughout the fieldwork.

## FIELD PROCEDURES AND METHODS

### Introducing the study

#### **Box 1: Introduction to the study and the team**

*[Introduce yourselves by name]*

We are independent researchers coming from different organisations. We have been employed by one of the funders of the safety net programme to consult the people in safety-net areas about the first year's implementation of this new programme. This team is focusing on targeting – that is, how the beneficiaries of the programme are selected and how successful the safety net has been so far in reaching the poorest chronically food-insecure people.

The purpose of the study is to inform the government and donors about things that are going well, and to make suggestions and recommendations on anything that should be changed or improved about the targeting.

We are not conducting a needs assessment, and we do not have any influence over the allocation of resources to areas or households. Any information you give us will not affect your benefits from the safety net.

Are you willing to spend some time to talk to us about your experience and opinions of the safety net targeting?

### Toolbox of qualitative methods

**Table 18: Toolbox**

	<b>Core methods (all sites)</b>	<b>Optional additions (depending on time and availability of informants)</b>
Wereda level	Wereda Food Security Task Force Interview	Key informant interviews
Kebele / Tabia level	Kebele Food Security Task Force Interview	Key informant interviews
Village* level	Community Food Security Task Force Interview Focus groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Public Works Beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Direct Support Beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Non-beneficiaries (of safety-net)</li> <li>▪ Women's group</li> </ul>	Key informant interviews
Household / individual level	Case studies / individual stories	

\* "Village" should be translated appropriately for each region.

#### **Core method 1: Task Force Interviews**

At Wereda, Kebele and village level, the team will conduct structured group interviews with the Food Security Task Force (or if a Task Force has not been formed, whatever group has been deciding the targeting of the Safety Net). The purpose of these interviews is to understand and document the *process* of targeting in the selected wereda. Some of the questions are different at different levels, while to some extent the three interviews

triangulate each other. Checklists for these interviews will be found in Appendix 4, 5 and 6.

### **Core method 2: Focus Groups**

In each village, a minimum of three focus group discussions should be held, representing the 2 safety-net beneficiary categories plus non-beneficiaries, i.e.

1. Public Works beneficiaries
2. Direct Support beneficiaries
3. Non-beneficiaries

Ideally, a separate men's and women's group should be convened for each category: however, time may not allow this. Therefore, the three focus groups above should be mixed-gender, while a fourth group for women only should be mixed-category (i.e. PW beneficiaries, DS beneficiaries, and non-beneficiaries):

4. Women's group.

Groups should have a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 12 members. Between 8 and 10 is probably ideal to get an active discussion involving a variety of views.

Focus group members may be household heads, or other knowledgeable household members. For the public works group, they should be people who actually did the work.

For each group, try to get a range of ages, and aim for approximately 50:50 women and men. The 50:50 gender mix may not be possible, but do your best to encourage the inclusion of women. Even if they don't say much in a mixed group, they will at least hear the discussion and be able to tell other women about it.

Keep your ears open to identify candidates for case-studies (i.e. people with interesting and relevant stories, who may be willing to talk to us privately in more detail about their experience and views of the safety net targeting).

If group members give different answers to some questions, try to record all the answers. It is more informative to know the range of answers than an average. Similarly if they disagree about something, this may be a fruitful area to probe (or to follow up with a case study). Try to make a note of the different opinions, whether there is heated disagreement, and roughly how many people are on each side.

Remember to record direct quotations (people's exact words) as much as possible.

See Appendix 7 for Focus Group checklists, and Appendix 8 for a Methodology Note on the PRA-based method for estimating coverage, exclusion and inclusion. Note that you may not be able to cover all the questions with all groups – use your judgement.

The focus groups, as well as the case studies, focus on investigating the *outcome* of the Safety Net targeting as well as community members' perceptions of the *process*.

### **Core method 3: Household case studies**

In each site, researchers should interview at least 1 case study from each of the 2 beneficiary categories, and one non-beneficiary (giving a minimum of 3 case studies per wereda, 6 per region, and 24 in total).

Case studies (individual stories) can give a deeper understanding of how people are affected by the Safety Net. They can add a "human face" to the report by illustrating individual experience. They enable us to pursue specific questions, or to illustrate certain types of beneficiary, or to understand hidden issues that people may not be willing to discuss in focus groups.

Case studies should be reported in direct voice, as close as possible to the exact words of the interviewee. Simply record what they say, don't interpret or summarise.

The format of case studies should be quite informal and open-ended. It is impossible to give a list of questions, as there are so many possible topics and directions the interview might take. However, as a rough checklist, you should aim to include the following:

- Household / individual **profile** (e.g. age, gender, household size, any particular problems such as disability, illness, orphans).
- Socio-economic **status** (assets, livelihood, food security etc.).
- **Participation** in Safety Net (e.g. PW beneficiary, DS beneficiary, Non-beneficiary)
- If beneficiary, what has been the effect of the Safety Net on their well-being or livelihood? Effect of transfers and effect of work requirement. How have transfers been used? **Benefits?**
- **Experience & opinions** of the targeting process – how and why selected or not selected.
- **Appeals** or complaints.

Most importantly - listen carefully, keep the key research questions in mind, and follow up any interesting issues or stories that arise.

### Selection of case-studies

Across the fieldwork as a whole, aim for a variety of the household characteristics shown in the columns in the table. Use the table to record the number of case studies of each type, marking “M” for each male interviewee and “F” for each female, and ticking for household characteristics. Note that you do not need to find a case study to fit each cell in this table, and that some households may meet more than one of the characteristics. The table is a guide to ensure a variety of case studies, not a rigid sampling frame – use your judgement according to the interesting cases you find.

	HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS							
BENEFICIARY CATEGORY	Labour-poor hh	Hh with able-bodied labour	Extremely poor hh	Elderly headed	Female headed	Hh appealed or complained about targeting	Household contains:	
							Disabled or sick adult(s)	School-age children (7-14 years)
PW beneficiary								
DS beneficiary								
Non-beneficiary								

Case study interviewees may be household heads, or other household members. Ideally half the interviewees should be women and half men. Individuals should be interviewed in private, and alone (or with another household member or helper if they choose).

Interviewees for case studies (i.e. in-depth discussion of their experience and their views of the safety-net programme) can be identified through the focus groups. They may either be focus group members who seem to have interesting stories or strong views on the topics discussed, or people suggested by focus group members (possibly people whose experience with the PSNP is raised during the focus group). Alternatively, ask a key informant to introduce you to households or individuals who meet the case study criteria (but beware of potential informant bias).

### Optional addition: Key Informant Interviews

A key informant interview can be anything from a formal interview with a semi-structured questionnaire, to a short conversation with a DA or local leader in the vehicle on the way to

a village. The defining feature of a key informant is that they are knowledgeable individuals who can provide information about the programme and the local situation.

Given the very short time for fieldwork, it may not be possible to conduct formal key informant interviews in all the weredas. They are therefore listed as an “optional addition” (depending on time and the availability of informants). On arrival in a Wereda, assess the availability of key informants (particularly those outside the formal Safety Net structures). As you proceed, with the fieldwork, decide who might be able to give key information on particular issues arising, or cross-check facts where necessary.

Key informants may include any of the following:

#### *Wereda level*

- WFSTF members (for more detailed follow-up discussion)
- Head of Wereda Council or Cabinet (*re.* targeting appeals – see Appendix 9)
- NGO or other agency staff (e.g. WFP where present)
- Head of Food Security Office
- Head of Wereda Rural Development Office (WRDO)
- Head of DPPA (*re* targeting of emergency relief in relation to PSNP)
- Bureau of Health, or doctors at health centre / clinic (*re* HIV/AIDS, chronic illness, and disability)
- Wereda Rapid Response Team (RRT) members (if existing?)
- DAs (Development Agents) for the selected kebeles
- Other knowledgeable observers

#### *Kebele level*

- DA(s)
- Kebele Administrator / Head of Council (*re* appeals procedures - see Appendix 10)
- Kebele Rapid Response Team (RRT) members (if existing?)
- NGO or other agency staff (e.g. WFP where present)
- Other knowledgeable observers (e.g. teacher; health worker)

#### *Village level*

- CFSTF members (for more detailed follow-up discussion)
- Church or Mosque leaders
- Leaders of Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), e.g. idir, equb.
- Elders
- Other knowledgeable observers

Draft checklists for Wereda and Kebele-level key informant interviews on appeals procedures are in Appendix 9 and 10. If time allows, the researchers should interview whoever is responsible for hearing complaints or appeals about the targeting of the safety net (see PIM and Safety Net Targeting Guideline for the formal structures).

### **Compiling the Wereda report**

At the end of fieldwork in each Wereda, you should compile a draft fieldwork report. This does not need to be a polished product: it is simply a means of ensuring that all the information, and your observations, from the Wereda are recorded before you move on.

1. First, make sure you have written up your fieldnotes from:

- WFSTF interview
- KFSTF interview
- CFSTF interview
- Focus group notes
  - PW beneficiaries
  - DS beneficiaries
  - Non-beneficiaries

- Women's group (if conducted)
  - Case study notes
- 2. Add any key informant interview notes.
- 3. Write down your own comments and observations about the Wereda. These need only be a couple of pages, and can be in bullet or note form if you prefer. They should cover:
  - What's the story? How has the Safety Net targeting been implemented in this Wereda?
  - What are the key problems or challenges you observed?
  - Who is benefiting from the Safety Net here, and who is being excluded?
  - Keeping in mind the key research themes and questions, what have we learnt from this wereda?
  - Any other comments, observations, questions, or issues arising.
- 4. Finally, put the computer files of all these notes into one folder with the name of the Wereda. If possible please e-mail it to [k.sharp@odi.org.uk](mailto:k.sharp@odi.org.uk). Make sure the research co-ordinator (Amdissa) has a copy – and make sure you have back-ups! If you collected any hard-copy documents, please put them in an envelope or folder marked with the name of the Wereda, and give them to Amdissa.

## **Appendix 1: Appeals, exclusion/inclusion and incentives**

**Objective:** To assess the effectiveness of the appeals systems, the key lessons learned from the implementation of these procedures, and recommendations on strengthening transparency of appeals structures.

### **Questions from TOR related to appeals:**

- 1) Assess to what extent formal mechanisms for addressing appeals are in place and functioning at kebele and woreda levels, and whether these are being complemented or substituted by informal mechanisms.
- 2) Assess how beneficiaries in the programme perceive the application of targeting criteria and procedures, and their awareness of and satisfaction with appeals mechanisms.
- 3) Assess the overall transparency and accountability of the targeting process, including the effectiveness of the information centre and rapid response mechanisms as tools to monitor programme targeting.

### **Other key questions**

- 1) What are the capacity constraints faced at woreda and kebele level? How do these shape the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of targeting PSNP beneficiaries? How do these shape the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of appeals procedures?
- 2) What incentives shape the targeting and appeals processes and outcomes? What pressures/incentives do local level PSNP implementers respond to during the targeting and appeals processes? How does this range of incentives vary in different field sites?
- 3) What can be done to increase the effectiveness and accountability of targeting and appeals processes? What safeguards can be strengthened / created to prevent unfair exclusion from the PSNP? How can appeals mechanisms/processes be strengthened?

## **Areas of analysis**

### **Exclusion/ Inclusion**

*Q: Are those who should benefit from the PSNP programme being excluded from benefits? If so, what is the scale of this exclusion? Is it systematic?*

Exclusion and mis-targeting are all but inevitable in any large safety net programme. The key questions are therefore the scale and systematic character of exclusion.

- 1) Is exclusion of those who should benefit from the PSNP or inclusion of those who should not (as defined by the PIM) widespread in any particular village, kebele, woreda?
- 2) Do local-level conflicts and divisions get reflected in who gets what and why?
- 3) Potential sources of inappropriate exclusion / inclusion might include:
  - a) Local socio-economic and political disputes;
  - b) Disputes between decision makers and excluded beneficiaries;
  - c) Nepotism: inclusion of relatives, friends, patrons etc. who are not supposed to be eligible for benefits;
  - d) Exclusion of groups within the community based on their ethnicity, caste, place of origin, HIV/AIDS status, orphans, the elderly etc.;

- e) Exclusion of landless households (who might not appear on tax or electoral roles);
  - f) Exclusion of those who are expected to be resettled through resettlement programme;
  - g) Exclusion of those who support or are actively engaged in party politics;
  - h) Etc.
- 4) Is inappropriate exclusion / inclusion in any way systematic? Or are the reasons for inappropriate exclusion / inclusion more piecemeal?
    - a) Are decision makers at a local level excluding people as a result of guidance from higher level authorities? (see incentives above).
  - 5) Are there ways in which the PSNP targeting process is creating / accentuating social cleavages and friction within communities?
  - 6) We need to ask focus groups and key informants (especially decision makers) to propose their own solutions to targeting/appeals processes? Get their insights into how to improve the PSNP in practice.


### **Incentives**

*Q: What incentives shape the targeting and appeals processes and outcomes? What pressures/incentives do local level PSNP implementers respond to during the targeting and appeals processes? How does this range of incentives vary in different field sites?*

Administrators and members of FSTFs face a range of incentives that help to shape the decisions they make about targeting. These incentives come from above (from the Federal level, from Regional officials and from donors). They also come horizontally from NGOs and CBOs working in local communities (e.g. REST in Tigray). Lastly, they come from below: from the citizens that comprise the woreda, kebele and village. It will be important for our research to understand and map out these incentives in the woredas, kebeles and villages in which we are working.

- 1) What guidelines / instructions are passed down from the federal and regional levels to the local level about targeting?
  - a) What technical instructions do officials receive about PSNP in general and targeting in particular?
  - b) What 'political' instructions do officials receive about PSNP in general and targeting in particular?
  - c) How does directive management shape decision made about targeting and appeals?
- 2) The implementation of the PSNP is supposed to be decentralised and flexible to reflect the diversity of circumstances in which it is applied.
  - a) Have PSNP targeting guidelines and practices been modified to suit local circumstances? If so, how have they been modified and why?
  - b) How have targeting and appeals processes been locally adapted?
- 3) The kinds of incentives (real or perceived) that local officials face might include:
  - a) Is there an incentive for woreda officials to prefer cash to food aid since this brings more money to woreda offices?
  - b) Are their pressures from local people for selection to spread PSNP resources as widely as possible?

In the field it might be useful to map out and explore individual incentives, pressures, constraints on specific actors to understand why particular decisions are made:



- c) Are their pressures from the region to select those individuals/households that are more likely to graduate?
- d) Do officials face pressure to focus PSNP resources and the resources of other programmes of a narrow group of beneficiaries to show progress is being made toward graduation?
- e) Are there pressures related to resettlement programme?
- f) Are there pressures to focus on those who are likely to provide the necessary contributions to public works?
- g) What party political incentives might influence the behaviour of local officials?
- h) What do local officials believe the PSNP's success will be measured by?
  - i) Quality and quantity of public works?
  - ii) Number of beneficiaries who 'graduate'?
- 4) How do some of these incentives contradict each other and the objectives of the PSNP?

### Accountability and transparency

*Q: How accountable is the targeting process? How accountable is the appeals process? How transparent are the procedures and processes of targeting and appeals to beneficiaries?*

It will be important for us to get a sense of how accountable the targeting and appeals processes are. Elected officials, civil servants and service providers engaged in the PSNP process are **accountable** when their actions are answerable to citizens and these citizens can sanction or reward their performance.

There is a supply and demand side to accountability. On the demand side, citizens or clients must be able to exercise, **voice**: they must be willing and able to demand their inclusion in the PSNP if they are eligible. On the supply side, the FSTF and kebele and

#### Definitions

**Voice:** 'describes measures ranging from participation of people in decision-making and product delivery to lodging complaints, engaging in organised protest or lobbying, used by civil society actors to put pressure on public service providers to demand better service outcomes.'

**Responsiveness:** 'describes the extent to which public service and NGO providers demonstrate receptivity to the views, complaints and suggestions of service users, by implementing changes to their own structure, culture and service delivery patterns in order to deliver a more appropriate product to clients.'

**Accountability:** 'includes both horizontal mechanisms - institutional oversight, checks and balances internal to the state and vertical (external) mechanisms - non-state actors holding the power-holders to account.'

(Source: Goetz and Gaventa, 2001)

woreda councils/cabinets must be able and willing to **respond** to the demands of citizens. An accountable relationship is, in other words, one in which voice is met by responsiveness.

Voice is linked to responsiveness through the medium of **public space**, the socio-political arena in which discussions are held and decisions made. Citizen's willingness and ability to express their voice either directly or through intermediate civil society organisations is fundamentally determined by the public space in which they operate. At a local level, public space can be constricted by local elites and their interests, Government or party actors domination of decision making processes, or socio-cultural practices (e.g. the marginalization of women's voices).

- 1) Are formal procedures and criteria as set out in the PIM and targeting manual and other guidelines being followed?
- 2) Who engages in decision making about targeting or appeals?
  - a) Is it the FSTF or the woreda cabinet?
  - b) Are these one and the same?
  - c) What is the role of NGOs and community based organisations (CBOs) in the FSTF and decision making processes?
- 3) How 'participatory' is the targeting process in a particular community / kebele / woreda?
- 4) Are particular groups of individuals within a community marginalised from this process? If so, who and why?
- 5) To whom are decision makers within the PSNP process accountable? (upward to higher levels of government? Downward to members of the community?)
- 6) Do community members understand how decisions were made about:
  - a) Their exclusion from benefits
  - b) Their inclusion within the PRSP
  - c) The overall number of beneficiaries selected
  - d) Eligibility for direct support
  - e) The split between food and cash based assistance
- 7) What mechanisms or processes exist to make targeting processes transparent?
  - a) Do beneficiaries know why and how they were selected for participation in the PSNP?
  - b) Are names of beneficiaries posted at the local level?
  - c) Are names of beneficiaries read out at local meetings?
  - d) Are there other ways transparency mechanisms operating?
- 8) What is the relationship between NGOs working on the PSNP (e.g. USAID funded areas) and the local government structures (woreda and kebele)?
- 9) Are there any cases of mismanagement or corruption in targeting (e.g. bribes or extortion for inclusion as a beneficiary)? If so what are the details and how widespread and robust are the allegations?
- 10) Do kebele and woreda officials and FSTF members understand why their requests (e.g. numbers of beneficiaries, split between PW and DS and cash versus food assistance) are modified by higher administrative levels (e.g. regions)?

- 11) Who do local people appeal to if they have a complaint about PSNP targeting? (e.g. Kebele authorities, social courts, Woreda authorities, Zonal authorities, Regional authorities, Rapid Response Team (came from.....), community meeting, church or mosque leaders, NGO, WFP or other organisation, etc.)

### **Capacity**

*Q: What is the overall capacity of the kebele and woreda for implementing the PSNP? What is the capacity to address grievances? How does this capacity shape outcomes in terms of targeting?*

#### Specific questions:

- 1) Personnel?
  - a) Number of DAs, administrators
  - b) Background of DAs and administrators
  - c) Training received in PSNP?
  - d) Changes in personnel since PSNP inception?
- 2) Do woreda and kebele official have a copy of the PIM? If so, do they find it a useful guide to implementing the PSNP?
- 3) Do woreda and kebele official have a copy of the Targeting manual? If so, do they find it a useful guide to targeting?
- 4) How many DAs are working in the kebele?
- 5) How do DAs define their role with regards to:
  - a) the PSNP as a whole
  - b) the targeting process
  - c) the appeals process
- 6) What turn over has there been among woreda and kebele staff engaged in targeting since PSNP started?
- 7) What training have DAs and other key staff working on the PSNP received about targeting since PSNP started? (specify when, what they learned, where)
- 8) Are woredas carrying out any monitoring and evaluation related to targeting? What information are they recording? Who are they reporting information to?

## **Appendix 2: Regional key informants – checklist of topics**

*Key informants are likely to include:*

- *Food Security Bureau*
- *DPPA*
- *RRT members*
- *Any implementing NGOs/ WFP staff*

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### **DESIGN of safety net targeting (Guidelines, instructions etc.)**

Describe the training & dissemination of the targeting guidelines, and any other regional instructions

Local adaptation of targeting guidelines – any processes or household criteria that differ from the national guideline?

Any other instructions from Region about safety net targeting (in addition to the guidelines?)

What instructions or training did the Region give to the Weredas on how to select *Kebeles* for the safety net?

Who (what kinds of people) do you consider the priority target groups for the safety net in this Region?

After the first year of implementation, what changes or improvements can you suggest to the targeting design and guidelines?

### **IMPLEMENTATION**

Describe the process / story of how the safety net was targeted in this Region in the past year (i.e. since the programme started until now). How many targeting exercises have been carried out, and when? What happened at the Wereda, Kebele and community levels?

How is the targeting of safety net beneficiaries coordinated with targeting of FSP and relief (DPPA) programmes? In this Region, do you consider the target groups for these different programmes the same, or different? Have you found any problems or confusions between the targeting of these different programmes?

### **APPEALS, ADJUSTMENTS, MONITORING**

RRT – have any Rapid Response Teams from the Region visited the Weredas to check on the implementation of targeting? Please give details.

RRT teams from Addis? (Dates, composition, findings, outcomes)

Has the Region heard of any complaints or problems with targeting at the Wereda, Kebele or community level? If so, what were the problems, what action was taken and who by? If possible, give specific examples / case studies.

How many times in the past year were Weredas asked to target or retarget the safety net? Did the process or criteria change from the beginning of the programme to the end of the first year? Any lessons learned?

### **TARGETING OUTCOMES**

In your opinion, how successful has the safety net been in reaching the priority target

groups, in its first year in this Region?

Do you think there are any people who have been *excluded* from the safety net, but who should be included? What kinds of people, where and why? Approximately how many (i.e. is this a major problem affecting large numbers, or relatively small?)

Do you think there are any people who have been wrongly *included* in the safety net? What kinds of people, where and why? Approximately how many (i.e. is this a major problem affecting large numbers, or relatively small?)

What are the main achievements and challenges from the first year of implementation?

What are the main challenges you face for the second year?

### **COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Our research team has been asked to provide practical recommendations on how to improve the design, implementation and accountability of safety net targeting for future rounds. Do you have any suggestions or observations to help us?

Any other comments?

### Appendix 3: Selected Weredas for PSNP Appraisal (summary data)

Region	Zone	Wereda	Rural population	PSNP provider	PSNP planned beneficiaries July 2005 (retargeted)				PSNP planned beneficiaries 2006				Emergency beneficiaries		Information sources		
					Cash	Food	Total	Total as % popn	Public works	Direct support	Total	Total as % popn	2005 (May)	2006	IC monitored	NGO baseline	IFPRI baseline
TIGRAY	South Tigray	<b>ENDERTA</b>	125,855	GoE	50,814	0	50,814	40%	73,187	2,136	75,323	60%	28,870	-	Yes	No	Yes
	East Tigray	<b>WUKRO</b>	88,448	NGO (REST)	36,937	42,903	79,840	90%	76,872	2,968	79,840	90%	6,997	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
SNNPR	Sidama	<b>BORICHA</b>	?	NGO (World Vision)	6,900	6,900	13,800	?	32,960	6,800	39,760	?	13,104	5,780	No	Yes	No
	Derashe SW	<b>DERASHE</b>	113,211	WFP	6,170	6,170	12,340	11%	16,723	3,950	20,673	18%	2,646	?	No	?	?
OROMIYA	W. Harerge	<b>CHIRO</b>	373,244	NGO (CARE)	0	40,947	40,947	11%	23,413	2,664	26,077	7%	37,779	45,610	Yes	Yes	No
	E. Harerge	<b>FEDIS</b>	201,543	WFP	0	62,456	62,456	31%	58,043	11,481	69,524	34%	11,347	15,330	No	No	Yes
AMHARA	North Wello	<b>BUGNA</b>	219,419	NGO (ORDA / FHI) & GoE	0	62,917	62,917	29%	59,500	10,500	70,000	32%	8,200	-	Yes	Yes	No
	South Wello	<b>KALU</b>	216,424	GoE	0	51,107	51,107	24%	58,006	5,897	63,903	30%	4,150	4,000	Yes	?	?

## **Appendix 4: Wereda FSTF (Food Security Task Force) Group Interview**

*[Note: if there is no WFSTF, request a meeting with whatever group has decided the targeting of the PSNP until now]*

### **A. WFSTF (IF IT EXISTS)**

1. Who are the members of the WFSTF? (*PLEASE FILL TABLE 1*)
2. When was the WFSTF formed?
3. How were the members of the WFSTF selected?
4. How many members are women? If none or few, why?
5. How frequently has the Task Force met since it was formed? (e.g. every month, every year)?
6. How many hours does each meeting take?
7. What are the responsibilities of the WFSTF?

### **B. PSNP (SAFETY NET) PRINCIPLES**

1. In your view, what is the purpose of the safety net?
2. How does the Safety Net differ from other programmes (e.g. emergency relief or FFW)?
3. Under the safety net, who should receive “direct support” (DS), i.e. free cash or food without working?
4. In your view, who should participate in the public works (PW) component of the safety net, i.e. work in exchange for the cash or food?
5. In this Wereda, how did you decide the numbers of PW and DS beneficiaries?  
Is there is a quota? If yes, how was it decided or where did it come from?
6. Do some households receive safety net transfers from both Public Works and Direct Support? **YES / NO**  
If yes, why?
7. Did this Wereda receive emergency relief in the last 12 months?  
**YES / NO CASH / FOOD**  
If yes, how did you separate the beneficiaries for emergency relief and the safety-net?

### **C. SAFETY NET TARGETING GUIDELINES**

1. Do you have a copy of the guidelines? (*SHOW COPY*) **YES / NO**  
If yes, in which language? **Amharic / Tigrinya / Oromifaa / English**
2. How many copies are available in the Wereda (who has a copy)?
3. Has the WFSTF received any training on the implementation and targeting of the safety net? **YES / NO**  
If yes, please give details (who received training, who from, when, what did it cover?)
4. Did you receive any other instructions on targeting the safety net? **YES / NO**  
If yes, please give details (What did they say? Who did they come from?)
5. Have the instructions or guidelines on targeting changed from the first safety net targeting until now? **YES / NO**  
If yes, please explain how they changed.
6. This is a national guideline, but conditions and culture are different in different regions and weredas. How have you adapted the guideline to the realities in this wereda?  
Do you have any suggestions for improvements or adjustments to the targeting guidelines?

#### **D. TARGETING OF KEBELES**

1. How many kebeles are in the Wereda? .....
- How many were included in the PSNP last year (2005)? .....
- How many will be included this year (2006)? .....

**Ask for detailed data – see Table W2. Ask the WFSTF who can give us this data (WRDO?), and arrange to meet him or her. If necessary, the table can be left and collected later.**

2. If some kebeles were included in the safety net and others were excluded, how was this selection made? (process, criteria, any problems?)
3. If some kebeles were excluded, do you think there are any chronically food-insecure households in those kebeles? **YES / NO**  
If yes, what do you think should be done for those households?
4. If all kebeles were included, how did the wereda decide the number of beneficiaries or quantity of resources to allocate to each kebele?

#### **E. TARGETING WITHIN KEBELES**

1. What instructions or training did this Wereda provide for the Kebeles on targeting the safety net?
2. Did the Wereda give any instruction on how many household members should be registered for the safety net?

#### **F. RETARGETING**

1. How many times has this Wereda assessed and compiled beneficiary lists since the Safety Net started?  
When? (give months)
2. Did the process run more smoothly after the first time? **YES / NO**  
Why?

#### **G. RESOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION (ACTUAL BENEFICIARIES)**

1. Did the resources received match the number of beneficiaries identified by the Wereda? **YES / NO**
2. If not, what did you do? - e.g.
  - Reduce the number of kebeles / villages / households included?
  - Reduce the number of people registered in each household?
  - Ask the Community FSTF to revise the beneficiary list?
  - Use the Wereda contingency fund?
  - Other (please explain)

#### **H. APPEALS OR COMPLAINTS**

1. How many complaints or appeals have there been about the targeting process in this Wereda?  
Who complained?  
What were the complaints about?  
Who did they complain to?
  - Kebele council/ cabinet
  - Wereda council / cabinet

- Zonal government
- Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
- NGO (Name: .....)
- church or mosque leader
- someone else (Who?.....)

What action was taken? What happened?

2. Has the Wereda been visited by a Rapid Response Team (higher-level government or agency staff visiting to check the PSNP progress)? **YES / NO**

If yes, when? .....

Where did they come from (e.g. Region, Addis Ababa)? .....

Was their visit helpful to the WFSTF? **YES / NO**

What did they do?

***I. OTHER COMMENTS***

Do you have any other comments on our discussion, or any suggestions on how to improve the targeting of the safety net for the future?

Table W1: WEREDA FOOD SECURITY TASK FORCE (WFSTF)

WEREDA NAME:	DATE:
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Name (optional)	Role in Food Security Task Force <i>e.g. Chair, Secretary, Member, etc.</i>	Position (usual job or status) <i>e.g. Head of WARDO, Women's Affairs, DPPB, etc..</i>	Member of Wereda Council? (Please ✓)	Member of Wereda Cabinet? (Please ✓)	Gender	Present? (Please ✓)
1					M / F	
2					M / F	
3					M / F	
4					M / F	
5					M / F	
6					M / F	
7					M / F	
8					M / F	
9					M / F	
10					M / F	

Table W2: WEREDA TARGETING OF KEBELES – obtain data from Wereda Food Security Desk or Rural Development Office

WEREDA NAME:	DATE:
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	A Kebele / Tabia Name	B Population	Safety Net Beneficiaries 2005 (= numbers who actually received transfers)			FOR KEBELE SAMPLING	
			C Public Works	D Direct Support	E All PSNP (PW + DS)	PSNP % ( E / B)	Rank
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							
10							

**NOTES**

1. List *all* Kebeles / Tabias in the Wereda (including those with no PSNP beneficiaries).
2. Check that the beneficiary numbers are *individuals* (not households).
3. Does the Wereda have gender-disaggregated data? YES/ NO. If yes, collect a copy.
4. If possible, collect all this information as a spreadsheet (Excel file), in soft copy and printout!

## Appendix 5: Kebele / Tabia FSTF (Food Security Task Force) Group Interview

[Note: if there is no KFSTF, request a meeting with whatever group has decided the targeting of the safety net until now]

### A. KFSTF (IF IT EXISTS)

1. Who are the members of the KFSTF? (PLEASE FILL TABLE K1)
2. When was the KFSTF formed?
3. How were the members of the KFSTF selected?
4. How many members are women? If none or few, why?
5. How frequently does the Task Force meet (e.g. every month, every quarter)?
6. How many hours does each meeting take?
7. What are the responsibilities of the KFSTF?

### B. PSNP (SAFETY NET) PRINCIPLES

1. How does the Safety Net differ from other programmes (emergency relief or FFW)?
2. Under the safety net, who should receive “direct support” (DS), i.e. free cash or food without working?
3. Who should participate in the public works (PW) component of the safety net, i.e. work in exchange for the cash or food?
4. In this Kebele / Tabia, how did you decide the numbers of PW and DS beneficiaries?
5. Do some households receive safety net transfers from both Public Works and Direct Support? **YES / NO**  
If yes, why?
6. Did this Kebele receive emergency relief in the last 12 months?  
**YES / NO CASH / FOOD**  
If yes, how did you separate the beneficiaries for emergency relief and the safety-net?

### C. SAFETY NET TARGETING GUIDELINES

1. Do you have a copy of the guidelines? (SHOW COPY) **YES / NO**
2. If yes, in which language? **Amharic / Tigrinya / Oromifaa / English**
3. How many copies are available in the Kebele / Tabia (who has a copy)?
4. Has the KFSTF received any training on the implementation and targeting of the safety net?  
**YES / NO**
5. If yes, please give details (who received training, who from, when, what did it cover?)
6. Did you receive any other instructions on targeting the safety net? **YES / NO**
7. If yes, please give details (What did they say? Who did they come from?)
8. Have the instructions or guidelines on targeting changed from the first safety net targeting until now? **YES / NO**
9. If yes, please explain how they changed.
10. This is a national guideline, but conditions and culture are different in different places. Does the guideline fit your situation? Have you adapted it to conditions in your Kebele / Tabia?
11. Do you have any suggestions for improvements or adjustments to the targeting guidelines?

### D. COMMUNITY TARGETING

1. How many villages are in the Kebele / Tabia? .....

2. How many were included in the PSNP last year (2005)? .....
3. How many will be included this year (2006)? .....

**Ask for detailed data – see Table K2. Ask the KFSTF who can give us this data (KRDO?), and arrange to meet him or her. If necessary the table can be left and collected later.**

4. If some villages were included in the safety net and others were excluded, how was this selection made? (process, criteria, any problems?)
5. If some villages were excluded, do you think there are any chronically food-insecure households in those kebeles? **YES / NO**
6. If yes, what do you think should be done for those households?
7. If all villages were included, how did the Kebele / Tabia decide the number of beneficiaries or quantity of resources to allocate to each village?

#### **E. VILLAGE AND HOUSEHOLD TARGETING**

1. What instructions or training did this Kebele / Tabia provide for the village decision-makers on targeting the safety net?
2. Are the names of beneficiaries (both PW and DS) publicly displayed or announced? **YES / NO**  
If yes, where? **Village / Kebele / Wereda**
  - Are the names posted in writing?
  - Are they read out at community meetings?
  - Is another method used to ensure that everyone in the community knows who is a beneficiary? Please explain:
3. For each targeted household, how many members were registered for the safety net?
4. How many times have you made a list of beneficiaries for the Safety Net in this Kebele / Tabia? When? (give months)
5. Did the process run more smoothly after the first time? **YES / NO**  
Why?

#### **G. RESOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION (ACTUAL BENEFICIARIES)**

1. Did the resources received match the number of beneficiaries identified by the Kebele / Tabia? **YES / NO**
2. If not, what did you do? - e.g.
  - Reduce the number of villages included?
  - Reduce the number of households included?
  - Reduce the number of people registered in each household?
  - Ask the Community FSTF to revise the beneficiary list?
  - Use the Kebele / Tabia contingency fund?
  - Other (please explain)

#### **H. APPEALS OR COMPLAINTS**

1. How many complaints or appeals were there about the Safety Net targeting process in this Kebele / Tabia?  
Who complained?  
What were the complaints about?  
Who did they complain to?
  - Kebele council/ cabinet
  - Kebele / Tabia council / cabinet

- Zonal government
- Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
- NGO (give name)
- church or mosque leader
- someone else (Who?)

What action was taken? What happened?

2. Has the Kebele / Tabia been visited by a Rapid Response Team (higher-level government or agency staff visiting to check the PSNP progress)? **YES / NO**

If yes, when?

Where did they come from (e.g. Wereda, Region, Addis Ababa)?

Was their visit helpful to the KFSTF? **YES / NO**

What did they do?

***I. OTHER COMMENTS***

Do you have any other comments on our discussion, or any suggestions on how to improve the targeting of the safety net for the future?

Table K1: KEBELE / TABIA FOOD SECURITY TASK FORCE (KFSTF)

KEBELE / TABIA NAME:	DATE:
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Name (optional)	Role in Food Security Task Force <i>e.g. Chair, Secretary, Member, etc.</i>	Position (usual job or status) <i>e.g. Head of Rural Development,, Women's Affairs, DPPB, etc..</i>	Member of Kebele / Tabia Council? (Please ✓)	Member of Kebele / Tabia Cabinet? (Please ✓)	Gender	Present? (Please ✓)
1					M / F	
2					M / F	
3					M / F	
4					M / F	
5					M / F	
6					M / F	
7					M / F	
8					M / F	
9					M / F	
10					M / F	

Table K2: KEBELE / TABIA TARGETING OF VILLAGES – obtain data from Kebele / Tabia Food Security Desk or Rural Development Office

KEBELE / TABIA NAME:	DATE:
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	A Village Name	B Population	Safety Net Beneficiaries 2005 (= numbers who actually received transfers)			FOR VILLAGE SAMPLING	
			C Public Works	D Direct Support	E All PSNP (PW + DS)	PSNP % ( E / B)	Rank
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							
10							

**NOTES**

1. List *all* villages in the Kebele / Tabia (including those with no PSNP beneficiaries).
2. Check that the beneficiary numbers are *individuals* (not households).
3. Does the Kebele / Tabia have gender-disaggregated data? YES/ NO. If yes, collect a copy.
4. If possible, collect all this information as a spreadsheet (Excel file), in soft copy and printout!

## Appendix 6: Community FSTF (Food Security Task Force) Group Interview

[Note: if there is no CFSTF, request a meeting with whatever group has decided the targeting of the safety net until now]

### A. CFSTF (IF IT EXISTS)

1. Who are the members of the CFSTF? (PLEASE FILL TABLE K1)
2. When was the CFSTF formed?
3. How were the members of the CFSTF selected?
4. How many members are women? If none or few, why?
5. How frequently does the Task Force meet (e.g. every month, every quarter)?
6. How many hours does each meeting take?
7. What are the responsibilities of the CFSTF?

### B. PSNP (SAFETY NET) PRINCIPLES

1. How does the Safety Net differ from other programmes (emergency relief or FFW)
2. Under the safety net, who do you think should receive “direct support” (DS), i.e. free cash or food without working?
3. In your view, who should participate in the public works (PW) component of the safety net, i.e. work in exchange for the cash or food?
4. In this Village, how did you decide the numbers of PW and DS beneficiaries?
5. What criteria (household or individual characteristics) did you use to select people for public works (PW) and direct support (DS)? (DON'T PROMPT)

PUBLIC WORKS	DIRECT SUPPORT
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Poorest households</li> <li>▪ Food shortage in previous years</li> <li>▪ Food shortage last year (2005)</li> <li>▪ Loss of assets</li> <li>▪ Illness</li> <li>▪ Other crisis in the household</li> <li>▪ No support from family or friends</li> <li>▪ No or little off-farm income</li> <li>▪ Livestock (none or few)</li> <li>▪ Landless</li> <li>▪ Little or poor quality land</li> <li>▪ Received relief in previous years</li> <li>▪ Participating in other Food Security Programmes</li> <li>▪ Female-headed household</li> <li>▪ Elderly-headed household</li> <li>▪ Many dependents (= household members unable to work)</li> <li>▪ Labour available</li> <li>▪ Other (please specify):</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Poorest households</li> <li>▪ Food shortage in previous years</li> <li>▪ Food shortage last year (2005)</li> <li>▪ Loss of assets</li> <li>▪ Illness</li> <li>▪ Other crisis in the household</li> <li>▪ No support from family or friends</li> <li>▪ No or little off-farm income</li> <li>▪ Livestock (none or few)</li> <li>▪ Landless</li> <li>▪ Little or poor quality land</li> <li>▪ Received relief in previous years</li> <li>▪ Participating in other Food Security Programmes</li> <li>▪ Female-headed household</li> <li>▪ Elderly-headed household</li> <li>▪ Many dependents (= household members unable to work)</li> <li>▪ No labour</li> <li>▪ Little labour</li> <li>▪ Disability</li> <li>▪ Pregnancy / breastfeeding</li> <li>▪ Other (please specify):</li> </ul>

**C. SAFETY NET TARGETING GUIDELINES**

1. Has the CFSTF received any training on the implementation and targeting of the safety net? **YES / NO**
2. If yes, please give details (who received training, who from, when, what did it cover?)
3. Did you receive any other instructions on targeting the safety net? **YES / NO**
4. If yes, please give details (What did they say? Who did they come from?)
5. Have the instructions or guidelines on targeting changed from the first safety net targeting until now? **YES / NO**
6. If yes, please explain how they changed.

**D. HOUSEHOLD AND INDIVIDUAL TARGETING**

1. How many households (or individuals – *please underline*) are in the Village?
2. How many were included in the safety net last year (2005)?
3. How many will be included this year (2006)?
4. In this community, how many times have you made a beneficiary list since the beginning of the PSNP? When? (give months).
5. Please explain the process used each time.
6. Are the names of beneficiaries (both PW and DS) publicly displayed or announced? **YES/ NO**
  - If yes, where? **Village / Kebele / Wereda**
  - Are the names posted in writing?
  - Are they read out at community meetings?
  - Is another method used to ensure that everyone in the community knows who is a beneficiary?
7. For each targeted household, how many members were registered for the safety net?
8. Did the process run more smoothly after the first time? **YES / NO**  
Why?

**G. RESOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION (ACTUAL BENEFICIARIES)**

1. Did the resources received match the number of beneficiaries identified by the Village? **YES / NO**  
If not, what did you do? - e.g.
  - Reduce the number of households included?
  - Reduce the number of people registered in each household?
  - Appeal to the Kebele / Tabia or Wereda?
  - Other (please explain)

**H. APPEALS OR COMPLAINTS**

1. How many complaints or appeals were there about the targeting process in this Village?  
Who complained?  
What was the complaint about?  
Who did they complain to?
  - Kebele council/ cabinet
  - Wereda council / cabinet
  - Zonal government
  - Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
  - NGO (Name: .....)

- church or mosque leader
  - someone else (Who?.....)
- What action was taken? What happened?

2. Has the Village been visited by a **Rapid Response Team** (higher-level government or agency staff visiting to check the PSNP progress)? **YES / NO**  
 If yes, when? .....  
 Where did they come from (e.g. Kebele, Wereda, Region, Addis Ababa)? Was their visit helpful to the CFSTF? **YES / NO**  
 What did they do?

***I. OTHER COMMENTS***

1. Do you have any other comments on our discussion, or any suggestions on how to improve the targeting of the safety net for the future? For example -
- What do you think are the best criteria for selecting PW and DS beneficiaries, in this community?
  - How should they be selected (who by, and by what process?).
  - Is there anything you would like to change about this programme for future years?

Table C1: COMMUNITY FOOD SECURITY TASK FORCE (CFSTF)

VILLAGE NAME:	DATE:
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Name (optional)	Role in Food Security Task Force <i>e.g. Chair, Secretary, Member, etc.</i>	Position (usual job or status) <i>e.g. Head of Rural Development,, Women's Affairs, DPPB, etc..</i>	Member of Village Council? (Please ✓)	Member of Village Cabinet? (Please ✓)	Gender	Present? (Please ✓)
1					M / F	
2					M / F	
3					M / F	
4					M / F	
5					M / F	
6					M / F	
7					M / F	
8					M / F	
9					M / F	
10					M / F	

## Appendix 7: Focus Group Checklists

First introduce yourselves, explain the overall purpose of the research, explain the subject of this discussion, and ask if the group members have any questions.

### A. GENERAL QUESTIONS (FOR ALL GROUPS)

1. What do the group members know about the safety net programme – what is its purpose, and who is it for (i.e. who should benefit)?
2. When did the safety net start in this community?
3. Who decided which people should be included in the public works and direct support?
4. Do you know about the CFSTF? Are you happy with the composition of the CFSTF?
5. How were these decisions made? If the group members know, ask them to describe the process.

### ADD Q ON COMMUNITY MEETING, & HOW MANY OF THE GROUP PARTICIPATED

6. In the past (before the safety net), did this community receive relief distributions? If so, what kinds of people benefited from relief (DPPC) distributions in the past? What differences do they see between the targeting and benefits of the safety net and emergency relief?
7. This year (i.e. in the past 12 months), has this community received any relief? If so, what kinds of people received the relief? What differences do they see between the people who received relief and the people who received safety-net transfers?
8. In this community, when are the months when people most need the safety net transfers?

*(Circle the month for each answer given, or score with beans – prepare the calendar table in advance, in Amharic or the local language, so people can see and understand it).*

May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

In the past year (since the safety net started), in which months have the payments (cash or food) actually been received? *(Circle or score)*

May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

So – did the transfers come at the right time?

9. If anyone in this community has a complaint about the targeting of the safety net, what can they do? Who can they complain to? What appeals processes exist at a local level? *[Keep this question general / theoretical – don't focus on specific cases until later in the discussion].*

### B. PROPORTIONAL PILING AND MATRIX DISCUSSION (FOR ALL GROUPS) ~ see methodology note.

*Then add sections:*

- C+D for Public Works Beneficiaries
- C+E for Direct Support Beneficiaries
- F for Non-beneficiaries
- G for Women

### Z. LAST QUESTIONS FOR ALL GROUPS:

1. *[If not already discussed]* Did anyone in the community complain or appeal about the safety net targeting? Who to? What happened? (Try to get specific examples and stories - without recording names - and perhaps identify a case-study informant willing to talk to us in more detail later).

2. Our team has been asked to give recommendations to the government and donors about how the targeting of the safety net can be improved for the future. Do you have any suggestions?
  - Do you think the existing system is generally good or generally bad?
  - Is there anything you'd like to see changed?
  - Is there anything you'd like us to tell the government and donors about the safety net?

### C. QUESTIONS FOR BENEFICIARIES (PW AND DS)

1. How much cash or food have you received from the safety net in the past year (i.e. since Gimbot / Miazia 1997 EC, or since it started until now)? *[Record all answers]*
2. How frequent was the payment (e.g. every month, every 2 months, only once)?
3. Did you know in advance when you would receive it?
4. Do you know when you will receive the next payment? Do you know how much it will be?
5. What did you do with the cash or food received so far? (If this is not a sensitive question, take a hand-count of how many spent it on food, how many on clothes, livestock, schooling, etc.)  
Record the answers by gender, e.g.:

	M	F
Food (grain)	6	4
Salt and pepper	1	3
School equipment	0	2
<i>etc.</i>		

6. Did the cash or food you have received from this programme make a difference to your situation?

### D. QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC WORKS BENEFICIARIES ONLY:

1. Why do you think you have been selected for the public works programme, i.e. working for the safety net transfers?
2. Do you agree with this decision? Is this a good system?
3. What kinds of work have you done on the safety-net programme in this community?
4. Who has been doing the work, e.g.
  - mostly men, mostly women, or about 50:50?
  - what age range? (how old is the youngest person working, and the oldest)?
5. Are the work norms the same for all workers? If they are different (e.g. for women or children), please explain.
6. What is the daily payment rate for the PW?
7. What is the daily wage rate for other unskilled work in this area?
8. Discuss the difference – e.g. if the PW is lower-paid than local alternatives, why are people doing it? What do they think about the wage rate?

### E. QUESTIONS FOR DIRECT SUPPORT BENEFICIARIES ONLY

1. Why do you think you have been selected for direct support, i.e. free safety net transfers without working?
2. Do you agree with this decision? Is this a good system?
3. Are you required to do anything in order to receive the transfer? (e.g. adult education, clinic attendance, organising crèche or bringing water for the public works, other light work .....)

**F. QUESTIONS FOR NON-BENEFICIARIES:**

1. Why do you think you were not included in the safety-net programme? (What were you told, and what do you think is the real reason, if different)?
2. Did you agree with the decision? Do you think it's fair that you were not included?
3. Did anyone complain or appeal about the targeting of the safety net?
4. If not, why not?
5. If yes, what did they complain about? Who to? What happened? What was the complaints process? What was the outcome of the complaint? How long did it take from complaint to resolution?

*(Try to get specific examples and stories - without recording names - and perhaps identify a case-study informant to talk to in more detail later).*

**G. QUESTIONS FOR WOMEN'S GROUPS:**

1. Within a safety-net beneficiary household, who receives the cash or food? (E.g., household head; the person who worked; the individual eligible for direct support; etc.).
2. Is it usually men or women who receive the transfer?
3. Who decides how the money or food will be used?
4. Does it make a difference if the transfer is food or cash? Why? Which do the women prefer and why?

***For women PW beneficiaries***

5. Do you do the same work as the men? What do you think about this?
6. Does the work interfere with your domestic and childcare responsibilities, or with any other activities?

***Last question for all women's groups (if the women were in the mixed group)***

7. Do you have any other comments or questions to add about the mixed-group discussion?

## Appendix 8: Methodology Note for Focus Groups ~ Proportional Piling and Matrix Discussion

The objectives of this method are:

- to estimate coverage<sup>29</sup>, exclusion<sup>30</sup> and inclusion<sup>31</sup> from the viewpoint of beneficiaries and other community members; and
- to open up discussion of why and how different kinds of people within the community are included in, or excluded from, the safety net.

Remember that, with this type of method, the discussion around the process of piling or sorting, and then probing and discussion of the result (“interviewing the matrix”) is often more revealing than the result itself. In this case, we are also interested in recording the result in order to estimate targeting errors as perceived by the people themselves. We will carry out the same exercise with each focus group, thus triangulating the findings for each village. Pay attention to differences between the different groups’ piling and viewpoints. Remember to record direct quotations (people’s exact words) as much as possible.

### ***Suggested method:***

1. Ask group members how many households are in the village – let them choose one person in the group to count out beans (one per household) while everyone discusses and checks.

If the village is very big, the group members may not know everyone in detail. In this case, ask them to estimate the approximate number of households.

2. Then ask them to discuss among themselves and divide the pile of beans (= households) into 3 categories:

- **Always food insecure** (can’t provide enough food for the family without assistance, even in good years)
- **Became food insecure in the last year** (perhaps because of illness, or other shocks such as asset loss or the death of a breadwinner)
- **Food secure** (able to provide enough food and basic needs for the family, without assistance).

*N.B. In doing this, the group will probably discuss named households – make sure they know that we are not recording names and this discussion will have no impact on who receives benefits from the safety net.*

3. Ask the group to describe each category of households – e.g. Why are these people always food insecure? Why did this group become food insecure in the last year? What makes the 3<sup>rd</sup> group food secure?

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<sup>29</sup> Coverage = % of eligible people (or households) who are included in the programme.

<sup>30</sup> Exclusion = % of eligible people (or households) who are excluded from the programme.

<sup>31</sup> Inclusion = % of beneficiaries who are not eligible (i.e. are wrongly included).

4. We now have 3 piles of beans. Draw a matrix (table) around the 3 piles like this:




	Public Works only	Direct Support only	PW + DS	Not included in safety net
Always food insecure 				
Became food insecure in the last year 				
Food secure 				

Either write the headings in the local language or use symbols – but make sure that everyone in the group understands what they mean (cross-check, ask one group member to explain to others, etc.).

5. Now take each pile in turn, ask the group to choose one person to count and place the beans, and ask them: From this group of households (e.g., those who are always food insecure), how many participated in the public works in the past year? How many received “direct support” without working? How many were not included in the safety net? Note that some households may have received safety net transfers under both public works and direct support – they should go in the PW+DS column.

If possible, take notes of the group’s discussion (including any disagreements) while they are sorting the beans.

At the end of this discussion, the matrix will look something like this:

	Public Works only	Direct Support only	PW + DS	Not included in safety net
Always food insecure 				
Became food insecure in the last year 				
Food secure 				

In your notes, record the numbers like this:

		PW	DS	PW + DS	Not included
Always food insecure	16	9	4	2	1
Became food insecure in the last year	6	1	2		3
Food secure	10	2			8

6. Interview the matrix, i.e. question and probe about the results. For example, in the imaginary matrix above there is one “always food insecure” household excluded from the safety net – why? (Is this a possible case study?). Also, there seem to be some food secure households included in the public works – why and how did this happen? What do the group members think about it? There are too many possible questions to predict them all – use your judgement, keep in mind the key research questions, and try to pick up important or interesting points from what the group has been discussing.

## **Appendix 9: Key Informant Checklist (Wereda level) ~ Appeals or Complaints**

*[Ask to talk to whoever is responsible for hearing complaints or appeals about the selection of PSNP beneficiaries – usually the head of the Wereda Council or Cabinet]*

### **Complaints to Woreda council or cabinet:**

1. Have they received any complaints since the PSNP inception? If so, how many?
2. What happened? What procedures do they follow when hearing, processing, and acting on appeals? (have them outline)
3. What has been the substance of the complaints received? (e.g. household/ individual excluded from PSNP entirely; household excluded from direct support; under-estimation of household size / need; delays in receiving benefits; etc.)
4. What was the most common type of complaint received?
5. Have they referred any complaints to the zonal or regional level? If so, why?
6. Has their approach to hearing, processing and resolving complaints changed since the start of PSNP? If so how and why has the approach changed?
7. How long does it take on average to hear, process and resolve an appeal?
8. Do they keep written records of appeals processes? If so, what specific information do these records provide?
9. If possible have council/cabinet officials describe specific **case studies** of grievances/appeals they have handled. Outline who made the complaint, what the complaint was, the process undertaken, the timeframe until resolution, and the ultimate outcome. Get as much detailed information as possible.

### **Complaints from Woreda council or cabinet:**

10. Do woreda officials report asking for one type of resource and receiving another? Have they received what they requested from the regional government (in terms of: cash/food split, number of beneficiaries, quantity of cash/food, etc.)
11. If they have not received what they requested, why do they believe this the case?
12. Do they believe that their office has received PSNP cash/food in a timely manner?
13. If they have a complaint about any PSNP processes (e.g. cash/food split, number of beneficiaries, timeliness), who do they complain to?
14. Have they voiced any complaints since the inception of the PSNP? If so what was the complaint? What was the response/outcome of the complaint?

## **Appendix 10: Key Informant Checklist (Kebele level) ~ Appeals or Complaints**

*[Ask to talk to whoever is responsible for hearing complaints or appeals about the selection of PSNP beneficiaries – usually the head of the Kebele Council or Cabinet]*

### **Complaints to Kebele:**

- 1) Have they received any complaints since the PSNP inception? If so, how many?
- 2) What happened? (what procedures do they follow when hearing, processing, and acting on appeals? (have them outline)
- 3) What has been the substance of the complaints received? (e.g. household/ individual excluded from PSNP entirely; household excluded from direct support; under-estimation of household size / need; delays in receiving benefits; etc.)
- 4) What was the most common type of complaint received?
- 5) Have they referred any complaints to the woreda or zonal level? If so, why?
- 6) Has their approach to hearing, processing and resolving complaints changed since the start of PSNP? If so how and why has the approach changed?
- 7) How long does it take on average to hear, process and resolve an appeal?
- 8) Do they keep written records of appeals processes? If so, what specific information do these records provide?
- 9) If possible have council/cabinet officials describe specific **case studies** of grievances/appeals they have handled. Outline who made the complaint, what the complaint was, the process undertaken, the timeframe until resolution, and the ultimate outcome. Get as much detailed information as possible.

### **Complaints from Kebele:**

- 1) Do kebele officials report asking for one type of resource and receiving another? Have they received what they requested from the regional government (in terms of: cash/food split, number of beneficiaries, quantity of cash/food, etc.)
  - a) If they have not received what they requested, why do they believe this the case?
- 2) Do they believe that their office has received PSNP cash/food in a timely manner?
- 3) If they have a complaint about any PSNP processes (e.g. cash/food split, number of beneficiaries, timeliness), who do they complain to?
- 4) Have they voiced any complaints since the inception of the PSNP? If so what was the complaint? What was the response/outcome of the complaint?