

**Review of the Government of  
Lesotho Emergency Response and  
Suggestions for future  
programming to address food  
insecurity in Lesotho**

**Final Report  
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## **Executive Summary**

In the context of the GoL Declaration of a State of Emergency in April 2002, and various appeals and responses on the part of the GoL and other stakeholders, the purpose of this review is threefold:

- Assisting the GoL in reviewing the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of GoL emergency responses, and drawing lessons for identifying areas for improvement including in the existing policy framework and institutional arrangements.
- Assisting the GoL in reviewing the GoL recovery programming, drawing lessons and identifying areas for improvement and refinement of recovery programming in the short term and ensuring that recovery efforts fit into, draw upon and enhance agricultural and poverty reduction strategies for improving food security
- Linking the information from the emergency and recovery program review to the formulation of steps that address long term development needs for improving food security needs and that complement national challenges and sectoral responses identified in the PRSP and ongoing recovery programmes.

The review paper develops an analytical framework that distinguishes between i) rapid onset emergencies that trigger crises and ii) longer-term sources of vulnerability and impoverishment that lead to acute or chronic food insecurity. Research took place through consultations with various different stakeholders (GoL, UN Agencies, Donors, NGOs and beneficiaries) at national, district and village level. Other information provided secondary data for cross-referencing and triangulation.

### **Emergence of the 2002-2003 food security emergency**

Agriculture and migrant labour have formed the backbone of the Lesotho economy for decades. The decline in migrant labour has contributed to increasing poverty, via a reduction in purchasing power, especially in rural areas. The status of agriculture is hotly disputed. Analysis of official data provides a strong challenge to the prevailing view that production is in decline. The view of agricultural decline and the drive towards self-sufficiency has dominated food security policies since the 1970s. More recently a broader view of food security, encompassing both food availability and food access, is gaining currency. Key underlying causes of the 2002-2003 emergency include the decline of migrant labour, limited capacity of agricultural production for sustainable rural livelihoods and the impacts of HIV/AIDS. However, it was the identification of other triggers factors that led to the declaration of a state of emergency.

Many stakeholders express narrow views of the dimensions behind the emergency. The perception of the emergency was largely one of food availability. Even so, the GoL farm inputs response was controversial. It is advised that the implementation and impact of the agricultural inputs programme is internally reviewed by the partners involved. There are many lessons to be learnt which need to be more clearly identified. Specifically the

role of the inter-ministerial committee versus the technical and implementation role of the MoAFS needs scrutiny.

With the focus on food availability, food access was ignored by many of those consulted. This, and the embracing of a controversial drought scenario, masks the underlying long-term poverty and food security problems in the country and has implications for the appropriateness of interventions that formed part of the emergency response.

The existing food security policies within Lesotho do not constitute a coherent policy framework and are heavily focused on agricultural production. Food security strategy needs to focus not solely on boosting agricultural production but also on ensuring that households in both rural and urban areas have sufficient income (either from agricultural or non-agricultural activities and transfers) to buy the food that they need.

Food security should not be viewed as a solely rural and agricultural issue, and the forthcoming development of a GoL food security strategy should reflect the multiple dimensions and multi-sectoral nature of food security.

### **Targeting Criteria and Capacity**

Targeting comprises both technical processes by which vulnerable households are identified and institutional / implementation processes by which assistance reaches those vulnerable households. There are some shortfalls in each case. The identification of vulnerable households needs to differentiate between those that are either chronically or periodically vulnerable in order to ensure that the most appropriate intervention reaches each vulnerable household. At an institutional and implementation level there are disparities between national, district and village level and concerns about communication between these different stakeholders. There are also concerns about capacity, particularly at district and village level in terms of resources and skills / training, to reach intended beneficiaries.

Assessments for appropriate identification of vulnerable people and the development of better vulnerability and food insecurity profiles need to account for the different kinds of vulnerability that people face, particularly acute and chronic vulnerability. This could be achieved by building stronger temporal analysis into vulnerability assessment so that households can be tracked over time.

### **HIV/AIDS and emergency programming**

Whereas stakeholder's assumptions about the food security crisis presented a variety of different views, the review learned that some key stakeholders at national and district levels were largely responding to a drought. In this case where drought is seen to be the cause (rather than just a trigger) of the food security crisis, the 'drought scenario' obscures the issue of HIV/AIDS and other causal factors of food insecurity in Lesotho. This means that that people seek solutions to drought in order to prevent continuation of the crisis rather than solutions that mitigate against the impacts of HIV/AIDS that would require longer-term strategic approaches instead of short-term emergency responses.

Evidence of learning on the part of IPs and WFP exists. Progress is being made in terms of a more comprehensive analysis of food insecurity in Lesotho and the subsequent trend of responses. Whilst the food aid programme was originally conceived without coherent HIV/AIDS planning, HIV/AIDS is increasingly taken into account – e.g. take home rations for OVCs and food distribution to chronically ill. It is recommended that this trend is continued. Furthermore it is recommended that food security linked to the HIV/AIDS pandemic draws on additional long term intervention approaches that go beyond emergency programming.

The mainstreaming of HIV / AIDS has started and but should be further encouraged. Currently mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS is taking place among UN Agencies and has taken root within some of the Government Departments who are committing 2 percent of their budget allocations for HIV/AIDS mainstreaming activities. However this type of mainstreaming has to be taken further and should be extended to: civil society, the private sector, and a wider spectrum of local and international NGOs. In the context of Lesotho, the policy framework needs strengthening and financial resources need to be committed to fight the course of HIV / AIDS. Specific attention should be given to the design and adaptation of information networks that can incorporate HIV / AIDS analysis. Food assistance programmes in the context of HIV / AIDS need careful consideration in terms of rations and food types, distribution points versus distances that people need to travel, waiting time etc. Appropriate support could include cash transfers and distribution of non-food items due to the diverse ways that AIDS impacts on households.

Ideally, long-term welfare provisions to HIV / AIDS affected households should become part of the humanitarian aid programming. However, there are those who are concerned about the sustainability of this type of welfare assistance. Moreover a dilemma exists when prioritising recurrent welfare payments against the need for other government spending especially on the investment priorities that stimulate economic growth. It would make sense, in this context, for HIV/AIDS affected households to receive assistance to allow them, where possible, to maintain productive livelihoods. Such assistance should focus on access to micro-credit, specific inputs and technical services. In this regard it would be advisable to consider the principles of the CARE Livelihoods Recovery through Agriculture Programme and see how they can be extended to other parts of the country.

### **The impact of food aid on the private sector and markets**

Arguments about the impact of food aid distribution on the private sector and local producers were based on hearsay, conjecture and anecdotes. The data that was available shows that, whilst sustained food aid distribution may suppress local subsistence production, by making people dependent on food aid rather than producing their own crops, maize distribution is unlikely to affect maize prices in Lesotho.

Analysis of the impact of food aid distribution on prices shows that maize prices are set within SACU and not at a domestic level. Interventions intended to keep maize prices down within the country (for example subsidies on food stuffs) may have the unintended impact of leading to net flows of food across the border into South Africa. If retail prices are higher in South Africa,

commercial producers in Lesotho will sell their produce in South Africa and not in Lesotho.

### **The policy framework and institutional arrangements for emergency responses**

Key challenges are the disparities at different levels with reference to the responsibilities, roles and resourcing of DMA. There are also disparities between sectoral partners that DMA is meant to coordinate. Whilst the DMA plan and the manual have clear guidelines, on the ground there is much confusion and a most serious concern arises over the ability of the DMA to adequately coordinate the emergency response. The review team observed a relatively weak structure on the ground especially in terms of financial, logistical and technical capabilities within DMA district offices, and the lack of support and supervision from the DMA headquarters.

One of the recommendations that is seen as a solution to improve the functioning of the DMA is decentralization for a leaner but more effective and cost-sustainable structure at national level, and a more effective well-designed structure at district level with independent and adequate financial budget provisions. Saving on overhead at national level would help funding the much-needed financial support at district based DMA offices.

It is also recommended that the DMA mandate is updated in a regular fashion in order to deal with newly emerging potential forms of humanitarian crisis situations (such as the those caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic).

### **Implementation capacity for the emergency response**

Capacity of WFP field offices is adequate for the supervision of IPs but, due to variable capacities of IPs, WFP frequently extends its role and steps in to maintain the food pipeline. In some cases there is (necessary) bypassing of limited capacity IPs by WFP in order to get the food distributed. Capacity building in providing humanitarian assistance IPs should be encouraged beyond the delivery of food aid and including other partners in addition to WFP.

DMA coordination structures are weak and a wide variety exists in IP capacity. WFP have to capacity build and their current role in this respect may need to be extended assist weaker IPs to upgrade their operations and capacities

FMU transportation and pipeline problems exist. There is frequent disruption of distribution because district stores are empty. FMUs function, especially in terms of reporting, accounting and auditing needs to be reviewed.

### **Costing aspects of the emergency response**

Identifying the costs of various different interventions requires a longer-term analysis that focuses not solely on outputs but on impact. This was not feasible within the scope of the current study but could be explored in greater depth in the development of a food security strategy for Lesotho. Given that it has not been possible to get data on the total amount of money that was spent either by the GoL, or by donors, there is a need for clearer accounting and reporting

procedures for funds spent on humanitarian emergencies. Failure to report is likely to undermine future requests for assistance.

### **Exit strategies**

No articulated exit strategies for the emergency response exist. This results from a lack of clear differentiation between mitigation and recovery activities. There is also a need to distinguish clearly between those who are chronically food insecure or acutely food insecure and between those who are chronically and periodically vulnerable.

### **Options for food security interventions in Lesotho**

The transfer of resources (food or non-food) must remain an important option to avoid vulnerable population groups losing their entitlements following the threat of a humanitarian crisis. Such resource transfers should be fully incorporated in disaster management planning in a way that they can be timely implemented whenever needed.

Advantages and disadvantages of different options are dependent on the specific status or nature of people's vulnerability. It is important to consider how the sequencing of different interventions or combinations of different interventions can have positive results. Households that appear to be chronically vulnerable, or have been vulnerable for long periods of time, that given the right circumstances could become productive, could benefit from a fixed period of food aid to maintain nutritional status accompanied by training and resources to enable investments in sustainable livelihoods activities.

It is also necessary to consider the disparity between policy making and policy implementation. Establishing good policy is difficult enough and should not be overridden by political expediency.

### **Recommendations**

The study makes a number of specific recommendations, all of which are provided in Section 5 of this report. In this section the recommendations are grouped under the main topics of this study, and a matrix is provided in Section 5 indicating the recommendation and the appropriate organisations for action and follow up. Here we summarise the most important of these:

- Policy development on food security A coherent policy framework should be developed that is focused both on agricultural production and income-related strategies in other sectors. This should complement and add to activities in the PRSP rather than be a parallel process. Internally review implementation and impact of the agricultural inputs programme.
- Targeting Criteria and Capacity Improve assessment methodology for appropriate identification of vulnerable people and the development of better vulnerability and food insecurity profiles in the light of different kinds of vulnerability that people face, particularly acute and chronic vulnerability.
- HIV/AIDS and food security: Develop long term food security intervention approaches linked to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Develop appropriate food assistance and other resource transfer packages in the context of people living with HIV / AIDS. Consider how principles of

the CARE LRAP programme can be extended to other parts of the country.

- Policy framework and institutional arrangements for emergency responses Update DMA mandate to incorporate strategies on newly emerging and potential forms of humanitarian crises situations (Including HIV/AIDS pandemic). Decentralize DMA and provide for a well designed structure at district level with independent and adequate financial budget provisions. Decentralize the functions of LVAC to district level and fully integrate them within DMA structures. Build capacity of collection, processing and analysis of food-security utilizing re-trained DMA staff at District level. Develop feasible district based contingency plans for timely food security interventions Consider district based DMA structures as a point of interaction with other partners and donors that are associated with disaster management
- Implementation capacity for the emergency response Provide capacity building to IPs beyond building capacity in the delivery of food aid. Review FMUs function, especially in terms of reporting, accounting and auditing
- Costing aspects of the emergency response Improve on availability of financial data through establishing clearer accounting procedures for humanitarian emergency operations.
- Exit strategies Develop clear differentiation guidelines between mitigation and recovery activities. Develop clear guidelines to distinguish between the chronically food insecure / vulnerable and the acutely food insecure / vulnerable
- Options for food security interventions in Lesotho Consider the sequencing of different interventions or combinations of different interventions in order to achieve optimal impact. Develop appropriate packages for chronically vulnerable households that aim at reintegration of into a productive process.
- Long-term food security Develop a multi-sectoral food security strategy on in-depth analysis of appropriateness of food for work, cash for work, vouchers and food aid to protect entitlements in emerging crisis situations. Widen out the analysis to broader activities (for example negotiating better access to employment opportunities in South Africa for Basotho).

The following principles should guide the decision-making process about long-term food security interventions:

- Interventions to be based on a broad conceptualisation of food security that takes into account both availability and access issues.
- Interventions to address the multi-dimensional nature of household and individual vulnerability.
- Interventions to give beneficiaries the opportunity to exercise choice and to ensure avoidance of view of beneficiaries as either victims or ignorant of their own needs.
- Interventions to encourage people to continue pursuing their own independent livelihoods and should discourage dependence.
- Where possible, avoid using interventions that are used or misused for purposes other than originally intended.

- Encourage and explore self-targeting mechanisms

## Acronyms:

AGOA	African Growth and Opportunities Act
CFSAM	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
CFW	Cash for Work
DDMOs	District Disaster Management Officers
DDMTs	District Disaster Management Team
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DMA	Disaster Management Authority
DRTF	Ministerial Disaster Relief Task Force
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
<i>Fato-fato</i>	Public works where wages are paid in cash
FFW	Food for Work
FMU	Food Management Unit
FNCO	Food and Nutrition Coordination Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoL	Government of Lesotho
Hh / hhs	Household(s)
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IASC	UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IGAs	Income Generating Activities
IPs	Implementing Partners
LAPCA	Lesotho Aids Programme Coordinating Authority
LRAP	CARE Livelihoods Recovery Through Agricultural Programme
LVAC	Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee
MoAFS	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MoFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MT	Metric Tonnes (1000 kg)
NEWU	National Early Warning Unit
NGO	Non-government organisation
NVF	New Variant Famine
OVCs	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PLWHA	People living with HIV/AIDS
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RTF	Review Task Force
SACU	Southern Africa Customs Union
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SCF	Save the Children Fund
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCAP	United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAC	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
VDMTs	Village Disaster Management Team
WFP	World Food Programme
WFP EMOP	World Food Programme Emergency Operation
WHO	World Health Organisation
ZAR	South African Rand

# 1 Introduction

The review of the Lesotho emergency response programme was commissioned by the Government of Lesotho and took place November and December 2003. The exercise was undertaken by team of local and international consultants. The review design, purposes and objectives were outlined in a Terms of Reference (Appendix 1). In summary the purposes of the review focussed on:

- Assisting the GoL in reviewing effectiveness, efficiency and impact of GoL emergency responses, and draw lessons for identifying areas for improvement including in the existing policy framework and institutional arrangements.
- Assisting the GoL in reviewing the GoL recovery programming, draw lessons and identify areas for improvement and refinement of recovery programming in the short term and ensuring that recovery efforts fit into, draw upon and enhance agricultural and poverty reduction strategies for improving food security
- Linking the information from the emergency and recovery program review to the formulation of steps that address long term development needs for improving food security needs and that complement national challenges and sectoral responses identified in the PRSP and ongoing recovery programmes.

The review was guided by a Review Task Force (RTF) an inter-ministerial, inter-agency team under the chairmanship of the GoL Ministry for Finance and Development Planning.

It is expected that the relevant ministries and departments within the GoL will be the main consumers of this review report. RTF members stressed that its use need to be extended to other partners and institutions.

Except for the executive summary, this report contains five main chapters. Chapter 2 describes the analytical and methodological approach drawn on by the team in carrying out its review work. Chapter 3 provides relevant background information in relation to the study, while Chapter 4 gives an account of the review findings. A final chapter summarises the main conclusions and recommendations. Before moving on, the remaining part of this introduction is used to define some of the key terms and concepts that will be used throughout this report, and to explain links between different terms.

## 1. Food Security

Since 1974, when the first World Food Conference was held, definitions of food security have come thick and fast but three significant changes in the ways that food security is understand can be identified (Maxwell 2001). First, there has been a shift from preoccupations with global and national levels to household and individuals. Second, the view that people try and obtain food over and above their other needs has given way to a broader livelihoods perspective in which vulnerability is a key factor. Third, there has been a shift from viewing food security purely in terms of objective indicators (people consuming enough calories and micro-nutrients) to more subjective indicators (people knowing where their next meal will be coming from and eating food that is socially and culturally acceptable). Following these changes, in this report we adopt the

food security definition adopted at the 1996 World Food Summit, namely that food security exists:

*When all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy lifestyle*  
([www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAINFO/ECONOMIC/ESA/fs\\_en.htm](http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAINFO/ECONOMIC/ESA/fs_en.htm)) .

Food security is, therefore, not solely about the production of food, but whether people can get access to food by purchasing or exchanging it. By extension, food security is not just about agriculture but about other sectors, including health, education, employment and trade. Thus, in the draft Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) it is not solely the food security priority that will influence food security, since this priority focuses on agriculture production alone. Other priorities, particularly that of job creation, will be just as important for food security because jobs will give people greater purchasing power to buy food.

## 2. Drought and Climate Variability

Definitions of drought vary. Meteorological, agricultural, hydrological and socio-economic definitions have different nuances of meaning.<sup>1</sup> In Lesotho, many different weather terms are often described by the word drought. For example, during consultations for this report, food aid beneficiaries used the phrase 'lesatsi lea chesa' but did not refer explicitly to a shortage of rainfall. As we will show later in the report, it is important to distinguish clearly between drought (a shortage of rainfall over a particularly period of time) and rainfall variability over an agricultural season. In Lesotho in the 2001-2002 agricultural season, there was not, strictly speaking, a drought. But there was variability in precipitation: some of the rain came at unusual times and some of it fell as hail.

## 3. Emergency, Recovery and Development

Perceptions of emergency situations are often closely linked to the causal factors or the triggers that set off a state of emergency (i.e. a drought emergency or a conflict related emergency). Whatever the causes, the state of emergency is considered as a situation in which (in most cases) a human catastrophe is occurring and urgent action in terms of humanitarian disaster assistance is called for to save peoples lives. This action is usually associated by bringing in relief assistance to ensure access to peoples most basic commodity requirements. In some parts of Africa humanitarian disasters have become part of everyday life. Emergency situations may occur as result of a mix of natural, man-made physical causes and of socio economic causes and are very rarely linked to one exclusive cause. So, emergency situations often result from a combination of different factors. As the analysis in this report shows, the emergency in Lesotho resulted from the combined impact of different factors (including the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic), and could not be attributed exclusively to a perceived drought.

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<sup>1</sup> See [www.nws.noaa.gov/om/drought.htm](http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/drought.htm)

Recovery is normally about returning to the situation existing prior to the emergency disaster. So, for example, it involves the action that assists emergency affected households in returning to the productive and socio-economic status they held before the emergency. In itself, emergency and recovery programming do little in terms of reducing the risk of disasters occurring. The chief objective of such programming is linked to ensuring peoples access to basic commodities and rebuilding people's livelihoods after a disaster.

Often, only appropriate long term development strategies can reduce the real causes of disasters, most importantly by reducing elements of risk in the environments in which disasters are occurring. Such development inputs need to be directly linked to poverty reduction, stimulating sustainable productive output, and strengthen and diversifying local economies. Moreover strategies are needed to built improved development infrastructures, build strategies for improved social delivery service, and encourage quality of administrative and political leadership. These long term development issues can contribute to a reduction in vulnerability to humanitarian disasters.

## 2. Approach

At an early stage of the review, the team recognised that the likely causes of food insecurity in Lesotho were a mix of long term and short term issues. Given this recognition, the team undertook great efforts at obtaining an appropriate insight into the conditions that lead to the crisis situations and the subsequent GoL emergency response and the recovery interventions.

Discussions with stakeholders from GoL, UN Agencies, Donors, International and Local NGOs identified various different dimensions of the emergency in Lesotho. Broadly, these dimensions included:

- Issues related to changes in agricultural production due to:
  - i. Environmental constraints – i.e. farming on marginal land
  - ii. Loss of fertile agricultural land in the lowlands due to expanding settlements and rural-urban migration
  - iii. Lack of (timely) inputs to support small farmers
  - iv. Climate – variability, drought, floods, hail
  - v. Lack of appropriate agricultural reform
- The impact of changes in the migrant labour system (especially due to retrenchments from South Africa mines due to structural change in the South African economy from the 1980s and changing South African immigration policy in 1995)
- The impact of HIV/AIDS on agricultural labour in affected or infected households

Among the GoL and other stakeholders a variety of different views about the respective roles of the various interventions were expressed. The team explored the weight attached to each of these dimensions in an effort to understand to what, precisely, the GoL felt it was responding to. In addition questions were asked about how far the response had been driven nationally (by GoL) or regionally (e.g. by donors and UN agencies). Central in this probe was to establish how far have regional issues influenced the GoL response? In what ways was this a positive influence, and in what ways did this influence led to (in)appropriate action?

The conceptual framework for this review was addressed from an overall development context with the aim of institutionalising humanitarian emergency preparedness and responses as part of a development process. In doing so the team focussed on developing a good understanding via a twin approach of:

1. Obtaining adequate knowledge of hazards that had activated prevailing crisis conditions and subsequent emergency responses by the GoL
2. Researching the set of causal factors that gave cause to societies and individuals within Lesotho to become more vulnerable to adverse consequences, and that added to the level of susceptibility and likelihood in which hazards triggered the food crisis.

This twin approach of looking at the hazards and researching the conditions in which they were allowed to develop into crisis situations provided an insight on how short and long term mitigation and development intervention strategies were addressing:

1. Protection of people's access to food during the various phases of the crisis

2. Engagement in long term development efforts aimed at reducing levels of vulnerability.

The intention during the review was to distinguish between the hazards that resulted in a food security crisis and vulnerability conditions that enabled those hazards to lead to a food security crisis. This distinction shed light on the effectiveness of emergency and recovery interventions and opened up a debate about developing a future mitigation approach.

The lessons arrived at during the review contribute to moves to add developmental approaches incorporating hazard mitigation and vulnerability reduction concerns to traditional approaches to emergency response. Reducing risk levels are part of both the development and humanitarian agenda, and have a central position in this approach. In this respect the review focussed on the forward-looking objectives and aspects.

Elements of the management strategies and emergency responses that were employed are categorised as:

1. Aiming to reduce the risks and consequences of hazards (disaster triggers) and,
2. Aiming to reduce risk in vulnerable environments, and reduce the levels of vulnerability itself.

Central in this approach was to look at the productive and economical position of the rural and peri-urban household in the various parts of Lesotho. How effectively had the emergency responses protected and supported livelihoods during the crisis? Had recovery efforts been effective during the post emergency recovery phase by re-activating asset growth through a process of production and exchange?

During the review attention was given to institutional contexts and organizational development issues. This led to recommendations on improving roles, functions, and capacities in the facilitation of mitigation strategies.

The review also paid attention to the impacts and significance of Lesotho's economic relationship with South Africa, for example the impact of food aid on markets and on other relevant areas.

## **2.1 Objectives of the study**

The specific objectives for this study as quoted in the Terms of Reference included the following:

1. In consultation with the Save the Children/ DMA partnership to enhance targeting capacity, review targeting criteria, identify the most food insecure areas and hotspots to enable prioritisation of the emergency response (geographic areas and sectoral intervention), and provide food insecurity and vulnerability profiles;
2. To review the degree to which emergency programming has been tailored to take account of the HIV/ AIDS pandemic and to provide

- recommendations on how to strengthen linkages between on-going HIV/ AIDS programming, emergency and recovery programming;
3. To review the implementation capacity of WFP/IP/FMU, specifically the location of WFP/IP projects in relation to the hotspots and the ability to deliver complementary activities;
  4. To review the actual or potential impact of the food aid operation on the private sector and markets;
  5. To review the existing coordination of DMA, policy framework and institutional arrangements for emergency response of GoL, Donors, International Organisations;
  6. To assess the cost of the response, with a view to identifying more sustainable interventions for the chronically poor and vulnerable.
  7. To identify modalities of intervention suitable for the Lesotho context and for which implementation capacity exists (Consideration should be given to vulnerable group feeding, food for work/free food, food for training, HIV/AIDS and school feeding);
  8. To review/suggest appropriate programming strategies for exit.

## **2.2 Methodology**

A terms of reference document was developed under guidance by the Review Task Force (See annex 1). The review team action plan, presented to the Review Task Force detailed the approach and work schedule for November 2003 through January 2004.

Specific methodologies that were employed by the review team included

- Literature review and secondary data analysis<sup>2</sup>
- Semi-structured interviews (utilizing specific question-guides for specific stakeholder groups)
- Focus group discussions (especially at village levels)

Three districts were selected as representative areas to be visited by the team of consultants. Selection was based on the following criteria:

- Absolute numbers and percentages of population in need of food assistance (as per the Lesotho VAC of September 2002).
- Coverage of different food economy zones identified in the Lesotho VAC.
- Some coverage of peri-urban or urban areas to identify food insecurity beyond rural areas and to include experiences of urban workers, for example in the garment industry.

The three districts that were identified were Thaba Tseka, Mafeteng and Quthing. Details for each district according to the above-mentioned criteria above are given in Table 2.1

The review team interacted with the RTF on a regular basis. Several preparatory meetings were in advance of the review. A first presentation of the initial review findings was given on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December 2003. The first draft report was presented on 9<sup>th</sup> December. During the meetings between the review team and the RTF an open dialogue on comments, suggestions and critique assisted the team in making relevant adjustments to the review process.

**Table 2.1 Criteria for selecting district studies**

District	Numbers and percentages of population expected to be in need of food assistance by February 2003	Coverage of food economy zones	Existence of urban workers and peri-urban food security issues related to purchasing power.
Thaba Tseka	99,057 / 75%	Mountainous, Senqu River	Very few urban workers
Quthing	76,931 / 75%	Mountainous, Senqu River	Very few urban workers
Mafeteng	87,937 / 30%	Lowlands, Some peri-urban	Existence of many urban workers

## 3 Background

### 3.1 General

Reviewing the context in which Lesotho's emergency arose in 2002 is important to any analysis of the emergency response or future long-term food security programming options. Not all the factors that have affected or influenced the emergency response are discussed here. It is assumed that the consumers of this report are conversant with Lesotho's history, geography and economy and only the most important or disputed issues are considered here.<sup>3</sup>

Lesotho is small, both in terms of population size and area, but there is little consensus on the actual size of the population.<sup>4</sup> Measurement is difficult and is compounded by the migrant labour system (which makes differentiating between *de facto* and *de jure* households difficult) and by the relative infrequency of the census (which takes place every 10 years). Current estimates of population size, based on projections of fertility and mortality rates are likely to be inaccurate given growing numbers of deaths from HIV/AIDS and changing labour migration in the last ten years. There are implications for the basis of any emergency response given that the baseline population data on which estimates for food requirements were based may be inaccurate. Uncertainty about population change is also significant in the context of urbanisation. Lesotho's urban areas are growing rapidly but food security continues to be seen as the remit of government institutions responsible for rural areas. As the urban populations grow, interventions for improved food security need to be different.

Lesotho's physical size, geography and location are also important. Rainfall, on average, is adequate but the acute variability of precipitation makes agriculture risky. The land area is small and the topography is dominated by mountains suitable only for livestock production. Official estimates categorise less than 10% of the country's land as suitable for arable use. So whilst population density is not excessively high – 668 people per 1,000 ha - only limited parts of the country are suitable for agriculture and inhabitation. In 1995, when the population was just over 2 million, there was only 0.16 ha of arable land or land under permanent crops for each person in the country (UNCHS 2003). There are significant challenges for agriculture but, as the next section will show, many of the negative statements about agricultural production should be challenged.

Lesotho's location, surrounded by South Africa, offers both advantages and disadvantages, compared to other countries in the region that had experienced food shortages in 2002-2003.<sup>5</sup> Whilst being landlocked can constrain economic

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<sup>3</sup> For those not familiar with Lesotho, useful country profiles can be found at: <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ls2.htm>, <http://www.sadc-fanr.org.zw/ls/lsgen1e.htm>, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country\\_profiles/1063291.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1063291.stm), <http://www.fao.org/giews/english/basedocs/les/lesgen1e.stm>

<sup>4</sup> Official estimates place the population at somewhere between 2 and 2.2 million but interviews with stakeholders as part of this review revealed estimates as low as 1.5 million.

<sup>5</sup> In discussing the Southern African region in this review, we distinguish between i) the Southern Africa region – Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe ii) countries that faced a food crisis in 2002-2003 - Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,

development, Lesotho has opportunities to access export markets via South Africa's superior transport infrastructure. With a common market agreement in place via SACU, Lesotho is no more landlocked than the interior of its larger neighbour.<sup>6</sup> However, in terms of agricultural production and manufacturing sectors, South Africa can take advantage of economies of scale and its products have flooded Lesotho's retail sector and make it difficult for local producers and manufacturers to compete. If the main concern is consumers, the relationship with South Africa can be seen in a different way: it means lower food prices and higher quality of food for consumers. Currency parity between South Africa and Lesotho has both positive and negative effects. Whilst the depreciation of the Rand in 2000 and 2001 had negative ramifications for Lesotho in terms of higher consumer prices, the Rand remains much stronger than other currencies in the region that have seen much sharper depreciations over the last ten years (for example Meticais, Zambian Kwacha and Zimbabwe Dollars). The validity of this view can be checked by including relative rates of inflation to establish if there has been a real depreciation.<sup>7</sup> There can also be benefits of currency devaluation, particularly for export-based industries that require few imports of inputs.

So what does this mean for the people of Lesotho and the ways in which they secure a living? This will be discussed in the next section.

### **3.2 Livelihoods**

Historically, two sources of livelihood have dominated livelihoods in Lesotho – agriculture and migrant labour to South Africa.

The migrant labour system has been comprised of two main activities – work in the South African diamond and gold mines and agricultural labour on commercial farms across the border, particularly in the cereal producing areas of the Free State. The impacts of migrant labour, particularly mine labour, on Lesotho have been widely analysed (Murray, 1981). Remittances from migrant labour have allowed households to reduce their dependence on agriculture and make investments to support their agricultural production. Incomes from migrant labour remittances have driven the local economy and local businesses. As a result, income and education levels in Lesotho are high compared to many other countries in Southern Africa (with the exception of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana). There are negative impacts of migrant labour. It has contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS in Lesotho. Women remaining in Lesotho when their husbands went to South Africa took on heavy burdens of responsibility and work, and the aspirations of many younger Basotho have shifted away from agricultural livelihoods. After being educated in Lesotho, many talented young people leave for South Africa, contributing to a 'brain drain' effect in the country. For older migrant labourers there are significant reasons not to return to Lesotho – particularly if they can get access to a pension in South Africa.

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Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe and iii) countries of SACU - Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.

<sup>6</sup> Barriers to exporting via South Africa result from cumbersome and inefficient customs procedures, particularly at smaller border posts, rather than from the policy environment at a macro-level.

<sup>7</sup> Annual rates of inflation in Lesotho are only very slightly above those in South Africa (see annual inflation rates for 2001 and 2002 measured by annual CPIs - <http://www.statssa.gov.za/> and <http://www.bos.gov.ls>)

The last two decades have seen significant changes in the migrant labour system. Large numbers of miners have been retrenched in South Africa. Retrenchments have resulted from structural change in the economy (for example, falling gold prices and technological intensification) over the last two decades and from changing South African immigration policy from 1995.<sup>8</sup> In five years between 1996 and 2001 the number of mineworkers (officially) in South Africa fell from over 100,000 to 61,412 (see Table 3.1). Retrenchments have had far reaching consequences. The 2001 CARE report on Livelihoods in Lesotho cites loss of income as the main source of shock or stress faced by households in rural and urban areas (Turner, 2001). Some households that have lost income as a result of retrenchment in South Africa have been able to get access to an alternative source of wage labour in urban areas in Lesotho, particularly Maseru, Mafeteng and Leribe, as new industries have been established in response to the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) that has opened up markets in the United States for products from Lesotho. However, according to stakeholders in NGOs in Lesotho, it is mostly women that are employed in these industries and one form of structural poverty (migrant labour to South Africa) has simply been replaced by another (wage labour in garment industries that pay low wages (around 600 Maloti per month)).<sup>9</sup>

**Table 3.1: Basotho employment in South African Mines (1991-2002)**

Year	Number of Workers	Year on Year Change (%)	Average Earnings (Rand)	Year on Year Change (%)
1991	122 188			
1992	119 596	-2.1	12 440	
1993	116 129	-2.9	13 359	7.4
1994	112 722	-2.9	14 562	9.0
1995	103 744	-8.0	16 801	15.4
1996	101 262	-2.4	19 186	14.2
1997	95 913	-5.3	21 193	10.5
1998	80 445	-16.1	24 678	16.4
1999	68 604	-14.7	27 657	12.1
2000	64 907	-5.4	30 131	8.9
2001	61 412	-5.4	32 030	6.3
2002	62 158	1.2	35 326	10.3

Source: Central Bank of Lesotho Annual Report 2002

The second main source of livelihoods in Lesotho has been through agriculture. It is assumed that the readers of this report are conversant with the structure of Lesotho's agricultural economy, but it is worth highlighting that the changing contribution of the sector and the problems that it faces are hotly disputed. The dominant narrative about agriculture in Lesotho is that production is declining and that the sector is troubled by drought, land degradation and inappropriate farming practices. For example, the FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission (CFSAM) in May 2002 noted that '*agriculture faces a catastrophic future; crop production is declining and could cease altogether over large tracts of Lesotho if steps are not taken*' (FAO/WFP 2002). This view is

<sup>8</sup> It should be noted, however, that retrenchments have fallen disproportionately amongst South Africans and not international workers as is often assumed.

<sup>9</sup> For reports on the mistreatment of staff in garment factories in Lesotho see <http://www.uniteunion.org/pressbox/050902-gap.html>

supported in some quarters and by many individuals in the GoL, with implications for the direction of food security policy and agricultural policy. For example, a stakeholder in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning commented that agriculture is very unlikely to be the main driver of economic growth in the foreseeable future and that it is fallacious to assume that, because we are working with the issue of food consumption, income for food purchases is best provided by production itself. In this case the concern is with alternative forms of income generation outside of agriculture production.

However, just as there is little agreement over Lesotho's current population because there is no current data, so it has been argued that pessimism about Lesotho's agricultural sector is rarely backed up with data. New analysis of official data (presented in draft form in Wyeth, Mashoai and Phutsoane, 2003) presents an alternative view and demonstrates a steady rise in agricultural output over two decades. Whilst agricultural output may not have kept pace with population growth (this is unclear without more accurate population figures), it is argued that there is no evidence of a 'catastrophic' decline in agriculture. Similarly, it is often argued that because agriculture's share in the economy has fallen, agriculture should not be seen as central to driving economy growth. However, Wyeth *et al* (2003) also show that, whilst the share of agriculture in GDP may have fallen (slightly), this does not mean that agriculture itself is in decline, rather that other sectors (for example textiles and electricity) have increased, as we would expect them to do in the context of industrialisation and macro-economic diversification. The main concerns in agriculture remain the high levels of variability, for example in maize outputs. These result not from drought *per se* but from rainfall variability. Alongside growing population pressure, the risks associated with this variability are at the heart of a growing sense of vulnerability in rural Lesotho.

What do these changes and problems mean for people in Lesotho? At about US\$470, Gross National Income (GNI) per capita remains relatively high when compared to those countries in the region facing emergencies in 2002-2003 but is significantly lower than the other SACU countries (see Appendix 3.1). Much of this continues to be derived from income from migrant labourers in the South African mines.<sup>10</sup> However, retrenchments over the last decade and a growing HIV/AIDS crisis have resulted in a decline in HDI from 0.574 in 1990, to 0.535 in 2000 (UNDP 2001). The adult literacy rate remains high at 83.4 per cent in 2000 (UNICEF 2003) but life expectancy is falling and is currently estimated at around 45.7 years.<sup>11</sup> HIV/AIDS infections are estimated at around 31% of the adult population, and deaths from AIDS in 2001 were estimated at 25,000 (UNAIDS 2002).

The implications for livelihoods and vulnerability of households are explored by Turner (2001) and are shown in greater detail in Appendix 3.2. Briefly, livelihoods trajectories amongst households of different wealth status and amongst households in rural and urban areas show a broad range of threats to livelihoods that result from broader changes in Lesotho's structural economy

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<sup>10</sup> In spite of retrenchments about 60,000 formal migrant labourers continue to be employed in South Africa.

<sup>11</sup> Estimates of life expectancy may be imprecise: Whilst there is a system of Births and Deaths registration in Lesotho, registration is not complete.

and in agriculture. The main impact of these threats has been that households have become more dependent on a wider range of different, but linked, activities that reduce risk and vulnerability but are often likely to be less remunerative than specialisation. We should beware of assuming that the fact that households in rural areas gain less than half of their income from agriculture is implicitly a bad state of affairs – there may be other more sustainable sources of income for these households.

Finally, it is also important to note the impacts that political instability and governance may have on Lesotho. In 1998, skirmishes destroyed or disrupted businesses and jobs and affected transfers to production. We will also see later how decisions surrounding the emergency have been based on scanty or no evidence and have been, in some cases, driven by domestic and international politics rather than the need of vulnerable people.

### **3.3 Policy frameworks influencing food security in Lesotho**

The factors that affect people's livelihoods in Lesotho that have been identified above have contributed to stakeholders' perceptions and, subsequently, to a policy framework on food security in Lesotho. By policy framework we do not mean a formal, explicit framework defined by government – this is only in the early stages of development. Instead we refer to a broad range of policies, in all sectors, that affect food security in the country. The focus here is on agricultural sector policies, since (almost) all food security policies in Lesotho have, until recently, been in this sector.

Central to any analysis of food security policy is establishing the extent to which food security is perceived to be an issue of the **availability** of food or an issue of people's entitlement or **access** to food. From a food availability perspective, food security is achieved if there is enough food in the country (either from home production or imports) to feed the entire population. In contrast, food access is about whether individual people or households are able, through production, exchange or purchase, to get the food that they need.

In the 1970s and 1980s, policy focused on food availability and self-sufficiency because of two related concerns: Lesotho's dependence on imports from South Africa, given the uneasy political relationship between the two countries under apartheid; and fears about the Lesotho economy's heavy dependence on migrant labour. It was felt that the country's economy would be more secure if it could produce more of its own food and give people a reliable alternative source of income from agriculture to reduce their dependence on a migrant labour system over which Lesotho had little control. Various different interventions have supported the drive to self-sufficiency over many decades, many of which were carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Land Reclamation.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> In 2003, the Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Land Reclamation was renamed Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and some of its former functions, for example cooperatives, were moved to other ministries. However, there is a danger that this change will reinforce the current view that food security is about agricultural production. There is a need for the portfolios to remain separate to ensure that food security activities are multi-sectoral.

In the 1990s, policy on food security continued to be dominated by the self-sufficiency objective but, under the influence of liberalisation, the potential contribution of commercial agriculture was seen as increasingly important. The GoL supported the development of small-scale production of high value crops for export. However, the prices of many privatised services rose beyond the reach of subsistence farmers.

More recently, NES (1999) identified six inter-related sub-strategies including:

- 1) further development of market reforms;
  - 2) privatisation and deregulation to curtail direct state involvement in production, pricing, processing and marketing of agricultural commodities;
  - 3) land reform and improvement of the natural resource base;
  - 4) diversification of the agricultural base entailing a shift into higher value horticulture crops, intensive livestock production and promotion of rural non-farm activities such as agricultural related small-scale input production and or product processing;
  - 5) re-orientation of agricultural support services towards sub-sectors where Lesotho has a comparative advantage as well as outsourcing extension and research activities to the private sector; and
  - 6) capacity building programmes
- (see Mphale *et al* 2003).

These NES sub-strategies will be taken into account later in the paper when exploring options for interventions. Also, many of these issues are addressed in the PRSP but the extent to which food access will be taken seriously within the PRSP remains to be seen. On the one hand, job creation (which would support household purchasing power and contribute to strengthening food access) is cited as the first priority of the PRSP. However, food security is the second priority but activities and objectives for this priority focus entirely on agricultural production. Whilst food access issues have rarely been considered in Lesotho's food security strategies, the current terms of reference for the development of a (cross-sectoral) food security strategy address both access and availability issues.

There are, of course, many other key policies that can be considered given that food security, particularly food access, is influenced by the activities of many different stakeholders, both within and outside government. These are explored in the policy matrix in Appendix 3.3.

### **3.4 Food Security and the emergence of the 2002-2003 emergency**

It is important though, to distinguish between the long-term changes and those shorter term impacts that trigger the onset or identification of an 'emergency'.

The long-term drivers behind the crisis and the factors that triggered the emergency or identification of the emergency are shown in Table 3.2. The most important of these are the retrenchment of migrant labourers and subsequent loss of purchasing power in rural households, the capacity of the agricultural production to contribute to secure rural livelihoods and the

HIV/AIDS pandemic.<sup>13</sup> Some of the triggers included the rapid devaluation of the Rand (and therefore the Maloti) and adverse weather conditions, including hailstorms, localised flooding and untimely rains.

Table 3.2: Triggers and sources of the emergency

Triggers that precipitated the emergency itself ( <i>and triggers that led to the crisis being identified</i> )	Underlying sources
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Devaluation of the ZAR leading to sudden loss of purchasing power and steeply rising maize prices</li> <li>• Hailstorms</li> <li>• Localised flooding</li> <li>• Untimely rains</li> <li>• Regional supply concerns (e.g. Zimbabwe)</li> <li>• <i>Identification of stunting and wasting amongst children, especially under fives.</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of purchasing power resulting from migrant labour retrenchments</li> <li>• HIV/AIDS pandemic – impact on household labour, expenditure on medical costs, etc.</li> <li>• Limited capacity of agricultural production alone for sustainable rural livelihoods.</li> <li>• Institutional weakness for response</li> </ul>

The chronology of events that led to the crisis are shown in appendix 3.5.<sup>14</sup> In April 2002, the Government of Lesotho declared a state of emergency. Relief measures were identified in three areas: food aid and distribution logistics, support to agriculture, and nutrition. Following the GoL launch of the Famine Relief Appeal, the UN responded with a regional inter-agency consolidated appeal (UNCAP) to run between July 2002 and June 2003. The specific details of the UNCAP for Lesotho, the WFP EMOP within the UNCAP and response from other donors and NGOs will be discussed in the next section.

**Conclusion:**

Agriculture and migrant labour have formed the backbone of the Lesotho economy for decades. The decline in migrant labour has contributed to increasing poverty, via a reduction in purchasing power, especially in rural areas. The status of agriculture is hotly disputed, though analysis of official data provides a strong challenge to the prevailing view that production is in sharp or catastrophic decline. The view of agricultural decline and the drive towards self-sufficiency has dominated food security policies since the 1970s. More recently a broader view of food security, encompassing both food availability and food access, is gaining currency. Key underlying causes of the 2002-2003 emergency include the decline of migrant labour, limited capacity of agricultural production for sustainable rural livelihoods and the impacts of HIV/AIDS. However, it was the identification of other triggers factors that led to the declaration of a state of emergency.

<sup>13</sup> Appendix 3.4 shows some of the potential impacts of HIV/AIDS in Lesotho, though there is a lack of clear data to determine which of these impacts has been most significant in the current emergency.

<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that the chronology is based on regional reporting (for example by FEWS, or reliefweb) and needs to be further developed to incorporate the views of people within Lesotho to a greater extent.

## 4 Findings of the Review

### Section 4.1 Analysis of the emergency

Prior to evaluating how the GoL, in cooperation with other stakeholders, has responded to the emergency and how successful the response has been, it is necessary to define the emergency itself. Without clarifying precisely the nature of the emergency that the GoL thought it was responding to, it is not possible to effectively evaluate. Deciding whether the GoL took the right course of action depends on the view of the crisis. If the emergency was caused by a rapid onset drought or flood or sudden currency devaluation – that is, an event which would end in time allowing a return to normality – then the key response would be to mitigate against the effects of the emergency and contain only a small amount of rehabilitation. If the emergency was caused by a longer-term trend such as deterioration in living conditions or combination of many different factors, then a longer-term response, including significant rehabilitation and / or recovery, would be required.

So, what exactly were the GoL, and other stakeholders, responding to? There is evidence of many different views amongst different stakeholders and divergence of views within particular organisations, departments and ministries.

The official line from the GoL declaration of a state of emergency was that a famine had occurred '*as a result of a serious crop failure precipitated by unfavourable weather conditions.*' This, it was noted, was compounded by a high rate of unemployment and retrenchment from South African industries. So, the official view was that crop failure and weather (and not just drought) caused the emergency, though there were other underlying causes. The Famine Relief Appeal reflects this view – with a request for support for food aid, support to agriculture (to ensure better production in subsequent seasons) and nutrition (for the provision of therapeutic feeding, fortified food, micronutrients and iodised salt). The details and costings of the Famine Relief Appeal are shown in Table 4.1 in Section 4.2. An immediate concern arises given that the appeal addresses only immediate mitigation of hunger and support to future agricultural production – and does not address the impacts of high levels of unemployment nor retrenchment from South African industries. It is also a concern that the long-term impacts of HIV/AIDS (Appendix 3.4.) are not addressed. Amongst interviews with individuals within government ministries, there was also cause for concern about views of the dimensions of the crisis. In general, those who were consulted by the team referred only to prevailing drought as a cause of the crisis, and not, unless pressed, to the underlying sources of vulnerability. The frequent citing of drought as the cause of the emergency is of serious concern, not least because there is no evidence of a drought in Lesotho in 2001-2003 (see Appendix 4.1 for rainfall data). The FAO/WFP CFSAM report in May 2002 shows clearly that there was no drought in the 2001-2002 period:

Unexpected heavy rain fell in late August over most areas of the country, which benefited some early land preparation for the summer cropping season. October was characterised by very wet conditions, particularly during the last ten days, which restricted land preparation and planting activities.

November rainfall was normal to above normal in most areas, but was particularly heavy during the first two dekads, further delaying crop establishment, especially in southern districts. Rainfall remained above normal in December and this trend continued through January. However, February was generally dry throughout the country with erratic rainfall. On a cumulative basis, rainfall was above normal for the 2001/2002 season, but quantities and distribution were erratic and delayed planting of crops. A widespread frost in March severely affected crops in most districts, and localised hailstorms exacerbated the problem (Source: FAO/WFP 2002).

Stakeholders need to distinguish more clearly between drought and other weather conditions – for example untimely rains. Simplistic explanations of the dimensions of the crisis, typified by the frequent referral to ‘drought’, will, without doubt, have hindered the impact of the response on food insecure households.

Within UN agencies, there is also divergence between specific agencies and between specific individuals. Following the declaration of the State of Emergency in April 2002, subsequent crop assessment missions by FAO/WFP confirmed the GoL’s concerns over food production in the country. This has led the FAO/WFP response to be heavily focused on a perception of declining agricultural production.<sup>15</sup> The Lesotho UNCAP cited stunting amongst under fives at 80% and 45% of all children suffering from stunting and 18% from wasting (UNCAP Lesotho 2002). The UNCAP noted, however, that there is not adequate time series data available to confirm whether these figures have worsened significantly over recent years. Whilst the stunting data reflects severe chronic (long-term) undernourishment, the wasting data for children that would indicate an acute food crisis are much lower (18%). This raises questions about whether the problems faced in Lesotho in 2002-2003 were the result of a famine (acute food shortage) or a longer-term problem (chronic food shortage) that would require a different solution.

Amongst NGOs, views of the dimensions of the emergency were varied. Some argued that people were starving as a result of drought (though meteorological data shows that there was no drought in Lesotho in season 2001-2002, that rainfall was above average but, in many areas, untimely – see Appendix 4.1 and Wyeth *et al* 2003). Others suggested that this was not a food crisis but a long-term problem of poverty, vulnerability and HIV/AIDS. The varying willingness of different NGOs to act as implementing partners in food distribution for DMA and WFP reflects, in part, these different views of the problems that Lesotho is facing.

It is important to note that, whilst some of the initial analyses of the emergency may have been inaccurate and resulted in responses that were not the most appropriate, there is evidence that most stakeholders have now recognised the need to pay as much attention to the underlying sources of household vulnerability that make households less resilient when facing shocks like rising food prices or untimely rains. Thus, through the course of the response, there

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<sup>15</sup> It is important to note that the FAO/WFP response resulted, in part, from an estimated cereal gap of 338,000 MT which resulted in part from a 33% fall in production **on the previous year** (which saw a particularly good harvest) and not on the five or ten averages.

has been increasing attention paid to long-term problems. The specificities of the response are identified in the next section.

**Conclusion:**

Many stakeholders had very narrow views of the dimensions behind the emergency. The perception of the emergency was largely one of food availability and food access was ignored by many of those consulted. This, and the concern with a so-called ‘drought’, masks the underlying long-term poverty and food security problems in the country and has implications for the appropriateness of interventions that formed part of the emergency response.

**Section 4.2 The emergency response and targeting issues**

The emergency response resulted from various appeals, including the GoL Famine Relief Appeal (Table 4.1 below), the UNCAP (including the WFP EMOP 10200), appeals by NGOs. Donors responded to these appeals in various different ways. It is extremely difficult to get clear data and information on the actual emergency response in Lesotho. There are two problems. First, whilst the requirements of the GoL, as indicated in the Famine Relief Appeal, are clear, there is not accessible data on how far the financial requirements of the appeal were met and to what extent the intended interventions were actually implemented.

Second, it is unclear what activities were carried out via:

- 1) GoL funded and GoL implemented activities
- 2) Co-funded but GoL implemented activities
- 3) Externally-funded but GoL implemented activities and
- 4) Externally-funded or co-funded but government coordinated activities

This complex picture means that it is difficult to clearly identify what were GoL responses and what were responses by other agencies, and indeed it would be futile to try and entirely isolate the GoL response from other activities. Thus, in this section we draw on contributions from other agencies, most notably the UNCAP.

The main activities for which funding was requested by the GoL is shown in table 4.1:

Table 4.1: Activities / programmes planned in the Famine Relief Programme Consolidated Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance<sup>16</sup>

Appeal Item:	Food	Agriculture	Nutrition
<b>Objective</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide food aid to vulnerable households affected by famine</li> <li>• Food for Work schemes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To mitigate the impact of food deficit by assisting the farming community in improving crop production and facilitating sustainable agricultural production.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To mitigate the impact of famine among the under-fives.</li> <li>• To reduce the number of babies born with low birth weights and to prevent malnourishment of breastfed babies of vulnerable households.</li> </ul>
<b>Activity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distribution of 231,000 MT of unsifted maize meal, 4,622 MT of edible oil, 23,100 MT of pulses and 1,284 MT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of inputs for agricultural production.</li> <li>• Provision of mechanical operations.</li> <li>• Promotion of food security through poultry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of 12,600 tons of supplementary feeding (fortified food) to undernourished Under Fives.</li> <li>• Provision of therapeutic feeding supplies to hospitalised Under Fives with severe malnutrition.</li> </ul>

<sup>16</sup> Whilst some information about intent can be gleaned from the objectives and activities envisaged in the appeal document, there was no explicit statement about outcomes and outputs from the appeal.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>of iodated salt</li> <li>• Payment by 156,000 MT of unsifted maize meal, 15,600 MT of edible oil, 1872 MT of pulses and 2,600 MT of iodated salt</li> </ul>	production.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of micronutrient supplements and iodised salts for children and pregnant women.</li> <li>• Monitoring and evaluation of the programme.</li> </ul>
<b>Beneficiaries</b>	Distribution: 642,000 FFW: 260,000	642,000 beneficiaries	165,000 beneficiaries
<b>Funding US\$</b>	Total cost: 96,959,470 GoL contribution: 1,900,000 External support: 95,059,470	Total cost: 37,316,200 <sup>17</sup> GoL Contribution: 1,500,000 External Support: 37,181,600	Total cost: 3,445,000 GoL Contribution: 400,000 External Support: 3,045,000
			<b>TOTAL (US\$): 137,720,670<sup>18</sup></b>

Source: Government of Lesotho (2002)

School feeding programmes that were already in place in April 2002 also continued.

In terms of funding, the main response to the emergency came via the UNCAP which added additional components to the GoL Appeal (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: The UNCAP July 2002-June 2003<sup>19</sup>

Sector / Activity	UNICEF	WHO	FAO	WFP	UNDP	Total (US\$)
Health and Nutrition	2,800,000	816,000				3,616,200
Education	245,000					245,000
Water and Sanitation		455,800				455,800
Food				33,184,065		33,184,065
Agriculture			3,288,600			3,288,600
Coordination					243,800	243,800
<b>Total (US\$)</b>	<b>3,045,000</b>	<b>1,272,000</b>	<b>3,288,600</b>	<b>33,184,065</b>	<b>243,800</b>	<b>41,033,465</b>

As can be seen, like the Famine Relief Appeal, the majority of the appeal was for food. The next most important item of expenditure was on agriculture.

As part of the emergency programme the GoL implemented an agricultural intervention programme through the distribution of farm inputs and the provision of agriculture services. The objective of this programme was to mitigate the impact of food deficit by assisting the farming community in improving crop production and facilitating sustainable agricultural production.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security has been charged with the responsibility of implementing the programme on targeted farm inputs. The programme officially entitled 'Famine Relief Programme for the 2002 – 2003 Cropping Year' was an initiative of the GoL and initiated by the Cabinet. A

<sup>17</sup> The figures are reproduced here exactly as they appear in the Famine Relief Programme Appeal. The figures for GoL Contribution and External Support do not add up to the Total Cost given but it has not been possible to ascertain which of the figures is incorrect.

<sup>18</sup> The total appeal was for a large amount of funds that would have been equivalent to about 20% of GDP and have caused a large surge in demand. However, it has not been possible to establish exactly what proportion of the request for external support was provided. There are implications for the accounting for of funds passed to government.

<sup>19</sup> This table does not include the subsequent contribution of UNFPA for Reproductive Health (RH) and HIV/AIDS of US\$192,000.

sub-committee of ministers was formed to oversee the modalities of implementation, while the MoAFS was charged with the responsibility of the implementing the programme.

The programme clearly intended to boost agricultural production after the perceived drought stress period. In doing so the programme embarked on a wide scale distribution of seeds (maize, wheat, beans, peas, sorghum, potatoes, vegetables and fodder) and the distribution of fertilisers, pesticides and lime. The other main intervention under the programme was focussed on providing ploughing services, utilising animal and machinery traction. The inputs were to be delivered to the beneficiaries on a 50% recovery basis. In other words, 50% of the costs were free, 50% were provided to the beneficiaries on a loan basis, recoverable after the first harvest.

The monitoring of progress and impact of this programme was done by the inter ministerial committee and through a national monitoring effort. The latter resulted in a the 'consolidated national monitoring and evaluation report' of the famine relief programme during the 2002 / 2003 cropping season. This report concluded that while the objectives had been appropriate, there were several complications in part arising out of the different (and often incorrect) interpretations of the programme especially by some politicians that caused controversy. Further conclusive observations included:

- Targeted acreage not fully achieved (both of ploughing and planting) in part caused by the late arrival of inputs.
- Low yield output of harvest (25-30%) of what could be expected under normal circumstances
- Programme not sustainable due to high investment costs and low production output
- Minimal participation of private sector, thereby compromising longer term objectives of privatisation
- Inadequate planning with regard to financial, human and material resources, which affected the progress on implementation.
- Cost recovery proved to be not feasible

The review team made the following additional observations while on field visit in the districts, which echoed the sentiments of a variety of stakeholders.

- The distributions were potential provided to who all who had arable land, irrespective of the production potential (e.g. the human and financial resources to produce a crop).
- The promise that subsidised farm inputs were to be provided prompted the majority of farmers not to purchase any of their own.
- The late arrival of the inputs resulted in the fact that planting and cultivation was not done. Some stakeholders went as far as arguing that the troubled inputs programme had been counter effective as result of this.
- Among those interviewed at district MoAFS offices strong views were expressed that the cost recovery programme was not feasible and should be halted. Farmers were unable to pay due to the low harvest yields. Ongoing cost recovery efforts were in fact more costly than what they were able to recover.

- The team also observed that personnel charged with cost recovery exercises felt frustrated as the activity (which they considered as fruitless) was interfering with their normal line of duties.

The priorities in the GoL Appeal and activities reflected the view that the central causes of the crisis were related to agricultural production. Reviewing some of the food insecurity and vulnerability profiles of households allows further interrogation of the extent to which this prioritising was appropriate.

The next section addresses this issue with reference to the first review objective: Objective a) IN CONSULTATION WITH THE SAVE THE CHILDREN / DMA PARTNERSHIP TO ENHANCE TARGETING CAPACITY, TO REVIEW TARGETING CRITERIA, IDENTIFY THE MOST FOOD INSECURE AREAS AND HOTSPOTS TO ENABLE PRIORITISATION OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE (GEOGRAPHIC AREAS AND SECTORAL INTERVENTION), AND PROVIDE FOOD INSECURITY AND VULNERABILITY PROFILES.

### **a) Food insecurity and vulnerability profiles**

The sources of food insecurity and vulnerability, at household and individual level, are manifold and some of them (for example impacts of HIV/AIDS on rural households, retrenchments from mines) have already been alluded to. There are differences in the vulnerability of rural and urban households, of households in different agro-ecological and food economy zones, and differences that relate to more specific household level circumstances (for example chronic illness, number of dependents and household composition). Here, we draw on two main sources to develop food insecurity and vulnerability profiles for Lesotho – the Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee (LVAC) Report and the CARE ‘Livelihoods in Lesotho’ report (Turner, 2001). Consultations in villages in Quthing, Mafeteng and Thaba Tseka allow triangulation of the profiles.

Vulnerability and food security profiles developed drawing on the LVAC assessments in August 2002 and on Turner (2001) are shown in Table 4.3. It is worth here identifying three issues that make it difficult to develop profiles based on the first round of LVAC. First, whilst the VAC process was originally conceived to identify a broad range of vulnerability issues, the identification of the regional food crisis in 2002 meant that the VAC was rapidly re-orientated to provide data to help identify food insecure households and had a fairly narrow focus – identifying cereal gaps and the need for food assistance.<sup>20</sup> Second, the first round VAC analyses vulnerability and food security by wealth rankings (very poor, poor, middle and better off) and by livelihood zones (lowlands, foothills, mountains, river valley) but, whilst the data was collected with wealth ranking as a subset of livelihood zones, analysis of these two sets of categories was not combined in LVAC’s first round.<sup>21</sup> Third, the VAC is focused on predominantly rural households and thus fails to account for vulnerability in urban areas (though the later rounds did identify a new livelihood / food economy zone – peri-urban). With a growing urban population in Lesotho,

<sup>20</sup> More recently, with the emergence of the view that the crisis and food security is not just about agricultural production, the focus is broadening to take into account a wider range of factors.

<sup>21</sup> The first round LVAC suggested that this analysis would follow by end September 2002 but it does not appear to have taken place.

and consensus about the serious impacts of declining purchasing power and fluctuating sifted maize meal prices on food security, it is useful to draw in a wider view of people's livelihoods beyond agriculture.

Turner (2001) does consider urban areas in the country. Appendix 3.1 identifies the key sources of vulnerability and the coping mechanisms drawn on by urban, lowland / foothills and mountain dwelling households (Turner, 2001). The range of indicators is broader than in the LVAC but not presented quantitatively. The impacts on food security are different in each context. For example, in urban areas one of the most important sources of risk is loss in income or desertion by a spouse or major breadwinner. In mountain areas these factors are also important but other shocks come into play related to climate, cultural ceremonies (for example costs of *bohali* and initiation for boys) and (amongst richer households) stock theft.

**Table 4.3 Vulnerability and Food Security Profiles by Wealth Ranking**

(Draws on data from Lesotho VAC September 2002, Turner 2001 and from consultations with beneficiaries in November 2003)

a) Very Poor		
The very poor do not own livestock nor have fields for food production. Very poor households are generally poorly clothed and cannot afford to purchase new clothing. Many are without shelter and survive from gifts they receive from relatives, friends and neighbours. The poorest are food insecure and many will not eat for a day or more – “these people will go to sleep hungry”. Very poor rural households do not have steady income or savings and can not afford to send their children to school. Some were described as not having children, rendering them less socially secure.		
Main Livelihood Strategies	Support from relatives, friends and neighbours, occasional piece jobs, begging, brewing <i>joala</i> , making mats, brooms, hats, etc., selling <i>dagga</i> , renting out a spare room, assistance from church.	
Production	Sharecropping, renting out land if unable to farm, small number of chickens, goats, growing and selling vegetables.	
Main shocks / risks / threats to livelihoods and food security	Chronic: illness in family, scarcity of piece jobs, large family to feed, lack of draught power, old age, insufficient and infertile land, poor sharecropping agreements, alcoholism, lack of inputs for farming. Acute: sudden illness and death, job loss, desertion by spouse / breadwinner, drought, livestock disease, cost of funerals, initiation costs for boys.	
Coping Strategies	Consumption	Rely on less preferred, less expensive meals 64% Reduce number of meals / day 71% Limit portions at mealtime 66% Get food from relatives or friends outside the household 71% Borrow food 63% Eat more wild foods 51% Skip whole days without eating 54% Purchase food in credit 35%
	Income	(LVAC data not disaggregated by wealth ranking)
	Expenditure	Reduce home items and expenditures (e.g. soap and blankets) 61% Reduce health care expenditures 54% Reduce beer and tobacco expenditures 44% Reduce education expenditures 38%
Other Food Security Indicators	Average cereal stocks: 0.44 x 80kg bag Households with no cereal stocks: 71% Wasting of children under five: moderate and severe: 12.7%	

b) Poor		
<p>Those who fall within the poor category were described as normally having 1 field, although most cannot cultivate due to lack of implements and the inability to secure inputs such as seed and fertilizer. Some in this category do not have fields at all. The poor own 1-2 livestock at most, or for the majority none at all. Many are unemployed and rely on piece work for income. Having little or no money does not allow people from the poor category to send their children to school, nor to purchase clothes. Like the poorest those in the poor category were described as having difficulty securing their next meal.</p>		
Livelihood Strategies		IGAs, assistance from relatives, <i>fato-fato</i> , brewing <i>joala</i> , renting out rooms, pensions (from SA), piece jobs, repairs (e.g. shoes), sale of livestock in crisis, hire out sons as herdboys, sale of wood and shrubs, begging
Production		Chickens, some pigs, few livestock, selling veg and fruit. Sharecrop to get access to draught power and other inputs
Main shocks / risks / threats to livelihoods and food security		Chronic: illness, lack of employment, large families, poor markets / competition, few piece jobs, under-utilisation of land, alcoholism, old age, unfair sharecropping arrangements, lack of housing. Acute: sudden illness and death, loss of remittances / job loss, drought, unanticipated medical costs and funerals, desertion by spouse or breadwinner, costs of ceremonies (initiation, bridewealth), livestock disease, stock theft.
Coping Strategies	Consumption	Rely on less preferred, less expensive meals 70% Reduce number of meals / day 66% Limit portions at mealtime 63% Get food from relatives or friends outside the household 60% Borrow food 56% Eat more wild foods 46% Skip whole days without eating 42% Purchase food in credit 37%
	Income	(LVAC data not disaggregated by wealth ranking)
	Expenditure	Reduce home items and expenditures (e.g. soap and blankets) 56% Reduce health care expenditures 51% Reduce beer and tobacco expenditures 46% Reduce education expenditures 39%
Other Food Security Indicators		Average cereal stocks: 1.6 x 80kg bag Households with no cereal stocks: 47% Wasting of children under five: moderate and severe: 6.7%

c) Middle		
<p>Most of those who fall within the middle livelihood category have fields and the means (implements and inputs) to produce food crops. Middle households were described as food secure in that they are able to feed their family. Many in this category own livestock and have at least one family member who is employed as a wage earner. Middle households can afford to send their children to school and may have a little savings. Middle household members are usually well dressed and can afford to purchase new clothes. A few may own shops and can employ others to work for them.</p>		
Livelihood Strategies	Work in SA, factories, taxi conductors, sewing and sale of clothes, remittances, IGAs, assistance from relatives, <i>fato-fato</i> , brewing <i>joala</i> , sale of veg, fruit, broilers, commercial beer, brick-making, rent out rooms, piece jobs, working as <i>ngaka</i> , petty retailing, building, sewing.	
Production	Cattle, pigs, chickens, sheep, goats. Sell livestock in crisis. Rent out fields, horses, donkeys	
Main shocks / risks / threats to livelihoods and food security	Chronic: Debtors defer payment, alcoholism, large families, chronic illness, education, low salaries / steady but high inflation, limited markets for retailing and agricultural products, burning of rangeland, lack of land. Acute: retrenchment / job loss, sudden illness and death, livestock theft and disease, costs of ceremonies, unanticipated health care, drought, rapidly increasing inflation, poor crop prices.	
Coping Strategies	Consumption	Rely on less preferred, less expensive meals 62% Reduce number of meals / day 38% Limit portions at mealtime 47% Get food from relatives or friends outside the household 39% Borrow food 46% Eat more wild foods 32% Skip whole days without eating 23% Purchase food in credit 44%
	Income	(LVAC data not disaggregated by wealth ranking)
	Expenditure	Reduce home items and expenditures (e.g. soap and blankets) 47% Reduce health care expenditures 47% Reduce beer and tobacco expenditures 35% Reduce education expenditures 30%
Other Food Security Indicators	Average cereal stocks: 2.41 x 80 kg bag Households with no cereal stocks: 28% Wasting of children under five: moderate and severe: no data	

d) Better off		
Households described as well off own a significant number and many different types of livestock. The well off have several fields, own implements to cultivate and have the means to secure inputs such as fertilizer and seed. Better-off households are food secure; household members eat well. Children attend school, are well dressed and can purchase new clothing as they like. Some operate their own businesses and can employ others to assist them. Some better-off households own their own vehicles.		
Livelihood Strategies		Savings, driving, <i>ngaka</i> , knitting and sewing, brewing, wage labour in SA, remittances, small business (e.g. cafes, shops, shebeens), renting out rooms, brick making, sell fruits and vegetables, piece jobs, brewing.
Production		Cattle, chickens, pigs, donkeys, horses, sheep, goats. Rent out fields, sell livestock in crisis, sharecrop out (offer land and equipment but not labour), hire out cattle and draught,
Main shocks / risks / threats to livelihoods and food security		Chronic: Chronic illness leading to death, low yields, cost of education, poor markets and competition, low crop and mohair prices, low wages, poor yields, burning of rangeland. Acute: Retrenchment / job loss, sudden illness, theft, sudden death of breadwinner, repairing vehicles, late repayment by debtors, cost of ceremonies, crop theft, drought, , animal diseases.
Coping Strategies	Consumption	Rely on less preferred, less expensive meals 37% Reduce number of meals / day 19% Limit portions at mealtime 22% Get food from relatives or friends outside the household 19% Borrow food 19% Eat more wild foods 11% Skip whole days without eating 0% Purchase food in credit 30%
	Income	(LVAC data not disaggregated by wealth ranking)
	Expenditure	Reduce home items and expenditures (e.g. soap and blankets) 22% Reduce health care expenditures 15% Reduce beer and tobacco expenditures 11% Reduce education expenditures 11%
Other Food Security Indicators		Average cereal stocks: 4.97 x 80 kg bag Households with no cereal stocks: 15% Wasting of children under five: moderate and severe : 3.5%

Having identified food security and vulnerability profiles for Lesotho, we need to ask which areas, livelihood categories and people were identified by the GoL and other stakeholders as being in need of emergency assistance? These two questions are addressed in the following sections b) and c).

### **b) Food insecure areas and hotspots, prioritisation of the emergency response (geographic areas and sectoral interventions)**

#### *Prioritisation of geographic hotspots*

Food security and vulnerability profiles can be used to identify key geographic hotspots. Given that wealth-ranked households and livelihood zones were not analysed in tandem in the first round LVAC, the prioritisation of geographic hotspots was largely decided through the cereal gap estimates provided therein. Thus, according to the LVAC, the highest numbers of population in need of food aid between September 2002 and March 2003 were to be found in Quthing, Maseru and Thaba Tseka districts. In terms of percentages of rural population the maximum need was in Thaba Tseka and Mokhotlong. District by district there is some difference between this assessment and the WFP EMOP 10200 where Mafeteng (which was not identified by the LVAC as a vulnerable area), Thaba-Tseka, Mokhotlong, Butha Buthe and rural parts of Maseru district were designated as EMOP areas for 12 months. Quthing, along with Mohale's Hoek and Qacha's Nek were bridging EMOP areas and were to receive support for 3 months only. However, in the subsequent EMOP 10290,

there is most focus on the Southern districts – including this time Mohale's Hoek and Quthing. Further information is required before the analysis and decision-making processes behind these differences in prioritisation can be fully understood.

### *Analysing the prioritisation of sectoral interventions?*

The sectoral response was driven largely by the sectoral allocations within the UNCAP. As we have seen, food rations formed by far the largest component of the response. The aim of the food rations was two-fold. First, rations were intended to prevent severe food shortage at household level that could lead to deterioration of nutritional status and lead to starvation. Second, rations were aimed to prevent further depletion of assets that would increase long-term vulnerability of poor households. This second aim is important given that erosion of household assets is becoming increasingly common because of the costs to households of HIV/AIDS induced mortality and morbidity. WFP estimated that 444,800 people would require food assistance in 2002-2003, some of these for a full twelve months and other for shorter periods. Transport, storage and handling costs slightly outweighed the cost of the food, much of which was sourced from outside the region.

In contrast, the costs associated with the agricultural sector response, coordinated by FAO, were mostly the costs of inputs. Activities in agriculture include provision of seed, fertiliser and farm tools, and seed capacity building. The GoL also committed itself to ploughing subsidies. The aim was to increase agricultural production at household level amongst vulnerable farming households to reduce the risk of a recurrent crisis. The World Health Organisation (WHO) component of the appeal aimed to control malnutrition and related diseases amongst 20,000 children under five in the affected areas. This was to be achieved mostly through training, strengthening capacity of health facilities and education. Linked to the WHO response, UNICEF targeted 115,000 children under five years of age for therapeutic feedings (in addition to those identified by WFP for supplementary feeding) and 75,000 pregnant or lactating women for supplementary feeding. UNICEF also asked for additional funds for improving primary school enrolment rates whilst WHO sought additional funds for water and sanitation. Other costs were associated with the coordination of the emergency response.

The UNCAP was to be implemented in coordination with various GoL ministries and agencies. In the case of some activities (for example inputs programmes) it is not always clear whether funding came from GoL alone or in collaboration with other agencies, for example, FAO. Without more data and reporting, it has not been possible to establish this. Other contributions from donors were also made direct to the government (for example the DFID-supported Livelihoods Recovery through Agriculture Programme (LRAP)).

The heavy prioritisation of food aid and agriculture in the emergency response raise questions about the extent to which some of the underlying causes of the emergency were understood when appeals were made. The contribution of HIV/AIDS will be discussed later but it is clear from the response that the erosion of purchasing power, particularly because of retrenchments from the mines in South Africa or other job losses, were not addressed in the emergency response.

### **c) Targeting Criteria and Capacity**

Reviewing the targeting process in the emergency response involves several different aspects. We can differentiate between the technical aspects of targeting – that is the identification by the VAC or other assessments of who is vulnerable, and the institutional or implementation aspects of targeting – that is whether interventions successfully reach the vulnerable people. Thus we need to ask whether there is mistargeting (for example by IPs, VDMTs and WFP) and food is not getting into the right hands, or whether the problem is that the right hands have not been clearly enough identified. It is, of course, likely that there is probably a little of both of these problems.

#### *Technical aspects of targeting*

A very clear message emerged from the first round of LVAC about which groups of very poor households were the most vulnerable. They included:

- Aged-headed households living alone or without a spouse;
- Female-headed households, particularly the large number of the very poor;
- Orphans living in households with a high dependency ratio; and
- HIV/AIDS victims and affected households

It is important, however, to bear in mind some of the biases that were inherent in the LVAC first round – for example rural bias, the narrow focus on food.

However, when the LVAC was released, some food distribution had already been or was underway and drew on slightly different targeting criteria. These were developed through the DMA/WFP/IP partnership in Lesotho as follows:

- The elderly, who are 65 years of age without income sources;
- Orphans (child headed households) without cash support; and
- The sick and disabled.

Earlier in this section we argued that there was a need to distinguish more clearly between chronic and acute food insecurity, so it is also important to think about vulnerability status in terms of chronic and acute vulnerability. All households experience vulnerability at some times, but we need to differentiate between households that are vulnerable in the long-term and those that may experience vulnerable for shorter periods, for example during certain seasons. Farrington *et al* (2003) suggest that it is useful to differentiate between chronically and periodically / spasmodically vulnerable households and suggest that households whose vulnerability stems from a chronic incapacity to engage in the productive economy will require one kind of assistance or support, assistance to those that are only periodically vulnerable should be different.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> It is important to bear in mind that these categories are not entirely static (i.e. households can suffer chronic vulnerability for many years but ultimately become left vulnerable – for example, as the number of dependents in the household change and children become economically active) and that within households chronic and periodic vulnerability can overlap.

In the case of the GoL response, it would have been sensible to differentiate between rural households with or without the capacity to re-engage in the productive economy. In the case of the GoL inputs programme, no such differentiation was made and so, in addition to the fact that inputs came late, inputs were distributed irrespective of whether households had the capacity to make best use of them.

The identification of vulnerable households, both by the LVAC and by the DMA/WFP/IP partnership tended to focus on households with individuals that were chronically vulnerable. In this case, transfers (including but not limited to food distribution) are the likely most appropriate intervention. It would be useful for future targeting to differentiate more clearly between the chronic and periodic vulnerability in order to ensure that the most appropriate intervention reaches the right beneficiary.

### *Institutional and implementation targeting issues*

During interviews with country / national level stakeholders, district level stakeholders, and within villages where food distribution took place, some serious concerns arose about the targeting process. Inevitably, because in villages and households there is no clear differentiation between EMOP 10200 and EMOP 10290<sup>23</sup>, it is not possible to limit this discussion to the targeting criteria of EMOP 10200 alone and there is necessarily some discussion of EMOP 10290.

The planned process for implementing targeting is outlined in the WFP EMOP 10200:

Targeting at the national and sub-national level will be carried out by Governments, WFP and IPs building on the consensus achieved in the initial CFSAM. Targeting at this stage will be based on the geographic areas that are the most affected. At the village level, the beneficiary communities themselves will play an integral role in determining criteria for receipt of distribution, registration, distribution and monitoring. WFP and IPs will facilitate these processes at the village level ensuring consistency with WFP targeting and distribution guidelines, including WFP's Commitments to Women (WFP 2002).

From consultations with stakeholders, it became clear that, in practice, the targeting process was a top-down process, with little or no input at grassroots level. Consultations with VDMTs raised concerns that the strict categories for targeting meant that many very poor households that were excluded. They argued that the presence of a lactating or pregnant woman, or an elderly household head, or someone who is chronically ill, does not necessarily or automatically indicate food insecurity or vulnerability.

VDMTs were meant to be able to clearly explain the targeting criteria to people in their villages but this was not the case. As a result, the changes in targeting between EMOP 10200 and 10290 have caused confusion and disappointment at household level. Because VDMTs have criteria handed down to them from

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<sup>23</sup> EMOP 10200 was the WFP's emergency operation from July 2002-July 2003. EMOP 10290 was for the period July 2003-July 2004.

above, they are not in a position to explain the reasons why certain categories of households are prioritised, or why priorities have changed.

There were also significant disparities between what people at country, district and village level think is the targeting process. The signal from country and district stakeholders is that there is community participation in targeting but in the six villages (two each in Quthing, Mafeteng and Thaba Tseka) that is either no evidence of community-based vulnerability ranking or else the ranking has been done without clarity on the criteria for ranking. Apart from the classification of some vulnerable groups, no instruments were put in place to enhance an appropriate selection by the communities themselves. It became clear that VDMTs had not received the appropriate guidance to undertake the targeting process. These issues will be considered further in the subsequent section on policy frameworks and coordination for emergency response.

### **Conclusion:**

Targeting comprises both technical processes by which vulnerable households are identified and institutional / implementation processes by which assistance reaches those vulnerable households. There are likely to be some shortfalls in each case. The identification of vulnerable households needs to differentiate between those that are either chronically or periodically vulnerable in order to ensure that the most appropriate intervention reaches each vulnerable household. For example chronically vulnerable people and those unable to work may benefit from food aid to help them cope with hunger whilst those who are periodically vulnerable but able to work would benefit from a different intervention, such as insurance against crop failure to reduce the risk of hunger, or food/cash for work in the months before harvest. At an institutional and implementation level there are disparities between national, district and village level and concerns about communication between these different stakeholders. There are also concerns about capacity, particularly at district and village in terms of resources and skills / training, to reach intended beneficiaries.

### **Section 4.3 HIV/AIDS and emergency programming**

Why is the extent to which HIV/AIDS programming has been part of the emergency response been identified as an important objective? Well, analyses of the regional humanitarian crisis in Southern Africa in 2002-2003 have noted that, whilst rainfall shortages in the region in 2001-2002 were much less serious than in 1991-1992 (the last major drought across Southern Africa), the impacts in 2002-2003 have been much more serious. In a paper presented at the Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee Meeting in Zimbabwe in 2002, Alex de Waal presented what has become known as the New Variant Famine (NVF) thesis. In this thesis it is argued that the nature and causal factors behind famine in Africa, particularly in Southern Africa, are changing. It is no longer drought that results in hunger in Southern Africa but the long-term erosion of household capital assets, including human labour power, that results from HIV/AIDS. Whilst in Lesotho, we do not know yet the precise impacts of HIV/AIDS on food security and therefore cannot assess the extent to which NVF is occurring in Lesotho, it remains important in this research to address the extent to which the emergency response has taken HIV/AIDS into account.

In terms of the impact on food security, the pandemic is likely to cause a substantial increase in vulnerability to other shocks, the emergence of new kinds of vulnerability and the erosion of capacities and skills. This occurs in a context of already fragile economies. More specifically as Harvey (2003) explains, HIV/AIDS potentially reduces household resilience levels to an absolute minimum, thereby considerably increasing vulnerability to shocks, as HIV/AIDS impacts on:

- Human capital, as it causes chronic illness and mortality, thereby reducing manpower at households, and increasing the burden of responsibilities for others. It reduces the ability of people to transfer knowledge between generations, and probably impacts on a wide range of activities linked to production and income.
- Financial capital, as it increases expenditure at household level, for example on medical care and funerals, while at the same time household income reduces, thus resulting in the sale of important assets.
- Social capital, as the pandemic causes overstressing of the support institutions and kinship support.
- Natural and physical capital, through the impact on land-tenure (i.e. widows and orphans can lose access and rights to land following the death of male head of household) and the likely sales of productive assets such as livestock. This would particularly be relevant for vulnerable groups such as widows and orphaned children.

In terms of food security the impact of the pandemic is two-dimensional: HIV/AIDS impacts on food security, whilst food insecurity itself increases vulnerability to HIV / AIDS. At a biological level malnutrition increases the risk of HIV infection. There are various arguments on how HIV / AIDS should be regarded in the context of humanitarian responses. These include:

- HIV / AIDS should be seen as an emergency on its own terms, and relief interventions are appropriate responses due to devastating impact on livelihoods
- HIV/AIDS causes additional shocks compounding food insecurity. As a result natural and complex disasters are triggered easier, and will last longer which call for adjustments in the response action to deal with this increased dimension of vulnerability.
- The impact of HIV / AIDS on livelihoods calls for a safety net or welfare system for those worse affected, whilst development processes need to streamline HIV / AIDS and identify mitigation strategies. Long-term relief action needs to be combined with development oriented interventions

It was estimated that in Lesotho, during the period under review the HIV/AIDS prevalence was rated at 31% within the age group between 15-49 years, the fourth highest world wide. During 2001 it was estimated that 73,000 children were orphaned resulting from an estimated 25,000 AIDS related deaths. These figures alone would have given cause for a pro-active anti HIV/AIDS programming strategy including one linked to its impact on food security.

So, the impact of HIV/AIDS is clearly aggravating food insecurity in Lesotho. Together with the impact of highly variable rainfall patterns on agricultural production, the dependency on marginal cultivation practices as well as an increase of population density (among others from retrenched miners returning from SA) it has contributed to the build up of the emergency.

**a) *The impact of HIV/AIDS and the emergency programme***

We examine here to which degree the emergency programme was tailored to take account of the HIV / AIDS pandemic during the period 2002 – 2003.

The first focus is on the emergency food distribution programme linked to HIV / AIDS. From a regional perspective the EMOP 10200 recognised the HIV / AIDS pandemic as ‘an underlying factor in reducing household and national resilience to shocks’ and the increase of lost incomes accounted for by HIV/AIDS. But there were few specific details that underpinned the seriousness of the scale and that were translated into a more rigorous target strategy. In recognition of the HIV / AIDS prevalence some adjustments were made in the food basket. These adjustments included:

- The minimum nutritional benchmark was adjusted from 2100 kcal to 2200 kcal
- The inclusion of pulses and fortified blended food

Although one of the objectives included ‘to safeguard the nutritional well being of vulnerable segments of the population such as the People Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHA)’, the EMOP did not give explicit directions to specifically target HIV/AIDS affected groups, although linkages were drawn in terms of working with organisations that were dealing with the impact of the problem.

It is unlikely that, in practice, the humanitarian response undertaken by the GoL and its partners between 2002 and 2003 was consciously linked to any of the above described response scenarios, or that a deliberate link was made to the emergency situation arising from the HIV/AIDS pandemic in terms of programming.

This conclusion is made on the following observations:

- The emergency food security crisis was largely seen as a scenario dominated by drought and a reduction of agricultural production. The Government of Lesotho Consolidated Appeal for 2002 / 2003 contained not reference at all to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and its linkage to food insecurity;
- In discussions with WFP Maseru it became clear that HIV / AIDS programming was only taking root much later (towards the end of the review period);
- During discussions in the field, DDMTs, VDMTs and beneficiaries indicated a lack of awareness of ongoing targeting aimed at specific vulnerable or affected HIV/AIDS groups; and
- Some IPs confirmed that targeting aimed at specific vulnerable or affected HIV/AIDS groups only began recently (under a new EMOP for the period 2003-4).

We focus now on the degree to which recovery programming had been tailored to take account of the HIV/ AIDS pandemic.

There is little evidence to support that this happened. The main recovery programme activities undertaken by the GoL focused on the distribution of farm inputs and some to the implementation of FFW. Our observations include the following:

- Specific references to the HIV / AIDS pandemic and its impact on food security were lacking in any of the proposal / planning documents reviewed, as well as the lack of specific strategic approaches incorporated for HIV/ AIDS affected groups in the programming.
- Discussions with the MOAFS in Maseru and some of the districts confirmed that the distribution of farm inputs were implemented under the Ministry's primary mandate and objective of targeting the agriculture productive sector, and were not geared towards specific vulnerable groups.

A notable exception to the latter observation is the Livelihoods Recovery through Agriculture Programme (LRAP). The design of this programme is specifically geared towards livelihood recovery of specific vulnerable groups including those affected by HIV/AIDS. This programme is implemented in the districts of Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek, Qacha's Nek and Quthing, through the MOAFS in partnership with CARE and with financial assistance from DFID. The partnership programme aims to enhance livelihood security through improved agricultural practices at homestead level. The programme focuses on specific vulnerable households that include women and children headed households and households affected by HIV / AIDS (and other chronic illnesses). The design and implementation of this programme is geared towards recovery at household level as it takes the livelihood perspective and opportunities of the target household as a centre of focus. It draws on best practice in the context of Lesotho and incorporates strategies such as water harvesting and storage, crop selection (for higher nutritional value), crop planting practices (to encourage optimal growth), and improved access to inputs, etc. Apart from these production-related strategies, LRAP is developing appropriate support services from government, private sector and civil society to the communities.

A review carried out between 27 and 29 October indicated good progress on the implementation of LRAP. The main successes of LRAP thus far has been in facilitating a partnership between the GoL and NGOs to have the support services delivered to the communities. Among others this has lead to some surplus production of agricultural produce (especially vegetables) to be utilised for marketing.

***b) Linking HIV/ AIDS to emergency and recovery programming:  
Future considerations***

A previous discussion on page 37 identified HIV/AIDS as a main contributing factor in the build up to the emergency. As HIV/AIDS increases chronic vulnerability, and its impact on food security is of a long-term dimension it needs long term intervention approaches in addition to (and beyond) the emergency programming. Humanitarian assistance needs to be combined with wider responses. In the absence of anti-retroviral medicine programmes on a wide scale, the prospects for productive participation in the economy for most of the AIDS affected are bleak. This in itself is a concern in terms of food security, as the pandemic will remain at the heart of food insecurity for years to come.

It is important to note however, that in the last two years considerable progress has been made in developing strategic approaches to combat the impact of HIV / AIDS. Central in this development is the improved conceptual thinking

that the impact of HIV/AIDS requires a diverse innovative intervention approach that is geared to addressing its diverse forms of impacts on individuals, households and society.

Progress so far has been made in developing institutional network and policy frameworks. The mainstreaming of HIV / AIDS within the operations of UN Agencies and International NGOs has become evident, allowing for greater integration of HIV AIDS issues in diverse programming agencies. This has ultimately led to improved HIV/AIDS programming. An example in practice is the targeting of OVCs and HIV / AIDS affected households by WFP under the current EMOP.

Mainstreaming of HIV / AIDS has started and but should be further encouraged. Currently mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS is taking place among UN Agencies and has taken root within some of the Government Departments who are committing 2 percent of their budget allocations for HIV/AIDS mainstreaming activities. However this type of mainstreaming has to be taken further and should be extended to, civil society, the private sector, and a wider spectrum of local and international NGOs. In the context of Lesotho, the policy framework needs strengthening and financial resources need to be committed to fight the course of HIV / AIDS.

The strategy proposed under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (under draft) includes interventions such as:

- Strengthening institutional and policy framework for the implementation to fight HIV / AIDS,
- Strengthen multi-sectoral responses to HIV/AIDS
- Mobilise financial and human resources
- Thematic interventions (prevention, care and support, impact mitigation)
- Scaling up voluntary counselling and testing
- Improving hospital care
- Mitigation of impact on orphans and vulnerable groups

Dealing with the challenge of providing human assistance associated with HIV AIDS requires specific attention for designing / adapting information networks that can incorporate HIV / AIDS analysis (including disaggregate data). Food assistance programmes in the context of HIV / AIDS need careful consideration in terms of rations and food types, distribution points versus distances that people need to travel, waiting time etc. Appropriate support could include cash transfers and distribution of non food items due to the diverse ways of the AIDS impact of households. Moreover, long term welfare provisions to HIV / AIDS affected households should become part of the humanitarian aid programming. (see also Harvey 2003)

## **Conclusion**

Whereas stakeholder's assumptions about the food security crisis presented a variety of different views, the review learned that some key stakeholders at national and district levels were largely responding to a drought. In this case where drought is seen to be the cause (rather than just a trigger) of the food security crisis, the 'drought scenario' obscures the issue of HIV/AIDS and other causal factors of food insecurity in Lesotho. This means that that people seek

solutions to drought in order to prevent continuation of the crisis rather than solutions that mitigate against the impacts of HIV/AIDS that would require longer-term strategic approaches instead of short-term emergency responses.

However there is evidence of learning on part of IPs and WFP. It was observed that progress is being made in terms of a more comprehensive analysis of food insecurity in Lesotho and the subsequent trend of responses. For example, whilst food aid programme was originally conceived without coherent HIV/AIDS planning, HIV/AIDS is increasingly taken into account – e.g. take home rations for OVCs, food distribution to chronically ill.

## **Section 4.4 The impact of food aid on the private sector and markets**

This section considers the potential impact of food aid distribution on private sector (especially grain traders, retailers and millers) and grain markets. It refers to objective c) in the terms of reference for this review:

TO REVIEW THE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE FOOD AID OPERATION ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND MARKETS

As part of the consultations that were carried out by the review team in Maseru and in Quthing, Mafeteng and Thaba Tseka districts, stakeholders were asked about the potential and actual impacts on food aid distribution on the private sector and local markets. The most important finding of the team on this issue is that, whilst the consultations provided a very wide range of different perspectives, there was a lack of evidence or data to support some of the claims that were made. Thus, understanding of the impact of food aid distribution on the private sector and markets can only be interpreted as hearsay, conjecture or anecdotal. The various scenarios that were identified will be explored here and attempts will be made, through very limited data, to confirm or rule out some of the scenarios. The scenarios, and their implications are shown in Table 4.4.

**Table 4.4: Impacts of food aid distribution on markets and the private sector**

<p><b>Scenario 1: Food aid pushes up local prices</b> The distribution of food aid discourages production at a local level, thus reducing supply and leading to an increase in prices.</p>
<p><b>Scenario 2: Food aid pushes down local prices</b> The distribution of food aid reduces demand for purchased maize, leading to a fall in prices</p>
<p><b>Scenario 3: No impact of food aid on prices</b> Food aid distribution does not have an impact on market pricing in Lesotho, either at national or local level, because Lesotho grain prices are effectively set by the larger South African / SACU market.</p>
<p><b>Scenario 4: Food aid adversely affects small-scale millers</b> Contracts for the milling of food aid to be distributed in Lesotho were awarded to Lesotho Flour Mills Ltd and private mills in Kroonstad such that small-scale, local millers were cut out of the market. There were three reasons for this. First the economies of scale of larger millers made their costs cheaper. Second, small-scale millers were unable to carry out fortification processes. Third, transport costs for moving unmilled maize to remoter small-scale producers were much</p>

higher. Local production by small farmers was also reduced so there was little milling of locally produced cereals.

Getting access to all the data required to assess all the scenarios was not possible within the time during which this report was produced. However, Table 4.5 shows the proportion of SACU maize produced by Lesotho. Of this food aid to Lesotho constitutes an even smaller proportion. Given that Lesotho contributes such a small proportion to the SACU common market, it is difficult to envisage a situation in which food aid in Lesotho itself would be likely to affect SACU, and therefore, Lesotho prices. If prices of maize fell in Lesotho significantly below prices in the rest of SACU, any maize in the country would find its way back across the border where it could be sold for higher prices (and the same effect can occur with subsidies on inputs – they are sold in South Africa at higher prices). Given that prices are set by the SACU market and not at a domestic level, Scenarios 1 and 2 are both unlikely. It is not possible to comment on the impact of food aid on small-scale millers, though an important question is raised about the costs and necessity of fortification of maize meal. In the case of Lesotho, this very rudimentary analysis of prices suggests that Scenario 3 is the most likely to occur in Lesotho.

**Table 4.5 – Lesotho maize production as a percentage of SACU maize production**

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total SACU Production	10,447,341	7,955,764	8,206,904	11,738,605	8,265,400	9,341,203
Lesotho Percentage of SACU production	1.4%	1.5%	1.5%	1.3%	1.2%	0.9%

**Conclusion:**

Consultations with stakeholders showed that arguments about the impact of food aid distribution on the private sector and local producers based on hearsay, conjecture and anecdotes. The data that was available shows that, whilst sustained food aid distribution may suppress local production, by making people dependent on food aid rather than producing their own crops, maize distribution is unlikely to affect maize prices in Lesotho. This severely constrains the GoL in stabilising consumer prices and enabling better access to food by Basotho. During stakeholder consultations in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning it was argued that, if prices are pushed down in Lesotho (for example if the GoL subsidises foodstuffs), then local production is likely to be sold across the border in South Africa, where Basotho producers can get higher prices for their produce.

**Section 4.5 The policy framework and institutional arrangements for emergency responses**

In Lesotho the Disaster Management Authority (DMA) plays has a crucial position in the policy framework for emergency responses. The DMA is located within the Prime Minister’s office and therefore has a close link to the Cabinet. The cabinet itself houses a Ministerial Disaster Relief Task Force (DRTF). Other structures that are linked to the DMA include the Food Management Unit (FMU) and the Food and Nutrition Coordination Office

(FNCO). Both of these agencies are situated within the Prime Minister's Office. The mandate of the DMA is to mainstream policies for the management and prevention of food-security crisis as part of disaster management. The agency is charged with the responsibility of advising the cabinet on issues related to crisis situations including the declaration of a national disaster status.

Lesotho is one of the countries that has a well laid out policy structure for disaster management and emergency responses. The main policy framework for emergency responses in Lesotho is embedded in the National Disaster Management Plan formulated in 1996. A National Disaster Management Act was passed in Parliament in 1997. The act involved the establishment of the Disaster Management Authority (the DMA). Under the act the DMA was empowered to carry out the national disaster management plan with provisions for a holistic approach on disaster management including disaster preparedness, mitigation response and recovery. The aim was to cater for integration of disaster management plans into national development planning.

The main objectives of the disaster management plan, in summary, are:

- Collection of relevant data to determine mitigation, preparedness and responses to reduce vulnerability to slow-developing and rapid-onset disasters.
- Assessing relief and recovery requirements in all disaster scenarios, but mainly of prevalent drought.
- Creating sustainable management structures that are supported by legislation at national, district and village levels.

Another set of objectives are focused on developing a cadre of disaster management staff at the various levels (national, district and village levels), and promoting institutional and public awareness of disaster effects and relief activities. This is to be achieved through (1) assessment of training needs, and tailor made training on disaster management aimed at GoL, NGO and UN staff to build a qualified cadre of staff; (2) integration of disaster management training in public administration and development management curricula; (3) provision of formal courses at district and village levels and training of trainers; and (4) running public awareness campaigns on disaster management.

Under the plan, it is intended that disaster planning procedures are largely focused on bottom – up approaches, from village and ward level up to district and central (national) level.

A disaster management manual plan has been in existence since 1996. Apart from explanations on objectives of the various sections of the disaster management plan, the manual provides guidelines for the various working groups, and for the DMA structures at district and village levels.

The review team had discussions with DMA officials and staff at national level, district level and at village level in an effort to learn more about the implementation of the disaster management plan. What stage of implementation had it reached? How well were the various structures operational and performing? What was achieved through the holistic approach of disaster management in terms of paying attention to preparedness,

mitigation, response and recovery? More specifically, what progress had been made in terms of managing and coordinating the current crisis?

**a) DMA structures and coordination**

DMA HQ at national level

An important function of the DMA is coordinating the process of disaster preparedness, -mitigation, -response and -recovery. Coordination is focused on the actions and programmes of Government, NGOs UN Bodies in all of these components of disaster management. The structures that have been developed under the DMA to do this include the establishment of the office of the chief executive, a deputy executive and several technical officers. In addition six working groups were established under the DMA cover the issues related to the executive, training, water and sanitation, health and nutrition, food and logistics, and agriculture. Each of these working groups has its own specific sets of objectives and plans. The working groups operate at national level and incorporate members from sector ministries, UN agencies and NGOs. The team was informed that some of these working groups met as frequently as once a month but some are fairly inactive. The office of the executive and the working groups form the point of interaction with other partners that are associated with disaster management.

At the DMA headquarters where the team had discussions, the team was informed that progress in implementing the disaster management plan had been inconsistent since its inception. One of the areas where progress had been made was on the collection of vulnerability data<sup>24</sup>. Setting up structures at national and district levels is ongoing. The team was informed that several components of the plan were not yet put into place. Important aspects of the training component had not been done since the inception of the plan.

Observations:

There are signals that one problem faced by the DMA was the difficulty on getting the holistic concept of disaster management across to other partners. DMA is largely seen as a reactive emergency agency. Many stakeholders including those from within ministerial departments are of the opinion that DMA's mandate has primarily been focusing on a reactive response to crisis situations, especially on food security emergencies. In practice, the work carried out so far had been of a reactive nature as result of DMA's primary occupation with management of the food security crisis since 2000. Other aspects of its role, in prevention and preparedness have seen less progress.

The result of this is that little tangible progress has been made. This is probably linked to DMA's failure to pro-actively follow up on some of the components linked to disaster preparedness, mitigation and recovery aspects and in part (as the team was informed) the failure to obtain maximum participation on the part of government ministries in attending meetings. Another factor in this respect is the lack of appropriate training (e.g. on the part of integrating disaster management training in public administration and development management curricula) and the lack of the public awareness campaigning.

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<sup>24</sup> Currently this is primarily received with the assistance of Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee (LVAC). LVAC is linked to the DMA where it has an office.

Another issue in relation to the DMA mandate is on how this mandate is updated in a timely manner as to how to deal with newly emerging potential forms of humanitarian crisis situations (such as the those caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The current DMA mandate is unclear on this issue.

Other issues that were recognized as barriers that prevented a higher rate of progress included the high rate of staff changes resulting in a flight of human resources (especially those who had been trained). In part this is resulting from relative modest remuneration conditions within Government.

There is a concern with the financial resources with regard to the DMA. The agency was apparently heavily supported by donor funding in the early stages of its existence, now has a skeleton annual budget provision. The review team was informed that the budget for the seven programmes that are coordinated under the PM's office Including LAPCA, FNCO, DMA and four others) is a total of M 36,000,000.

#### Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee (LVAC)

LVAC is a committee formed out of Ministries (MOAFS, MOFDP), UN Agencies, NGOs, NEWU, FMU, DMA, Bureau of Statistics and the Department of Environmental Health. The LVAC is based at the DMA headquarters in Maseru where it has an office. The total membership of the committee is 35 members. The committee is charged with the responsibility to provide relevant data for disaster management programming focused on food security. It's primary occupation has been focussed on bi-annual livelihoods-based vulnerability assessments. The latter is primarily carried out by the Technical Committee, whose members total 13, composed out of the overall membership of LVAC. Currently LVAC is supported through SCF with technical assistance. Although the LVAC is closely associated with DMA, it is not part of its legal structure. Currently a strategic plan is developed whereby the focus will be on further integration. Another focus in the strategic plan will be on linking up with a proposed poverty monitoring unit within the MoFDP.

The LVAC was formed from a perceived need for agreed and consensus based vulnerability assessment information. Before LVAC, there was little in the coordination of vulnerability assessments with disparities between organizations' own assessments. So the challenge for LVAC had been to pull together organizations and agree on one concept and method of vulnerability assessment. Currently LVAC uses the Food Economy Approach in their methodology. The current challenges are to ensure to get regular assessments done and get the analysis out in time.

Another issue is focused on the usage of the information produced, and how it is translated into relevant and timely food security interventions. The review established that there is a need to decentralize information to district level and make it more adaptable to district based intervention/implementation structures. This can be done by introducing simpler and district specific versions of the current analysis reports and make the presentation easier for the audience at the district end.

#### DMA at district level

At district level DMA has offices within most district headquarters each headed by a District Disaster Management Officer. Other employees in this office include extension staff. The responsibilities of this office are linked to assisting the DS in his /her role as leader of the DDMT, preparation of district disaster preparedness plan, coordination, and training (especially the VDMTs).

The other structure that exists at this level is the District Disaster Management Team (DDMT). The DDMT is headed by the District Secretary and the DDMO acts as secretary to this committee. The rest of the DDMT is composed of various district government officers representing departments such as health, agriculture, rural development, FMU, and security, plus NGOs (especially those involved in relief programming) and some church and school representatives. The team may further co-opt the chairperson of the District Development Council and principal chiefs as ex-officio members. The main tasks of the DDMT involve the provision of multi-sectoral inputs in the district, development of disaster management plans and preparedness plans, and participation in the management and implementation these plans when appropriate.

While visiting the districts in Quthing and Thaba Tseka, the team spoke to some members of the DDMTs individually and to the District Secretaries. In Mafeteng the team met with the DDMT in a scheduled meeting. The following points emerged from these discussions:

- The DDMT teams are primarily concerned with the implementation of the famine relief programmes supported by the GOL and the WFP. Here most of the progress has been made.
- Beyond the emergency food distribution little is received in terms of mitigation and preparedness.
- The DMA staff lack essential logistical and financial support and this forms a major barrier to effective work by the DMA team. For example, in Mafeteng the DMA staff depended entirely on WFP logistical and administrative support. It was here that DMA was regarded as entirely defunct and essential functions (such as reporting) were done by WFP as result the lack of capacity on the part of DMA.
- Support and supervision from the DMA HQ to district based DMA staff is not forthcoming.
- There is a disparity on the understanding of function and roles between some of the DDMT members

#### DMA at village level

The Village Disaster Management Team (VDMT) is the DMA structure at village level. The team is composed out of several elected community members, and normally includes a chief that is co-opted to the team. The members function as non-paid volunteers. Although the VDMT was supposed to be an empowered disaster management structure within the Disaster management plan, in practice little attention has been given to empowerment (training, functioning / roles). (For more information on the VDMT ref. to section 4.6.b)

#### ***b) Donors and International Organisations***

The official line is that donors and international organisations link with the DMA in their efforts of supporting disaster management. In this regard, the

relationship between WFP and DMA is strongest, due to the current orientation of both agencies on the delivery of food aid. Some partners have expressed concern about the relationship between WFP and DMA due to the poor level of capacity in DMA (i.e. on the delivery of appropriate food-security information and lack of efficient coordination).

Not all efforts in disaster management are coordinated by the DMA. For example the FAO supported seed distribution intervention was using WFP and MoAFS structures directly. It is unclear if the DMA was utilised in any way to coordinate the subsidised farm input programming undertaken by the MoAFS. NGOs are also likely to undertake disaster management related programmes (such as Food For Work programmes that have no link with WFP donated food or DMA coordination).

## **Conclusions**

Most serious questions for the study are emerging under this objective. Key problems are the disparities at different levels with reference to the responsibilities, roles and resourcing of DMA. There are also disparities between sectoral partners that DMA is meant to coordinate. Whilst the DMA plan and the manual have clear guidelines, on the ground there is much confusion and a most serious concern arises over the ability of the FMA to adequately coordinate the emergency response. The review team observed a relatively weak structure on the ground especially in terms of financial, logistical and technical qualities within DMA district offices, and the lack of support and supervision from the DMA headquarters.

One of the recommendations that is seen as a solution to improve the functioning of the DMA is a process of decentralization. This would need to lead to a leaner but more effective and cost-sustainable structure at national level, and a more effective well designed structure at district level with independent and adequate financial budget provisions. Saving on overhead at national level would help funding the much needed financial support at district based DMA offices.

## **Section 4.6 Implementation capacity for the emergency response**

In this section we focus first on describing the system of implementation and its capacity of the food distribution programme. Basically four partners are involved in the food distribution system. These include the WFP, The DMA, FMU, and the implementing partners (IPs).

A later section (4.6. e) discusses the implementation capacity of the MOAFS in the distribution of the subsidised farm inputs.

### **a) WFP**

WFP is the UN organisation charged with the objective of bringing relief to acutely food insecure areas specifically through the provisions of timely food distributions. In Lesotho WFP works closely together with the following partners: the DMA, the FMU, the Ministry of Health (on the under-five supplementary feeding programme), the Ministry of Education (on the school feeding and the OVC programme) and the implementing NGOs (on the general food distribution programme). Our focus here is on the implementation of the general food distribution programme.

Apart from having its main Country Office in Maseru, the WFP has several field offices in the districts where it is operating. This is where many of the observations during the review were made. The field offices are generally well equipped with basic office and logistical requirements (computers, faxes, transportation) and staffed and coordinated by UNV and national staff that include food-monitoring officers. The primary task of these officers is to monitor and examine the food distributions carried out by the IPs, in an effort to establish if the operations are done in accordance with the objectives and criteria. They report on targeting and distribution proceedings and efficiency, beneficiary food access, utilisation of the food provisions by beneficiaries and their level of satisfaction in terms of quality.

So, in theory, the WFP's main function in the districts where relief food distributions are operational is one of monitoring and supervision. (The capacity building of targeting structures (such as the VDMTs) is under the responsibility of the DMA, and implementation of the food distribution directly falls under the responsibility of IPs.) Because of some recognised weaknesses linked to poor DMA functioning and some of the weaker IPs, in practice the role of WFP goes beyond the above described functions as there is a recognised need for WFP to provide a capacity building to both the DMA and some of the IPs, as well as logistical support to DMA.

In order to ensure continuation of the programme and have the distributions delivered to the beneficiaries there is a need, in some cases, for WFP to bypass DMA and IPs in the implementation of the food distribution programme, mainly as result of perceived lack of capacity on the part of these agencies. This was observed both in parts of Mafeteng and in Thaba Tseka where WFP had been directly distributing food rations at some distribution points<sup>25</sup>.

It is generally observed that the capacity of the WFP offices and staff is adequate to undertake their role. However in some districts, a heavy demand exist on their function to support weaker IPs and the DMA in terms of capacity building and/or providing logistical support, that potentially can out-limit the available capacity and resources of some of the WFP field offices.

#### ***b) DMA***

Although the implementation capacity of the DMA structures in the district and villages have already been discussed above (see section 4.5 a.) there is still a need to discuss their role in terms of the food distribution programme. One of the main functions of the VDMT linked to the programme is the overseeing the targeting process according to guidelines and criteria to be provided by the

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<sup>25</sup> The distribution programme involves the village structures such as the VDMT, but more directly the several distribution committees.

DDMO. The role of overseeing the function of distributing the food rations is to be done by so-called distribution committees, composed out of selected beneficiaries from each village.

In practice there is much confusion on the ground regarding the implementation involving these structures. The following are some of the observations:

- In some circumstances the roles of VDMT and the distribution committees are mixed, with the VDMT taking an active part both in overseeing targeting as well as famine relief distributions.
- In some areas competition was observed between the VDMT and the distribution committees, arising from the lack of a perception on their roles.
- VDMTs as well as distribution committees may not exist everywhere. In Thaba Tseka the role of VDMT was carried out by the community development councils
- It appears that sometimes distribution committees are directly set up by implementing partners without the involvement of the VDMTs
- DDMO guidance to VDMTs in the process of providing capacity for targeting was weak

The confusion in the villages is the likely cause of a lack of DMA capacity at district level. DDMOs are to provide direction support and supervision to set up the structures at village level. Apart from logistical and financial problems there appears to be a staffing problem.<sup>26</sup>

DMA was also involved in the coordination of food for work activity. However, confusion exists as to how much food was committed for this intervention. The Government of Lesotho Consolidated Appeal for 2002 / 2003 indicated a request for food requirements for 260,000 people.

Within the districts little evidence has been observed of FFW activities being implemented, although some VDMTs mentioned that road maintenance and dam construction were supported under FFW programmes.

The coordination role of DMA is at national and at district level. DMA is also responsible for the soliciting of resources to implement FFW and for drawing up guidelines for food for work projects. Currently the latter is done without the input from beneficiaries. The guidelines are distributed to DDMTs in the districts. At the District level the DDMT form sub-committee of four members charged with overseeing the coordination of FFW. This committee is in consultation with the target communities who propose FFW projects to the DDMT. The DMA is responsible for the technical appraisal of the proposed projects. Once approved, the DDMT identifies village supervisors with relevant skills in relation to the project to be implemented. The supervisors will be remunerated for their supervision work during the execution of the projects.

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<sup>26</sup> Despite having made advance preparations for all three district visits only junior DMA staff was met while none of the DDMOs were available during the visit of the review team. Two districts had long-standing problems to fill up the post of DDMO due to transfers.

There is no strong involvement of NGOs and ministries in the FFW activities coordinated by DMA. Currently FFW with some partners is implemented on a limited scale (at Thaba Tseka, Qachas Nek and Quthing).

The implementation of FFW projects is restraint due to the lack of resources. A main focus has been on tree planting to some extent on roads maintenance and dam construction.

The review team was unable to assess the impact of the programme, both in terms of impact on household food security and in terms of the output in public good. Within the places visited by the team, no FFW activities were observed while beneficiaries of such activities could not be identified. Furthermore it was not possible to locate any relevant documentation of programme impact regarding FFW. It is also unclear as to how the above described system of coordination functions. The team was unable to locate any of the officers (or sub-committees) responsible for the coordination of FFW in the three district visited.

### **c) *FMU***

In contrast to what its name suggests (Food Management Unit) the FMU is a logistical unit rather than a management unit. The FMU is largely responsible for receipt and storage of food, distribution to the relief distribution points. It should account for each of these aspects. It handles all WFP donated food, plus food distributed for the school feeding programme and for the supplementary under five feeding programme. It has its own small fleet of lorries (8 in number, donated by the WFP), but most food transport is done through contractors. There is a network of warehouses across the country that is operated by the FMU. Some of these are in need of renovation.

The Lesotho Government is responsible for covering initial expenditures on food transport, of which 50% is reimbursable through the WFP. It turns out that there are difficulties here as FMU claims that the government payments are more than often not forthcoming and result in food distribution pipeline problems. Thus far, FMU have managed somehow by negotiating advance payments on the 50% reimbursable costs from WFP. The government is also responsible for maintaining the eight lorries, but similar problems regarding payment exist here too.

It is unclear how the DMU maintains records of the food distributions and how these are audited. The review team made several attempts to acquire relevant data but was unable to obtain adequate and satisfactory on its food distribution figures for the period under review.

### **d) *Implementing Partners***

Implementing partners that participate in the food distribution programme include a mix of local and international NGOs. The NGOs sign a letter of agreement with WFP as part of their engagement that spells out their specific roles. The main role of the IPs is focused on implementing the distribution programme to beneficiaries through a network of distribution points, and interacting with the VDMTs on targeting issues and with the distribution committees on distribution issues. Generally each of the districts where the food distribution programme is operational is served by one or two IPs. The

IPs are mandated to report on all operations they undertake, including on the roles of beneficiaries

Some of the IPs are well equipped and organised to undertake the responsibility but others have severe organisational and capacity problems. In our assessment, a relatively strong IP capacity was observed in Quthing District. In Mafeteng and Thaba Tseka capacities were notably weaker. It seems that some of the IPs that already had a presence in some of the districts before the food distribution operation began, are better prepared and equipped than those who had to stretch their services beyond their existing presence to serve new areas under the programme. As mentioned earlier, some of the IPs have been unable to carry out some of their responsibilities and the work was effectively implemented by WFP.

The WFP monitors the functioning of the IPs as far as the food distribution is concerned and encourages an active dialogue on the (IPs) strengths and weaknesses. These are then translated into a strategic action plan for capacity building. Several IPs seem to benefit from this component. Currently while some IPs are well organised, most still require a lot of support and benefit from the capacity building component.

Some of the key problems linked to IP capacity include the following:

- To monitor their operations and provide accurate data
- Provide accurate and timely reports
- To deal effectively in correcting targeting error (inclusion / exclusion error)
- Provide adequate information to distribution committees and beneficiaries on the food entitlements resulting from a lack of appropriate communication
- Guiding and supporting distribution committees

**Conclusions:**

Capacity of WFP field offices is adequate for the supervision of IPs. The role however is extending due to variable capacities of IPs, as they have to step in to keep the food distribution programme going. So, in some cases there is (necessary) bypassing of IPs by WFP in order to get the food distributed.

DMA coordination structures are weak and a wide variety exists in the capacity between IPs. WFP have to capacity build and their current role in this respect may need to be extended in assisting the weaker IPs may need to be extended to upgrade their operations and capacities

FMU transportation and pipeline problems exist (e.g. in Quthing, frequent disruption of distribution because the stores are empty).

The distribution programme on farm inputs implemented by the MoAFS had been controversial.

**Section 4.7 Costing aspects of the emergency response**

The aim of costing some aspects of the emergency response is linked to one of the review objectives namely: 'To assess the cost of the response, with a view to identifying more sustainable interventions for the chronically poor and vulnerable'.

The main costing of the emergency expenditures came through the UNCAP and GoL Famine Relief Appeals. The details of the components have been provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 in Section 4.2.

The following concerns emerge when comparing the costs of the emergency response with projected costing of more desirable, feasible and more sustainable intervention strategy.

- One of the findings show that the emergency response was largely build on a drought scenario, whereas some of the main causal factors were in fact linked to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other structural poverty concerns. How relevant can the costing comparison be between the relatively short term emergency response programming during the period under review and the desired long term action required to address the issues of HIV/AIDS?
- Costing analyses of food aid programmes tend to be output rather than outcome driven. It is our view that only an in-depth, impact or outcome driven costing analysis would have been valuable to the process of identifying suitable and sustainable interventions for the chronically poor and vulnerable groups. But it is recognised that such a study requires a longer term involvement, as it involves the collection of primary impact data on a variety of variables, which is not feasible under the present conditions of the current study.

**Conclusion:**

Identifying the costs of various different interventions requires a longer-term analysis that focuses not solely on outputs but on impact. This was not feasible within the scope of the current study but could be explored in greater depth in the development of a food security strategy for Lesotho.

**Section 4.8 Exit strategies**

This section refers to the following objective in the review terms of reference:

Objective h): TO REVIEW / SUGGEST APPROPRIATE PROGRAMMING STRATEGIES FOR EXIT

A review of the appeals and implementing strategies of the major agencies involved in the emergency response, notably GoL and UNCAP (including the WFP EMOP 10200) shows that there no exit strategy for the emergency response was identified by these agencies. This is of great concern – particularly given worries expressed in many consultations about the level of dependence that was resulting from the food distribution programme. So why is there no clear exit strategy? The team has identified a number of reasons for this:

First, given the growing understanding that it climatic conditions and the devaluation in the Rand **triggered** rather than **caused** the crisis, it is also clear that the underlying problems that caused the crisis will not go away quickly. For example, whilst the Rand has recovered against major international currencies and maize prices have come down, the sources of people's vulnerability remain and thus, people remain vulnerable.

Second, as shown in section 4.2, there has been the lack of differentiation between people who are chronically or acutely food insecure, and lack of differentiation between people who are chronically or periodically vulnerable. Without differentiating clearly between people who will need assistance through direct transfers and people who could, relatively quickly, re-enter the productive economy has meant that interventions which might have formed part of an appropriate exit strategy have not be appropriately targeted. The example of non-targeted inputs is a case in point.

These issues have led to a lack of clarity amongst various agencies about which aspects of response have been for mitigation and which have been for recovery. This lack of clarity is reinforced by the view amongst many agencies that DMA's role is being solely about mitigation / response and not about prevention, rehabilitation or recovery.

#### **Conclusion:**

There are no articulated exit strategies for the emergency response. This results from a lack of clear differentiation between mitigation and recovery activities. There is also a need to distinguish clearly between those who are chronically food insecure or acutely food insecure and a between those who are chronically and periodically vulnerable.

### **4.9 Options for food security interventions in Lesotho**

This section is dedicated to exploring some of the alternative modalities for intervention in the context of humanitarian provisions to households in Lesotho involving resource transfers that intent to assist vulnerable households to overcome periods of stress. It draws on the analytical framework in the previous section that identified different vulnerability status in households and differentiated between households that are chronically or periodically vulnerable. In this section we explore some of the pros and cons of different intervention options.

Just as in most countries that are facing recurrent humanitarian emergencies or the threat of famine, the food aid transfer has been the main response to assist households and communities under stress in Lesotho. From a historical perspective, the food aid response has been the result of a perception that famines were caused by food shortages linked to a food availability decline (FAD).<sup>27</sup> Nowadays the rationale behind food aid is somehow more complex

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<sup>27</sup> Historically, policies to avert famine would focus on estimating aggregate food requirements, and improve food procurement and availability. These policies, however, did not take in consideration people's deferent levels of entitlement to food. Empirical research from Asia and Africa show that the threat of famine in famine can continue to exist in countries where aggregate food production was above normal or where abnormal declines in the availability of food did not occur. The preferred

and controversial. In the case of Lesotho, we have already seen that the availability of food has rarely been a problem, despite its variable agriculture production output. Distributions through imports and market retail are well dispersed and assured. The problem of accessing food and other primary livelihood commodity requirements for rural and peri-urban households is first and foremost linked to variable levels of (low) purchasing power that have a bearing to some of the underlying causes of food insecurity (see section 3.4). So from this perspective, the argument presented here is that resource transfers in the context of Lesotho should focus on improving access. Intervention strategies should develop appropriate and timely options that can support, strengthen, and maintain levels of purchasing power during stress periods.

In the discussion below, we will focus on some key resource transfer options and develop a rationale on its feasibility to utilise the interventions in different circumstances in the Lesotho context. We will focus on five main resource transfers and modalities: Food Aid, Food for Work, Cash Aid, Cash for Work, and Voucher systems. We will consider how appropriate they are for Lesotho in the context of the different vulnerability statuses, and in the context of specific physical conditions and implementation capacity in the country.

Before doing so, it is worth returning briefly to our discussion about different kinds of vulnerability. We need to bear in mind the social categories of vulnerable people (malnourished under-5s, disabled, chronically ill) but also distinguish between different kinds of vulnerability -

- 1) Those who are chronically vulnerable
- 2) Those who are need support to engaged, but could be engaged more fully in the productive economy, and
- 3) Those who could potentially engage in the productive economy but are in danger of becoming chronically vulnerable.

Appropriate modalities of intervention are different for these categories for vulnerability status. The chronically vulnerable are likely to need long-term social protection interventions. The third group might benefit most from support that enables them to invest in agriculture or small businesses. The middle group – those that could engage in the productive economy but are in danger of becoming chronically vulnerable might need both social protection mechanisms and investment in their livelihoods. There are important lessons to learn about the sequencing of these interventions from elsewhere in the world.

### **a) Food Aid**

Food aid can be effective as a resource transfer to support individual households that are under stress, and the team found evidence that food aid has worked in Lesotho. First, during the study many beneficiaries confirmed the effectiveness of the food aid adequately meeting their nutritional requirements, when it had arrived on time. Second, it assisted vulnerable groups to preserve

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choice of utilising food in relief programmes, rather than cash is partly linked to the perception/approach of FAD.

household assets that otherwise might have been boarded-off and utilised to buy food commodities.

However, one the most important questions arising is how appropriate food aid is in effectively addressing deeper livelihood needs beyond food requirements. The needs of vulnerable groups go far beyond maintaining nutritional requirements. Additional needs to enable recovery include the investments in health and sanitation, shelter, education, fuel, water, livestock feeds, agriculture inputs, assets, paying off loans, and investments in kinship relations. Food aid can play a limited role in satisfying these primary livelihood requirements. In some areas in Africa it has been observed that recipients of food aid may sell up to 50% of their rations in order to fulfil part of their other basic needs (as described above). Market prices for relief food are usually at low levels. In such circumstances food aid offers little choice or hope for the future and adds little to the outlook from an economic perspective. The need to prevent sale of relief food was stressed in the WFP EMOP 10200.

Food aid is expensive. The WFP EMOP 10200 showed that the costs of the operation constituted 38% of the total costs, though costs of transporting food to South Africa were less to countries in the interior. Whilst local procurement (when available) is cheaper and has the potential to be a significant driver of the local economy it is unlikely that major donors (particularly the US and EU) would be as supportive of food aid were it not a good way to offload their own agricultural surpluses. It is also important to ensure that private traders are not disadvantaged through local procurement.

Finally, there are also concerns that, where food aid becomes regularised or takes place over a long period of time, it result in dependency and discourage households from investing in other sources of livelihood. So, while food aid can be effective in maintaining or restoring nutritional standards and in saving lives it plays a less important (and sometimes negative) role in maintaining or restoring livelihoods. It needs to be carefully targeted. Whilst there may be argument for long-term transfers (either food or non-food) for those who are chronically vulnerable, it is a less appropriate for those who can engage in the productive economy.

#### ***b) Cash Aid***

In Africa, little experience exists in dealing with cash aid to vulnerable households in averting famine. In theory though, cash aid could be a more appropriate and effective way of offering choices to protect or restore livelihoods. In consultations with beneficiaries, the team heard from some (but not all) beneficiaries that it would have been more useful to receive cash that enabled them to make choices about what food they bought and consumed. For example, one beneficiary in Mafeteng District commented a cash transfer would have allowed her to buy paraffin and food. Instead she had to spend hours each day foraging for meagre firewood resources to cook the food ration that she had received. Generally cash aid may have a more rigorous impact and be more successful in maintaining an economic perspective for recipient households, as it offers choices and allows households to focus on their own priorities.

Other arguments in favour of cash are its positive influence on local and regional food production and markets and that it involves a more effective and less costly vehicle for resource transfers in situations where adequate volumes of cereals are available. One important question is whether vulnerable households have the capacity to make appropriate choices about expenditure? There is a need to find an appropriate path between 1) the view that, in part, it is households' mismanagement of resources and expenditure that has resulted in this crisis and 2) the view that it is vulnerable households themselves that are best placed to make choices about how to improve their own livelihoods.

### **c) *Voucher schemes***

Voucher schemes may provide an effective way of combining cash transfers and food aid. Vouchers can be distributed to targeted households who can then exchange the vouchers for food and non-food products at retail outlets. Voucher systems can be designed to offer choice to beneficiaries. They can choose between food, where they are chronically vulnerable, and other products, for example seeds and fertiliser for agriculture or other items to establish /invest in small businesses, where they lack sufficient resources to be otherwise more fully engaged in productive activity. In this sense, they overcome some of the difficulties in differentiating between different vulnerability statuses amongst households, because the range of choices allows households to identify their own needs.

Where there are serious concerns about particular aspects of people's vulnerability, the voucher system could be designed to make some voucher products more attractive than others. For example, where nutritional deficiencies associated with certain diets are a concern, foods to overcome those deficiencies could be subsidised within the voucher system. The WFP EMOP 10200 identified increasing levels of pellagra, associated with maize-dominated diets. Other complementary foods, for example, beans, could be exchanged more cheaply than maize. Similarly, in order to encourage more diversified cropping and a shift away from maize to other cereal, like sorghum, could be encouraged through greater subsidies on sorghum seed.

There are, of course, limitations to voucher systems. Just as with food aid, products exchanged for vouchers can be exchanged or sold for other and the impacts on food security can be imperfect.

Similarly, voucher systems are heavily dependent on effective markets and retail system networks. In urban areas, where there are many retailers and more effective market distribution systems, voucher could be an important way to overcome growing urban food insecurity by supporting purchasing power. Whilst the positive impacts of cash for work and cash transfers in urban areas are hindered where cash could easily be spent on items such as alcohol and tobacco, well-implemented vouchers systems could overcome these problems. As experiences from the UK and US show, secondary markets are very difficult to avoid but voucher are more difficult to exchange for unintended products than cash transfers.

In rural areas, the challenges to successful voucher systems are greater but there are various example to guide how voucher systems might be deployed in

Lesotho.<sup>28</sup> In Chile, the privatisation of agricultural extension services was accompanied by the distribution of voucher to small farmers. Farmers could pay for private extension services with vouchers that extension providers then redeemed from the government. The quality of extension services increased because of competition, but poorer farmers were not excluded from access. In Malawi, targeted inputs were trialled using a voucher system and the benefits of vouchers were compared to those from starter pack (inputs provision) benefits (Gough *et al* 2002). Two types of vouchers were trialled. Some vouchers were only redeemable for starter packs. Flexi-vouchers were redeemable for either starter packs or goods up to 450 Malawian Kwacha. Goods included soap, salt, oil, fertiliser, maize seed, agricultural tools, pots and pans, blankets, lamps and similar household goods. The pilot flexi-voucher scheme was a test of the capacity of retailing chains to provide packs and other items. However, the largest network of retailers in Malawi did not anticipate the demand and failed to stock enough of the voucher exchange products. Thus, in Lesotho's remotest areas, where there are no retail outlets to enable a voucher system, food aid delivered directly to beneficiaries at distribution points may remain the best response for chronically vulnerable households. However, one NGO in Lesotho, CARE, is currently exploring whether the penetration of informal retailers (for example those selling herbal life and other medicines / remedies) into the most remote parts of Lesotho could be imitated in the sale or voucher exchange of products that are relatively easy to transport. Examples include seeds for home gardens where HIV/AIDS affected households are being encouraged to grow vegetables near home rather than try and cultivate large fields of maize.

#### **d) Food for Work / Cash for Work**

Both food for work (FFW) and cash for work (CFW) use the interface of labour as a pre-requisite of distribution of resource transfers. In this way they are most appropriate where households / individuals are vulnerable but do have the capacity to engage in productive labour. Most experience in Africa is with FFW, but some countries have started to experiment with CFW programming in humanitarian assistance programmes. Here we review some advantages and disadvantages of both.

The freedom of choice on investing for livelihood protection and recovery: More than FFW, cash for work provides for a freedom of choice on priorities and expenditure. The autonomy to spend cash transfers the way households deem fit is a main advantage of CFW. CFW increases the ability to make a variety of choices to invest in livelihood protection and recovery pending individual socio economic needs. Experience has shown that where appropriate levels of cash transfers were made, cash transfers were often used as seed funding to start up small-scale trade, and strengthen or diversify local economic activities (ref). We do, however, need to bear in mind that there are circumstances where FFW might be more appropriate. Offering cash to people does not necessarily mean that it will be spent wisely. For example, Turner (2001) shows that a key threat to livelihoods in Lesotho (in all parts of the country) resulted from unwise expenditure. Money that would be better spent

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<sup>28</sup> For a review of worldwide experience of vouchers in agricultural extension see Chapman and Tripp (2003)

on food or invested in livelihoods, is spent on beer and tobacco (see especially the section on the Impact of FFW and CFW on women).

Cost effectiveness and the distribution costs: CFW programme spending includes the costs of cash-transfers, the operational overhead costs of implementing agencies, investments in materials for programme implementation and related logistics. All of these are equally relevant for FFW programmes, but the gross expenditures related to food transports such as (overseas) shipment, clearance, warehousing and logistics are additional in the case of FFW.

Variation and choice on satisfying dietary needs: Across regions and ethnic groups beneficiaries often vary in their dietary needs. Cash transfers allow for a more flexible way to purchase different basic food needs. Experience shows that food distributed through FFW programmes is not always culturally adaptable, and is often exchanged through markets in order to obtain indigenous foods.

Impact on local economy: As with food aid, FFW can stimulate the local economy (specifically local agricultural production) if food is procured locally. Similarly, CFW has the potential to boost broader local economies beyond markets for agricultural produce as (1) local trade investments are encouraged (2) CFW potentially increases the level of exchanges between beneficiaries and existing district based traders and producers

Impact on communities: Both FFW and CFW projects can provide for social benefits for communities as a whole. But this is only true if projects supported under FFW and CFW take adequate care in planning and design and adequate commitments are made in terms of technical supervision during implementation process. Unfortunately often serious flaws in design of projects structure and a poor record of technical control is observed compromise the quality output and the social benefits for the communities.

Impact on women: CFW can improve women's status and can improve the position of marginalized groups. Women often form a significant proportion of the workforce. Through their participation they can maintain greater control over the cash earned, and are thereby empowered to focus on their own priorities of livelihood investments. So, whilst there are strong arguments for directing CFW towards women, counter arguments in this regard exist too. For example, whilst women are known to be more likely to use household resources for the benefit of the whole family, but we need to be aware that this could place an overwhelmingly burden on women. Amongst the most vulnerable households, where there are significant concerns about cash for work expenditure (see above on tobacco and alcohol), FFW is more likely to ensure that households maintain their nutritional status.

Impact on targeting: There is an element of self-selective targeting linked to FFW because wages are often at unattractive levels for those who are not in an absolute need. This in contrast to CFW schemes, as they may be extremely popular and seen as rare opportunities to earn cash in environments where employment opportunities are usually low.

Impact on corruption and misappropriation: Both FFW and CFW schemes are open to misappropriation and mismanagement. CFW, as opposed to FFW, potentially reduces the risk of misappropriation from a perspective of simplifying the route of distributing resources. Relatively transparent management systems with proper checks and balances in terms of planning, reporting and auditing arrangements can control the resource transfer in a much less complicated manner than is the case with FFW. However, there is a counter argument based on the scale of misappropriation. If transparent management systems are not in place, it is easy to siphon off both cash and food, but misappropriating food on a large scale is much more difficult. The interim PRSP in Lesotho identified serious problems with transparency of management, planning, reporting and auditing arrangements in Lesotho and various interventions are in place to rectify some of these problems. Unless FFW and CFW schemes have strict reporting, auditing and accountability, they are unlikely to be efficient mechanisms for intervention.

#### **Experience from elsewhere: Cash For Work in Northern Kenya**

Food aid is still the most common resource transfer intervention in situations of humanitarian crises, but there is an increased tendency to opt for transfers involving cash. One of such resource transfer programmes was implemented in Northern Kenya during a drought recovery period between 2001-2002. The impact of the programme was assessed during a programme evaluation early 2003. The key issues / lessons learnt are shown below.

The programme had two principal objectives to be achieved

- Communities successfully recover from drought
- To achieve appropriate outputs in terms of community projects (supported under CFW)

#### Programme Design

##### Preparation

- Mobilization of communities to understand the nature of the programme and select suitable development projects is critical.
- Mobilisation on aspects of livelihood investments is key in recovery projects that use cash transfers
- Capacity building of local institutions need to be planned for as part of the programme

#### CFW Packaging

CFW needs to be a packaged.

- To include a food ration or the provision of meals to the labour force is key to provide for adequate calories during the demanding work.
- This will prevent that earned cash will be spend on food purchases up instead for livelihood investments.

#### Appropriateness of CFW versus other recovery interventions

- Generally CFW is considered highly popular and appropriate by target communities.
- Without exception all communities consider CFW as a more suitable alternative as opposed to FFW, mainly resulting from the observation that as a commodity, cash has a much wider prospect for recovery investment, especially when adequate cash transfers are made.
- FFW as a recovery measure is comparatively much less beneficial in terms of adequate livelihood investments
- However CFW should not be considered as the ultimate solution to support recovery. Different communities require different solutions.

#### Sustainability of CFW projects

Factors that influence long term sustainability of projects supported under cash for work include:

- Adequate and timely planning
- Appropriate mobilisation and capacity building of target communities
- Effective design and technical support

## Impact

Impact on livelihood investments considered very high, especially where adequate transfers were made in lump sums. Most households were able to invest in small-scale businesses that continued to supported their livelihood.

## Conclusions:

In this section we have identified the advantages and disadvantages of various different modalities of intervention for food security. We have argued that the transfer of resources (food or non-food) must remain an important option to avoid vulnerable population groups losing their entitlements following the threat of a humanitarian crisis. Such resource transfers should be fully incorporated in disaster management planning in a way that they can be timely implemented whenever needed.

As we have seen, the advantages and disadvantages of different options are dependent on the specific status or nature of people's vulnerability. It is important to consider how the sequencing of different interventions or combinations of different interventions can have positive results. For example, households that appear to be chronically vulnerable, or have been vulnerable for long periods of time, that given the right circumstances could become productive, could benefit from a fixed period of food aid to maintain nutritional status accompanied by training and resources to enable investments in sustainable livelihoods activities.

It is also necessary to consider the disparity between policy making and policy implementation. One stakeholder in the MoAFS commented that a clear problem was that policy actually implemented during the 'crisis' was that ordered by politicians with no reference to technical good sense offered by technical analysts. Thus, establishing good policy is difficult enough but often overridden by political expediency – this is shown in the final column in Table 4.6 where feasible interventions are not always politically most desirable ones.

**Table 4.6: Pro and cons of resource transfer options**

Type of Resource Transfer	Appropriate when?	Main advantage(s)	Main disadvantage(s)	Comments	Desirability and Feasibility in Lesotho?
Food Aid	In humanitarian crises that have resulted in a severe shortfall in food availability and access or in highly inflated food market prices	Provides direct nutritional contribution to affected population	Lack of choice in livelihood investment Expensive Potentially creating dependency	Widely used across Africa despite several controversies	If delivered by external agencies does not depend on capacity of GoL institutions. Food aid is politically desirable because it wins votes. Can be funded externally because of US and EU surpluses. Does not require large domestic tax base or strong financial institutions
Cash Aid	In humanitarian crises that have resulted in a severe drop in purchasing power, but where markets continue to operate reasonably and food is adequately available	Provides a wider set of options in livelihood protection. In other words affected households have the ability to invest in their own prioritised livelihood needs	Potential misappropriation (i.e. alcohol abuse) where beneficiaries are unable to make conscious choices on expenditures	Little experience gained so-far across Africa in using this option	Lack of transparent accounting procedures could enable theft. Limited tax base within country to fund cash transfers – would be dependent on external support. Requires strong financial institutions which are not yet evident in

	through the retail system	Cost effective			Lesotho.
Food for Work	During pre-crisis mitigation.  During recovery phases following humanitarian crises	If planned well FFW provides both household livelihood protection and social community benefits  Self-selective in targeting	Lack of choice in livelihood investment	Adequate implementation capacity a pre-requisite	Where food is supplied by external agencies, public works could be feasible. Does not require strong financial institutions or domestic tax base.
Cash for Work	During pre-crisis mitigation.  During recovery phases following humanitarian crises	Provides a wider set of options in livelihood protection/Investment. In other words affected households have the ability to invest in their own prioritised livelihood needs  Cost effective  Potentially stimulates local economy	Potential misappropriation (i.e. alcohol abuse) where beneficiaries are unable to make conscious choices on expenditures	Few experiences across Africa so far encouraging.	Needs tax base to fund large public works activities. Cash for work is politically desirable because it wins votes. Needs strong financial institutions which not yet evident in Lesotho.
Voucher Systems	During pre-crisis, mitigation and recovery phases. When different households are experiencing different phases beneficiaries.	Provides options in both protection and investment – offering choice to households.  Potential for misappropriation (i.e. exchange for alcohol instead of food or seeds) can be overcome.	Seen as unfeasible in parts of Lesotho because of remoteness but there are examples (e.g Herbal Life) of potential.	Some experience elsewhere, e.g. Malawi but this demonstrates the disadvantages (but also how they might be overcome).	Less dependence on financial institutions that case-based interventions. Requires strong reporting and accounting mechanisms, down to village level. May require smaller tax base than cash-based interventions because donors more willing to fund?

## **Section 5: Conclusions and Recommendations**

This section presents the consolidated conclusions and recommendations of the review. Each of these are presented by subsection.

### **Emergence of the 2002-2003 food security emergency**

#### **Conclusions:**

Agriculture and migrant labour have formed the backbone of the Lesotho economy for decades. The decline in migrant labour has contributed to increasing poverty, via a reduction in purchasing power, especially in rural areas. The status of agriculture is hotly disputed. Analysis of official data provides a strong challenge to the prevailing view that production is in decline. The view of agricultural decline and the drive towards self-sufficiency has dominated food security policies since the 1970s. More recently a broader view of food security, encompassing both food availability and food access, is gaining currency. Key underlying causes of the 2002-2003 emergency include the decline of migrant labour, limited capacity of agricultural production for sustainable rural livelihoods and the impacts of HIV/AIDS. However, it was the identification of other triggers factors that led to the declaration of a state of emergency.

Many stakeholders express narrow views of the dimensions behind the emergency. The perception of the emergency was largely one of food availability. Food access was ignored by many of those consulted. This, and the embracing of a controversial drought scenario, masks the underlying long-term poverty and food security problems in the country and has implications for the appropriateness of interventions that formed part of the emergency response.

#### **Recommendation**

The existing food security policies within Lesotho do not constitute a coherent policy framework and are heavily focused on agricultural production. Food security strategy needs to focus not solely on boosting agricultural production but also on ensuring that households in both rural and urban areas have sufficient income (either from agricultural or non-agricultural activities and transfers) to buy the food that they need.

Food security should not be viewed as a solely rural and agricultural issue, and the forthcoming development of a GoL food security strategy should reflect the multiple dimensions and multi-sectoral nature of food security.

### **Targeting Criteria and Capacity**

#### **Conclusion:**

Targeting comprises both technical processes by which vulnerable households are identified and institutional / implementation processes by which assistance reaches those vulnerable households. There are likely to be some shortfalls in each case. The identification of vulnerable households needs to differentiate

between those that are either chronically or periodically vulnerable in order to ensure that the most appropriate intervention reaches each vulnerable household. For example chronically vulnerable people and those unable to work may benefit from food aid to help them cope with hunger whilst those who are periodically vulnerable but able to work would benefit from a different intervention, such as insurance against crop failure to reduce the risk of hunger, or food/cash for work in the months before harvest. At an institutional and implementation level there are disparities between national, district and village level and concerns about communication between these different stakeholders. There are also concerns about capacity, particularly at district and village in terms of resources and skills / training, to reach intended beneficiaries.

### **Recommendation**

Assessments for appropriate identification of vulnerable people and the development of better vulnerability and food insecurity profiles need to account for the different kinds of vulnerability that people face, particularly acute and chronic vulnerability. This could be achieved by building stronger temporal dimensions into assessments and by drawing on longitudinal panels with the vulnerability assessment methodologies.

## **HIV/AIDS and emergency programming**

### **Conclusion**

Whereas stakeholder's assumptions about the food security crisis presented a variety of different views, the review learned that some key stakeholders at national and district levels were largely responding to a drought. In this case where drought is seen to be the cause (rather than just a trigger) of the food security crisis, the 'drought scenario' obscures the issue of HIV/AIDS and other causal factors of food insecurity in Lesotho. This means that that people seek solutions to drought in order to prevent continuation of the crisis rather than solutions that mitigate against the impacts of HIV/AIDS that would require longer-term strategic approaches instead of short-term emergency responses.

### **Recommendations**

Evidence of learning on part of IPs and WFP exists. Progress is being made in terms of a more comprehensive analysis of food insecurity in Lesotho and the subsequent trend of responses. Whilst food aid programme was originally conceived without coherent HIV/AIDS planning, HIV/AIDS is increasingly taken into account – e.g. take home rations for OVCs, food distribution to chronically ill. It is recommended that this trend is continued. Furthermore it is recommended that food security linked to the HIV/AIDS pandemic needs long term intervention approaches in addition that go beyond emergency programming.

The mainstreaming of HIV / AIDS has started and but should be further encouraged. Currently mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS is taking place among UN Agencies and has taken root within some of the Government Departments who are committing 2 percent of their budget allocations for HIV/AIDS mainstreaming activities. However this type of mainstreaming has to be taken further and should be extended to , civil society, the private sector, and a wider

spectrum of local and international NGOs. In the context of Lesotho, the policy framework needs strengthening and financial resources need to be committed to fight the course of HIV / AIDS.

Specific attention should be given to design and adapt information networks that can incorporate HIV / AIDS analysis. Food assistance programmes in the context of HIV / AIDS need careful consideration in terms of rations and food types, distribution points versus distances that people need to travel, waiting time etc. Appropriate support could include cash transfers and distribution of non-food items due to the diverse ways of the AIDS impact of households.

Ideally long term welfare provisions to HIV / AIDS affected households should become part of the humanitarian aid programming. But there are concerns about the sustainability of this type of welfare assistance. Moreover a dilemma exists when prioritising recurrent welfare payments against the need for other government spending especially on the investment priorities that stimulate economic growth (Devereux 2003).

It would make sense that, in this context, HIV/AIDS affected households would receive assistance to allow them to maintain a productive and economical perspective and enable them to maintain their livelihoods. Such assistance should focus on access to micro-credit, specific inputs and technical services. In this regard it would be advisable to consider the concept of LRAP and see how this programme concept can be extended to other parts of the country.

## **The impact of food aid on the private sector and markets**

### **Conclusions**

Arguments about the impact of food aid distribution on the private sector and local producers were based on hearsay, conjecture and anecdotes. The data that was available shows that, whilst sustained food aid distribution may suppress local production, by making people dependent on food aid rather than producing their own crops, maize distribution is unlikely to affect maize prices in Lesotho. This has implications for the types of interventions that the GoL might draw on to stabilise consumer prices and enable better access to food by Basotho. During stakeholder consultations in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning it was argued that, if prices are pushed down in Lesotho (for example if the GoL subsidises foodstuffs), then local production is likely to be sold across the border in South Africa, where Basotho producers can get higher prices for their produce.

### **Recommendation**

It seems that analysis of the impact of food aid distribution on prices shows that maize prices are set within SACU and not at a domestic level but there is a need for a more detailed analysis of this by an economist / agricultural economist. In developing future strategies, policy-makers must bear in mind that interventions intended to keep maize prices down within the country (for example subsidies on food stuffs) may have the unintended impact of leading to net flows of food across the border into South Africa. If retail prices are higher in South Africa, commercial producers in Lesotho will sell their produce in South Africa and not in Lesotho.

## **The policy framework and institutional arrangements for emergency responses**

### **Conclusions**

Key problems are the disparities at different levels with reference to the responsibilities, roles and resourcing of DMA. There are also disparities between sectoral partners that DMA is meant to coordinate. Whilst the DMA plan and the manual have clear guidelines, on the ground there is much confusion and a most serious concern arises over the ability of the FMA to adequately coordinate the emergency response. The review team observed a relatively weak structure on the ground especially in terms of financial, logistical and technical qualities within DMA district offices, and the lack of support and supervision from the DMA headquarters.

### **Recommendations**

One of the recommendations that is seen as a solution to improve the functioning of the DMA is a process of decentralisation<sup>29</sup>. This would need to lead to a leaner but more effective and cost-sustainable structure at national level, and a more effective well designed structure at district level with independent and adequate financial budget provisions. Saving on overhead at national level would help funding the much-needed financial support at district based DMA offices.

It is also recommended that the DMA mandate is updated in a regular fashion in order to deal with newly emerging potential forms of humanitarian crisis situations (such as the those caused by the HIV/AIDS endemic).

The DMA decentralization process should involve the following:

- Revisit the functions of the DMA headquarters and reduce its function to the core functions of coordination and liaison.
- Rebuild DMA structures at district level by revisiting and reviewing staffing requirements. (Does the current cadre of staff at district level have the appropriate technical expertise?). Develop an appropriate curriculum for refresher training for potential candidates among district based DMA staff.
- Provide more weight at the DMA structures at District level. It is here that disaster management should be fully incorporated in the district development planning functions and the operations of NGOs and government departments. It is especially important that a holistic approach in emergency preparedness should be applied at the district level. Once more this can be done by linking DMA structures to district development planning, but importantly the DMA itself needs to transform itself as to be able to provide direction in this process. Currently there exists an over-simplistic concept of disaster management with almost an entire focus on food aid operations.

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<sup>29</sup> Elsewhere in Africa, in Northern Kenya for example such decentralised disaster management structures have been in place for more than fifteen years, and have slowly evolved from basic food security information systems to district based food-security planning and intervention models with a reasonable rate of success. Much can be learned from this model or could be adapted .

A start should be made by decentralizing the functions of LVAC to district level and fully integrate them with the DMA structures. As explained earlier there is a need for more district specific analysis reports. It should be considered that the collection, processing and analysis of food-security data is done utilizing DMA staff at District level. Once such a system is developed there is a stronger likelihood that regular assessments are done and analysis be provided in good time. The analysis should include key indicators of environment (rainfall and forage production) agricultural and livestock production, local economic indicators (including market information), welfare indicators including diet intake and nutritional status.

A stronger, well informed and district based institutionalised DMA at district level that is capable of analysing district food-security situations and developing contingency plans has a stronger feasibility that the information is translated into relevant and timely food security interventions. It should be noted that not all situations require massive and immediate action from relief agencies. For example small scale interventions at district level on budget support (e.g. FFW, CFW) can be easier triggered for some specific vulnerable groups, once the level of authority is decentralized and district based contingency plans are available.

It is also important to consider decentralize the function of the various workgroups, many of which are defunct. Is there a need for these working groups who operate at national level? It should be considered that District based DMA structures form the point of interaction with other partners that are associated with disaster management. As mentioned earlier, the DMA at national level should maintain a liaison function. The point of interaction with donors and partners should be shifted towards the districts once a capable DMA structure has been re-established at that level.

## **Implementation capacity for the emergency response**

### **Conclusions:**

Capacity of WFP field offices is adequate for the supervision of IPs. The role however is extending due to variable capacities of IPs, as they have to step in to keep the food distribution programme going. So, in some cases there is (necessary) bypassing of IPs by WFP in order to get the food distributed.

DMA coordination structures are weak and a wide variety exists in the capacity between IPs. WFP have to capacity build and their current role in this respect may need to be extended in assisting the weaker IPs may need to be extended to upgrade their operations and capacities

FMU transportation and pipeline problems exist (e.g. in Quthing, frequent disruption of distribution because the stores are empty).

The distribution programme on farm inputs implemented by the MoAFS had been controversial.

### **Recommendations:**

Capacity building in providing humanitarian assistance IPs should be encouraged, but this should go beyond building capacity in the delivery of food aid. The current role of WFP may be extended, but other partners should be identified.

The DMA, originally mandated to play an active role in building capacities linked to humanitarian assistance programming within districts, cannot fulfil this role due to the lack of its own capability. Financial, logistical and technical support are required at this level.

It is advised that the implementation and impact of the agricultural inputs programme is internally reviewed by the partners involved. There are many lessons to be learnt which need to be more clearly identified. Specifically the role of the inter-ministerial committee versus the technical and implementation role of the MoAFS needs scrutiny.

FMUs function, especially in terms of reporting, accounting and auditing needs to be reviewed.

The controversial distribution programme on farm inputs implemented by the MOAFS should be reviewed by the stakeholders and the many lessons learned should be clearly articulated to avoid a duplication in future.

## **Costing aspects of the emergency response**

### **Conclusion:**

Identifying the costs of various different interventions requires a longer-term analysis that focuses not solely on outputs but on impact. This was not feasible within the scope of the current study but could be explored in greater depth in the development of a food security strategy for Lesotho.

### **Recommendation**

Given that it has not been possible to get data on the total amount of money that was spent either by the GoL, or by donors, there is a need for clearer accounting and reporting procedures for funds spent on humanitarian emergencies. Failure to report is likely to undermine future requests for assistance.

## **Exit strategies**

### **Conclusion & recommendation**

No articulated exit strategies for the emergency response exist. This results from a lack of clear differentiation between mitigation and recovery activities. There is also a need to distinguish clearly between those who are chronically food insecure or acutely food insecure and a between those who are chronically and periodically vulnerable.

## **Options for food security interventions in Lesotho**

### **Conclusions**

The transfer of resources (food or non-food) must remain an important option to avoid vulnerable population groups losing their entitlements following the threat of a humanitarian crisis. Such resource transfers should be fully incorporated in disaster management planning in a way that they can be timely implemented whenever needed.

### **Recommendations**

Advantages and disadvantages of different options are dependent on the specific status or nature of people's vulnerability. It is important to consider how the sequencing of different interventions or combinations of different interventions can have positive results. Households that appear to be chronically vulnerable, or have been vulnerable for long periods of time, that given the right circumstances could become productive, could benefit from a fixed period of food aid to maintain nutritional status accompanied by training and resources to enable investments in sustainable livelihoods activities.

It is also necessary to consider the disparity between policy making and policy implementation. Establishing good policy is difficult enough and should not be overridden by political expediency.

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Relevant agency / process</b>
<b>Emergence of the 2002-2003 food security emergency</b>	
Review food security policies within Lesotho agricultural production in the light of agriculture AND other relevant sectors	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning  Ministry of Agriculture and Food security  Other relevant sector ministries
Ensure that long-term food security policy takes account of existing development and poverty reduction activities (for example PRS)	PRSP Secretariat, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning  Ministry of Agriculture and Food security
<b>Targeting Criteria and Capacity</b>	
Improve assessment methodology for appropriate identification of vulnerable people and the development of better vulnerability and food insecurity profiles in the light of different kinds of vulnerability that people face, particularly acute and chronic vulnerability.	LVAC with support from RVAC and districts
<b>HIV/AIDS and emergency programming</b>	
Develop long term food security intervention approaches linked to the HIV/AIDS pandemic.	Via development of Food Security Strategy Paper.
Encourage HIV/AIDS mainstreaming to: civil society, the private sector, and a wider spectrum of local and international NGOs.	
Strengthen the policy framework and allocate adequate financial resources need to fight the course of HIV / AIDS.	
Design and adapt information networks that can incorporate HIV / AIDS analysis.	
Develop appropriate food assistance and other resource transfer packages in the context of people living with HIV / AIDS	Via development of Food Security Strategy Paper
Consider the principles of the CARE LRAP programme and explore how this programme concept can be extended to other parts of the country.	LAPCA  Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security  CARE
<b>The policy framework and institutional arrangements for emergency responses</b>	

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Relevant agency / process</b>
Update DMA mandate to incorporate strategies on newly emerging and potential forms of humanitarian crises situations (Including HIV/AIDS pandemic).	Cabinet
Decentralize DMA and provide for a well designed structure at district level with independent and adequate financial budget provisions..	Cabinet / District Government
Revisit the functions of the DMA headquarters and reduce its function to the core functions of coordination and liaison.	Cabinet
Rebuild DMA structures at district level by revisiting and reviewing staffing requirements.	Cabinet / District Government
Develop an appropriate curriculum for refresher training for potential candidates among district based DMA staff.	DMA (Maseru)
Provide more weight at the DMA structures at District level, and integrate disaster management in district development planning functions and the operations of NGOs and government departments.	DMA (Maseru and District)
Decentralize the functions of LVAC to district level and fully integrate them within DMA structures.	LVAC, DMA
Build capacity of collection, processing and analysis of food-security utilizing re-trained DMA staff at District level.	LVAC, DMA (District)
Based on LVAC experience develop a district food security information system to include key indicators of environment (rainfall and forage production) agricultural and livestock production, local economic indicators (including market information), welfare indicators including diet intake and nutritional status.	LVAC (within proposed Poverty Monitoring Unit), BOS
Develop feasible district based contingency plans for timely food security interventions	District DMA, District Agriculture and Food Security
Decentralize the function of the various workgroups at national level.	District DMA, various District Government Departments
Consider district based DMA structures as a point of interaction with other partners and donors that are associated with disaster management	Cabinet, DMA (Maseru and District)
<b>Implementation capacity for the emergency response</b>	
Provide capacity building to IPs beyond building capacity in the delivery of food aid.	International Agencies
Extend current role of WFP in capacity building of IPs	WFP
Identify other partners to undertake roles in capacity building	DMA to identify international agencies
Dedicate adequate financial, logistical and technical support for capacity building process	Cabinet
Internally review implementation and impact of the agricultural inputs programme <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Clearly identify and articulate lessons learnt</li> <li>▪ Specifically review the role of the inter-ministerial committee versus the technical and implementation function of the MoAFS</li> </ul>	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
Review FMUs function, especially in terms of reporting, accounting and auditing	Cabinet
<b>Costing aspects of the emergency response</b>	
Identify the costs of various different interventions incorporating output / impact analysis during food security development study	Via Food Security Strategy Paper
Improve on availability of financial data through establishing clearer accounting procedures for humanitarian emergency operations.	All institutions involved in UNCAP and GOL Appeal
<b>Exit strategies</b>	
Develop clear differentiation guidelines between mitigation and recovery activities.	DMA and Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
Develop clear guidelines to distinguish between the chronically food insecure and the acutely food insecure	LVAC, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Relevant agency / process</b>
Develop clear guidelines to distinguish between the chronically and periodically vulnerable.	LVAC, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
<b>Options for food security interventions in Lesotho</b>	
Consider the sequencing of different interventions or combinations of different interventions in order to achieve optimal impact.	Via development of Food Security Strategy Paper
Develop appropriate packages for chronically vulnerable households that aim at reintegration of into a productive process, by providing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ i.e. a fixed period of food aid to maintain nutritional status</li> <li>▪ training and resources to enable investments in sustainable livelihoods activities.</li> </ul>	Via development of Food Security Strategy Paper
Consider the disparity between policy making and policy implementation.	Following the PRSP
Avoid political expediency in policymaking	Following the PRSP
<b>Towards a long-term food security strategy for Lesotho</b>	
Develop a multi-sectoral food security strategy on in-depth analysis of appropriateness of ffw, cfw, vouchers, food aid	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (especially the PRSP Secretariat)
Widen out the analysis to broader activities (for example negotiating better access to employment opportunities in South Africa for Basotho).	Ministry of Agriculture and Food security Other relevant sector ministries Local and International NGOs International bilaterals and multilaterals

## **Towards a long-term food security strategy for Lesotho?**

This draft paper has presented a review of the Government of Lesotho response to the emergency in 2002-2003 according to certain objectives laid out in the by the review task force in the terms of reference.

In terms of perceptions of the emergency the team identified strong need for better information and analysis about agricultural production, sources of vulnerability and the underlying causes of food security. There is a need to move from analyses based on food availability to a combination of food availability and food access by vulnerable households. Narrow views of the emergency, particular the concern with a so-called 'drought', and claims of declining agricultural production can mask the underlying long-term poverty and food security problems in the country and has implications for the appropriateness of interventions that formed part of the emergency response.

The response itself was dependent on the identification and targeting of vulnerable households and geographic areas. There is a need to coordinate and more clearly understand the basis on which geographic hotspots are identified and to think about the temporal aspects of vulnerability and food insecurity. In terms of implementation, there are serious challenges for the coordination role, responsibilities and resourcing of the Disaster Management Authority, though it will take further work to identify appropriate pathways to a more effective response. Whilst WFP is well-resourced, DMA coordination structures are weak and a wide variety exists in the capacity between IPs.

The transfer of resources (food or non-food) must remain an important option to avoid vulnerable population groups losing their entitlements following the threat of a humanitarian crisis. Such resource transfers should be fully incorporated in disaster management planning in a way that they can be timely implemented whenever needed. Advantages and disadvantages of different options are dependent on the specific status or nature of people's vulnerability. It is important to consider how the sequencing of different interventions or combinations of different interventions can have positive results. Whilst this review has taken the first steps in identifying options for longer-term food security have been identified in this review, there is not the scope in the report to go beyond our preliminary analysis of the small set of interventions that we have considered here. The next steps in the development of a multi-sectoral food security strategy will require more in-depth analysis on the appropriateness of ffw, cfw, vouchers, food aid etc. and to widen out the analysis to broader activities (for example negotiating better access to employment opportunities in South Africa for Basotho). However, based on the findings of this review, we present a preliminary set of principles that could guide the decision-making process about different interventions.

### **Principles:**

- 1) Food security planning should be placed firmly within the context of the existing Poverty Reduction Strategy. A multi-sectoral food security strategy should seek to complement and build-on the elements of the PRSP that deal with food access and food availability issues.
- 2) Interventions should be based on a broad conceptualisation of food security that takes into account both availability and access issues.
- 3) A range of interventions will better address the multi-dimensional nature of household and individual vulnerability.
- 4) Interventions should give beneficiaries the opportunity to exercise choice and ensure that they are treated neither as victims nor as people who are incapable of understanding their own needs.
- 5) Interventions should not discourage people from continuing to pursue their own independent livelihoods and should encourage dependence. For example, in rural areas, cash for work or food for work schemes should not take place when people could be planting or ploughing or harvesting in their own fields. Cash for work would be best implemented in advance of planting or ploughing to enable households to buy seed or rent draught in order to plough. Food for work should take place in the months just before the harvest, when household food stocks are most likely to have run out.
- 6) The fungibility effect (people using transfers for things other than what they were intended) should be minimised, though evidence of widespread different use of transfers may be evidence of a poorly conceived interventions that does not take into account people's needs and preferences.
- 7) Given scarce resources and the problem that some targeting is so expensive that universally applied interventions have a greater poverty reduction impact, self-targeting mechanisms should be explored. For example distributing yellow maize instead of white maize reduces the number of richer households trying to get access to free or subsidised food. In the case of food or cash for

work, paying minimum wages reduces the attractiveness of food or cash for work to richer households.

It is important to bear in mind the potentially significant ethical issues associated with both these examples. As we argued at the very beginning of this report, food security is not just about ensuring that people have enough food, but ensuring they can access and consume food in a way that is culturally and socially acceptable to them.

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## Terms of Reference/ Scope of Work

### REVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LESOTHO EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING TO ADDRESS FOOD INSECURITY IN LESOTHO

#### Background

1. Lesotho is one of the poorest countries in the world. With a per capita income of US\$ 415 (1999), the country is grouped amongst the 49 least developed countries and is ranked 137 out of 175 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index. More than half the population of 2.2 million live below the poverty line out of which 40% are destitute. Lesotho has one of the most unequal income distributions in the world with more than half of all incomes flowing to the richest 10% of the population. Three quarters of the country is mountainous, and difficult to access especially in the months of May-September when snow can block access. The remaining quarter of the country constitute lowlands where 80% of the people live and is the most intensively cultivated zone. Only 9% of land is under cultivation.

2. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is proving catastrophic, with at least 31 percent of the population infected. In a country of 2.2 million, the effect of this on Lesotho's social structure, livelihoods and food security is substantial and is likely to worsen over the next five to ten years.

3. The GoL declared a state of emergency in April 2002 and launched a Famine Relief Appeal for over \$137 million. The May 2002 FAO/WFP assessment showed an anticipated cereal gap of 338,000 MT of which WFP planned to meet approximately 50,000MT for relief food for an estimated 444,800 people. Following the September Vulnerability Assessment (VAC), the numbers requiring food assistance increased dramatically to 650,000 and was expected to increase again following the December VAC. This year although harvests were reported to be marginally better than last year, the food insecurity situation is expected not to change significantly hence an appeal by government for emergency food and non food aid is highly likely as indicated by the VAC of June 2003. Two sources provide different data, which will require further analysis. See 2002/3 Highlights table below.

	FAO/WFP	DMA
Domestic Cereal supply	118, 200 MT	127,400MT
Consumption	438,900MT	394,830MT
Commercial Import	288,700MT	253,000MT
Deficit	32,000MT	35,430MT
WFP Pipeline	12,000MT	12,000MT
<b>Balance</b>	<b>20,000MT</b>	<b>23,430MT</b>

*Source: FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission to Lesotho, June 2003 and DMA bulletin of July 2003 respectively.*

4. The scale of the required emergency and recovery response has stretched the capacity of most stakeholders, especially the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. This has highlighted the need for further analysis into

the emergency response, preparedness and recovery policy and institutional framework of the GoL. In response, the GoL is setting up a task team, chaired by the Ministry for Finance and Development Planning and includes representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Disaster Management Authority, Development Cooperation Ireland, DFID, Save the Children UK, FAO, WFP and UNDP.

2. The situation in Lesotho is rooted in a complex mix of both the combined effects of reduced agricultural output due to adverse weather conditions, steep increases in prices for staple foods, the impact of HIV/AIDS at the homestead level, and the country's extreme vulnerability to absorb shocks compounded by a weak economy and falling levels of human development. Basotho have for years been resorting to multiple livelihood strategies with agriculture playing a dwindling role for most households. Actual income from agriculture is 46% even though 80% of the population still rely on agriculture as part of their livelihood strategy.

3. Food insecurity in Lesotho could be said to be the result of availability, access and utilisation due to the fact that the purchasing power of most of Lesotho's vulnerable people is grossly undermined by complexity of problems some of which are outlined above. The general increase in poverty trends stemming from limited livelihood opportunities, has eroded coping mechanisms over time, leaving many Basotho highly vulnerable to shocks.

### **Purpose**

4. Although the harvest for 2002/03 planting season may be slightly higher than that of 2001/02, it is expected that there will be a requirement for general food distribution to affected areas beyond the 2003 harvest. This continuation of food assistance needs to be well targeted so as not to undermine the market. The purpose of this review is:

- i. To assist the GoL to review the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the GoL emergency response to date in order to draw lessons and to identify potential areas for the improvement, including a review of the existing policy framework and institutional arrangements.
- ii. To assist the GoL to review the GoL recovery programming to date in order to draw lessons and to identify potential areas for the improvement and refinement of recovery programming in the short term; and, to ensure the recovery efforts dovetail into, draw upon and enhance the agriculture sector strategy and the poverty reduction strategy to improve food security for the people of Lesotho;
- iii. Utilising the information garnered from the emergency and recovery programming review, to recommend steps to be undertaken to address long term strategies to improve food security, complementing national challenges and sectoral responses identified in the Poverty Reduction Strategy and on-going recovery programmes.

### **Objectives**

5. The objectives of the review of the are:

- In consultation with the Save the Children/ DMA partnership to enhance targeting capacity, review targeting criteria, identify the most food insecure areas and hotspots to enable prioritisation of the emergency response (geographic areas and sectoral intervention), and provide food insecurity and vulnerability profiles;

- To review the degree to which emergency programming has been tailored to take account of the HIV/ AIDS pandemic and to provide recommendations on how to strengthen linkages between on-going HIV/ AIDS programming, emergency and recovery programming;
- To review the actual or potential impact of the food aid operation on the private sector and markets;
- To review the implementation capacity of WFP/IP/FMU, specifically the location of WFP/IP projects in relation to the hotspots and the ability to deliver complementary activities;
- To review the existing coordination of DMA, policy framework and institutional arrangements for emergency response of GoL, Donors, International Organisations;
- To assess the cost of the response, with a view to identifying more sustainable interventions for the chronically poor and vulnerable.
- To identify modalities of intervention suitable for the Lesotho context and for which implementation capacity exists (Consideration should be given to vulnerable group feeding, food for work/free food, food for training, HIV/AIDS and school feeding);
- To review/suggest appropriate programming strategies for exit.

## **Scope**

6. During the review process, the consultants will meet with the following stakeholders:

- GoL officials at the Capital and District levels including the Disaster Management Authority, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, the Ministry for Finance and Development Planning and the Cabinet Subcommittee for emergency response;
- A selection of beneficiaries of the emergency and recovery programmes to date;
- UN agencies at country level;
- Key Donors;
- A selection of WFP and FAO implementing partners in Lesotho;
- Representatives of the private sector;
- Other key stakeholders as appropriate, including a selection of local and International NGOs and village committees.

## **Expected Outputs**

7. The study to produce the following:

- Comprehensive report of the study.
- Recommendations for future emergency response and recovery
- Steps towards the development of long-term food security strategy.

## **Management Arrangements**

11. The review will be led by the GoL Ministry for Finance and Development Planning. The review will be a staged process following the three outputs outlined. The Review Team will consist of an independently recruited consultant as Team Leader who will provide expertise throughout the review with additional consultants brought in to provide specific expertise as recommended and identified in the action plan. DFID-SA, in conjunction with the Review Task Force (RTF) will undertake to identify and recruit the consultants for the review. A guidance committee, to ensure quality control and to provide oversight, will be formed as a sub-committee of the RTF.

## **Competency and Expertise Required**

12. It is envisaged that three consultants will undertake the study, one international consultant and two local consultants. Along with sound and relevant academic qualifications the consultants should have considerable experience in assessing emergency response, vulnerability and food security situations in Africa specifically in the east and southern regions. Experience in Lesotho will be an added advantage. The consultants will also demonstrate strong communication and documentation skills.

## **Reporting**

14. At the end of each stage identified in the action plan, the consultants will present their initial findings to the RTF and discuss ideas and recommendations with the relevant stakeholders in Lesotho. The report from each stage should be submitted no later than one week after the end of each mission with a consolidated final report submitted by the TL within two weeks of the end of the review.

- The TL is responsible for submitting to the RTF an action plan within 5 days of contract start date.
- The action plan should identify specific times for presentation to the RTF of findings and outline recommendations.
- A draft final report in line with expected action will be presented to the RTF and finalised within two weeks thereafter. A precise final report with annexes will be presented with an executive summary no longer than 10 pages.
- WFP will provide the fourth team member on the consultancy, while FAO will make available an expert to support the process.

## Appendix 3

### 3.1 Gross National Income and Purchasing Price Parity Gross National Income for Selected Countries in Southern Africa, 2002

Country	Gross National Income (US\$ per capita)	Purchasing Power Parity Gross National Income (US\$ per capita)
Botswana	2980	7770
Lesotho	470	2710
Malawi	160	570
Mozambique	210	1050 <sup>a</sup>
Namibia	1780	6650
South Africa	2600	9870
Swaziland	1300 <sup>a</sup>	4430 <sup>a</sup>
Zambia	330	770
Zimbabwe	480 <sup>a</sup>	2120

Source: World Bank (2003) *World Development Report 2004: Making services work for poor people*, World Bank, Washington DC

<sup>a</sup> Figures are for 2001. Source: World Development Indicators (2003)

### 3.2 Livelihoods change in Lesotho

Source: Adapted from Turner (2001)

<b>Livelihood trajectories in urban areas</b>				
	<b>Livelihood categories</b>			
Issues	Very poor	Poor	Average	Better off
Threatening Livelihoods	Large family to feed Long term illness in the family Deaths in the family Scarcity of piece jobs Retrenchment / loss of jobs Deserted by breadwinner / spouse	Long term illness in the family Deaths Not able to secure jobs Not having either land or the means to plough Increase in family size Poor market / competition Drought No remittances from working family members	Sell goods on credit and money not paid back on time Spend money on alcohol rather than families Jealousy from those who do not have income Increase in family size Poor market / competition Retrenchment / job loss Long-term illness Death in family	Cost of educating children Poor use of money coming back into the household Cost of repairing taxis / vehicles Taxis or taxi parts are stolen People who are given credit do not pay back on time Stock theft Poor market / competition Retrenchment / job loss Long term illness Increasing family size
Maintaining Livelihoods	Piece jobs Begging Assistance from relatives	<i>Fato-fato</i> Remittances Renting rooms IGAs e.g. veg, fruit, food Assistance from relatives	Small IGAs, e.g. sale of veg, veg, fruit Home gardens Brewing <i>joala</i> Renting rooms	Having many livelihood activities
Improving Livelihoods	Paid employment Remittances	Paid employment Good yields	Securing better paid jobs Wise use of retrenchment money Wise use of remittances Communal savings	Expanding business e.g. taxi business Wise use of retrenchment money Wise use of remittances Communal savings

<b>Livelihood trajectories in the lowlands and foothills</b>				
	<b>Livelihood categories</b>			
Issues	Very poor	Poor	Average	Better off
<b>Threatening Livelihoods</b>	<p>Chronic ill health Scarcity of piece jobs and permanent jobs Increase in family size Death in household Desertion by spouse / breadwinner / children Paying bridewealth Old age No draught power People not repaying when buying on credit Insufficient and infertile land Poor sharecropping arrangements Drought Loss of livestock from disease Spending money on alcohol Cost of funerals</p>	<p>Few piece jobs available Unable to utilise farm land effectively Poor markets due to few customers Increase in family size Deaths in household Long term illness Cost of health care Cost of funerals Family disputes Desertion by spouse, breadwinner, children Unable to produce sufficient food for hh Cost of initiation for boys Paying bridewealth No draught power People not repaying when buying on credit Drought Alcoholism / spending money on alcohol Poor sharecropping arrangements Loss of livestock from disease Stock theft Old age</p>	<p>Stock theft Increase family size Death (especially breadwinner) or chronic illness Paying bridewealth People delay in repaying debts Spend too much on alcohol Poor markets due to few customers / competition Retrenchment / job loss Drought Cost of initiation for boys Cost of education children Cost funerals Cost of health care Poor sharecropping arrangements/ disputes / having no one to sharecrop with Livestock death from disease Low crop prices Not having land to farm Increased inflation / low salaries Family disputes Poor crop prices</p>	<p>Death of breadwinner Long term illness Stock theft Low yields Poor market for business / competition People delay in repaying debts Paying bridewealth Retrenchment / job losses Drought Cost of repairing vehicles Cost of initiation for boys Livestock death from disease Poor market for wool / mohair Cost of educating children Alcoholism and wasting money on women Crop theft Low crop prices Insufficient land to farm Increase in inflation / low salaries Old age Family disputes</p>
<b>Maintaining Livelihoods</b>	<p>Piece jobs Begging Help from neighbours / relatives / friends Sale of <i>joala</i> <i>Fato-fato</i> Hire out herd boys Sharecropping Home gardens</p>	<p>Help from neighbours, friends, relatives Piece jobs Subsistence farming Sale of <i>joala</i> Sale of fruits / veg <i>Fato-fato</i> Renting out fields Pensions Sale of livestock</p>	<p>Subsistence farming Sale of livestock Home gardens Remittances and savings Sale of fruit / veg and <i>joala</i> Wages from employment Small IGAs Sharecropping or rent out fields <i>Fato-fato</i></p>	<p>Remittances Wage work Farming for own consumption Hiring out livestock / vehicles Sale of fruit / veg and <i>joala</i> Sharecropping Sale of livestock in crisis Family cooperation Savings</p>
<b>Improving Livelihoods</b>	<p>Good yields Sharecropping Sale of dagga Receiving bridewealth Sheep/cattle as herding payment Decrease in hh size Hh member finds paid job</p>	<p>Availability of piece jobs Secured wage employment Good yields Sharecropping Receiving bridewealth Free Std 1 education Livestock as payment for herding Sale of dagga</p>	<p>Good yields Sale of surplus crops/ Commercial farming Brewing <i>joala</i> Sharecropping Access to more farm land Sale of dagga Decrease in household size Communal savings</p>	<p>Good yields Sale of surplus crops Sharecropping Wise use of money Sale of bottled beer Sale of dagga Increase in number of working members of the household</p>

<b>Livelihood trajectories in the mountains</b>				
	<b>Livelihood categories</b>			
Issues	Very poor	Poor	Average	Better off
<b>Threatening Livelihoods</b>	Cost of initiation ceremony for boys Long term illness (time and money costs) Death (cost of burial and loss of income) No inputs for farming Poor markets / competition Desertion by spouse / breadwinner Increase in family size / have to rent homes Drought Death / theft of livestock	Long term ill health Death Drought Death / theft of livestock Have to rent homes Not having land to farm or capacity to utilise farms due to infertility of land or lack of income to purchase inputs Scarcity of piece jobs Customers are reducing in numbers because many do not have jobs Increase in family size Divorced or abandoned by spouse / children Cost of initiation ceremony for boys <i>Bohali</i> payments Debt People do not pay back credit on time Poor sharecropping arrangements Burning of rangeland (grazing, thatch and wood is depleted)	Drought Late planting of crops / poor yields Increase in family size Stock theft Animal diseases Debts People do not repay credit Spend too much on alcohol Customers are reducing in numbers because many do not have jobs Retrenchment / job loss Long term illness Death of breadwinner <i>Bohali</i> payments Cost of initiation ceremony for boys Burning of rangeland (grazing, thatch, wood is depleted) Not having own fields Poor sharecropping arrangements Poor markets for wool / mohair, IGAs	Drought Long term ill health Death of breadwinner Low wages Retrenchment / job loss Stock theft Poor yields Cost of educating children Increase in family size Cost of initiation ceremony for boys Paying off <i>bohali</i> Spending too much on alcohol Animal diseases Low price of wool / mohair Burning of rangeland (grazing, thatch and wood is depleted)
<b>Maintaining Livelihoods</b>	Brewing <i>joala</i> Help from relatives Begging Faith in God / Church fellowship Sale of livestock in crisis Sale of dagga (money from this actually very important)	Sale of <i>joala</i> Piece jobs (e.g. weeding, harvesting) Shoe repair Radio repairs Small IGAs Sale of grass hats / mats Help from children / parents / neighbours Crisis sale of livestock Sale of dagga (very important) Sale of livestock	Piece jobs Sale of livestock Sale of <i>joala</i> Small IGAs e.g. selling fruits / veg on the street Remittances Assistance from children / parents <i>Fato-fato</i> Remittances Crisis sale of livestock Home gardens Sale of wool / mohair	Sale of livestock Sale of veg Piece jobs Business ventures Sale of wool / mohair IGAs Remittances
<b>Improving Livelihoods</b>	Receiving <i>bohali</i> Sharecropping Good yields Waged employment Consistency of piece jobs	Securing waged employment Able to farm Receiving <i>bohali</i> Decrease in family size Increase scale of dagga sales Consistency of piece jobs Piece jobs offered by LHDA means people have more to spend on <i>joala</i> and IGAs of other hhs	Securing waged employment Having surplus crops to sell Good yields Sale of wool / mohair Good markets for crops Receiving <i>bohali</i> More than 1 hh member working Decrease in family size Increase scale of dagga sale	Sale of surplus crops Good yields Good markets for farm crops Receiving <i>bohali</i> Businesses More than 1 hh member working Sale of dagga Wise use of money

### 3.2 Policy Matrix for Food Security in Lesotho

Source: SADC FANR

		POLICY	PRACTICE	IMPLICATIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
Trade and Marketing Implications	Pricing - Farm gate	No price control	Farmers sell at own prices	Farmers are likely to receive competitive producer prices	Maintain the status quo
	Pricing - Retail	No price control	20% subsidy on unsifted maize being effected through the normal marketing channels	Market interventions could help improve the overall food security situation by lowering prices and thus increasing accessibility	Need to carefully target food assistance in times of shortage without disrupting local markets
	Import / export Participation	No subsidies			
	Import / Export duties	No duties except for beans export level of .20 lisente charged	Food prices closely linked to those in South Africa	Free movement of food is encouraged	Maintain the status quo unless need arises to protect domestic industries
	Domestic Marketing	No government intervention		Market may no ensure availability and access to food by the vulnerable groups at all times	Need for safety nets
	Food Reserves				
	Futures	No policy		Price and supply stability is ensured through futures markets	
	GMO	No policy		Uncontrolled or unmonitored importation and production of GMOs	Biotechnology policy encompassing GMOs among others must be put in place
Transport	Swaps	No policy			
	Transport				
	Transit Fee				
Input Policies	Security				
	Distribution	Private sector and cooperatives distribute inputs	Sometimes come late for the season	Low production resulting in food insecurity	Strengthen cooperatives to address smallholder farmers needs
	Pricing (subsidy)	Government subsidises seed and planting operations. Fertiliser subsidies since 1980s. Retailers given price to sell at.	Fertiliser subsidies range from 5-30%	Private sector competes with non-subsidised inputs	Need incentives to enhance increased private sector participation
	Imp / Exp Participation				
Macro-policies	Imp/Exp duty				
	Foreign Exchange	Fixed exchange rate system with the Rand. Commercial banks authorise dealers in foreign exchange	Monitoring done on daily basis on reserve money	Lowers uncertainty on cross border trade and investment	Maintain fixed exchange rate system by keeping Rand reserve and other foreign exchange
	Forex facilities / Financing / Investment				
	Credit	No agricultural / development bank	No preference for farmers	Lack of credit for farmers	Encourage group savings and set up policies that will ensure access to credit by smallholder farmers
Strategic Framework	Interest rates	Set by the market	16.33% (Prime rate)	It is costly for farmers to acquire credit	Reduce interest rates. Need for more competition
	Safety net programmes	Aimed at (1) those with no income who are unable to work (disabled, orphans, elderly, sick); and (2) unemployed with no other source of income (FFW). Government assists welfare organisations dealing with orphans and disabled. This is in the form of giving financial assistance to those associations, NGOs, etc.			
	Longer-term Food / Agricultural Sector Recovery Strategy	Promoting diversification to high value crops, irrigated agriculture, and community development especially in feeder roads development, rural water supply through comprehensive participatory approaches.			

### 3.3 Impacts of HIV/AIDS on food security and rural livelihoods

Impacts of HIV/AIDS on food security	Implications
Decrease in the agricultural labour force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decrease in the areas cultivated, in weeding, pruning and mulching resulting in a decline in crop variety, yields and untimely soil fertility</li> <li>• Increase in fallow land return to bush</li> <li>• Less labour-intensive cropping patterns and animal production</li> <li>• Decrease in women's productive activities due to their role as care providers</li> <li>• Missed planting seasons</li> </ul>
Chronic illness or death of a household member	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase in health expenditure</li> <li>• Funeral costs</li> </ul>
Change in household composition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Change in the age or sex of the household head</li> <li>• Increase in the household dependency ratio</li> <li>• Out-migration of young adults</li> </ul>
Increase in the number of orphaned children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase in the fostering of orphaned children</li> <li>• Child-headed households resulting in reduced attendance or withdrawal of children from school</li> </ul>
Change in household nutritional status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase in the malnutrition of people living with AIDS and other household members due to the increasing impoverishments of the household</li> </ul>
Acute decline in household income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decrease in farm income sources and the proportion of farm output marketed</li> <li>• Sale of land</li> <li>• Liquidation of savings and slaughtering of livestock to provide income for health care and funerals</li> <li>• Decrease in women's contributions to household income</li> <li>• Decline in purchased items including food</li> <li>• Increased need for cash income sometimes resulting in sex work</li> </ul>
Decrease in credit availability and use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase in interest rates and more frequent loan defaults</li> </ul>
Decrease in aggregate community income and assets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduction in investment</li> <li>• Increase in community expenditure for formal and informal health care</li> </ul>
Loss of agricultural knowledge, practices and skills and their transmission from one generation to the next	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decrease in the availability of skilled labour and essential agricultural knowledge for orphan-headed households</li> <li>• Loss of gender-specific agricultural knowledge</li> </ul>
Decrease in access to natural resources, especially land	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Depletion of resources in close proximity to households, especially water and forest assets</li> <li>• Decrease in biodiversity and the pool of genetic resources</li> </ul>
Exacerbation of gender-based differences in access to resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase in gender inequality, resulting in a decrease in access to land, credit and knowledge, for women in general, but particularly for widows</li> </ul>
Change in social resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Less time available to participate in community-based organisations, associations and other support networks</li> </ul>
Increase in social exclusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased stigma associated with HIV, thus increasing the difficulty of maintaining social and kin groups</li> </ul>
Decrease in tangible household assets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor household maintenance</li> <li>• Increase in sale of household goods, equipment and tools</li> </ul>
Degradation of public services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduction in the quality and quantity of public service provision</li> </ul>

- Less maintenance of communal irrigation systems, terraces and roads

Source: FAO HIV/AIDS Programme, Factsheet on HIV/AIDS, food security and rural livelihoods

### 3.4 Chronology of Emergency Response in Lesotho

(This chronology is based on work carried out for a DFID Learning Review in Pretoria in September 2003. It is incomplete but will be completed for the final draft in January).

	LESOTHO	REGIONAL SITUATION AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
2001		
January		WFP estimates Southern Africa needs more than 500,000MT of food aid particularly to support refugees from DRC, relief and recovery in Angola and flooding in Mozambique and Malawi
February		Heavy rains cause flooding, displacement and crop damage in Southern Africa
March		Further flooding in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique
April		NEWUs report maize production affected by dry conditions in most countries; Import requirements expected to rise; FEWSNET note dependence on maize in SADC countries.
May		
June	15% of Lesotho population predicted to need food aid.	FAO/WFP crop assessments show regional cereal deficit - production down 17% on previous year but will meet 94% of SADC requirements. Angola and DRC still at 'most risk of serious food insecurity' though concern arising about impacts of economic decline in Zimbabwe
July		Maize production lowest in six years but total production plus stocks remains marginally above consumption requirements
August		
September		
October	Heavy rain delays and prevents planting.	SADC predicts normal rainfall for 2001/2002 rainfall season but displacement due to conflict and floods could affect food security
November	Planned commercial imports of cereal to cover 80% of requirements.	High levels of imports required to meet cereal requirements from previous season; Many import plans will not leave reserves or carry-over stocks.
December		Heavy rains and dry spells continue to affect crop growth.
2002		
January	7,000 households affected by flooding begin receiving food aid.	
February		The region suffers largest maize production gap in years; Slow imports cause food shortages
March	Frost curtails the end of the growing season.	UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Working Group meets in Rome to assess the Southern Africa Food Crisis
April	Government declares a state of famine and requests WFP/FAO assistance.	<i>WFP coordinates UN vulnerability assessments in the six worst affected countries</i>
May	WFP bridging emergency operation for Lesotho finalised. WFP/FAO assessment reports 500,000 in need of food aid.	<i>WFP establish regional coordination and logistics unit in JHB</i>

	LESOTHO	REGIONAL SITUATION AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
	Elections held in Lesotho.	
June		IASC holds humanitarian needs meeting in JHB and presents FAO/WFP CFSAM findings; <i>Christian Aid launches emergency appeal for Southern Africa</i> ; Oxfam advocacy calls for the right to food to reach the top of the agendas of international finance institutions and governments.
July	WFP EMOP to include general food distribution and school feeding.	<i>UN Consolidated inter-agency appeal (CAP) for US\$611m including WFP Regional EMOP US\$518m (at last update).</i>
August	WFP report food aid secured for Lesotho is insufficient for 444,000 people at risk of starvation.	<i>James Morris appointed Special Envoy on the humanitarian crisis in Southern Africa</i>
September	Coverage of food aid in Lesotho to be increased from 448,000 people to 718,000 based on national VAC. Focus on casual workers, those affected by HIV/AIDS and under 5's. <b>GoL Livelihoods recovery through agriculture programme</b>	First Regional VAC provides evidence for urgent action to avert a humanitarian disaster before the 2003 harvest (and includes information on impact of HIV/AIDS on food security); 36.5% of WFP EMOP funded; Meeting of the SADC Transport and Logistics Committee in Harare; <i>Morris on first mission to Southern Africa as Special Envoy</i> ; <i>Judith Lewis appointed Regional Emergencies Coordinator</i>
October		de Waal presents paper on New Variant Famine in Southern Africa at SADC VAC Meeting; <i>SAHIMS Established</i> ; <i>C-SAFE established</i> , WFP express concerns about the operation of parallel (C-SAFE) pipelines. Meeting to formalise operation plan for smooth flow of traffic along the Nacala corridor.
November	UNICEF develops plans for new nutrition survey to update the last available national nutrition data from 2000;	<i>WFP regional strategy update for southern Africa launched.</i>
December		WFP estimate that 16m people in the region require food aid; Oxfam and Save the Children release report on HIV/AIDS and hunger in Southern Africa
2003		
January	Inter-agency vulnerability assessment reported that 650,000 people need food aid until the end of March; HIV/AIDS - Lesotho has 4th highest rate in the world - is exacerbating the situation.	Lewis (Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa) join's Morris' second mission to region; Regional VAC released confirming increasing food aid needs; <i>US pledge US\$114m emergency aid grant to C-SAFE</i>
February	DFID support agreement of TORs for a review of the impact and effectiveness of the emergency response in Lesotho; Given rising numbers of vulnerable people WFP may need to reduce rations; DFID urges WFP to improve targeting, especially since prospects for harvest have improved.	More than 70% of EMOP funded, with a shortfall of US\$132m through March 2003; Response to CAP food sector appeal is promising for first 6 months of 2003 but only 19% of the requested funding for non-food aid interventions has been pledged; WFP and UN advocate that all UN agency programmes are planned through the lens of HIV/AIDS and its impact on women and children; <i>WFP and UNAIDS sign MOU increasing their cooperation in responding to HIV/AIDS</i> ; <i>RIACSO holds first health task force meeting</i> ; mid-term CAP review emphasises the need to fund non-food items; RIACSO meeting stresses need for structural issues of vulnerability to be addressed in PRSPs.
March	Heavy rain affects access to Thaba Tseka; state of standing crops good in spite of heavy rain.	FANRPAN organise Regional Dialogue on agricultural recovery, food security and trade policies in Gabarone; <i>SAHIMS information system operational</i> ; VAC Regional workshop aims to ensure consistency between national VACs for March/April - WHO advocate inclusion of health indicators; <i>SAHIMS public website launched.</i>

	LESOTHO	<b>REGIONAL SITUATION AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES</b>
April		WHO convenes meeting at RIACSO to explore the implications of the New Variant Famine thesis; FAO forecasts for harvest are variable but generally improved though there remains a major crisis in Zimbabwe;
May		<i>IFRC launches appeal for Euro 9 million for Food Security and Integrated Community Care; National VAC Assessments take place with common methodology.</i>
June		
July		97% by tonnage of previous WFP EMOP met and 73% of the US\$ 656 million requested in the revised 2002 CAP. <i>New Regional Consolidated Appeal seeks US\$530 million; Of this \$308 million (538,257 MT) will be targeted relief through WFP.</i>

## Appendix 4

### 4.1 Rainfall levels by district – averages, actual and variation

District	Average rainfall (30 year period)	Actual rainfall 2001-2002 – above or below average	Coefficient of variation
Thaba-Tseka	524.50	Above average	19.3
Quthing	544.47	Above average	19.5
Mokhotlong	564.27	Above average	17.8
Qacha's Nek	572.58	Above average	22.6
Mohale's Hoek	578.67	Above average	26.9
Mafeteng	619.49	Above average	24.7
Leribe	661.43	Above average	25.3
Maseru	668.83	Above average	20.3
Butha-Buthe	702.56	Above average	24.0
Berea	719.46	Above average	20.5

## Appendix 5: Stakeholders, task force members and workshop attendants

<b>NAMES</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>POSITION</b>
Abbot, Joanne	CARE	Programme Coordinator
Adoro, Ts'eliso	World Vision, Quthing	Field Coordinator
Albrecht, Karl, P.	US Embassy	Deputy Chief of Mission
Andersen, Rasmus Kai	EU	Third Secretary
Atema, James	DFID	Poverty Reduction Adviser
Breen, James	FAO	Emergency Coordinator
Camarada, Castro P.	FAO	Country Representative
Chaka Ntsane, Tsiu.	Temo holdings	Vice President
Chulu, Osten	UNDP	Economist
Haassan, Abdi	WFP Mafeteng	Mafeteng coordinator
Hlatsoa, 'Me	MFDP	PRSP Secretariat
Kelly, Tom	DFID	Regional Humanitarian Adviser
Khoza, Maratabile	WFP Quthing	District Coordinator
Lebona, N.	MFDP	CEP(DEP)
Lepheana, R.	MOAFS	Director of Crops Services
Leposa, L.M	FDP	Director
Lesoetsa, Ntalenyane.	DMA	Chief Executive
Letsie, Khosi	MFDP	DPS
Lieta, Nthaletso	Red Cross	Secretary general
Loftus, Robert Geers	US Embassy	US Ambassador
Lofvall, Mads	WFP	Country Deputy Director
Lulie, Shewangezan	SCHK	Emergency Programme Manager
Mabaso, Seelta	MFLR	Chief C. officer
Machai, 'Me	MFDP	PRSP Secretariat
Majoro, Moeketei	MFDP	Principal Secretary
Makitle, P.	DMA	Senior Economic Planner
Makoro, Frank	Dorcas International	Regional Director
Makuena, ?	MOAFS	
Malie, M. (Mrs)	MOAFS	Principal Secretary
Mamasupa, 'Me	WFP Mafeteng	
Mamolefi, 'Me .	FMU	Food Administrator
Masemanate, Me and colleagues	Agriculture and Food Security, Quthing District	
Masoabi, T.J.	Ministry of Education & Tr.	Director of Planning
Matsere, Elias	Mafeteng District	District Secretary
Moeketse, Malibuseng	UNICEF	Nutrition Adviser
Mohe, Tselilo	LCN	Project Officer
Mojaki, Matseliso	DMA	Chief Economic Planner
Mokhameleli, Sechaba	CARE	Project Manager, Highlands Community Livelihood Project
Mokitinyane, Nthimo	FAO	Ass FAO Rep.
Molapo, Mr.	DMA	Senior Economic Planner, Agriculture and Food Security
Montsi, (Mr.)	World Vision	Food Security Officer
Mopeli, Makoanyane	Min. of Industry , Trade And Marketing	
Moshi, Magdalena	WFP	Program coordinator
Motoboli, Metsekae	MOFS, Department of crops	Senior Agricultural engineer
Mpobole, Me	Quthing District	District Secretary

Muhangi, Peter	SC-UK / LVAC	LVAC
Munyiri, Agostino	UNICEF	P/O, Health & nutrition
Ncholu, Ncholu	FMU	Director
Nolan, Paula	Development Cooperation Ireland	Attache (Development Cooperation)
Ntsane, Chaka	Temo Holdings	Director
Olsen, Christian	MOFDP	Economic Planner
Owen Calvert	WFP	VAM Regional Officer
Phakisi, Tlelima	DFID	Programme Officer
Phea, Tseliso	DMA	Field Officer
Phoolo, Mamokhantso	MOAFS	Chief Nutrition officer
Rakoena, Thabiso	MOAFS	Economist
Ramphalile, Karabo	BOS	Quthing Statistician
Rwabuhemba, Tim M.	UNAIDS	Country Programme Advisor
Sebongile Ncholise	Ministry of finance	Director, fiscal analysis
Sebotsa, M	Food and Nutrition Coordination Office	Acting Director
Sekoto, M.	MOAFS	Director of Livestock
Selco, Lerato	MFDP	Chief Economic Planner
Sethonyana, Mamoqeli Malea	Lesotho Red Cross Society	Disaster Preparedness and Response Coordinator
Setorus, Marge	CARE	Interim Director
Sinnathamby, Daniel	CARE	Country Representative
Tiati, Molongaenyane	Health	Senior Economic Planner
Tseleso, Tslen	FAO	Agronomist
Ts'epang Manyeli	Lesotho Red Cross Society	Programme Director
Turner, Stephen	Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam	Consultant
Undulu, John	Lesotho Red Cross	Head of Lesotho Delegation
<i>various</i>	DMA, Mafeteng	District Disaster Management Team
Webster, Diana	DFID	Head field office
West, G	MFDP	Economic Advisor DEP
Wyeth John	MOAFS	Policy analyst
Zergebar, Techeste	WFP	Lesotho Representative