

**External Evaluation of the Protection Standby Capacity Project  
(PROCAP)**

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James Darcy  
Sorcha O'Callaghan  
Andrew Bonwick

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## Abbreviations

CAR	Central African Republic
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDD	Internal Displacement Division
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Red Cross
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non Governmental Organisations
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSOCC	Onsite Operations Coordination Centres
PCWP	Protection Cluster Work Plan
PROCAP	Protection Standby Capacity Project
PSU	PROCAP Support Unit
RC/HC	Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
SAFDEM	African Standby Roster for Humanitarian & Peace Support Missions
SC	Steering Committee
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SPHERE	Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response
SPO	Senior Protection Officers (SPOs)
SRSO	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TDH	Terre Des Hommes
TORs	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
WFP	World Food Program

## Executive Summary

- i. The evaluation team assessed PROCAP and its constituent elements against three main criteria: *relevance*, *effectiveness* and *efficiency*. It applied these criteria to the different project elements, including deployment of Senior Protection Officers (SPOs), support to stand-by rosters, training and website development, and the management of PROCAP. In conducting the evaluation, the team drew on PROCAP and other documentation, and on interviews with a wide range of agency and donor staff at field and headquarters levels, including those met during visits to Northern Uganda, Sudan and DRC.
- ii. PROCAP has to be seen in the context of wider developments at the international level relating to the protection of civilians. On the political side, these include the adoption by UN member states of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and peace-keeping forces increasingly operating with civilian protection mandates. On the humanitarian side, they include the formation of a global 'Cluster' for protection, and growing numbers of humanitarian NGOs seeking to engage with the protection agenda. From the field visits undertaken for this evaluation, it was apparent that major questions remain about what constitutes the priority protection agenda in a given context, the respective roles of the protection-mandated agencies and of NGOs in addressing that agenda, and the significance of the Cluster approach in fostering more coordinated and effective responses.
- iii. In light of the well-documented capacity gaps on the part of the mandated agencies in addressing this evolving agenda, the team endorses the original rationale for the PROCAP initiative and recommends that the initiative should continue. While the mandated agencies have initiated processes to develop internal emergency capacity, these are currently not sufficient to meet requirements, particularly at senior levels. The team concludes, however, that the project should evolve to ensure greater relevance to the current humanitarian environment. In particular, PROCAP should be re-aligned in order to provide more direct support to the roll-out of the Cluster approach, and the PSU should work with the Protection Cluster Working Group to identify contexts where this is possible. PROCAP should not be viewed as a permanent mechanism, but should be wound down once it is clear that the necessary capacity has been developed within the mandated agencies.
- iv. While the team concludes that PROCAP passes the overall test of relevance, considerable differences of emphasis were found amongst those interviewed as to the core purpose of the project. The UN mandated agencies tend to see PROCAP primarily as a mechanism for boosting their own operational capacity. Others – including OCHA and many of the donors – stress the strategic inter-agency dimension, and see PROCAP essentially as a means of assisting the UN Country Team design and implement a coherent inter-agency protection strategy. The stated purpose of the project allows for both interpretations, and tension over these differences of view is evident both at field and headquarters level. This is compounded by ambiguity as to how PROCAP relates to the role of the protection Cluster Lead and the global Protection Cluster Working Group. These various uncertainties, more than any other factor, are likely to limit the effectiveness of PROCAP until they are resolved.
- v. The evaluation makes various recommendations concerning the prioritisation of requests for SPO deployments, distinguishing leadership and mid-level strategic roles from essentially operational roles. Given the responsibility of the RC/HC for ensuring that the UN Country Team is working to a coherent protection strategy, covering not just IDPs but the civilian population as a whole, it is proper for the HC to insist that the lead protection agency plays a coordination role, either by deployment of a senior staff member or by requesting a PROCAP SPO. The evaluation team recommends that the HC be encouraged to discuss with the Cluster Lead agency and the other mandated agencies the potential for SPO deployments to ensure the fulfilment of the strategic

coordination role. In some cases, a deployment to the HC's office or to OCHA may be the best way of achieving this objective, and should be actively considered.

- vi. As regards the effectiveness and efficiency of SPO deployments, the team concludes that most of the deployments have been effective in enhancing the protection response of UN mandated agencies. While early delays in identifying SPOs reduced initial impact, the Steering Committee acted swiftly in getting the project underway, and the timeliness of later deployments was satisfactory. Only a minority of the subsequent deployments have been obviously 'strategic' at an inter-agency level. Others have played an important part in the work of the mandated agencies in more implementation-oriented roles. The skills, expertise and experience of the SPOs themselves have been widely commended, and the team concludes that the individuals are sufficiently qualified for their posts – and in some cases over-qualified for some of the implementation roles they have been asked to undertake.
- vii. The team identified a number of factors which are reducing the effectiveness of SPO deployments. Some of these relate to the rules governing deployments, including the current six-month time limit, which the team recommends be extended to allow deployments of up to 12 months in appropriate cases. Other factors are to do with the relationship between receiving agencies and SPOs at field level. While the minimum conditions agreed by the Steering Committee in July 2006 have ensured greater support to SPOs, the team recommends that SPOs are supervised by a senior member of staff. Given their relative lack of knowledge of specific agency policies and approaches, the team recommends that a dedicated training package is developed for SPOs.
- viii. The *demand* for SPO deployments has been variable, and less than might be expected. This raises questions around the perceived relevance and added value of this element of the project. Agencies appear to have been reluctant to request deployments on terms that suggested a role beyond the agency's own mandate, and over which they might have limited control. On the other hand, there is a considerable demand for deployments to fill posts that agencies would otherwise struggle to fill, for lack of funds or immediate availability of staff. An increase in the number of SPOs on the roster with child protection and human rights experience is recommended, as well as increased communication on the initiative.
- ix. As regards the relevance of other project activities, there is a strong argument for developing a cadre of protection specialists at a junior level who have experience working across multiple agencies. There is a general shortage of suitably qualified and experienced protection officers available for flexible deployment through the rosters. The evaluation team concludes that it is important that PROCAP continues to improve the quantity and quality of roster members with protection skills. However, the team found that the range of different initiatives underway should be streamlined, and that the role of PROCAP in relation to the roster operators should change.
- x. The training developed and delivered through PROCAP was found to be of an excellent standard. While it has not increased the *number* of protection staff available for deployment, it has made a significant contribution to the *quality* of work of participants, and the team strongly endorses its continuation. The proposed Training of Trainers approach should be adopted, with the number of 'certified' trainers limited in order to maintain quality.
- xi. Current efforts to expedite the deployment of junior protection staff have not proved effective, and the team suggests that these are discontinued. Instead, PROCAP should take on a facilitation and support role in regard to the rosters. The focus should be on increasing the number of protection staff on current rosters; increasing the utility of these rosters to OHCHR; and promoting greater coherence across the various rosters in terms of recruitment, training and mentored deployments.
- xii. Disagreement amongst participating agencies on the principal purpose of the project has meant that the Steering Committee is currently involved as much in day-to-day management issues as in providing strategic direction. The team suggests that such engagement is both inappropriate and

inefficient, and should be reduced to the provision of overall direction to the initiative. While the Committee should remain involved in the approval of new SPO recruitments, it should not generally be involved in the approval of deployment requests.

- xiii. The work of the Norwegian Refugee Council in recruiting and contracting the SPOs has been exemplary, and the team strongly endorses their continuing in this role. Head-hunting appropriately qualified candidates to apply for the SPO posts will remain an important part of the recruitment process, and the team recommends that NRC is provided with the necessary financial and technical support required to pursue this.
- xiv. On the issue of project management and administration, while some project funds have been used on activities that have not achieved their objectives, overall cost-effectiveness was found to be acceptable. The evaluation team has concluded that the overall management of the project by PSU has been effective, particularly in securing financial support for the initiative and in commencing programme activities. While the current level of staffing for the project is considered appropriate, human resources expertise would be required to implement some of the evaluation recommendations. Finally, the team concludes that there is logic in OCHA hosting the project, given its inter-agency and coordination dimensions; but that if the initiative is transferred to one of the mandated agencies, particular care must be taken to preserve its inter-agency character.

### What is PROCAP?

PROCAP is an inter-agency UN project aimed at enhancing UN protection response and contributing to global protection capacity through the predictable and effective deployment of personnel with proven protection expertise. Established in October 2005, the project responds to priority gaps and needs in emergency protection response through three principal activities:

**Deploying members of a core team of Senior Protection Officers (SPOs)** on short-term missions to provide expertise in the strategic and operational policy, planning, coordination and implementation of the UN protection response. The SPOs act as a full-time protection surge capacity and are on permanent rotation in the field on deployments to UNHCR, UNICEF, OHCHR or OCHA.

**Enhancing the number, quality and effectiveness of protection personnel (at junior to mid-levels) in existing stand-by rosters** by increasing roster size and diversity and through inter-agency training workshops, practitioner exchange and dissemination of protection tools. PROCAP works closely with stand-by rosters in Austcare, the Danish Refugee Council, the Norwegian Refugee Council, RedR Australia, Save the Children Sweden and Save the Children Norway.

**Facilitating deployment from existing protection standby rosters and strengthening inter-agency coordination.** The PROCAP website aims to enable timely and appropriate matching of junior to mid-level protection expertise with human resource gaps and to support streamlined deployment, as well as providing an extensive resource library of protection documents and an interactive forum to discuss protection.

Overall project direction is provided by an inter-agency Steering Committee comprising OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA and an NGO representative. A management and secretariat function is undertaken by a PROCAP Support Unit (PSU), hosted by OCHA. The Norwegian Refugee Council has a contractual and administrative role in relation to the SPOs. Financial support is provided by the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

### The evaluation team

James Darcy (team leader) is Director of Programmes at the Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

Sorcha O'Callaghan is a Research Officer in the Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI

Andrew Bonwick is an independent consultant

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## Introduction

- 1) The Protection Standby Capacity Project (PROCAP) was first proposed in July 2005 to develop a standby capacity of ‘up to 100 qualified and experienced protection officers to support the operational protection response of UN agencies’. A particular emphasis was placed on the ‘rapid deployment of qualified experienced protection staff with the requisite seniority to lead and support a UN country team protection response’. The project’s conception predates the formation of the global Protection Cluster, but its implementation does not.
- 2) Since the project’s inception in October 2005, there have been 16<sup>1</sup> separate deployments of PROCAP’s SPOs, 13 of which have lasted around six months. A matrix providing details of these deployments can be found in annex 4. At the time of writing, ten SPOs<sup>2</sup> are employed by NRC on behalf of the project. In addition, PROCAP has working relationships with six standby rosters<sup>3</sup> that between them contain 150 protection ‘profiles’.<sup>4</sup> This represents an increase of approximately 30% over the course of the project, although not all of this increase is attributable to PROCAP and a significantly lower number are available for deployment at any one time. One additional standby agreement between a roster and an operational agency (NRC and OHCHR) has been signed.<sup>5</sup> PROCAP has also run three five-day protection training courses for a total of 56 roster members, half of whom have been deployed to the field following the training. The PROCAP website, which contains details of people on some of the standby rosters as well as interactive forums and a protection resource bank, was launched in January 2007.
- 3) PROCAP’s most recent strategy paper (1 October 2006–30 September 2007) envisages increasing the number of SPOs to 15, as well as continuing to support the standby rosters. New initiatives aim to increase synergies between the different elements of the initiative, and to create a protection ‘community of practice’. PROCAP is also investigating the creation of a certification process as a quality-mark mechanism for roster members.
- 4) The PROCAP initiative was designed as a pilot project, and an evaluation was scheduled following the first six months of the initiative. Due to the staggered recruitment of SPOs and the late establishment of the PROCAP Support Unit (PSU), this was delayed until the completion of the first phase of the project. Three consultants affiliated to the Overseas Development Institute were contracted by the Evaluation and Studies Unit of OCHA on 15 January 2007 to undertake an external evaluation. A preliminary report was submitted on 26 January.

## Methodology

- 5) The approach of this evaluation has been to assess PROCAP and its various components against three main criteria: *relevance*, *effectiveness* and *efficiency*. In other words, the evaluation team considered what purpose PROCAP was serving, how well it was serving it and

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<sup>1</sup> The deployments to OCHA and UNHCR in Southern Blue Nile, Sudan and OCHA and UNHCR for Somalia are each counted as one deployment.

<sup>2</sup> In terms of seniority, three of these SPOs had over 15 years’ experience and qualified for ‘level 1’ salaries. Seven had over ten years’ experience and received ‘level 2’ salaries. While the SPOs are contracted by NRC and are not UN staff, these salary scales are equivalent to P5 (level 1) and P4 (level 2). At the Steering Committee Meeting of 7 February 2007, it was proposed that up to four of those on level 2 salaries would be upgraded to the higher salary scale.

<sup>3</sup> NRC, DRC, Austcare, RedR Australia, Save the Children Norway and Save the Children Sweden.

<sup>4</sup> Note that 45 of these ‘profiles’ are specifically child protection specialists on Save the Children rosters. These people can be deployed to Save the Children or to UNHCR under an agreement that pre-dates PROCAP.

<sup>5</sup> All the other standby agreements in place predate PROCAP, sometimes by a decade or more.



whether there might be better (more cost- and time-effective) ways of achieving similar results.

- 6) Full details of the evaluation methodology can be found in the Inception Report (see annex 2). The methodology used was primarily inductive and empirical, drawing on in-depth interviews with key actors regarding their perceptions of the quality and relevance of the work of PROCAP. Three field studies were carried out in countries that have received PROCAP SPOs (Sudan, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)).
- 7) The efficiency of the project was evaluated in terms of its timeliness and cost-efficiency. A comparison was drawn between the stand-by rosters supported by PROCAP and the 'Surge' project run by IRC in support of UNHCR.
- 8) Representatives of all the mandated agencies dealing with PROCAP were interviewed, as were all the SPOs and representatives of each of the standby rosters. A meeting was also held with the donors to PROCAP. In the field, a wide range of protection and other actors were contacted. Representatives from the ICRC and IRC were interviewed, to provide points of comparison. A full list of those interviewed is available in an annex to this report. The interviews were carried out on the basis that the views expressed would not be attributed to the individuals concerned; where appropriate, the name of the agency is mentioned.
- 9) The evaluation has reviewed existing documentation associated with PROCAP. In addition to reviewing strategy documents, the evaluation took advantage of existing internal reflections on the project, including mid-term reviews and an informal review of the deployments of SPOs.
- 10) Minutes of management meetings and meetings with standby partners were reviewed to gain insights into the management of PROCAP. Records of deployments and, where permitted, recruitment (e.g. profiles of successful and unsuccessful candidates) were examined in relation to the SPOs. Documentation such as deployment requests, handover reports, debriefings and similar documents relating to individual deployments of SPOs were also reviewed. Protection strategies and other relevant documents were examined in the countries where the field reviews were carried out.
- 11) The latest draft of the training materials produced as part of this project have been reviewed in their own right, and in the light of feedback during the course of the evaluation. The PROCAP website (which it is still under development) was also examined.
- 12) Lastly, an e-mail survey was sent to all 56 participants in the PROCAP protection training to ascertain their experience prior to receiving the training, their views of the training and its relevance to any subsequent deployments. Thirty-four responses were received, and five of the respondents were selected for a follow-up interview by telephone.

## 1. The Relevance of PROCAP

### 1.1.Context

- 13) The PROCAP initiative was devised in 2005, at a time when the model of protection for internally displaced persons (IDPs) adopted by the UN system was one of ‘collaboration’.<sup>6</sup> This model envisaged a comprehensive response based on different actors assuming protection roles in accordance with their individual expertise. However, a lack of appropriately qualified and experienced protection specialists made it difficult for UN agencies to design and mount effective and coordinated protection responses. Deficiencies in protection capacity amongst UN agencies were particularly notable during the response to the Darfur crisis.
- 14) According to informant interviews, the PROCAP initiative was devised by what was then the Internal Displacement Division (IDD) of OCHA,<sup>7</sup> in collaboration with OHCHR, UNHCR and UNICEF. The project established activities to reinforce protection capacity in order to lead and support a UN Country Team (UNCT) protection response. While it was originally intended to respond to IDP contexts only, following concerns raised by UNICEF and OHCHR in particular this was expanded to ‘emerging, evolving or changing crisis particularly involving situations of internal displacement’ (Project proposal, 2005). The need for a strong coordination role, reinforcing the protection capacities of HCs and their offices was particularly emphasised in the original discussions surrounding the project. This implied that OCHA might also be included as a client of PROCAP, but at the insistence of the protection-mandated agencies it was agreed that OCHA would only be able to access PROCAP as a last resort, when the protection officers were not required by the mandated agencies.
- 15) In June 2005, in response to the Humanitarian Response Review, a programme of reform was launched to address significant systemic gaps in the humanitarian response.<sup>8</sup> UNHCR was designated lead of the ‘Global Protection Cluster’ for the protection of IDPs in conflict-related humanitarian emergencies, with the expectation that UNICEF would, in many instances, take on the lead responsibility in natural disasters.<sup>9</sup> The cluster approach has since been piloted in DRC, Uganda and Liberia, and has been adopted as the coordination model in other contexts. A timetable for introducing the cluster approach in existing emergencies is being developed, with the expectation that this model will be progressively adopted over the next two years, as well as in newly emerging crises.
- 16) The context in which PROCAP was originally designed has thus evolved considerably. Protection-mandated agencies are expected to look beyond their individual mandates to respond collectively and collaboratively to a broader spectrum of protection-related issues. Meanwhile, OCHA has formulated policies on its role in protection, and other UN agencies (including WFP and IOM) are increasingly considering their own position in this area.<sup>10</sup> Most

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<sup>6</sup> The collaborative approach was initially outlined by the IASC in its Policy on the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (December 1999). It was subsequently reaffirmed by the IASC as the preferred means of responding to situations of internal displacement in the Supplementary Guidance to HCs and/or on their Responsibilities in Relation to Internally Displaced Persons (April 2000) and the Guidance Note on the Collaborative Approach (March 2003).

<sup>7</sup> IDD has since been restructured to become the Department of Protection Support Services (DPSS).

<sup>8</sup> United Nations (2005), Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/87–E/2005/78.

<sup>9</sup> ‘UNHCR is the lead of the Global Protection Cluster. However, at the country level in disaster situations or in complex emergencies without significant displacement, the three core protection-mandated agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF and OHCHR) will consult closely and, under the overall leadership of the HC/RC, agree which of the three will assume the role of Lead for protection.’ IASC (2006), Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response, 6th Working Group Meeting, 15–17 November, 2006.

<sup>10</sup> OCHA (2006), OCHA’s Role in Supporting Protection: International and Field-based Responsibilities, September 2006.

importantly, perhaps, the evolution of Integrated Missions and the incorporation of civilian protection elements into the mandates of UN and regional peacekeeping forces has raised urgent questions about protection strategies that straddle the political–humanitarian divide and require new forms of dialogue (if not collaboration) between military and humanitarian actors.

- 17) New approaches, skills and expertise are thus required across the agencies involved in protection. While a review of capacities of the mandated agencies and of progress on the humanitarian reform agenda is beyond the scope of this evaluation, the team found that at an operational level, major questions remain about the priority protection agenda in a given context, the respective roles of the protection-mandated agencies and the significance of the Cluster approach. The mandated agencies were transparent about the challenges they were facing in addressing these concerns, and these constraints were also confirmed by other informants. Internal mechanisms to meet current and evolving capacity requirements remain inadequate. While each of the mandated agencies has started building internal capacity, key informants from OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF and OHCHR all reported significant capacity gaps in protection at both senior and junior levels.
- 18) These capacity gaps and other institutional challenges will need to be addressed on a more system-wide and longer-term basis than is possible through an initiative like PROCAP. As such, the team endorses the original diagnosis of a lack of experienced staff capacity in protection, particularly at the senior level, which provides the rationale for PROCAP.
- 19) In light of the above, the evaluation team recommends the continuation of PROCAP as a useful mechanism for expanding the numbers and quality of protection staff, and as a way of ensuring a more predictable and timely protection response. However, PROCAP should be seen in perspective: it is not a substitute for building institutional capacity in the relevant UN bodies. It is therefore essential that agencies, with support from donors, continue to build up their own capacities and specialist rosters.

## 1.2.Overall Relevance

- 20) The overall objective of PROCAP, as stated in the project proposal,<sup>11</sup> is to ‘develop a protection standby capacity (PROCAP) of up to 100 qualified and experienced protection officers to support the operational response of UN agencies. PROCAP aims to strengthen the collaborative response and agencies receiving PROCAP personnel will be expected to contribute to the Country Team’s overall collective protection response and to take on an increased responsibility on behalf of the UN Country Team’. The aim as stated in the most recent strategy paper is ‘to enhance UN protection response and contribute to global protection capacity through the predictable and efficient deployment of personnel with proven protection expertise’.
- 21) On balance, interviewees were positive about PROCAP, both from the point of view of those deployed under it and from those who have benefited from those deployments. In Geneva, the protection-mandated agencies signalled their support for a standby protection capacity project; while not without reservations, all were broadly supportive of the PROCAP initiative. UNHCR, the main user of PROCAP, was the most complimentary, stating that overall it is ‘very appreciative of the support that PROCAP provides to mandated agencies in strengthening their operational response’. However, like UNICEF, UNHCR felt that significant modifications were required to reflect the needs of the mandated agencies. OHCHR also indicated general approval, but highlighted PROCAP’s limited relevance to the agency to date (it has had only one SPO deployment and only has an MOU with one (NRC) of PROCAP’s six rosters). UN representatives widely commended PROCAP training, but other elements of the project –

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<sup>11</sup> OCHA Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division (2005), A Proposal to Increase international Capacity for Protection (PROCAPPROCAPPROCAP), A Pilot Project, 29 July 2005.

such as the certification process and PROCAP online – were not believed to be of major benefit.

- 22) Despite agreement that there are capacity gaps in protection, and general endorsement of the PROCAP initiative, there are substantially divergent views amongst the agencies involved in PROCAP on the nature of those gaps, on the capacity requirements for an effective inter-agency protection response, and on the role of PROCAP in providing such capacity. This emerged as a consistent and recurring theme from a review of the project documents, notes from steering committee meetings (for example, notes from the 21 April 2006 and 7 July 2006 meetings) and interviews with key informants in Geneva and across numerous field locations. The disagreement largely centres on the criteria for deployment of SPOs, and what constituted a ‘strategic’ role in a given context.
- 23) The original proposal of 2005 set out three criteria for the deployment of PROCAP personnel: the existence of an emerging, evolving or changing crisis with a protection dimension, particularly involving situations of internal displacement; a need to accomplish specific tasks or fill a personnel gap until the agency is able to recruit or deploy appropriate protection officers; and a strategic intent to strengthen the collective protection response. Following difficulties in the first PROCAP deployment (to Bunia, DRC, for UNHCR) and an increase in demand for deployments, in April 2006 it was agreed that a clear policy on analysing and prioritising the *strategic impact* of deployment requests should be devised (Steering Committee meeting, 21 April 2006). These were elaborated in July as part of the informal review process. The revised criteria emphasised the use of PROCAP in ‘new, emerging or rapidly changing humanitarian crises’ with IDP-related issues, and set out the potential use of PROCAP deployments in cluster/non-cluster and ‘static’ contexts (existing emergencies, and protracted or neglected crises).
- 24) Despite the acceptance of these criteria by the agencies participating in PROCAP, fundamental differences remain. The original proposal document stated that SPOs would ‘lead and support a UN country team response’ and emphasised the ‘development’ of comprehensive protection strategies and the ‘creation’ of appropriate mechanisms. In interviews, OCHA emphasised the potential catalytic effect of the SPOs, who would work as ‘inter-agency ambassadors’ encouraging greater collaboration and fostering enhanced inter-agency spirit and effort. The project’s donors highlighted this ‘additionality’ as fundamental to their support. The mandated agencies, by contrast, emphasised the operational benefits of PROCAP, and insisted that these too should be understood as ‘strategic’. They believed that the project focused too heavily on the development of strategies and on establishing coordination mechanisms at national level, but stressed that the real test of coordination was in ensuring collaborative *implementation*. This, they said, frequently involved working at provincial level, rather than in national capitals. They questioned the feasibility of parachuting senior leadership capacity into a context for a six-month period, believing that institutional capacity should be complemented, not supplanted, by PROCAP SPOs. UNHCR also believed that the contexts into which SPOs can be deployed were too narrowly defined, and that the deployment of an SPO into neglected crises might have greater impact than deployment into a relatively well-supported emergency.
- 25) Perhaps any UN inter-agency project is destined to cause friction. However, this difference in the perception of PROCAP’s purpose is undermining the project. The lack of clarity and consensus is generating frustration within all the agencies involved, and is also resulting in time-inefficiencies in management and deployment administration. While other rosters under development as part of the humanitarian reform agenda do not place the same level of emphasis on the strategic component – and the WatSan roster in particular is likely to function more as a surge capacity mechanism – it is the team’s view that coherence and collaboration is of particular importance in protection, and that the inter-agency nature of the project should therefore be maintained as the priority for PROCAP. However, the team recommends PROCAP repositions itself to increase its relevance to broader protection issues, as well as to the humanitarian reform agenda.

- 26) In terms of the first issue, the RC/HC has overall responsibility for ensuring that the UN Country Team is working to a coherent protection strategy, covering not just IDPs but the civilian population as a whole, including the non-displaced, refugees and populations affected by natural disasters. It is proper for the HC to insist that the lead protection agency plays a coordination role in this regard, either by deployment of a senior staff member or by requesting a PROCAP SPO. The evaluation team recommends that the HC be encouraged to discuss with the Cluster Lead agency and the other mandated agencies the potential for SPO deployments to ensure the fulfilment of the strategic coordination role.
- 27) Given that some protection issues may not be within the remit or capacity of the Cluster Lead, the team also recommends that deployments are permitted to the HC's office, or to OCHA, to undertake a strategic development or coordination role.<sup>12</sup> In particular, deployments may be required to support OCHA in its facilitation of cross-cluster analysis, and in ensuring that protection is mainstreamed across and between clusters.<sup>13</sup> Other examples include the development of legislation, development of information and advocacy guidelines and strategies on protection issues (including between political, military and humanitarian actors), development of civilian protection strategies with emerging national institutions, protection advisory roles in peace and ceasefire negotiations, and protection advisory functions for the HC.
- 28) The issue is more complicated where an Integrated Mission exists. Depending on the context, it may be felt that deployment to the Mission and in particular to the HC/Deputy SRSG, is untenable where the role of the Mission is contested (as in Sudan), where it is perceived as politically 'compromised', or where its the military component may be is itself directly involved in the conflict. That said, the team believes that it should potentially be open to DPKO to request a PROCAP deployment. For deployments to the HC/RC's office, OCHA and DPKO, the requesting office should specify a clear terms of reference, set out the interface with the Cluster Lead and indicate how such a deployment complements the collective protection response. As with all SPO requests, such deployments should be discussed and agreed by the UNCT.
- 29) In light of the shared objectives of the Protection Cluster and PROCAP,<sup>14</sup> and the expected progressive roll-out of the Cluster approach to new and existing emergencies, the team recommends that the Steering Committee ensures greater synergies with this group beyond those currently reflected in the 2007 Protection Cluster Work Plan (PCWP). In particular, the team recommends that the Protection Cluster, working with the Steering Committee, has the ability to recommend deployments to one or two ongoing major humanitarian crises where the Cluster approach will be adopted, and which would benefit from a significant injection of capacity. Once the roll-out timetable is available, an extraordinary meeting of the Steering Committee should be scheduled, with participation from the Protection Cluster. The aim should be to develop a list of priority countries for deployment of SPOs to support the roll-out of the Cluster approach. Identification ideally should be undertaken following the Protection

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<sup>12</sup> This recommendation is in line with the Protection Cluster Work Plan 2007 (section 27), to 'Strengthen the capacity of HC/RCs to actively support strategies aimed at promoting more sustained and assertive advocacy'.

<sup>13</sup> See footnote 8.

<sup>14</sup> The 2006 Protection Appeal objectives included 'sufficient and well-trained protection capacity and preparedness at the global level, enabling the humanitarian community to mount timely and effective protection response to two–three new emergencies per year of 500,000 persons. UN (2006) Appeal for Improving Humanitarian Response Capacity: Cluster 2006, Revision, March 2006.

Cluster mapping exercise, but it should not be contingent on that process.<sup>15</sup> Selection should be based both on need and on potential impact, and there should be a facility for multiple deployments. Any deployments will need to be negotiated with the Cluster Lead in the identified countries, and ultimately endorsed by the relevant UNCT.

### 1.3. Project Duration

- 30) PROCAP was established as a temporary initiative to support the response of protection-mandated UN agencies, individually and collectively, while these agencies increase their capacity through normal staffing and recruitment processes. Interviews with the mandated agencies identified ongoing and significant difficulties in identifying internal staff with the requisite experience and profile to undertake roles envisaged by the humanitarian reform agenda (coordination, inter-agency or IDP-related roles). All three agencies are in the process of developing internal rosters to provide more flexible and timely capacity.<sup>16</sup> However, in interviews they were clear that it would take considerable time before adequate capacities were in place.
- 31) PROCAP will remain a useful and relevant mechanism for at least the length of time it takes agencies to build up sufficient capacity to meet their new roles under the Cluster approach. As outlined above, it may also have a broader protection role. However, without a clear exit strategy, there is a danger that PROCAP will become a permanent fixture, and may discourage the building up of more permanent capacity within the agencies. The team therefore recommends that PROCAP is maintained at its current proposed capacity of 15 SPOs until the roll-out of the Cluster approach is complete (estimated to take at least until the end of 2008). The continuation of PROCAP beyond that point should be judged according to whether the response to a new large-scale emergency<sup>17</sup> indicates continuing, serious capacity gaps in the system.

### 1.4. Conclusions and Recommendations (Relevance)

- 32) In light of the well-documented and reported capacity gaps within the mandated agencies, the team endorses the original rationale for the PROCAP initiative and recommends that the initiative should continue. While the protection mandated agencies have begun to develop internal emergency capacity, this does not meet current requirements, particularly at senior levels. The team concludes, however, that the project should evolve to ensure greater relevance to the current humanitarian environment. In particular, PROCAP should be realigned in order to more directly support the roll-out of the Cluster approach, and the PSU should work with the Protection Cluster Working Group to identify contexts where this is possible. Greater relevance could be ensured by allowing deployments to the HC's office or to OCHA. PROCAP should be wound down following the roll-out of the reform agenda, and once

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<sup>15</sup> The PCWG 2007 Workplan (Version 17 January 2007), section 16, states that a mapping exercise will be undertaken and indicates the establishment of a priority list of countries which will receive start-up support or review missions from the global cluster.

<sup>16</sup> In September 2006, UNHCR commenced an internal process aimed at identifying and selecting 15 senior protection staff (at P4/P5 level) to be included on a roster for deployment into contexts where the cluster approach is underway. This roster forms part of a pre-existing emergency roster within UNHCR. Once identified, these individuals will participate in the OCHA-led inter-agency training (under development by the Humanitarian Reform Support Unit in OCHA and planned for May/June 2007). A 'fast-track' recruitment process has also been agreed which allows for swift external recruitment processes (approximately two months) for situations where there is an emergency or a 'new scenario'. However, this is predicated on there being suitably qualified individuals to recruit, which is frequently not the case, particularly in francophone or Arabic countries. OHCHR is also establishing an emergency roster which will be made up of approximately 40 staff of various profiles and seniority.

<sup>17</sup> In UN terms, these are countries requiring Humanitarian Coordinators with humanitarian crises, which are beyond the scope of any one agency's mandate, and where the needs are of a sufficient scale and complexity to justify a multi-sectoral response with the engagement of a wide range of humanitarian actors.

it is clear that the necessary capacity has been developed across the mandated agencies. With this in mind, the team concludes as follows:

- The team endorses the original rationale for the PROCAP initiative and recommends its continuation. However, it should not be used as a substitute for building protection capacity within agencies.
- The team recommends that deployments are made possible to the HC's office, or to OCHA, to undertake strategic, policy development roles which are of benefit to an inter-agency response. In situations where the HC determines that additional protection capacity is required to support the inter-agency protection response, the team recommends that an HC be enabled to request an SPO deployment to a protection mandated agency or to the Cluster Lead to ensure the fulfilment of the strategic coordination role.
- The team believes that it should potentially be open to DPKO to request a PROCAP deployment where this would be of strategic value.
- The team recommends that the Steering Committee ensures greater synergies with the Protection Cluster, including the facility to recommend deployments in advance to one or two ongoing major humanitarian crises or contexts where the Cluster approach will be adopted, and which would benefit from additional capacity, including multiple deployments.

## 2. Deployment of Senior Protection Officers (SPOs)

### 2.1. Roles Performed

*The aim of PROCAP, as set out in the recent strategy paper, is to enhance UN protection response and contribute to global protection capacity through predictable and efficient deployment of personnel with proven protection expertise.*

- 33) An analysis of the project documents shows that, since the project's inception in October 2005, there have been 16<sup>18</sup> separate deployments of PROCAP's Senior Protection Officers. Thirteen of these deployments have lasted the maximum duration of six months, and two of these involved time extensions. UNHCR has had nine deployments, UNICEF four, and OHCHR one; OCHA and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) were involved in the remaining deployments. The deployments have mainly been to African countries (Lebanon, Georgia and Pakistan were the exceptions).<sup>19</sup> All except Pakistan have been in response to conflict-related emergencies; all have been IDP-related to some degree,<sup>20</sup> with seven deployments involving functions related to the Cluster approach.<sup>21</sup> Six deployments have involved strategic, advisory or coordination roles at national level,<sup>22</sup> six have involved coordination at provincial or regional levels<sup>23</sup> and three have been related to establishing or running offices.<sup>24</sup>
- 34) PROCAP has thus allowed for an injection of protection capacity into the UN system, particularly into situations of new, emerging or rapidly changing humanitarian crises. However, in terms of the leadership and strategic purpose that was envisaged for PROCAP, the team found that this had only been partially fulfilled to date. While an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness and impact of each of the individual deployments is not within the scope of this evaluation, an assessment of the strategic and operational dimensions of the deployments can be found in annex 4. The deployments have been assessed according to a set of criteria which judges their strategic and operational elements. A distinction has been drawn between the senior and mid-level roles undertaken, on the grounds that this has given rise to considerable debate and discussion amongst the participating agencies. This analysis has been made on the basis of information drawn from interviews with representatives of the agencies involved in PROCAP, SPOs and external observers, as well as from project documents.

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<sup>18</sup> The deployments to OCHA and UNHCR in Southern Blue Nile, Sudan and OCHA and UNHCR for Somalia are each counted as one deployment as they involved a transfer of hosting agency only.

<sup>19</sup> Deployments to date have been to the following contexts: Bunia (DRC), Lira (Uganda), Tyre (Lebanon), Somalia, Tblisi (Georgia), Muzaffarabad (Pakistan), Darfur/Juba (Sudan), Southern Blue Nile (Sudan), Khartoum (Sudan), Central African Republic, Lubumbashi (DRC), Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), Gulu (Uganda), Goma (DRC), Kenya.

<sup>20</sup> The deployment to UNICEF in Kenya focuses mainly on Somali refugees in Kenya, but involves contingency planning for internal displacement as a result of floods or political unrest.

<sup>21</sup> Bunia, DRC (UNHCR), Lira, Uganda (UNHCR), Lebanon (UNHCR), Pakistan (UNICEF), Lubumbashi, DRC (UNICEF), Abidjan (UNHCR), Gulu, Uganda (OHCHR), Goma, DRC (UNHCR), Southern Blue Nile (UNHCR).

<sup>22</sup> Somalia (OCHA/UNHCR), Georgia (UNHCR), Pakistan (UNICEF), CAR (UNHCR), Abidjan (UNHCR). The deployment to Lebanon (UNHCR) included work in Beirut, as well as in Tyre.

<sup>23</sup> Bunia, DRC (UNHCR), Lubumbashi, DRC (UNICEF), Goma, DRC (UNHCR), Lira, Uganda (UNHCR), Gulu, Uganda (OHCHR), Southern Blue Nile, Sudan (UNHCR).

<sup>24</sup> Bunia, DRC (UNHCR), Lira, Uganda (UNHCR), Gulu, Uganda (OHCHR).



### Criteria for Assessing Strategic Nature of Deployments

#### Indicators of strategic role at senior level (strategic leadership):

Work generally at a national or regional level and involving (1) development of strategy for coordination mechanisms, establishment or major redirection of coordination mechanisms at national or multi-regional level (e.g. establishing/leading national protection working group); (2) leadership in protection or provision of senior-level protection advice at the outset of a crisis or at a new juncture in the crisis (through agency/HC/RC office); (3) development of comprehensive protection strategies of benefit to overall protection response (through agency/HC/RC office); and/or (4) provision of task-specific advisory support for agency/HC/RC office of benefit to overall UNCT response.

#### Indicators of strategic role at mid-level (strategy design and implementation):

Work generally at a sub-national level and involving (1) reinforcement or geographical extension of pre-existing coordination mechanisms (e.g. establishing/leading protection working group at sub-national level); (2) development of strategies, needs assessments, monitoring tools and training; (3) supporting a protection-mandated agency to take on increased responsibility; and/or (4) inter-agency protection programming or programming of major significance to overall protection response.

#### Indicators of operational role:

Work centred on the programme of an individual agency, such as (1) running/establishing offices, representational work and/or donor relations; (2) operational or programmatic work for an individual agency rather than inter-agency; and/or (3) substitution of a staff position due to recruitment delays or difficulties.

- 35) Some deployments, like those to Tbilisi, Georgia (UNHCR), Darfur, Sudan (UNMIS), Khartoum, Sudan (UNICEF), Lebanon (UNHCR), Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire (UNHCR) and, potentially, Central African Republic (UNHCR),<sup>25</sup> have certainly been strategic. But even these deployments – with the exception perhaps of the ones to Georgia and Darfur – have not been at the expert level originally envisaged by the project. This appears to be as a result of two factors. First, it has been difficult to identify and recruit individuals with the requisite seniority and expertise to carry out such roles. Second, the protection-mandated agencies have not used PROCAP for such functions. Interviewees felt that this was an unrealistic ambition in many contexts stating, for instance, that it was not viable to “*parachute someone in from the outside, as this would side-line the individuals on the ground*”. However, interviewees indicated that this role is more feasible at the beginning of a crisis, a new departure in the crisis or response (JAM in Darfur, a new coordination mechanism in Côte d'Ivoire) or where a demand for technical assistance is required on a specific issue (IDP legislation in Georgia, IDP returns in Khartoum). This was endorsed in interviews with SPOs and field-based staff, who agreed that coming in at the outset of a crisis or the roll-out of the Cluster approach gave much greater scope for strategic impact.
- 36) The team recommends that deployment to senior-level leadership roles is re-asserted as the central pillar of PROCAP. As outlined above, aligning PROCAP more closely with the Protection Cluster will allow for deployments at the roll-out of the cluster approach to set up new coordination mechanisms and develop national-level strategies, and deployment into the HC's office or to OCHA will (in some circumstances) facilitate the engagement of SPOs in leadership roles. The team recommends that the PSU continues to work with the mandated agencies to identify situations where the deployment of SPOs into technical or strategic roles is of strategic value. A requesting agency or the HC may consider it necessary to supplement

<sup>25</sup> As this deployment has recently commenced, this can be judged on the basis of the TORs only.

senior-level deployment with a mid-level deployment to the Cluster Lead or other mandated agency at the field level, where the role required is specifically to set up inter-agency coordination functions.<sup>26</sup> This could be supplemented in appropriate cases with more junior deployments from stand-by rosters.

- 37) In other cases, deployments have been less senior, but still of significant strategic or inter-agency value, with the deployments to Bunia, DRC (UNHCR), Goma, DRC (UNHCR), Lubumbashi, DRC (UNICEF), Southern Blue Nile, Sudan (OCHA/UNHCR), Muzzafarabad, Pakistan, (UNICEF), Somalia (OCHA / UNHCR) included in this category. Most of these deployments have been to support UN mandated agencies at a sub-national level, either in terms of developing and implementing protection strategies or supporting the establishment of coordination mechanisms. In many instances, the agreement of these deployments was contentious and involved a debate about their 'strategic' quality, sometimes resulting in the requesting agency having to change the emphasis in the terms of reference to ensure that this was central.<sup>27</sup> Concerns were raised by OCHA in particular on the grounds that these deployments did not have the requisite seniority and inter-agency requirements set by PROCAP. For their part, the protection-mandated agencies at both Geneva and field levels stress the need for PROCAP to be 'user-driven'; while there may be merit in senior leadership deployments, a greater need exists to develop and oversee implementation of programmes.
- 38) In the view of the evaluation team, ensuring that inter-agency coordination moves beyond strategy development and into coordinated action will be central to the success of the Cluster approach. The shortage of experienced protection staff is significant in this respect, particularly those with knowledge of IDP issues or with the requisite inter-agency coordination experience. The team thus considers that these mid-level roles should be recognised as 'strategic', and that requests for SPO deployments into such roles should be accepted when the conditions (elaborated below in 4.2.3) are met.
- 39) There are other cases where the SPO has been deployed into what is essentially an agency staff role, as in Lira (UNHCR), Gulu (OHCHR) and Kenya (UNICEF). While many of these positions have had an inter-agency dimension, the emphasis of these deployments has been on individual agency concerns such as programme design, partner identification and managerial roles, including office start-up. While some of these deployments have been successful, the skills and experience of the SPOs do not necessarily correspond with these functions, and it is not clear why these posts could not be filled by the agency itself. In several of these cases, PROCAP appears to have been used essentially as a quick, convenient and cheap means of addressing a staffing gap.
- 40) The team recommends that staff-substitution or 'bridging' deployments should not normally be undertaken by PROCAP. However, where a strategic purpose can be clearly demonstrated in an operational role (such as OHCHR's 'operationalisation' in Gulu), such requests should be considered – though only where the administrative component of the deployment is directly related to the protection role. SPOs should not be expected to play essentially managerial or administrative roles.

## 2.2. Effectiveness of Deployments

- 41) While additional capacity does not necessarily result in an enhanced UN protection response, the team found evidence of significant achievements resulting from deployments. The many outputs have included the establishment of protection working groups at national and provincial levels (Côte d'Ivoire); the development of an IDP monitoring framework (Somalia); establishment of provincial offices; the development of advocacy strategies (Bunia, DRC);

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<sup>26</sup> On occasion, these sub-national roles may themselves require a more senior deployment.

<sup>27</sup> For instance, agreement to the deployment to Pakistan was conditional on the terms of reference broadening from a focus on child protection to include general protection needs and concerns (Steering Committee Notes, 3 March 2006).

framing an IDP returns strategy (Khartoum); and capacity-building and training on Guiding Principles, human rights and protection issues (Southern Blue Nile, Sudan, and Lubumbashi, DRC). While it is difficult to gauge the impact of such achievements on the overall protection response, it is reasonable to conclude that they have enhanced the ability of protection agencies to address the protection concerns of at-risk populations.

- 42) From the point of view of the mandated protection agencies, most deployments were considered successful in enhancing the UN response, and agencies appreciated in particular the seniority and experience of the SPOs on the roster, the speed with which they were deployed and the fact that the deployment was free to the receiving agency. The perspective of a UNHCR supervisor is broadly representative: 'For a manager, you are essentially looking at how quickly someone can be on board and how quickly someone can be productive'. The 'strategic' or inter-agency aspect of the deployments was emphasised less, and tended to feature more significantly in those deployments involving a technical, advisory or national-level role. Knowledge of IDP issues and previous experience of inter-agency coordination was mentioned in a few instances as useful. One UNHCR manager felt that having a different profile in a Cluster Lead role engendered greater acceptance of UNHCR's role: 'One of the major problems when you have UNHCR staff is the lack of familiarity with IDP operations in general and the fact that others may not want to come on board with UNHCR'. Others expressed the view that an ability to 'think outside the agency box' was one distinct advantage of SPO deployments. Some UN field representatives acknowledged that the 'open-minded' and collaborative approach of the SPOs may have resulted in outcomes that may not have been possible with core staff of the agency – though this view was more widely expressed by non-UN actors. Sometimes this expressed itself in innovative inter-agency approaches, such as the adoption of non-standard, versatile incident monitoring forms in Gulu. At other times, the benefit seemed to derive from bringing general humanitarian and operational experience to bear on a problem, rather than specialist legal or other skills.
- 43) External observers tended to be more complimentary, highlighting the critical capacity that the SPOs had brought to the context, their seniority and expertise and the importance of their inter-agency or collaborative qualities. Many spoke of the SPOs going beyond the mandates of the receiving agencies, having significant participatory and coordination skills and pushing the receiving agencies to take on advocacy issues. As one observer from an Integrated Mission stated: 'All PROCAP deployees had a broader, more comprehensive understanding of protection. More proactive, better able to bring things forward with HQs ... a totally different approach'. In DRC, the presence of an SPO was believed to have been instrumental in the agreement of a 'signature' inter-agency project between UNICEF and UNHCR.
- 44) However, in many instances the team discovered a significant disparity between the seniority and strategic quality of the deployment as envisaged by the TORs and the roles actually performed in practice. A number of inhibiting factors were highlighted by the receiving agencies, the SPOs and external interlocutors; these are highlighted below.

### ***2.2.1. Predictability and Timeliness***

- 45) Delays in the recruitment of SPOs significantly reduced the impact of the project during the 18 months reviewed. While the original project documents set March 2006 as the date for reaching full capacity, by this point only seven SPOs had been contracted and only three deployed. It took until June 2006 to hire the full roster of ten SPOs, and full capacity was reached only in January 2007. However, the Steering Committee was swift in deploying the SPOs once they were on board.
- 46) PROCAP's proposal document states that the project aims to deploy personnel within five to 15 working days of having received a request from the field. In a number of cases, this speed of deployment was not necessary as requesting agencies submitted requests for deployment far in advance. Annex 4 sets out the speed of approval and deployment rates (where figures

are available). Overall, the average time between receipt of request by the Steering Committee and actual deployment was 31 days. In terms of working days, this amounts to a little over one working week longer than the 5–15 working days set out in the proposal. Breaking these figures down, the average time taken by the Steering Committee to approve a request following receipt was nine days. The average time between this approval and the actual deployment was 22 days. In a number of cases a preferred date for deployment was indicated by the requesting agency, and in these instances, the average time between the date of requested deployment and actual deployment was 24 days. The speed of deployment is to be commended when judged against the project objectives, particularly given that these averages include the lengthy delays in deployment to Côte d'Ivoire due to the lack of available francophone SPOs.

- 47) A number of SPOs raised the issue of down-time between deployments. Their concern was the lack of predictability about future deployments, the length of down-time between deployment and the productive use of such time. While this question has not arisen frequently, the team recommends that, where there is a potential for a gap in deployment, the SPO should be brought to Geneva (or another appropriate location) to support the work of the Protection Cluster or one of the mandated protection agencies.

### ***2.2.2. Length of Mission***

- 48) The six-month time period currently permitted by PROCAP was consistently highlighted by receiving agencies, SPOs and external observers as too short to achieve the terms of reference outlined for deployments. The rationale for this limitation was that it was sufficient to allow strategic input to in-country teams to develop a strategy, establish a coordination architecture or provide task-specific advisory support; a longer mission risked being used for staff substitution. While in some instances a short time period may be adequate to achieve time-bound objectives, the fact that extensions have been required even in task-specific roles indicates that this may not be the norm. In most cases, there is a requirement both to develop strategy and oversee its initial implementation. The complexity of the contexts into which SPOs are being deployed and the need to get acquainted with the hosting agency and external stakeholders meant that, in many cases, SPOs were becoming fully productive only in their third month. As one OCHA observer commented, 'six months is far too short to be a catalyst for anything. Who are you? What do you know? Six months should be the minimum'. A receiving agency which had had successful experiences with two deployments stated that they would not request again due to the time limitation, as it was not possible to achieve such ambitious objectives within six months.
- 49) Initial deployments of up to nine months should be allowed. A mid-term review meeting should be held between the SPO and the receiving agency to evaluate and assess the value of the deployment and agree any necessary changes. This might include termination of the deployment by agreement between the PSU and the receiving agency where it is not fulfilling its original purpose. Extensions up to a maximum of 12 months should be allowed upon evidence that a credible recruitment process has been set in motion for replacement of the SPO, unless the requirement for that particular role ceases with the end of the deployment.

### ***2.2.3. Prioritising and Increasing Deployment Requests***

- 50) While requests for SPO deployments are growing, the PSU in particular expressed surprise that demand was not higher. The team found that there are a number of possible reasons for this. First, the request process is predicated on an individual agency identifying a capacity gap, and seeking assistance through PROCAP. In interviews, some felt that agencies may not wish to publicly highlight such deficiencies; others noted that mandated agencies may not want external SPOs to perform these roles. Second, the process depends on agencies knowing about PROCAP; particularly at field level, the team found that awareness of the initiative and its purpose was very limited.

- 51) The team believes that resolving the ambiguity surrounding the principal purpose of PROCAP should allow agencies to better determine its relevance to a given context. Ensuring that the initiative is of greater overall relevance through aligning it with the Cluster roll-out, expanding its use and allowing multiple deployments should also increase uptake. Finally, the team recommends that the PSU and Steering Committee undertake increased promotion of PROCAP and communication of its purpose.
- 52) A mechanism for prioritisation of requests should be agreed by the Steering Committee. The team recommends the following approach:
- Given the potential for senior inter-agency capacity to significantly enhance a protection response in a given context, the team recommends that senior work – generally at a national or multi-regional level – involving one or more of the functions below should be given priority:<sup>28</sup>
    - Development of strategy for coordination mechanisms, establishment or major redirection of coordination mechanisms at national or regional level (e.g. establishing/leading national protection working group).
    - Leadership in protection or provision of senior-level protection advice at the outset of a crisis or at a new juncture in the crisis (through agency or HC/RC office).
    - Development of comprehensive protection strategies of benefit to the overall protection response (through agency or HC/RC office).
    - Provision of task-specific advisory support for agency or HC/RC office of benefit to overall UNCT response.
    - Support to the roll-out of the Cluster approach. The team recommends that up to five SPO deployments per year be deployed by agreement between the Protection Cluster Working Group and the PSU, with a facility for multiple deployments.
  - Mid-level deployments, generally for work at a sub-national level, should be considered as the second priority, with the work incorporating one or more of the following:
    - Reinforcement or geographical extension of pre-existing coordination mechanisms (e.g. establishing/leading sub-national protection working group).
    - Development of strategies, needs assessments, monitoring tools and training.
    - Supporting a protection-mandated agency to take on increased responsibility.
    - Inter-agency protection programming or programming of major benefit to the overall protection response.
  - Finally, purely operational roles should be considered as a lower priority and should be accepted only when a contribution to some wider strategic purpose can be demonstrated. Such deployments should be accepted only where sufficient administrative support is in place.
  - Minimum conditions for deployment should include the following:
    - Provision of clear TORs that conform to the criteria set out above.
    - Supervision by the Representative or the Head of Protection of the requesting agency, or the Humanitarian Coordinator.
    - The Humanitarian Coordinator must sign the request form, and agencies are expected to consult with partners or the protection cluster working group on development of the TORs.

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<sup>28</sup> This distinction between the seniority of deployments is drawn here in order to maximise the potential for impact through PROCAP. It is not intended to suggest that a hard distinction should be drawn between the experience or grade of different SPOs.

- Basic support – an office, vehicle, translator and communications – are necessary pre-requisites for effective action. SPOs are provided with mobile phones and computers.
- Agencies must provide protection staffing plans that describe how and when PROCAP deployees will be replaced.

#### ***2.2.4. Matching SPOs with Requests***

- 53) The level of expertise, experience, professionalism and skills on the current roster was widely acknowledged by those interviewed, and the mandated agencies commended the work of the Steering Committee and NRC in their selection of SPOs. The SPOs have a minimum of ten years' experience, and while many of them have undertaken short-term UN assignments at some stage in their career, most have had long-term experience with a range of protection-oriented NGOs or the ICRC. Many are generalists and have a broad base of different skills and experience in protection, appropriate to the inter-agency purpose of the initiative. However, this has proved problematic for some receiving agencies, who pointed to an insufficient level of knowledge of agency-specific policies and programmes. SPOs too spoke of 'learning on the job' and felt that their induction into the agency and role was insufficient. UNICEF and OHCHR complained of the limited number of SPOs with child protection and human rights experience. A lack of diversity on the roster and the limited number of SPOs with French and Arabic skills was also noted.
- 54) A number of receiving agencies were also concerned that the SPOs had a significantly different approach to UN agencies due to the fact that many are from outside the UN system. They believed that they had what was termed 'an activist approach' that was not appropriate to a context where the UN agencies were trying to encourage national governments to adhere to their protection responsibilities. The perception of a mismatch in skills and approach was said to have decreased the level of authority and autonomy afforded to the SPO in some instances. On the other hand, a number of the SPOs pointed to a higher level of effectiveness due to 'not having to toe the agency line', and said that fresh approaches and a lack of concern about hierarchy meant that they were able to push organisations to move beyond their individual mandates. Others recognised the need for consensus-building, and felt that diplomacy, negotiation and tact were critical qualities.
- 55) While a distinction is drawn here between senior leadership and mid-level design/implementation functions, this is not to suggest that a division should be made between different SPOs, or that two different grades should be established. The team endorses the current approach of matching an available SPO's skills and experience to the objectives outlined in the deployment request.
- 56) The strategic value of individual SPOs should increase as they gain experience in different settings and with different agencies, putting a premium on retaining the best of them. Field-based supervisors from mandated agencies believed that there was considerable benefit accruing from an SPO who had a previous deployment elsewhere, and was thus more familiar with UN culture, as well as with mandates and inter-agency coordination. Furthermore, the recruitment process is very costly in financial and human resource terms. The team therefore recommends greater investment in supporting and retaining the SPOs, including through targeted training and facilitating access to the mandated agencies' training.
- 57) OCHA, in collaboration with the Protection Cluster Working Group, should develop a training package targeted at PROCAP SPOs, with a focus on the strategic leadership and coordination of protection. In this regard, OCHA should draw on and feed into some of the training under development by the Humanitarian Reform Support Unit, and should pursue the possibility of expert SPOs joining this training.
- 58) NRC should work with the human resource departments of OHCHR and UNICEF to identify individuals with strong human rights and child protection backgrounds. Efforts to expand the

diversity of the roster should continue, with NRC and OCHA working through their country offices to identify suitable in-country candidates.

- 59) It has proved difficult to recruit SPOs of appropriate seniority. Over 700 applications and almost 50 interviews over the last 14 months have resulted in only 12 successful recruitments.<sup>29</sup> In part this has been due to a general shortage of experienced protection staff. The best-qualified candidates thus have a surfeit of opportunities. There are two factors that make recruitment particularly difficult. First, a number of potentially suitable candidates have withdrawn their applications when they realised that the positions were ‘deep field’ (rather than capital city); and second, people who already have UN staff positions have been put off by the prospect of having to resign to take on a one-year PROCAP contract.
- 60) The team believes that reasserting the senior, leadership nature of PROCAP will, for some candidates, address the first issue. The team also believe that creating a cadre of professionals with inter-agency experience is highly beneficial to the development of protection operations. UN staff members should thus be encouraged to take leave of absence to work as an SPO. This should be done with approval from the individual’s supervisor, and should be undertaken on a secondment basis.
- 61) OCHA and other members of the Steering Committee have, in a number of cases, head-hunted individuals, some of whom have gone on to become SPOs despite not having the requisite experience as set out in the recruitment advertisement. Given the difficulties experienced in attracting appropriately qualified candidates for the SPO positions, the team recommends that NRC sets out a head-hunting policy for approval by the Steering Committee, which is then actively pursued by NRC and the other agencies engaged in PROCAP.

#### **2.2.5. Support to SPOs**

- 62) The level of effectiveness of the deployment and the potential of SPOs to achieve the strategic component of their TORs was, in the views of both the SPOs and other observers, linked to a set of minimum conditions within the hosting agency. These included the match of the actual assignment with the TORs; the level of capacity within the receiving organisation (where capacity was low, it was reported that administrative and managerial responsibilities were frequently transferred to the SPO); the level of authority, latitude and support afforded to the SPO to carry out their functions; and the seniority of the individual supervising the SPO. The team’s findings accord with these views, and it is clear from interviews and a review of documents that, where these conditions were less favourable, the strategic nature of the deployment was less important than it might otherwise have been.<sup>30</sup>
- 63) The issue of supervision of the SPOs is particularly important. A senior reporting line not only affords greater influence and access, but also highlights the seniority of the position. The level of integration into the receiving agency is also significant. A number of SPOs reported that staff in the receiving agency treated them as consultants and were unwilling to provide administrative and logistical assistance. While the minimum administrative conditions set out in July 2006 should prevent this in the future, an outstanding matter for some SPOs was the lack of a clear mechanism for cash advances to SPOs. Many SPOs did not have access to cash in the field and relied on loans from colleagues or advances from NRC. NRC indicated that there is a mechanism for provision of cash within three working days of receipt of a request. Given the lack of clarity amongst SPOs on this mechanism, it should be more clearly communicated to them.

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<sup>29</sup> One SPO has not yet started; one has already left, hence the disparity with the figure given in 1 above.

<sup>30</sup> This was evident in a number of cases, including: Bunia, DRC (UNHCR), Gulu, Uganda (OHCHR), Lira, Uganda (UNHCR), Muzaffarabad, Pakistan (UNICEF) and Somalia (UNHCR/OCHA).

- 64) The team recommends that SPOs should report to either the Representative or Head of Protection (or equivalent) in the receiving agency, or to the HC. The PSU should contact the SPO four weeks into the deployment to evaluate the degree to which the role meets the TORs, that reporting lines are as agreed and that minimum administrative conditions are in place. The team also recommends that the PSU develop a brief, simple introductory email for receiving agencies that explains PROCAP and the role and status of SPOs. This should be circulated within the receiving agency prior to the arrival of the SPO. The team suggests that a mechanism for payment of SPOs should be established, perhaps through NRC if it has offices in the country of deployment.

### 2.3. Conclusions and Recommendations for Deployment of SPOs

- 65) The team concludes that many of the deployments have been effective in enhancing the protection response of the UN agencies, through assisting the protection mandated agencies in undertaking roles and tasks ranging from the establishments of protection clusters to the development of IDP legislation, policies and frameworks. While there have been delays in identifying SPOs, the team believes that the Steering Committee acted swiftly in initiating the project and deploying its first SPO. It judges the timelines of later deployments to be satisfactory.
- 66) In the opinion of the team, insufficient coherence and clarity amongst the participating agencies on the principal purpose of the project has reduced its overall impact at the senior, leadership level. Some deployments have nonetheless played an important role in reinforcing the strategic work of the mandated agencies at an implementation level. The team concludes that the SPOs are sufficiently qualified for their roles (if not over-qualified for some of the implementation roles). While the minimum conditions which were agreed by the Steering Committee in 2006 have ensured greater support to SPOs, the team has identified a number of continuing factors – both on the part of the receiving agencies and the SPOs – which are reducing the effectiveness of the deployments. In order to increase the impact and effectiveness of future deployments, the team makes the following recommendations:

Regarding the ‘strategic’ purpose of PROCAP:

- Senior-level leadership roles should be reasserted as the central pillar of PROCAP.
- Mid-level (design and implementation) roles should also be recognised as ‘strategic’, and deployment should be allowed to fulfil such roles, when specific conditions are in place.
- Purely operational, staff-substitution or ‘bridging’ roles should not normally be undertaken by PROCAP. Such deployments should only be considered where a clear strategic purpose can be proven, and administrative staff are in place to support the SPO.

Regarding the duration of deployments:

- Initial deployments of up to nine months should be allowed to all contexts, with a mid-term review which endorses the inter-agency strategic impact of the deployment. Extension to 12 months should be possible if there is evidence that a credible recruitment process has been set in motion for replacement of the SPO.
- Where there is a gap in deployment, the SPO should be brought to Geneva to support the work of the Protection Cluster or one of the mandated protection agencies.



Regarding prioritising and increasing deployment requests:

- A mechanism for prioritisation should be agreed by the Steering Committee and the minimum criteria should be expanded. Senior-level strategic work at a national or multi-regional level and support to the roll-out of the Cluster should be given priority. Mid-level (design and implementation) deployments for work at sub-national level should be the next priority, and operational roles should be considered only as a last resort. Minimum conditions for deployment should include supervision by the Representative or the Head of Protection of the requesting agency, or the Humanitarian Coordinator.
- The PSU and the Steering Committee should increase promotion of PROCAP and communication of its purpose. Regular emails should be circulated by the participating agencies highlighting the initiative. PSU should increase contact with field-level Protection Working Groups. Examples of the types of roles and tasks undertaken to date should be provided.

On the issue of recruiting and supporting SPOs:

- UN staff members should be actively encouraged to take a leave of absence to work as an SPO. This should be limited to one year only, with approval from the individual's supervisor, and should be undertaken on a secondment basis.
- NRC should elaborate a head-hunting policy for approval by the Steering Committee. Head-hunting should then be actively pursued by NRC and the other agencies engaged in PROCAP.
- The training facilities of the mandated agencies should be made available to SPOs. In addition, OCHA, in collaboration with the Protection Cluster Working Group, should develop a training package targeted at PROCAP SPOs, with a focus on the strategic leadership and coordination of protection.
- NRC should work with the human resource departments of OHCHR and UNICEF to identify individuals with strong human rights and child protection backgrounds. Efforts to expand the diversity of the roster should continue, with NRC and OCHA working through their country offices to identify suitable in-country candidates.
- A mechanism for payment of SPOs should be established, perhaps through NRC.

### 3. Junior Protection Staff

- 67) In addition to increasing the availability of senior protection staff for deployment, PROCAP aimed to increase ‘the number of protection profiles within NGO standby pools and ... the quality of temporary protection profiles through additional and comprehensive training’.<sup>31</sup> The concern here was with the availability of people at the equivalent of UN P2 or P3 level. Within this, PROCAP also intended to increase the diversity of people on the rosters.
- 68) The designers of PROCAP also believed that there was considerable inefficiency in the roster deployment process, with mandated agencies competing over a limited pool of people. The goal was to create a coordinated approach.

#### 3.1. Increasing Numbers & Diversity

- 69) PROCAP chose to increase the number and diversity of protection ‘profiles’ on NGO rosters. It has sought to do this by encouraging rosters either to take on protection profiles or to increase the number of protection profiles (as defined by the rosters themselves) available. It has working relationships with six rosters, all of which already had working relationships in their own right with some or all of the mandated agencies.
- 70) The rosters run by DRC, NRC, RedR Australia and Austcare contain general protection staff and have MoUs in place that allow them to deploy staff to UNICEF, UNHCR and OCHA. The rosters run by Save the Children Norway and Save the Children Sweden are a niche resource that aims to tap social service professionals in Norway and Sweden to supply child protection specialists specifically to SCF and to UNHCR. All the MoUs that allow the deployment of staff to these agencies predate PROCAP. Most date back to the early 1990s.
- 71) NRC is the only roster to have an MoU with OHCHR. It was signed principally to allow the deployment of SPOs, and this is currently<sup>32</sup> the only institutional relationship between a roster and a mandated agency that can be attributed to PROCAP.
- 72) During the time that PROCAP has been existence, there has been an increase from 96 to 154 (approximately 50%) in the number of protection profiles listed on these rosters. During the same period the IRC Surge roster has increased by 20% to 217.<sup>33</sup> In interviews with the mandated agencies it became clear that there is a widespread belief that roster members have jobs in their home countries from which they take leave of absence in order to be deployed for humanitarian work. However, based on the responses given by participants in the PROCAP training, over 80% of the roster members for protection consider themselves to be career humanitarians. Roster operators note that many of the roster members are either looking for an entry-point into the UN system or are working on short-term contracts as a lifestyle choice. On this basis it is considered that a direct comparison with IRC’s roster is valid.
- 73) The table below shows the change in protection profiles by roster over the course of 2006. Figures are from PROCAP reports and from the rosters themselves.

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<sup>31</sup> Note that there was no intention of PROCAP forming its own roster at this level.

<sup>32</sup> At the time of writing, Candem is negotiating an MoU with OCHA thanks to the work of PROCAP.

<sup>33</sup> The Surge Roster is run by IRC for UNHCR. It is funded by donors, principally BPRM via UNHCR, to provide P2, P3 and occasionally P4 level protection staff to UNHCR’s field offices. There are approximately 40 people deployed at any one time. Deployments are generally for a period of 11 months. IRC uses a screening interview, a three-hour test and a second interview to screen candidates. Three references are checked for each candidate.. Candidates who are successful are submitted to UNHCR for final selection onto the roster. Approximately 5% of applications are successful. Many are national staff of mandated agencies or former UNVs/ JPOs who continue to look for a ‘way in’ to the UN system, but others have worked exclusively for NGOs in the past. UNHCR profess to be extremely happy with the way in which this roster functions.

Agency	Protection Profiles January 2006	Protection Profiles January 2007	Notes
NRC	30	30	No change.
DRC	15	30	Protection people selected onto roster because of PROCAP.
Austcare	21	30	Austcare roster 100% protection. Formed 2005. Some overlap with RedR roster.
RedR Australia	0	19	All but one already on roster but labelled 'Community Services'. 6 new people joining shortly.
Save the Children Norway	30	30	No change.
Save the Children Sweden	15	15	No change.
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>154</b>	

- 74) It is notable that DRC is the only agency that clearly attributes the increase in protection 'profiles' to PROCAP. DRC had previously had 36 protection people on its roster, but realised many were not deployable. As a result of ProCap they 'cleaned' up the roster reducing the number to 15 and launched an international recruitment drive because of encouragement received. Austcare was in the process of establishing itself as a protection-only roster anyway, but appreciated the support from PROCAP. Eighteen of the 19 protection profiles on the RedR Australia roster were not new to the roster but had previously been tagged as 'Community Services'. After engagement with PROCAP the roster realised that the profiles could also be tagged as 'protection'. RedR Australia also pointed to a proactive targeting of the Australian social work sector, stimulated by PROCAP. As a result of this work, RedR Australia is adding six further protection profiles to its roster.
- 75) The direct impact of PROCAP on the absolute number of protection profiles is thus rather limited: at best fewer than 35 new protection profiles have been made available to the mandated agencies. This is considerably short of the target of 90 in the original project proposal. Furthermore, only 20–30% of roster members are in the field at any given time, so the target of 90 on the roster equates to around 20 in the field.
- 76) A detailed analysis of what is preventing further expansion of the rosters is beyond the scope of this evaluation. However, three key themes came out of interviews with the roster operators. The first was funding. All the rosters with which PROCAP works send people to the mandated agencies fully funded, and are thus dependent on receiving sufficient funding for them. Some of the rosters need to request funding from their governments for each deployment or group of deployments (e.g. to Darfur). This can be administratively complicated and can cause delays, but does not appear to have been preventing significant numbers of deployments. PROCAP had initially budgeted \$1.14 million to support ten deployments for a period of 12 months each; despite offering this support to the rosters, requests were only received for the funding of four deployments of three months each, at a cost of \$140,000. All were from SCF Norway, and all were funded. As a result, the no-cost

extension of October 2006 reduced this budget line to \$150,000 to support the deployment of six people for three months each.<sup>34</sup>

- 77) Finding appropriate people to deploy seems to be the main issue. There are two aspects to this problem. First, many rosters find it difficult to identify and attract appropriate new members. The majority of roster members are resident in the country where the roster is based. In some cases this is due to residency restrictions imposed on the roster by its donors, but even where this is not the case (e.g. NRC and DRC) the expense of recruiting and then providing training to people from a wide area is often prohibitive, as it may involve several trips to Europe prior to deployment. IRC, which recruits globally but does not provide or demand training prior to deployment, does not have this problem with its Surge roster. This in turn has a profound effect on the diversity of roster members. According to PROCAP's own figures, from May 2006, 82% of the people on the rosters come from Scandinavia, Australia or New Zealand. By contrast the IRC roster is approximately 15% North American, 40% European and 45% 'southern' (mainly Africa).
- 78) Second, recipient agencies are often reluctant to take people with limited field experience, even where they have significant professional experience and skills developed in their own country. An example cited on several occasions was of social workers working with Australian aboriginal communities. At the same time, the mandated agencies have commented that people on the rosters do not always meet their requirements. Neither of these issues are being dealt with on a systematic basis by PROCAP. In order to increase diversity, PROCAP has invested significant time in courting two 'southern' rosters, Mercy Malaysia and SAFDEM. Although DRC and Mercy Malaysia are continuing to discuss 'ways forward', to date, this has not delivered any results. Based on the experience of IRC, PROCAP's main strategy should be to address issues within rosters that restrict diversity within existing rosters, rather than explicitly seeking southern-based rosters. This recommendation runs contrary to the conclusions of the May 2006 consultants' report on diversity in rosters; however, that recommendation has not borne fruit and seems unlikely to do so to any significant extent in the near future.
- 79) One area in which PROCAP has had success has been increasing communication between the different roster operators. They all found that meetings convened by PROCAP created a new forum that has allowed some of these common issues to be brought to the fore. This forum should be built upon in order to deal with the substantive issues that are preventing the rosters from expanding (see below).

### **3.2. PROCAP Protection Training**

- 80) In addition to promoting protection, PROCAP has run three five-day training courses for a total of 56 participants from the NGO rosters. Participants, those running the rosters and staff of the mandated agencies have all praised the course, which focuses on core skills and systematic situation analysis. All of the rosters cite the training as the most important contribution that PROCAP has made to their work.
- 81) The development of the course was well executed, in particular the decision to base the content on an analysis of the attitudes, skills and behaviours that make deployments of standby personnel more or less effective. The first course was delivered behind schedule, but as quickly as was realistically possible given the constraints faced. The most significant of these was the lack of agreement on course content, and the lack of trust between the mandated agencies and those developing the course. Although the training departments of each agency made a significant and welcome investment in developing the course materials and each was pleased with the outcome, the level of control they sought to exercise resulted in inefficiency. Furthermore, with the exception of OHCHR, which provided a staff member for

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<sup>34</sup> These figures are drawn from the project's budgetary documents and interviews with NRC.

the duration of the course in Geneva, the mandated agencies have opted to bring people in and out for particular sessions.

- 82) In terms of participation, the PROCAP training course was designed for experienced individuals. The initial course asked for five years of prior professional experience and preferred a prior deployment with a UN agency. Most of the rosters considered this unrealistic given the types of people they could attract. In practice (based on responses to a survey), 50% of the participants had less than two years of protection experience, and 65% had less than one year of *field* protection experience. However, 70% of participants had previously worked for a mandated agency.
- 83) Just under 40% of respondents have been deployed to a mandated agency after the course. Of these, a quarter had not worked for a mandated agency before, and only half of these believed that the course was instrumental in their deployment. In interviews, the mandated agencies claimed that participation in the course did not increase the chances of selection for deployment. The course has thus not to date increased the number of protection people available to the mandated agencies, i.e. it has not taken people who would not otherwise have been deployable and converted them into deployable 'profiles'. However, given the entry requirements of the course it is arguable that this was never the objective.
- 84) The team has found that the course made a significant contribution to the quality of the work of the participants. Of the people who have been deployed to the mandated agencies following the training, just over half said that it was very relevant, and they used what they learnt regularly; the remainder said it was quite relevant and they used it in their work. Indeed, the participants interviewed all praised the focus on transferable skills, such as strategy development and the identification of interlocutors. Many felt that colleagues in the field would benefit from similar training, as it promotes a wide reaching analysis rather than a narrow agency-specific agenda as the foundation of protection intervention. By contrast, the mandated agencies all said that the course was insufficient preparation for the field as it did not provide participants with adequate agency-specific skills, for example how to carry out effective human rights monitoring.
- 85) When asked how replicable the course was, and how the degree to which quality depended on the individual trainers (Liam Mahoney and Christine Knudsen), all emphasised the need for trainers able to bring their own significant experience of protection to the course.
- 86) The course cost approximately \$18,000 to develop. The cost of delivery in Geneva at \$270 per participant day (excluding travel and DSA of participants) is comparable to the cost of the Reach Out training programme on refugee protection delivered between 2000 and 2005. The cost in Australia and Kenya rose to around \$410 and \$490 per participant day due to the higher travel costs of the facilitators<sup>35</sup> and the fewer participants present. In 2007, PROCAP plans to hold four training courses, each for 25 people. Assuming that these remain five-day courses, this equates to \$333 per participant day.
- 87) In addition to the training provided by PROCAP, all of the rosters provide in-house training on humanitarian affairs, security management and similar subjects. Indeed they all insist on roster members having received this training prior to deployment. People deployed by SCF *must* complete UNHCR's induction training prior to deployment as part of the deal between the two agencies. However, the rosters do not have systematic access to agency training programmes. Instead, this is negotiated on an *ad hoc* basis. Some rosters send people on UNICEF's child protection training or UNHCR's Workshop on Emergency Management. DRC regularly hosts training programmes such as OCHA's orientation course in order to secure places for its staff.

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<sup>35</sup> And consequently reduced travel costs for the participants.

- 88) The evaluation team strongly endorses the continuation of the training programme, although it recommends that PROCAP ensures that each course has the full 25 participants to keep the cost in the region of \$300 per participant day. The team also endorses the proposed Training of Trainers (ToT) approach, and recommends the SPHERE model of a small number of 'certified' trainers. This course should remain supplementary to, not a replacement for, training in agency-specific mandates and protocols, which must remain the responsibility of the individual agencies. In addition to this, with the global Protection Cluster establishing a Training Task Force (Facilitated by UNHCR; due for completion February 2007), there is an opportunity for PROCAP to support the rosters in accessing the available training in a systematic and coordinated manner.

### 3.3. Certification, Selection & Quality Control

- 89) PROCAP has also been seeking to integrate a certification process with the training course. Discussions have taken place with a consultant, identified by the University of Turin, on a methodology for certification, based on a combination of knowledge, core competencies and demonstrated skills to be assessed and tested during PROCAP training. According to the September 2006 Steering Committee minutes, this is to 'assist in evaluating varying levels of competence and would streamline the process of deployment through identification of those with a known level of protection knowledge'. It was asserted that the 'certification of agency-agreed core competencies is [...] key to this, in order to reduce negotiation about profiles'.
- 90) Whilst it is accepted that negotiation about profiles is a significant obstacle to an efficient deployment process, few interviewees believed that this form of certification would provide the solution. None of the mandated agencies claimed to look at whether an individual had been through PROCAP training in deciding whether to deploy, and did not support its use in a certification process. The roster operators had similar views, and pointed to trust between themselves and the mandated agencies as being key.
- 91) Two models are worth considering. The first is the model used by SCF Norway and Sweden in their agreement with UNHCR. In this case, UNHCR makes a request to Save the Children and, if it is able to, SCF sends UNHCR a person to fulfil the TORs. UNHCR plays no role in the selection process. Although this agreement was the result of tough negotiations, the relationship works because sufficient trust has been built up over the last ten years. However, SCF only sends child protection specialists, an area in which it has particular expertise and which, for UNHCR, is subsidiary to its core mandate. It is doubtful whether such an approach could be applied to protection generalists working within the core expertise of the mandated agencies.
- 92) The second is the IRC Surge model. IRC has a rigorous recruitment process involving initial screening, a three-hour protection competency test, an interview and the checking of three references prior to candidates being submitted to UNHCR for approval to join the roster. Once candidates (about 5% of initial applicants) are on the roster, their CVs can be put to UNHCR for individual deployments. Several CVs may be submitted and UNHCR will then choose between them. UNHCR professes to be very happy with this arrangement, noting that 'people request Surge deployments because there are no bad experiences'.
- 93) Until individual rosters build up the necessary levels of trust with the agencies concerned, it would be more appropriate for PROCAP to support rosters working to the second (Surge) model. This is particularly pertinent in light of the work of the Protection Cluster to develop core competencies and skill profiles for protection officers (facilitated by TDH, which is using the competencies developed for PROCAP as a starting point; due for completion March 2007). This should allow rosters that deploy to multiple agencies to recruit to a common framework, and should meet the requirements of the recipient agencies. It also allows skills and competencies developed outside the humanitarian arena to be recognised.
- 94) In addition, DRC has had very positive experiences with WFP. People on their (non-protection) roster with skills developed outside the humanitarian sphere are taken on one month

mentored deployments and supported into the organisation. While DRC are already negotiating similar arrangements (for two to three month mentored deployments) with UNHCR, there is an opportunity for PROCAP to support the rosters in developing such arrangements on a more systematic basis.

- 95) As well as improving the efficiency of the deployment process, both types of intervention will help to address the issue faced by most of the rosters of finding an entry-point for highly qualified professionals who do not yet have field experience of humanitarian work.

### **3.4.Process and Efficiency: PROCAP Online**

- 96) Over the last six months PROCAP has invested a significant amount of time and spent approximately \$23,000 developing an interactive website for the roster operators, roster members and roster users, as well as for the SPOs. The ambitious plan was inspired by the virtual 'Onsite Operations Coordination Centres' (OSOCC). These appear to have become very successful in the management of responses to rapid-onset natural disasters.
- 97) There are three main aspects to the site. The first is a searchable resource bank of protection materials. While the resources available are relatively comprehensive, there is a danger that the quantity of material available is becoming overwhelming, and PROCAP should consider prioritising and flagging a small number of key materials that complement the PROCAP training.
- 98) The second aspect of the PROCAP website is the creation of private interactive forums on which SPOs, roster members and roster operators can share materials. The aim is to create a 'community of practice' between members. As the forums only went live in January 2007 it is too early to judge conclusively what the uptake has been like, and whether the site will manage to establish itself. At the time of writing<sup>36</sup> there have been a total of 34 postings on the SPO section of the forums.
- 99) For both of these aspects of the website, it is questionable whether PROCAP is the most suitable host. The Protection Cluster is also developing a website which will include an 'interactive field practice room' to share protection experiences (UNHCR facilitating; due for completion March 2007 according to the workplan, but unlikely to be delivered on time). It is thus suggested that the PROCAP Steering Committee work to ensure that the 'community of practice' aspects of the website be relocated here as discrete discussion areas open to all who require them. The annual technical meetings recommended above for the SPOs should engender closer working relationships, and the dedicated chat room should be moved to the 'interactive field practice room' on the Protection Cluster website, if it is required. A simpler method of achieving the same end might be to set up a group email.
- 100) The final aspect of the website is a database of roster members available for deployment. The objective of the database was to allow field offices to get live information on which roster members are available for deployment, thus reducing the need to ring around multiple agencies. Although around 50 'profiles' have been entered into the database, it has not been a success. The recipient agencies (UNHCR and UNICEF) both said that they did not need an extra layer between themselves and the rosters; the roster operators believe that it is almost impossible to keep the online information up to date. This was acknowledged in the September 2006 partner meeting. All the rosters make considerable efforts to build relationships with their members. If the database functioned as envisaged, this important human resource aspect would be lost.

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<sup>36</sup> 5 March 2007.

- 101) The team thus recommends that the database function of PROCAP online be discontinued. Instead, the website should reposition itself in line with the recommendations below to build a community of practice and provide support and information specifically to roster operators and the agencies that use or are considering using roster members, rather than targeting individual protection officers.

### **3.5. Conclusions & Recommendations (Junior Protection Staff)**

- 102) At a time when the global Protection Cluster is emphasising inter-agency protection cooperation and coordination, including the development of joint needs assessment (by the Needs Assessment Task Force, facilitated by UNHCR and due to complete the framework by March 2007), there is a strong argument for developing a cadre of protection specialists at a junior level who have experience working across multiple agencies. The rosters are failing to locate or attract suitably qualified and experienced protection officers available for flexible deployment. The team thus concludes that it is important that PROCAP continues its work to improve the quantity and quality of roster members with protection skills.
- 103) The team concludes that PROCAP has made a valuable contribution to the quality of roster members through the provision of the training course. By convening meetings between roster operators, PROCAP has also played an important role in highlighting common issues faced by these rosters. However, PROCAP has not addressed those issues to a significant degree, and has not succeeded in increasing the number of protection profiles to the extent anticipated. Nor has it significantly increased diversity amongst the rosters (particularly when contrasted with the IRC Surge roster). This may have been in part due to the short time available. However, the team considers that the decisive factor was the issues which PROCAP chose to address.
- 104) With this in mind, the team recommends that PROCAP reposition itself in a facilitation and support role to roster providers, the agencies and the protection clusters. Its primary objective should be to help existing rosters to recruit and develop protection ‘profiles’ suitable for deployment. In particular, PROCAP (PSU) should:
- Continue to promote protection with experienced roster providers which do not yet provide protection staff (as per DRC and RedR Australia previously). This should include non-funded rosters (such as RedR in the UK) which service not only the UN agencies but also NGOs, who are increasingly demanding protection staff. In particular, PROCAP should look towards rosters which can bring human rights experience into the mix. Diversity should primarily be promoted by addressing limiting factors within rosters, not by seeking new rosters from new areas.
  - Facilitate the signing of MoUs between roster providers and the mandated agencies. In particular, PROCAP should work with OHCHR to develop an appropriate standard MoU so that it is able to benefit from this resource.
  - Bring the roster providers together so that they can work with the protection cluster to identify core competencies for protection officers. Encourage the roster providers to recruit to these competencies when selecting people for their rosters.
  - Have the roster providers agree recruitment procedures with the mandated agencies that allow the mandated agencies to feel confident in the protection profiles on the rosters. This may include a process of pre-approval as per the Surge example.
  - Encourage the roster operators and mandated agencies to agree on the training, potentially including PROCAP training on core protection skills, required for each deployment. Where that training is agency-specific (e.g. in human rights monitoring), agree with the mandated agencies what is required and help the rosters to secure the necessary places on the training programmes of that agency.
  - Bring the roster operators and mandated agencies together to develop a scheme of mentored deployments similar to the arrangement that DRC has with WFP. These



deployments should be used to allow individuals with substantial professional expertise to gain their first field experience.

With regard to current activities, the team recommends that:

- PROCAP continues to provide training in core protection skills as per the existing course. Furthermore, that PROCAP builds a small cadre of ‘certified’ trainers who can carry out training sessions on behalf of the rosters.
- PROCAP ceases to investigate using the PROCAP course as a certification process for protection officers. [*Note that the materials developed have already been provided by PSU to the Task Team on Competencies.*]
- PROCAP ceases to run a ‘live’ database of roster members available for deployment.
- PROCAP remodels the current website specifically to provide information and support to roster operators and agencies currently using or considering the use of rosters, based on the activities outlined above. The Steering Committee should consider offering the work already carried out on developing a protection resource bank and communities of practice to the Protection Cluster for inclusion on its website.
- IRC’s Surge project provides a good example of a cost-effective recruitment regime, based on telephone interviews and an extensive written examination followed by a further interview for those who succeed. Surge also enters some roster members into UNHCR’s six-month Protection Learning Programme. It is recommended that PROCAP promote these aspects of best practice with the roster operators, in particular helping roster members to access agency-specific training. This should be supplemental to pre-deployment training.
- Finally, the team recommends that OHCHR begin to make use of the rosters as a way of bringing humanitarian expertise into the organisation. In line with the recommendations to PROCAP, the team recommends that OHCHR decide what additional support or training roster members may require to be able to work effectively within the organisation, and work with PROCAP to ensure that it is available.

## 4. Management of PROCAP

### 4.1. PROCAP Steering Committee

- 105) Overall management of PROCAP has been undertaken by a Steering Committee comprising representatives from UNHCR, UNICEF, OHCHR, OCHA and ICVA (representing NGOs) and NRC (as an observer). A total of 35 people have participated over the course of the 15 meetings held. Despite this, there has been a reasonable degree of continuity in the representation of the agencies. ICVA has been notable by its absence. It is suggested that, although ICVA has a wide membership base that includes many southern NGOs, it is not a particularly suitable NGO representative on a body that deals specifically with protection capacity. The evaluation team thus recommends that ICVA be replaced on the Steering Committee with a representative selected by the roster operators working with PROCAP.
- 106) The Steering Committee has been as much involved in day-to-day management issues as in providing strategic direction for the project. In particular this has included approving both the appointment and the deployment of individual SPOs. While some of the deployments have involved considerable negotiation of the TORs, there is no evidence to suggest that this is the result of overly bureaucratic processes, but rather that the request did not fully meet the 'strategic' criteria. UNHCR, UNICEF and OHCHR all separately commented on the amount of time devoted to attending monthly meetings. Furthermore, both UNHCR and UNICEF reported that considerable changes were frequently required before they could approve the meeting minutes, suggesting that the authors were not fully reflecting the discussions that took place.
- 107) Because the mandated agencies (as reflected in the minutes of the February 2007 meeting) give greatest weight to the use of SPOs in filling operational gaps rather than playing the interagency leadership role, these agencies tend to want decision-making powers in the day-to-day running of PROCAP. While this may remain appropriate for the final approval of SPO recruitments, the Steering Committee needs to revisit the principles according to which deployments are made, with a view to agreeing a system for prioritisation.
- 108) The team recommends that the Steering Committee should continue to agree the appointment of SPOs, but that it should cease to manage individual deployments. Where significant modifications to the ToRs are recommended by OCHA, this should be negotiated between the requesting UN Country Team, the requesting agency and the PSU. In turn, the PSU should provide a detailed report, including a financial breakdown, to the Steering Committee for consideration at each meeting.
- 109) The evaluation team recommends that the monthly Steering Committee meeting be replaced by a quarterly meeting to provide overall direction to the project, and in particular to decide on priority countries where conditions are right for PROCAP engagement. An extraordinary meeting or decision by email may be required in the event of major developments in a given crisis. The Steering Committee members should also take responsibility for actively promoting PROCAP in the priority countries and, through their own agencies, provide support when SPOs working in the field require organisational weight behind them in order to fulfil their functions.

### 4.2. Hosting of PROCAP

- 110) The question of which agency should manage the project was a recurrent topic of debate during interviews at Geneva and field level, with the project's donors, in particular, raising the issue in discussions. The team considered it relevant to include this issue in its evaluation in order to address the ongoing uncertainty resulting from such questioning.
- 111) UNHCHR and UNICEF believe that the management of the project should be subsumed into the Protection Cluster. This type of arrangement is being developed by other clusters, particularly Watsan. If this was to occur with PROCAP UNHCR, as the protection Cluster Lead, would be the natural host and the agency has signalled its interest in taking on this role in

Steering Committee meetings. In the opinion of the two agencies, such a transfer would provide two benefits. The first would be to assure a greater operational perspective within PROCAP and closer alignment between the work of the Protection Cluster Working Group and that of PROCAP. This in turn would reduce the time devoted to the two initiatives by the participating agencies.

- 112) However, many donors and in-country representatives felt that if one of the mandated agencies were to host PROCAP, this would undermine the project's inter-agency dimension. Indeed, one agency currently hosting an SPO indicated that it would not have requested a deployment if the project was managed by a mandated agency alone.
- 113) While the team endorses the view that PROCAP should become more relevant to the work of the Cluster, and has set out proposals above on how this can be achieved, it does not conclude that the project needs to transfer to UNHCR. In light of the inter-agency dimensions of the project and the fact that significant coordination is involved in its management, there is logic to it being managed by OCHA. Should the management shift to one of the mandated agencies, the team recommends that particular care is taken to preserve the project's inter-agency dimension.

#### **4.3. PROCAP Support Unit**

- 114) The PROCAP Support Unit consists of two people (L4, L3) as well as a part-time general service (G3) post. The first person only joined PROCAP in April 2006, and the second in August of that year. Prior to this, staff of the Internal Displacement Division acted as the support unit. Consultants were used to investigate issues such as diversity, and a potential partnership with SAFDEM. The budgeted cost of the Unit for 2007 is \$350,000.
- 115) On a day-to-day basis the PSU performs a secretariat function for the Steering Committee, a management function for the project and a support function for the SPOs. The first of these involves convening meetings and organising minutes. The second consists of managing PROCAP training courses, managing the Standby Partner online roster, record-keeping and reporting, including providing analysis on project progress to the Steering Committee. The support function to SPOs consists of supporting NRC in recruitment, processing deployment requests, coordinating the deployments themselves and supporting SPOs in the field, including through the development of a community of practice.
- 116) The PSU and IDD have also carried out a number of project functions, not least the setting up of the SPO system. They also initiated and designed the PROCAP protection training programme, built relationships with the six standby rosters and investigated relationships with three further rosters (Mercy Malaysia, Canadem and SAFDEM). Finally, they designed and created the PROCAP website.
- 117) A number of interviewees claimed that they did not understand the work of the PSU, did not know why it required two and a half staff members and questioned the division of roles between the PSU, the Steering Committee and NRC. A number of SPOs, in particular, felt that greater transparency on these issues would be helpful, as well as more proactive support. A document outlining the division of roles between the different stakeholders has been developed, and the team recommends that this is given to SPOs and other interested actors. In addition, the team recommends greater communication on the part of the Unit with SPOs in terms of reporting requirements and deadlines, end-dates, extensions and potential deployments, as well as the distribution of protection policies of relevance to the work of SPOs. Based mainly on the written materials provided and limited feedback from the SPOs, the evaluation team has concluded that the PSU has managed the day-to-day business of PROCAP reasonably effectively and efficiently. Some questions have been raised about the secretariat function for the Steering Committee, but only in terms of the accuracy of the meeting minutes.

- 118) Finally, regarding the project functions, the team has concluded that the IDD has been highly efficient and effective in getting the project funded and the SPO system up and running in the short period between the conception of the project (July 2005) and the first SPO deployment (December 2005). Although the first training course was delivered late, both training recipients and roster providers consider the quality of the product excellent and the cost is comparable with other similar courses, notably Reach Out. The team thus also concludes that the IDD and PSU have been effective and efficient in this activity.
- 119) The work of the IDD and PSU around the standby rosters has been less successful. Successes and failures have been examined above, but some resources have been wasted, certainly in the development of parts of PROCAP online, and arguably in efforts to bring Mercy Malaysia and SAFDEM into the PROCAP fold.<sup>37</sup>
- 120) Overall, the team concludes that the IDD and the PSU have performed well, and that two and a half posts is not excessive for the work currently carried out. The recommended actions to deal with the standby rosters are described elsewhere, and do not relate to the management of PSU itself. However, if accepted, the recommendations regarding support to the stand-by rosters will require a significant degree of human resource expertise. The team therefore suggests that, if these recommendations are accepted, PSU ensures that one of its staff is a human resources professional.

#### 4.4. Norwegian Refugee Council

- 121) The Norwegian Refugee Council was chosen as the host agency for the SPOs because of its long and successful track record in managing rosters and its existing standby arrangements with UNHCR, UNICEF and OCHA. NRC is responsible for advertising, screening candidates and contract management of the SPOs. The actual hiring decision rests with the Steering Committee. PROCAP funded one and a half full-time posts in NRC (approximately \$150,000) for this purpose until October 2006, and a single post thereafter. \$115,000 was also spent on recruitment (approximately \$9,600 per SPO recruited). Given the high level of these posts and the difficulty in finding suitable candidates, this did not strike the evaluation team as unreasonable.
- 122) Without exception, all of the SPOs recruited by NRC have praised the organisation for its professionalism throughout the recruitment and contracting process. While it has taken NRC almost a year to recruit the ten SPOs, this is largely attributed to the lack of available protection staff with the required profile. NRC advertised the positions extensively (including in the *Economist* and the *International Herald Tribune*, although these advertisements elicited no response), received over 700 applications, interviewed 40 people and made 16 job offers (five of which were turned down).
- 123) None of the people interviewed suggested that the delays in recruitment related to any inefficiency on the part of NRC. However, despite asking for the advertisements to be changed several times, NRC has been constrained by instructions from the Steering Committee that the P5 equivalent TORs<sup>38</sup> and selection criteria be maintained, despite the proven difficulty of finding candidates at this level, and despite the fact that the majority of SPOs actually hired have less experience. Furthermore, over the course of 2006, members of the Steering Committee have recommended candidates to NRC who did not meet the selection criteria (for example, due to a lack of field experience or language ability). Some of the candidates have subsequently been hired, so the overall result is favourable. However,

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<sup>37</sup> Mercy Malaysia is likely to enter a relationship with DRC whereby it screens South Asian candidates for the DRC roster. However, this does not address one of DRC's key constraints to increasing diversity: the cost of bringing people to Europe and back several times in order to provide them with the pre-deployment training that DRC considers mandatory.

<sup>38</sup> The equivalency relates to number of years of relevant experience. As noted earlier, successful candidates are contracted by NRC and are not UN staff.

requesting NRC to re-examine candidates who did not meet the criteria without re-examining the criteria themselves undermined both the efficiency and transparency of the process. NRC also feels that it is effectively being asked to do a significant amount of head-hunting in order to fill the expanded number of SPO positions for 2007. NRC does not believe that it has the skills or experience to perform this function efficiently.

- 124) As of the start of 2007, the criteria for selection have been eased to reflect the reality of the recruitment process. However, the issue of head-hunting has not been addressed. The team concludes that head-hunting will remain an important part of the SPO recruitment process, and recommends that the Steering Committee invite NRC to ask for the financial and technical support it requires in order to pursue this.

## 5.5 Conclusions & Recommendations (the Management of PROCAP)

- 125) From the beginning of the project until 29 September 2006<sup>39</sup> PROCAP had spent a total of \$2.23 million. The vast majority of this has been a grant of \$2 million to NRC to pay for the SPOs. By the end of 2006 NRC had spent approximately \$1.5 million of this grant, principally on SPO salaries and associated expenses. Of the remainder, staff costs accounted for \$69,000, consultants \$77,000, travel \$18,000, training \$41,000, general assistance \$13,000 and administration and support \$56,000. Although some of these resources have been wasted on activities that have not delivered results, the evaluation team has concluded that the overall cost-effectiveness of the project is acceptable. By providing the project with a clearer focus, in terms of the function of the SPOs and the role of PROCAP in relation to roster operators, the evaluation team believes that these inefficiencies can be reduced.
- 126) In terms of the management of the project, the evaluation team concludes that a higher level of trust needs to be generated between OCHA and the PSU on the one hand, and the mandated agencies on the other. This will allow the mandated agencies to concentrate on providing strategic direction to PROCAP and promoting and supporting it within their agencies, and will allow OCHA and the PSU to run the project efficiently, without micro-management from the outside. The team is aware that trust needs to be built over time, but makes the following recommendations:

Regarding the current structure:

- The Steering Committee should provide strategic leadership and support to PROCAP, including deciding on priority countries for interventions. Meetings should be reduced to one every three months.
- The Steering Committee should stop vetting individual SPO deployments, though it should continue to approve individual recruitments. The agencies should consider who the most appropriate people are to represent them on this strategic agenda.
- The PSU should provide a detailed report, including financial breakdowns, to the Steering Committee for consideration at each quarterly meeting.
- NGO representation on the Steering Committee should be passed to the roster operators working with PROCAP, which should then choose an individual to represent them on a basis that they deem appropriate.

Regarding the hosting of PROCAP:

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<sup>39</sup>The latest finalised figures provided to the evaluation team.

- OCHA should continue to host PROCAP, but ensure greater synergies with the Protection Cluster Working Group. If the hosting passes to a mandated agency, care should be taken to preserve the inter-agency nature of the project.

Regarding the PROCAP Support Unit:

- The size of the PSU is appropriate to deliver the type of project anticipated by the 2007 PROCAP strategy, in the light of the recommendations made by this evaluation. However, as a large part of the work of PROCAP is human resource-related, the evaluation team recommends that the Steering Committee ensure that one member of the team is an experienced human resources professional.

Regarding NRC:

- NRC received unequivocal support from all those interviewed during the course of the evaluation. The team thus strongly endorses it continuing in its role. The team also supports NRC's request for support (financial and technical as well as through introductions) from the Steering Committee to allow it to build up a small head-hunting capacity for the SPOs.

## 5. Summary of Evaluation Recommendations

- 1) The team endorses the original rationale for the PROCAP initiative and recommends its continuation. However, it should not be used as a substitute for building protection capacity within agencies.
- 2) The team recommends that deployments can be made to the HC's office, or to OCHA, to undertake strategic, policy development roles which are of benefit to an inter-agency response. In situations where the HC determines that additional protection capacity is required to support the inter-agency protection response, the team recommends that an HC can request an SPO deployment to a protection-mandated agency or to the Cluster Lead to ensure the fulfilment of the strategic coordination role.
- 3) The team believes that it should potentially be open to DPKO to request a PROCAP deployment where this would be of strategic value.<sup>40</sup>
- 4) The team recommends that the PSU ensures greater synergies with the Protection Cluster, including the facility to recommend deployments to one or two ongoing major humanitarian crises or contexts where the Cluster approach will be adopted, and which would benefit from additional capacity, including multiple deployments.

### Regarding the 'strategic' purpose of PROCAP:

- 5) Senior-level leadership roles should be re-asserted as the central pillar of PROCAP.
- 6) Mid-level (design and implementation) roles should also be recognised as 'strategic' and deployment should be allowed to fulfil such roles, when specific conditions are in place.
- 7) Purely operational, staff-substitution or 'bridging' roles in times of recruitment difficulties or delays should not normally be undertaken by PROCAP. Such deployments should only be considered where a clear strategic purpose can be proven, and administrative staff are in place to support the SPO.

### Regarding the duration of deployments:

- 8) Initial deployments of up to nine months should be allowed to all contexts, with a mid-term review which endorses the inter-agency strategic impact of the deployment. Extension to 12 months should be possible upon evidence that a credible recruitment process has been set in motion for replacement of the SPO.
- 9) Where there is a gap in deployment, the SPO should be brought to Geneva to support the work of the Protection Cluster or one of the mandated protection agencies.

### Regarding prioritising and increasing deployment requests:

- 10) A mechanism for prioritisation should be agreed by the Steering Committee and the minimum criteria should be expanded. Senior-level strategic work at a national or multi-regional level and support to the roll-out of the cluster should be given priority. Mid-level (design and implementation) deployments for work at sub-national level should be the next priority, and operational roles should be considered only as a last resort. Minimum conditions for deployment should include supervision by the Representative or the Head of Protection of the requesting agency, or the Humanitarian Coordinator.

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<sup>40</sup> The deployment to DPKO indicates a deployment to an Integrated Mission under DPKO.

- 11) The PSU and the Steering Committee should increase promotion of PROCAP and communication of its purpose. Regular emails should be circulated by the participating agencies highlighting the initiative. PSU should increase contact with field-level Protection Working Groups to promote its use. Examples of the types of roles and tasks undertaken to date should be provided.

#### **On the issue of recruiting and supporting SPOs:**

- 12) The bar on UN staff members taking leave of absence to work as an SPO should be lifted. This should be limited to one year only, with approval from the individual's supervisor, and should be undertaken on a secondment basis.
- 13) NRC should elaborate a head-hunting policy for approval by the Steering Committee. Head-hunting should then be actively pursued by NRC and the other agencies engaged in PROCAP.
- 14) The training facilities of the mandated agencies should be made available to SPOs. In addition, OCHA, in collaboration with the Protection Cluster Working Group, should develop a training package targeted at PROCAP SPOs with a focus on the strategic leadership and coordination of protection.
- 15) NRC should work with the human resource departments of OHCHR and UNICEF to identify individuals with strong human rights and child protection backgrounds. Efforts to expand the diversity of members of the roster should continue, with NRC and OCHA working through their country offices to identify suitable in-country candidates.
- 16) A mechanism for payment of SPOs should be established.

#### **In relation to stand-by rosters:**

- 17) Continue to promote protection with experienced roster providers who do not yet provide protection staff. This should include non-funded rosters (such as RedR in the UK) which also service NGOs. In particular, PROCAP should look to rosters which can bring human rights experience into the mix. Diversity should primarily be promoted by addressing limiting factors within rosters, not by seeking new rosters from new areas.
- 18) Facilitate the signing of MoUs between roster providers and the mandated agencies. In particular, PROCAP should work with OHCHR to develop an appropriate standard MoU.
- 19) Bring the roster providers together so that they can work with the protection cluster to identify core competencies for protection officers. Encourage the roster providers to recruit to these competencies when selecting people for their rosters.
- 20) Convene the roster providers to agree recruitment procedures with the mandated agencies that allow these agencies to feel confident in the protection profiles on the rosters. This may include a process of pre-approval as per Surge.
- 21) Convene the roster operators and mandated agencies to agree on the training required for each deployment. Where that training is agency-specific (e.g. in human rights monitoring), agree with the mandated agencies what is required and help the rosters to secure the necessary places on the training programmes of that agency.
- 22) Convene the roster operators and mandated agencies to develop a scheme of mentored deployments.



**With regard to current activities, the team recommends that:**

- 23) PROCAP continues to provide training in core protection skills as per the existing course. Furthermore, PROCAP builds a small cadre of ‘certified’ PROCAP trainers to carry out training sessions on behalf of the rosters.
- 24) PROCAP ceases to investigate using the PROCAP course as a certification process for protection officers. *[Note that the materials developed have already been provided by PSU to the Task Team on Competencies.]*
- 25) PROCAP ceases to run a ‘live’ database of roster members available for deployment.
- 26) PROCAP remodels the current website specifically to provide information and support to roster operators and information for agencies currently using or considering the use of rosters. The Steering Committee should consider offering the work already carried out on developing a protection resource bank and communities of practice to the Protection Cluster for inclusion on its website.
- 27) IRC’s Surge project provides a good example of a cost-effective recruitment regime. It is recommended that PROCAP promote these aspects of best practice with the roster operators, in particular helping roster members to access agency-specific training. However, this should be supplemental to pre-deployment training.
- 28) Finally, the team recommends that OHCHR begin to make use of the rosters as a tool to bring humanitarian expertise into the organisation. In line with the recommendations to PROCAP, the team recommends that OHCHR decide what additional support or training roster members may require, and on this basis work with PROCAP to ensure it is available.

**Regarding the current structure:**

- 29) The Steering Committee’s role should be to provide strategic leadership and support to PROCAP, including deciding on priority countries for interventions. Meetings should be reduced to one every three months.
- 30) The Committee should cease to vet individual SPO deployments, though it should continue to approve individual recruitments. The agencies should consider who the most appropriate people are to represent them on this strategic agenda.
- 31) The PSU should provide a detailed report, including financial breakdowns, to the Steering Committee for consideration at each (quarterly) meeting.
- 32) NGO representation on the Steering Committee should be passed to the roster operators working with PROCAP, who should then choose an individual to represent them.

**Regarding the hosting of PROCAP:**

- 33) OCHA should continue to host PROCAP, but should ensure greater synergies with the Protection Cluster Working Group. If hosting passes to a mandated agency, care should be taken to preserve the inter-agency nature of the project.

**Regarding the PROCAP Support Unit:**

- 34) The PROCAP Support Unit is appropriate to the type of project anticipated by the 2007 PROCAP strategy. However, the evaluation team recommends that the Steering Committee ensure that one member of the team is an experienced human resources professional.

**Regarding NRC:**

- 35) NRC received unequivocal support from all those interviewed during the course of the evaluation. The team thus strongly endorses it continuing in its role. The team also supports NRC's request for support from the Steering Committee to allow it to build up a small headhunting capacity for the SPOs.

## **Annexes**

Annex 1: Evaluation Terms of Reference

Annex 2: Inception Report, including description of methods used

Annex 3: Persons interviewed

Annex 4: Strategic nature of deployments

Annex 5: Speed of deployments

Annex 6: Survey of Trainees

Annex 7: Selected Results of Survey



## **DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE Evaluation of the PROCAP**

### **1. Background**

The Protection Standby Project [ProCap] aims to enhance UN protection response and contribute to global protection capacity through the predictable and effective deployment, of personnel with proven protection expertise. It thus reinforces the strategic and operational protection response for Internally Displaced Persons [IDPs] and other vulnerable groups in emergencies and protracted complex crisis. ProCap is a critical part of the inter-agency global capacity building effort to the Humanitarian Reform Agenda and is consistent with and supportive of the goals of the global Protection Cluster.

Initially launched in November 2005 by OCHA/IDD in close consultation with UN partner agencies and NGO standby partners, including OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Danish Refugee Council, Save the Children Norway and Sweden, Austcare and RedR Australia. It is an emergency standby mechanism which serves to strengthen the capacity and quality of the UN's collaborative protection response in humanitarian emergencies.

In June 2005, the Secretary General's report on "Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations, identified significant gaps in key sectors of humanitarian response, including protection, as well as the need to reinvest in systematic capacity for humanitarian response. In both this report and other reviews of humanitarian response, protection in emergency situations, including in relation to the internally displaced, was highlighted as a major concern. In addressing the identified gaps, the Humanitarian Reform Agenda seeks to enhance humanitarian response capacity, predictability, accountability and partnership in order to reach more beneficiaries, with more comprehensive needs-based relief and protection, in a more effective and timely manner. A key component of the Humanitarian Reform Agenda, focuses on mapping and enhancing the response capacities of national, regional and international actors, particularly their human resources, and increasing surge capacity.

The role of ProCap in mitigating capacity gaps and reinforcing existing standby capacity was recognised in the original project document and remains vital to meeting one of the key 2006 objectives for the Protection Cluster at a global level; sufficient and well-trained protection capacity and preparedness at the global level, enabling the humanitarian community to mount a timely and effective protection response to two-three new emergencies per year of 500,000 persons. To achieve this, the Cluster aims to have effectively trained, inter-agency surge capacity and standby partnerships in place, to put in place protection strategies on the basis of joint needs assessments, to expand existing standby deployment schemes and to enhance training of field staff.

The project responds to priority gaps and needs in emergency protection response and is a flexible deployment mechanism aimed at (1) increasing the number of experienced senior protection personnel available for short – term missions (Tier I) and (2) increasing the number of protection profiles within NGO standby pools and improving the quality of temporary protection personnel through additional training (Tier II). ProCap personnel are deployed to support protection-mandated agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, OHCHR). ProCap is linked to the current IASC reform initiatives arising from the Humanitarian Response Review and is consistent with the responsibilities of the Protection Cluster to increase response capacities.

The expected results of ProCap are:

1. Support to protection mandated agencies and country teams to strengthen their operational response.
2. Development of field-based comprehensive protection strategies and appropriately tailored protection mechanisms.

ProCap project oversight is provided by an inter-agency Steering Committee composed of representatives of OCHA, UNICEF, OHCHR and UNHCR as well as an NGO representative (International Council of Voluntary Agencies, ICVA). NRC attends Steering Committee meetings as an observer. Recruitment and administrative management of the core team of senior protection officers is undertaken by the NRC through a memorandum of understanding with OCHA. The ProCap Support Unit, hosted by OCHA/Internal Displacement Division (IDD) in Geneva, acts as the secretariat for the Steering Committee, and liaises with NRC. Additional tools for improved interaction with the various partners and participants of the project are currently under development, which include an internet tool (ProCap Online).

The initial objectives of the project were outlined in the *'Proposal to Increase International Capacity for Protection (ProCap): A Pilot Project (29 July 2005)* and implementation began in October 2005. The first year of implementation was completed on 30 September 2006. Proposed initiatives for the development of the project in 2006-7 has been mapped out in the *'Strategy Paper, 1 October 2006 – 30 September 2007'* developed by the Inter-Agency Steering Committee and shared with stakeholders in October 2006. The Steering Committee agreed to request a six-month no-cost extension from donors as a result of cost under spends during the initial phase.

The initial project proposal envisaged a quantitative and qualitative assessment of ProCap after the first six months. However, this was not undertaken due to the staggered recruitment of senior protection officers and the late establishment of the ProCap Support Unit. ProCap is now completing its first phase of implementation and OCHA/IDD, the Steering Committee and ProCap stakeholders have requested that the external evaluation should be completed before mid-February 2007.

## **2.0 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation**

The main purpose of the evaluation is to:

- (1) Review the impact of deployments (for both Tier I and Tier II)
- (2) Review administrative/managerial set-up of the project
- (3) Through the review of (1) & (2), assess overall achievements and added-value of the project.

The evaluation is intended to be comprehensive and encompass all areas of the project: deployment, capacity building and strategic impact of senior protection officers; efforts to build of standby protection officers; synergies of these components; as well as managerial structures.

## **3.0 Issues to be addressed by the Evaluation:**

### **(1) Review the impact of the Project**

#### **Tier I**

- Relevance (including timeliness) and strategic nature of deployments, including the substantive coherence and clarity of tasks assigned to SPO
- Assess contribution of Tier I deployments to receiving agencies, Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators and to protection response/strategy of the protection cluster as a whole.
- **Identify obstacles for Tier 1 deployments. [it would be good to keep in because if there are blockages, then the evaluators need to find these and assist everyone concerned in making recommendations to move forward].**
- Assess agency response and support to SPO deployments at HQ and field level
- Assess reliability of recruitment process for selection of candidates with the appropriate profile/skills/experience for the tasks (Roster assessment)
- Explore the efforts agencies have made to merge the concept of bolstering protection capacity efforts within their respective organisations in complementarity with the project.

#### **Tier II**

- **(The first three bullet points were removed by the SC). Why? Tier 1 talks about relevance etc, and tier 11 should look at this as well.**
- Assess conceptual clarity of the project, in particular coordination, capacity building and training aspects. The aims of Tier II as defined in the project documentation will be evaluated, and any

changes in dynamics on establishment of Tier II since the initial establishment of ProCap will be recorded.

- Assess added-value to stand-by partners.
- Assess the value-added provided through the ProCap training programme

## **(2) Review administrative/managerial set-up of the project**

### **Steering Committee**

- Review set-up, methodology, membership, efficiency, support and cost effectiveness.

### **ProCap Support Unit**

- Evaluation of the type of activities and support provided to the Steering Committee, Agencies, NGOs, Donors, SPOs; efficiency, cost effectiveness.

### **NRC**

- Evaluation of the management of the SPO roster, recruitment process, and links with the ProCap Support Unit, Steering Committee, Agencies and SPOs.

### **Donors**

- Assessment of the interface with donors.

### **Tier II**

- Review of extent to which the size, set up, and diversity of standby rosters have worked. Make initial suggestions for other ways in which to strengthen the rosters.

### **ProCap Online**

- Evaluation of relevance, conceptual and operational clarity (clear purpose and usefulness to users Agencies, Support Unit and Stand-by Partners)

## **4.0 Proposed Method**

- Two external consultants will be recruited for this evaluation. The first would focus on aspects listed under (1) above, and the second on issues listed under (2) above.

b) The evaluation will be carried out through:

- Analyses of various sources of information including desk reviews<sup>1</sup>, interviews with key stakeholders (ProCap/IDD staff, NRC, IASC, steering committee members, relevant partner agencies, donors, agency field staff and HC/RCs); and through cross-validation or triangulation of data.
- A simple mapping exercise should be completed at the outset of the evaluation and details should include numbers of personnel deployed, countries, length of deployment, time taken to recruit and deploy, numbers trained etc.
- Results or indicators of success should be measured, where it is appropriate to do so, against the current work plan and existing set of process and impact indicators.

c) The evaluation will be fully independent. It will seek the views of all relevant actors. A representative sampling of all stakeholders in ProCap, including UN Agencies and NGO partners, Country Teams receiving ProCap protection officers, as well as donors, should be established. In addition:

- As part of this consultative process, an **evaluation workshop** will be organised by the Consultants, provisionally in Nairobi, to seek feedback on all aspects of the ProCap project. The team leader should participate and play a key role in this workshop. Participants should include, *inter alia*, Senior Protection

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<sup>1</sup> e.g. A Proposal to Increase International Capacity for Protection (ProCap): A Pilot Project Interim Review of ProCap Implementation, March 2006; Strategic Deployments of ProCap Senior Protection officers: An Informal Review, July 2006; ProCap Leaflet, September 2006; Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap) Strategy Paper, 1 October 2006 – 30 September 2007.

Officers, Standby Protection Experts, representatives of host agencies and Country Teams receiving Tier I and Tier II deployments.

- **Consultative meetings** will also be held in Geneva with key stakeholders in the project, including donors.

d) The period of analysis will be September 2005 -December 2006 inclusive.

e) Within the standard methodologies common to evaluate UN funded projects, the consultant will be required to propose the **methodology** for achieving the stated objectives of the consultancy [including project country visits to three out of four of the following receiving countries: Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Pakistan], and a detailed **work plan** for completing the work. Final reporting should include or propose options on how the evaluation should be utilised. The consultants should propose an action plan based on their recommendations for stakeholders to take forward. Consultants are referred to the norms and standards for evaluation established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (the two documents are available from the website of the OCHA Evaluation and Studies Unit: <http://ochaonline.un.org/esu>).

f) An **inception report** will be required including a detailed **methodological note**. A format for the inception report will be provided by the OCHA Evaluation and Studies Unit.

g) The final output of the consultancy will be an **evaluation report**, which shall contain the elements specified in the document on standards for evaluation (pp.17-23) developed by the United Nations Evaluation Group (available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/esu>).

## **5.0 Management Arrangements**

The CVs of potential consultants will be circulated for Steering Committee comment, which shall be given within 24 hours. The consultants will report to ESS/OCHA. The Steering Committee itself will be asked to review and comment on the TOR, inception report and the draft report.

The ESS evaluation manager will follow the evaluation process closely, will assist in the preparation of all necessary documentation in collaboration with the ProCap Support Unit/IDD and the participating agencies, and will stay in regular contact with the evaluation team for the duration of the evaluation exercise, and review, disseminate and collate comments on the draft report. The Steering Committee will provide the ProCap Support Unit with a list of interviewees and the latter will assist in setting up appointments with UN agency/NGO staff members involved in ProCap.

The ProCap Support Unit/IDD will provide logistical support to the evaluation team, assist in gathering all relevant background information, setting up relevant appointments and coordinating/organizing the field visits of the team.

The ProCap Steering Committee also commits to developing a management response matrix to respond/react to the recommendations made by the Team. This management response matrix will include an indication on whether or not the recommendation is approved, how it will be implemented (if agreed), by whom and by when.

## **6.0 Competency and expertise requirements**

This evaluation requires senior expertise and a thorough understanding of the UN humanitarian system, familiarity with the working of humanitarian agencies and an in-depth knowledge of issues related to protection (In particular for the consultant focusing on issues listed under (1)). In addition, expertise on cost-efficiency and cost effectiveness analysis and project management will be required.

It is envisaged that two consultants will be required to carry out the evaluation. The team leader (TL) will be responsible for drafting the report; the second team member (TM) will provide inputs into the report, research support and most likely focus all evaluation aspects regarding management and cost-efficiency and cost-benefit analysis. However, the final workload distribution will be decided upon by the team in collaboration with the Steering Committee during the briefing phase.

## **7.0 Deliverables**



a) The Consultants will produce the following deliverables:

- An inception report
- A presentation on the preliminary findings
- A draft final report, reflecting comments received from the Core Learning Group
- Presentation of the draft final report (including a PowerPoint and proposal for utilisation of findings)
- Workshop with key stakeholders, including donors, on the draft final report
- Final report

b) Reporting - The final report should be succinct and fully edited report in English of no more than 15,000 words in a printed and an electronic version. The report will include an executive summary (up to 2,500 words) and will address all of the key issues indicated above. The report should be structured to provide succinct conclusions for each issue as well as specific, targeted and action-oriented key recommendations. The annex will include a description of the method used, a bibliography, list of persons interviewed and the terms of reference.

**8.0 Timing and Duration:**

c) It is foreseen that the evaluation will require the consultants to work for a total of x working days over an estimated overall duration of 8 weeks. The fully edited report shall be submitted to OCHA’s Evaluation and Studies Unit no later than end - February 2007. The report will be shared with IASC members as well as the Donor Support Group.

d) The evaluation field missions are expected to take place in January 2006.

**9.0 Tentative Timeline:**

		TL	TM
Briefing with ESS ( 1 day) (possibly by phone)	(week 1)	1	1
Desk Review (including interviews with key stakeholders by phone/email/) ( 5 days)	(week 2 -3)	5	5
Inception Report (writing and submission) (1 day)	(week 4)	1	1
Discussion and (as needed) revision of the Inception report (1 day)	(week 4)	1	
Visit to Geneva (5 days) – Interview with key stakeholders	(week 5-6)	5	5
Field Visits (visit to 3 countries, 3 days each) that have benefited from PROCAP deployments; participation in a regional stakeholder workshop, provisionally in Nairobi (15 days)	(week 6-7)	15	-
Presentation in Geneva on preliminary findings (2 day)	(week 8)	2	2
Draft Final Report (writing and submission) (8 days)	(week 10)	5	3
Presentation of the Draft Final Report to key stakeholders (1 day)	(week 12)	1	
Final Report (3 days)	(week 14)	3	1
<b>Total</b>		<b>39</b>	<b>18</b>

**10.0 Use of the evaluation:**

The evaluation is expected to provide input to a decision-making process regarding the future of the ProCap project and its management and should translate into a plan of action. The results of the evaluation will be shared with all ProCap stakeholders by OCHA.

**11.0 Financial Management:**

***Draft Terms of Reference, ProCap Evaluation, Draft 30.10.06***

Funding for the evaluation will be provided by the PROCAP budget. The current cost estimate is as follows:<sup>2</sup>

Teamleader: 600/day x 39 = USD 23,400  
Team member: 400/day x 18 = USD 7,200

Team Travel: USD 20,000  
ESS Travel: USD 5,000  
Contingency: USD 5,000

Cost estimate: USD 60,600 (plus 13% overhead)

Total Cost estimate: USD 68,000

**12.0 Suggestions for Key Documentation**

- Project Proposal: A Proposal to Increase International Capacity for Protection (ProCap): A Pilot Project
- Mid Term review: Interim Review of ProCap Implementation, March 2006
- Senior Protection Officer mid-term and end of mission reports.
- Individual Terms of Reference for Senior Protection Officer deployments
- Recruitment advertising material and plans
- Feedback received from Country Teams
- The “informal” review of ProCap Senior Protection Officer Deployments – undertaken in July 2006 by ProCap Support unit and Steering committee.
- Reports and evaluation material from the three protection training workshops [March 20-25<sup>th</sup> in Geneva and 9-14<sup>th</sup> July in Australia, and 5-10 November in Kenya].
- Report on ‘Challenges and possible strategies to increase the capacity and diversity of the Standby Protection Capacity’
- ProCap Online concept and briefing material
- MOUs, Guidelines and ‘Roles and Responsibilities’ established with and between stakeholders in ProCap.
- Minutes of the monthly steering committee meetings.
- Minutes of Partners Meetings
- Notes for the File of Stakeholder meetings
- Generic CV’s for protection staff [to check on skill set and experience].
- Relevant print out of email correspondence among steering committee members, PSU and NGOs.
- New papers or documents of relevance delivered before end December 2006.

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<sup>2</sup> Pending evaluation workshop costing.

**Inception report:**  
**External Evaluation of the Protection Standby Capacity**  
**Project (ProCap)**  
January 17<sup>th</sup> 2007

**Evaluators:** James Darcy  
Sorcha O’Callaghan  
Andrew Bonwick

**OCHA Contact Point:** Claude Hilfiker, ESU

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## 1. Objectives and scope of the evaluation

This evaluation will consider the extent to which ProCap has both supported the protection mandated agencies and country teams to strengthen their operational response and contributed to the development of comprehensive field-based protection strategies and appropriate protection mechanisms in the countries prioritized by the project. In so doing it will:

- Map the project accomplishments under Tier I and Tier II against expected outputs;
- Determine the relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and long-term sustainability of these accomplishments;
- Explore obstacles to achievement of specific objectives through an examination of contextual issues, capacity, institutional barriers, management processes and decision-making;
- Recommend short-term operational and longer-term strategic actions.

The Protection Standby Capacity Project [ProCap] was developed to enhance UN protection response and contribute to global protection capacity. It aims to reinforce the strategic and operational protection response for Internally Displaced Persons [IDPs] and other vulnerable groups in emergencies and protracted crises through the predictable and effective deployment, of personnel with proven protection expertise.

ProCap is consistent with and supportive of the goals of the global Protection Cluster. One of the Cluster's key objectives in 2006 was to have sufficient and well-trained protection capacity and preparedness at the global level for the humanitarian community to mount a timely and effective protection response to 2-3 new emergencies of 500,000 persons each year. To achieve this the Cluster aimed to put in place protection strategies on the basis of joint needs assessments; to create inter-agency surge capacity and standby partnerships as well as expanding existing standby deployment schemes; and to enhance the training of field staff.

ProCap's role of filling capacity gaps and reinforcing existing standby capacity was recognised in the original project document. It was launched in November 2005 by OCHA/IDD in close consultation with UN partner agencies and NGO standby partners, including OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Danish Refugee Council, Save the Children Norway and Sweden, Austcare and RedR Australia.

It is a flexible deployment mechanism aimed at both increasing the number of experienced senior protection personnel available for short-term missions (Tier I) and increasing the number and quality of protection 'profiles' within NGO standby pools, through provision of training and otherwise (Tier II). Both groups are deployed to support protection-mandated agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, OHCHR).

An inter-agency Steering Committee (OCHA, UNICEF, OHCHR, UNHCR and ICVA as an NGO representative) provides managerial oversight of ProCap. The Internal Displacement Division (OCHA/IDD) in Geneva hosts the ProCap Support Unit that acts as the secretariat for the Steering Committee and also liaises with NRC. In turn, NRC is responsible for the recruitment and administrative management of the core team of Senior Protection Officers (SPOs) through a memorandum of understanding with OCHA. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue developed protection training for the project. Additional tools including “ProCap Online” are also currently under development.

Through these mechanisms the project expected to:

1. Support to protection mandated agencies and country teams to strengthen their operational response.
2. Develop comprehensive field-based protection strategies and appropriately tailored protection mechanisms.

The terms of reference for this evaluation stipulate that it should review the impact of deployments under Tiers I and II of the initiative; review the administrative and managerial set-up of the project and assess overall achievements and added-value. All areas of the project should be reviewed as part of this process including: deployment, capacity-building and strategic impact of SPOs; efforts to establish a roster of stand-by protection officers; synergies between different components of the project; and the managerial structures underpinning the initiative.

In order to achieve this the evaluation will:

- Map project accomplishments under Tier I and Tier II against expected outputs;
- Determine the relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and long-term sustainability of these accomplishments;
- Explore obstacles to achievement of specific objectives through an examination of contextual issues, capacity, institutional barriers, management processes and decision-making;
- Recommend short-term operational and longer-term strategic actions.

Questions of impact and relevance are fundamental to this evaluation, in terms of assessing the benefit of deployments to specific agencies and crises, the training and capacity building of stand-by partners and, most critically, the overall added value of the ProCap initiative in enhancing global protection capacity. While it is difficult to ensure that qualitative judgments of this nature accurately reflect what has been achieved, this evaluation plans to examine the quality and quantity of inputs (such as training modules, skills of those deployed), outputs (assessments, strategy papers, working groups etc), as well as perceptions of their added value in specific crises and to overall response.

## **2. Proposed methodology**

### ***2.1. Methodological approach***

The evaluation methodology will primarily be inductive and empirical. It will draw on in-depth interviews with key actors regarding their perceptions of the quality and relevance of the work of ProCap. In particular field studies will be carried out in three countries that have received ProCap SPOs (Sudan, Uganda and DRC) in order to judge the value that the ProCap project has added to specific responses.

In addition, the efficiency of the deployment mechanisms – both of SPOs and the NGO ‘surge’ capacity – will be evaluated against best practice. Comparisons will be drawn between deployments of protection staff through ProCap and other mechanisms, notably the ‘standard’ procedures of the mandated agencies and other rosters such as the ‘Surge’ project run by IRC in support of UNHCR.

### ***2.2. Data collection tools***

*Review of documentation:* The evaluation will review existing documentation associated with ProCap. In addition to reviewing strategy documents, the evaluation will take advantage of existing internal reflections on the project, including the two mid-term reviews already carried out as well as the informal review of the deployments of the SPOs.

Minutes of management meetings will be reviewed to gain insights into the management of ProCap. Records of deployments and, where permitted, recruitment (e.g. profiles of successful and unsuccessful candidates) will be examined in relation to the SPOs.

Documentation such as deployment requests, hand-over reports, debriefings and similar documents relating to individual deployment of SPOs will also be reviewed. Protection strategies and other relevant documents will be reviewed in the countries where the field reviews will be carried out.

The training materials produced as part of this project will be reviewed in their own right and in the light of feedback received during the course of the evaluation.

Finally the ProCap website (which it is understood is still under development) will be looked at.

*In-depth interviews:* Structured in-depth interviews will be at the heart of this evaluation. Face-to-face interviews will be undertaken in Geneva, Khartoum, northern Uganda and Kinshasa, with additional interviews by telephone to individuals and organizations outside these locations. Please see below for key informants to this review.

*Email survey:* Lastly an e-mail survey will be sent to all (approx. 50) participants in the ProCap protection training to ascertain their experience prior to receiving the training; their views of the training as such and then its relevance to any subsequent deployments. Up to five of the respondents will also be interviewed.

### ***2.3. Key informants and agencies***

The following groups will be contacted:

- Steering Committee Members (individually or in groups, as appropriate)
- Each member of the ProCap Support Unit (and, if appropriate, IDD staff who filled this function prior to the Unit's creation).
- Each of the SPOs currently deployed by ProCap.
- NRC representative responsible for the recruitment of ProCap SPOs.
- Senior representative(s) of the IDD.
- Protection Human Resources people in each of the mandated agencies (i.e. UNHCR, OHCHR and UNICEF).
- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue staff responsible for the training materials.
- Donors to ProCap.
- A selection of those responsible for the rosters that are supported by ProCap.
- A selection of recipients of ProCap training.

In addition, findings and experiences will be cross-checked with:

- Members of the Protection Cluster working group.
- Protection specialists in each of the mandated agencies.
- ICRC protection human resources staff.
- Staff responsible for 'non-ProCap' rosters, e.g. IRC's "Surge" project.

During the field studies, the following groups will be contacted:

- SPOs on deployment.
- The Humanitarian Coordinator or his designated representative.
- The head of the mandated agency with responsibility for the SPO(s).
- Protection Working Groups or equivalent structures.
- Field protection staff from mandated and non-mandated agencies.
- Major humanitarian agencies working on protection in that context.
- Donor representatives.

## ***2.4. Organization of the Review***

The ODI team will work closely with the ESS evaluation manager and the ProCap Support Unit to achieve the specific outputs outlined in the terms of reference. The HPG Director (James Darcy) will lead this review, working with two additional researchers, Sorcha O’Callaghan and Andrew Bonwick. This team provides a combination of protection expertise; institutional analysis and decision-making in the humanitarian sector and in-depth field experience, including in ProCap countries. All three have previous experience of working with and for humanitarian agencies and are familiar with structures and operations.

It is understood that the ESS evaluation manager and/or ProCap Support Unit will provide logistical and administrative support, including facilitating visa and travel arrangements to Geneva and field sites; facilitating meetings and hosting arrangements in the field and provision of guidance on different elements of the evaluation where required.

## ***2.5. Key evaluation questions***

Key evaluation questions are outlined in section 3 below. These questions will be developed into more detailed questionnaires to guide each set of interviews.

## ***2.6. Performance criteria***

The evaluation will measure the success of ProCap against the criteria of Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness as described in the ALNAP Quality Proforma.

To address the issues of relevance, the evaluation will focus on a series of questions relating to whether and in what ways ProCap has fulfilled, and continues to fulfill, an identified need in the protection sector. The effectiveness and efficiency of the initiative will be determined through understanding whether ProCap has increased the availability of appropriate protection staff and the different factors that have facilitated or constrained the effectiveness of ProCap staff once they arrive in the field. The extent to which the ProCap management structure has facilitated or impeded the implementation of the project will be reviewed to further assess efficiency and effectiveness.

As the evaluation is intended to inform the future direction of the ProCap initiative in addition to reviewing work undertaken thus far, recommendations on maintaining or increasing the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the initiative will form a central part of the work.



### 3. Issues to be studied

The following three issues will be studied:

- Is ProCap fulfilling an identified need (Relevance)?
- Has ProCap increased the availability of appropriate protection staff in humanitarian crises? What has facilitated or constrained the effectiveness of ProCap staff once they arrive in the field (Effectiveness; Efficiency)?
- To what extent has the ProCap management structure facilitated or impeded the implementation of the project (Effectiveness; Efficiency)?

#### *3.1. Is ProCap fulfilling an identified need (Relevance)?*

This first question will focus on the rationale behind ProCap; what the project set out to achieve; and whether the original rationale remains or has evolved. Subsidiary questions will include:

- What was the analysis that gave rise to the ProCap project? What was the problem identified?
- Was this a shared analysis; if so, by whom?
- If there are diverging views on the identification of the problem, what were the other views; what impact are these views having on the ongoing development of ProCap? In particular are the views or priorities from the field the same as the views of the Headquarters?
- Why was this particular approach chosen as the solution? What were the other options considered and why were they discounted? In particular, why was a structure created separate from the HR functions of the Cluster lead agencies?
- (Overlapping with 3.2 below) Has the actual implementation of ProCap fulfilled the need identified?
- Has the original need changed since it was identified? If so, in what ways should the ProCap initiative evolve in order to take account of these changed needs and additional anticipated needs?
- Given that ProCap was not intended to become a permanent structure, what conditions need to be satisfied before the initiative draws to a close? What further is required to achieve these conditions?

***3.2. To what extent has ProCap increased the availability of appropriate protection staff in humanitarian crises? What has facilitated or constrained the effectiveness of ProCap staff once they arrive in the field (Effectiveness; Efficiency)?***

This question will focus on the implementation of ProCap. It will look at three separate areas. Firstly, the extent to which each of Tier I and Tier II have resulted in the deployment of experienced protection staff to the field; secondly, the extent to which those deployed have been able to fulfill the expectations that ProCap has put on them; and thirdly, what could be changed to help Tier I and Tier II meet the objectives of the project more effectively.

- How often has Tier I managed to deploy the right people to the right place at the right time?
- Where have the people deployed come from and why were they not available through existing recruitment systems? What is their background and experience?
- Once deployed, how do the expectations of the receiving agency compare with those objectives of ProCap?
- What have SPOs actually achieved when deployed? To what extent have they supported just the receiving agency and to what extent have they supported the protection community as a whole?
- In light of the distinct characteristics of a ProCap deployment (short-term, highly experienced and skilled), is it possible to identify a range of activities to which ProCap is particularly suited and unsuited?
- What conditions need to be in place on deployment for an SPO to fulfill the objectives of ProCap? What are the most significant obstacles? How can these be overcome?
- How many people have been identified through the Tier II system that would not otherwise have been identified? Of these, how many have been deployed? What additional support do partners require in order to establish a roster of appropriate stand-by protection officers?
- How many people have been trained by Tier II? What is their background and how were they selected? What support is given to help those trained secure a deployment? How many have been deployed? How relevant was the training to the deployment? How does the training compare with and complement other training available through the registers?
- What is the relationship between activities undertaken under Tiers I and II of ProCap? How could better synergies be achieved?

### ***3.3. To what extent has the ProCap management structure facilitated or impeded the implementation of the project (Effectiveness; Efficiency)?***

This question will examine the ProCap management structure. It will look at the mechanics of the project management, including the recruitment and deployment of SPOs, the development of training etc. It will also emphasize the relationships between the agencies involved, i.e. between the UN agencies themselves and between the UN agencies and the partner NGOs.

- How well has the IASC Steering Committee for the project functioned? To what extent has this management structure facilitated or impeded the achievement of the objectives of ProCap? What changes (if any) could be made to improve performance?
- How has the recruitment of SPOs been managed, both within the UN system and NRC? Given the difficulties experienced, what could be done differently to overcome these difficulties?
- How have the deployments been managed? On what basis have the deployments been approved? Have the decisions made been in line with the objectives of ProCap?
- Is there a common understanding of the purpose and priorities of ProCap shared by the agencies involved? To what extent has the IASC SC been able to resolve differences as they arise?
- To what extent has management decision-making promoted synergies between the different components of the ProCap initiative? How could this be better achieved?

## **4. Reporting / Deliverables**

As per the ToR, the following deliverables will be produced:

- An inception report
- Preliminary findings by February 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2007
- A draft final report, reflecting comments received from the Core Learning Group submitted w/c 5<sup>th</sup> March, 2007
- Presentation of the draft final report (including a PowerPoint and proposal for utilisation of findings)
- Workshop with key stakeholders, including donors, on the draft final report
- Final report

The final report should be succinct and fully edited report in English of no more than 15,000 words in a printed and an electronic version. The report will include an executive summary (up to 2,500 words) and will address all of the key issues indicated above. The report should be structured to provide succinct conclusions for each issue as well as specific,

targeted and action-oriented key recommendations. The annex will include a description of the method used, a bibliography, list of persons interviewed and the terms of reference.

## 5. Timetable

Task	8 <sup>th</sup> Jan	15 <sup>th</sup> Jan	22 <sup>nd</sup> Jan	29 <sup>th</sup> Jan	5 <sup>th</sup> Feb	12 <sup>th</sup> Feb	19 <sup>th</sup> Feb	26 <sup>th</sup> Feb	5 <sup>th</sup> Mar	12 <sup>th</sup> Mar
Briefing										
Inception Report & Questionnaires										
Key Informant Interviews, Geneva Email survey										
Mapping exercise Tier II evaluation Tier I evaluation										
In-country travel										
Data analysis and review of management structures										
Preliminary report (23 <sup>rd</sup> Feb)										
Final draft report (w/c 5 <sup>th</sup> Mar), final report and presentation (tbc)										



## Annex 3: List of Interviewees

### Headquarters

OHCHR	Matthias Behnke Human Rights Officer
OHCHR	Gunnar Theissan Human Rights Officer
OHCHR	Francesca Marotta Coordinator
OHCHR	Taatsu Dawson Human Rights Officer
OCHA	Dennis McNamara, Special Adviser on Displacement to the UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator
OCHA	Marc Vincent Chief, Protection and Policy, IDD/DPSS
OCHA	Christine Knudsen IDP Protection Adviser
OCHA	Pamela Jennings, PSU
OCHA	Belinda Holdsworth PSU
UNHCR	Betsy Greve, Africa Desk
UNHCR	Solange Senaize, Africa Desk
UNHCR	Renata Dubini Chief, Protection Capacity Section
UNHCR	Larry Bottinick Senior Protection Officer
UNHCR	Hiroko Araki Surge Capacity
UNHCR	Johanna Haener Emergency Roster EPRS
UNHCR	Arjun Jain Training Officer, Protection
UNHCR	Justin D Training Officer, Protection
UNICEF	Julien Temple Project Coordinator, Standby Arrangements (EMOPS)
UNICEF	Luc Chauvin Programme Officer, Inter-Agency
UNICEF	Jean-Luc Bories Programme Officer
UNICEF	Manuel Fontaine New York office
UNICEF	Massimo Zucca Emergencies
NRC	Kari Kvalberg Human Resources Coordinator
ICVA	Manisha Thomas Policy Officer
NRC	Merethe Nedreboe, Human Resources Coordinator
ICRC	Alain Aeschlimann, Head of Protection
IRC	Margaret Green Director, Protection
IRC	Greg Brown Geneva Liaison and Protection Surge, Capacity Program Director
Protection Cluster Working Group	Philip Korane, UNHCR Kabi Bernander, UNHCR Hermione Holland, NRC
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue	Liam Mahoney

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue	David Petrasek
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue	Deborah Mancini
DRC	Lone Bilsoe Lassen
RedR Australia	Rhodri Wynn-Pope
SCF Norway	Ashild Brekke
Austcare	Kate Berry
SCF Sweden	Ingela Norberg (written input)

### Senior Protection Officers

Erin Mooney
Paul White
Michelle Berg
Simon Russell
Laurie Wiseberg
Louise Taylor
Steve Onwuasoanya
Etienne Antheunissens
Irene Schmidt (former SPO)

### Protection Training Participants

Sarah Elliott
Olivia Wellesley Cole
Sylvia Winton
Solve Bjorn Randal
Tania Pesce

### Donors

Australia	Geoff Adlide Counsellor (Development)
Australia	Tim Poletti
Australia	Leonie Oates-Mercier Program Officer
Canada	Emina Tudakovik
Denmark	Asser Berling-Rasmussen
Norway	Asbjorn Braanaas
Sweden	Jakob Hallgren Counsellor
Sweden	Mikael Lindvall
United States Mission	Nance Kyloh

### Country Office Interviews

<i>DRC</i>	
<b>OCHA</b>	Andrew Wyllie, Senior Field Coordinator, Kinshasa
<b>OCHA</b>	Gloria Fernandez, Chef de Bureau, Kinshasa
<b>OCHA</b>	Patrick Levand Homme, Head of Office, Goma
<b>OHCHR</b>	Benjamin Hutton, Head of Office, Goma
<b>OHCHR</b>	Anne Judith, Human rights officer
<b>OHCHR</b>	Kashesha Ndombasi, human rights officer
<b>MONUC</b>	Béatrice Philippe, Co-lead of cluster protection at national level
<b>MONUC</b>	Paul Bonard, ex Adviser to DRSRSG on protection
<b>MONUC</b>	Vanessa Kant, Political Affairs, Goma
<b>MONUC</b>	Civil Affairs, Goma
<b>UNHCR</b>	Ralph Gruenerr, Head of Protection, DRC
<b>UNHCR</b>	Head of Office, Goma
<b>UNDP</b>	Head of Post Conflict Unit
<b>UNICEF</b>	Stephen Blight, Protection Coordinator, DRC
<b>UNICEF</b>	Silvia Danailov, Chief, Emergencies



<b>UNICEF</b>	Pernielle, Protection, Goma
<b>ICRC</b>	Head of Protection, DRC
<b>ACF</b>	Herve Heviet Chef de Bureau
<b>MSF Belgium</b>	Dan Sermand, Head of Mission
<b>NRC</b>	Karen Bjornestad, Head of Mission
<b>Oxfam</b>	Eva Smets, Policy and Advocacy Adviser
<b>Dutch Embassy, Kinshasa</b>	Roy Hans
<b>DFID, Kinshasa</b>	Ros Cooper

<i>Uganda</i>	
<b>OCHA Kampala</b>	Giovanni Bosco (IDP Advisor) Kampala
<b>OHCHR, Gulu</b>	Geoffrey Omon (Programme Assistant)
<b>OHCHR, Gulu</b>	Jean-Nicholas Beuze (Head of office)
<b>OHCHR, Gulu</b>	Jean-Nicholas Beuze (Head of office)
<b>OHCHR</b>	Daniel Kamphuis (Human Rights Officer)
	James Otto, Patricia Okelo – Human Rights Focus, Gulu
<b>AVSI</b>	Louisa Seferis (Protection Officer)
<b>NRC</b>	Cathy Relleen (Protection and Advocacy Adviser)
<b>UNICEF</b>	Catherine Jones (Child Protection Officer)
<b>UNHCR</b>	Harry Leefe (Head of office)

<i>Sudan</i>	
<b>UNMIS</b>	Thomas Linde (Director – Protection of Civilians unit (PoC))
<b>UNMIS</b>	Irene Schmidt (ex-PSO, now Deputy Director, UNMIS PoC)
<b>UNMIS</b>	Mark Bowden (Director of Civil Affairs, UNMIS)
<b>UNMIS</b>	Pat Duggen, RRR
<b>OCHA</b>	Ramesh Rajasingham (Head of office, OCHA)
<b>OCHA</b>	Michael Jensen (head of Policy and Planning, OCHA)
<b>UNICEF</b>	Bo Viktor Nylund (Senior Protection Officer, UNICEF)
<b>UNHCR</b>	Monika Sandvik (IDP Protection Advisor, UNHCR)
<b>RC/HC</b>	Manuel da Silva (UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator)
<b>DFID</b>	Jonathon Patrick (Humanitarian Advisor, DfID)
<b>IRC</b>	Sebastian Der-Kinderen (Senior Protection Officer, IRC)
<b>NRC</b>	Lotte Grauballe (Country Director, NRC)

<i>Other</i>	
<b>OCHA, Somalia</b>	Rheena Ghelani
<b>UNHCR, Lebanon</b>	Stephane Jaquemet
<b>UNHCR, Georgia</b>	Naveed Hassain
<b>UNICEF, Pakistan</b>	Marc Savail (former)
<b>UNHCR, Cote D'Ivoire</b>	Saber Azam
<b>UNHCR Cote D'Ivoire</b>	Buti Kale



## Annex 4: Strategic Nature of Deployments

### Indicators of Strategic Work at Senior Level (Strategic Leadership)

- Work was at a national or multi-regional level
- Work involved the development of strategy for coordination mechanisms, establishment or major redirection of coordination mechanisms at national or multi-regional level e.g. establishing/leading protection working group at national level)
- Work involved leadership in protection or provision of senior-level protection advice at the outset of a crisis or at a new juncture in the crisis (through agency / HC/RC office)
- Development of comprehensive protection strategies of benefit to overall protection response (through agency / HC/RC office)
- Provision of task specific advisory support for agency / HC/RC office of benefit to overall UNCT response

### Indicators of Strategic Work at Mid Level (Design and Implementation)

- Work was at a regional level
- Work involved the reinforcement or geographical extension of pre-existing coordination mechanisms (e.g. establishing/leading protection working group at sub-national level)
- Work was in a support capacity though supporting a protection-mandated agency take on increased responsibility,
- Inter-agency protection programming or programming of major benefit to overall protection response

### Indicators of Operational Work

- Management or administrative work for an individual agency, such as running / establishing offices, representational work and/or donor relations
- Operational or programmatic work for an individual agency rather than inter-agency programmatic work
- Substitution of a staff position due to recruitment delays or difficulties

<b>Request</b>	<b>ToRs</b>	<b>Indicators of Strategic Work at Senior Strategic Leadership</b>	<b>Indicators of Strategic Work at Mid Level</b>	<b>Indicators of Operational Work</b>	<b>Overall</b>
DRC, Bunia, UNHCR, 9.02.2006-08.08.06	Establish a regional protection working group (RPWG) for Ituri in Oriental Province. Lead regional inter-agency mapping exercise of existing protection-related activities; Lead regional inter-agency analysis of existing protection capacities, gaps and needs		Work was at regional level involved establishment of regional cluster, co-chairing cluster meetings, development of inter-agency strategies and responses through the protection cluster	Established and set up UNHCR office in Bunia Worked on 5 UNCHR-funded projects (property, separated children, IDP return, communication network, clothing distribution)	Mainly operational deployment with some mid-level strategic functions
Uganda, Lira, UNHCR 05.03.06-08.09.06	Facilitate the establishment of UNHCR protection presence, set-up of a security assessment cell, creation of return plan.		Work was at regional level to establish UNHCR office, establish protection working group, build network with local stakeholders, develop regional strategies on return, camp management, protection monitoring	Worked as head of office, undertook recruitment, significant representational role	Mainly operational deployment with some mid-level strategic functions
Lebanon, UNHCR, 16.10.06-15.04.07	Develop a strategic protection network and mechanism for IDP returnees and other affected populations Develop workplan (and lead its implementation) for Protection Cluster	Work at national level to develop protection strategy for IDPs in Lebanon, involving all partners – part of overall response, rather than at leadership level, co-chair already-established PWG.		Some administrative, HCR-specific work, particularly at beginning of assignment	Strategic at leadership level, but with significant operational components

<i>Request</i>	<i>ToRs</i>	<i>Indicators of Strategic Work at Senior Strategic Leadership</i>	<i>Indicators of Strategic Work at Mid Level</i>	<i>Indicators of Operational Work</i>	<i>Overall</i>
	for early recovery phase Protection advice to government, UN agencies, NGOs on protection for early recovery and development phases ensure collective approach Capacity building government staff and strengthen protection mechanisms in the country.				
Somalia, OCHA / UNHCR, 05.03.06-16.04.06	With protection and idp monitoring group, develop framework, guidelines, monitoring and reporting tools, and training module for protection parties	Objective was for short-term, leadership-level, strategic input with agencies then implementing framework/strategy. However, in practice strategic and senior nature of work limited, entailed high degree of IT/database technical input, limited opportunity for high-level engagement/influence, limited external interaction			Strategic in objective but operational in practice. Much of the work could have been undertaken by more junior staff member
Georgia, UNHCR, 18.08.06-04.03.07 inc. extension	Identification of needs and gaps in IDP protection and related legal framework. Work with inter-agency Legal Group to strengthen Georgia's legislative framework on IDPs, in line with international standards & experience from elsewhere. Advise on broader IDP issues, including legal status, social assistance and durable solutions.	Leadership role, with strategic components. Development of national framework, working with national and international stakeholders, including broader civil society partners to provide overall support to national implementation process.			Strategic at leadership level
Pakistan, UNICEF, 22.04.06-23.07.06	Lead the Protection Cluster in Muzaffarabad; assist and support the Muzaffarabad UN team in the development and implementation of a collaborative response strategy for the protection of the most vulnerable people affected by the earthquake.		Work was at a regional level therefore influence curtailed, strategic nature reduced by pre-existing strategies and fact that IDPs from earthquake already returning. However, a number of protection initiatives / policy decisions made possible due to deployment (monitoring in camps, areas of return, relocation, advocacy on compensation, participatory camp management, legal assistance and land).		Strategic at mid-level
Sudan, JAM/Darfur, Sudan, Juba, UNMIS UNMIS, 26.07.06--31.03.07	Protection technical expert for Darfur Early Recovery Team, needs assessment, strategy development, engagement/rep with shareholders, lessons-learnt doc	Work at senior and leadership level. Needs assessment undertaken, strategy developed.			Strategic at leadership level

<i>Request</i>	<i>ToRs</i>	<i>Indicators of Strategic Work at Senior Strategic Leadership</i>	<i>Indicators of Strategic Work at Mid Level</i>	<i>Indicators of Operational Work</i>	<i>Overall</i>
Sudan, Blue Nile, OCHA / UNHCR, 08.06.06 – 11.02.07	To identify major protection risks in southern Sudan, and develop comprehensive inter-agency response strategy for resident, returnee and IDP populations		Work at a regional level to chair regional protection cluster, raise profile of IDP issues, support / oversee protection monitoring project and support assisted returns.		Strategic at mid-level
Sudan, Khartoum, UNICEF, 13.05.06 – 12.11.06	Support Unicef protection unit to strengthen operational response in relation to child protection programmes in particular IDP returns to south; develop field-based comprehensive protection strategies, mechanisms and response with regard to IDP protection issues; increase UNICEF's advocacy	Work at leadership level, support/advocacy to government on IDP issues. With Khartoum Protection Steering Group, strengthened protection reporting, advocacy and understanding of protection.			Strategic at leadership level
Central African Republic, UNHCR, 03.02.07 – 02.08.07	Develop Monitoring and Coordination Framework; Undertake Advocacy and sensitization on GPs; Establish programmes on SGBV; Supervise Material Assistance to victims of protection incidents; Provide Agency Operational Support; Coordination and training with other stakeholders				Deployment just commenced but TORs indicate strategic leadership work
DRC, Lubumbashi, UNICEF, 01.06.06 – 30.11.06	To support the UNICEF Protection team in DRC to strengthen its operational response in emergencies with focus on the province of Katanga but covering the three zones in DRC as needed. To develop the network of protection partners in order to increase the coverage of protection mechanisms in the country		Participation in regional protection cluster, input to policy positions, advocacy with national stakeholders, advocacy on SGBV, returns, DDR, training on human rights and children and women's rights.	TORs focus on capacity gap filling to develop and lead Unicef emergency response in Katanga, focusing on child protection and CAFF, limited implementation of this component of work	Strategic at mid-level insofar as it allowed protection agency take on increased protection responsibilities, however TORs focussed on individual agency rather than inter-agency work
Cote d'Ivoire, UNHCR, 14.01.07 – 13.07.07	Refining the protection cluster strategy; Assist UNHCR and cluster members in implementing strategy, Design protection tools (e.g. mechanism for profiling of IDP's population); develop data collection strategy; assist in info gathering; Develop coordination; Develop tools and identify training needs	Establishing cluster coordination mechanism, developing HCR national protection strategy building on some pre-existing work			Strategic at leadership level
Uganda, Gulu, OHCHR, 06.08.06- 31.01.07	OHCHR's Field Coordinator for Northern Uganda, represent OHCHR in district-based inter-agency protection cluster teams, facilitate OHCHR's lead, at district level, on protection sub-cluster on		In latter stages of deployment, focus on coordination, establishment of programmes, human rights training,	Strong emphasis on duties as Acting Head of Sub Office in Gulu with responsibilities for Lira, Kitgum and Pader	Mainly operational deployment with some mid-level strategic functions

<i>Request</i>	<i>ToRs</i>	<i>Indicators of Strategic Work at Senior Strategic Leadership</i>	<i>Indicators of Strategic Work at Mid Level</i>	<i>Indicators of Operational Work</i>	<i>Overall</i>
	human rights and rule of law, in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Lira.				
DRC, Goma, UNHCR, 05.09.06 – 04.03.07	Support the role of UNHCR in the provincial protection working groups (PPWG) of Goma, Bukavu, Bunia and Uvira. Lead the inter-agency mapping exercise of protection-related activities, identify / fill gaps Assist in development and implementation regional protection strategies.		Work at regional level, support development and agreement of inter-agency project,		Strategic at senior / implementation level
Kenya/Somalia, UNICEF, 01.02.07- 01.06.07	Manage the overall development, implementation and coordination of the UNICEF Child Protection Programme, including child protection with respect to the current emergency flood response, the anticipated influx of refugees from Somalia, and in preparation for internal displacements of persons anticipated as the political atmosphere becomes heated in the run up to the elections later in 2007.				Deployment just commenced but appears operational due to single agency / staff substitution elements

**Annex 5: LENGTH OF TIME INVOLVED IN DEPLOYMENT OF PROCAP SENIOR PROTECTION OFFICERS**

<i>Request</i>	<i>Received</i>	<i>Approved</i>	<i>Comments</i>	<i>How long did it take to approve?</i>	<i>Time between approval and deployment</i>	<i>Time between requested deployment &amp; deployment date</i>
DRC, Bunia, UNHCR	Request dated 19.12.05 Passed to PSU 5.1.06	ProCap meeting 6.1.06	Requested date of deployment: 1.2.06	1	35	8
Uganda, Lira, UNHCR	Original request 22.12.05. Revised request : 19.01.06		Requested : for when support funding available	Not specified	Not specified	45
Lebanon, UNHCR	Request 2.10.06	5.10.06. SC meeting.	Requested date of deployment: 15.10.06	3	10	1
Somalia, OCHA	Request for HC office dated 4.1.06			Not specified		60
Georgia, UNHCR	Request for extension: 13.11.06	7.7.06. SC meeting Extension approved: 17.11.06	Request for extension, 13.11.06	Not specified	Not specified	Not specified
Pakistan, UNICEF			Requested date of deployment: 10.3.06.			43
Sudan, JAM/Darfur, UNMIS	Request received 2.6.06	7.7.06. SC Meeting	Request made for clarification and discussion with country team. Requested date of deployment, 15.6.06	35	19	41
Sudan, Blue Nile, OCHA	Request Received from UNHCR week of 2.6.06	2.6.06	In preparation for UNHCR deployment	0	6	6
Sudan, Khartoum, UNICEF	Request 19.4.06	21.4.06. SC Meeting	Requested deployment date: 15.5.06	2	24	0
Central African Republic, UNHCR	Received 19.01.07	Agreed by email 2.2.07		14	1	Not specified
DRC, Lubumbashi, UNICEF	Received 20.04.07			Not specified	Not specified	Not specified
Cote d'Ivoire, UNHCR	Received 9.11.06	21.11.06	Requested date of deployment, 15.11.06. No french speakers. Revised request date: 15.01.07.	12	54	60
Gulu, OHCHR	6.07.2006	Endorsed by SC 7.7.06	Requested date of deployment: end 8.06.	1	30	0
*DRC, Goma, UNHCR	Received 7.4.06 Maintained request 2.6.06	7.7.06. SC Meeting	Original request for 1.5.06. Discussed in SC, with UNCT. Agreed deployment of EA from his start date.	0	Not specified	Not specified
Kenya/Somalia, UNICEF	Request received 26.12.07.	13.01.07	Requested date of deployment: 1.2.07 Discussed in SC 10.01.07. Revised by UNICEF.	18	19	0
<b>AVERAGE</b>				Av = 8.6 days	Av = 22 days	Av = 24





# Evaluation of ProCap

## Survey of Participants in ProCap Training

### Humanitarian Experience

How long have you been involved in humanitarian work? Of this, how much time have you spend in the field? How long have you been working specifically on protection? Of this, how much time have you spent in the field? Do you consider humanitarian work to be your career? Which, if any, of the mandated agencies (or OCHA) had you worked for prior to receiving ProCap training?	Less than 1 year Less than 1 year Less than 1 year Less than 1 year Yes. This is what I do. None
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### ProCap Training

Where did you receive ProCap training? Which, if any, of the mandated agencies had you worked for since receiving ProCap training?	Nairobi, Kenya None
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### *If you were deployed after the training*

Where were you deployed to? How long for? Do you feel that the ProCap training was instrumental in you being deployed? How <i>relevant</i> was the ProCap training to your deployment? How <i>complete</i> is the ProCap training? (To what extent did it prepare you for deployment)	Less than 3 months Yes Very: I use what I learnt regularly Very: I did not need more training to do my work
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*Is there anything else you would like to say about the ProCap training?*

### Other Training Received

<b><i>What other types of training have you received?</i></b>	
General humanitarian training General protection training Agency specific training (e.g. Refugee Status Determination; Human Rights Monitoring etc.) If you received agency-specific training, from which agency/ agencies?	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>



### Any Other Comments

### Follow-up?


May we contact you by phone/ email to follow up on this survey? Phone number: E-mail	Yes
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
## Annex 7: Selected Results of the Survey of PROCAP Trainees



**Deployments to Mandated Agencies Before and After PROCAP Training**



**How Relevant Was The PROCAP T**



### How Complete Was The PRC

