

# **Assessing Key Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effectiveness of Multilateral Organisations**

## **Final Report**

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# List of Acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
BA	Bangladesh
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CC	Country Coordinator
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DG DEV	Directorate General for Development
DG Relex	Directorate General for External Relations
DFI	Development Finance International
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
GH	Ghana
GNI	Gross National Income
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IN	India
MO	Multilateral Organisation
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network
MP	Member of Parliament
ODA	Official Development Assistance

ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PFM	Performance Management Framework
RDB	Regional Development Bank
SPA	Strategic Partnership for Africa
TA	Technical Assistance
TZ	Tanzania
TB	Tuberculosis
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WB	World Bank
WGA	World Governance Assessment
WI	Well Informed
WIP	Well Informed Person
ZA	South Africa
ZM	Zambia

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# Interpreting the Data

The first thing to note is that the number of people informed enough to report on each Multilateral Organisation (MO) varied. The World Bank (WB) was the organisation best known, with 233 of 261 respondents able to answer questions about it, while only 89 felt informed enough to answer questions about the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM). In addition, the number answering each question varied considerably. This is important to bear in mind when interpreting the data; the lower the sample size the less robust the results.

Two types of graph are presented in this report.

**Ranking data:** The first type of graph present the data from the questions where respondents were asked to rank the MOs. These data are presented as bar charts showing the average rank achieved by each organisation.

Respondents were asked to rank three or more MOs for questions 9, 10, 11 and 12. In order to analyse the results, the average score was calculated as follows. A first place ranking was given 3 points, a second place ranking 2 points, and a third place ranking 1 point. MOs that were rated lower than 3, or were not rated at all, were assigned a value of 0. Average scores were then calculated for each MO by dividing the total score by the number of respondents eligible to rank it. For question 9 (relating to the fifteen effectiveness criteria) the range between the high and low weighted scores for each criterion was divided into thirds, creating three groups (Highest, Middle and Lowest scorers) to allow a more user friendly presentation of the large amount of data. For many of the questions only a few respondents offered responses about some of the organisations. It is important to look at the sample size shown in the graphs when interpreting this data. We only report relative ranks where the sample size is above 10.

**Rating data:** The second type of graph presents the data from questions 4 - 6, 8, 13 – 16, where respondents were asked to rate the performance of the MOs on a five point scale, from 1 - *very low* to 5 - *very high*. In the Executive Summary and Aggregate Findings chapter, data are presented as bar graphs to provide a quick visual picture of the findings. In the profiles, the data are presented as points indicating the rating with bars showing the 95% confidence interval in order to provide more information to the reader's interpretation. Since our samples are small relative the population of potential respondents, changing who was interviewed would have affected the exact scores. The confidence interval is the range in which the true score is 95% likely to fall. The wider it is, the less accurate the estimated mean. The size of the confidence interval is primarily influenced by the sample size and the variation among respondent answers. The more that confidence intervals overlap, the less likely it is that the true averages actually differ.

In order to ease understanding when the data is explained in the text, the mean rating is described as a series of ranges as shown in Table 2.

Symbol	Explanation
■	mean rating
⊥	confidence interval
'Org Name' – xx	xx = number of responses about organisation

**Table 1: Key for graphs**

Range	Descriptor
4.75 – 5.00	Very High
4.25 – 4.74	High to Very High
3.75 – 4.24	High
3.25 – 3.74	Moderate to High
2.75 – 3.24	Moderate
2.25 – 2.74	Low to Moderate
1.75 – 2.24	Low
1.25 – 1.74	Very low to Low
1.00 – 1.24	Very low

**Table 2: Reporting the data ranges**



# 1 Executive Summary

## 1 Introduction

In 2007, ODI undertook a pilot project to identify the views of stakeholders in recipient countries about the performance of key multilateral organisations, and their preferences for which organisations should disburse additional aid.

Despite the dip in aid volumes in 2005, the OECD/DAC predict that aid volumes will rise to around \$130 billion by 2010.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, however, several bilateral donors are reducing costs by holding or even cutting staff numbers. These donors are therefore considering increasing the aid they channel through multilateral organisations, because they will find it difficult to distribute the extra money bilaterally. In addition, increasing aid given through multilaterals could cut procurement costs and streamline political conditionality.

If this change is to happen, however, bilateral donors need to be aware of the effectiveness of multilateral agencies. Some attempts to measure effectiveness have included results-based management toolkits, and investigating organisational policies and processes. Most efforts have relied on perception data, but these have usually focused on the opinions of staff from donor governments and agencies, or rarely from recipient government officials<sup>2</sup>.

Until this survey, there had been no systematic studies to seek the views of the range of stakeholders who interact with donors in-country and are responsible for implementing donor programmes

## 2 The survey

Stakeholders from six countries gave their views and perceptions about various dimensions of effectiveness of seven organisations. The six countries were: Bangladesh, Ghana, India, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. The seven organisations were: the African Development Bank; and Asian Development Banks, the European Commission, the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) and the World Bank. Local country coordinators administered a questionnaire seeking views from five stakeholder groups (business leaders, civil servants, civil society leaders, government ministers, and members of parliament). 261 individuals responded to the questionnaire, and contributed an additional 2300 comments which provide valuable context and additional insight.

Since 2005 much of the attention of donor and recipient governments has been focused on assessing progress towards indicators of effectiveness as stated by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

The survey sought respondents' perceptions of multilateral organisation performance according to three measures from the declaration: (1) overall development effectiveness; (2) harmonising with other donors; and (3) alignment with government priorities.

In addition, respondents were asked to rank the organisations against fifteen performance criteria. The survey also asked respondents to rank the organisation in the order in which

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<sup>1</sup> OECD/DAC April 2007, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/26/38341348.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Donor attempts to assess donor effectiveness where the results are publicly available include: The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) Survey, the OECD/ DAC Paris Baseline Survey, the Performance Management Framework (Denmark), and the Strategic Partnership for Africa survey.

they would prefer them to act as disbursement channels for any additional overseas development aid.

### 3 The results

*Effectiveness in policies and procedures was rated higher than that in disbursing funds.* The fifteen additional effectiveness criteria can be split into two groups: criteria relating to the way donors provide funds, and criteria relating to donors' policies and procedures. Respondents' ranking of the criteria suggests that the criteria relating to policies and procedures are more important; six of eight policy and procedural criteria were rated by 70% or more of those who answered the question as 'highly important', compared with only two of the seven funding criteria. Respondents were also offered the opportunity to add additional criteria that they believe to be important to donor effectiveness. Few did this, suggesting that the list presented in the survey was seen to be adequate.

*Little difference was perceived between multilateral organisations in indicators for the Paris Declaration.* In aggregate, respondents identified little difference between organisations against the three Paris Declaration indicators of ownership, harmonisation and alignment. Where there are differences, the UN agencies tended to be rated higher than the Banks and European Commission, though this was country specific.

*The Asian Development Bank, UNDP and World Bank ranked highest for both the funding, and the policies and procedures criteria.* The Asian Development Bank, UNDP and World Bank received a greater number of highest place rankings than the others. The European Commission received three highest place rankings, the African Development Bank one, and the Global Fund for Aids, TB and Malaria received none.

*There was no perceived difference between agencies in overall effectiveness.* This finding is surprising for two reasons. First, respondents clearly saw differences between the organisations in terms of the fifteen effectiveness criteria. Second, other studies assessing multilateral organisations identified differences in their effectiveness. The result suggests, therefore, that respondents took into account other factors as they assessed overall effectiveness.

Respondents have complex views about the factors that influence the overall effectiveness of different multilateral organisations. There was a statistically weak association between the promotion of government ownership and rankings of overall effectiveness, and similarly weak associations between the fifteen effectiveness criteria and overall effectiveness. This raises the possibility that respondents were taking into account a range of other factors as they thought about MO effectiveness.

Respondents' open-ended comments on the questionnaire provide further insight into the factors they seemed to be taking into account when assessing overall effectiveness. For example, the *focus of activities* appears to be important. UNICEF and the Global Fund for Aids, TB and Malaria were valued for their health focus; the African and Asian development banks, the World Bank, and, to a lesser extent the European Commission, for their focus on productive sectors and infrastructure; and UNDP for its technical assistance. The *scale of activities* also appears to be a factor, as the Banks and the European Commission received more positive comments about the amount of money they can disburse, while the UN agencies received almost exclusively negative comments in this regard.

*Preferences for which multilateral organisation should disburse additional aid appear to be independent of perceptions of effectiveness.* In aggregate, respondents ranked UNDP as first preference for disbursing additional aid. Comparing the multilateral organisations that can disburse significant sums of extra financing, stakeholders preferred the African and Asian Development Banks to the World Bank and European Commission. Analysing the data

confirms that respondent preferences for disbursement are only weakly correlated with the overall effectiveness, the Paris Declaration and other effectiveness indicators explored in the study. This suggests that other factors also influence disbursement preferences.

*Governance appears to be an important influence on disbursement preferences.* Overall, the African Development Bank rated poorly for most of the fifteen effectiveness indicators. Despite this, respondents in three of the four African countries studied preferred it over the European Commission and World Bank as a disbursement channel for additional aid. Additional comments suggest that one key reason for this could relate to the more equitable governance structure of the African Development Bank. This supports the hypothesis that perceptions of ownership of the institution and its policies can trump perceptions about its effectiveness.

*Country context is important.* Several additional comments indicated that a broader context is important in determining stakeholder perceptions of effectiveness. These contextual factors will vary across countries but could include the history of the organisation in that country, the visibility of its activities, the type of activities it undertakes, as well as personal factors such as the performance of the head of the agency in country.

The pilot study has demonstrated that key stakeholders in aid recipient countries want to have their voices heard. It invited the views of senior individuals from five respondent groups. The individuals invited to complete the questionnaire are all very busy and at the beginning of the project there was a real fear that they would not find the time to complete a questionnaire. In the end, the majority of respondents also contributed textual comments, totalling over 2300.

## **4 What next?**

*Understanding recipient stakeholder perceptions is vital to understanding the effectiveness of multilateral organisations.* Our results suggest that donor governments and recipient stakeholders differ in the factors they use to assess effectiveness. Bilateral donors place more emphasis on outputs and outcomes, while recipient stakeholders appear to place at least as much importance on ownership and governance. Given the clear consensus that ownership of the development process is critical to aid effectiveness, understanding stakeholder perceptions must be a critical element of any overall assessment of donor effectiveness.

This difference in emphasis on the range of factors which could be taken into account while assessing effectiveness suggests that a single tool is not a viable way to assess donor effectiveness. Instead, a variety of tools will be needed to capture the various dimensions of effectiveness necessary to obtain a complete view. These include results-based management tools, assessments of organisational processes, and different stakeholder assessments. Donors, recipient governments and key stakeholders will then need to use the range of evidence generated to form judgements about which multilateral organisations to fund and engage with.

*Donors will need to take stakeholder views about multilateral organisations into account.* The African Development Bank was a preferred disbursement organisation despite rating relatively poorly for the fifteen effectiveness criteria in the survey. Yet donors will find it hard to justify significantly increasing funding through this Bank in the immediate future given mixed views of its effectiveness. This suggests that bilateral donors need to work harder to assist the African Development Bank to build its capacity and increase its effectiveness in order to provide bigger volumes of funding to it since it is the institution with which stakeholders appear to feel the greatest sense of ownership.

If donors include the views of recipient stakeholders in assessments of effectiveness, then multilateral organisations will need to pay closer attention to issues of governance and ownership. The issue of country ownership will continue to be important. It is likely that the views of recipient stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental, about donor performance will therefore become more important, and methodologies of this type will be increasingly used by donors to assess effectiveness before channelling funds. Given that governance and ownership appear to play an important role in shaping stakeholders' views, multilateral organisations that want to improve their ratings will need to pay closer attention to these issues.

## 2 Aggregate Results

There have been a number of attempts by donors, alone or in partnership, to assess the effectiveness of multilateral organisations (MOs). Mostly, they seek the views of donor staff working in country, or less frequently, the views of the recipient country government. This pilot is the first systematic study of the views and perceptions of a broader group of recipient country stakeholders about the effectiveness of a range of MOs.

The views of 261 individuals are reported, from five stakeholder groups in six countries, and with reference to seven MOs. Locally recruited country coordinators identified and recruited respondents to complete a questionnaire over the period March to May, 2007.

The countries were chosen to ensure a mix from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as well as a range of aid dependency and income. They were: Bangladesh, Ghana, India, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia

The organisations were chosen for the range of sectors they operate in and activities they undertake. They were: the relevant Regional Development Banks (RDBs) - the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), The European Commission (EC), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM), The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); and the World Bank (WB).

The organisations included in the pilot carry out very different types of activities. In order to account for this, as well as to assist the reader's understanding, we have split the organisations into two groups: first, those that can disburse large volumes of funding for a range of activities (primarily through lending) - the WB, RDBs and the EC; second, the United Nations (UN) agencies and the GFATM, which are more specialised. We compare the results *within* these two groups for the majority of the questions. Where we compare *between* the groups, it is because the organisations carry out the activity referred to in the question, or because the difference between the groups is significant.

A detailed description of the data collection and how to interpret the results can be found in the methodology report in Appendix 3. Tables containing the scores and ratings for all questions can be found in Appendix 2.

### 1 The Results

#### 1.1 Criteria for assessing effectiveness

Drawing on work carried out already with recipient country stakeholders by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and separately by Development Finance International (DFI), respondents were presented with fifteen criteria which could affect an organisation's performance. The criteria break down into two distinct groups. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each criterion using a scale of high, medium and low. The criteria below are presented in rank order, highest at the top.

Overall, the criteria relating to policies and procedures appear to be more important; six of eight criteria were rated by 70% or more of the respondents as highly important. In relation to funding, only two of the seven criteria receive 'highly important' ratings above 70%. This suggests that, of these fifteen factors, respondents put more weight on the policies and procedures of MOs, rather than factors associated with the delivery of the funds.

### Funding Criteria

- Disburses funds quickly
- Flexible in the types of funding provided
- Makes long term commitments
- Provides predictable funding
- Provides funds with low conditionality
- Provides untied aid
- Provides highly concessional funds

### Policies and Procedures Criteria

- Facilitates the participation of stakeholders in its work
- Is transparent in the way it makes funding decisions
- Is cost-effective
- Undertakes constructive policy dialogue
- Monitors and evaluates its work effectively
- Programmes and projects aligned to government's development priorities
- Harmonises with the procedures of other donors
- Uses government procurement procedures

## 1.2 Perceptions of effectiveness

### a. Rating overall effectiveness

All seven organisations in the survey are rated in the range 3.30 – 3.52 by respondents assessing their overall effectiveness, see Figure 1. No organisation is rated higher than another in aggregate and there are only a few differences at country level. Disaggregating the different elements of accountability, see below, suggests that respondents use a range different factors to assess the overall effectiveness of different organisations.




Figure 1: Respondents rate the overall effectiveness of the MOs equally

### b. Rating performance against the fifteen effectiveness criteria

The AsDB and UNDP are the top performers in the two groups of organisations as rated against the fifteen effectiveness criteria. Table 3 and Table 4 show the ranges of scores, highest, middle, and lowest, for the funding criteria, and the policies and procedures criteria respectively.

The AsDB and WB were rated higher than the EC and the AfDB for all fifteen effectiveness criteria. The AsDB is in the top or middle performance bands for all fifteen criteria, though it is important to be aware that the majority of the responses relating to the AsDB came from Bangladesh. The AfDB is not placed in the top performance band for any of the criteria, and is in the bottom band for ten of them.

Highest scorers	Middle scorers	Lowest scorers
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**Key for effectiveness criteria rating tables**

<b>FUNDING</b>	<b>AsDB</b>	<b>WB</b>	<b>EC</b>	<b>AfDB</b>	<b>UNDP</b>	<b>UNICEF</b>	<b>GFATM</b>
Disburses funds quickly							
Flexibility in the types of funding it provides							
Makes long term commitments							
Provides predictable funding							
Provides funds with low conditionality							
Provides untied aid							
Provides highly concessional funds							


**Table 3: Rating MO performance against the funding criteria**

UNDP is rated higher than both UNICEF and GFATM. It is not placed in the bottom performance band for any of the criteria. UNICEF is not placed in the top band for any criteria, while GFATM is placed in the bottom band for all the criteria.

<b>POLICIES AND PROCEDURES</b>	<b>AsDB</b>	<b>WB</b>	<b>EC</b>	<b>AfDB</b>	<b>UNDP</b>	<b>UNICEF</b>	<b>GFATM</b>
Facilitates stakeholder participation							
Transparent funding decisions							
Cost effective							
Constructive policy dialogue							
Monitoring and evaluating							
Aligns to government's priorities							
Harmonises with other donors							
Uses government procurement							


**Table 4: Rating MO performance against the policies and procedures criteria**

**c. Effectiveness of health sector and technical assistance activities**



**Figure 2: The health sector activities of UNICEF and GFATM are rated higher than other MOs**

In aggregate, UNICEF and GFATM are ranked first and second for the effectiveness of their activities in the health sector, see Figure 2. The WB ranks above the EC while both RDBs are ranked last, possibly because neither has portfolios with a significant health component. This aggregate picture largely remains the same at country level.




**Figure 3: The TA of UNDP and the WB are rated higher than other MOs**

In aggregate, UNDP’s TA is perceived to be more effective than UNICEF and GFATM, as Figure 3 shows. The WB’s is seen to be more effective than the EC and both RDBs. Both of these pictures are largely repeated at country-level.

*d. Capacity building*

In aggregate, the MOs are rated in the range 2.91 – 3.64 for the effectiveness of their capacity building activities, see Figure 4. There are no differences in the ratings of either the group of MOs that can disburse significant sums of additional Official Development Assistance (ODA), or the group comprising the UN agencies and GFATM.

Comparing the ratings of the two groups where there are differences, in aggregate or at country level, UNDP is likely to be rated higher than one or more of the RDBs, WB and EC.



**Figure 4: Respondents rate the MOs equally for the effectiveness of their capacity building activities**


### 1.3 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to the Paris

*a. Government ownership, harmonisation and alignment*

In aggregate, respondents rate the performance of the MOs against the Ownership, Harmonisation and Alignment dimensions of the Paris Declaration as broadly equal, see Figure 5. The only difference within the two groups of organisations is for the alignment




indicator where, in aggregate, the AfDB is given a higher rating than the WB. At country level there are few differences within the two groups of organisations. Looking across all of the country profiles and between the two groups of organisation, the UN agencies tend to be rated higher than the WB for both the promotion of ownership by government, and the alignment indicators.



**Figure 5: Respondents rate MOs performance against the Paris Declaration as broadly equal**

*b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups*

In aggregate, there are few differences between the performance ratings given to the MOs for the extent to which they promote ownership either by civil society or by parliament. In aggregate, the EC rates higher than both RDBs for the extent to which it promotes ownership by civil society, while UNDP rates higher than GFATM for the extent to which it promotes ownership by parliament, see Figure 6.



**Figure 6: Respondent perceptions of the extent of MO promotion of ownership by different stakeholder groups**

At the country level, the EC is rated higher than the RDBs in three countries, Ghana, India and Zambia, for the extent to which it promotes ownership by civil society. In Bangladesh the EC also rates higher than the WB. There is no pattern to the limited number of differences seen for the extent to which the MOs promote ownership by Parliament in the ratings.

Looking across all of the country profiles and between the two groups of organisation, the RDBs are likely to rate lower than the other organisations, particularly the UN agencies for the extent to which they promote ownership by civil society.

#### 1.4 What is influencing perceptions of overall effectiveness?

The data were examined for indications of whether perceptions of the effectiveness indicators highlighted above are influencing overall effectiveness ratings. For all organisations, except the AsDB, a positive association is found between the perception that MOs are promoting government ownership and perceptions of overall effectiveness, i.e., respondents rating an organisation higher for the extent to which it promotes government ownership are more likely to give it a higher overall effectiveness rating. There is a positive association between the harmonisation indicator and ratings of overall effectiveness for the UN agencies and GFATM. Finally, there is a positive association between capacity building and ratings of overall effectiveness for the EC, UNDP and WB.

However, examining the data on effectiveness in more detail generates few significant patterns. One pattern that does emerge is that in relation to the elements of the Paris Declaration, the UN agencies, particularly UNDP, are more likely to rate higher than the RDBs and the WB.

If respondents were just taking the factors covered in the questions described above into account when assessing the overall effectiveness of organisations, then UNDP would be expected to rate higher than the RDBs and WB. That it does not suggests that respondents are taking into account a range of other factors that are not covered by the survey questions as they assess overall effectiveness.

**Box 1: Comments about the overall effectiveness of MOs**

*"AfDB support tend to be visible in infrastructure."* (Zambia Civil Service)

*"GFATM and UNICEF's funding especially as regards to HIV/AIDS and children, its effectiveness can be seen through activities currently implemented in these two areas"* (Tanzania Civil Service)

*"... UNDP is doing very well in human development (health and education)"* (Bangladesh Government)

*"Infrastructure projects of the World Bank, particularly roads construction, connectivity and networking have drawn widespread praise"* (India Parliament)

*"The World Bank provides a lot of aid and funds many development; social economic and environmental activities. It has been doing this for a long time, of course with conditions"* (Tanzania Parliament)

*"Organisations such as the EC hide behind their regulations forcing recipients to use their procedures... arguing that these cannot be changed quickly because of their bureaucracy etc. These regulations impede efforts at attaining aid effectiveness."* (South Africa Government)

*"UNDP support is minimal"* (Zambia Civil Society)

*"The WB and AsDB monitor the projects very effectively and continuously..."* (Bangladesh Civil Service)

*"The European Commission is very bureaucratic and takes a long time when contracts are signed and when it is implemented. UNDP and World Bank are much better, even though there are delays also"* (Ghana Business)

*"The World Bank gives loans as a general rule which have to be paid at some future date. We need more grants"* (Zambia Business)

The comments provided by respondents when they were answering the overall effectiveness question provide some insight about the other factors which might be influencing the ratings, see Box 1. There were some categories of comments which were broadly made about all the organisations. A number of comments are made about the *sector or activity focus* of the organisations. Respondents appear to value the different organisations for different reasons, GFATM and UNICEF for their health focus, the RDBs, WB, and to a lesser extent the EC, for their focus on the productive sectors and infrastructure, and UNDP for its capacity building and Technical Assistance (TA) activities. *Scale of activities* also might be a factor, the Banks and EC generally getting more positive comments about the amount of money they can

disburse while the UN agencies receive almost exclusively negative comments in this regard. *Disbursement speed* might also be a factor, with the UN agencies generally being praised while the Banks and EC receive more mixed comments.

In addition, the Banks and EC received a number of other categories of comment relating to them alone. *Monitoring and evaluation* appears generally positively viewed for the WB, but less so for the RDBs. All of them received a good number of negative comments relating to the *conditionality* attached to their ODA. *Concessionality* is also clearly a factor with some stakeholders making negative comments about the WB and AsDB. The EC was generally praised.

### 1.5 Preferences for disbursement

In aggregate, UNDP is ranked first; it is preferred as a channel for additional ODA, see Figure 7, even though it is not able to fund development interventions directly (other than through TA). This picture is repeated in four out of the six of the sample countries.

In aggregate, of the group of four organisations that can disburse significant sums of extra financing, stakeholders preferred the RDBs to the WB and EC. The picture is more varied at the country level. Table 5 presents the MO rankings in aggregate and by country. The picture of the relative rankings for these organisations in aggregate is repeated only in Tanzania. In Ghana the AfDB is ranked below the WB.

The aggregate picture for the AsDB, as the second most preferred channel for additional ODA above both the WB and EC, obscures preferences at country level. The aggregate picture is repeated in Bangladesh, but in India the WB and AsDB are ranked by too few people to allow meaningful judgements to be made.




Figure 7: The RDBs are preferred as channels for additional ODA over the WB and EC

Respondents are clearly taking into account a large range of factors when they think about which MO they prefer as a channel for additional ODA. The answers to the Paris Declaration questions are weakly associated with higher rankings on the disbursement question for the EC and WB. The answers of respondents who ranked the EC higher for disbursing funds quickly are moderately associated with their preferences for it as a disbursement channel, as are the answers of those who ranked the WB higher for facilitating the participation of stakeholders in its work. The majority of the other fifteen effectiveness criteria are also weakly associated with the disbursement question for the EC, WB, and UNDP. A smaller number of these criteria, but with no discernible pattern, are weakly associated for the other

organisations. Further work with respondents would need to be carried out to identify which of these criteria are important in influencing disbursement preferences.

Organisation	All	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
UNDP	1	1	1	3	2	1	1
AsDB	2	2		5			
AfDB	3		3		4	2	3
UNICEF	4	4	4	1	1	3	5
WB	5	5	2	2	6	4	5
EC	6	3	5	4	3	6	2
GFATM	7	6	6	6	5	5	4

Table 5: Relative rankings for which MOs should disburse additional ODA by country<sup>3</sup>

Comments received from respondents in relation to the question about how to disburse additional ODA through the multilateral system reveal little beyond that highlighted above, see Box 2 below. Though few comments were received for the AfDB, one factor which is mentioned is that it receives higher rankings because it is the *African Development Bank*. This raises the hypothesis, which cannot be tested using the data generated in this phase of the pilot project, that respondents compare their role in the governance of the WB and EC to their role in the AfDB, specifically in terms of board representation, and that this is a strong predictor of disbursement preferences. That the WB is the second most preferred channel for additional ODA in India would appear to strengthen this hypothesis, India being a country where questions of ownership and governance are less important given the strength of country leadership over development policies. Untangling the range of possible factors which affect disbursement preferences will have to be tested at a later stage.

**Box 2: Comments about disbursement preferences**

*"The AfDB is an African Development Bank it therefore has a better understanding of Africa's situation"*  
(Zambia Business)

*"AfDB - [...] they were formed specifically with Africa in mind and should have the capacity to deal with African nations"*  
(Ghana Parliament)

*"...AsDB and World Bank will be best in areas of physical development e.g. infrastructure related works..."*  
(Bangladesh Government)

*"Aid is more effective for the EC ranked high, less transaction costs, less unnecessary travel costs, more flexible and programmes more aligned to government plans"*  
(Zambia Government)

*"WB's loan disbursement policy is guided by the head office. Their prescription never give results for the LDCs"*  
(Bangladesh Business)


*"UN agencies are not cost effective and their efforts have limited penetration compared to WB, EC and AsDB. Infrastructure improvement and upgrading projects have generated numerous wage employment opportunities at the local level"*  
(India Parliament)

*"...UNDP works most closely with the Governments and civil society compared to the others, therefore more aid to UNDP may mean more support to Governments and CSOs"*  
(Tanzania Civil Society)

## 1.6 Reforming multilateral aid

At the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify three things they would change about multilateral aid. Figure 8 below shows the number of times different issues were raised by respondents in response to this question. Conditionality is mentioned the most times, almost double any other issue. This reinforces some of the qualitative data generated in other questions. While most of the other issues highlighted in Figure 8 are covered within other elements of this report, one new issue does stand out, that of stopping the use of foreign experts providing TA.

<sup>3</sup> Care must be taken when examining the ranks presented in this table. The ranks presented here are based on the average scores received by individual MOs in aggregate and at country level. The differences between these scores are large for some organisations and very small for others.



**Figure 8: Conditionality is the issue respondents would most like to change about multilateral aid to their country.**

Label - comment	Label - comment
A - less conditionality	G - more predictable funding
B - reduction in number and complexity of MO procedures	H - more accountability of MOs
C - more transparency among MOs	I - better harmonisation with other donors
D - less use of foreign TA	J - better promotion of ownership
E - more participation of stakeholders in MO programmes	K - improved M&E by MOs
F - more aligned with national agenda	L - more long term commitment among MOs

**Table 6: Key for figure 11**

### 3 Introduction

The purpose of this report is to present and analyse the results of phase one of a pilot project to assess stakeholder perceptions of the effectiveness of multilateral organisations. The project was commissioned by DFID in order to:

- Build a better understanding of the performance of MOs amongst decision-makers, parliamentarians and other key stakeholders both in donor and recipient countries;
- Develop a better informed dialogue between MOs and DFID staff at headquarters and country level;
- Develop a better informed dialogue between MOs and key stakeholders in-country;
- Improve the performance of MOs at the country level.

The information in this report about stakeholder perceptions of MO effectiveness will be used by DFID alongside a suite of other methods for assessing agency effectiveness, both to improve policy and strengthen accountability.

The data for phase one of this project, which are presented in this report, were generated through the completion of a questionnaire administered in six pilot countries.

# 4 Literature Review

## 1 Introduction

A number of different methodologies have been designed and used to assess the effectiveness of donor organisations, including MOs. A number of these assessments have covered the organisations assessed in this survey and make detailed results publicly available. These are described below. In addition the following methodologies have been implemented by individual bilateral agencies, but detailed results are not available: Multilateral Monitoring Survey System (Netherlands); Multilateral Effectiveness and Relevance Assessment (Canada); Multilateral Effectiveness Framework (UK). A much fuller summary of all of these methodologies can be found in Duska-Anema Development Associates 2006.<sup>1</sup>

## 2 Assessments of MOs

### 2.1 Commonwealth Secretariat and La Francophonie

Over a series of three ODI facilitated workshops, in London, Dhaka and Yaoundé, the Commonwealth Secretariat and La Francophonie brought together over 70 senior government officials and NGO representatives from 27 countries. The purpose of the workshops was to bring southern voices to bear on the debate about the reform of the aid architecture.

Working in groups, participants identified a list of attributes of what an 'ideal' donor agency would look like. The majority of groups identified the following attributes as important: alignment; flexibility transparency; high concessionality; participatory approach; predictability; speed of disbursement; volume of financing; cost effective; light bureaucratic procedures; and untying of aid. Workshop participants ranked a range of donors against these attributes as part of a process of prompting dialogue about which donors provided more effective aid from their perspective<sup>2</sup>.

### 2.2 Development Finance International

Development Finance International (DFI) has developed a methodology to assess the performance of donors against a set of objective criteria broken down into two areas and against 13 separate headings as follows:

- **Policies:** concessionality, amount of assistance, type and channel of assistance, sectors and projects, flexibility, predictability, policy conditionality, policy dialogue
- **Procedures:** conditions precedent, disbursement method, disbursement procedure, procurement procedures, co-ordination and evaluation

By holding intensive workshops in Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), DFI supports Finance Ministry officials to assign a score (1 low to 5 high). Using these criteria governments have assessed the overall quality of each donor's and creditor's resources on an objective basis. The second part of the methodology requires the government to assess its own policies and procedures in order to understand the impact these have on the delivery of external assistance flows. This assessment uses the same factors as the first stage. By combining the assessments of donor and government policies and procedures, this methodology enables governments to do a number of things including: prioritise the most desirable donor sources of future new financing; assess dependence on donors providing good and poor quality aid; and identify priority areas for overall improvement of donor and government policies and procedures at the individual country level<sup>3</sup>.

## **2.3 MOPAN Survey**

The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) Survey is carried out by a group of like-minded donor countries<sup>4</sup> and is an assessment of MOs in countries where they have bilateral programmes. MOPAN surveys have been carried out on an annual basis since 2004. Three different MOs have been assessed in each of the three surveys to-date<sup>5</sup>.

MOPAN captures the perceptions of in-country staff to assess behavioural aspects of MO partnership performance with national stakeholders and other development agencies in the country. The survey is carried out as a light touch questionnaire, answered by individual in-country staff from all of the participating governments. Questionnaire respondents meet to discuss their responses and produce one country report. The MOPAN Headquarters aggregates the individual country reports into a synthesis report<sup>6</sup>.

## **2.4 Paris Baseline Survey**

Governments and donors attending the Paris High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness agreed to monitor progress against the twelve indicators in the Declaration. This survey is the first of three and is intended to determine the baseline performance for eight of the indicators to enable future progress to be tracked. Desk reviews will be used to assess the other four indicators. The survey was managed by a National Coordinator who was appointed by the recipient government. Questionnaires were separately completed by individual donors and by the government. These questionnaires were designed to capture both quantitative data assessing progress against each indicator, as well as a qualitative assessment of progress. The data gathered by government and donors diverged in many cases, requiring intense discussion before a country worksheet could be completed and returned to the DAC Secretariat<sup>7</sup>.

## **2.5 Performance Management Framework (Denmark)**

The Performance Management Framework (PMF) is an assessment of MOs for Danish development cooperation which uses a number of information sources: MOPAN; recent relevant evaluations of some of the organisations; minutes from High-Level consultations with the organisations; minutes from Board and Annual Meetings; and results based management systems where present. In addition, the survey seeks the perceptions of Danish multilateral representatives and embassies in programme countries about organisational effectiveness. Finally, it uses reports from the relevant mission to the MO or the department in order to supplement the perception assessments<sup>8</sup>. There have been two surveys; in 2002 and 2005.

## **2.6 Strategic Partnership for Africa**

Beginning in 2003, the Strategic Partnership for Africa (SPA) has undertaken an annual survey to establish the progress made by 20 budget support donors in aligning and harmonising their activities in fifteen Poverty Reduction Strategy countries in Africa. The 2006 questionnaire was designed to be short and easy to answer with tick-boxes for quantifiable responses and room for qualitative comment where appropriate. Respondents ranked the performance of donors between 1 (poor) and 5 (excellent). The questionnaire is completed in three parts:

- Jointly by governments and representatives of direct budget support donors;
- By direct budget support donors individually ;
- By government representatives<sup>9</sup>.



### **3 Conclusion**

These assessments of MO effectiveness provided a useful backdrop to inform the work of this project; the questionnaire attempted to pick-up on a number of the issues highlighted by some of these methodologies. An attempt was made to relate the results from the stakeholder perception surveys presented in this report and the results from the different methodologies, but this proved challenging. Few of the questions asked in this survey related directly to the questions from the other methodologies making direct comparison very difficult. Where more direct read through of the questions was possible, particular with the MOPAN survey, the time since the survey was undertaken proved problematic; comparing the results of this stakeholder perception survey undertaken in 2007 to the results from the 2004 or 2005 MOPAN survey was judged to be difficult to justify. Ensuring that future perception surveys are more easily triangulated with other effectiveness surveys will be important.

# 5 Effectiveness Criteria

## 1 Identifying Effectiveness Criteria: Funding and Procedural

Stakeholders take a range of criteria into account when assessing the effectiveness of MOs. In addition to assessing stakeholder perceptions about the overall effectiveness of MOs and other specific aspects of effectiveness such as progress against the Paris Declaration, the questionnaire also sought their views on additional criteria that are important to them in relation to MO effectiveness.

In order to produce a list of important criteria, the project looked to previous research conducted both by ODI and by DFI. The fifteen effectiveness criteria were developed by government officials and civil society representatives from twenty-seven countries who attended workshops organised by the Commonwealth Secretariat facilitated by ODI or came from workshops held by DFI with Ministry of Finance officials in Highly Indebted Poor Countries. The questionnaire also offered respondents an opportunity to add additional criteria. However, very few respondents did this and no new criteria emerged. The fifteen effectiveness criteria in the questionnaire can be divided into two categories: *Funding*, and *Policies and Procedures*. These two categories have seven and eight criteria respectively

## 2 Ranking the Importance of the Effectiveness Criteria

Respondents were asked to rank the importance of the criteria using a scale of high, medium and low. The total score was calculated for each criterion. The scores were then used to rank the criteria in order, from the highest to the lowest.




Figure 9: Ranking the importance of the seven funding criteria

As shown in Figure 9, most of the funding criteria were considered to be of either high or medium importance. The criterion ranked the highest is the quick disbursement of funds. Closely behind are flexibility in funding, long term commitments, predictability, low conditionality and providing untied aid. Providing concessional funds is perceived as the least important, having the most 'lowest' rankings of any indicator.

For the criteria covering policies and procedures, facilitating the participation of stakeholders is perceived as most important by the respondents, see Figure 10. Closely behind are transparency in funding decisions, alignment with government's development priorities, monitoring and evaluation, engaging in constructive policy dialogue, and being cost effective. Ranking lower is harmonising with other donors. The lowest priority by far is using government procurement procedures.

Overall, the category of policies and procedures appears to be more important because six of eight criteria are rated as highly important by more than 70% of respondents to the question. Under the funding category, only two of the seven criteria, disbursing funds quickly and flexibility, are rated 'highly important' ratings by more than 70% of respondents to the question. This suggests that, in relation to the factors listed here, respondents put weight on the policies and procedures associated with the delivery of development aid than the type of funding delivered.




Figure 10: Ranking the importance of the eight policy and procedure criteria

### 3 Ranking the MOs on Funding and Procedural Effectiveness

After asking respondents to rank the importance of the different effectiveness criteria, they were asked to rank the performance of the three MOs that they knew best against each of the fifteen criteria using a scale of 'Best Performer', 'Second Best' and 'Third Best'. Though the typical respondent in this study were informed enough to report on over four MOs, they often reported on fewer than three.

To adjust for the difference in response rates to these questions, the average score was calculated for each MO. The range of scores was then divided into thirds: highest score, middle score and lowest score. This process is explained in more detail in Appendix 3.

#### 3.1 Ranking funding effectiveness

Examining the RDBs, WB and EC as a group (Table 7) against the funding criteria, the AsDB and WB are ranked as top performers more often than the EC and the AfDB. The AsDB is ranked as a top performer for four criteria and has no bottom rankings. The WB is ranked as a top performer for three criteria and receives two bottom ranks. The EC is ranked top for one criterion, in the middle third of performers for the majority and receives two bottom rankings. By contrast, the AfDB receives no top, and four bottom rankings.

It is important to note that the results for the AsDB are from only two countries, India and Bangladesh, and more respondents in Bangladesh answered questions about the AsDB than in India. Care must be taken therefore when interpreting these results.

Examining the UN agencies and GFATM, UNDP dominates with five effectiveness indicators in the top third and only two in the middle third. UNICEF has five in the middle third and only two in the bottom third. GFATM is in the bottom third on all seven criteria.

Highest scorers	Middle scorers	Lowest scorers
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Key for effectiveness criteria rating tables (Tables 7 and 8)

FUNDING	AsDB	WB	EC	AfDB	UNDP	UNICEF	GFATM
Disburses funds quickly	1.40	1.03	0.84	0.76	1.11	0.90	0.73
Flexibility in the types of funding it provides	0.90	0.82	0.83	0.73	1.19	0.79	0.52
Makes long term commitments	1.10	1.21	0.87	0.80	0.84	0.71	0.48
Provides predictable funding	0.86	0.89	0.82	0.70	0.91	0.68	0.54
Provides funds with low conditionality	0.86	0.71	0.81	0.84	1.19	0.96	0.58
Provides untied aid	0.85	0.70	0.76	0.71	1.06	0.87	0.65
Provides highly concessional funds	0.92	0.97	0.80	0.63	0.95	0.69	0.47

Table 7: Rating MO performance against the funding criteria

### 3.2 Ranking procedural effectiveness

Examining the performance ratings of the RDBs, EC and WB against the policy and procedures ratings, again the AsDB is the top performer, see table 8. It is ranked as a top performer for all eight criteria. The WB has five criteria in the top third, and the remaining three in the middle third. The EC has only two criteria in the top third, six in the middle third, and one in the bottom. As above, the AfDB fairs much worse, with only two criteria in the middle third and the remainder in the bottom third.

Examining the UN agencies and GFATM, UNDP once again dominates this group with five of seven criteria in the top third; UNICEF has five in the middle third and three in the bottom. GFATM once again is found in the bottom third on all policy and procedural criteria.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES	AsDB	WB	EC	AfDB	UNDP	UNICEF	GFATM
Facilitates stakeholder participation	1.17	0.97	0.88	0.70	1.20	0.87	0.63
Transparent funding decisions	1.40	0.96	0.84	0.78	1.01	0.74	0.63
Cost effective	1.00	0.77	0.76	0.68	0.91	0.71	0.56
Constructive policy dialogue	0.96	1.07	0.86	0.67	1.18	0.72	0.45
Monitoring and evaluating	1.17	1.24	0.91	0.67	0.97	0.68	0.53
Aligns to government's priorities	1.17	1.06	0.95	0.72	1.23	0.87	0.58
Harmonises with other donors	1.11	0.99	0.92	0.67	1.06	0.68	0.37
Uses government procurement	0.90	0.84	0.83	0.72	0.89	0.62	0.47

Table 8: Rating MO performance against the policies and procedures criteria

Overall, the organisations able to disburse substantial sums of ODA are perceived to be more effective than UNICEF and GFATM when ranked against these fifteen effectiveness criteria. Except for the AfDB, the financial institutions dominate the top and middle thirds in both categories.

The results suggest that overall perceptions of MO performance vary considerably. For instance, on disbursing funds quickly, only the AsDB is found in the top third, while for predictability several MOs are in the top third. As discussed in the individual MO profiles below, perceptions of performance against some of these effectiveness criteria are positively correlated with higher preferences for disbursement of additional funds for individual MOs. The data suggest that stakeholders value different aspects of each organisation. The importance and number of criteria that appear important vary considerably across the seven MOs. While these results are interesting and provide valuable insights into the factors considered concerning disbursement choices, they do not tell the entire story about why stakeholders prefer one MO over another.

# 6 African Development Bank Profile

## 1 Organisation Background<sup>10</sup>

The AfDB was established in 1964 and has 53 African country shareholders. Its 23 non-African country shareholders are limited to a one third share of capital and votes on the Board. Each member government is represented on the Board of Governors and all four of the African countries surveyed are members of the organisation.

The Bank promotes economic and social development through loans, equity investments and TA. In the four sample countries, its mission is promoting growth and poverty reduction. In Ghana it focuses on education, health, rural services, and social protection, in South Africa on infrastructure, in Tanzania on developing skills, improving infrastructure, supporting agriculture, improving governance and reducing poverty, and in Zambia on agriculture, water, energy, and child welfare. AfDB's disbursements by country are shown in Table 9. Although South Africa does not receive ODA from the AfDB, it does receive non-concessional funding; its results have therefore been retained in the survey.

	GH	ZA	TZ	ZM
3yr Avg. \$m (03-05)	54.91	N/A	71.66	12.67
% ODA	4.8	<sup>11</sup> N/A	4.3	1.4

Table 9: AfDB African Development Fund disbursements by country<sup>12</sup>

## 2 Respondents Profile

Table 10 shows the number of respondents who were informed and well informed about the AfDB. Nearly 70% of the respondents in both Ghana and Tanzania were informed enough about the AfDB to answer questions about it, this percentage falls in both South Africa and Zambia where 40% and 49% respectively were able to answer questions about it. In aggregate, a respectable 59% of the African respondents were able to provide their views.

GH	ZA	TZ	ZM	Total
34	14	34	17	99

Table 10: Number of informed and well informed respondents about the AfDB by country

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness

Respondents rate the overall effectiveness of the AfDB in providing aid as *moderate* (3.30). The country scores range from 2.63 in South Africa to 3.68 in Tanzania. The aggregate picture of respondents perceiving no significant difference between the AfDB and the other MOs is repeated in every country except Ghana. Here the AfDB is perceived to be less effective than the WB. Respondents in Tanzania perceive the AfDB to be more effective than those in South Africa.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

Given the limited scale of its activities in the health sector, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the AfDB is, in aggregate, ranked last for the effectiveness of its activities in this sector. This picture is repeated at the country level.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

With an explicit element of its mission being the provision of TA it is perhaps more surprising that the AfDB is ranked second last for the effectiveness of its TA in aggregate. This picture

is also true at the country level in Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania. In Zambia, the AfDB is ranked in last place below even GFATM.




Figure 11: Country ratings of the overall effectiveness of the AfDB

#### d. Capacity building

The work that the AfDB carries out in the area of building capacity in public institutions is rated as *moderate to high* (3.25) in aggregate, lower than UNDP. In Ghana it also rates lower than the WB. There are no other differences.

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

#### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

In aggregate, respondents rate the extent to which the AfDB promotes government ownership as *moderate to high* (3.45). At the country level, there are no differences between the AfDB and other MOs, except in South Africa. Here, the EC rates higher than the AfDB.

In aggregate, respondents rated both the extent to which the AfDB aligns with government policies as *moderate to high* (3.66), higher than the WB. This picture is broadly repeated in the countries in the survey. For harmonisation it is rated as *moderate* (3.16) in aggregate and there is no difference between it and the other MOs in the survey.

#### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

The extent to which the AfDB promotes ownership by civil society is rated as *moderate* (2.84) in aggregate. The AfDB rates lower than the EC in aggregate. At the country level it rates lower than the EC in Ghana and Zambia, and lower than the WB in Ghana. The extent to which it promotes ownership by parliament is rated as *low to moderate* (2.61) in aggregate. The only country difference is in Tanzania where the AfDB rates lower than the WB.

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

The picture painted of the AfDB's performance against the Paris Declaration and other effectiveness indicators is mixed and it is difficult to relate these perceptions to the aggregate perception that the AfDB's overall effectiveness is no different to that of the other organisations. Respondents who perceive the AfDB to be promoting government ownership of development policies are more likely to give it a higher overall effectiveness rating. A limited number of comments were made about the AfDB in relation to the overall effectiveness question, see box 3. It is not possible therefore to group comments in order to identify other factors which might be affecting perceptions of overall effectiveness.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursing additional aid




Figure 12: Country preferences for disbursing additional aid through the AfDB

Respondents rank the AfDB, in aggregate, as the third most preferred organisation to disburse additional aid, above the WB and EC. Of the MOs operating in the region, only UNDP is ranked higher in aggregate with a score of 1.63<sup>13</sup>. Disaggregating the data to look at the country level also finds the AfDB ranking above the WB in every country except Ghana. It ranks above the EC in Ghana and Tanzania. See Figure 12, for the AfDB's score at country level and Table 11 for its ranking in each country.

	Aggregate	GH	ZA	TZ	ZM
Rank	3	3	4	2	3

Table 11: Ranking AfDB in terms of country preferences for disbursing additional aid

Looking at the performance ratings given to the AfDB in relation to the fifteen effectiveness criteria does not help answer the question about why the AfDB is preferred to the WB and/or EC at country level and in aggregate. The AfDB rates worse than both organisations against these criteria; it scores no top ratings, and indeed rates as a bottom performer for over half of the funding criteria and nearly all of the policies and procedures criteria<sup>14</sup>. Only three of these criteria are weakly associated with higher preferences for the AfDB to disburse additional funding: flexible funding, the speed of its disbursement and whether it undertakes constructive policy dialogue. Other factors must also be influencing these preferences.

Respondents did not make many comments about the AfDB while indicating their disbursement preferences. Those comments that were made suggest only a few additional factors that might help explain their rankings. The fact that it is the *African* Bank appears to be viewed positively, see box 4 above. The focus of its activities also appears highly valued. Other comments are more mixed and it is difficult to identify additional factors. One hypothesis is that respondents compare their government's role in the governance of the WB and EC to their role in the AfDB and this is a strong predictor of disbursement preferences.

Another factor which might be influencing the scores for different indicators is the profile of the AfDB in country. One key factor influencing this may be the presence of an AfDB country office. The Bank currently has an office in Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia, all opened relatively recently, the oldest being four years old and Zambia's opened only last year. Again, this will have to be tested later.

## 4 Conclusion

Other studies assessing the effectiveness of the AfDB give it a mixed review, so it is perhaps surprising that our respondents rank the organisation as favourably as they do for overall effectiveness. Looking in more detail at the ratings for specific aspects of effectiveness, ratings for AfDB tend to vary more widely than those of other organisations. AfDB is more likely to be rated below the EC or the WB in response to questions related to the Paris Declaration and the delivery of specific activities. The AfDB is also rated below the EC and WB against the fifteen effectiveness criteria, see chapter 5. Further work needs to be done to understand if respondent perceptions are affected by the fact that the AfDB has only recently gained a country presence in three of the sample countries.

The results about effectiveness highlight a paradox though. Despite its lower ratings, the AfDB is the second most preferred channel for additional ODA, ranked higher than the EC and WB in aggregate. Though the data is unable to provide clear evidence, a plausible hypothesis is that the AfDB is preferred as a disbursement channel because respondents feel a greater sense of ownership, with its strong regional membership.



# 7 Asian Development Bank Profile

## 1 Organisation Background<sup>15</sup>

The AsDB was established in 1966 and has 48 regional and 19 non-regional members. India was a founding member while Bangladesh joined in 1973. All members of the Bank are members of the Board of Governors. Although India does not receive ODA from the AsDB, it does receive non-concessional funding; its results have therefore been retained in the survey.

	BA	IN
3yr Avg. \$m (03-05)	53.47	N/A
% total ODA	3.9	N/A <sup>16</sup>

Table 12: Total disbursements from the Asian Development Fund by country

The AsDB describes its mission as “*improving the welfare of the people in Asia and the Pacific*” and its main instruments for carrying out its mission are; policy dialogue, loans, TA, grants, guarantees and equity investments. In the two sample countries, the AsDB focuses on the energy, transport and urban development sectors. A further focus in Bangladesh is the education sector. For its work in additional sectors the Bank supports the work of other donors. The AsDB’s disbursement by country is shown in Table 12.

## 2 Respondent Profile

BA	IN	Total
51	21	72

Table 13: Number of informed and well informed respondents about the AsDB by country

Table 13 shows how many respondents in each country considered themselves to be informed enough to answer questions about the AsDB. In Bangladesh nearly all did, while just over half of those in India considered themselves so. While we report the results in aggregate below, this distribution of respondents should be borne in mind. The results from India clearly have to be treated with considerable care and the aggregate results will tend to be driven more by Bangladeshi perceptions.

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness

The overall effectiveness of the AsDB in providing aid is rated as *moderate to high* (3.33),. There is no difference perceived between its effectiveness and that of the other MOs either in aggregate or in either country. Respondents in Bangladesh perceive the AsDB to be more effective than those in India.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

In aggregate the AsDB ranks second to last for the effectiveness of its activities in the health sector, ahead only of the AfDB. Given the low level of activities in this sector, this ranking is unsurprising.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

In aggregate, the AsDB ranks third for the effectiveness of TA. Respondent perceptions of the effectiveness of the AsDB’s TA differ between the two countries. In Bangladesh, the AsDB is ranked second, below UNDP, and above the EC and the WB for this indicator. In

India, the AsDB ranks fourth, below the top ranking WB, but roughly on a par with both the EC and UNDP.




Figure 13: Country ratings of the overall effectiveness of the AsDB

#### d. Capacity building

In aggregate, respondents rate the efforts of the AsDB to build the capacity of public institutions as *moderate* (3.02), lower than UNDP.

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

#### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

Respondents assess the performance of the AsDB against all three of the Paris Declaration questions, ownership, alignment and harmonisation, as *moderate* (3.16, 3.13 and 2.98 respectively), in aggregate. In India, the AsDB is rated lower than the WB for the extent to which it harmonises with other donors. .

#### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

In aggregate, the AsDB was rated *low to moderate* (2.68) for the extent to which it promotes ownership by civil society, lower than the EC. The AsDB was rated *moderate* (2.76), in aggregate, for the extent to which it promotes ownership by Parliament.

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

In aggregate and in both countries, respondents answering the question about AsDB’s overall effectiveness do not rate it higher than any of the other MOs. Against a number of the individual effectiveness indicators highlighted above, where there are differences in ratings, the AsDB is more likely to be rated lower than the EC, WB and the UN agencies, though there is no consistency as to which of these is likely to be rated higher. This suggests that other factors might be influencing perceptions of overall effectiveness. The data show no associations between different indicators and the overall effectiveness ratings. This may well be as a result of the small number of countries sampled and the divergence in views between the two countries.

Few comments about the AsDB were received from respondents in response to the question about overall effectiveness. See Box 5 for a selection of comments. Mixed views were received about the effectiveness of its monitoring and evaluation, but beyond that there was no clear pattern to the comments. It is difficult to identify any clear factors that might be influencing overall perceptions of effectiveness, from those comments that were received.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursing additional aid

In Bangladesh, the AsDB is the second most preferred MO to disburse additional aid, behind UNDP, but above both the WB and EC. See Figure 14 for the AsDB’s score and Table 14 for its rank by country




Figure 14: Country preferences for disbursing additional aid through the AsDB

	Aggregate	BA	IN
Rank	2	2	5

Table 14: Ranking the AsDB in terms of country preferences for disbursing additional aid

In aggregate, respondents rate the performance of the AsDB against the fifteen effectiveness criteria above both the EC and WB. At face value this might help to explain why it is preferred over both as a channel for additional ODA. For its policies and procedures, it rates as a top performer for all of the policy and procedure criteria. It rates as a top performer for just over half of the funding criteria<sup>17</sup>. The performance of the AsDB against the fifteen effectiveness criteria does not fully explain why it is preferred second in aggregate as a disbursement channel for ODA because no correlations are found between these effectiveness criteria and the disbursement question, but respondents ranking the effectiveness of the AsDB’s TA more highly are likely to prefer it as a channel for additional ODA. That this is the only correlation found is probably as a result of the fact that respondents in only two countries are answering the questions and their views appear to be relatively divergent. Most of the comments received in relation to this question are from Bangladesh and don’t shed much light on disbursement preferences, see Box 6.

## 4 Conclusion

The overall effectiveness of the AsDB in providing aid is rated as *moderate to high*. In aggregate, respondents rate the performance of the AsDB against the fifteen effectiveness criteria above both the EC and WB. However, the results described above must be treated with caution. Over twice as many respondents in Bangladesh were able to answer questions about the organisation than in India. This means that the aggregate findings are heavily driven by respondents in Bangladesh and any results from India must be treated as preliminary.

# 8 European Commission Profile

## 1 Organisation Background<sup>18</sup>

The European Commission's development policies and funding programmes are run by the Directorate General for Development (DG DEV) and the Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex). DG DEV was formed in 1957 and works on the programming, policy and strategies phase of the project cycle for ACP countries. DG Relex deals with non-African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries. Both feed into the implementing agency responsible for on-ground delivery, the EC EuropeAid Cooperation Office.

Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia are signatories to the Cotonou Agreement and funding is provided through both the European Development Fund (EDF) (except to South Africa) and thematic budget lines. South Africa, Bangladesh and India access EC development financing exclusively through the Commission's Budget. Table 15 shows that the EC is one of the larger donors in the sample countries.

	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
3yr Avg. \$m (03-05)	62.94	70.72	129.81	150.07	167.58	114.08
% ODA	4.6	6.2	11.7	22.9	10.1	12.9

Table 15: EC aid disbursements by country

Except in India, the main focus of its development financing is in productive sector development, infrastructure, rural development, capacity building and macro-economic support. In India, the focus is on key social sectors (specifically health and education).

## 2 Respondents Profile

Table 16 shows the number of respondents who were informed enough to answer questions about the EC. In all countries except India, between 60% and 80% were informed about it. In India, just over 35 % were informed about it.

BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM	Total
45	38	14	22	39	28	186

Table 16: Number of informed and well informed respondents about the EC by country

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness

In aggregate, respondents rate the EC as *moderately* (3.30) effective in the way it provides development aid. There is no difference between the EC's rating and those given to the other MOs. At the country level, see Figure 15, the picture is broadly similar except in Zambia where the EC is rated higher than the WB.


#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

The EC ranks fifth for its health sector activities effectiveness, below GFATM, UNICEF, UNDP and the WB. This picture is broadly repeated in all countries. The aggregate result is perhaps unsurprising given the low level of these activities in most of the surveyed countries.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

In aggregate, the EC is ranked fourth for the effectiveness of its TA, below the AsDB, UNDP, and WB. In South Africa, its TA is perceived to be more effective than the other MOs. In

Tanzania, the EC's TA is perceived to be more effective than the AfDB. In Bangladesh it is perceived to be more effective than the WB.



**Box 7. Comments about the EC**  
 “The EC is too bureaucratic and it is almost impossible to access financing in time” (Zambia Civil Service)  
 “EC lending is very complicated and demanding in its financial accounting, a long wait period” (India Civil Society)  
 “EC always provide what they pledge” (Zambia Government)  
 “EC is giving very effective assistance in trade sector development” (Bangladesh Government)  
 “The UN and EC offer more than just funding, they build capacity in government and civil society. They offer a package” (South Africa Parliament)  
 “[The EC]... makes long term commitments and programs are aligned to the government programs” (Government Zambia)

Figure 15: Country ratings of the overall effectiveness of the EC

d. *Capacity building*

In aggregate, respondents rated the extent to which the EC builds capacity of central institutions as *moderate to high* (3.27). In Tanzania, respondents rate the WB and UN agencies higher. This is the only country difference.

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

a. *Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation*

In aggregate, the EC's promotion of ownership by the government is rated *moderate to high* (3.31), broadly similar to the other MOs. The ratings are broadly consistent across countries, except in South Africa where the EC is rated nearly a point higher than the WB.

Respondents rate the extent to which the EC aligns with government policies as *moderate to high* (3.40), in aggregate. The EC is rated as *moderate* (3.20) in terms of the extent to which it harmonises with other donors, in the middle of the range of organisational ratings. Ratings for both these indicators are broadly consistent across countries.

b. *Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups*

In aggregate, respondents rate the EC's promotion of ownership by civil society as *moderate to high* (3.35). At the country level the picture is mixed; the EC is rated higher than the AfDB in Ghana and Zambia, and higher than the WB in Bangladesh. The extent to which it promotes parliamentary ownership is rated *moderate* (2.91), in aggregate.

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

Although the EC is not perceived to be less effective overall than other MOs, its performance on the other indicators of effectiveness varies depending on the country. Respondents rating its performance higher for the promotion of government ownership and for the effectiveness of its capacity building activities were more likely to rate its overall effectiveness higher.


Respondents made a number of related comments in relation to the overall effectiveness question. The most, all negative, comments were made about the EC's bureaucracy. A number of negative comments were made about its disbursement speed, though a few noted that its funding is predictable and most were positive about the scope of its activities. See Box 7 for a selection of comments.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursing additional aid

	Aggregate	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
Rank	6	3	5	4	3	6	2

Table 17: Ranking the EC in terms of country preferences for disbursing additional aid

In aggregate, both the WB and AfDB are preferred as channels for additional ODA more than the EC. At the country level, this situation is repeated in Ghana and Tanzania. In Bangladesh, the EC is ranked second out of the organisations that can disburse significant sums of additional ODA; behind the AsDB. In South Africa and Zambia, the EC is preferred by to both the WB and AsDB. See Table 17 for the EC’s ranking and Figure 16 for its score, in each country.



**Box 8. Comments about the EC**

“...EC tied to EU countries political interests...”  
(Ghana Civil Society)

“The EC would be best suited to this if they allowed use of local procedures in programme implementation (already applied in some limited instances through sector support).”  
(South Africa Government)

“EC is the worst due to bureaucracy”  
(Tanzania Parliament)

“EC – Not very flexible: strong conditionalities although not necessary”  
(Zambia Business)

“EC usually gives grants and are more flexible”  
(Zambia Government)

“The EC is a participant in the GBS and one of the member countries can be coordinated”  
(Tanzania Parliament)

Figure 16: Country preferences for disbursing additional aid through the EC

The performance ratings given to the EC for the fifteen effectiveness criteria offer some idea of what might be influencing perceptions. The EC is rated as performing less well against these criteria than both the WB and AsDB. One of the criteria, disburses funds quickly, is found to be moderately correlated to the disbursement question. Another eight of the fifteen are weakly correlated<sup>19</sup>. In total, half are drawn from the funding criteria and half from the policies and procedures criteria. Of the Paris Declaration questions, alignment and ownership are weakly correlated, as are the answers to the overall effectiveness question and the rankings given for the effectiveness of its health sector activities. This suggests that these factors may influence whether respondents prefer the EC as a disbursement channel.

While there are a good number of comments, there is little consistency to the areas they cover and it is not possible to draw a conclusion about whether there are additional factors influencing preferences. More than half of the comments are from Zambia where it was the most preferred disbursement channel. See Box 8 for a selection of comments.

In the case of South Africa, a reasonable hypothesis would be that respondent preferences for the EC as a disbursement channel are influenced by the size of disbursements relative to overall ODA and the strong relationship between the EC and South Africa. In fact, for all countries in the survey, the EC’s disbursements form a relatively large proportion of total ODA. That it performs relatively badly in a number of these countries suggests that the relationship between disbursement size and preferences is not clear and may differ between countries. This is something that will have to be investigated at a later stage.

## **4 Conclusion**

Other assessments of the effectiveness of the EC give it a mixed review. In this survey respondents rank the organisation as moderately effective, though there is variation between countries in the ratings given by respondents in relation to specific effectiveness questions. The same is true when comparing the preferences for respondents for the EC as a disbursement channel for additional ODA compared with the RDBs and the WB. This raises the possibility that respondent perceptions about the effectiveness of the EC are largely affected by country context, though the current data offers no insights into what aspects of the context are important.

# 9 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Profile

## 1 Organisation Background<sup>20</sup>

GFATM was established in 2002 to provide significant amounts of new resources to prevent and treat three diseases: AIDS, TB and Malaria. Its sole purpose is as a financing mechanism; it implements its programmes through other organisations and has no meaningful presence in country. See Table 18 for GFATM's grants by country.

	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
3yr Avg. \$m (03-05)	6.26	10.55	8.12	18.45	29.33	35.00
% ODA	0.5	0.9	0.7	2.8	1.8	3.9

Table 18: GFATM grants by country

Unlike the other organisations in this study, it is a private foundation and its board is drawn not from member governments, but representatives of governments, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the private sector. None of the countries covered in this survey have Board representation.

## 2 Respondents Profile

GFATM is the least well known of the organisations in the survey. In both, India and Zambia fewer than 10 people were informed enough to answer questions about its effectiveness, see Table 19. Results from these two countries in particular must be treated very carefully, but the results from all of the countries are not very robust. In addition, for many of the questions a large percentage of the respondents who could provide an answer chose not to.

BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM	Total
17	18	5	18	22	9	89

Table 19: Number of informed and well informed respondents about GFATM by country

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness

Respondents rate the overall effectiveness of GFATM as *moderate to high* (3.44) in aggregate. At the country level, given the large confidence intervals it is no surprise that there is no significant difference between the effectiveness rating given to GFATM and any of the other MOs in the study. At the country level, respondents in Bangladesh rate the overall effectiveness of UNDP and UNICEF higher than the GFATM.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector


Overall, as is to be expected given its clear focus in this area, GFATM is ranked highly for the effectiveness of its activities in the health sector.

In South Africa and Tanzania, both GFATM and UNICEF are ranked higher than any of the other MOs in the sample. Only in Bangladesh did GFATM rank lower than second place. Here, UNICEF was ranked highest, with GFATM, UNDP and the WB receiving lower, but broadly similar, scores.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

GFATM does not provide TA. This will explain its last place ranking and low score for this indicator.





**Box 9. Comments about the GFATM**  
 “GFATM - There are a few number of AIDS patients in our country. So, there working area and programme are limited” (Business Bangladesh)  
 “GFATM and UNICEF’s funding especially as regards to HIV/AIDS and children, its effectiveness can be seen through activities currently implemented in these two areas” (Civil Service Tanzania)  
 “World Bank has more rigid procedures compared to GFATM” (Civil Service India)  
 “GFATM has been fast in disbursing funds” (Business Tanzania)  
 “GFATM - supports all stakeholders, builds systems as well as services” (Civil Society Tanzania)

Figure 17: Country ratings of the overall effectiveness of the GFATM

d. *Capacity building*

GFATM is rated as *moderate* (2.91), in aggregate, for the extent to which it builds the capacity of public institutions, lower than UNDP and UNICEF. At the country level few differences are seen. In Bangladesh and Tanzania, respondents rate GFATM lower than UNDP, and in Tanzania they rate GFATM lower than UNICEF.

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

a. *Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation*

In aggregate, GFATM is rated as *moderate to high* (3.43) for the extent to which it promotes ownership by the government; a situation that is broadly repeated in every country in the sample. It is also rated *moderate to high* (3.55) for the extent to which it aligns to government policies, and as *moderate* (3.17) for the extent to which it harmonises with other donors. There are minimal differences between GFATM’s ratings and those of other organisations for any of these indicators in aggregate or at country level. However, in Tanzania, respondents rate UNDP significantly higher than GFATM in promoting ownership by the government.

b. *Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups*

In aggregate, the extent to which GFATM promotes ownership by civil society is rated *moderate to high* (3.58). The extent to which it promotes ownership by parliament is rated as *low to moderate* (2.67), in aggregate. In Bangladesh, respondents rate UNDP higher than GFATM in promoting ownership by parliament.

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

Respondents who rate the performance of GFATM higher for promoting government ownership were more likely to rate its overall effectiveness higher too. Higher ratings for the effectiveness of GFATM’s capacity building activities are also associated with higher overall effectiveness ratings too. There are not enough comments (see Box 9) to shed further light on the factors respondents are using to assess overall effectiveness.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursing additional aid

It is noticeable from Figure 18 that the number of people ranking GFATM is low that its scores across all six countries are very low. Table 20 shows that GFATM is the least preferred MO for disbursing additional aid in aggregate and in half of the sample countries.




Figure 18: Country preferences for disbursement preferences for additional aid through GFATM

	Aggregate	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
Rank	7	6	6	6	5	5	4

Table 20: Ranking GFATM in terms of country preferences for disbursement preferences for additional aid

The performance ratings given to GFATM for the fifteen effectiveness criteria in the questionnaire offer some idea of what might be influencing perceptions; its performance against all the criteria is rated as being in the bottom third. While it would appear reasonable to suggest that these relatively poor ratings are influencing preferences, given the limited number of respondents answering questions about the GFATM, statistical tests reveal few robust correlations between the answers to other questions and disbursement preferences. The number of comments made by respondents in relation to this question is also too small to offer much guidance about what is influencing respondent preferences.

There are a number of possible hypotheses which might explain the preference that GFATM not be used as a channel for disbursement. Respondents might be looking for an organisation able to undertake a range of activities when they expressed their preferences for which MOs should disburse additional aid. Comments which relate to other organisations, identifying infrastructure and productive sectors as important, would appear to back this hypothesis up. See Box 10 for a selection of comments about the GFATM.

That UNICEF, despite its health focus, was preferred as a disbursement channel by a considerable margin in a number of countries suggests that other factors may be at play though. A second hypothesis therefore, is that its lack of country presence may have affected respondents’ preferences for disbursement. Further identification of the factors affecting perceptions and preferences related to GFATM will require further work.

## 4 Conclusion

Overall, respondents rate the overall effectiveness of GFATM as *moderate to high*. As expected, GFATM is ranked highly for the effectiveness of its activities in the health sector. At the country level there is no significant difference between the effectiveness rating given to GFATM and other MOs in the study. Due to the small number of respondents answering questions specifically about GFATM, findings at the country level must be treated with caution.

# 10 United Nations Development Programme Profile

## 1 Organisation Background<sup>21</sup>

UNDP was founded in 1965 to coordinate the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the United Nations Special Fund. In 1971, the two organisations were fully unified as UNDP. The role of UNDP is to provide the UN with development advice, advocacy and grant support. It is funded by voluntary contributions from member nations and operates in 166 countries.

All countries in this survey are members of UNDP. Across the majority of these countries, UNDP works in the areas of governance, development and poverty reduction, energy and the environment, HIV/AIDS, and aid effectiveness. Table 21 shows that the contribution of UNDP to total aid volumes in the sample countries is minimal.

	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
3yr Avg. \$m (03-05)	17.16	3.94	18.40	2.50	7.26	4.02
% ODA	1.25	0.34	1.66	0.38	0.43	0.45

Table 21: UNDP grants by country

## 2 Respondents Profile

In Bangladesh, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia 89% or more of respondents were informed enough to answer questions about UNDP. In South Africa and India, these percentages were 66% and 53% respectively. Overall therefore, the sample size for UNDP is one of the largest, see Table 22.

BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM	Total
51	44	20	23	46	31	215

Table 22: Number of informed and well informed respondents about UNDP by country

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness

In aggregate, the effectiveness of UNDP was rated as *moderate to high* (3.48). There are no differences in the perceptions of UNDP effectiveness compared to other organisations. At the country level there were few differences. Respondents in Bangladesh rated UNDP higher than GFATM. Respondents in Ghana perceived UNDP to be more effective than respondents in India.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

UNDP ranks lower than both GFATM and UNICEF in all countries except Bangladesh for the effectiveness of its activities in the health sector. Here it is ranked below UNICEF, but ahead of GFATM. UNDP ranks roughly equal to, or above, the WB in Bangladesh, South Africa and Zambia. This is surprising given UNDP's activities are minimal in the health sector. Further work with respondents would need to be undertaken to understand whether it is the profile of its cross-cutting HIV/AIDS work or some other factor that explains the results.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

In aggregate, UNDP was ranked first for the effectiveness of its TA. At the country level, this picture is repeated in Bangladesh, Tanzania and Zambia. In Ghana and South Africa it is ranked second behind the WB and EC respectively. Given its mandate, a high ranking for TA

is perhaps to be expected, but given the small size of its budget relative to the WB, the RDBs and the EC some other factors may also be influencing respondent perceptions.




Figure 19: Country ratings of the overall effectiveness of UNDP

#### d. Capacity Building

UNDP was given a *moderate to high* (3.64) rating for its effectiveness in helping to build the long term capacity of central institutions, higher than RDBs and GFATM. At the country level, the picture is mixed. Respondents in Bangladesh rated UNDP higher than GFATM and UNICEF. In Tanzania they rated UNDP higher than the EC and GFATM. In Ghana and India, respondents rated UNDP higher than the relevant RDB.

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

#### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

In relation to its promotion of ownership by governments, the extent to which it aligns to government policies and harmonises with other donors, UNDP is rated *moderate to high* (3.72, 3.69 and 3.45 respectively). A number of differences between country responses are identified. Respondents in Tanzania rate UNDP higher than GFATM in promoting ownership by government.

#### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

In aggregate, in relation to both promoting ownership by civil society and parliament, UNDP is rated as *moderate to high* (3.56 and 3.14). In aggregate, respondents rate UNDP higher than GFATM in promoting ownership by parliament. This picture is repeated in Bangladesh. In Zambia, respondents rate UNDP higher than UNICEF. Between countries, respondents in Ghana rate UNDP in promoting ownership by civil society higher than those in Bangladesh

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

Despite UNDP's higher ratings for many of the individual effectiveness indicators, it is not perceived to be more effective overall. Respondents must be taking a range of other factors into account when making judgements about overall effectiveness. Respondents who give UNDP higher ratings for its promotion of ownership by governance, for harmonisation and for its capacity building activities are more likely to rate its overall effectiveness higher. Respondent comments (see Box 11) also suggest that they value the focus of UNDP's work and the speed of disbursement, though they also note that it is not able to disburse significant sums of ODA.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursing additional aid

Despite its very small share of total ODA, UNDP is ranked, in aggregate, as the preferred organisation to distribute additional aid. Disaggregating the data, this picture is repeated in four of the sample countries. In the two where it does not, the picture is as follows. In India it ranks below UNICEF and the WB, and in South Africa below UNICEF. See Figure 20 for country scores and Table 23 below for country rankings.




Figure 20: Country preferences for disbursing additional aid through UNDP

	Aggregate	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
Rank	1	1	1	3	2	1	1

Table 23: Ranking UNDP in terms of country preferences for disbursing additional aid

The performance ratings given to UNDP for the fifteen effectiveness criteria in the questionnaire offer some idea of what might be influencing perceptions. Only the AsDB is rated as a top performer more times than UNDP. The fifteen effectiveness criteria against which MO performance is ranked offer some insights into what might be influencing respondent preferences. UNDP is rated as top performer for more than half of the funding criteria, and half of the policies and procedures criteria. Well over half of these effectiveness criteria, roughly split between those related to UNDP's funding, and to its policies and procedures<sup>22</sup>, are weakly correlated to preferences for disbursement.

The comments given by respondents suggest that ownership and alignment are two factors that they place particular emphasis as they think about their preferences.

## 4 Conclusion

At the aggregate level, the effectiveness of UNDP was rated as *moderate to high*. There are no significant differences in the perceptions of UNDP effectiveness compared to other organisations. However, in relation to specific questions about effectiveness, UNDP is likely to be rated higher than its comparators. This suggests that assessments of UNDP's effectiveness take into account more factors than just those specified in the survey.

Despite its very small share of total ODA, UNDP is ranked, in aggregate, as the preferred organisation to distribute additional aid. Ownership and alignment appear to be two variables influencing respondent perceptions of which organisation should distribute additional aid.

# 11 United Nations Children’s Fund Profile

## 1 Organisation Background<sup>23</sup>

UNICEF was established by the UN in 1946 to provide welfare to children affected by the Second World War. Guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF’s mission is to protect children's rights, help meet their basic needs and expand their opportunities to reach their potential.

	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
3yr Avg. \$m (03-05)	11.12	4.00	29.96	1.20	9.64	4.06
% ODA	0.81	0.35	2.71	0.18	0.58	0.46

Table 24: UNICEF grants by country

UNICEF operates in 191 countries and is governed by ECOSOC which elects an Executive Board every three years. Of the sample countries, only India currently sits on this board. UNICEF’s work focuses on a number of similar themes and sectors in the sample countries including, education, child protection, water and sanitation, nutrition, in the health sector its work includes immunization, HIV/AIDS, maternal well being and early childhood health. See Table 24 for UNICEF’s grants by country

## 2 Respondents Profile

UNICEF is relatively well known in the sample countries with over 65% of respondents in all countries except Zambia being well informed enough to answer questions about it. Even in Zambia, over 50% are well informed enough, see Table 25.

BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM	Total
40	32	25	23	35	19	174

Table 25: Number of informed and well informed respondents about UNICEF by country

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness


Respondents rate the overall effectiveness of UNICEF in providing aid as *moderate to high* (3.52). There is no difference in aggregate between the perceptions of effectiveness with the other MOs. At the country level, only in Bangladesh is a difference seen; here UNICEF is rated as more effective than the GFATM.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

In aggregate, UNICEF is ranked the highest for the effectiveness of its activities in the health sector. This is perhaps to be expected given that the focus of much of its work is in this area. At the country level, UNICEF is ranked first for the effectiveness of its health activities in every country except South Africa where its score is marginally lower than GFATM.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

Given its very limited level of activities in this area, the picture is inevitably different in relation to the rankings given to UNICEF for the effectiveness of its TA. In aggregate, UNICEF is ranked fifth, behind UNDP. This ranking, behind UNDP, is also seen in Bangladesh, Ghana and Tanzania. In the other countries the picture is more mixed. In India, it is ranked second behind the WB and roughly on a par with the other MOs which undertake TA. In South Africa, it is ranked third, behind the EC and UNDP and above the other MOs.



#### Box 13. Comments about UNICEF

"...UNICEF [...] release funds timely"

(South Africa Government)

"For [...] UNICEF, I would think that they are able to bring in resources for some important government programs with much lesser strings attached (say water and sanitation)"

(Civil Society India)

"UNICEF is engaged in enhancing the progress of child related development issues and completed all target programmes at cost effective way."

(Bangladesh Business)

"UNICEF ... provide aid but with conditionalities that make the recipient country use the money in non-priority areas."

(Zambia Civil Society)

"UNICEF does not have too much money but can be efficient in providing what they have."

(India Civil Society)

Figure 21: Country ratings of the overall effectiveness of the UNICEF

#### d. Capacity building

UNICEF is rated *moderate to high* (3.32), in aggregate, in terms of the extent to which it builds the capacity of central institutions. In aggregate, respondents rate the effectiveness of UNICEF's capacity building higher than GFATM. At the country level, UNICEF is rated lower than UNDP in Bangladesh and higher than the EC and GFATM in Tanzania. Respondents in Tanzania rated UNICEF higher for capacity building than those in Bangladesh

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

#### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

In aggregate, UNICEF is ranked *moderate to high* (3.47) in terms of the extent to which it promotes ownership by the government. Respondent perceptions are that UNICEF aligns, in aggregate, to government policies in the range *moderate to high* (3.66). The aggregate rating for harmonisation is also *moderate to high* (3.29). There is no difference between its rating and that of the other MOs in aggregate or country level.

#### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

In aggregate, UNICEF is rated *moderate to high* (3.47) for the extent to which it promotes ownership by civil society. UNICEF's promotion of ownership by parliament is rated as *moderate* (2.83), no different to the other MOs in aggregate or at country level. Respondents in both Ghana and Tanzania rate UNICEF higher for its promotion of ownership by civil society than respondents in Bangladesh.

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

In five out of the six countries, UNICEF's ratings of overall effectiveness do not differ in relation to the other MOs, yet for a number of the individual effectiveness indicators highlighted above, respondents rate its performance as better than the WB, RDBs and the EC. This suggests that respondents are taking into account a range of other factors as they rate UNICEF in relation to overall effectiveness, otherwise they might be expected to rate it higher than the WB, RDBs and EC for this indicator. Respondents who perceive that UNICEF is promoting ownership by government more effectively are more likely to rate its overall effectiveness higher. The same positive association with overall effectiveness is seen for the harmonisation question.

Respondent comments, see Box 13, might suggest some of the other factors are influencing their perceptions of UNICEF's overall effectiveness. The largest number of comments is



made in relation to the scope and focus of its work. The majority are positive. More mixed comments, both positive and negative, are made in relation to its alignment to government priorities and to its disbursement speed. Finally a few comments are made about UNICEF's perceived efficiency.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursing additional aid

In aggregate, UNICEF is the fourth preferred MO for disbursing additional ODA. This is lower than UNDP and higher than GFATM. At the country level, in India and South Africa, UNICEF is ranked as the most preferred organisation to disburse additional funding, see Figure 22. In the remaining four countries UNICEF's ranking relative to UNDP and GFATM is the same as in aggregate.




Figure 22: Country preferences for disbursing additional aid through UNICEF

The performance ratings given to UNICEF for the fifteen effectiveness criteria appear, at first sight, to offer some idea of what might be influencing respondent preferences for UNICEF as a channel for additional ODA. UNICEF is not rated as a top performer for any of the fifteen effectiveness criteria<sup>24</sup>. However, only five of these criteria<sup>25</sup> are correlated to respondent preferences for disbursement suggesting that other factors might be influencing respondent preferences.

	Aggregate	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
Rank	4	4	4	1	1	3	5

Table 26: Ranking UNICEF in terms of country preferences for disbursing additional aid

Few comments were received about UNICEF in response to the disbursement question, see Box 14. Examining the comments relating to all MOs suggests one factor might be that respondents value MOs which are able to work in a range of areas, particularly infrastructure and the productive sectors. A second factor which the broader set of comments suggests that respondents are taking into account the size of UNICEF's budget compared to the banks and EC. This will have to be tested at a later stage.

That respondents in India and South Africa place UNICEF as their preferred organisation to disburse additional ODA is intriguing. Its ranking above the EC and/or the WB in the other countries suggests one hypothesis that, despite its small share of overall ODA, it has a strong, visible presence in country and that this affects respondent perceptions. It is not been possible to test the data for this hypothesis.



## **4 Conclusion**

UNICEF is ranked highly for the delivery of its core activities in the health sector in every country. While there is more variability in the results for the other effectiveness criteria, it is worth noting that UNICEF is likely to be rated higher than the RDBs, EC and WB for questions related to the Paris Declaration. This is despite the fact that respondents rate its overall effectiveness the same as the other organisations. This suggests that their assessments of UNICEF's effectiveness take into account more factors than just progress with the Paris agenda. Respondent comments suggest that factors affecting the overall effectiveness rating include issues of scale and the focus of activities.

# 12 World Bank Profile

## 1 Organisation Background

The WB was established in 1944 to carry out post-war reconstruction and development. Its mandate has expanded over the last 60 years and now encompasses ‘worldwide poverty’ alleviation. Around 30% of the Bank’s staff are based in country offices.

Both India and South Africa were founding members of the WB. All the other countries had joined by the early 1960s. The content of the current Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) varies. Across the majority in this survey, the WB’s focuses on areas such as governance reform, growth and poverty reduction; the Bank lends money in pursuit of these goals. In two, South Africa and increasingly India, the Bank focuses on providing TA. In all countries except South Africa, the WB contributes a significant proportion of overall ODA. See Table 27 for the WB’s development financing by country – through the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
3yr Avg. \$m (03-05)	423.03	283.19	470.59	N/A	391.39	118.50
% ODA	30.7	24.7	42.6	N/A <sup>26</sup>	23.6	13.4

Table 27: WB (IDA and IBRD) development financing by country

## 2 Respondents Profile

Table 28 shows that for the vast majority of the sample countries, the WB is very well known by respondents. Over 95% of respondents in Bangladesh, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia were informed enough about the WB to answer questions about it. In India, it was over 85%. Only in South Africa is the WB not very well known. Given the level of WB lending to South Africa this is not surprising, but should be borne in mind when interpreting results.

BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM	Total
54	47	33	18	47	34	233

Table 28: Number of informed and well informed respondents about the WB by country

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness

Survey respondents in the six countries ranked the overall effectiveness of the WB as *moderate* (3.33), not significantly different to any other MO. At the country level there are a few differences; it was rated lower than the AsDB in Bangladesh, higher than the AfDB in Ghana and lower than the EC in Zambia.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

The aggregate picture of the effectiveness of the WB’s health activities, that it ranks below GFATM and UNICEF and above the EC, AsDB and AfDB, broadly represents the picture at country level. The main difference is that its ranking relative to UNDP varies depending on the country; it is lower in Bangladesh and Zambia, and higher in Ghana, India and Tanzania.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

In aggregate, the WB ranks second for the effectiveness of its TA, below UNDP but above the RDBs and EC. This picture is broadly representative of Ghana, India, Tanzania and

Zambia. In Bangladesh, the AsDB, the EC and UNDP rate as more effective than the WB.




Figure 23: Country ratings of the overall effectiveness of the WB

#### d. Capacity building

In aggregate, respondents rate the effectiveness of the WB's capacity building activities as *moderate to high* (3.36) effective, no different to the RDBs and EC. At the country level the picture is more mixed. The WB is rated lower than the EC in Bangladesh, but higher in Tanzania. In Ghana it is rated higher than the AfDB.

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

#### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

In aggregate, respondents rate the effectiveness of the WB promotion of ownership as *moderate* (3.17). At the country level, respondents in South Africa and Zambia rate the WB lower than the EC. The WB is rated as *moderate* (3.24), in aggregate, for the extent to which it aligns to government policies, significantly lower than the AfDB. At the country level, respondents in Zambia rate the WB lower than the EC. Respondents rated the extent of its harmonisation as *moderate* (3.22) in aggregate. At the country level, respondents in India rate the WB higher than the AsDB. Those in Zambia rate it lower than the EC.

#### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

In aggregate, the promotion of ownership by both civil society and parliament by the WB is rated as *moderate* (3.04 and 2.87 respectively). In Bangladesh, the WB is rated lower in promoting civil society ownership than the EC and higher than AfDB in Ghana.

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

In aggregate, and broadly at country level, the WB's rating for overall effectiveness does not differ relative to the ratings of the RDBs and the EC. Respondents rating the WB higher for its promotion of ownership by government are more likely to rate its overall effectiveness higher. The same is true for those rating the extent of its harmonisation higher, and for those who rate the effectiveness of its capacity building of public institutions higher.

When asked to comment on why they rated the overall effectiveness of the MOs as they did, the most comments made by respondents were in relation to the WB. Box 15 contains a sample of representative comments. These indicate that respondents value the scale of the WB's lending, but are more mixed on the scope of its activities. There are mixed views, the majority positive, about the effectiveness of the WB's monitoring and evaluation. Respondents are much more critical about the speed of the WB's disbursement of funds, its

procedures and about the conditionality associated with its programmes. A number of comments indicate that respondents perceive the level of concessionality to be too low.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursing additional aid

In aggregate, respondents prefer the WB as a disbursement channel less than the RDBs and more than the EC. Respondents' preferences vary between countries, see Figure 24. Unlike the other MOs, there are few notable commonalities between countries. In Zambia, it is ranked below the EC and broadly on a par with the AfDB. In Bangladesh, it is ranked lower than the AsDB, on a par with the EC.




Figure 24: Country preferences for disbursing additional aid through the WB

In Tanzania, the WB ranks between the AfDB and EC. In Ghana, the WB ranks second above the AfDB and EC. Respondents in India rank the WB second, behind UNICEF. See Table 29 for country rankings.

	Aggregate	BA	GH	IN	ZA	TZ	ZM
Rank	5	5	2	2	6	4	5

Table 29: Ranking the WB in terms of country preferences for disbursing additional aid

When its performance against the fifteen effectiveness criteria is ranked, the WB performs relatively well, being ranked in the top third for eight of the criteria, in the middle third for five of them, and in the bottom third for only two<sup>27</sup>. More of its top rankings are found in the policies and procedures group of criteria than in the funding criteria.

Respondents are clearly taking into account a large range of factors when they think about whether they prefer the WB as a channel for additional ODA or not. Unlike the majority of other MOs, higher ratings for the Paris Declaration questions are weakly associated with preferences for disbursement. Higher ratings of overall effectiveness, for the WB's delivery of health activities and TA are also weakly associated. Twelve of the effectiveness criteria are also weakly associated<sup>28</sup>: six are funding criteria and six policies and procedures criteria.

Respondents' comments highlight other factors which might help explain the WB's ranking, see Box 16. There were positive comments regarding scope and size.

The WB rates broadly higher than the EC and RDBs in Ghana for the majority of indicators. It is also the country where it received the highest average score for the disbursement question and many positive comments about it were made.

## **4 Conclusion**

Overall ratings for the WB on effectiveness and the three Paris Declaration indicators are similar to other MOs in the survey. On the more detailed criteria for effectiveness the WB receives consistently better scores than the AfDB. It is therefore surprising that the AfDB is preferred to the WB as a channel for disbursing additional ODA. Comments suggest that the issue of ownership/governance is an important factor influencing respondent preferences rather than narrower perceptions of effectiveness. Respondent comments also suggest that compared to the specialised agencies, the scope and scale of the WB's activities are valued, but issues such as the speed of disbursement and conditionality are largely negatively perceived.

# 13 Bangladesh Profile

## 1 Background

The AsDB plays a major role in the energy, transport, education, urban health, and urban water supply and sanitation sectors<sup>29</sup>. EC aid commitments in Bangladesh are currently the second largest in Asia, after Afghanistan<sup>30</sup>. In the most recent country strategy, the focal areas were the social sectors with a preference for education, health, good governance and human rights, and economic and trade development<sup>31</sup>. The WB CAS<sup>32</sup> aims to improve the investment climate and empower the poor, as well as strengthen Bangladesh's core governance processes and institutions<sup>33</sup>. The CAS envisages a programme of around US\$3 billion over four years.<sup>34</sup>

GFATM has allocated 35% of its funding to HIV&AIDS and 65% to TB in the period 2002-2006.<sup>35</sup> UNDP focuses primarily on the following areas: democratic governance, energy and environment, human development and crisis prevention and poverty reduction.<sup>36</sup> UNICEF's programme comprises girls' education, water, environment and sanitation, child development and education, child protection and HIV&AIDS.<sup>37</sup> See Table 30 for the amount of ODA to Bangladesh by MO.

Total ODA	% MO ODA	% ODA/GNI	AsDB <sup>38</sup>	EC	GFATM	UNDP	UNICEF	WB <sup>39</sup>
1376	53	2.3	53.47	62.94	6.26	17.16	11.12	423.03

Table 30: Amounts of ODA (\$ million) to Bangladesh, three year average (2003-2005)

## 2 Respondent Profile

Table 31 shows that the respondent profile has very balanced representation from each stakeholder group. The civil society group contains extra respondents, but not at the expense of other WIP groups.

Business	Civil Servants	Civil Society	Govt. Ministers	MPs	Total
10	11	15	9	10	55

Table 31: Breakdown of respondents by stakeholder group in Bangladesh

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness

Ratings of overall effectiveness ranged from 3.0 for GFATM to 3.58 for UNICEF, see Figure 25. The AsDB is rated significantly more effective than the WB. This is noteworthy given that the size of the WB's portfolio is approximately eight times bigger than that of AsDB. UNDP and UNICEF are rated significantly more effective in providing aid than the GFATM.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

In the health sector, UNICEF is ranked as being the most effective, followed by UNDP and the WB. The EC and the AsDB are ranked last.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

In terms of the effectiveness of TA, UNDP is ranked first. Below it fall the AsDB, EC, WB and UNICEF in that order.

#### d. Capacity building

Ratings for the effectiveness of the MOs' capacity building of public institutions range from 2.31 for GFATM to 3.40 for UNDP. UNDP is rated higher than the UNICEF and the WB.




Figure 25: Perceptions of development effectiveness in Bangladesh

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

#### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

For government ownership, ratings range from 2.90 for the EC to 3.38 UNDP. There are no significant differences between the ratings for any of the MOs.

For alignment, the ratings range from 2.88 for the WB to 3.29 for UNDP. The only difference seen between MOs' ratings for alignment is that UNDP is rated higher than both UNICEF and GFATM.

For harmonisation, ratings range from 2.97 for the EC to 3.22 for UNICEF. There are no differences between the ratings for any of the MOs for this indicator.

#### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

For the promotion of ownership by civil society, ratings range from 2.60 for the WB to 3.20 for the EC. The EC is rated higher than the WB. There are no other differences seen between the ratings for the organisations.

For the promotion of ownership by parliament, scores range from 2.17 for GFATM, to 3.06 for UNDP. UNDP is rated higher than GFATM for this indicator. There are no other differences.

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

Respondents appear to take into account a range of factors when they are assessing the overall effectiveness of the MOs operating in Bangladesh. Looking for associations in the data it is found that, for all MOs except UNDP, high ratings for promoting ownership of development policies by the national government are associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness. For all MOs except the WB, high ratings of harmonisation with other donors are associated with overall effectiveness. In addition, for EC, UNDP, UNICEF and WB high ratings of capacity building of central public institutions are associated with overall effectiveness. See Box 17 for a selection of comments from Bangladesh.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursement

UNDP is ranked first overall for channelling additional sums of aid (the same as the aggregate result) even though it has the second smallest portfolio, see Figure 26. It is ranked higher than UNICEF. The AsDB, which has the third largest share of ODA, is ranked second overall and is preferred to the EC which in turn is preferred by a small margin to the WB, even though the WB has the largest portfolio in Bangladesh.




Figure 26: Preferences for disbursing additional aid in Bangladesh

The factors affecting Bangladeshi respondents’ preferences for the AsDB are unclear. There are no associations between their ratings for any of the fifteen effectiveness criteria and their preferences for disbursement. However, their comments suggest that they favour the AsDB’s ‘user friendly policies and procedures’ as well as its overall effectiveness and reliability, see Box 18 for a selection of comments.

Preferences for the EC are associated with one of the fifteen effectiveness criteria – quick disbursement of funds. The comments shed no further light on factors that respondents might be taking into account when they are thinking about the EC as a disbursement channel.

In the case of the WB, higher ratings for seven of the fifteen effectiveness criteria are associated with higher preferences for disbursement. Three of these are funding based criteria and four policy and procedure based criteria<sup>40</sup>. Respondent comments (see Box 18) suggest additional factors which respondents might be taking into account when thinking about the WB as a disbursement channel: concessional funding, scale of disbursements, and effective monitoring and evaluation.

Preferences for UNDP are associated with four of the fifteen effectiveness criteria - harmonisation with other donors, stakeholder participation, transparency in funding decisions and constructive policy dialogue. The latter also appear in the some comments from respondents strengthening the hypothesis that this is an influencing factor behind respondents’ preference for UNDP in the disbursement question.

Preferences for UNICEF are associated with two of the fifteen effectiveness criteria – effective monitoring and evaluation and stakeholder participation. The two comments about the UNICEF praise its work in health and child affairs, but are too few to draw any firm conclusions.

No associations were found for the GFATM and comments were too few to draw any conclusions.



# 14 Ghana Profile

## 1 Background

The AfDB aims to improve the investment environment and promote pro-poor pro-gender equity policies.<sup>41</sup> Support from the EC to Ghana focuses in three areas: rural development, road transport and macro-economic support. These sectors are complemented by other activities in the field of health, education, governance, the environment, culture, private sector development and trade.<sup>42</sup> The WB's investment is channelled through programmes that contribute to the objectives of the private sector led growth pillar; rural productivity and sustainable resources use, strengthening the business environment and road infrastructure.<sup>43</sup> The human resources development pillar is channelled through programmes related to water and sanitation, health and HIV/AIDS and the education sector. Financial assistance is also provided through one programme focusing on financial sector and public sector.<sup>44</sup>

The GFATM has allocated 46% of its funding for HIV&AIDS related activities, 37% of its funding for Malaria activities and 17% of its funding for TB related activities since its inception.<sup>45</sup> UNDP projects focus on democratic governance, poverty and economy, sustainable livelihoods and employment creation, HIV&AIDS, energy and environment and facilitating aid effectiveness and harmonisation.<sup>46</sup> UNICEF's three key objectives are to contribute to: maternal well-being and early childhood care, the provision of equitable access of all children to quality basic education; and the support of children in need of special protection.<sup>47</sup> See Table 32 for the amount of ODA to Ghana by MO.

Total ODA	% MO ODA	ODA/GNI	AfDB	EC	GFATM	UNDP	UNICEF	WB <sup>48</sup>
1146	41	13.0	54.91	70.72	10.55	3.94	4.00	283.19

Table 32: Amounts of ODA (\$ million) to Ghana, three year average (2003-2005)

## 2 Respondent Profile

Business	Civil Servants	Civil Society	Govt. Ministers	MPs	Total
10	12	11	6	10	49

Table 33: Breakdown of respondents by stakeholder group in Ghana

Table 32 shows that the respondent sample in Ghana was relatively balanced.

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness


Scores range from 3.09 for AfDB to 3.70 for GFATM, see Figure 27. The WB is rated higher than the AfDB. There are no other differences between the ratings for the different MOs.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

UNICEF ranks first for the effectiveness of its health sector activities, above the WB and UNDP. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

The WB is ranked first for the effectiveness of its TA, followed by UNDP. UNICEF and the EC take third and fourth place.



#### Box 19: Comments from Ghana

"The World Bank's aid is very effective [...] as it is tied to economic development and poverty alleviation in many cases" (Civil Servant)  
 "the EC through the EDF and other initiatives have been very effective" (Parliament)  
 "EC - moderate due to long bureaucratic procedure - national civil society cannot access them directly, only either vis EC international partner NGO, or via government." (Civil Society)  
 "UNDP - high because their projects and programmes very specific in strengthening capacity" (Civil Society)  
 "UNICEF works behind schedule even in time-bound projects. Does not provide any format for project proposal development and reporting..." (Civil Society)

Figure 27: Perceptions of development effectiveness in Ghana

#### d. Capacity building

Ratings for all organisations in building capacity of central public institutions ranged from 3.00 for GFATM to 3.80 for the WB. Both UNDP and WB rate higher than AfDB.

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

#### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

For the promotion of ownership by the government, scores range from 3.43 for the EC to 3.79 for UNDP. Scores range from 3.53 for the EC to 3.83 for GFATM for alignment with government policies. For harmonisation with other donors, ratings range from 3.00 for the AfDB to 3.43 for the WB.

There are no differences in the ratings of the different MOs for any of these indicators.

#### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

For the promotion of ownership by civil society, scores range from 3.00 for the AfDB to 4.17 for the GFATM, though the confidence interval for GFATM rating is very large. The AfDB rates significantly lower than the both the EC and the WB. For the promotion of ownership by Parliament, scores range from 2.50 for UNICEF to 3.00 for the GFATM, though again the confidence interval for GFATM rating is very large. There are no differences in the ratings of the different MOs for this indicator.


### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

Analysing the data to understand what factors might be influencing the perceptions of overall effectiveness reveals a mixed picture. For the AfDB and the WB, high ratings for promoting ownership by government are associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness. For the EC high ratings for building capacity of central public institutions are associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness. For UNICEF, high ratings for harmonisation are associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursement

In Ghana, amongst the organisations that can disburse significant sums of additional ODA, the WB is the preferred organisation through which to disburse additional funds, see Figure 28. The AfDB comes second, followed by the EC.

UNDP is ranked first overall, even though it has the smallest portfolio.



**Box 20: Comments from Ghana**

*"My experience with the WB shows that they are effective in disbursing funds and are good fund administrators"* (Civil Service)

*"The WB plays a pivotal role in the development programmes in several countries world wide"* (Civil Service)

*"WB - too detached"* (Parliament)

*"UNDP is more flexible and relates closely with partners"* (Civil Society)

*"UNDP is very effective in disbursing aid and their planning process is efficient with time frames strictly being adhered to"* (Business)

*"AfDB - They might have a better sense and what the needs are and they were formed specifically with Africa in mind and should have the capacity to deal with African nations"* (Parliament)

**Figure 28: Preferences for disbursing additional aid in Ghana**

None of the fifteen effectiveness criteria are associated with respondents' preference for the AfDB. However, text comments suggest that the AfDB's relatively high ranking in disbursing additional aid might be influenced by the extent to which it is perceived to promote ownership of development policies, align with policies of the national government, and provides funding with low conditionality.

For the EC, higher ratings given for the overall effectiveness question are associated with higher rankings for disbursement. In addition, two of the fifteen effectiveness criteria - its ability to disburse funds quickly and the extent to which it harmonises with other donors - are associated to respondents' rankings for the disbursement question. Comments by Ghanaian respondents about the EC, are too few and varied to draw any firm conclusions.

Higher rankings for the WB are associated with higher rankings in seven of the fifteen effectiveness criteria – five policy and procedure based criteria and two funding based criteria<sup>49</sup>. In addition, text comments from Ghanaian respondents suggest a number of other factors influence the WB's ranking. These include the key role it plays in national development and its ability to administer funds effectively. However, some comments criticise the WB for not promoting ownership of development policies by the national government, see Box 20.

In the case of UNDP, two of the fifteen effectiveness criteria – long term commitment and low conditionality - are associated with its disbursement ranking. Text comments (half of which are from civil society), suggest that its strong performance might also be explained in part by its promotion of ownership of policies by its partners, as well as its effectiveness and efficiency in delivering aid.

For UNICEF, only one of the effectiveness criteria – using government procurement procedures is associated, albeit strongly, with higher rankings for disbursement. The comments are too few and varied to draw any firm conclusions.

For GFATM, no associations are found, and the comments are too few to draw any conclusions about respondents' preference for the MO.

# 15 India Profile

## 1 Background

The key pillars of AsDB assistance strategy are inclusive and broad based growth, social development and good governance.<sup>50</sup> The EC has recently adopted a two-pronged approach to cooperation with India: on the one hand to help India achieve the MDGs by continuation of support in key social sectors (health/education) and, on the other, to implement the EU-India Partnership through an Action Plan which will support India's sector reform policies in favour of the poorest, promote dialogue in areas of mutual interest and enhance economic co-operation, all of which will help to generate wealth and employment in India.<sup>51</sup> The WB strategy emphasises investing in people through better health and education, empowering communities to participate in their own development, improving the effectiveness of government and promoting private sector-led growth to achieve the country's development goals.<sup>52</sup>

GFATM in India has disbursed 62% of its funds to HIV&AIDS activities, 13% to Malaria activities, and 23% to TB activities.<sup>53</sup> The UNDP's key thematic priorities are promoting gender equality and strengthening decentralisation.<sup>54</sup> Its focus areas are poverty reduction and human development, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, energy and the environment, and HIV&AIDS and development.<sup>55</sup> UNICEF operates programmes in health, nutrition, water, environment and sanitation, HIV&AIDS, education and child protection.<sup>56</sup> See Table 34 for the amount of ODA to India by MO. Although India does not receive ODA from the AsDB, it does receive non-concessional funding, the results from the AsDB are therefore described below.

Total ODA	% MO ODA	ODA/GNI	AsDB <sup>57</sup>	EC	GFATM	UNDP	UNICEF	WB <sup>58</sup>
1106	42	0.2	0	129.81	8.12	18.4	29.96	470.59

Table 34: Amounts of ODA (\$ million) to India, three year average (2003-2005)

## 2 Respondent Profile

It must be noted that India has a small sample size making the drawing of robust conclusions more difficult (see Table 35). Business and Civil society represent complete groups whereas for Ministers there is a particularly small sample size. In addition, individual stakeholders reported on fewer MOs than in other countries, as a result for many of the questions, only a few respondents offered responses for some of the MOs.

Business	Civil Servants	Civil Society	Govt. Ministers	MPs	Total
10	8	10	3	7	38

Table 35: Breakdown of respondents by stakeholder group in India

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness

Ratings for all organisations ranged from 2.86 for UNDP to 3.67 for GFATM, with no differences between the organisations, see Figure 29.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

UNICEF is ranked first with the WB behind. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.

c. *Effectiveness of technical assistance*

The WB and UNICEF are ranked first and second for the effectiveness of their TA. The AsDB is ranked after them. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.




Figure 29: Perceptions of development effectiveness in India

d. *Capacity building*

Ratings for the effectiveness of MOs' capacity building of central public institutions range from 2.67 for the EC to 3.33 for the GFATM, there are no differences between the organisations.

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

a. *Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation*

For government ownership, ratings for the organisations range from 3.09 for the EC to 3.33 for UNDP. For alignment, ratings range from 3.10 for the EC to 3.75 for GFATM. There are no differences between the ratings of the MOs for either of these indicators.

For harmonisation, ratings range from 2.75 for the AsDB to 3.75 for the GFATM. The WB rates higher than the AsDB. There are no further differences between the organisations.

b. *Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups*


For promotion of ownership by civil society, ratings for the MOs range from 2.20 for the AsDB to 3.75 for the GFATM. For promotion of ownership by parliament, ratings for the MOs range from 2.88 for the EC to 3.42 for the WB. There are no differences between the organisations for either of these indicators.

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

Respondents appear to take into account a range of factors when they are assessing the overall effectiveness of the MOs operating in India. Looking for associations in the data, it is found that for the AsDB and the WB, high ratings of harmonisation are associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness. For the WB, high ratings of capacity building of central public institutions are also associated with overall effectiveness. Unlike in other countries, respondents in India do not positively associate ownership with overall effectiveness. An explanation for this could be that the Indian Government provides strong ownership in the development process, making promotion of ownership by MOs less of an issue. There are no

associations in the data for the other MOs. See Box 21 for a selection of comments from India about overall effectiveness of MOs.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursement



**Box 22: Comments from India**  
*"UNDP has better understanding of development issues and has the ability to take others along with them"* (Civil Society)  
*"Bilateral agencies were largely more effective than the multilaterals in India. Since these agencies are now planning to work through multilateral channels, the best alternative is to support the World Bank, which has presence in a range of Sectors in India"* (Business)  
*"The WB [...] with the large resources at its command, it can be more effective than other MOs."* (Civil Society)  
*"UNICEF work largely within a mandate set out by the government."* (Civil Service)  
*"UNICEF is a more focused and trusted agency..."* (Civil Service)

Figure 30: Preferences for disbursing additional aid in India

UNICEF is ranked first overall for channelling additional sums of aid. It is ranked ahead of UNDP. The WB, with the largest portfolio, is ranked second overall, see Figure 30. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.

None of the fifteen effectiveness criteria are associated with respondents' preference for the WB. However, comments from respondents suggest that the WB's focus of activity might be influencing its ranking on the disbursement question, see Box 22

While none of the ratings for the fifteen effectiveness criteria are associated with respondents' preference for UNDP, Indian respondents' comments suggest that they value the fact that UNDP aligns itself with the development policies of national government and undertakes constructive policy dialogue (see box 22). These could be factors which influence respondents' preference for UNDP.

Factors influencing Indian respondents' preference for UNICEF and GFATM are unclear from their answers to the questionnaire. None of the fifteen effectiveness criteria are associated with respondents' preference for UNICEF. Furthermore, the text comments offer few clues.

# 16 South Africa Profile

## 1 Background

The AfDB's medium-term strategy is geared towards supporting the government's objectives of accelerating economic growth, generating employment and reducing poverty.<sup>59</sup> The EC's strategy focuses on the objectives of equitable access to and sustainable provision of social services, equitable and sustainable economic growth, deepening democracy and regional integration and co-operation.<sup>60</sup> Current WB support to South Africa is in form of TA, and sharing experiences and lessons learned in the areas of: agriculture and land reform, urban development and municipal finance, private sector development, industry and trade, public administration and service delivery and environmental conservation.<sup>61</sup>

GFATM has disbursed 41% of its funds to HIV&AIDS activities and 59% to HIV/TB activities.<sup>62</sup> UNDP is involved in integrated sustainable rural development, a holistic response to HIV&AIDS and poverty and environment and development.<sup>63</sup> UNICEF's programme comprises early childhood development, birth registration, preventing gender based violence, life skills development and prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV.<sup>64</sup> See Table 36 for the amount of ODA to South Africa by MO. Although South Africa does not receive ODA from the AfDB, it does receive non-concessional funding, the results relating to the AfDB are therefore described below.

Total ODA	% MO ODA	ODA/GNI	AfDB	EC	GFATM	UNDP	UNICEF	WB
656	26	0.3	N/A	150.07	18.45	2.50	1.20	0 <sup>65</sup>

Table 36: Amounts of ODA (\$ million) to South Africa, three year average (2003-2005)

## 2 Respondent Profile

It must be noted that South Africa has a small sample size making the drawing of robust conclusions more difficult, see Table 37. The sample is heavily skewed towards civil society with the MPs group having a particularly small sample size. In addition, individual stakeholders reported on fewer MOs, as a result for many of the questions only a few respondents offered responses for some of the MOs.

Business	Civil Servants	Civil Society	Govt. Ministers	MPs	Total
6	5	13	8	3	35

Table 37: Breakdown of respondents by stakeholder group in South Africa

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness


Ratings of overall effectiveness ranged from 2.63 for the AfDB to 3.71 for GFATM (see Figure 31), with no differences between the ratings of the MOs.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

In the health sector, GFATM which has the largest portfolio ranks as being the most effective. UNICEF is second and UNDP third. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.

### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

The EC and UNDP rank first and second in delivering TA effectively, followed by UNICEF in third. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.



#### Box 23: Comments from South Africa

“...as far as research is concerned, I believe that the EC has had a moderate effectiveness in providing aid. It could be improved by facilitating more long term studies as opposite to just short and specific studies” (Civil Service)

“Many of the MO's come up with good independent reports and play a good oversight role. The UN and EC [...] build capacity in government and civil society.” (Parliament)

“Development Aid will be effective if it aligned with government priorities”. (Civil Service)

“UNDP hardly has any profile in South Africa. That can mean it effectively ties its development agenda - and takes leadership - from the SA government. Or alternatively, it might mean that it's unable to bring something new to the table.” (Civil Society)

Figure 31: Perceptions of development effectiveness in South Africa

### d. Capacity building

Ratings for the effectiveness of the MOs' capacity building of public institutions range from 3.10 for GFATM to 3.65 for UNDP. There are no differences between the ratings of the MOs.

## 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

For government ownership, ratings for MOs range from 2.73 for the AfDB to 3.70 for the EC. The EC rates higher than the AfDB and the WB, with no further differences.

For alignment, ratings for MOs range from 3.25 for the WB to 4.00 for UNDP. For harmonisation, ratings for the MOs range from 2.85 for the EC to 3.47 for UNDP. There are no differences between the ratings of the MOs for either of these indicators.

### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

For the promotion of ownership by civil society, ratings for MOs range from 2.57 for the AfDB to 3.69 for the GFATM. For the promotion of ownership by parliament, ratings for MOs range from 2.50 for the AfDB to 3.33 for the EC. There are no differences between the ratings of the MOs for these two indicators.


## 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

No associations between overall effectiveness and other indicators are found to help explain what influences South African perceptions about the effectiveness of the different MOs. This is due to the relatively small sample size and that respondents were, on average, informed about relatively fewer MOs. See Box 23 for a selection of comments from South Africa.

## 3.4 Preferences for disbursement

Despite its low level of ODA to South Africa, UNICEF is ranked first overall for channelling additional sums of aid. It is followed by UNDP. The EC, with the largest portfolio, ranks third overall, see Figure 32. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.





**Box 24: Comments from South Africa**

*“UNICEF by the nature of its reach and profile has good impact”* (Business)

*“Directing the money to the [...] World Bank does not guarantee that the poorest continents will reap the dividends.”* (Civil Society)

*“First UNICEF because I have the perception that they do a vital work”* (Civil Service)

*“UNICEF by the nature of its reach and profile has good impact”* (Business)

*“The UNDP’s perceived interactive and consultative profile informs [my] selection”* (Business)

*“The AfDB is a regional organisation and is more in touch with continent issues and has a stake in its development.”* (Government)

**Figure 32: Preferences for disbursing additional aid in South Africa**

None of the fifteen effectiveness criteria are associated with South African respondents’ preference for the AfDB. The two comments received about the AfDB both mention the AfDB’s suitability for channelling additional finance due to its familiarity with African issues. However these are too few in number to draw any conclusions.

South African respondents preferences for the EC are associated with three of the fifteen effectiveness criteria; two funding based criteria (low conditionality and predictable funding) and one policy and procedure based criteria (monitoring and evaluation). The limited number of comments from South African respondents about the EC allows no firm conclusions to be drawn

None of the fifteen effectiveness criteria are associated with respondents’ preference for UNICEF. However, analysis of a limited number of text comments suggests two factors which might be influencing respondents’ preferences for UNICEF. These are its presence in a number of sectors, such as health and children, and its in-country profile, see Box 24.

None of the fifteen effectiveness criteria are associated with South African respondents’ preference for the WB, the GFATM or the UNDP. Moreover, the comments about the MOs are too few and often contradictory; they do not help in drawing any firm conclusions about what may be influencing South African respondents’ preference for respective MOs

# 17 Tanzania Profile

## 1 Background

AfDB projects approved during the Country Strategy Paper period were in agriculture, the social sectors, public utilities, the transport sector and an institutional support project for good governance.<sup>66</sup> EC funds are mainly spent on budgetary support for economic reforms; infrastructure and; agriculture and education.<sup>67</sup> The WB's CAS for Tanzania focuses on higher growth, poverty reduction, and institutional reforms to improve governance and service delivery.<sup>68</sup>

GFATM in Tanzania has disbursed 50% of its funds to HIV&AIDS activities, 14% of its funds to HIV/TB activities and 36% of its funds to Malaria activities.<sup>69</sup> UNDP's work focuses on poverty monitoring and pro-poor policy development, democratic governance, development management and aid coordination and energy and the environment.<sup>70</sup> UNICEF's programmes comprise care for refugees, especially mothers and children, support for government's immunisation programme, vitamin A supplementation and de-worming, distribution of insecticide treated bed nets, prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV and development of a national policy to protect orphans and vulnerable children.<sup>71</sup> See Table 38 for the amount of ODA to Tanzania by MO.

Total ODA	% MO ODA	ODA/GNI	AfDB	EC	GFATM	UNDP	UNICEF	WB <sup>72</sup>
1657	44	14.9	71.66	167.58	29.33	7.26	9.64	391.39

Table 38: Amounts of ODA (\$ million) to Tanzania, three year average (2003-2005)

## 2 Respondent Profile

Table 39 shows that the number of respondents in Tanzania is close to the fifty expected for this survey and that the distribution between groups is relatively well balanced

Business	Civil Servants	Civil Society	Govt. Ministers	MPs	Total
8	10	10	8	13	49

Table 39: Breakdown of respondents by stakeholder group in Tanzania

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness

Ratings for the MOs range from 3.28 for the EC to 3.68 for the AfDB, with no differences between the ratings of different organisations, see Figure 33.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector


UNICEF is ranked the first, ahead of the second placed GFATM. The WB, which is third, is closely followed by UNDP in fourth. These are followed by the AfDB in fifth and the EC in last.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

UNDP is ranked first, closely followed by the WB, the UNICEF are third, EC fourth and AfDB fifth.

#### d. Capacity building

For building the capacity of central public institutions, ratings range from 2.93 for GFATM to 3.95 for UNDP. The EC rated lower than UNDP, UNICEF and the WB.



#### Box 25: Comments from Tanzania

"MOs rated high have played a key role in funding the Government and other institutions." (Business)

"AfDB provides financial support/Aid in activity areas that are likely to reduce poverty with particular emphasis on women" (Government)

"AfDB is directly accountable to African countries. WB financing is highly influenced by the "Big power" interests and policies" (Government)

"WB is sometimes bogged down with inflexible conditionalities" (Business)

"All of the above [MOs] are not effective, that is why poverty is rampant" (Parliament)

Figure 33: Perceptions of development effectiveness in Tanzania

## 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

For the promotion of government ownership, ratings range from 3.33 for the EC to 4.07 for UNDP. UNDP is rated higher than GFATM, with no further differences.

For alignment, ratings ranged from 3.32 for the EC to 3.90 for UNDP. For harmonisation, ratings ranged from 3.28 for the AfDB to 3.67 for UNDP. There are no differences between the ratings of the MOs for either of these indicators.

### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

For the promotion of ownership by civil society, ratings ranged from 2.94 for the AfDB to 3.89 for UNICEF. There are no differences between the ratings of the MOs for this indicator.


For the promotion of ownership by parliament, ratings ranged from 2.57 for the AfDB to 3.35 for UNDP. The WB rates higher than the AfDB, with no further differences

## 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

Respondents appear to take into account a range of factors when they are assessing the overall effectiveness of the MOs operating in Tanzania. Looking for associations in the data, it is found that, for the AfDB, EC and WB, high ratings for promoting government ownership are associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness. For the EC and the WB, high ratings of capacity building of central public institutions are also associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness. Furthermore, for the AfDB, high ratings of harmonising with other donors are associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness.

For UNDP, high ratings for capacity building of central public institutions are associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness. For UNICEF, high levels of promoting government ownership are associated with high ratings of overall effectiveness. Non-government respondents (Business, Civil Society and Parliamentarians) are more likely to rate UNDP and AfDB higher with regards to overall effectiveness than government respondents (Government Ministers and Civil Servants). See Box 25 for a selection of comments from Tanzania.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursement



**Box 26: Comments from Tanzania**  
*“UNDP has project officials who work with government staff more closely on daily basis”*  
 (Civil Service)  
*“The AfDB is less conditional and committed to Africa, also their cost is low compared to other organizations”*  
 (Parliament)  
*“AfDB due to the fact that it provides services to the poorest countries which are found in Africa...”*  
 (Government)  
*“UNICEF due to importance attached to children”*  
 (Government)  
*“WB [...] are likely to favour the productive sectors for growth promotion”*  
 (Civil Society)  
*“The WB is too conditional and their aid is cost[ly]”*  
 (Government)

**Figure 34: Preferences for disbursing additional aid in Tanzania**

Even though it has the smallest portfolio, UNDP is ranked first overall in channelling additional sums of aid, ahead of UNICEF and the GFATM. The AfDB ranks second overall ahead of the WB and EC

None of the effectiveness criteria are associated with respondents’ preferences for the AfDB. However, comments by Tanzanian respondents, see box 26, suggest two factors that might be influencing Tanzanian preferences for the AfDB: its level of commitment and cost effectiveness.

Of the fifteen effectiveness criteria, three (flexibility in funding type, quick disbursement of funds and stakeholder participation) are associated with respondents’ preference for the EC. The text comments shed no further light on its poor performance as they are few in number and mixed in content making any firm conclusions difficult to draw.

Of the fifteen effectiveness criteria, four factors (flexibility in type of funding, quick disbursement of funds, harmonisation with other donors and stakeholder participation) are associated with respondents’ preferences for the WB. In addition, a number of comments suggest the WB might be preferred due to its focus on the productive sectors. However, a number of negative comments suggest the WB’s aid is too conditional, is costly for the government and this might be affecting preferences.

Two of the fifteen effectiveness criteria - flexibility in types of funding and quick disbursement of funds - are associated with respondents’ preferences for UNDP. Analysis of Tanzanian respondents’ comments suggests that UNDP might also be preferred due to its trusted nature and its inclusion of various different stakeholders in its programmes, see Box 26.

Four of the fifteen effectiveness criteria - harmonisation with other donors, constructive policy dialogue, transparency in funding decisions and long term commitment - are associated with respondents’ preference for UNICEF. The text comments, which are few in number, shed no further light on influencing factors behind the ranking for UNICEF.

There were no associations between any of the effectiveness criteria and Tanzanian respondents’ preference for the GFATM. Moreover no comments were explicitly made about the GFATM in Tanzania, shedding no light on possible influencing factors behind the disbursement preferences for the GFATM

# 18 Zambia Profile

## 1 Background

Projects funded by the AfDB are in the areas of agriculture, water and sanitation and budget support.<sup>73</sup> In the current EC Country Strategy Paper, priority areas are in macroeconomic support, transport and infrastructure development, productive sectors of the economy, capacity building and institutional development. Health and education are non-focal areas of EU support.<sup>74</sup> The WB's CAS centres around the three main objectives of sustained economic growth anchored in: a diversified economy; improved lives and protection of the most vulnerable; and a well managed public sector.<sup>75</sup> See Table 40 for the amount of ODA to Zambia by MO.

GFATM in Zambia has disbursed 58% of its funds to HIV&AIDS activities, 28% to Malaria and 14% to TB.<sup>76</sup> UNDP focuses on multi-sectoral responses to HIV&AIDS, governance, environment and natural resources management, with gender, information and communication technology and advocacy cross cutting themes.<sup>77</sup> UNICEF's programme comprises learning achievement, community based education, HIV&AIDS and life skills, primary health care and nutrition and water and sanitation.<sup>78</sup>

Total ODA	% ODA	MO	ODA/GNI	AfDB	EC	GFATM	UNDP	UNICEF	WB <sup>79</sup>
886		33	16.9	12.67	114.08	35.00	4.02	4.06	118.50

Table 40: Amounts of ODA (\$ million) to Zambia, three year average (2003-2005)<sup>80</sup>

## 2 Respondent Profile

Table 41 shows that Zambia has a small sample size. This makes the drawing of robust conclusions more difficult. The sample also includes no MPs. In addition, individual stakeholders reported on fewer MOs, as a result for many of the questions only a few respondents offered responses for some of the MOs.

Business	Civil Servants	Civil Society	Govt. Ministers	MPs	Total
9	6	10	10	0	35

Table 41: Breakdown of respondents by stakeholder group in Zambia

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Perceptions of effectiveness

#### a. Rating overall effectiveness


The ratings for overall effectiveness for the MOs range from 3.07 for the WB to 3.67 for the EC (see Figure 35). The EC is rated higher than the WB. There are no further differences between the ratings of the MOs.

#### b. Effectiveness of activities in health sector

In the health sector, UNICEF is ranked as being the most effective, with UNDP and the WB behind in that order. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.

#### c. Effectiveness of technical assistance

In terms of the effectiveness of TA, UNDP is ranked first, followed by the WB in second place and the EC in third. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.



#### Box 27: Comments from Zambia

“very high rating for EC due to the fact that it provides high concession funds (Grants) makes long term commitments and programs are aligned to the government programs, World Bank rated low because of high transaction costs, more resources spent on the bank are huge i.e. number of staff and their maintenance as well as travel instead of the channelling resources to beneficiaries”  
(Government)

“EC always provide what they pledge as well as AfDB while the World Bank sometimes changes their pledges”  
(Government)

“UNDP commits and disburses funds within the program cycle. The others tend to commit but disburse funds based on their conditionalities which are sometimes not met, hence resulting in incomplete programs”  
(Business)

Figure 35: Perceptions of development effectiveness in Zambia

#### d. Capacity building

Ratings for the effectiveness of the capacity building of central public institutions by the MOs range from 3.00 for the AfDB to 3.65 for UNDP, with no differences between the ratings of the organisations.

### 3.2 Perceptions of performance against indicators linked to Paris

#### a. Government ownership, alignment and harmonisation

For government ownership, ratings range from 2.82 for the WB to 3.97 for UNDP. The only difference between the MOs’ ratings is that EC rates higher than the WB. For alignment, ratings range from 2.97 for the WB to 4.00 for GFATM. The EC again rates higher than the WB, with no further differences. For harmonisation, ratings range from 2.83 for GFATM to 3.62 for UNDP. Once again the EC rates higher than the WB, with no further differences.

#### b. Promotion of ownership by other stakeholder groups

For the promotion of ownership by civil society, ratings range from 2.62 for the AfDB to 3.82 for UNDP. The EC is rated higher than the AfDB with no further differences.


For the promotion of ownership by parliament, scores range from 2.25 for GFATM to 3.46 for UNDP. UNDP is rated higher than UNICEF, with no further differences

### 3.3 What is influencing perceptions of effectiveness?

Due mainly to the small sample size, no associations between fifteen effectiveness ratings and other effectiveness factors were identified. See Box 27 for a selection of comments from Zambia.

### 3.4 Preferences for disbursement

UNDP is ranked first overall for channelling additional sums of aid, see Figure 36. The EC ranks second overall and is ahead of the WB. The number of people reporting on the other organisations is too small to make further judgements.



**Box 28 Comments from Zambia**

*"EC usually gives grants and are more flexible"*  
(Government)

*"The EC aligns its work with government's priorities and works with civil society and private sector"*  
(Civil Society)

*"UNDP tries to be more transparent in its dealings ..."*  
(Government)

*"...because money received through UNDP will be grants"*  
(Civil Service)

*"World Bank usually gives loans at market rate which are expensive for a poor country like Zambia"*  
(Government)

*"The AfDB is an African Development Bank it therefore has a better understanding of Africa's situation"*  
(Business)

**Figure 36: Preferences for disbursing additional aid in Zambia**

Zambian respondents' preferences for the EC are associated with two of the fifteen effectiveness criteria - quick disbursement of funds and predictable funding. Comments from Zambian respondents also suggest that the EC is favoured due to its concessional and flexible funding, its alignment with government policy, and participation of different stakeholders in its programmes, see Box 28. These could be influencing respondents' choices in the disbursement question.

One of the effectiveness criteria - quick disbursement of funds is associated with the Zambian respondents' preference for UNDP. Furthermore some comments suggested that UNDP disbursed concessional funding and was transparent in its operations, suggesting these could be influencing factors in respondents' choice for disbursement. See Box 28.

There were no associations between the fifteen effectiveness criteria and Zambian respondents' preference for the AfDB, WB, GFATM and UNICEF. Comments were also too few to draw any conclusions about respondents' disbursement preferences.

# 19 Stakeholder Profiles

## 1 Introduction

Well-informed persons (WIPs) were recruited from five groups. These groups included three groups with direct links to the government - government ministers, civil servants and MPs. Country coordinators were instructed to seek out senior ministers, high ranking civil servants and MPs sitting on relevant committees. The other two groups sit outside government and included business leaders and leaders of civil society organisation (CSO).

Building on methodology used in the World Governance Assessment (WGA), for a respondent to be considered qualified to complete the questionnaire, they needed to be either 'informed' or 'well-informed' about at least one of the seven MOs included in this study. The questionnaire and the instructions to our local data collection partners stressed the importance of respondents having direct experience with the organisations.

Based on experience from two rounds of the WGA, government, civil service, MPs and business leaders tend to be very difficult to reach and get to complete the questionnaire. In this study these hard to reach respondents made up 80% of the samples. The situation was further complicated by the requirement that the WIPs have experience with one or more of the multilateral organisations and the rather short time allotted to complete the project.

## 2 Describing the Respondent Groups

### 2.1 Government ministers

This category includes all politically appointed individuals, whether full ministers, deputy or assistant ministers, politically appointed director generals or state secretaries. The stakeholders were recruited in roughly equal proportion from the Central Ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, Office of the Prime Minister/ President/ Vice President, as well as Sector Ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education. In a number of countries it was difficult to identify current ministers willing to answer the questionnaire. In these cases former ministers who had been out of office for no longer than three years were also approached to complete the questionnaire. Often the questionnaire was turned over to a deputy minister.

### 2.2 Parliament

This includes all politically elected individuals in legislative institutions. Parliament WIPs sitting on a committee that has responsibility for oversight of the government's relations with MOs, likely to be the Budget, *or* Finance *or* Public Accounts committee were recruited. In addition, individual backbench parliamentarians known to be interested in this issue were approached and care was taken to ensure a cross-party selection of parliamentarians whenever possible. In a number of countries it was difficult to identify current parliamentarians willing to answer the questionnaire. In these cases former MPs who had been out of office for no longer than three years were also approached to complete the questionnaire.

### 2.3 Civil service

This category includes individuals appointed to positions in the bureaucracy. Respondents were selected, in roughly equal proportion, from the Central Ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, Office of the Prime Minister/ President/ Vice President, as well as Sector Ministries such as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education.



## 2.4 Business leaders

This category refers to business people. In order to keep this group as homogenous as possible, only top managers or directors were selected. The list is likely to contain both large and medium enterprises and could include both indigenous firms and subsidiaries of multinational corporations.

## 2.5 Civil society leaders:

This category includes domestic organisations active in civil society. Respondents were selected from a cross-section of such organisations which have had contact with MOs, including economic research organisations.

## 3 The Composition of the Respondent Groups

The average number of stakeholders per group was 52. They ranged from a low of 43 for MPs to a high of 69 for civil society organisation leaders. More detail can be found below in Table 42.

Country	Business	Civil Servants	Civil Society	Ministers	MPs	Total
Bangladesh	10	11	15	9	10	55
Ghana	10	12	11	6	10	49
Tanzania	8	10	10	8	13	49
India	10	8	10	3	7	38
South Africa	6	5	13	8	3	35
Zambia	9	6	10	10	0	35
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>261</b>

Table 42: Number of respondents from each stakeholder group by country

Considering the short timeframe and the specialized knowledge required, coverage in most stakeholder group samples is good. Clearly there were problems in South African, Zambia and to some degree in India. In addition to the problem that there were some small stakeholder groups, these Indian, South African and Zambian stakeholders reported on fewer MOs than in the other countries. Therefore, results from these three countries need to be carefully interpreted.

Multilateral Organisation	Informed	Well Informed	% Well Informed	Total Reporting on MO
AfDB	76	23	23	99
AsDB	46	26	36	72
EC	132	54	29	186
GFATM	62	27	30	89
UNICEF	113	61	35	174
UNDP	123	92	43	215
WB	117	116	50	233

Table 43: Number of informed and well informed respondents by organisation

Respondents were asked to rate their knowledge level on each MO and only answers from respondents who reported they were either 'informed' or 'well informed' about an MO were included in the results in this report. The typical respondent reported on about four MOs. The average number of MOs reported on varied from country to country, with India averaging just over three and Bangladesh coming in just under five MOs. Of course the knowledge of the respondent groups also varied, see Table 43. The percentage of well-informed respondents averaged 35% overall and the ranged from a low of 23% for the AfDB to a high of 50% for the WB. Similarly, the number of knowledgeable respondents who reported on each organisation varied from a low of 72 for the AsDB to a high of 233 for the WB. More information on the composition and knowledge levels of the respondents overall and for each country can be found in the 'methodology report'

## **4 Stakeholder Group Differences**

One might expect significant differences to exist between the perceptions of these five stakeholder groups. However when examining these responses of these groups in several different ways, very few difference were found.

### **4.1 Differences in Perceptions between the Five Stakeholder Groups**

In the first series tests, the responses of each of the five groups were compared to each other on over 50 different variables. In the question on alignment with government development polices, for example, there was a significant difference of 0.71 with civil servants giving the higher score over government ministers when rating the WB. In the question on the capacity building of central public institutions, business leaders were more positive than government ministers concerning the AsDB.

There were thirteen significant stakeholder group differences across the seven MOs in the questions concerning ownership by civil society (question 14) and the parliament (question 15). In these cases civil society respondents were more critical than respondents from the civil service, parliament and business. Considering the nature of these questions, these differences are not too surprising.

Over 275 tests were made comparing the five stakeholder groups against each other for each of the seven MOs contained in each question. In total there were fifteen significant differences found between the answers of the five stakeholder groups. Using the .05 significance level for these tests, five significant tests are expected out of every 100 due to random results, therefore the results of these tests should not be taken too seriously.

### **4.2 Differences in Perceptions Inside and Outside Government**

The second strategy adopted to test for potential differences was based on the hypothesis that those inside the government – ministers, civil servants and MPs - might have different view than those more on the outside – business leaders and CSO leaders<sup>81</sup>. This also increased the sample sizes in each group increasing the power of the statistical tests to detect significant differences. Using a T-test to check for difference in the means between these two groups the results were very similar to the results reported above.

In these tests, those inside the government were found to be more critical concerning the effectiveness of the GFATM's activities in the health sector than those outside government. The other significant differences were again found in question 14-16. Those in the government tended to rate the ownership questions higher than those outside the government for AfDB, EC, UNICEF and the WB on question 14, which asks about ownership by the civil society. On question 15, ownership by the parliament, there was one difference for UNDP where government insiders rated ownership higher.

Examining the results from both testing strategies, it was striking there was only one difference on the Paris Declarations (question 4 - 6) and none on effectiveness (question 8). The differences found, for the most part occur in questions where possible vested interests by some of the stakeholder are likely present i.e. – ownership issues.

### **4.3 Differences in Perceptions between Informed versus Well-Informed**

Examining the difference between 'informed' (I) and 'well informed' (WI) stakeholders there were a few minor differences found, see Table 43. Well informed respondents tended to rate MOs higher for various questions than those who identified themselves as just informed. As above, with well over 100 tests performed using the .05 significance level, some of these results are likely random.

	<b>Differences between informed and well informed stakeholders</b>
Q4 Ownership	WI higher for the EC
Q5 Alignment	WI higher for the AsDB
Q8 Effectiveness	WI higher for the AsDB
Q13 Capacity building	WI higher for the AsDB
Q14 Ownership by Civil Society	WI Higher for the WB
Q15 Ownership by Parliament	WI higher for the GFATM

**Table 44: Differences in perceptions between informed and well informed stakeholder groups by question**

In conclusion, there are no headline differences between the stakeholder groups, including tests between the informed and well informed groups. This speaks well of the quality of the samples and suggests that no group or groups have axes to grind or a significant bias for or against those they directly receive development funds from. In sum, these differences amount to no more than an interesting methodological footnote.

## 20 Conclusion

This was a pilot project to establish the perceptions and views of five key stakeholder groups about the effectiveness of a range of multilateral organisations. In addition, it sought to discover which of these MOs they would prefer to see used by bilateral donors as a channel for additional aid. Despite a tight time period, the data generated does paint a picture of respondent views and preferences, particularly in the three countries where the short data collection period did not negatively affect the sample size.

Recipient country stakeholders rarely have their views about the effectiveness of donor organisations systematically canvassed. Despite the fact that we were seeking the views of the most senior people from within the five sample stakeholder groups, people clearly wanted to be heard. In all, 261 people took between thirty minutes and an hour to rate and rank the organisations in the survey. A staggering 253, over 95% of them, made some sort of open-ended comment during the survey, leaving 2318 comments to analyse in total. This was many more than had been expected.

Despite its limitations, both in terms of the short data collection period and an overly long questionnaire, the survey has generated some clear pictures of respondent views and preferences for disbursement. The data help to answer questions about why respondents hold the views and preferences that they do, and help pose new questions and hypotheses.

# Appendix 1: Questionnaire

COUNTRY:

ACCESS CODE \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIRMATION CODE \_\_\_\_\_

Donors, recipients and independent observers generally agree that the international aid system is too complicated and imposes high costs on all parties. Different donors have different characteristics in the way they deliver aid and provide policy advice. Different governments and stakeholders value different characteristics whether it is, for example, predictability or the level of conditionality. Prioritising which donors to partner with therefore requires aid recipient countries to balance a wide range of different criteria.

Multilateral organisations (MOs), such as the World Bank and the United Nations, are important actors within the donor community both because of the value of the aid they deliver, as well as the impact of their policy advice on national government policy. While many studies about the effectiveness of MOs have been conducted, one opinion that has not been systematically heard is that of key stakeholders from within the recipient countries.

The organisations to be assessed in this pilot are: the relevant Regional Development Bank (eg African or Asian Development Bank), the European Commission, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, United Nations Children’s Fund, United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank.

You have been identified as someone who can help us add this missing voice in **country name here**. We believe this assessment will build a better understanding of the performance of multilateral organisations (MOs) amongst decision-makers and other key stakeholders in recipient countries. We hope the results of this survey, which will be shared with the public, will help to develop a better-informed dialogue

between these organisations and key stakeholders in **Country name here**.

*The information obtained will be treated with the strictest confidence. We will not release information about the responses of any individual who takes part in this survey.*

We are well aware that standard quantitative questions cannot capture the full complexity of development aid. Therefore, we have provided an opportunity for you to comment after every question. This is critically important to increasing our understanding of these complex issues. Thank you in advance for taking the extra time to do this.

**Who is an expert?** An expert is someone who has at least one year’s experience of working with or on issues related to multilateral donors. If you don’t meet these qualifications, please contact the country coordinator.

On average the questionnaire takes between 20 to 30 minutes to complete, depending on how much you comment. We look forward to adding your voice to other stakeholders in **Country Name**

**1. Please identify the group you are most closely associated with**

- Business
- Civil Service
- Civil Society Organisation
- Government
- Parliament

**2. What is your Gender?**

- Male
- Female

**3a. First, we would like to get an idea of how well informed you are about each of the following organisations.** *Please don't worry if you have had experience with only one or two of these organisations. We certainly don't expect everyone to have experience with all six listed below. Please just answer questions on the organisations you feel comfortable reporting on*

<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Not well Informed – never had any contact with this organisation</b>	<b>Informed – have had some direct contact and am aware of what they are doing in my country</b>	<b>Very well Informed - have worked with them on several projects</b>
African/Asian Development Bank (AfDB/AsDB)			
European Commission (EC)			
The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)			
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)			
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)			
World Bank (IDA/IBRD)			

**3b. Please give us an idea of the types of interaction you have had with MOs over the past 1 to 3 years** *Please tick (✓) all that apply:*

- Attended conferences or meetings organised by one or more of these organisations
- Attended conferences or meetings organised by one or more of these organisations, with expenses paid by the organisation
- Attended consultations organised by one or more of these organisations
- Worked directly on projects or programmes organised by one or more of these organisations
- Contracted to carry out work for one or more of these organisations
- Negotiated with one or more of these organisations
- Lobbied for or against the activities of one or more of these organisations
- Other \_\_\_\_\_ (please specify)

The next three questions are about the extent to which the multilateral organisations are working to implement the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in your country. This Declaration, signed by donors and aid recipient countries, had the participation of a range of civil society organisations. While not the last word, it does represent a consensus on how to deal with some of the challenges posed by the current aid system. In particular, it highlights a number of key areas which need to be improved, including; ownership, alignment and harmonisation.

**4. Please rate the extent to which each organisation you are familiar with promotes the ownership by the government of development policies.** *By promoting ownership we mean the extent to which donors enable and support the government to devise and produce its own national development strategy rather than dictating the strategy.*

	<i>Please place a tick (√) in column for organisations you have knowledge of</i>				
<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Very Low – it does not encourage and support the government in formulating a development strategy</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Very High – it strongly encourages and supports the government in formulating a development strategy</b>
AfDB or AsDB					
EC					
GFATM					
UNICEF					
UNDP					
World Bank					

**We would be interested in understanding your highest and lowest ratings or any other comment.**

Comments/Context/Examples \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**5. Please rate the extent to which each organisation you are familiar with aligns with the development policies of the national government.** *By alignment we mean the extent to which the programmes and priorities of donor organisations support the priorities laid out in the national development plan.*

	<i>Please place a tick (✓) in column for organisations you have experience with</i>				
<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Very Low – its projects, programmes and strategies do not relate to those of the government</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Very High – its projects, programmes and strategies relate very well to those of the government</b>
AfDB or AsDB					
EC					
GFATM					
UNICEF					
UNDP					
World Bank					

**Briefly explain your highest and lowest rankings or provide any other comment**

Comments/Context/Examples \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_



**6. Please rate the extent to which each organisation harmonises with other donors.** *By harmonisation we mean the extent to which donor policies and procedures are designed to reduce the demands on recipient government by, for example, increasing the number of joint missions.*

	<i>Please place a tick (√) in column for organisations you have experience with</i>				
<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Very Low – it does not work with other donors</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Very High – it works effectively with other donors</b>
AfDB or AsDB					
EC					
GFATM					
UNICEF					
UNDP					
World Bank					

**Please tell us a little about your highest and lowest ratings or provide any other comment**

Comments/Context \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Government officials and civil society representatives from twenty seven countries attended workshops organised by the Commonwealth Secretariat last year. They discussed the factors which make organisations more effective donors and generated the list below. A few additional criteria came from workshops held by the NGO Debt Relief International with Ministry of Finance officials in Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) countries.

**7. Which of the criteria in the list below do you think are important for the effectiveness of multilateral donor organisations?** *We have left space in the table for you to add any criteria you think we have missed from the list.*

Criteria	<i>Please check only one column for each criterion.</i>		
	<b>High priority</b>	<b>Medium priority</b>	<b>Low priority</b>
Disburses funds quickly			
Facilitates the participation of stakeholders in its work			
Flexible in the types of funding it provides			
Harmonises with the procedures of other donors			
Is cost effective			
Is transparent in the way it makes funding decisions			
Makes long term commitments			
Monitors and evaluates its work effectively			
Programmes and projects aligned to government's development priorities			
Provides funds with low conditionality			
Provides highly concessional funds			
Provides predictable funding			
Provides untied aid			
Undertakes constructive policy dialogue			
Uses government procurement procedures			

**Comments/Context/Examples** \_\_\_\_\_

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**8. Please rate the organisations you know best on their overall effectiveness in providing aid and development financing.**

	<i>Please place a tick (√) in column for organisations you have experience with</i>				
<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Very Low – it is not at all effective</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Very High – it is very effective</b>
AfDB or AsDB					
EC					
GFATM					
UNICEF					
UNDP					
World Bank					

**Please take an extra minute or two and provide us with a brief explanation of the meaning behind your highest and lowest ratings**

Comments/Context \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**9. Based on the 3 organisations you know best, please rate them on their performance related to each criteria, where 1 = The Best Performer; 2= Second Best Performer and 3 = Third Best Performer. If you feel comfortable ranking more than 3 MOs feel free to do so.**

*If you have added any criteria in Q7, please repeat them here.*

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>AfDB/ AsDB</b>	<b>EC</b>	<b>GFATM</b>	<b>UNDP</b>	<b>UNICEF</b>	<b>World Bank</b>
Disburses funds quickly						
Facilitates the participation of stakeholders in its work						
Flexible in the types of funding it provides						
Harmonises with the procedures of other donors						
Is cost effective						
Is transparent in the way it makes funding decisions						
Makes long term commitments						
Monitors and evaluates its work effectively						
Programmes and projects aligned to government’s development priorities						
Provides funds with low conditionality						
Provides highly concessional funds						
Provides predictable funding						
Provides untied aid						
Undertakes constructive policy dialogue						
Uses government procurement procedures						

**Comments/Context/Examples** \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**10. It is likely that bilateral donor governments will allocate additional aid to multilateral organisations in the coming years. If there was additional development money available, which MOs should bilateral donors ask to distribute it? Please rank three multilateral organisations. Where 1 = your first choice; 2 = second choice and 3 = your third choice. If you feel comfortable ranking more than 3 MOs feel free to do so. We have left you space to write in two additional multilateral organisations if you would like to do so.**

Organisation	Ranking
AfDB or AsDB	
EC	
GFATM	
UNICEF	
UNDP	
World Bank	

**Please briefly explain why you ranked the organisations as you did**

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**11. The health sector is of critical importance to both donor and recipient countries. Based on the 3 organisations you know best, please rate them on the effectiveness of their activities in the health sector. Please rank three multilateral organisations. Where 1 = your first choice; 2 = second choice and 3 = your third choice. If you feel comfortable ranking more than 3 MOs feel free to do so. We have left you space to write in two additional multilateral organisations if you would like to do so.**

Organisation	Ranking
AfDB or AsDB	
EC	
GFATM	
UNICEF	
UNDP	
World Bank	

**Please briefly explain why you ranked the organisations as you did**

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**12. All of the donors below provide technical assistance in addition to financial assistance. Based on the 3 organisations you know best, please rate them on the effectiveness of their technical assistance. Please rank three multilateral organisations. Where 1 = your first choice; 2 = second choice and 3 = your third choice. If you feel comfortable ranking more than 3 MOs feel free to do so. We have left you space to write in two additional multilateral organisations if you would like to do so.**

Organisation	Ranking
AfDB or AsDB	
EC	
GFATM	
UNICEF	
UNDP	
World Bank	

**Please briefly explain why you ranked the organisations as you did**

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**13. Please rate the extent to which the organisations you know best help build the long-term capacity of central public institutions, such as central government ministries and local government.**

	<i>Please place a tick mark (✓) in the appropriate column</i>				
<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Very Low – it does not effectively build the capacity of public institutions</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Very High – it effectively builds the capacity of public institutions</b>
AfDB or AsDB					
EC					
GFATM					
UNICEF					
UNDP					
World Bank					

**Once again, it will be your comments and examples that help us understand your ratings**

Comments/Context/Examples \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_



**14. To what extent do the organisations you are familiar with encourage ownership of the country’s development policies by civil society?**

	<i>Please place a tick (√) in column for organisations you have knowledge of</i>				
<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Very Low – it does not effectively promote ownership by civil society</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Very High – it effectively promotes ownership by civil society</b>
AfDB or AsDB					
EC					
GFATM					
UNICEF					
UNDP					
World Bank					

**Again, any comments or examples you can provide are greatly appreciated**

**Comments/Context** \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**15. To what extent do the organisations you know best encourage the ownership of the country’s development policies by parliament?**

	<i>Please place a tick (√) in column for organisations you have knowledge of</i>				
<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Very Low – it does not effectively promote ownership by parliament</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Very High – it effectively promotes ownership by parliament</b>
AfDB or AsDB					
EC					
GFATM					
UNICEF					
UNDP					
World Bank					

**Again, any comments or examples you can provide are greatly appreciated**

Comments/Context/Examples \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**16. Please rate the extent to which the organisations you know best encourage the ownership of the country’s development policies by business and the private sector**

	<i>Please place a tick (√) in column for organisations you have knowledge of</i>				
<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Very Low – it does not effectively promote ownership by the private sector</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Very High – it effectively promotes ownership by the private sector</b>
AfDB or AsDB					
EC					
GFATM					
UNICEF					
UNDP					
World Bank					

**Again, any comments or examples you can provide are greatly appreciated**

Comments \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**17. If you could change three things concerning multilateral aid to your country, what would they be?**

*We know this is a long survey, but we need you to stay with us for a few more very important questions. Please help us to understand your opinions about multilateral donor organisations better.*

1.

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2.

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3.

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**18. We would like to know if you would be interested in discussing the results of this survey with the project leaders at some time in the second half of this year. This would give you the chance to reflect on the opinion data produced by this survey, as well as suggest ways to improve the work.**

Please provide your name and address if you are interested in discussing the data and/or would like to receive a copy of the report based on this survey. Please tick the appropriate boxes below.

*The information you have provided in this questionnaire will be treated with the strictest confidence. We will not release information about the responses of any individual who takes part in this survey.*

Yes, I may be interested in discussing the data if time allows

No, I am not interested in discussing the data

Copy of report

Yes, I would like a copy of the report.

No, I am not interested in a copy of the report

**First name:** \_\_\_\_\_

**City:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Last name:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Postal / Zip code:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Address 1:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Country:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Address 2:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Email:** \_\_\_\_\_

**19. Finally, we would greatly appreciate any additional comments and suggestions you may have:**

**Thank you very much for your time.** Your opinion will help to build a better understanding of the performance of multilateral organisations amongst decision-makers and other key stakeholders in recipient countries. We hope the results of this survey will help to develop a better-informed dialogue between these organisations and key stakeholders.

Please return completed questionnaire to: **INSERT CC NAME AND ADDRESS.**

# Appendix 2: Data Tables for Rankings and Ratings

## 1 Introduction

This appendix lists the scores for all the questions in the questionnaire. Scores are listed for organisations at the aggregate and country level. As highlighted in the section entitled 'interpreting the data', questions 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15 and 16 ask the respondents to rate an organisation on a five point scale (1-5), while questions, 10, 11 and 12 ask respondents to rank an organisation 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>. The scores are thus presented in two groups, those scores that are mean ratings for questions 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15 and 16, and those that are average scores for questions 10, 11 and 12.

Question 7 asked respondents which of fifteen criteria listed (7 funding based criteria and 8 policy and procedure based criteria), they thought were important for the effectiveness of multilateral donor organisations. Respondents were asked to answer by rating each of the criteria listed, with high priority, medium priority or low priority. The points for each criterion were then totalled and ranked in descending order. Question 9 asked respondents to rank the organisations they were well informed about, against each of the fifteen criteria. The results are presented as an average score, which describes how well an organisation performs against each of the criteria – the higher the score, the better they perform. Note that answers for questions 7 and 9 are presented at the aggregate level only due to insufficient sample sizes at the country level.

The graphs presenting these results visually are found in Appendix 4 which is provided as a separate document due to its length.

## 2 The Results

### 2.1 At the aggregate level

#### a. Rated questions

Organisation	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q8	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16
AfDB	3.45	3.66	3.16	3.30	3.25	2.84	2.61	3.34
AsDB	3.16	3.13	2.98	3.33	3.02	2.68	2.76	3.23
EC	3.31	3.40	3.20	3.30	3.27	3.35	2.91	3.35
GFATM	3.43	3.55	3.17	3.44	2.91	3.58	2.67	3.02
UNDP	3.72	3.69	3.45	3.48	3.64	3.56	3.14	3.17
UNICEF	3.47	3.66	3.29	3.52	3.32	3.47	2.83	2.69
WB	3.17	3.24	3.22	3.33	3.36	3.04	2.87	3.50

#### b. Ranked questions

Organisation	Q10	Q11	Q12
AfDB	1.32	0.33	0.51
AsDB	1.32	0.38	1.24
EC	0.97	0.52	1.04
GFATM	0.66	1.35	0.44
UNDP	1.63	0.86	1.63
UNICEF	1.13	1.83	1.03
WB	1.06	0.88	1.43

c. *Q7 Funding based criteria*

Criteria	Low	Medium	High	Total score
Disburses Funds Quickly	4	51	185	661
Flexibility in the types of funding it provides	12	53	170	628
Makes long term commitments	9	67	157	614
Provides predictable funding	13	58	159	606
Provides funds with low conditionality	14	63	154	602
Provides untied aid	23	49	159	598
Provides highly concessional funds	37	78	115	538

d. *Q7 Policy and Procedure based criteria*

Criteria	Low	Medium	High	Total score
Facilitates the participation of stakeholders in its work	2	42	188	650
Is transparent in the way it makes funding decisions	5	37	190	649
Is cost effective	13	56	160	630
Undertakes constructive policy dialogue	6	57	169	627
Monitors and evaluates its work effectively	10	57	166	622
Programmes and projects aligned to government's development priorities	8	44	178	605
Harmonises with the procedures of other donors	18	88	126	572
Uses government procurement	56	73	104	514

e. *Q9 Funding based criteria*

Criteria	Average score by organisation						
	AfDB	AsDB	EC	GFATM	UNDP	UNICEF	World Bank
Disburses Funds Quickly	0.76	1.40	0.84	0.73	1.11	0.90	0.90
Flexibility in the types of funding it provides	0.73	0.90	0.83	0.52	1.19	0.79	0.79
Makes long term commitments	0.80	1.10	0.87	0.48	0.84	0.71	0.71
Provides predictable funding	0.70	0.86	0.82	0.54	0.91	0.68	0.68
Provides funds with low conditionality	0.84	0.86	0.81	0.58	1.19	0.96	0.96
Provides untied aid	0.71	0.85	0.76	0.65	1.06	0.87	0.87
Provides highly concessional funds	0.63	0.92	0.80	0.47	0.95	0.69	0.69

f. Q9 Policy and Procedure based criteria

Criteria	Differences in Perceptions between						
	AfDB	AsDB	EC	GFATM	UNDP	UNICEF	World Bank
Facilitates the participation of stakeholders in its work	0.70	1.17	0.88	0.63	1.20	0.87	0.97
Is transparent in the way it makes funding decisions	0.78	1.40	0.84	0.63	1.01	0.74	0.96
Is cost effective	0.68	1.00	0.76	0.56	0.91	0.71	0.77
Undertakes constructive policy dialogue	0.67	0.96	0.86	0.45	1.18	0.72	1.07
Monitors and evaluates its work effectively	0.67	1.17	0.91	0.53	0.97	0.68	1.24
Programmes and projects aligned to government's development priorities	0.72	1.17	0.95	0.58	1.23	0.87	1.06
Harmonises with the procedures of other donors	0.67	1.11	0.92	0.37	1.06	0.68	0.99
Uses government procurement	0.72	0.90	0.83	0.47	0.89	0.62	0.84

## 2.2 Bangladesh

a. Rated questions

Organisation	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q8	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16
AsDB	3.16	3.11	3.07	3.48	3.1	2.84	2.64	3.31
EC	2.93	3.05	2.97	3.13	3.11	3.20	2.82	3.28
GFATM	2.93	2.93	3.08	3.00	2.31	2.93	2.17	2.57
UNDP	3.38	3.29	3.16	3.45	3.40	3.16	3.06	2.85
UNICEF	3.32	3.25	3.22	3.58	2.94	3.03	2.76	2.77
WB	2.98	2.88	3.00	3.06	2.85	2.60	2.50	3.41

b. Ranked questions

Organisation	Q10	Q11	Q12
AsDB	1.61	0.43	1.37
EC	0.91	0.44	1.20
GFATM	0.41	0.88	0.35
UNDP	1.65	1.08	1.86
UNICEF	0.88	2.13	0.93
WB	0.80	0.81	1.06



## 2.3 Ghana

### a. Rated questions

Organisation	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q8	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16
AfDB	3.56	3.76	3.00	3.09	3.06	3.00	2.76	3.00
EC	3.43	3.53	3.07	3.46	3.40	3.61	2.67	3.35
GFATM	3.55	3.83	3.10	3.70	3.00	4.17	3.00	3.00
UNDP	3.79	3.73	3.37	3.68	3.76	3.88	2.89	3.38
UNICEF	3.67	3.79	3.29	3.63	3.42	4.00	2.50	2.65
WB	3.50	3.57	3.43	3.63	3.80	3.59	2.88	3.53

### b. Ranked questions

Organisation	Q10	Q11	Q12
AfDB	1.32	0.35	0.44
EC	0.82	0.34	0.76
GFATM	0.56	1.28	0.33
UNDP	1.57	0.57	1.57
UNICEF	0.94	1.63	0.84
WB	1.49	1.19	1.74

## 2.4 India

### a. Rated questions

Organisation	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q8	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16
AsDB	3.18	3.20	2.75	2.87	2.69	2.20	3.27	2.92
EC	3.09	3.10	3.40	3.00	2.67	3.13	2.88	3.29
GFATM	3.25	3.75	3.75	3.67	3.33	3.75	3.33	2.25
UNDP	3.33	3.46	3.50	2.86	3.27	3.13	3.00	2.56
UNICEF	3.11	3.59	3.22	3.13	3.22	3.00	3.19	2.50
WB	3.27	3.50	3.35	3.30	3.12	2.74	3.42	2.89

### b. Ranked questions

Organisation	Q10	Q11	Q12
AsDB	0.62	0.24	0.90
EC	1.00	0.64	1.00
GFATM	0.60	1.60	0.00
UNDP	1.25	0.55	0.90
UNICEF	1.60	1.76	1.08
WB	1.42	0.76	1.42

## 2.5 South Africa

### a. Rated questions

Organisation	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q8	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16
AfDB	2.73	3.60	3.20	2.63	3.22	2.57	2.50	3.86
EC	3.70	3.89	2.85	3.11	3.58	3.47	3.33	3.07
GFATM	3.60	3.69	3.07	3.71	3.10	3.69	2.56	3.33
UNDP	3.58	4.00	3.47	3.53	3.65	3.56	3.00	2.92
UNICEF	3.45	3.95	3.06	3.61	3.36	3.53	2.86	2.58
World Bank	2.77	3.25	3.07	3.07	3.30	3.10	2.89	3.70

### b. Ranked questions

Organisation	Q10	Q11	Q12
AfDB	0.86	0.07	0.50
EC	1.18	0.73	1.50
GFATM	0.78	1.56	0.33
UNDP	1.30	0.87	1.39
UNICEF	1.48	1.52	1.22
WB	0.56	0.22	0.94

## 2.6 Tanzania

### a. Rated questions

Organisation	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q8	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16
AfDB	3.63	3.73	3.28	3.68	3.55	2.94	2.57	3.54
EC	3.33	3.32	3.41	3.28	3.23	3.42	3.07	3.67
GFATM	3.50	3.57	3.30	3.50	2.93	3.78	2.94	3.50
UNDP	4.07	3.90	3.67	3.56	3.95	3.73	3.35	3.69
UNICEF	3.70	3.84	3.41	3.59	3.74	3.89	3.00	2.74
WB	3.35	3.40	3.37	3.64	3.78	3.27	3.22	3.93

### b. Ranked questions

Organisation	Q10	Q11	Q12
AfDB	1.38	0.59	0.71
EC	0.74	0.56	0.85
GFATM	0.77	1.45	0.64
UNDP	1.91	0.83	1.80
UNICEF	1.20	2.03	1.26
WB	1.09	1.00	1.74

## 2.7 Zambia

### a. Rated questions

Organisation	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q8	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16
AfDB	3.43	3.36	3.15	3.30	3.00	2.62	2.38	3.00
EC	3.54	3.64	3.58	3.67	3.35	3.25	2.83	3.31
GFATM	3.86	4.00	2.83	3.17	3.50	3.60	2.25	3.20
UNDP	3.97	3.93	3.62	3.48	3.65	3.82	3.46	3.00
UNICEF	3.53	3.75	3.60	3.30	3.33	3.45	2.64	2.75
WB	2.82	2.97	3.06	3.07	3.34	2.93	2.58	3.34

### b. Ranked questions

Organisation	Q10	Q11	Q12
AfDB	0.94	0.00	0.24
EC	1.39	0.57	1.11
GFATM	0.89	1.56	0.78
UNDP	1.74	1.16	1.71
UNICEF	0.79	1.63	0.89
WB	0.79	0.82	1.41

# Appendix 3: Methodology Report

## 1 Introduction

The aim of this project was to seek the perceptions of key stakeholders in aid recipient countries about the effectiveness of MOs. This group is rarely consulted about the effectiveness of donor organisations and even less often in a systematic fashion. The project used the methodology pioneered in the World Governance Assessment (WGA). The methodology relies on identifying well-informed persons (WIPs) in various stakeholder groups and asking them to complete a detailed questionnaire on the topic in question. If used correctly, this methodology can identify differences in perception between stakeholder groups and countries, as well as differences over time. In addition, it can be used to identify the factors that might be affecting differences in perceptions. Used sensibly, this can be a powerful methodology for understanding stakeholder perceptions.

This was a pilot project aimed at securing usable data, as well as testing the methodology in a new area of research. There was a limited period of time available to carry out this survey. Identification of respondents and data collection took place over a period of about two and half months. In Bangladesh, Ghana and Tanzania this limited time period has caused fewer issues. But in India, South Africa and Zambia the identification of the right people to answer questions about each of these organisations combined with the limited data collection period was more difficult. This has led to a more limited sample size which is less well informed than the other three countries. Giving country coordinators another month to identify respondents who were informed about more organisations, and an additional month to collect the data would have added to the robustness of the results and hence strengthened the conclusions in the report.

## 2 The Country Coordinators

The methodology used for collecting the data relies on the involvement of a country coordinator in each sample country to identify respondents and manage the data collection. The selection of country coordinators (CC) is therefore critical. First they must have a good knowledge of the well-informed persons who have experience with MOs in their country. The experience of the WGA shows that identifying well-informed persons and gaining access to them can be quite difficult. CCs were chosen on the basis that they had the resources to commit to the project, significant interest in the project, good internet access, above average computer skills, as well as a good record of completing projects on time. The Country Coordinators for this project were:

- **Bangladesh** Iqbal Ahmed, Unnayan Onneshan, Dhaka, Bangladesh. <http://www.unnayan.org/>
- **India** Manish Dubey, TARU, Delhi, India. <http://www.taru.org/>
- **Ghana** Kathryn Saunders of Participatory Development Associates Ltd, Accra, Ghana. <http://www.pdaghana.com/>
- **South Africa** Lorenzo Fioramonti of Civicus, Johannesburg, South Africa. <http://www.civicus.org>
- **Tanzania** Apronius Mbilinyi of Daima Associates, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- **Zambia** Flint Zulu of Civil Society for Poverty Reduction, Lusaka, Zambia. <http://www.cspr.org.zm/>

### **3 The Sample**

#### **3.1 The sample organisations**

For this pilot project a variety of organisations were chosen. Key international and regional organisations were chosen from inside and outside the UN system. Organisations were chosen for the range of sectors they operate in and activities they undertake. A total of seven organisations were chosen. The organisations studied carry out very different types of activities in the sample countries. In order to assist the data analysis and the reader's understanding, we have broken them down into two basic groups: those that can disburse large volumes of funding for a range of activities (primarily through lending) - the WB, RDBs and the EC; second, the United Nations (UN) agencies and the GFATM, which are more specialised. For the majority of the questions we compare these organisations in these two groups.

##### Group One

- The African Development Bank
- The Asian Development Bank
- The European Commission
- The World Bank

##### Group Two

- The Global Fund to fight HIV, TB and Malaria
- The United Nations Development Programme
- The United Nations Children's Fund

The presence of the regional banks in the sample means that six of the sample organisations operate in each of the sample countries.

#### **3.2 The sample countries**

Sample countries were chosen for this pilot using a range of criteria, some pragmatic and others which it was proposed might affect respondent perceptions of MO effectiveness. Firstly, all of the sample organisations had to be operating in the country. Secondly, given the short timescale for the project, all of the countries had to be English speaking to avoid delays caused by translation. Finally, in terms of the pragmatic criteria, the timescale also meant that ODI had to have good contacts in each country to help insure the selection a high quality country coordinator.

Countries were then chosen on the basis of ensuring a mix from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as well as a range of aid dependency and income. The original list of potential countries was Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, and Vietnam. ODI and DFID chose the following six countries from the list;

- Bangladesh
- Ghana
- India
- South Africa
- Tanzania
- Zambia

### 3.3 The sample groups

The survey was administered to five groups of well-informed persons (WIPs) in each country. The five groups included senior appointed government officials, business leaders, leaders of civil society organisations, parliamentarians and high ranking civil servants. The WIPs were primarily selected using reputational sampling<sup>82</sup>. Snowball sampling<sup>83</sup> was used when necessary. Country coordinators were instructed to identify at least fifteen WIPs for each of the five stakeholder groups, with the final goal being ten completed questionnaires from each group.

Government Ministers: This category includes all politically appointed individuals, whether full ministers, deputy or assistant ministers, politically appointed director generals or state secretaries. These stakeholders were recruited in roughly equal proportion from the Central Ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, Office of the Prime Minister/ President/ Vice President, as well as Sector Ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education. In a number of countries it was difficult to identify current ministers willing to answer the questionnaire. In these cases former ministers who had been out of office for no longer than three years were also approached to complete the questionnaire.

Parliamentarians: This category includes all politically elected individuals in legislative institutions. Parliamentary WIPs sitting on a committee that has responsibility for oversight of the government's relations with MOs, likely to be the Budget, or Finance or Public Accounts committee were recruited. In addition, individual backbench parliamentarians known to be interested in this issue were approached and care was taken to ensure a cross-party selection of parliamentarians. In a number of countries it was difficult to identify current parliamentarians willing to answer the questionnaire. In these cases former MPs who had been out of office for no longer than three years were also approached to complete the questionnaire.

Civil Servants: This category includes individuals appointed to positions in the bureaucracy. Respondents were selected, in roughly equal proportion, from the Central Ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, Office of the Prime Minister/ President/ Vice President, as well as Sector Ministries such as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education

Business Leaders: This category refers to business people. In order to keep this group as homogenous as possible, only top managers or directors were selected. Business leaders were recruited from both large and medium enterprises and included both indigenous firms and subsidiaries of multinational corporations.

Civil Society Leaders: This category includes domestic organisations active in civil society. Respondents were selected from a cross-section of such organisations which have had contact with MOs, including economic research organisations.

Based on experience from two rounds of the WGA, government ministers, high ranking civil servants, MPs and business leaders tend to be very difficult to reach and get to complete the questionnaire. The situation was further complicated by the requirement that the WIPs have experience with one or more of the multilateral organisations. Moreover, for those in the government, civil service and parliament, reporting on multilateral donors may be even more sensitive than reporting on the state of governance. In the end, the CCs had to work very hard to secure the completed questionnaires.

### 3.4 Describing the samples

Table 45 describes the stakeholder sample sizes in aggregate and at country level. The samples from Bangladesh, Ghana and Tanzania are the largest and most balanced. Each

has good representation from all five stakeholder groups and the overall sample size is very close to the original goal of 50. Moreover, in these three countries individual stakeholders were informed enough to report on a higher number of MOs than in the other three countries. Samples from India, South Africa and Zambia were all less than 40 and suffered from uneven representation across the five stakeholder groups.

Country	Business	Civil Servants	Civil Society	Govt. Ministers	MPs	Total
Bangladesh	10	11	15	9	10	55
Ghana	10	12	11	6	10	49
Tanzania	8	10	10	8	13	49
India	10	8	10	3	7	38
South Africa	6	5	13	8	3	35
Zambia	9	6	10	10	0	35
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>261</b>

Table 45: Study Sample Size: by country, WIP group and in aggregate

The nature of a study which attempts to identify and seek the opinions of senior people from different stakeholder groups means that ensuring a good gender balance is very difficult. Table 46 breaks down the gender of the respondents by country and in aggregate. Statistical testing suggested no significant differences in perceptions between Male and Female responses at the aggregate level.

Country	% Men	% Women
Bangladesh	87	13
India	76	24
Ghana	84	16
South Africa	57	43
Tanzania	78	22
Zambia	77	23
<b>Aggregate Totals</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>22</b>

Table 46: WIP breakdown by gender

Table 47 describes the breakdown of the stakeholder groups for each MO at the aggregate level. The first two columns present the total who reported being 'informed' and 'well informed'. The third column reports percentage of those well informed.

The MO with the fewest number of stakeholders reporting is the AsDB, because it is only being active in 2 of the six countries in the study. Next is the GFATM, which does not have a country presence. The best know MO, as might be expected, is the WB, followed by UNDP, EC, UNICEF and the AfDB, which operates in four of the six countries.

The WB is not only the best known MO; at 50% it also has the highest percentage of well informed stakeholders. The AfDB has the lowest percentage of well informed stakeholders reporting on it. The wide variance in the number of stakeholders reporting on each organisation provided its own set of challenges during the analysis of the data, described in detail below.

Multilateral Organisation	Informed	Well Informed	% Well Informed	Total Stakeholders Reporting on each MO
AfDB	76	23	23%	99
AsDB	46	26	36%	72
European Commission	132	54	29%	186
GFATM	62	27	30%	89
UNDP	123	92	43%	215
UNICEF	113	61	35%	174
WB	117	116	50%	233

Table 47: Number of 'Informed' and 'Well Informed' respondents by multilateral organisation

The number of stakeholders who were able to report on each MO varied considerably and these differences were often more extreme at the country level. Table 47 presents a breakdown of the total number of WIPs reporting on each MO in each country. It shows the percentage who considered themselves 'well informed' about each organisation. It also

shows the total number reporting each MO (in parentheses) at the country level. The mean number of MOs that each stakeholder reported on was just over four. Sixty-six percent of the stakeholders were about to report on at least four MOs.

Clearly, organisations such as GFATM were not as well known in many countries as the WB and UNDP. Table 48 shows that these differences were exacerbated at the country level. While India, South Africa, Zambia have smaller sample sizes, they also have a lower numbers of respondents reporting on some of the MOs. These differences limited the statistical testing in these cases and suggests that some of the finding from these countries, for some of the MOs be interpreted conservatively.

Country	% of well informed respondents (total number of respondents) reporting on:							Total
	AfDB	AsDB	EC	GFATM	UNICEF	UNDP	WB	
Bangladesh		35% (51)	27% (45)	24% (17)	38% (40)	49% (51)	57% (54)	55
India		38% (21)	50% (14)	40% (5)	44% (25)	35% (20)	36% (33)	38
Ghana	26% (34)		21% (38)	11% (18)	22% (32)	36% (44)	53% (47)	49
South Africa	21% (14)		50% (22)	39% (18)	48% (23)	52% (23)	33% (18)	35
Tanzania	26% (34)		21% (39)	36% (22)	40% (35)	44% (46)	47% (47)	49
Zambia	12% (17)		29% (28)	44% (9)	16% (19)	39% (31)	59% (34)	35

Table 48: Number of WIPs for each MO, by country

## 4 Study Management.

In order to ensure consistency in data collection across the countries, each CC received training materials and a package containing specially designed contact letters, an implementation schedule, a specially designed excel study management tool, and other supporting documents. Each coordinator was trained by phone. Topics covered included implementation schedule, deadlines, WIP selection and recruitment, communication, the survey implementation process, study management, data entry and data verification. Weekly progress reports were required from the CCs and there was regular communication with them using email, SKYPE and phone calls during the course of the project.

## 5 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire was administered using several different modes: self administered on paper by far was the most common, followed by face-to-face and email with a very small percentage were self administered online. Once again, experience using this method in the WGA suggests that providing a variety of modes increases response from these very busy well informed persons.

Data were entered by the CCs using NSurvey software, an online survey program. All completed surveys were then sent to ODI and the data entry verified. Surveys entered directly online by WIPs could not be verified.

## 6 The Data

Data collection began on March 5, 2007 after CCs sent their samples to ODI for inspection. It ended on May 21, 2007. The data were exported into excel. Once in excel the variables were recoded to match the codebook developed for this project. The data were then transferred into Stata and SAS, both statistical analysis programs. At this point a series of new variables were created to facilitate the data analysis. This data set is quite complex, with each WIP answering questions on up to six MOs. The final data set contains over 300 variables.

Q3a asks each stakeholder how well-informed they are about each of the MOs in the sample. If a stakeholder reported that they were 'Not well informed' about a particular MO, but subsequently answered questions about that MO, these answers were removed from the data set to ensure that only 'informed and well informed' answers were included in the final data set for analysis.



## 6.1 Text data

In addition to the quantitative data, respondents were asked to comment at the end of each question. These text data are used in the report to add context to help the reader better understand the rankings and ratings given in the quantitative questions. Overall, 253 of the 261 stakeholders provided an astonishing 2318 open-ended comments on the seven MOs and on multilateral aid in general. A separate file was created for the comments of each stakeholder. Codes were developed by carefully examining a sample of the comments from each country and stakeholder group. Other codes were added based on theory developed from previous research on MOs. The comments contained in 253 files representing the comments of each stakeholder were then individually coded and analysed using ATLAS TI qualitative software. A series of queries were run using the codes developed to extract comments based on a variety of criteria including by country, and by stakeholder group.

## 6.2 Interpreting the quantitative data

The questionnaire generated two types of quantitative data; ranking of performance relative to other MOs and rating of the performance of each MO on a five point scale.

### a. Ranking data

Respondents were asked to rank three or more MOs for questions 9, 10, 11 and 12. In order to analyse the results, the average score was calculated as follows. A first place ranking was given 3 points, a second place ranking 2 points, and a third place ranking 1 point. MOs that were rated lower than 3, or were not rated at all, were assigned a value of 0. Average scores were then calculated for each MO by dividing the total score by the number of respondents eligible to rank it. For question 9 (relating to the fifteen effectiveness criteria) the range between the high and low weighted scores for each criterion was divided into thirds, creating three groups (Highest, Middle and Bottom scorers) to allow a more user friendly presentation of the large amount of data. For many of the questions only a few respondents offered responses about some of the organisations. It is important to look at the sample size shown in the graphs when interpreting this data. We only report relative ranks where the sample size is above 10.

### b. Rating data

Respondents were asked to rate the performance of all of the MOs about which they were informed or well informed for questions 4 – 6, 8, and 13 – 16. They were asked to rate performance on a five point scale, see Table 49 below:

Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High
1	2	3	4	5

Table 49: Rating scale used for questions 4 – 6, 8, and 13 – 16

Means were then calculated at the aggregate level for each organisation and stakeholder group and at the country level. In the Executive Summary and Aggregate Findings chapter, data are presented as bar graphs to provide a quick visual picture of the findings. In the profiles, the data are presented as points indicating the rating with bars showing the 95% confidence interval in order to provide more information to the reader's interpretation. To avoid reporting the many mean statistics in these data, some results are reported using descriptors representing the different data ranges as shown in Table 51.

Range	Descriptor
4.75 – 5.00	Very High
4.25 – 4.74	High to Very High
3.75 – 4.24	High
3.25 – 3.74	Moderate to High
2.75 – 3.24	Moderate
2.25 – 2.74	Low to Moderate
1.75 – 2.24	Low
1.25 – 1.74	Very low to Low
1.00 – 1.24	Very low

Table 51: Reporting the data ranges

Symbol	Explanation
■	mean rating
⊥	confidence interval
'Org Name' – xx	xx = number of responses about organisation

Table 50: Key for graphs

## 7 Data Analysis

Data analysis was conducted in a conservative manner.

### 7.1 Weighting the sample

Overall sample sizes across countries and the sample sizes of the stakeholder groups are not equal. To take account of this, the samples could have been weighted. Weighting requires a series of subjective judgements to be made. For instance, should the responses of one stakeholder group be weighted more than another, should the responses of ministers have more weight than a questionnaire filled out by deputies or assistants, should the responses of someone who says they are well informed about an MO have more weight than someone who is just informed, or finally should the responses of one country be given more weight in the aggregate analysis given the potential differences in data quality? In each case, if a decision were taken to weight a particular group, a second subjective judgement would have to be made about the size of the weighting to be given. A decision was therefore made not to weight the samples in order to remove any unjustified elements of subjectivity. The decision not to weight the data is backed-up by tests examining the difference of responses by WIP groups, and the level of MO information which suggest few differences in country and stakeholder perceptions of MO effectiveness.

### 7.2 Non-response

One key issue that had to be faced while analysing the data was that of non-response. This is always a concern in survey research. While this survey appears to be only seventeen substantive questions, respondents were asked to rate performance against one variable for up to six different MOs for most questions. For some questions, for example question 11 about the effectiveness of activities in the health sector, a relatively large non-response rate was seen suggesting that many of the respondents might not feel informed enough to rank the organisations for this question. Question 9 highlights another reason why non-response was seen. Respondents were asked to rate the MOs on fifteen effectiveness criteria for three MOs; this demanded 45 different responses. Question 9 had the largest non-response rate suggesting that respondents did not have the time to devote to answering the question.

It is important when faced with non-response to examine which respondents answered, and which failed to answer key questions. One of the key questions in this project is question 10 – the disbursement question. A careful look at both groups (responders and non responders) for all seven MOs revealed few serious concerns. Only 8 of 21 respondents in India ranked the AsDB in the top three for disbursement, while in Bangladesh 36 of 51 chose it, meaning that results for question 10 at the aggregate level are being driven more by answers from Bangladesh than from India. Of lesser concern were responses for question 10 concerning GFATM, where they appear to be heavily influenced by respondents from Tanzania and South Africa, the two countries where the MO is better known. Finally, it appears that factors

possibly influencing responses to question 10 for UNICEF include a high number of female stakeholders and stakeholders representing civil society.

Several other factors, such as the lack of a random sample and rather small sample sizes do not allow the data to be 'pushed' too hard. The key is to be aware of the limits of the data and not to over extend the data analysis and testing.

### **7.3 Statistical testing**

To this end, simple statistical tests and tools were used, such as Correlations, T-tests of sample means and ANOVAs to check for differences between countries and WIP groups.

Significance tests were also carried out to establish where statistically significant differences in the data lie. Differences between the ratings of MOs are only reported where the P-value<sup>84</sup> is less than or equal to .05.

It is important to remember that while difference may be of *statistical significance*, it is also important to examine and interpret these differences in terms whether the difference is large enough to impact on the real world. So, while there may be a statistical difference between the estimated means of two MOs on a five point scale, the placing on the scale must also be meaningfully different. For example, while a 0.2 difference on a five point scale may be significant statistically, it is probably not large enough to justify identifying one MO as performing better in the real world than another. Results are only reported if the difference in the estimated mean rating is 0.4 points or more.

In cases where the sample sizes allowed, multivariate models were developed using Probit for question 8, which asks for perceptions on overall effectiveness. Probit is a procedure that is used for ordinal or ranked data to understand relationships between independent variables. In this case relationships were looked for between answers to question 8 about overall effectiveness and: the promotion of government ownership; harmonisation; and the effectiveness of capacity building. These were the questions where the non-response rate (see below) was not too high and more robust correlations could be made.

Several dummy variables were included in the aggregate analysis. These included a dummy variable for the WB. This variable allows the identification of any survey received after May 1, 2007 to enable tests to be run to establish if the controversy about Paul Wolfowitz had any effect on the way respondents answered the questionnaire in relation to the WB. The tests revealed that there was no effect. A dummy variable was also created for aid dependency and for Government WIPs (ministers, MPs and civil servants). These results are reported where relevant.

An attempt was made to develop a multivariate model between question 10, the disbursement question, and the rating of MO performance against the fifteen effectiveness criteria in question 9. This was not possible due to the high non-response rate to question 9. This meant that the sample sizes for the multivariate models became so small, that they were no longer representative of the larger group of respondents who had answered question 10. The next best approach was to examine simple correlations comparing the rankings of the MOs on question 10 with the effectiveness criteria in question 9, the Paris questions (question 4-6), overall effectiveness (question 8), effectiveness in healthcare and TA (question 11, 12), and capacity building (question 13). Where there are significant associations they are reported.

## **8 Conclusion**

This was a pilot project aiming to provide some usable data to help inform bilateral donor allocation decisions, but also to test the methodology to see if it can provide useful insights into the perceptions and opinions of key stakeholders in recipient countries; a group that is

not systematically heard by donors. As has already been noted, the period for the identification of the respondents and for the collection of data was too short by almost two months. This caused problems in three of the sample countries, India, South Africa and Zambia. As a result the sample sizes here are too small. In addition, had time not been so tight, focus groups would have been held in one or two of the sample countries to ensure that the questionnaire covered all of the areas of interest for these stakeholders. Finally, pre-testing the questionnaire in one country would have identified the issue with non-response and adaptations could have been made which would have helped to increase the robustness of the conclusions.

Despite these problems, 261 well informed and very busy people took the time to answer the questions. In addition, over 95% of them provided open-end comments; 2318 were received in total. In addition, the data from Bangladesh, Ghana and Tanzania and in aggregate, demonstrate that this methodology can identify with some robustness the perceptions of key stakeholders and that hypotheses about what is affecting perceptions and preferences can be explored and tested with some robustness.

# End Notes

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2 Burall, S. and Maxwell, S. with Rocha Menocal, A. (2006) Reforming the international aid architecture: Options and ways forward, [http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working\\_papers/wp278.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working_papers/wp278.pdf)

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5 Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) (2005) The MOPAN Survey 2005: Perceptions of Multilateral Partnerships at Country Level; Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) (2004) The MOPAN Survey 2004, Survey Report; Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) (2006) The Annual MOPAN Survey 2006: Donor Perceptions of Multilateral Partnerships at Country Level.

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7 OECD/DAC (2007) Aid Effectiveness, 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, Overview of the Results (Pre-publication copy), <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/45/38597363.pdf> OECD/ DAC (2006) [explanatory note <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/25/36306334.doc>], Accessed on 4th June 2007

8 Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006) Annual Performance Report, Denmark, DANIDA

9 Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) (2007) Survey of Budget Support, 2006, Third Draft 25 January 2007

10 The information for the AfDB Organisation Background is drawn from the following references:

African Development Bank (AfDB) (2001) South Africa Country Strategic Plan 2001 - 2003, [http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB\\_ADMIN\\_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSINFORMATION/SOUTH%20AFRICA%20CSP%202001-2003.PDF](http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSINFORMATION/SOUTH%20AFRICA%20CSP%202001-2003.PDF). Accessed on 4th June 2007

African Development Bank (AfDB) (2005) Ghana: Country Strategy Paper, 2005 - 2009, [http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB\\_ADMIN\\_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSINFORMATION/CSP\\_GHANA\\_2005-2009\\_FINAL\\_BOARD.DOC](http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSINFORMATION/CSP_GHANA_2005-2009_FINAL_BOARD.DOC). Accessed on 4th June 2007.

African Development Bank (AfDB) (2006a) Tanzania: 2002 - 2-4 Country Strategy Paper Update, Country Operations Department North, East and South Regions, [http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB\\_ADMIN\\_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSINFORMATION/TANZANIA-%20CSP%20UPDATE.PDF](http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSINFORMATION/TANZANIA-%20CSP%20UPDATE.PDF). Accessed 4th June 2007,

African Development Bank (AfDB) (2006b) Zambia: 2002 - 2004 Country Strategy Paper, 2006 Update, Regional Department South B, [http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB\\_ADMIN\\_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSINFORMATION/ZAMBIA%20CSP%20UPADTE%202006.DOC](http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSINFORMATION/ZAMBIA%20CSP%20UPADTE%202006.DOC). Accessed on 4th June 2007 and

[http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?\\_pageid=473,968615&\\_dad=portal&\\_schema=PORTAL](http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968615&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL). Accessed on 4th June 2007

11 South Africa is not eligible to receive concessionary funds from the AFD, and its disbursements are hence not classed as ODA. However, it does receive other official flows from the AFD.

12 All ODA figures here and throughout this report unless otherwise stated are from the OECD.Stat database, accessible at [http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_34447\\_36661793\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,2340,en_2649_34447_36661793_1_1_1_1,00.html). Accessed on 4th June 2007

13 The AsDB is ranked second in aggregate but obviously does not operate in Africa.

14 The AfDB is rated as a middle performer for only the following criteria only: making long term commitments; predictable funding; low conditionality; level of harmonisation; use of government procurement procedures, against the rest it is rated as a bottom performer.

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15 The information for the AsDB Organisation Background draws from the following references:

<http://www.adb.org/About/>. Accessed on 4th June 2007

<http://www.adb.org/Bangladesh/default.asp>. Accessed on 4th June 2007

Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2005) Bangladesh: Country Strategy and Programme 2006 - 2010

<http://www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/BAN/2005/default.asp>. accessed on 4th June 2007,

Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2006) ADB Country Operations Business Plan: India 2007 - 2009

<http://www.adb.org/documents/CSPs/IND/2006/COBP-IND-2006.pdf> Accessed on 4th June 2007

16 India does not receive concessionary funds from the AsDB. Its disbursements are hence not classed as ODA. However, it does receive other official flows from the AsDB, such as Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR).

17 The AsDB rates as a top performer for the majority of the fifteen effectiveness criteria. Those that it rates as a middle performer for are: its flexibility in providing different types of funding; levels of conditionality; and untied aid.

18 The information for the EC Organisation Background draws from the following references:

[http://ec.europa.eu/development/index\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/index_en.cfm). Accessed on 5th June 2007

[http://www.eudelbangladesh.org/en/eu\\_and\\_country/cooperation/index.htm](http://www.eudelbangladesh.org/en/eu_and_country/cooperation/index.htm). Accessed on 5th June 2007

[http://delgha.ec.europa.eu/en/eu\\_and\\_ghana/ec\\_and\\_gov.htm](http://delgha.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_ghana/ec_and_gov.htm). Accessed on 5th June 2007

[http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/india/intro/dev.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/intro/dev.htm). Accessed on 5th June 2007

<http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/RegionsCountries/Countries/South%20Africa.htm>. Accessed on 5th June 2007

<http://www.deltza.cec.eu.int/en/cooperation/cooperation.htm>. Accessed on 5th June 2007 and

[http://www.delzmb.ec.europa.eu/en/eu\\_and\\_country/cooperation.htm](http://www.delzmb.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_country/cooperation.htm). Accessed on 5th June 2007

19 In addition to the one effectiveness criterion which is mentioned in the text as being moderately correlated to the disbursement question, the following eight criteria are weakly correlated: flexibility in funding; predictability; low conditionality; stakeholder participation; transparency in funding decisions; alignment; harmonisation with other donors, and using government procurement procedures

20 The number of respondents who took part in our survey who were 'informed' or 'well informed' about GFATM was low. As a result it is difficult to draw clear conclusions for some of the questions. This is a particular problem in India and Zambia. Caution must therefore be used when interpreting the data for GFATM which is found in the appendix.

21 The information for the UNDP Organisation Background draws from the following references:

<http://www.undp.org/about/>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

<http://www.undp.org.in/>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

[www.un-bd.org/undp/index.php?cal=c](http://www.un-bd.org/undp/index.php?cal=c). Accessed on 6th June 2007

<http://www.tz.undp.org/about.html>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

<http://www.undp.org.za/Default.htm>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

<http://www.undp-gha.org/>. Accessed on 6th June 2007 and

<http://www.undp.org.zm>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

22 These are quick disbursement, long term commitment, predictability, low conditionality, concessional funding, stakeholder participation, transparency, policy dialogue, alignment, harmonising, using government procurement procedures.

23 The information for the UNICEF Organisation Background draws from the following references:

<http://www.unicef.org/about/>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

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<http://www.unicef.org/bangladesh/activities.html>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

<http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ghana.html>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

<http://www.unicef.org/india/overview.html>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

<http://www.unicef.org/southafrica/activities.html>. Accessed on 6th June 2007

[http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/tanzania\\_1254.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/tanzania_1254.html). Accessed on 6th June 2007 and

[http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zambia\\_1391.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zambia_1391.html). Accessed on 6th June 2007

24 UNICEF receives a middle performance rating for the majority of the effectiveness criteria and low performance ratings for the following five: disburses funds quickly; makes long term commitments; makes transparent funding decisions; is cost effective; and for its monitoring and evaluating.

25 These criteria include quick disbursement of funds, long term commitment, predictability, undertaking constructive policy dialogue and harmonisation with other donors.

26 The Bank currently has one loan active in South Africa – the Municipal Financial Management Technical Assistance Project, which was approved in 2002 for an amount of US\$15 million

27 The WB ranks as a top performer against the effectiveness criteria for: its long term commitments, the predictability of its funding, and the concessionality of its funding. It rates as a middle performer for: the speed of its disbursement; the flexibility of its funding; the extent to which it facilitates stakeholder participation in its work; the transparency of its funding decisions; and its cost effectiveness. It ranks as a low performer for: conditionality; and untied aid.

28 Effectiveness criteria that are associated with higher preferences for the WB to be a channel for additional ODA are: its cost-effectiveness; the flexibility of its funding; its speed of funds disbursement; the length of its funding commitment; level of conditionality; the effectiveness of its monitoring and evaluation; whether it undertakes constructive policy dialogue; the predictability of its funding; the extent to which it facilitates stakeholder participation in its work; the transparency of its funding decisions; whether it unties aid or not; and the extent to which it harmonises with other donors

29 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2005

30 EC External Relations, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/bangladesh/intro/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/bangladesh/intro/index.htm). Accessed on 7th June 2007

31 Delegation of the EC to Bangladesh, [http://www.eudelbangladesh.org/en/eu\\_and\\_country/cooperation/index.htm](http://www.eudelbangladesh.org/en/eu_and_country/cooperation/index.htm). Accessed on 7th June 2007

32 Developed with the Government, AsDB, DFID and JICA

33 World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org.bd/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/BANGLADESHEXTN/0,contentMDK:20868123~menuPK:295773~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:295760,00.html>. Accessed on 7th June 2007

34 World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org.bd/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/BANGLADESHEXTN/0,contentMDK:20868123~menuPK:295773~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:295760,00.html>. Accessed on 7th June 2007

35 The Global Fund, <http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/Portfolio.aspx?countryid=BAN&lang=en>. Accessed on 7th June 2007

36 UNDP Bangladesh, <http://www.un-bd.org/undp/about.html>. Accessed on 7th June 2007

37 UNICEF Bangladesh, <http://www.unicef.org/bangladesh/activities.html>. Accessed on 7th June 2007

38 Asian Development Fund

39 IDA and IBRD lending

40 These are: cost effectiveness, its quick disbursement of funds, harmonisation with other donors, low conditionality, constructive policy dialogue, predictability and stakeholder participation in its programmes

41 African Development Bank (AfDB) (2005)

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- 42 EC Delegation in Ghana, [http://delgha.ec.europa.eu/en/eu\\_and\\_ghana/ec\\_and\\_gov.htm](http://delgha.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_ghana/ec_and_gov.htm)
- 43 World Bank, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/GHANAEXTN/0,menuPK:351962~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:351952,00.html>. Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 44 ibid
- 45 The Global Fund, <http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/Portfolio.aspx?countryid=GHN&lang=>. Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 46 UNDP Ghana, <http://www.undp-gha.org/index.php>. Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 47 UNICEF Ghana, <http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ghana.html>. Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 48 IDA and IBRD lending
- 49 The five policy and procedure based criteria are: cost effectiveness, harmonisation with other donors, monitoring and evaluation, constructive policy dialogue, stakeholder participation and transparency in decision making. The two funding based criteria are long term commitments and low conditionality.
- 50 Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2006) ADB Country Operations Business Plan: India 2007 - 2009, <http://www.adb.org/documents/CSPs/IND/2006/COBP-IND-2006.pdf> Accessed on 4th June 2007
- 51 EC, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/india/intro/dev.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/intro/dev.htm). Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 52 World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,contentMDK:20195738~menuPK:295591~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:295584,00.html>. Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 53 The Global Fund, <http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/Portfolio.aspx?CountryId=IDA&Component=HIV/AIDS&lang=en>. Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 54 UNDP, [http://www.undp.org.in/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=37&Itemid=109](http://www.undp.org.in/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=37&Itemid=109). Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 55 ibid
- 56 UNICEF, <http://www.unicef.org/india/overview.html>. Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 57 Lending was from Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR). Lending approved in 2006 amounted to \$1,260 million, This was non-concessional and hence not classed as ODA.
- 58 IDA and IBRD lending
- 59 African Development Bank (AfDB) (2001)
- 60 European Commission (EC) (2003) South Africa - European Community Country Strategy Paper AND Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for the period 2003 - 2005, [http://www.eusa.org.za/PDFdownload/Country%20Strategy%20Papers/CSP\\_2003\\_2005.pdf](http://www.eusa.org.za/PDFdownload/Country%20Strategy%20Papers/CSP_2003_2005.pdf). Accessed on 4th June 2007.
- 61 World Bank, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SOUTHAFRICAEXTN/0,menuPK:368086~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:368057,00.html>. Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 62 The Global Fund, <http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/Portfolio.aspx?countryid=SAF&lang=>. Accessed on 7th June 2007
- 63 UNDP South Africa, <http://www.undp.org.za/Default.htm>. Accessed on 8th June 2007
- 64 UNICEF South Africa, <http://www.unicef.org/southafrica/activities.html>. Accessed on 8th June 2007
- 65 The Bank currently has one loan active in South Africa – the Municipal Financial Management Technical Assistance Project, which was approved in 2002 for an amount of US\$15 million.
- 66 African Development Bank (AfDB) (2006a)
- 67 EC Delegation in Tanzania, <http://www.deltza.cec.eu.int/en/cooperation/cooperation.htm>. Accessed on 8th June 2007



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68 World Bank, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/TANZANIAEXTN/0,menuPK:287345~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:258799,00.html>. Accessed on 8th June 2007

69 The Global Fund, <http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/Portfolio.aspx?countryid=TNZ&lang=en>. Accessed on 8th June 2007

70 UNDP Tanzania, <http://www.tz.undp.org/about.html>. Accessed on 8th June 2007

71 UNICEF Tanzania, [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/tanzania\\_1254.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/tanzania_1254.html). Accessed on 8th June 2007

72 IDA and IBRD lending

73 African Development Bank (AfDB) (2006b)

74 EC Delegation in Zambia, [http://www.delzmb.ec.europa.eu/en/eu\\_and\\_country/cooperation.htm](http://www.delzmb.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_country/cooperation.htm). Accessed on 8th June 2007

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76 The Global Fund, <http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/Portfolio.aspx?countryid=ZAM&lang=>. Accessed on 8th June 2007

77 UNDP Zambia, [http://www.undp.org.zm/?file=show\\_doc.html&id=2907&setLang=uk](http://www.undp.org.zm/?file=show_doc.html&id=2907&setLang=uk). Accessed on 8th June 2007

78 UNICEF, [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zambia\\_1391.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zambia_1391.html). Accessed on 8th June 2007

79 IDA and IBRD lending

80 OECD stats

81 This hypothesis was tested in the WGA and found that significant difference often occurred between those inside the government and those outside.

82 Reputational, Purposive or Judgment samples are picked for their supposed representativeness of the population of interest as determined by 'experts', or because they are capable of offering the desired information. For this survey stakeholders who were well-informed and experienced on issues related to MO effectiveness were recruited. Based on the CC's assessment of their reputation, or from repeated appearances in the media on MO effectiveness issues, stakeholders were recruited to participate in the study.

83 Snowball samples are a type of judgment sample. For this type of sampling, the initial set of stakeholders identified through reputational sampling is asked to help select others to take part in the survey. It is important to bear in mind that snowball samples are useful so long as the researcher is aware of their limitations, in particular that there is a danger that WIPs will propose similarly minded additional people thus reducing the representativeness of the sample.

84 Definition of a P-value. Consider a survey where you've measured the answers of two groups of respondents and the means are different. How sure are you that the population means are different as well? There are two possibilities: The populations have different means or the populations have the same mean, and the difference you observed is a coincidence of random sampling. The P-value is a probability, with a value ranging from zero to one. It is the answer to this question: If the populations really have the same mean overall, what is the probability that random sampling would lead to a difference between sample means as large (or larger) than you observed? Generally, a P-value less than or equal to .05 is considered significant