

Executive summary

# ‘Doble afectación’

## Living with disasters and conflict in Colombia

Ayesha Siddiqi, Katie Peters and Julia Zulver

September 2019



**giz** Deutsche Gesellschaft  
für Internationale  
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH

 Federal Ministry  
for Economic Cooperation  
and Development

Readers are encouraged to reproduce material for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the ODI website. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI or our partners.

This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.

Cover photo: Army unit stationed in Comuna 13, the most dangerous district in Medellín, Colombia. © Lianne Milton/Panos.

---

## About this paper

This report is part of the project ‘When disasters and conflict collide: uncovering the truth’, a collaboration between the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). The lead researcher is Katie Peters, Senior Research Fellow, ODI ([k.peters@odi.org.uk](mailto:k.peters@odi.org.uk)).

### Available in this series

Peters, K. (2018) *Accelerating Sendai Framework implementation in Asia: disaster risk reduction in contexts of violence, conflict and fragility*. London: ODI ([www.odi.org/publications/11153-accelerating-sendai-framework-implementation-asia-disaster-risk-reduction-contexts-violence-conflict](http://www.odi.org/publications/11153-accelerating-sendai-framework-implementation-asia-disaster-risk-reduction-contexts-violence-conflict))

Peters, K. and Peters, L.E.R. (2018) *Disaster risk reduction and violent conflict in Africa and Arab states: implications for Sendai Framework Priorities*. London: ODI ([www.odi.org/publications/11208-disaster-risk-reduction-and-violent-conflict-africa-and-arab-states-implications-sendai-framework](http://www.odi.org/publications/11208-disaster-risk-reduction-and-violent-conflict-africa-and-arab-states-implications-sendai-framework))

Peters, K., Holloway, K. and Peters, L.E.R. (2019) *Disaster risk reduction in conflict contexts: the state of the evidence*. London: ODI ([www.odi.org/publications/11340-disaster-risk-reduction-conflict-contexts-state-evidence](http://www.odi.org/publications/11340-disaster-risk-reduction-conflict-contexts-state-evidence))

Peters, K., Peters, L.E.R., Twigg, C. and Walch, C. (2019) *Disaster risk reduction strategies: navigating conflict contexts*. London: ODI ([www.odi.org/publications/11341-disaster-risk-reduction-strategies-navigating-conflict-contexts](http://www.odi.org/publications/11341-disaster-risk-reduction-strategies-navigating-conflict-contexts))

Peters, K., Dewulf, A., Barbelet, V., Benoudji, C. and Le Masson, V. (2019) *Pursuing disaster risk reduction on fractured foundations: the case of Chad*. London: ODI ([www.odi.org/publications/11411-pursuing-disaster-risk-reduction-fractured-foundations-case-chad](http://www.odi.org/publications/11411-pursuing-disaster-risk-reduction-fractured-foundations-case-chad))

Peters, K., Eltinay, N. and Holloway, K. (2019) *Disaster risk reduction, urban informality and a ‘fragile peace’: the case of Lebanon*. London: ODI ([www.odi.org/publications/11412-disaster-risk-reduction-urban-informality-and-fragile-peace-case-lebanon](http://www.odi.org/publications/11412-disaster-risk-reduction-urban-informality-and-fragile-peace-case-lebanon))

Mena, R., Hilhorst, D. and Peters, K. (2019) *Disaster risk reduction and protracted violent conflict: the case of Afghanistan*. London: ODI ([www.odi.org/publications/11413-disaster-risk-reduction-and-protracted-violent-conflict-case-afghanistan](http://www.odi.org/publications/11413-disaster-risk-reduction-and-protracted-violent-conflict-case-afghanistan))

Siddiqi, A., Peters, K. and Zulver, J. (2019) *‘Doble afectación’: living with disasters and conflict in Colombia*. London: ODI ([www.odi.org/publications/11414-doble-afectacion-living-disasters-and-conflict-colombia](http://www.odi.org/publications/11414-doble-afectacion-living-disasters-and-conflict-colombia))

Peters, K. (2019) *Disaster risk reduction in conflict contexts: an agenda for action*. London: ODI ([www.odi.org/publications/11408-disaster-risk-reduction-conflict-contexts-agenda-action](http://www.odi.org/publications/11408-disaster-risk-reduction-conflict-contexts-agenda-action))

---

## Multimedia content

- Online feature including videos from Colombia, Lebanon, and Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Disaster Risk Reduction, Ms Mami Mizutori ([www.odi.org/disasters-conflict](http://www.odi.org/disasters-conflict))
- Podcast series: *When disasters and conflict collide* ([www.odi.org/opinion/10507-podcast-series-when-disasters-and-conflict-collide](http://www.odi.org/opinion/10507-podcast-series-when-disasters-and-conflict-collide))
  - Episode 1: *Conflict: the elephant in the diplomatic meeting room*
  - Episode 2: *The politics of disasters*
  - Episode 3: *A call to action*

All reports and content as well as information on the project can be found online: [www.odi.org/projects/2913-when-disasters-and-conflict-collide-uncovering-truth](http://www.odi.org/projects/2913-when-disasters-and-conflict-collide-uncovering-truth)

## Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr Arabella Fraser, Dr Emily Wilkinson, Linda Helfrich and Ria Hidajat for acting as peer reviewers for the report. Their valuable comments are greatly appreciated. Thanks also to Matthew Foley for editorial support, Hannah Measures for her assistance with the research, Steven Grattan for translation support in-country and Hannah Bass for coordinating the production process.

---

# Executive summary

Colombia is considered one of the most advanced countries in Latin America for disaster risk reduction (DRR). Decades of state engagement in large-scale disasters has generated a relatively mature legal and institutional framework governing disaster response and risk reduction, developed over the past 20–30 years. However, the country also has a long history of conflict, involving targeted killings, generalised violence, kidnapping and extortion. Despite a recent peace process, violence continues.

As in many other parts of the world, Colombia's current DRR policy and practice fail to take adequate account of the conflict situation. As a result, large numbers of conflict-displaced people (an estimated 15% of the country's population is internally displaced) are highly vulnerable, with scant protection against the devastating effects of disasters. Colombia's conflict-affected poor are forced to live in locations that increase their exposure to natural hazards.

This case study sheds light on why disaster risk is so high in Colombia, and how disasters and conflict interact to increase vulnerability. In addition to exploring the current national institutional and policy frameworks for DRR, it includes a critical analysis of two recent disasters: a landslide in the Mocoa area in 2017 and the structural failure of a dam resulting in severe flooding of the Cauca River in 2018.

The findings highlight the complex and inherently political nature of DRR efforts in a context of conflict, protracted displacement and troubled state–society relations. The study highlights the need for an approach that goes beyond technocratic solutions; the reality that there are competing visions for DRR in conflict situations; and the fundamental necessity of rebuilding the social contract and recognising the rights and voices of affected citizens.

## The double impacts of disasters and conflict

Colombia is one of the most hazard-prone countries in Latin America, exposed to cyclones, coastal and river flooding, earthquakes, landslides and volcanic activity. Millions of people are displaced due to violence and conflict, and levels of poverty and income inequality are high. Families often have no other option than to live in high-risk areas. The situation is referred to locally as 'doble afectación' or 'doubly affected'. Since 2012, victims of violence can apply to a dedicated government body – Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (UARIV), known as the 'Victims' Unit' – for financial compensation and other benefits, but progress in delivering support has been slow.

Against this background, the government has made significant strides over the years in implementing more effective disaster risk management frameworks, including dedicating a national institution, the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo en Desastres (National Disaster Risk Management Unit) (UNGRD), to that purpose. Even so, for a range of reasons, major disaster events still exceed the national capacity to respond. One of the main factors hampering effective DRR is that current approaches to disaster and conflict risk are disconnected, with UARIV and UNGRD operating independently of each other. One consequence is institutional neglect of conflict as the context in which DRR ambitions are pursued. Lack of funding, corruption and insufficient decentralisation of resources also hamper effective DRR. Solutions generally lack community engagement, tend to rely on external technical experts and offer infrastructure solutions, rather than building local capacity. All of these factors combine to perpetuate a predominantly 'top-down' approach to risk reduction.

---

## Opposing visions and an ‘uncaring’ state

The 2018 Cauca floods were the result of structural failures during the construction of a hydropower dam, widely touted as Colombia’s largest infrastructure project. The event highlights many of the complexities associated with a technological or man-made disaster, and its politicisation. First, because it was not caused by a natural hazard, and there were vested political and private interests, the government refused to classify it as a disaster. Second, the state was unwilling or unable to categorise affected communities correctly, effectively preventing many people from accessing relief. Third, limited efforts were made to define responsibilities for risk reduction and post-disaster response for such an event, which was considered outside the remit of UNGRD because it was not a natural hazard. This effectively privatised responsibility to the company building the dam, yet the government failed to hold the company accountable for compensation or further risk reduction efforts. The lack of an effective response exacerbated community feelings of marginalisation and further undermined already fragile levels of trust in the government.

The 2017 landslide in Mocoa was caused by heavy rainfall coupled with erosion and lack of vegetation on the surrounding slopes. It left more than 300 people dead, injured or missing, with thousands more losing their homes. Most of the internally displaced and indigenous groups living in Mocoa were left out of disaster preparation activities, and their participation in rehabilitation planning has also been very limited. Some officials even maintained that these groups had no rights since they ‘chose’ to live in a hazard-prone area. In the aftermath of the landslide, many simply returned to the same dangerous locations, while others resettled in areas they considered to be at higher risk from future landslides.

Both disasters illustrate that, while there has been a shift in political thinking to prioritise risk reduction, inadequate prevention and mitigation measures and conflicting visions of DRR between the state and affected citizens hamper efforts to build disaster resilience, as well as doing little to repair already fractured state–citizen relations. State policies that result in dispossession or

displacement – a factor in both examples – only reinforce the perception of an ‘uncaring’ state. Top-down institutional support also contributes to this belief.

Another aspect highlighted by both events is the importance of rights and voice and the need to groundtruth visions of DRR, especially in a country with a history of state violence against its citizens. This calls for a change in mindset away from a culture of expert-led planning and towards meaningful and genuinely ‘bottom-up’ dialogue that empowers citizens with the knowledge and skills they need to build more resilient livelihoods.

## Recommendations

The Colombia case highlights the close interactions between disasters and conflict, and their effects on people’s lives and livelihoods. When the legal and institutional frameworks for dealing with disasters and conflict are compartmentalised, insufficient attention is likely to be paid to the ways in which vulnerabilities are linked. Addressing this does not warrant convergence of these frameworks – that would be legally problematic in Colombia – but it does require due recognition of linked vulnerabilities and impacts in order to better design and deliver DRR in conflict contexts. New challenges arising from the demobilisation of armed groups and the crisis in neighbouring Venezuela are only reinforcing the impetus to find more effective solutions. With each disaster affecting citizens differently, including in terms of their perceptions of the state, there is a need for nuanced and thorough consideration of conflict dynamics in the design and delivery of DRR. Urgent action is required to deepen knowledge and understanding of the disaster–conflict interface.

The lessons from this study yield useful recommendations for strengthening the institutional regimes dealing with ‘doubly affected’ citizens, both in Colombia and elsewhere.

### Adopt a more community-based vision of DRR

A legally mandated and robust system for local consultation would enable a more integrated approach to DRR that addresses people’s demands for social justice and helps repair state–society relations.

---

### **Improve coordination among agencies and across scales**

There is an urgent need to improve coordination between UARIV and UNGRD to foster the design and delivery of disaster response and DRR for 'doubly affected' communities. This includes working out how to overcome existing challenges and avoid exacerbating mistrust between citizens and the state.


### **Establish clear legal responsibility for DRR relating to man-made disasters**

The Cauca floods demonstrate clearly that privatising responsibility does not work. On the contrary, there is a danger that the current approach will deepen the divide between people and the state and further entrench the strongly held beliefs that are undermining the social

contract. There is therefore a need for more robust and punitive laws to safeguard citizens from such disasters.

### **Strengthen the underlying social contract and build trust**

Enshrining the rights and entitlements of citizens in law is a critical foundation for dealing with disasters in areas affected by armed conflict and insecurity. This requires a more consultative, transparent and equitable DRR process that addresses people's basic human rights, including protection from violence and disasters. Equally, better access to disaster relief (achieved by addressing current classifications and removing the need to demonstrate that people are in danger or deserve to receive support) will not only benefit people directly, it will also help build trust and restore faith in the state.





**Evidence.  
Ideas.  
Change.**

---

ODI is an independent, global think tank, working for a sustainable and peaceful world in which every person thrives. We harness the power of evidence and ideas through research and partnership to confront challenges, develop solutions, and create change.

---

**ODI**  
203 Blackfriars Road  
London SE1 8NJ

+44 (0)20 7922 0300  
info@odi.org

odi.org  
odi.org/facebook  
odi.org/twitter