



Working paper 555

Disaster risk reduction strategies

Navigating conflict contexts

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Key messages

- Disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies are the cornerstone of formalised action for reducing natural hazard-related disaster risk and setting the strategic direction for a district, country or region to become more resilient to disasters.
- Of the seven Sendai Framework global targets, international attention has increasingly concentrated on the one with the most urgent deadline, Target E. Target E commits governments to increase the number of countries with local and national DRR strategies by 2020.
- While advancing progress on Target E and increasing the number of local and national DRR strategies has been adopted as a global policy priority (McElroy, 2017), less attention has been paid to how strategies can or should take context into consideration, especially contexts affected by violent conflict.
- This working paper explores whether DRR strategies, frameworks, tools and approaches make reference to conditions of conflict, and if so how. While evidence on the coverage of DRR strategies is patchy, preliminary information suggests that contexts typically classified as conflict-affected, post-conflict or fragile are least likely to have DRR strategies.
- DRR strategies could potentially acknowledge and address how vulnerabilities to disaster and conflict may be shared, how conflict could contribute to disaster risk and vice-versa, and how DRR strategies could be used as a vehicle for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

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About this project

This working paper is part of the project ‘When disasters and conflict collide: uncovering the truth’, a collaboration between the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). If you have evidence, ideas or stories to share on Disaster Risk Reduction in fragile and conflict affected contexts, please contact the lead researcher, Katie Peters (k.peters@odi.org.uk).

More information on the project can be found at: odi.org/disasters-conflict.

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1 Introduction

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies are the cornerstone of formalised action for reducing natural hazard-related disaster (‘disaster’) risk and setting the strategic direction for a district, country or region to become more resilient to disasters. DRR strategies ‘define goals and objectives across different timescales and with concrete targets, indicators and timeframes’. In line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, local to regional strategies should aim to prevent the creation of disaster risk, reduce existing risk and strengthen ‘economic, social, health and environmental resilience’ (UNISDR, 2017). National DRR strategies provide a means for governments to articulate their intentions to protect citizens against current and future disaster risk, and act as an instrument through which civil society can hold governments accountable for those actions.

Of the seven Sendai Framework global targets (see Box 1), international attention has increasingly concentrated on the one with the most urgent deadline, Target E. Target E commits governments to increase the number of countries with local and national DRR strategies by 2020. The development of strategies at local and national levels is essential to efforts to reduce disaster risk, but it is clear that strategies alone are not enough: it is the content and delivery of these strategies that will determine their effectiveness, and how well countries and localities can progress towards the Sendai Framework targets to reduce loss of life (Target A), affected persons (B), economic loss (C) and damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services (D).

While advancing progress on Target E and increasing the number of local and national

DRR strategies has been adopted as a global policy priority (McElroy, 2017), less attention has been paid to how strategies can or should take context into consideration, especially contexts affected by violent conflict. This paper is based on the premise that, to be effective, strategies must be tailored to their context. It investigates whether DRR strategies, frameworks, tools and approaches make reference to conditions of conflict, and if so how. The findings are intended to pave the way for future research to explore the extent to which explicit recognition of ‘conflict’ in DRR strategies helps or hinders action on DRR in violent conflict contexts. Baseline and monitoring data on the coverage of local to national DRR strategies is patchy, but preliminary information tentatively shows that contexts typically classified as conflict-affected, post-conflict or fragile are least likely to have DRR strategies.¹

Although Target E is a quantitative measure focused on increasing the number of contexts with DRR strategies, the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) has provided guidance to encourage alignment and coherence with the Sendai Framework. For example, monitoring progress on Target E entails a ten-point scale for countries to self-assess the extent to which their strategies align with the Sendai Framework, and the degree of alignment to a great extent also indicates the quality of these strategies. Experience suggests that, to achieve the outcomes and goals of an international disasters framework – such as Hyogo Framework – strategies need to be designed in ways that adequately reflect the risk profile and socio-political-economic and

1 Raw data and email exchange between Katie Peters (ODI) and UNDRR and the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR).

Box 1 Sendai Framework Global Targets

- a) Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per 100,000 global mortality rate in the decade 2020–2030 compared to the period 2005–2015.
- b) Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower average global figure per 100,000 in the decade 2020–2030 compared to the period 2005–2015.
- c) Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030.
- d) Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030.
- e) Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020.
- f) Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of this Framework by 2030.
- g) Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to the people by 2030.

Source: UNISDR (2015).

cultural context in which they will be delivered (Wilkinson et al., 2017).² Failure to do so results in poorly tailored strategies, policies and plans with limited impact on reducing disaster vulnerabilities (Twigg, 2015).

Tailoring strategies to the operational context may be particularly important, both to be effective and to ‘Do No Harm’, in contexts affected by violent conflict, where people are at particularly high risk of disaster impacts (Peters, 2018; Peters and Peters, 2018; Siddiqi, 2018). It has been argued that consideration of issues of violence, conflict and fragility are essential – even non-negotiable – as they are part and parcel of the construction of disaster risk (Wisner, 2011; Peters, 2018: 9). However, there is insufficient evidence to say whether DRR strategies should or should not explicitly include reference to ‘conflict’ or conflict-related terms. It is conceivable that, under certain conditions, it may actually serve as a hindrance to include conflict-related terms when articulating a DRR strategy, and in these contexts it may be better to pursue DRR strategies under a veneer of

political neutrality. We do know that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to DRR (UNISDR GAR, 2015). Thus, the inclusion or exclusion of conflict terms should not be prescriptive. Nevertheless, the assertion here is that failing to include consideration of conflict (noting that this does not necessarily denote explicit inclusion of conflict-related terms) in the design of a DRR strategy could be problematic if goals, objectives, targets and indicators are articulated in ways that do not reflect the social, cultural, political, economic and environmental context in which a strategy is to be pursued.

On the basis of this review, we warn that DRR strategies that do not adequately consider conflict risk creating unintended (potentially negative) consequences for the dynamics of peace and conflict. At a minimum, DRR strategies intended to be implemented in conflict contexts should Do No Harm (Harris et al., 2013). Indeed, arguably DRR strategies in any context should be conflict sensitive, as conflict is a natural part of societal interactions and thus present in all societies (OECD, 2018). Applying Do No Harm

2 Sendai Priority 1 (UNISDR, 2015: 15) states that DRR strategies must be tailored to the context to ‘ensure the use of traditional, indigenous and local knowledge and practices, as appropriate, to complement scientific knowledge in disaster risk assessment and the development and implementation of policies, strategies, plans and programmes of specific sectors, with a cross-sectoral approach, which should be tailored to localities and to the context’.

and conflict-sensitive approaches to DRR entails tailoring interventions to avoid unintended negative impacts on the drivers of conflict, while also aiming to improve the delivery and sustainability of interventions (Peters, 2017). Beyond conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm principles, DRR strategies could potentially acknowledge and address how vulnerabilities to disaster and conflict may be shared, how conflict could contribute to disaster risk and vice-versa, and how DRR strategies could be used as a vehicle for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. By extension, the research also touches on the question of quality of delivery. While the bulk of the paper concentrates on the extent to which issues of conflict are reflected in DRR strategies, and whether this is adequate for guiding the implementation of DRR actions in contexts of violent conflict, Chapter 4 asks the same question of a sub-set of DRR tools and technical frameworks: do Disaster Recovery Frameworks and Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments fare any better?

Although the Sendai Framework negotiators considered terminology on ‘armed conflict’ and ‘foreign occupation’ within the draft text, for various political reasons the terms did not reach the final iteration (Walch, 2015; Peters, 2017). Despite the word ‘conflict’ not being in the international framework, it is stated that certain countries require ‘special attention’, and references to conflict appear in various regional DRR strategies, particularly in Africa. Here, conflict is articulated as an underlying driver of disaster risk. References are also made to conflict at the national level in very different ways across countries and documents, most often where national constructs of emergency management encompass both natural hazards and man-made crisis (e.g. conflict). However, there is limited evidence to show that, in these cases, there is a clear and thorough consideration of how to enact DRR in contexts of violent conflict (see Peters and Peters, 2018).

The authors are cognisant that the Sendai Framework text has been agreed and is no longer up for negotiation, but local, national and regional DRR strategies *are* being devised and/or updated ahead of the 2020 deadline. Moreover, with or without formal DRR strategies, DRR

interventions are ongoing around the world, including in contexts affected by violent conflict. As such, governments and civil society alike must find ways to deliver DRR commitments, including in violent conflict contexts, regardless of whether there is explicit recognition of such contexts in formal documents.

1.1 About this paper

This paper constitutes a systematic review of a sub-set of international, regional and national DRR strategies to better understand where and to what extent issues of violence, conflict and fragility are considered. It is intended for government entities designing and delivering DRR strategies, namely national disaster management agencies, convening bodies such as UNDRR, implementing agencies, namely the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and GNDR, as well as funding and technical assistance entities such as the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Agence Française de Développement (AFD). The goal is to help governments more systematically consider violent conflict in policy design and implementation.

The paper is structured as follows. Following a discussion of the methodology, Chapter 2 provides an introduction to DRR strategies and Target E, and explores the politics of conflict-related terms from a DRR perspective. In Chapter 3 the paper assesses a sub-set of international frameworks and regional and national DRR strategies for their inclusion of conflict. Chapter 4 reviews tools and technical frameworks, namely the Disaster Recovery Framework (DRF) and Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments (VCAs), for their consideration of conflict. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the findings and offers policy recommendations.

1.2 Methodology

The research methodology combines a systematic keyword search and a content analysis of DRR frameworks, strategies and policy documents across scales, including global, regional and

national level. The countries selected and examples provided are intended to be illustrative and insightful, but are not exhaustive or representative.

The global level was restricted to the two global frameworks for DRR: the Hyogo Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2005–2015 (UNISDR, 2005) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015). The regional scale focused on Asia, Africa and the Arab region, where a detailed review of regional strategy documents was conducted.³ Governments in Asia have a strong tradition of convening to discuss DRR issues, whereas the Arab region is relatively new to this space. Africa offers the potential to explore how conflict has been considered in formal processes, with references to conflict in various regional DRR declarations.

For the national-level analysis, the research team chose five countries on the advice of the Advisory Group set up for the project ‘When disasters and conflict collide: uncovering the truth’, comprising senior-level DRR policy-makers and scholars. The countries were selected from the Index for Risk Management (INFORM) 2018 and 2019 rankings of the most severe categories of complex risk (very high; high). The selection criteria were intended to ensure a diversity of contexts (with

varied geographies and hazard and conflict conditions) and approaches to DRR, as well as the feasibility of conducting secondary data collection remotely. The intention of the analysis was not to link regional to national strategies, so the regional and national selections did not inform each other. The five countries and their position on various rankings are shown in Table 1.

For each region and country, foundational DRR documents were identified. This included searching for national DRR strategy, policy and/or implementation plans; legal frameworks, such as disaster laws; and sectoral strategies (where DRR has been explicitly mainstreamed). Efforts were made to explore sub-national DRR strategies, but lack of availability means that sub-national analysis was only possible for Afghanistan.

Once documents were collated, a keyword search was carried out to identify relevant sections within each document.⁴ Content analysis of the documents provided an assessment of the extent to which conflict and related key terms are considered in foundational DRR documents, and how and in what ways conflict is included qualitatively. The findings were subsequently summarised at each level: international (section 3.1), regional (section 3.2) and for each country, against a set of common headings (section 3.3).

Table 1 Risk management rankings of selected countries

	INFORM 2019 categorisation	INFORM 2018 categorisation	INFORM 2019 ranking	INFORM 2018 ranking	Fund for Peace Fragile States Index 2018
Afghanistan	Very high	Very high	4th	4th	9th
Chad	Very high	Very high	7th	3rd	8th
Colombia	High	High	29th	29th	71st
Haiti	Very high	High	14th	14th	12th
Liberia	High	High	41st	41st	30th

3 Regional groupings follow the UNDRR regional groups, which often reflect economic and political groupings, but it is worth noting that these can differ from other regional political, economic and even UN country groupings.

4 Key terms included conflict, fragil*, violen*, war, peace, ‘Do No Harm’ and security. Related terms were also collated, including social violence, armed conflict, conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict mediation, conflict reduction, conflict analysis, conflict sensitive/ity, conflict sensitive/ity, fragility, fragile, violence, violent, violent conflict, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, insecurity, security sector, security policy, security forces. Recurring words on similar themes were recorded and shared with the team for consideration/inclusion.

For the tools and technical framework analysis, the team carried out a qualitative review of two prominent processes: the DRF, developed by the GFDRR with the European Union (EU) and UNDP, and VCAs, which are used frequently by NGOs. Focusing on the DRF and VCA enabled examples of publicly available methodologies and assessment reports to be gathered and assessed. The DRF was selected because it is regarded as a coherent and holistic approach to recovery (and hence to building back better, in line with the Sendai Framework), and because a number of worked examples are available from different operating contexts (see Annex 1 for a full list). VCAs were selected because they have been widely used and cited in DRR programme design and delivery, including across a range of contexts. Principal sources used were the IFRC's VCA repository⁵ and methodologies and case studies collected by the ProVention Consortium's Community Risk Assessment project.⁶ Additional online searches of VCA and risk assessment methodologies and reports provided further material. Most

of the more than 40 documents reviewed for this section were methodological guides and manuals, with some material on implementation and findings (see Annex 2 for a full list). A keyword search was undertaken, using the same words as the review of DRR strategies (see above), and supplemented by a broader content review where necessary.


A draft version of the paper was circulated for consultation, including at the Africa–Arab Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction in Tunis in October 2018, where interviews and focus groups were convened to test the ideas, ensure that the results were accurate and representative, source new examples of strategies, frameworks, tools and approaches adapted to conditions of violence, conflict, fragility and security and collate insights from policy-makers and practitioners, which helped shape the concluding section.⁷ The interviews sought to verify, challenge and bolster the researchers' interpretation of the document review. As with all ODI research, the paper was also subject to an internal and external peer review.

5 See <http://vcarepository.info/>.

6 See www.proventionconsortium.net/?pageid=32&projectid=8.

7 Feedback was captured through recordings of the focus group discussions and feedback forms.

Figure 1 Coverage of the study



2 DRR strategies and Target E

2.1 What is a DRR strategy?

The strong emphasis on DRR strategies in the Sendai Framework (see Box 2) is in part a reaction to the lack of attention DRR strategies received in previous international instruments. Although one of the pillars of the Hyogo Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2005–2015 was to ‘Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation’, and the responsibilities of states for achieving DRR were identified, the emphasis was on institutions and processes, not national DRR plans and strategies (UNISDR, 2017).

Progress towards disaster resilience under the Hyogo Framework was substantial but uneven, and the need for a different approach was widely acknowledged, including more

emphasis on national strategies (Wilkinson et al., 2017). UNISDR (2017a) calculated that, in 2016, 147 countries had some sort of national DRR legislation, strategy or plan, against 51 without any kind of national-level document for implementing DRR. There were some significant regional variations. For example, more countries in Asia and the Americas had a DRR strategy or plan than in the Arab region (where less than half had a national-level DRR document). The study also concluded that most DRR legislation and strategies focused on managing disasters through preparedness and response, rather than setting out comprehensive measures for reducing disaster risk. Many existing national DRR strategies and plans were not actionable due to weak disaster risk governance systems and a lack of dedicated financial resources, technical and institutional capacities and accountability measures, such

Box 2 Sendai Framework Target E

Target E of the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015: 12) is to ‘Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020’. As part of the linked reporting processes between UNISDR and Agenda 2030, progress on DRR strategies will help deliver the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Specifically, progress on Target E will contribute towards SDG Goal 1 Target 1.5, Goal 11 Target 11.5 and 11b, and Goal 13 Target 13.1.

As part of the global monitoring process to track progress on the Sendai Framework’s seven global goals, two indicators for Target E have been agreed:

- E1 – Number of countries that adopt and implement national disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework.
- E2 – Percentage of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with national strategies.

To help quantify progress, a set of 10 key elements have been identified which characterise local to national DRR strategies (see Box 3). Five levels of implementation have been identified, ranging from ‘comprehensive implementation’ to ‘limited implementation’, each with different scores.

as targets, timelines and indicators (UNISDR, 2017a; b). By the end of the Hyogo Framework period, few countries had a genuine national DRR strategy that outlined a set of objectives and the measures and resources needed to achieve them. National DRR plans and programmes tended to describe a limited set of processes and outputs, and in some cases focused on specific hazards alone (Wilkinson et al., 2017).

There is no blueprint for a national DRR strategy; a strategy can take a variety of forms, depending on the governance structures of the country concerned. A review of governments' self-assessed progress under the Hyogo Framework points out that 'To produce an effective national DRR strategy, governments and their partners will need a theory of change for DRR policies that defines the national goals and the objectives, and interventions that will contribute to achieving those goals' (Wilkinson et al., 2017: 10). What form this takes is open to interpretation. UNISDR (2017b: 4) states that, 'It may be one comprehensive strategy document or a system of strategies across sectors and stakeholder with one overarching document linking them'. That said, five critical enabling elements have been identified as important (UNISDR, 2017b):

1. A strong governance mechanism and legal frameworks to manage the process of developing a DRR strategy and enabling implementation.
2. Comprehensive understanding of disaster risk and coping capacities to inform disaster risk management (DRM) measures.
3. Sufficient and stable financial resources to implement the strategy.
4. Technical and institutional implementation capacities.
5. Strengthened mechanisms to follow up, periodically assess and publicly report on progress.

A more detailed think-piece was developed for the 2017 Global Platform to share best practices in developing national DRR strategies and to provide some insight on expectations for DRR strategies (UNISDR, 2017c). These include being enforced by legislative frameworks; supporting

DRR mainstreaming; promoting policy coherence; defining public and private sector roles and responsibilities; and being supported by local to national financing. These maturing ideas on what makes for an effective DRR strategy have been further embedded into the monitoring processes for the Sendai Framework.

2.2 Progress towards Target E in conflict contexts

There is very little in the way of best practice, guidance and advice on how to convene a process to design a DRR strategy in a conflict context, or what an effective DRR strategy looks like for conflict contexts. The feasibility of replicating processes designed in relatively peaceful contexts in societies divided by conflict poses additional challenges that are yet to be fully addressed in strategy implementation guides (UNISDR, 2018). DRR actions, including reducing existing risk and avoiding the creation of future risk, are rarely evaluated in terms of how conflict impacts on these actions, or how these actions could impact on conflict, either positively or negatively. Existing research on the topic has concentrated on disaster response by external actors, namely the UN and international NGOs, and tends to highlight the importance of developing conflict-sensitive responses to ensure that aid in these situations does not exacerbate conflict (c.f. Street, 2012; Zicherman et al., 2011). Many case studies on disaster response in conflict-affected situations, including Sri Lanka (Hyndman, 2011), Indonesia (Waizenegger and Hyndman, 2010), Haiti (Schuberth, 2017), Pakistan (Arai, 2012) and Somalia (Menkhaus, 2012), have provided evidence supporting the need for conflict-sensitive disaster response and Do No Harm approaches, but there is still no guidance on how conflict-affected states could design DRR strategies, particularly with a view to ex-ante and long-term engagement. General policy design in conflict situations often focuses on the limitations imposed by the operational context, including insecurity, low capacity and low economic growth (Center on International Cooperation, 2011; Messineo and Wam, 2011).

Thorough conflict analysis must inform policy design to help ensure that new policies do not

Box 3 The Sendai Framework: 10 key elements of national/local DRR strategies/plans

Does the national/local DRR strategy/plan ...

1. have different timescales, with targets, indicators and time frames?
2. have aims at preventing the creation of risk?
3. have aims at reducing existing risk?
4. have aims at strengthening economic, social, health and environmental resilience?
5. address the recommendations of Priority 1, Understanding disaster risk: Based on risk knowledge and assessments to identify risks at the local and national levels of the technical, financial and administrative disaster risk management capacity?
6. address the recommendations of Priority 2, Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk: Mainstream and integrate DRR within and across all sectors with defining roles and responsibilities?
7. address the recommendations of Priority 3, Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience: Guide to allocation of the necessary resources at all levels of administration for the development and the implementation of DRR strategies in all relevant sectors?
8. address the recommendations of Priority 4, Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to 'Build Back Better' in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction: Strengthen disaster preparedness for response and integrate DRR response preparedness and development measures to make nations and communities resilient to disasters?
9. promote policy coherence relevant to disaster risk reduction such as sustainable development, poverty eradication, and climate change, notably with the SDGs/the Paris Agreement?
10. have mechanisms to follow up, periodically assess and publicly report on progress?

Source: UNISDR (2017).

exacerbate conflict (Center on International Cooperation, 2011; OECD, 2011; Debarre, 2018), while also being sufficiently flexible to address the changing dynamics and vulnerabilities that these situations involve (Debarre, 2018). Specific guidance on how governments can integrate considerations of conflict into DRR strategies is needed – from minimalist (i.e. Do No Harm) to maximalist (i.e. peacebuilding) approaches – while decisions about the level of ambition for DRR strategies could be embedded into routine processes. Policy design should also be inclusive and ensure the meaningful participation of local actors in the development and implementation of these policies (IDEA, 2017; Debarre, 2018).

2.3 Key terms

This research uses the UNDRR terminology (UNISDR, 2017) for all terms related to disasters, including disaster, risk, hazard, disaster risk reduction, disaster risk management, preparedness, mitigation, response and

prevention. Disasters are defined as: 'A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts' (UNISDR, 2017: 13). The term 'natural disasters' is used only when in a direct quote. All references to 'disasters' refer to natural hazard-related disasters.

A hazard is defined by UNDRR as: 'A process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation' (UNISDR, 2017). The Sendai Framework terminology guide, unlike the Hyogo Framework, included the caveat that 'This term does not include the occurrence or risk of armed conflicts and other situations of social instability or tension which are subject to international humanitarian law and national legislation' (UNISDR, 2017). Thus, the Sendai Framework confines itself to action on hazards

not related to conflict.⁸ However, this does not negate the need to think more carefully about how to enact DRR *in* conditions of conflict or fragility, even if the aim is not to work *on* conflict (Harris et al., 2013; Peters et al. 2016; Peters, 2017).

Despite internationally agreed definitions, governments, organisations and donors may use different definitions in their strategies, frameworks, tools and approaches; in some cases, agencies may still be using the UNDRR terminology of 2009, which guided the implementation of the Hyogo Framework. For example, the 2013 Myanmar Disaster Management Law includes disaster impacts from ‘violence and armed insurgencies’ (Government of Myanmar, 2017). Nevertheless, the definitions developed by the UNDRR Open-Ended Working Group on Terminology and Indicators are respected, and this research does not seek to undermine those efforts, though it should be noted that there is growing interest in

exploring the interrelationship between concepts, approaches and experiences of disasters and conflict coherently, concomitantly and/or in coalescence (Harris et al., 2013; Peters et al. 2019; Stein and Walch, 2017; UNESCAP, 2018).

There are many ways to define, conceptualise and categorise conflict and contexts experiencing different dimensions of conflict. This review uses the term violent conflict to denote contexts experiencing ‘interstate war, armed conflict, civil war, political and electoral violence, and communal violence’ (UN and World Bank, 2018: 18). The methodology adopted here does not seek to impose specific definitions of conflict, but instead uses a predefined set of key terms associated with the concept of violent conflict as part of the search criteria. Doing so allows the definitions used by the authors of the original sources consulted (be they regional bodies, governments, agencies or NGOs) to be recorded and analysed.

8 That said, the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015: 11) includes Paragraph 15: ‘The framework applies to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters caused by natural and man-made hazards, as well as related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks’. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some organisations and countries are interpreting Paragraph 15 as including issues of conflict and insecurity.

3 International, regional and national DRR frameworks and strategies

3.1 Global frameworks for DRR

The two global frameworks on DRR largely do not feature conflict (or related key terms) in any meaningful way. Although countries often labelled as fragile or conflict-affected⁹ are signatories to the global frameworks, the frameworks themselves do not actively encourage or express the need for consideration of adapted approaches to DRR in conditions of violent conflict.

3.1.1 The Hyogo Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2005–2015

The key terms violence, fragility, war, Do No Harm and peace do not appear in the Hyogo Framework in any notable way. The term ‘fragile’ is used in relation to ecosystems in the context of environment and natural resource management. Two references are made to food security and one to peace when referencing the title of a conference on gender training (noted here but discounted for the purposes of this research).

The framework did refer to conflict: ‘An integrated, multi-hazard approach to disaster risk reduction should be factored into policies, planning and programming related to sustainable development, relief, rehabilitation, and recovery activities in post-disaster and post-conflict situations in disaster-prone countries’ (UNISDR, 2015: 4). It does not appear that any specialist guidance was produced to support the implementation of DRR activities in post-conflict

contexts, but the assumption and intention of the Hyogo Framework was to pursue DRR in post-conflict contexts.

The Hyogo Framework’s working definition of a hazard was: ‘a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage’ (UNISDR, 2009: 17). Thus, the UNDRR terminology which guided the implementation of the Hyogo Framework was sufficiently broad to include consideration of conflict, though this is likely to have been unintentional given that, over the 10-year implementation period, neither UNDRR nor the stakeholders who sought to deliver DRR took explicit steps to address conflict under the umbrella of implementing the Hyogo Framework.

3.1.2 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030

The Sendai Framework makes no reference to the key terms violence, conflict, fragility, war, Do No Harm and peace. Two references are made to security in relation to food security; despite natural hazards and conflict being well-known drivers of food insecurity (FAO, 2018), conflict is not mentioned in the framework. During the consultation processes and through to the drafting and signing of the Sendai Framework, numerous multi-stakeholder contributions, primarily from international NGOs, and supported by some

9 For example in the OECD Fragile States list or the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index.

Member States, expressed a desire to include conflict and related key terms (Peters, 2018). During the negotiation process these were removed as many government delegations perceived the inclusion of the terms armed conflict and foreign occupation as too political (Walch, 2015).

3.2 Regional frameworks for DRR

A review of strategies and key policy framework documents for Africa and the Arab region finds a number of references to key terms associated with conflict, though minimal reference to related terms such as peace, violence, fragility and security. Where conflict is included, it is often as part of a description of developmental challenges in the region, and in some instances in regard to the role conflict plays in creating and exacerbating vulnerabilities to disaster risk and vice-versa. The Asia strategies make some reference to food security, as well as noteworthy references to gender-based violence – more notably so than the other two regions.

The regions are not presented here with the intent of comparison or to frame the country cases, but rather to show a breadth of regional-level examples. Each region has a very different history of engagement with frameworks for DRR; in Asia, governments have been convened through ministerial conferences since 2005, whereas governments in the Arab region started the process of formally convening through the UNDRR system more than 10 years later (though other regional coordination mechanisms are in operation, for example through the League of Arab States).

3.2.1 Regional strategies: Africa

The African continent began its strategic vision for DRR with the African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2005–2010, followed by multiple programmes of action. While none of the documents reviewed goes into great detail about when or how to address the links between conflict and disaster, including no mentions of Do No Harm or conflict-sensitive strategies, the relationship between disaster and conflict issues there is consistently mentioned.

The African Regional Strategy was developed to bring together the various policies and

strategies throughout the continent to improve their effectiveness and efficiency through a more strategic approach. The Strategy recognised that disasters threatened governments' capacity to make substantial progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, and aimed to 'contribute to the attainment of sustainable development and poverty eradication' (AFDB et al., 2004: 9) through the articulation of six objectives for DRR and corresponding strategies. The Strategy was clear that 'disaster risk results from the interaction between natural, technological or conflict induced hazards and vulnerability conditions' (AFDB et al., 2004: 4). It also specified that conflicts can increase the risk of natural hazard-related disasters, and that natural hazards can influence conflict characteristics (including type, onset and intensity). As such, the Strategy included disasters resulting from both natural and human-induced hazards, including conflict. It was explicit that activities centred on conflict resolution and peacebuilding fall under the domain of the African Union Commission on Peace and Security, but it was intended to work collaboratively with the Commission on the links between conflict and disaster. The Strategy did not include any reference to the terms violence, fragility, Do No Harm or war. Similarly the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the African Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2005–2010 that translated the Strategy into actions for policy-makers, disaster managers and practitioners in the region did not include mention of any of the keywords included in this study.

The First Africa Regional Platform for DRR, established under UNISDR Africa, held its first meeting in 2007 to consider how to strengthen implementation of the Strategy, as well as the Hyogo Framework. A regional meeting organised by the African Union Commission, UNISDR Africa and the World Bank in 2008 recommended a substantive revision of the Programme of Action in line with the Hyogo Framework, to be extended to 2015. The Second Africa Regional Platform in 2009 resulted in the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the African Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2006–2015. The meeting and revised Programme

of Action confirmed commitments to DRR in the region, but did not include any mention of conflict, violence or related terms.

The Extended Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Declaration of the 2nd African Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction 2010 aimed to reduce the social, economic and environmental impacts of disasters in the region. The document ‘supports disaster risk reduction, preparedness and recovery, including from violent conflicts’ (African Union Commission and UNISDR, 2011: 22), recognising that Africa is impacted by ‘natural and man-made’ disasters, including conflict. There are no further references to violence, conflict, fragility or other keywords in the document.

Following the adoption of the Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 2015), the African Union and Member States modified the Extended Programme of Action to align with the Framework, resulting in the African Union Commission’s Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in Africa (in line with the Regional DRR Strategy). This identifies conflict as one of the factors that can aggravate disaster risk and reduce the coping capacity and resilience of communities. One of the objectives of the Programme of Action was to ‘Strengthen coherence and integration between disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and mitigation, ecosystem management, conflict and fragility, and other development imperatives’ (African Union Commission, 2016: 7). Another objective was to strengthen gender-sensitive DRR strategies that also address risk drivers, including conflict. An intended output or expected result of the Programme of Action was ‘Enhanced mutual reduction of disaster risk, fragility and conflict’ (African Union Commission, 2016: 24).

East Africa

The East African Community Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Strategy 2012–2016 explicitly conceptualised conflict as a ‘human-induced disaster’ and explained that situations of violent conflict often correspond with environmental degradation, food insecurity and

overpopulation (EAC Secretariat, 2012: v). The strategy lists as examples post-election violence in Kenya in 2007–2008, armed conflicts in Uganda from 1980–2007, cattle rustling in the Karamoja area and conflicts in Tanzania between farmers and pastoralists. The document affirmed that, ‘In development of the strategy, it is understood that disaster risks result from the interaction among natural, technological or conflict induced hazards and vulnerability conditions’ (EAC Secretariat, 2012: 9). Regional peace and security was cited as a collective responsibility by the partner states within the Strategy, and the document stated that the Disaster Risk Reduction Management Unit would be linked and harmonised with the existing Disaster Risk Reduction Unit ‘created under the protocol of peace and security with the objective of addressing regional peace and conflicts’ (EAC Secretariat, 2012: 54).

West Africa

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Policy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2006) states that ECOWAS Member States were becoming increasingly interested in DRR due to ‘efforts to fulfil its peace and security mandate, including the management of humanitarian outcomes of conflicts’ (ECOWAS, 2006: ii). In line with this, one of the objectives of the policy is to ‘Enhance the contribution of disaster reduction to peace, security and sustainable development of the sub region’ (ibid.: 9). The policy suggests that ‘achieving the objectives of the policy will contribute to reduction of conflict’ (ibid.: 10). However, similar to the African Regional Strategy, the policy does not authorise intervention in situations of conflict, stating that this is under the purview of the peace and security mechanism of ECOWAS. However, the policy can be employed in complement with the peace and security mechanism in situations where conflict exacerbates disasters, recognising that ‘disaster and conflict are linked and are mutually reinforcing’ (ibid.), conflicts affect disaster outcomes and disasters affect the type, onset and intensity of conflicts. The policy identifies that, together, disasters and conflicts in West Africa ‘undermine individual, country, regional and ecosystem security’ and ‘impact heavily on food security and compromise efforts to combat HIV/AIDS and other tropical diseases’ (ibid.: ii).

3.2.2 Regional strategies: Arab states

Following the First Arab Summit on Socio-Economic Development in 2009, the Council of Arab Ministers responsible for the environment agreed on the need to develop a strategic approach to DRR in the region in part to support socioeconomic development gains. The Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2020 (LAS and UNISDR ROAS, 2011) was developed with the region's commitment to the Millennium Development Goals and the Hyogo Framework in mind. The Strategy recognised conflict and civil unrest as secondary risks to the region, but did not go any further to address these risks, the challenges they bring or how they interact with disaster risks. No mention of violence, fragility, peace or Do No Harm was made. The next phase of the strategy, the Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2030, contains the same comment on conflict and civil unrest.

One of the outcomes of the 2018 Africa–Arab Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in Tunis was the Prioritized Action Plan 2018–2020 of the Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2030 to Implement the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. This acknowledges the relationship between disaster and conflict, and argues that ‘conflicts and political turmoil’ are among drivers of risk in the region. The document also calls for the region to ensure that new infrastructure developed in post-conflict or post-disaster contexts is disaster risk-resilient.

As the Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction was being developed in late 2010, civil unrest, including protests and armed rebellions, spread across the region in what became known as the ‘Arab Spring’. It is not surprising, then, that both the Strategy and its Action Plan acknowledge the increasing impact of conflict in the region and list conflict and civil unrest among the compound risks increased by natural hazard-related disasters and climate change. However, neither goes into further detail on the relationship between disasters and conflict.

3.2.3 Regional strategies: Asia

The Asia region is considered among the most advanced globally in DRR policy, coordination and financing, and a number of regional

strategies, frameworks, plans and policies for DRR have been developed and ratified. The region is also vastly varied in socioeconomic, geographic and environmental conditions, and there are significant sub-regional differences in disaster risk and DRR strategies and policies. What is consistent across the region, however, is that very few strategies and policies consider the links between disaster and conflict. The Asia Regional Plan for Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 promotes gender-sensitive approaches to DRR actions at all levels, including ‘prevention and response to gender-based violence’ (UNISDR, 2016: 8), but does not make reference to other types of social or political violence or conflict. The Action Plan 2018–2020 of the Asia Regional Plan for Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 also mentions preventing and responding to gender-based violence within DRR actions. Enhancing Regional Cooperation for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in Asia and the Pacific makes no reference to any of the keywords included in this study.

Asia-Pacific

While strategies, plans and frameworks for disaster risk management and reduction in the Asia-Pacific region do not address the connections between disasters and conflict, there are several references to human security. The Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Asia Pacific Region 2009–2015 argues that ‘reducing the risk of disaster enhances human security’ (APEC, 2008: 8), and that human security and political imperatives should be taken into account for more effective disaster preparedness, risk reduction and response.

Along the same lines, the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2017–2030 defines human security as ‘first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes,

in jobs or in communities' (SPC, 2016: 30). However, human security or other keywords do not feature elsewhere in the document, and there is no mention of how conflict or violence could disrupt human security. The Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plan and Disaster Risk Reduction Framework: Strategy to Building Adaptive and Disaster-Resilient Economies: Annex A do not mention of conflict, violence, security, peace or other related keywords. The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Regional Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and Regional Priorities for Action did not itself address the prevention or resolution of conflicts, but it did comment that the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016 marked a 'shifting' of 'the paradigm towards ... preventing and ending conflicts; and strengthening resilience' (ECO, 2017: 4).

Central Asia and the South Caucasus

The Plan of Action for Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in Central Asia and South Caucasus Region does not make any mention of conflict, violence, security, peace or other related keywords.

South Asia

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management makes no mention of conflict, violence, security, peace or other related keywords.

Southeast Asia

The Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in December 2004 affected countries throughout Southeast Asia. The devastating disaster brought together a Special Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders' Meeting on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami on 6 January 2005, where leaders agreed on the need to develop a regional instrument for disaster management (ASEAN, 2012). This resulted in the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). The Agreement, which includes DRR, reaffirms ASEAN's commitment to regional cooperation and aims to 'contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region' (ASEAN, 2005: n.p.).

ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management was endorsed by the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management (AMMDM) and the Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP) to AADMER in 2015. The Vision provides a 10-year strategic direction for disaster management in the region. The document states that AADMER should 'ensure that there are mechanisms to enable protection and assistance for all especially those most vulnerable' during humanitarian events (ASEAN, 2016a: 5). It goes on to describe how climate change-induced 'natural disasters' will likely 'exacerbate pre-existing non-traditional security issues' (ibid.: 4), though there is no further elaboration on what these issues include. The Vision does note that, as a result, ASEAN will find it difficult to address the multi-faceted nature of future humanitarian crises, and calls for institutional collaboration between ASEAN mechanisms, including the ASEAN Political Security Community, in disaster management and emergency response.

The AADMER Work Programme 2016–2020 makes one reference to conflict as a hazard to consider in the long term. The Agreement also discusses security issues and the security impacts of climate change in Asia. The strategic aim of the Programme is 'to focus on deepening the region's capacities in responding to natural and climate-related disasters as a necessary foundation towards post-2020 longer-term expansion of the region's capacities to respond to increasing security-related, health, technological and other hazards' (ASEAN, 2016b: 106). Disaster risk management is seen as part of traditional and non-traditional political/security issues, in recognition that 'disasters cause severe insecurity to the lives of people' (ibid.: 142).

3.3 National DRR strategies

This section presents the findings of a review of national DRR strategies in five countries: Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia, Haiti and Liberia. Each country case includes a description of the conflict context (which is intentionally emphasised), an overview of the DRR strategy (where one exists) and related policy documents, an assessment of the extent to which key terms are included and a short concluding section.

The documents were evaluated in terms of their understanding of potentially overlapping conflict and disaster vulnerabilities, how conflict may impact disaster and how disaster may impact conflict; their consideration of conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm; and any mention of the potential for DRR to contribute to conflict prevention or peacebuilding.

The findings are mixed. In all five countries a number of DRR policy documents and plans exist, with varying titles, ambitions and timeframes. However, it was consistently difficult to pinpoint *the* national DRR strategy for a country, and in Chad, Haiti and Liberia DRR strategies do not exist.¹⁰ Most strategies and/or policy documents include a paragraph introducing the country context, with a brief description of conflict conditions. Beyond this there was much variation – Afghanistan makes a clear distinction between ‘man-made’ and ‘natural’ disasters, whereas Colombia’s DRR strategies make no reference to the armed conflict that has plagued the country for more than half a century. None of the documents reviewed makes any attempt to interrogate or nuance how the challenges of conflict have been accounted for in the articulation of the strategy, or how they will affect the DRR outcomes described.

3.3.1 Country case: Afghanistan

Context

Afghanistan is classified as a least developed country (LDC) with high levels of poverty (over a third of the population live below the poverty line) and income inequality, institutionalised gender inequality and human rights abuses, alongside warlordism, corruption and clientelism. The country has been embroiled in complex violent conflicts, insurgencies and political instability for decades, including the Saur Revolution (1978), the Soviet–Afghan war (1979–89), civil war (1989–2001) and the rise of the Taliban and the US-led ‘war on terror’ (since 2001). Disputes over water resources and land are also a source of violent conflict and local insecurity (UNEP, 2013). Displacement

due to conflict and violence is long-lasting and large-scale: there are nearly 2.5 million registered refugees from Afghanistan, making this the second-largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2018). Another 1.3 million people are internally displaced (IDMC, 2018).

In addition to conflict, Afghanistan is prone to multiple rapid- and slow-onset disasters, including earthquakes, landslides, floods and flash floods, avalanches, land degradation, desertification and drought. These disasters are recurrent and have a high human impact, affecting 200,000 Afghans a year on average (OCHA, 2018). As well as fuelling displacement, disasters disrupt social services and the provision of humanitarian aid (Save the Children, 2013). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported in 2018 that droughts are so frequent that farmers do not have the time to recover adequately from one before the next hits (FAO, 2018b). Disasters do not affect the country equally: earthquakes, the deadliest disasters in the country, primarily impact the north and north-east, while floods are most frequent in the north and west (World Bank, 2017). The poorest households are affected by disasters nearly twice as frequently as the wealthiest (*ibid.*). Meanwhile, the effects of climate change on the timing and amount of water availability are expected to have cascading impacts on agricultural livelihoods, food insecurity and poverty (WFP, 2016).

DRR documents reviewed

Key publicly available official disaster-related policies and strategies are listed below. Alongside national strategies, this review also includes examples from provincial-level plans.

- **Current national DRR strategy:** The Afghanistan Disaster Management Strategy 2014–17 is the most recent strategy included in the review; a subsequent DRR strategy was officially endorsed in December 2018 but had not been officially translated into English at the time of writing.
- The Afghanistan Disaster Management Strategy 2014–2017 (MMRD, 2014).

10 An updated Afghanistan Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction was adopted in December 2018, but the official English translation was not available at the time of writing.

- Badakhshan Provincial Disaster Management Plan (BDNP, 2013).
- Badakhshan Gender Standard for Disaster Risk Management (ANDMA, 2013).
- The Afghanistan Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) for Disaster Risk Reduction: Towards Peace and Stable Development (GoA, 2011).
- The Afghanistan National Disaster Management Plan (GoA, 2003).
- The Afghanistan Law on Combating Disasters in the Republic of Afghanistan (GoA, 1991).

The Office of the State Minister for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs (DMHA) oversees the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and its work on disaster risk reduction, response and recovery. The Department of Disaster Preparedness (DDP), now ANDMA, was established in 1973 and promoted to ministry status in 2015. ANDMA has seven directorates with varying capacities to enact DRR across 37 provinces, shaped by factors such as resources, security and terrain. The government has embraced the Sendai Framework, establishing a national focal point as well as a national platform, and the country is working to develop local strategies at the district level to complement the national strategy on DRR.

Summary of findings

Several policy documents acknowledge that conflict affects most of the country and contributes to disaster vulnerability. For example, the Afghanistan National Disaster Plan (GoA, 2003) explains how conflict-driven deforestation undermines flood protection, watershed management and soil stability. Conflict also undermines Afghanistan's ability to anticipate, prepare for and respond to shocks (GoA, 2011), and has destroyed the coping capacity of the government and communities alike (GoA, 2003). References to conflict include tribal tensions, warlordism and violence (GoA, 2011).

The SNAP states that conflict and disaster, along with development, must be addressed together, and that 'The distinction between man-made and natural disasters is no longer that clear when we consider the complex causes of

droughts, landslides and floods' (GoA, 2011: 17). The document identifies poverty as one of the driving factors of conflict, and notes how disaster can increase poverty and create the conditions for further conflict (GoA, 2011). The Afghanistan National Disaster Plan explains that drought and conflict have led to internal displacement, and IDPs have little access to livelihood opportunities and infrastructure (GoA, 2003). Local governance institutions are noted in the MMRD (2014) as playing an important role in addressing conflict and disasters.

Some of the documents reviewed go beyond hinting at Do No Harm approaches (though these are not explicitly mentioned), and suggest that DRR can support peace in the country. The ambition is for DRR to contribute to peace and peacebuilding, as well as multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary collaboration (GoA, 2011). The Badakhshan Gender Standard for Disaster Risk Management notes the importance of maintaining security in the post-disaster period, and the specific need to prevent violence against women. While there is no mention of Do No Harm or conflict sensitivity in programming, there is reference to a no-regrets approach in the SNAP, though the meaning of the term is unclear (GoA, 2011).

The potential for DRR to increase conflict and violence through funding shortfalls and the unequal distribution of funding is noted in the Afghanistan Disaster Management Strategy 2014–2017, along with the need to 'adequately meet the urgent and timely need for equitable development benefiting rural Afghanistan in terms of infrastructure, economic development and local governance' (MMRD, 2014). The SNAP mentions violence as a threat to the implementation of DRR programmes (GoA, 2011).

Conclusion

Afghanistan suffers from a complex and protracted interaction between disaster and conflict, and there is little sign of any improvement in the foreseeable future. Afghanistan's official disaster management policies recognise the complex two-way relationship between disaster and conflict, which necessitates that they be addressed in an integrated way. Impacts on particularly

vulnerable groups are not noted in any depth. Despite broad aims around peace and collaboration, there is a lack of clarity on how to achieve these goals at both national and local levels. Even in terms of the more modest aim of working effectively in conflict-affected contexts, there is an absence of reference to or guidance on Do No Harm or conflict-sensitive approaches to disaster risk reduction and response.

3.3.2 Country case: Chad

Context

Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a Human Development Index of 0.392, placing it 185th out of 188 (UNDP, 2016). Following internal conflicts between 2005 and 2010, largely peaceful elections were held in 2011, 2012 and 2016. Armed groups including Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda-related groups are active around Lake Chad (UNDP, 2016), causing displacement and disrupting livelihoods. Inadequate health provision, conflict-related displacement and food insecurity have left more than 4 million Chadians in need of humanitarian assistance. More than 7.5 million are chronically or severely vulnerable due to displacement, food insecurity, malnutrition and public health emergencies, including malaria, the leading cause of death in the country (OCHA, 2019; UNDP, 2016).

Chad is affected by a wide range of natural hazards, particularly drought, floods following intense rains, insect infestations and food insecurity linked to conflict, natural resource management and changes in temperature and precipitation. The UN Development Assistance Framework reported that, in 2014, 39% of Chadian households faced at least one natural hazard-related disaster, mainly related to droughts and floods (République du Tchad and United Nations, 2017). Floods occur mainly in central, southern and eastern Chad, including the capital, N'Djamena. Over the past 45 years Lake Chad has lost 90% of its total volume and surface area; this decline has had serious consequences for the 30 million or so people in Chad, Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon who depend on Lake Chad for their lives and livelihoods (Salkida, 2012; UNDP, 2016).

DRR documents reviewed

Key publicly available official disaster-related policies and strategies include:

- **Current national DRR strategy:** There is currently no national DRR strategy in Chad.
- The National Development Plan 2017–2021 (République du Tchad, 2017d).
- The UN Development Assistance Framework 2017–2021 (République du Tchad and United Nations, 2017).
- Plan d'action national de renforcement des capacités pour la réduction des risques (CADRI, 2014).
- 2014 Plan d'Organisation des Secours du Tchad (ORSEC Relief Plan).
- 2002 decree (no. 529/PR/PM/MCD/2011) establishing the Civil Protection Directorate under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Governance.

Chad does not have adequate legislation or a national policy document to guide DRR efforts in the country, instead relying on reactive post-crisis policy-making. Aspects of DRR are delivered by three ministries: the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Governance, the Ministry of Economy and Development and the Ministry of Women, Child Protection and National Solidarity. A 2002 decree establishing the Civil Protection Directorate (CPD) is the main instrument for preparedness and response and, since 2011, disaster prevention. The CPD lacks political weight and financial backing. The Chadian government has received external support to review and bolster its policy and institutional architecture for DRR, most notably through a Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) capacity assessment in 2014. As a result of this process, a National Action Plan to Strengthen Disaster Risk Reduction, Preparedness and Response to Disasters was created, but this is yet to be ratified or financed.

Numerous ministries and departments oversee threat-specific aspects of DRR, including public health, environment, climate change, food security and locust infestation. Despite the lack of a formalised national DRR strategy, Chad engages in aspects of prevention and preparedness through a number of regional

drought and food security initiatives and programmes, and is a member of the Permanent Inter-State Committee to Combat Drought in the Sahel (CILSS). A national Information System on Food Security and Early Warning (SISAAP) is supported by FAO and funded by the EU.

Finally, two national development plans incorporate aspects of DRR – the National Development Plan 2017–2021 (République du Tchad, 2017d) and the UN Development Assistance Framework 2017–2021 (République du Tchad and United Nations, 2017).

Summary of findings

In the absence of a national DRR strategy, the CADRI assessment report – *Rapport d'évaluation des capacités nationales pour la réduction des risques, la préparation et la réponse aux urgences au Tchad* – highlights the importance of DRR for the country, and suggests that identifying the main vulnerabilities and risks may be a first step in reducing the impacts of natural hazards (CADRI, 2014). The CADRI plan, which acted as an input to Chad's National Development Plan, recommends that the government address the vulnerabilities underlying disasters, although the Plan itself does not provide specific details on how to do this in the context of conflict, a surprising omission given the relationship between conflict and disaster vulnerabilities in the Lake Chad region.

The documents reviewed do not reflect on how DRR could or should be done differently in conflict-affected contexts. The CADRI report focuses squarely on how to bolster DRR capacity and aligning national ambitions with the Sendai Framework, with limited consideration of the barriers, opportunities or alternative entry points in the context of conflict.

Conclusion

Available policy documents do not discuss in any significant detail how conflict has contributed to specific types of vulnerability to natural hazards in Chad. There is also no discussion surrounding conflict-sensitive DRR efforts. A recent paper co-authored by UNDP and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) calls for disaster and conflict prevention to be better integrated to increase resilience, describes

the dynamics of conflict and fragility around the Lake Chad region and recommends the adoption of conflict-sensitive approaches to avoid exacerbating existing conflicts or creating the conditions for new ones to arise (UNDP and OCHA, 2018). It remains to be seen whether the development of a national plan for DRR will take into consideration the full range of vulnerabilities, including armed violence and its multiple effects.

3.3.3 Country case: Colombia

Context

The civil conflict in Colombia has claimed at least 262,000 lives (Centro nacional de memoria historica, 2018); another 80,000 have disappeared and 7.6 million have been displaced (UNCHR Colombia, 2018). In addition to domestic conflict-induced displacement, Venezuelans fleeing political and economic crisis have also taken refuge in Colombia.

The two main non-state armed groups in the conflict, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) and *Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional* (ELN), were founded in the 1960s after a decade of political violence known as *la Violencia*. The increasing strength of the guerrilla movement led to the creation of paramilitary groups to protect the interests of landowners and elites. The national army tolerated and later used these groups in their fight against the guerrillas (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012). While the main paramilitary group, the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC), demobilised in 2004, many splinter groups still exist. Guerrilla and paramilitary groups have been heavily involved in the narcotics industry and the drug trade (Insight Crime, 2015). The Colombian security forces are also implicated in extreme violence. Army brigades under pressure to show evidence of combat success abduct and kill civilians in what are known as 'false positives' (where civilians are falsely identified as combatants) (HRW, 2018). All sides have committed human rights abuses, including killings and executions, disappearances and forced displacement, the recruitment of child soldiers and rape (HRW, 2018).

A peace accord signed by the FARC and the Colombian government in 2016 formally

brought to an end 52 years of armed conflict – the longest-running insurgency in South America. FARC formally terminated its status as an armed group the following year. Concerns for the durability of the peace agreement with the FARC have increased with the election of Iván Duque to the presidency in 2018. Duque has vowed to alter the conditions of the agreement, including imposing harsher punishments on the FARC. Exploratory peace talks continue between the government and the ELN, but no ceasefire has been signed (International Crisis Group, 2018) and low-level conflict continues with the ELN, other guerrilla groups and criminal groups called *Bacrim* (short in Spanish for criminal gangs).

The relationship between conflict and displacement has been well documented (Stirk, 2013). There is also a connection between displacement and natural hazards, as 50% of disaster victims in Colombia are IDPs. The most common hazards are earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, droughts and floods, with an estimated 84% of the Colombian population exposed to two or more hazards (GFDRR, 2018). One of the most destructive disasters in recent years was the rainy season associated with La Niña in 2010–11, which triggered more than 1,200 floods, nearly 800 landslides and other related disasters affecting three million people. Total damage was estimated at \$6 billion (CEPAL, 2012).

DRR documents reviewed

Key publicly available official disaster-related policies and strategies include:

- **Current national DRR strategy:** 2015 Plan Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres 2015–2025 (PNGRD, 2016).
- The 2014 National Policy for Disaster Risk Management (Government of Colombia, 2015b).
- Law 1523 (2012), which mandates local authorities to undertake a range of DRR actions.
- Law 4147 (2011), which established the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (UNGRD).

Colombia has long invested in DRR. The Nevado del Ruiz disasters in 1985, a volcanic eruption

that triggered a mudflow avalanche killing 25,000 people in the town of Armero, began Colombia's commitment to DRR (Ramirez and Zeiderman, 2010). In 1989, the government established the National System for Prevention and Attention to Disaster (SNPAD) through Law 46 of 1988, and regulated its structure and organisation under Decree 919 the following year (Ramirez and Zeiderman, 2010; Zeiderman, 2012). The institutional framework for DRR was redesigned following the La Niña disaster with Law 1523 in 2012 (GFDRR, 2014) and the National Policy for Disaster Risk Management 2015–2025. Law 1523 mandates local authorities to undertake natural hazard and risk identification and to take the findings into consideration in land-use plans. The law also includes the continuation of emergency mechanisms and data collection down to the local level, supported by the Sistema Nacional la Gestión del Riesgo en Desastres (SNGRD) and the Fondo Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (FNGRD). The 2015 Plan Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres 2015–2025 (PNGRD) is delivered by the UNGRD (Government of Colombia, 2015b). These policy frameworks have been integrated into broader national development efforts under the National Development Plan 2014–2018 (Government of Colombia, 2015a).

Summary of findings

While Colombia has an advanced institutional framework for DRR, a number of disaster-related vulnerabilities remain. Factors such as poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, conflict-related displacement from rural to urban areas and rapid changes in land use have created and/or amplified the magnitude of disasters and their impacts. A number of these vulnerabilities, including conflict impacts, are not mentioned in the DRR strategy or policy framework. There is no specific guidance in the documents reviewed on how to undertake DRR actions in conflict-affected contexts, and no mention is made of conflict sensitivity or Do No Harm.

The PNDGR defines vulnerability as the physical, economic, social, environmental or institutional susceptibility of a community to the adverse effects of hazards on people and livelihoods, and acknowledges poverty as the

main vulnerability factor in the country (28.5% of the population live in poverty, and 8.1% in extreme poverty) (Government of Colombia, 2015b). Beyond this, the primary DRR documents examined in this review do not make direct links between decades of armed conflict and increased disaster vulnerability. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) (2017) notes that the conflict has contributed to environmental degradation, for example from the unregulated exploitation of natural resources, the cultivation of illicit crops and deforestation, but these issues are not mentioned in the formal policy architecture. A World Bank analysis of DRR in Colombia points to population growth in urban centres, linked to rapid and unplanned urbanisation and forced displacement, as another vulnerability factor (Campos et al., 2012). People displaced by conflict often live in vulnerable areas highly exposed to hazards, particularly landslides. The World Bank's analysis provides guidance on avoiding conflict over land, but does not link this to overall conflict dynamics in the country.

Conclusion

The relationships between disaster and conflict in Colombia are diverse, complex and dynamic. The implications of conflict are obvious: it limits access, undermines effective implementation, disrupts livelihoods, causes displacement and exacerbates environmental degradation. The effects of disasters may also feed grievances and make people more likely to join armed groups. For example, farmers facing unsustainable production and climate conditions are left with a choice between moving to a city or joining a local armed group (Wilches-Chaux, 2016). Adding conflict as a driving factor of risk would acknowledge that conflict-affected people are disproportionately vulnerable to disaster – but would also link responses to conflict to the pursuit of DRR, which is politically problematic in Colombia (see Siddiqi et al., 2019). That said, ways could be found to enable more targeted responses informed by a deeper understanding of vulnerabilities linked to disasters, conflict and displacement, recognising that efforts to protect citizens from natural hazards could help to rebuild the social contract in marginalised localities.

3.3.4 Country case: Haiti

Context

Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere, ranked 168th in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2017). High levels of political instability and violence (including riots and street protests), high rates of violent crime and frequent disasters dramatically reduce development gains (UNDP, 2017). Haiti is highly exposed to hydrometeorological (hurricanes, high winds, excess rainfall, landslides, flooding) and geological (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis) hazards, with over 93% of its territory and more than 96% of its population at risk of two or more hazards (World Bank, 2015). Between 1971 and 2015, Haiti was subject to disasters almost every year, and nearly 75% of households are economically impacted by at least one shock annually (World Bank, 2015). The earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010 was catastrophic, killing an estimated 220,000–313,000 people. In October 2016, Hurricane Matthew struck Haiti's south-west coast, affecting more than 2 million people, or about 20% of the country's population.

Although Haiti has developed little official legislation for disaster risk reduction and management, the national emergency response, contingency and recovery plans – in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake and a cholera outbreak in 2013 – are considered important foundations with clear structures for operations and coordination at each devolved level of governance. The Haitian Civil Protection Agency (DPC) is key to disaster risk management, though it has existed without a proper legal mandate since its inception. Regional approaches, such as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDEMA), are also important to Haiti's DRR efforts. Despite progress towards DRR in Haiti since 2005, further advances are likely to be impeded without stronger and more formal legal and institutional frameworks and mechanisms in place (IFRC, 2015).

DRR documents reviewed

Key publicly available official disaster-related policies and strategies include:

- **Current national DRR strategy:** the Plan National de Gestion des Risques et Désastres (PNGRD) (2001).
- National Contingency Plan (2013).
- Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (2010).
- The Plan National de Réponse aux Urgences (PNRU) (2001, updated in 2009).

The most recent version of the PNRU focuses on emergency response, and sets out the steps to follow during and after a crisis. For example, it describes how different institutions should coordinate the response, manage donations and maintain order and security. The PNGRD highlights the hazards, vulnerabilities and risks Haiti faces, and describes risk management efforts according to the phases of the disaster management cycle: prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. However, its focus is mainly on prevention.

Following the 2010 earthquake, the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (2010) sets out priorities for ‘rebuilding’ infrastructure and hardware. The plan mentions violence prevention and the exploitation of marginalised individuals, but does not assess the relationship between hazard vulnerabilities and risk governance, resource distribution and human security. A National Contingency Plan in 2013 provided a detailed analysis of vulnerable zones in each department, institutional capacity, needs, strengths and weaknesses of the DPC and provisional national budgets. However, it was limited to shorter-term needs in the context of hydro-meteorological hazards, rather than encompassing a more comprehensive multi-hazard approach, and was not integrated with actionable DRR programmes or activities.

Summary of findings

The PNGRD highlights the wide range of vulnerabilities affecting Haiti. Poverty is the primary risk driver, according to the PNGRD, followed by political and institutional factors, including instability and a lack of coordination between relevant institutions. While the 2001 plan acknowledges that the country is affected by frequent episodes of political instability, there is no mention of armed violence as a factor driving

vulnerability for some sections of society. It is also not clear to what extent DRR should be pursued during a political crisis, and if so how.

The PNRU does not draw any systematic links between conflict and disaster vulnerability; while it makes a distinction between war and peace, it only describes emergency response in the context of peace. The document highlights the importance of conflict resolution during disasters and their aftermath to ensure that people do not resort to violence to redress grievances. The role of the police in preventing riots during disasters is also mentioned.

Conclusion

The main documents governing DRR in Haiti make scant reference to violent conflict and political instability, and it is not clear how armed conflict changes the way disaster management is undertaken in the country, or how violence is increasing vulnerability to disasters. While there is evidence that insecurity complicates implementation of DRR measures (Dandoy, 2013), this is not documented or considered in official documents. There is little explanation of how best to implement DRR in a context affected by political instability and widespread violence. A more holistic understanding of intersecting risks, including violent conflict and disasters, could improve the context specificity of Haiti’s DRR policies. This should be a consideration in the event Haiti updates or creates new policy instruments for DRR.

3.3.5 Country case: Liberia

Context

Liberia has a long history of violent social conflict, inequality and marginalisation stemming from its experiences under colonial rule. Under the leadership of Charles Taylor, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) militia group invaded Liberia in 1989, sparking 14 years of civil war from 1989–2003. Around 250,000 people were killed and a million displaced (Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2009). All sides committed atrocities and acts of horrific violence against civilians (Vinck et al., 2011). The civil war included the widespread abuse of and violence against children, including

the use of approximately 15,000 child soldiers (IRIN, 2003; Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2009), and extensive gender-based and sexual violence as a tactic of war, with an estimated 40,000 victims of wartime rape (UN, 2014).

The long-term effects of the conflict have contributed to the fragility and vulnerability of social and natural systems (Stanturf et al., 2015). Institutions and physical and social infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the war are still being rebuilt or recreated, and corruption, abuse of power and low functionality affect all branches of government (EEAS, 2018). Access to services such as electricity, water and sanitation is low, and the country suffers from high levels of extreme poverty. Gender-based and sexual violence remains widespread, discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community is institutionalised through the criminalisation of same-sex sexual activity, and human rights violations during the war are treated with impunity (Amnesty International, 2018). Classified as a least-developed, low-income country, Liberia is a destination, origin and host country for refugees.

Liberia is affected by a range of hazards, including extreme temperatures, floods and storms. Food insecurity is another concern. The country was severely affected by the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014–15, with disproportionate impacts in areas most heavily involved in the conflict (McPake et al., 2015).

DRR documents reviewed

Key publicly available official disaster-related policies and strategies include:

- **Current national DRR strategy:** The National Disaster Management Agency of Liberia (NDMA) has drafted a National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction 2016–2021, but this is not publicly available.
- The National Policy and Response Strategy on Climate Change (2018).
- The National Disaster Management Policy (2012).
- The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) (2008).

The NDMA is responsible for overseeing disaster risk reduction and management. The NDMA was established in law in 2012, along with a National Disaster Management Policy. By 2030, the NDMA seeks to have ‘established measures to effectively prevent and reduce the impact of and recover from human induced and natural hazards’.¹¹ Liberia has aligned itself with the Sendai Framework, with the Minister of Internal Affairs/Commissioner acting as focal point. One of the key challenges facing the NDMA is its lack of technical and financial resources and political support.

The upcoming National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction 2016–2021 was the result of a detailed Capacity Needs Assessment carried out by the Liberian government and UNDP. The assessment sought to review the effectiveness of the National Disaster Relief Commission (NDRC) and partner institutions at local and national levels; undertake an inventory and review national capacity development initiatives in DRR; and develop the national action plan to enhance implementation of DRR activities.

Summary of findings

The national policy documents reviewed all acknowledge to varying degrees how civil war has contributed to Liberia’s vulnerability to disasters through damage and destruction to the country’s social, political, economic and environmental landscape. The documents generally refer to the effects of the civil war in terms of large-scale displacement, increased environmental fragility, the destruction of physical infrastructure and decimation of health and education systems and damage to the economy and the agriculture sector. However, there is less discussion of the specific mechanisms that link civil war and disaster vulnerability (e.g. *how* the loss of physical and social infrastructure leads to disaster vulnerability). One exception is the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) of 2008, which states that the loss of

11 See <http://ndmaliberia.org/mission/>.

meteorological and hydrological monitoring systems during the war has prevented the country from collecting data and distributing information and forecasts to enable farmers and others whose livelihoods depend on natural resources from making optimal decisions, in turn undermining the country's adaptive capacity.

The policy documents also make little mention of – or display much concern about – current violence or conflict risk in the country leading to disaster vulnerability, referring only to the impacts of historical conflict. None of the documents contain mention of political fragility or instability, nor do they acknowledge that the process of rebuilding social and physical infrastructure in the post-war period may also contribute to disaster vulnerability. Again, the only exception is the NAPA, which states that the current security situation (i.e. in 2008) presents a risk to successful implementation.

The policy documents contain very little description of how disaster can lead to conflict or violence, with the notable exception of the National Disaster Management Policy, which points to the need to prevent and stop violence against women and other vulnerable groups

during disasters and crises, and includes in its policy principles the importance of developing women's networks and institutions for conflict prevention during disasters, DRR and post-disaster reconstruction. However, the potential for disaster to lead to other types of violence or social conflict is absent from this and the other policy documents, and the role of national and local governments in preventing violence is not addressed. Principles of Do No Harm, conflict-sensitive approaches and conflict prevention and peacebuilding within DRR are also not referred to in these documents.

Conclusion

Policy documents acknowledge how social conflict has contributed to vulnerability to disaster and climate change across the country. However, the references to violent conflict are largely historical (i.e. the civil war), and do not reflect a proactive risk management approach to the interrelationship between social conflict and violence and disasters. As Liberia continues to build the strength and capacity of its institutions, it will be necessary to acknowledge and address the challenges it faces as a post-conflict country.

4 Tools and technical frameworks

The previous chapter looked at the extent to which issues of conflict are reflected in DRR strategies and related policy documents, and whether this is adequate for guiding the implementation of DRR in contexts of violent conflict. This chapter extends this line of enquiry by asking the same question of a sub-set of tools and technical frameworks for DRR. Do they fare any better than formal DRR strategies at the international, regional and national scale?

A review of 24 mainstream DRR and disaster resilience toolkits (Peters, 2017: 26) found that: ‘eight of the toolkits did not significantly engage with or discuss conflict, 12 encouraged engagement in conflict management activities, 10 encouraged engagement in conflict resolution, and nine toolkits encouraged either indirect or direct involvement of DRR practitioners in peacebuilding activities’. While there was an intention that DRR interventions engage with conflict, there was also inconsistency in the extent to which issues of conflict and related conditions are incorporated in DRR toolkits, and a neglect of common principles and approaches widely regarded as necessary to ensure that aid interventions avoid causing harm: ‘only seven of the toolkits encouraged the incorporation of conflict sensitivity, and even fewer (five) explicitly advocated the Do No Harm principles’ (Peters, 2017: 26).

This chapter reviews selected DRR tools and technical frameworks to shed light on the extent to which they account for conditions of violence, conflict, fragility and insecurity in their operational context; prescribe different courses of action in relation to different states of violence, conflict, fragility and insecurity; provide guidance on operational delivery (staff safety, protection of the intervention); and offer advice on navigating the challenges of conflict

to achieve disaster resilience outcomes for target populations. Practical constraints related to the time investment and scope of the research mean the review is intentionally selective. In the future, the intention is to extend the review and develop guidance on how DRR tools and technical frameworks can be harnessed, enhanced and adapted to become more viable for conditions of conflict.

4.1 Mainstreaming DRR

Recognition that development processes can increase vulnerability and exposure to hazards has led to the development of specific actions and approaches to manage disaster risk. Since the late 1990s, this has often taken the form of ‘mainstreaming’ DRR into development programming. Mainstreaming aims to ‘consider and address risks emanating from natural hazards in medium-term strategic frameworks and institutional structures, in country and sectoral strategies and policies and in the design of individual projects in hazard-prone countries’ (Benson et al., 2007: 1). Changes can be related to policy, institutional functioning or processes and procedures. As an example, the ProVention project Tools for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction, a major mainstreaming initiative, published a series of 14 guidance notes aimed at supporting development organisations to mainstream DRR in hazard-prone countries (Benson et al., 2007).

A substantial number of DRR tools, approaches and technical frameworks have been developed over the years, some focusing on specific aspects of disaster risk management (e.g. risk mitigation, preparedness, response), others focusing on specific sectors (e.g. water

and sanitation, health, shelter) or specific groups within society (e.g. children and young people, people with disabilities) and others tailored to specific organisations. International NGOs have commissioned toolkits to facilitate mainstreaming in ways that speak to their organisational policies, practices and ways of working.¹²

Here we examine two different DRR processes: the Disaster Recovery Framework (DRF) and Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (VCA). The former is a focused approach applied specifically to post-disaster recovery planning and implementation. The latter comprises a variety of tools and methods in widespread use by many different kinds of agency for more than two decades, particularly in project design.

4.2 The Disaster Recovery Framework

The *Guide to developing disaster recovery frameworks* (commonly known as the DRF Guide) was launched by GFDRR in 2014, in partnership with the EU, UNDP and the World Bank. The DRF is intended to assist governments and partner agencies to deliver effective and efficient post-disaster recovery, providing guidance on key planning and decision-making processes for recovery policies and programmes, based on some sort of assessment (such as a Post Disaster Needs Assessment). GFDRR stresses that it is important for the DRF to be government-led, and as such is not fundamentally a tool for NGOs. The DRF Guide offers a flexible methodology that national institutions can adapt to their own context. It is based on lessons from country experiences (in Bangladesh, Haiti, Laos, Mozambique, Pakistan, the Philippines, Senegal and Yemen) and good practice from around the world, as well as extensive stakeholder consultation. It is based around six ‘modules’ for designing and implementing recovery plans.

The DRF is distinctive among technical documents in its relatively strong awareness of the potential for conflict escalation, in this case

in recovery planning and processes, though only one paragraph in the DRF Guide is actually dedicated to conflict. Even so, conflict is clearly identified as a primary concern in designing recovery strategies and deciding priorities, and a planned revision is intended to strengthen guidance in conflict-affected contexts.¹³ Recovery actions are expected to contribute to conflict prevention, stability and peacebuilding.

The DRF conceptualises conflict as both an external process (recovery in areas already conflict-affected) and an internal one (divisions and tensions arising from recovery plans and implementation). There is a two-way relationship between intervention and conflict. Recovery actions in conflict contexts may be affected by the conflict itself, but action in a conflict-affected setting may well have an impact on the conflict. The concern of recovery planners should therefore be ensuring that their intervention does not exacerbate conflict tensions, but helps reduce them by reducing inequalities and bridging social divisions. It is essential for participating agencies to understand conflict contexts, drivers and dynamics, and act on the results of this analysis by building in appropriate provisions and activities at the planning stage, or adjusting existing, ongoing interventions.

The DRF states explicitly that recovery processes must have a conflict-sensitive perspective to be effective, and acknowledges that recovery is usually initiated and regulated by central government (sometimes through newly created recovery agencies) and often constrained by sectoral concerns. It also recognises the need for equitable and responsive recovery across affected districts and communities, and for clear priorities to promote conflict-sensitive, pro-poor, pro-vulnerable and gender-sensitive recovery. Recovery planning should include multiple stakeholders in consultative processes across affected locations, sectors and social groups to gain support for and acceptance of recovery plans. Community participation is seen as fundamental to ensure local acceptance and ownership of recovery efforts and their long-term

12 For example, see Action Aid: www.actionaidindia.org/disaster-risk-reduction-tools/.

13 Communication between the authors and the World Bank.

sustainability. Impartiality and equity – not taking sides, and ensuring that all sides in a conflict receive fair treatment – are central to the DRF approach.

On paper, the effort made to explicitly consider conflict conditions and dynamics is noteworthy. However, of the eight country case studies, most have little to say about conflict. The study of the 2010 Haiti earthquake does not discuss violence, conflict, gangs or security issues, although it does acknowledge the country's complicated political history. While the study of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake does not refer to wider social tensions and conflict, it does note the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA)'s judicious use of recovery grants to reduce inequities and reduce and manage conflicts and grievances. A study of long-term recovery from a tropical storm in Yemen in 2008 highlights the challenges that recovery institutions face when dealing with disaster events in a country with high levels of political, security, demographic and socioeconomic challenges. It notes how post-disaster recovery planning and funding efforts stalled as a result of wider instability that accompanied protests and unrest in the country and throughout the Middle East and North Africa from 2011. Yemen's worsening security environment prevented the completion of reconstruction and recovery initiatives, and donor funding ceased.

A joint GFDRR, World Bank Group, EU and UNDP thematic study of recovery in conflict contexts identifies problems arising from attempts to establish standard policies and procedures, rather than adapting to specific, sometimes unique, local characteristics and contexts. The study, which includes a detailed case study of recovery in Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami, also suggests that recovery frameworks may potentially use the opportunity created by disaster to contribute to peacebuilding. Country-level Disaster Recovery Frameworks have been produced using the DRF Guide methodology for Nepal (after the 2015 earthquakes, where GFDRR provided technical assistance to the government for the Post Disaster Needs Assessment, recovery planning and the establishment of a reconstruction

authority), Fiji (Tropical Storm Winston, 2016) and Malawi (2015 floods). These do not address conflict, though the Nepal recovery framework identifies violence against women and children as an important issue.

4.3 Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment

VCAs originated in the 1980s alongside broader efforts to better understand crisis situations and improve the developmental impact of emergency aid (Anderson and Woodrow, 1998). The approach is widely used by many different agencies, particularly NGOs, in development, DRR, response and recovery programming. This discussion is based on a review of a representative sample of more than 50 VCA tools, reports and associated publications since the 1990s.

VCAs enable users to identify and assess a range of threats and vulnerabilities, and to understand and evaluate household, community and organisational capacities to withstand them. Although agencies use a wide variety of VCA methodologies adapted to their own interests and ways of working, nearly all VCA implementation guidelines emphasise the need to be flexible and adaptable to local conditions. Most VCAs focus at the local or community levels, and use participatory approaches for data collection and community engagement. Many approaches and methods are derived from the IFRC's pioneering VCA toolbox (IFRC, 1996).

VCA tools are designed to be applied in many different kinds of hazard, disaster and crisis. In practice, they tend to focus on events triggered by natural hazards, but many identify other hazard types, including technological hazards, conflict and violence. There is widespread recognition in VCAs of the multi-causality of disasters through the interaction of different types of threat (e.g. environmental degradation coupled with drought and internal conflict, climate change intensifying environmental degradation, water scarcity and food insecurity). Conflict has long been seen as an underlying cause of vulnerability in VCA guidance (e.g. Heijmans and Victoria, 2001). None of the guidance reviewed provides a thorough taxonomy of forms of conflict, violence

and insecurity, although some more recent guides are starting to look at this more systematically.¹⁴ Only one of the methods reviewed, the Turkana WESCOORD Task Force VCA tool and guidelines, focused specifically on conflict-affected contexts (Turkana WESCOORD Task Force, n.d.). Some recent VCA models suggest the use of specific tools to analyse power, conflict and protection issues, and these can be applied in zones of insecurity and conflict. Resilience also features more strongly in some recent tools, which seek to offer ways to understand complex systems of risk, including interactions between sub-components of risk and relationships with different systems and risk factors.

The word ‘security’ features in many VCA guides, but is interpreted in different ways and is rarely discussed. Implicitly, security is sometimes treated as the opposite of vulnerability. Few VCAs use the term in a general sense, but apply it to specific aspects, particularly food security and conflict, and sometimes social security. Similarly, ‘fragility’ tends to be applied to the state of the local environment or economy rather than to governance and politics. ActionAid’s PVA (2005) is the only model to use human security as a framing for rights-based analysis of the links between vulnerability, power, rights and freedoms.

VCAs usually adopt participatory methods. These are also sometimes used to prevent or resolve local conflicts (e.g. participatory mapping of natural resources, used alongside a suite of other actions, can help to identify ownership, rights and resource management responsibilities, which in turn has the potential to head off conflicts over issues of access, distribution and conservation). Participatory tools have the potential to identify hazard exposure, risks and vulnerabilities (through mapping, transect walks, seasonal calendars, timelines) as well as sources of conflict and tension in communities (through focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, scenario planning). Participatory tools in VCA can also identify ‘enablers’ and ‘dividers’

within communities. The use of a variety of research methods is sometimes advocated to avoid bias and reduce the risk of conflict. Participatory VCA methods are sometimes used in situations of tension or instability (e.g. Oxfam in Mindanao: see de Dios, 2002), but it is more usual for guidance to advise against assessment teams putting themselves at risk. The use of secondary data may be suggested in such cases.

Community-based disaster management approaches generally assume a degree of consensus within communities, but this may be difficult to achieve in situations of underlying instability or conflict. VCA guidance almost always recognises that there will be divisions within and between communities. It also states the need to understand these divisions and the factors behind them. Some guidance puts more explicit emphasis on social inequalities, exclusion and power dynamics (e.g. ActionAid’s PVA), and there is a general awareness that VCA can strengthen community relationships or cause tension between different groups where contested issues are revealed or discussed. Guidance generally acknowledges the need for trust between assessment teams and community actors, sensitivity training for assessment teams in handling difficult topics and the importance of neutrality and good facilitation to ensure that different voices are heard and to address potential conflicts that may surface during the assessment and planning process. Guidance is usually alert to the operational risks to community DRR programmes and personnel in areas of social tension or conflict.

Some guidance asserts that preventing or reducing social tension should not be separated from DRR, even arguing that CBDM, by reducing community vulnerability, can contribute to community cohesion (e.g. IFRC, 2006). However, there is a reluctance to apply or adapt VCA to conflict resolution.¹⁵ It is more usual for VCA guidance to advise the application of

14 For example see GOAL (2016); BRACED Myanmar Alliance (n.d.).

15 One of the methods studied, World Vision’s COVACA, uses a combination of DRR, CCA and conflict-sensitivity tools, though it is not clear how this works in practice.

separate conflict reduction or peace-building tools and approaches to resolve such issues.¹⁶ Most approaches can be used to address potentially contentious local issues such as natural resource management, but they are not well-suited to engage with conflict resulting from underlying political or ethnic divisions, or with larger-scale conflicts.

VCA guidance seeks to be applicable to both rural and urban contexts. In practice, it is based on rural field experience and with rural communities principally in mind, although greater attention is now being given to the distinctiveness of urban physical, socioeconomic and political-institutional environments and relationships when conducting VCA, including

urban violence, gangs and criminality (a good example is IFRC, 2014). VCA approaches that are specific to particular urban contexts can reveal otherwise unseen dynamics and incidents of violence (ibid.: 58).

More research is needed to assess how well formal guidance and recommendations in VCA guides are translated into practice. The IFRC's online repository (vcarepository.info) of VCA reports has examples from conflict-affected contexts which demonstrate how VCAs can be used to identify and examine conflict and related issues, and a number of reports are available from NGOs and UN agencies, though these have not been collated in a way that allows for readily available comparison.

16 See IFRC guidance on the Red Cross Better Programming Initiative methodology and Canadian Red Cross guidance on preventing violence in disasters. Tearfund suggests using the ROOTS book *Peace-building within our communities* (Blackman, 2003).

5 What to do with conflict? Discussion and recommendations

Four years into the 15-year implementation period of the Sendai Framework, the first test for the international community comes in 2020 with the Target E deadline to ‘Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies’. Countries often labelled as fragile or conflict-affected typically have lower coverage of DRR strategies – and even less likelihood of implementation, for a whole variety of reasons – and so research has focused on contexts which experience violent conflict, where achieving change is both most pressing and most difficult. This review of DRR strategies in conflict-affected contexts seeks to contribute to the measurement of baselines for Target E, while the assessment of *whether* and *to what extent* issues of conflict are considered within those strategies aims to highlight examples for other conflict-affected contexts as they devise or update their DRR strategies.

Increasing the number of DRR strategies is an important first step towards institutionalising DRR and approaching the reduction of disaster risk coherently across levels and sectors, but when archetypal strategies correspond to peaceful and stable societies, they may be of little use for contexts affected by conflict. The content and delivery of DRR strategies determines how they will actually go on to reduce the human and material costs of disasters.

This research takes Target E as the entry point to investigate one key part of the risk governance landscape – DRR strategies – to see whether they offer an opportunity to address criticisms around deficiencies in how DRR is designed and implemented for and in

conflict contexts (Peters, 2018; Siddiqi, 2018). Any reference to conflict, however brief, in DRR strategies at national and regional level is the result of individuals and governments championing its inclusion, in reflection of their specific contextual needs. It is certainly not a reflection of a top-down or normative directive, given that the Sendai Framework does not mention conflict or related terms.

The research found no clear patterns in when or how DRR strategies consider conflict, nor are there clear connections between policy levels. Conflict is not explicitly considered in global frameworks, and at regional and sub-regional levels there is significant variation in how conflict is addressed. Africa tends to have the most consistent and sophisticated treatment of conflict in regional strategies, while the topic is not central in Asia and the Arab region. The research also found that regional strategies do not necessarily determine how national strategies are formulated in terms of how conflict is addressed (though the research did not intend to contrast national to regional scale). For example, while Liberia’s national strategy acknowledges the legacy of the civil war on the country’s meteorological and hydrological monitoring systems, Chad lacks national-level DRR strategies altogether. While the tools and technical frameworks reviewed occasionally acknowledged the mutually reinforcing relationship between disaster and conflict from a vulnerability perspective, that understanding has largely not translated into clear guidance for integrating conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive approaches into DRF or VCA processes or programming approaches.

Why is conflict still under-represented in DRR strategies, tools and technical frameworks? This is at odds with the evidence that disasters and conflict collide on a regular basis in many countries (OECD, 2018; Peters and Peters, 2018; Peters, 2018; Siddiqi, 2018). Interviews and meetings with government, UN and NGO representatives, including at the 2018 Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction and the 2018 Africa–Arab Regional Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction, point to an urgent need for DRR to be enacted in contexts affected by conflict. We suggest four explanations to account for this absence, and propose several ways to address it.

First, we need to challenge perceptions that conflict is ‘too political’ to be included in DRR strategies. The introduction of the term conflict and related terms (armed conflict, violence, etc.) in DRR dialogues can be seen as politically complicated by governments or UN convening bodies such as UNDRR (Peters, 2017). These terms are often perceived as better placed in other policy forums with a specific related mandate, such as regional peace and security dialogues, or in discussions on Sustainable Development Goal 16 to promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.¹⁷ However, where conflict fundamentally forms part of the construction of disaster risk or seriously impacts on DRR strategies and action, leaving issues surrounding conflict to other sectors may not be satisfactory. It may be essential to address conflict or the impacts of conflict in official DRR strategies and implementation plans to improve their quality and effectiveness. Governments and the international community alike are missing the point of attaining Target E if strategies are unlikely to be effective in reducing disaster risk in some contexts. State of the art DRR that seeks to address complex risk in conflict contexts may need to enter into realms previously considered ‘too political’ and to do so by considering conflict dynamics.

More research is needed to articulate and promote the benefits of integrating considerations

of conflict in DRR strategies, tools and technical frameworks – to work with those governments and regional bodies that do articulate this link, and to downplay the perceived political costs that governments and international agencies often allude to. Documenting cases of countries that have included reference to violent conflict in their DRR legislation, and highlighting how it alters and potentially increases the quality and results of DRR efforts, may help persuade governments of the benefits of such an approach.

Second, consideration should be given to how violent conflict may be addressed by DRR strategies, even in informal or implicit ways. Policy-makers, practitioners and government agencies may have informally discussed the challenges conditions of violent conflict present, but decide not to explicitly articulate conflict dynamics in DRR strategies and related policy documents. For example, some countries in the Arab region are reluctant to disclose data on conflict or natural hazards for security reasons. That said, conflict might, and should, still be taken into consideration indirectly through concepts such as vulnerability, exposure, resilience and capacities. This may be a more politically palatable route or starting point for some governments. A first step is to ensure that conflict dynamics are included in vulnerability assessments – using politically palatable wording – so that a deeper and more accurate picture of risk profiles can be developed from which to take decisions about prioritisation of resources for DRR actions.

Third, rectify the fact that there is insufficient guidance to help decision-makers gauge the extent to which DRR strategies, tools and technical frameworks could interact with and affect conflict dynamics. Regardless of whether conflict is explicit or implicit, agencies and actors need to think and act differently in conflict contexts to ensure that, at a minimum, they Do No Harm and, some would argue, ideally support conditions for peace or conflict prevention. Adaptations to disaster response have been made in humanitarian response, including

17 For more information, see: www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/.

conflict sensitivity and in the Sphere standards,¹⁸ but little has been done on ex-ante DRR. Only with a more robust evidence base will it be possible to draft guidance for decision-makers to consider how DRR strategies and approaches can include working on and/or in conflict.

Finally, in the absence of a suite of DRR strategies, tools and technical frameworks for handling different forms of conflict, create a set of templates which governments and agencies can consider, emulate or adapt. There is a conspicuous lack of DRR strategies that are consciously tailored to violent conflict contexts or that integrate disaster and conflict risk reduction, and there are few examples for policy-makers to draw on. However, there is increased attention from donors on the need to provide development assistance in situations of fragility and violent conflict. The major donor countries, the UN and the World Bank have all reaffirmed their commitment to the prevention of armed conflict and disasters, particularly in the most fragile regions, and DRR has a central role to play in this new development landscape. However, ex-ante DRR has mostly been developed and applied in peaceful countries, and few DRR strategies, tools or frameworks systematically consider conflict dynamics. This is despite the fact that – as the national cases above show – strategies are intended to be implemented in contexts of violent conflict. This limited experience provides few tools and methodologies that agencies interested in integrating conflict into their DRR strategies can draw on. This needs to be rectified.

Consideration of violent conflict and DRR strategies, tools and technical frameworks brings the ‘political’ back into discussions on DRR, which have arguably become increasingly technical, or rather technocratic (Siddiqi, 2018; Galliard, 2018). To harness the potential for a more political DRR discourse and action, we need to first understand:

- the extent to which formal and/or explicit recognition of ‘conflict’ in DRR strategies helps or hinders progress on DRR in violent

conflict contexts. Does inclusion lead to changes in the design and delivery of implementation approaches? If so, how?

- what options exist to present issues of conflict in politically sensitive and diplomatic ways? How can this be utilised to deepen understanding and strengthen action on the interaction of conflict and disaster vulnerabilities, especially with governments?
- do particular contexts lend themselves more readily to DRR beyond Do No Harm approaches and conflict sensitivity? How can we gauge when DRR strategies and actions could be effective vehicles for advancing conflict prevention ambitions? Could DRR strategies in such contexts be strengthened through explicit links with formal and informal conflict prevention efforts?
- what could conflict-sensitive DRR entail, and what criteria should be used to evaluate if DRR strategies and actions are ‘adequately’ conflict sensitive? What evidence can be used to develop guiding principles, and which actors should be involved in developing this normative stance?
- what is the relationship between recognition of conflict in DRR strategies from the sub-national to regional or national level? What are the implications of this – are spaces opened up for discussion on conflict in regional or international forums, or do regional convening spaces prevent a more nuanced discussion of the challenges conflict presents to designing and delivering DRR strategies? Which level of governance is most likely to lead to innovation?
- violent conflict is dynamic. History shows that DRR actions are often paused or ceased when violent conflict is such that individuals and agencies deem it unfeasible to pursue implementation and/or policy reform. What can we learn from past experiences about how to continue DRR work by adapting to these challenges? What are the barriers to restarting these efforts – and what are the implications for achieving the Targets A through E of the Sendai Framework in the timeframe laid down?

18 For more information see www.spherestandards.org/.

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Annex 1 GFDRR Disaster Recovery Frameworks reviewed

We only include a sub-set of conflict-affected country studies. There are also country studies for Senegal, Nepal (formerly conflict-affected), Malawi, Mozambique (formerly conflict-affected), Bangladesh and Philippines (Typhoon Yolanda, which didn't affect Mindanao).

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Annex 2 List of VCA, risk assessment and other DRR planning tools reviewed

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