



Annotated  
bibliography

# The use of community- based targeting in low- and middle- income countries

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September 2012



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# Introduction

This annotated bibliography was commissioned and financed by the Social Protection and Labour Unit of the World Bank in 2012. A modified systematic review process was adopted to identify literature addressing the performance of community-based targeting (CBT)

approaches in the implementation of social protection programmes in the Global South. A total of 131 documents were identified in the review process. These are listed in the bibliography below, and the annotated bibliography which follows.

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# Annotated Bibliography

## 1. Adato, M. and Haddad, L. 2002, "Targeting Poverty through Community- Based Public Works Programmes: Experience from South Africa," *Journal of Development Studies*.

This article analyses the targeting effectiveness of seven labour intensive public works programmes, based on the National Public Works Programme (NPWP), targeted to the poor in Western Cape Province and examines the role of the different actors involved including government, CBOs, trade unions and private sector. The study uses mixed method research, both quantitative and qualitative, and economic and sociological perspectives. In a context of high unemployment and high infrastructural needs with

limited resources, the targeting criteria have become a highly contested debate. Part of the process takes place as self-selection but most of the time there are more people desiring to work than jobs available. CBOs often take the role of distributing limited jobs since projects are required to have community participation and community members are seen as the most appropriate for this role.

The selection methods vary from putting names in a hat, in a list or through interviews but all selection criteria had been decided at a public meeting. As result, community members feel they are making equitable decisions based on need and they feel more satisfied by a random selection rather than a targeted one. Community members also see it



as equitable to give jobs to people involved in community activities. The main advantages of this method are: 1) local people know who is poor within the community; 2) they consider other community priorities; and 3) there is an educational process on how to manage a decision-making forum. Nevertheless, selection through communities can bring significant risks: excluded or dissatisfied community members can disrupt the projects and there is potential for conflict within the community when deciding priorities and outcomes, especially in the South African case given historical biases against employing women in construction works. In conclusion, communities are in the best position to allocate resources. However, to counterbalance the possible risks mentioned in the study, community participation mechanisms need to be transparent, accountable, and open to participation from outsiders.

**2. Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. and Tobias, J. 2011, "Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," Draft Paper, May.**

This study shows the results of an experiment in 640 Indonesian villages on three different approaches to target the poor: proxy-means tests (PMT), community targeting and a hybrid. The study evaluates both which method best targeted the poor based on consumption-based poverty and which method produced the highest satisfaction from the point of view of beneficiaries. The authors use randomized evaluation techniques to compare PMT targeting with methodologies that consider different degrees of community involvement in the targeting decision. The authors first compare how the methods perform from the perspective of the central government and then, in order to understand the different performance of other methods, the authors investigate their trade-offs along four dimensions: elite capture, the role of effort, differences in information, and different conceptions of poverty.

The results show that community targeting did not perform better than PMT based on consumption, however it resulted in higher satisfaction and greater legitimacy. Community targeting showed 60 per cent fewer complaints than the PMT and there were fewer difficulties in distributing the funds in the community. Indeed, villagers suggested fewer modifications to the beneficiary list when asked about the targeting results.

The study evaluates four more dimensions: elite capture, community effort, local concepts of poverty and information. There was no evidence of elite capture or that households related to the elites are more likely to receive benefits. Effort is an important factor, at the start of the community meetings the targeting performed better than in the PMT but it worsens as the meeting continues. Communities showed a different understanding of poverty than per capita consumption which can explain the greater satisfaction levels

with community targeting. Overall, results can be generalized in this case since they are similar in both urban and rural locations, in villages with greater or less inequality and with greater or lower levels of social connectedness.

**3. Alderman, H. 2002, "Do local officials know something we don't? Decentralization of targeted transfers in Albania," Journal of Public Economics.**

This study examines the attempt of the Albanian government to devolve responsibility for a social assistance programme to local authorities. This programme is the Ndihme Ekonomika (NE, meaning economic support in Albanian) which was designed to support urban families with no other source of income as well as rural families with small landholdings. The article addresses the question of whether local officials have access to information on household welfare that is unavailable to central authorities and whether they use this information. The author uses data from a 1996 household survey that was explicitly designed to assess both the targeting efficiency of the program and its flexibility under different regulations. The study tests the statistical significance of information additional to that contained in a set of indicators of welfare originally used to determine program eligibility. There are three steps to the commune's allocation process. First, families apply to the commune's office of social assistance. The programme administrator (an official paid by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection) then draws up a list of eligible recipients and estimates household needs according to its size and landholding, as well as whether household members earn a wage or receive a pension. Finally, the elected commune council determines the allocation for each household which may change from month to month based both on new information as well as the total received from the centre.

The results show that practically half of the poorest families received some assistance from the NE programme at the time of the survey. In contrast, relatively few well-off households received assistance. Indeed, it is shown that local authorities appear to both have access to information that is not easily captured in household surveys and to use this information to allocate benefits among the households under their jurisdiction. On the other hand, there are still many poor people who are not covered by social assistance since the performance depends on the allocation from the centre. Moreover, in the absence of a transparent allocation procedure, the magnitude of grants reflects voting patterns. Finally, the study shows that the richer the community, the less social assistance is targeted to the poor. However, despite the poverty within communities that deliver social assistance in rural Albania they appear to have some ability to distinguish the relative need among their overall population.



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**4. Armstrong, D. 2007, “A Review of Social Assistance Grants in Swaziland: A CANGO/RHVP Case Study on Public Assistance in Swaziland,” Regional Hunger Vulnerability Programme.**

The author evaluates social assistance in Swaziland focusing on the Old Age Grant (OAG) and the Public Assistance Grant (PAG) which constitute the country's two largest cash-based social transfers. The OAG is provided for the elderly who are above the age of 60 and the PAG covers all vulnerable groups below the age of 60 who are not beneficiaries of any other grant or source of income, mainly destitute as well as people with disabilities. This report is based on a review of reports that have assessed the programme, newspaper articles, interviews with key informants and the results of the Ministry of Health & Social Welfare (MOHSW) which carried out a situation analysis survey on the plight of the elderly poor, registered the elderly and developed procedures for issuing the grant.

The OAG operates as a universal scheme to address income poverty among the elderly. The author points out that social assistance for the elderly is widely accessible in Swaziland due to the fact that the OAG is disbursed through community centres (Tinkhundla) and social welfare offices. Local Parliamentarians, Headmen and Rural Health Motivators (RHMs) are responsible for ensuring that the destitute elderly can access the grant. The application procedure for accessing the grant is through registration which is carried out in communities. New beneficiaries are submitted on an ongoing basis by Members of Parliament (MPs) and community leaders. The facilitating role of MPs, community leaders and Rural Health Motivators (RHMs) plays a crucial role in reducing access costs for the vulnerable. MPs and RHMs carry out home visits in their respective areas to register candidates who are eligible for the grant. The grants are disbursed at civic centres (Tinkhundla) which are within close proximity to homesteads as well as at regional welfare offices. However, since it is a universal scheme to which ‘everyone’ is potentially eligible, this has great appeal to the rural masses who constitute 70% of the populace. Moreover, the OAG also takes up the bulk of the department's manpower since Social Welfare Officers are reported to have been away from their offices for months on end, working in the field to prepare and pay out the grant to the detriment of efficient implementation of other grants.

The Public Assistance Grant (PAG) on the other hand operates as a targeted scheme aimed at meeting the needs of the vulnerable who are below the age of 60. The enforcement of its target beneficiaries is much more effective due to the use of a means test. However, the overwhelming levels of poverty whereby 69% of the population live below the poverty line is a clear indication that the Public Assistance Grant is excluding a significant proportion of its intended beneficiaries. The assessment is normally validated by anecdotal evidence from community workers such as rural health motivators (RHMs).

**5. Aryaratne, I. and Ferré, C. 2012 Samurdhi Disaster Management, Draft.**

This article evaluates how disaster-related contingency planning could be incorporated in Sri Lanka's largest social welfare programme, Samurdhi. This programme has the greatest potential in terms of outreach and capacity to reach the poor. It is well suited to reach not only the poor but also the vulnerable in case of disasters but it needs to improve the effectiveness of its targeting mechanism. Fourteen years after its creation, it remains a poorly targeted project: in 2000, from its cash and food stamp component it missed about 40 per cent of households ranked in the poorest consumption quintile, and almost 44 per cent of the total budget was spent on households from the top three quintiles. To improve its targeting performance the programme has been experimenting with a CBT strategy the results of which seem to be mixed. This method (The Family Classification Methodology, FCM) has proved to give better results than the previous one (which was based on the subjective judgement of the programme officer), and if implemented well it has the potential to properly allocate resources to the poor during times of disaster. FCM is a consultative process whereby people define their own welfare situation compared to that of all other households. The process is facilitated by a development officer or “Niyamaka” who is randomly appointed. Once the criteria have been agreed upon by the working group (formed by institutional and community stakeholders), a General Meeting (Jana Sabha) is held with the entire village and the basis for choosing these indicators is explained by the development officer. Once a consensus is reached with the audience, all families are ranked by order of wealth. The final ranking can be modified by any family through a system of appeals.

The results of the study are based on a household survey that was fielded between February and April 2009 in three villages that were both prone to disasters and had used the FCM to identify Samurdhi beneficiaries. The results of this study show that FCM, when correctly implemented, has good results at ranking households according to households' wealth. Afterwards, an exercise of a group discussion on a sample of three communities shows that the variables that were highly correlated with health status were: household size, household head education, household head gender, nature of latrines, and ownership of non-removable assets. The following observations were found: First, the FCM process has been conceptually well understood and could be implemented properly within the communities. Second, the ranking of households according to wealth status made by FCM was accepted. Third, villagers and officers were open to reconsider and revise the FCM with the necessary adjustments. However, results are limited and cannot be generalized to the national level.

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**6. Aryeetey, G. et al. 2010, "Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme: empirical analysis of three strategies," *Tropical Medicine and International Health*.**

The aim of this article is to evaluate the effectiveness of three alternative strategies to identify poor households: means testing (MT), proxy means testing (PMT) and participatory wealth ranking (PWR) in urban, rural and semi-urban settings in Ghana. In Ghana, despite the fact that some 18-28% of the population can be considered as poor and thus require premium exemptions, only about 2% of the insured benefit from premium exemptions for the poor. For the evaluation, the authors rely on a survey of 145-147 households per setting to collect data on consumption expenditure to estimate MT measures and of household assets to estimate PMT measure. Then, they organised focus group discussions to derive PWR measures. They compare errors of inclusion and exclusion of PMT and PWR relative to MT, the latter being considered the gold standard measure to identify poor households.

The results show that compared to MT, the errors of exclusion and inclusion of PMT ranged between 0.46-0.63 and 0.21-0.36, respectively and of PWR between 0.03-0.73 and 0.17-0.60 respectively, depending on the setting. In conclusion, PMT and PWR have considerable errors of exclusion and inclusion in comparison with MT. In a strict sense, the authors claim it is not possible to conclude whether PMT or PWR is a more effective strategy to identify the poor. However, whereas the errors of exclusion and inclusion remained relatively stable across the three settings, they varied widely for PWR. The authors claim that PWR has appeal because it reflects communities' perceptions on poverty. However, its definition of the poor varies across settings and this may provoke in some way unequal exemption policies in the country. Therefore, its acceptability as a uniform strategy to identify the poor in Ghana may be questionable. The authors conclude that PMT and MT are potential strategies to identify the poor and their relative societal attractiveness should be judged in a broader economic analysis.

**7. Ayala, F. 2009, "Republic of Ghana Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) Operational Assessment Report," Ayala Consulting**

This report analyses the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) unconditional cash transfer that has been piloted since 2008, and it makes recommendations to improve it so it can be scaled-up to national coverage. LEAP tries to target poor households, but does not try to define poverty through its eligibility criteria. The current targeting system uses a combination of geographical, community-based and categorical. This approach is not criticised by the author but he argues that the implementation and the process of each stage have to be redefined since LEAP beneficiaries can be eligible for other programmes while non beneficiaries might be excluded. After the districts

are selected, community committees continue with the targeting process of households. There is a list which is verified in a general meeting and then the district officer and community committee members visit targeted households to fill up a form. The author claims this process is very long and complicated, involving many steps. The community committees do not identify all extremely poor households, there is subjective selectivity and it has high risks of both inclusion and exclusion errors, favouritism, clientelism, imperfect information and human error.

The report recommends combining the use of an objective method (PMT) for identifying the poor complemented with a community-based verification phase along with categorically targeting ultra-poor households within this group (to identify household members at particular risk of underperformance of key indicators). However, it highlights the strengths of CB methods (participation, legitimacy and transparency) and the weaknesses (selection bias or favouritism, imperfect information, time consuming, labour-intensive and expensive compared to the value-added over other systems).

**8. Ayala, F. 2010, "Report to the technical working group: field visits to observe and improve the community validation process," Ayala Consulting**

This report is the result of two days of field visits to observe and improve the process of Community Validation being facilitated by the recently recruited and trained Community Mobilization Facilitators (CFMs) of World Vision Lesotho. Community Validation refers to a step in the targeting process in which Village Assistance Committees (VACs) review lists of all households surveyed for data collection for the National Information System for Social Assistance (NISSA). During the field visits, the team members observed the facilitation of Community Validation and supported the process by making recommendations, answering questions and clarifying the process.

Several examples were observed of large households being categorized as poor despite being well-off. However, since the targeting system consists of both an objective step (NISSA) and a subjective step, each balances the other and no changes to the formula are recommended, as the VACs did a good job of identifying these households. Indeed, it was observed that some more remote areas were missed or skipped by the Enumerators or households refused to participate but now wish to. Moreover, it was found that in some cases, though rare, households were surveyed while visiting another village/while on the road.

The report recommends that in order to maintain good relationships with the communities and boost the efficiency of the process under tight timelines, CMFs should be given clear instructions on how to appropriately and effectively communicate with villages. They should: explain the reason for the visit, ensuring sufficient advance notice of processes to take place, and having an idea or prepared response to VACs' or Chiefs' questions regarding some

kind of remuneration or rewards for their services (e.g. that this initiative is for the community, and that a small amount is given to avoid inconveniences.

**9. Baird, S. et al. 2009, "Targeting in a Community-Driven Development Program: Applications and Acceptance in Tanzania's TASAF," The World Bank**

The authors bring together poverty maps and administrative records to evaluate the targeting of Tanzania's Social Action Fund (TASAF). They use a census of households in 100 villages across 5 districts of Tanzania to study within-village targeting of a specific component of TASAF, namely the "Vulnerable Groups" programme which is supposed to be available only to households with a "vulnerable" member, defined as a widow, orphan, disabled, HIV-affected or elderly person.

Within this eligibility criterion, villages are supposed to poverty target eligibility for membership in an entrepreneurial investment group, which will then compose a business plan and be funded for a collective venture. TASAF applications go through an elaborate screening process whose purpose is to avoid elite capture. It had a massive sensitization campaign in which every village in Tanzania was visited and given information about the programme and how to apply. The process is participatory, villages are required to undertake a number of coordinated actions in order to initiate the application process and verify the application. Project selection takes place at the village level, and all the important steps of application screening are done by district officials. Once the funding formula has been set and money disbursed, this process is driven entirely by district and village level decision-making.

The authors find that richer, more literate, and more politically active communities are likely to apply. Because the effects of political activism on application rates are mostly found within-district, and because project selection mechanisms were not designed to avoid this effect, the final distribution of funding is biased heavily towards communities with high voter turnout. Within villages the authors find similar results. Communities are successful at picking households within the "vulnerability" eligibility requirement that are substantially poorer than the average vulnerable households. Group leaders are better off than the average eligible, and better educated. Beneficiary households are found to be poorer than the average eligible household, but they are disproportionately engaged in village level meetings and likely to come from well-connected families. In conclusion, TASAF is relatively well targeted towards the poor at every level of decision-making, but also consistently favours units that are most active in the political space. Seen in this way, the authors conclude that a VG targeting process which has managed to form groups of individuals who are very poor but are relatively well-connected, and to provide these groups leaders who are less poor and well-educated, may be a triumph of effective targeting.

**10. Bardhan, P. 2002, "Decentralization of Governance and Development," The Journal of Economic Perspectives**

The author analyses a particular kind of decentralization in developing and transition economies: the devolution of political decision making power to local level, small-scale entities. For his analysis the author distinguishes decentralization in the sense of devolution of political decision-making power from purely administrative delegation of functions of the central government to local branches. The author is interested in cases where local community organizations become formally involved in the implementation of some centrally directed or funded projects.

The author debates the benefits of decentralization. He claims that political accountability in poor countries, for example, is particularly affected by the likelihood of corruption or capture by interest groups. While local governments may have better local information and accountability pressure, they may be more vulnerable to capture by local elites, who will then receive a disproportionate share of spending on public goods. If the central bureaucrat is corrupt then the situation is worse in a way that leads to targeting failures and inefficiently low and inequitable service delivery. Central government has the problem of lacking information on local needs, delivery costs and the amount delivered. Therefore, many programs in developing countries have a large gap between the commitment of resources at the central level and the resources that are actually received at the local level. Decentralization, by giving control to local authorities, does not solve the problem since elites receive a larger weight of welfare, and there is a tendency of the local government to overprovide the service to local elites.

Moreover, the author claims that the extent of capture of local governments by local elites depends on levels of social and economic inequality within communities, fairness and regularity of elections, transparency in local decision-making, media attention, among other factors. These factors vary across communities and countries. When the potential of capture of local governments is serious then decentralization programs have to pay more attention to strengthening local accountability mechanisms. The cases of Brazil (Santos, 1998) and Bolivia (Faguet, 2001) are examples of decentralization with positive service-delivery outcomes. Another effective example is the case of Bangladesh, exposed by Galasso and Ravallion (2001); however, negative examples of decentralization on targeting decisions exist like the case of the transfer program Progres a Mexico (Coady, 2001) or with modest gains on targeting efficiency like in Albania (Alderman, 1998).

The author concludes that to achieve effective decentralization it has to be complemented by serious attempts to change the structures of power within communities and to improve the chances of participation and voice of the disadvantaged in the political process.



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**11. Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. 2005, "Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries," *Journal of Public Economics***

The aim of this paper is to review the extent of local capture in relation to higher level governments' capture. The author's intention is to develop an analytical framework for assessing the effects of delegating authority over the delivery of an antipoverty program to local governments, rather than to central governments.

The author claims that the primary problem with the decentralized system is the likelihood of local governments to be pressured from local elites to divert supplies. These reflect weaknesses in many spheres like the functioning of a fair electoral process at the local level, lower levels of political awareness among the poor, and the tendency for wealthier groups to form special interest groups that contribute to campaign finances of political parties. This anti-poor bias, and therefore targeting failures under decentralization, tends to be more severe in regions with high poverty rates. Therefore, intraregional targeting improves with decentralization in low-poverty regions, and worsens in high-poverty regions. In the author's model decentralization enhances the cost-effectiveness of the delivery system, and reduces bureaucratic corruption and it also tends to exhibit intraregional targeting efficiency. However, the scale of delivery might be smaller compared with the centralized model and the reductions are likely to be particularly severe in poorer regions, resulting in a poorer interregional targeting performance.

**12. Barrett, C. and Vhattamishra, R. 2010, "Community-based risk management arrangements: A review," *World Development***

While there are many studies that have examined community-based responses to risk in developing countries and how they enable households to cope with shocks, this article goes further in providing an up-to-date, comprehensive review and overview of the most commonly observed arrangements. The authors define community based risk management arrangements (CBRMAs) as "all coordinated strategies used and managed by social groupings of individuals for the purpose of protection against the adverse effects of different types of risk" (p. 2). These include mutual insurance groups of various sorts, but also groups that provide facilities for savings and credit and provision of public goods, among other things. Their catalogue of CBRMAs includes developing countries, especially in Latin America, Africa (Botswana, Nigeria, Madagascar, Swaziland, Kenya) and Asia (India, Bangladesh, Philippines).

The authors point out the potential advantages of CBRMAs relative to public or risk management schemes that do not involve communities in program identification and administration. The following advantages are mentioned: First, community participation often results in improved targeting outcomes; communities can better

identify the most needy and vulnerable among them. In addition, they also have an advantage of lower information and enforcement costs due to the continuous interaction among members and lack of privacy that characterizes peasant economies and densely-populated urban communities in developing countries. Moreover, the cost of monitoring is likely to be low and social sanctions are commonly available as relatively low-cost enforcement mechanisms. CBRMAs which have benefited from these characteristics are microfinance institutions.

Nevertheless, the interpersonal relations also bring the possibility that these arrangements are vulnerable to fraud, corruption and manipulation by individuals in influential or powerful positions. This is more common in isolated rural communities where effective checks and balances are absent. Therefore, as mentioned by Conning and Kevane (2002), only communities with a degree of egalitarian preferences and transparent decision-making systems will be more effective in targeting resources to poor households within the community. Another disadvantage is that certain groups (including the poorest ones) are often excluded from informal insurance networks and enjoy limited, if any, risk pooling with others in the community. This evidence is found in Ethiopia, Ghana and India, as well as in Tanzania and Senegal where the poorest cannot participate in mutual aid health institutions because they are not able to afford contributory payments. The key point is that group formation for risk management is voluntary, and therefore potentially excludes groups of particular interest to policymakers or groups along the lines of ethnicity, occupation, gender, or other characteristics. Finally, the authors claim that CBRMAs have been found to fail in the wake of natural or manmade disasters, when poor households have limited resources for self-insurance and often cannot benefit themselves from local risk sharing arrangements.

**13. Beesley, J. undated, "The Hunger Safety Nets Programme, Kenya: A Social Protection Case Study," Oxford: Oxfam GB**

The author evaluates the Hunger Safety Nets Programme (HSNP) which began in 2008 in four of the poorest districts in northern Kenya as a pilot. The article is based on other reports made by Oxfam and other academic sources and interviews of beneficiaries. The pilot is structured across two phases. Phase one's (2008-2012) goal is to deliver regular guaranteed cash transfers to up to 60,000 households or 300,000 chronically food insecure people. In phase two, HSNP will potentially scale up to cover 1.5 million people across the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs). The programme is testing three different targeting methodologies (community-based targeting, category targeting based on age criteria, and dependency ratio in households) to evaluate which methodologies are the most cost efficient in tackling chronic hunger and

poverty and most effective in targeting the poorest and most vulnerable to food insecurity including the elderly.

Community based targeting focuses on household-based entitlement, where the threshold is set per geographical targeting unit (e.g. per sub-location) according to poverty and demographic data. Communities (with guidance from Oxfam) determine relevant enrolment criteria and decide in open meetings which people within the sub-location meet these criteria. The report recognises that inclusion and exclusion errors are inherent in the design of all three tested methodologies. The author highlights that CBT promoted participation, empowered the vulnerable, was locally accurate, easy to understand for illiterate populations and transparent. However, CBT showed that poverty is relative. What is perceived as a “poor” (and therefore eligible) household in one region may not equate with what is perceived as “poor” in another. This method, according to the report, is heavily process oriented and therefore difficult to implement on a large scale, particularly in countries with low capacities. Indeed, the report claims that awareness was relatively uniform across the three targeting methods and 96% of beneficiaries reported that the programme objectives were explained to them. The author suggests the need to find a simpler method of beneficiary identification and targeting without losing transparency and efficiency. Moreover, he warns that targeting is challenging where populations do not have a settled lifestyle and people could be missed out at any point in the process, therefore follow up is required.

**14. Bergeron, G., Sutkover, S., and Medina, J. M. 1998, “How reliable are Group Informant Ratings? A Test of Food Security Ratings in Honduras,” World Development**

The authors of this study examine the viability of group informant rating methods analysing the food security rating in a rural area of Honduras. The participants, who were members of producer associations in thirteen different communities, were asked to rate the food security status of all households in their association. Only members of households targeted by an agricultural development project are included in the experiment.

Measures suggest that participants considerably failed on rating food security. This is explained by many reasons: social stratification, different people have different information and criteria, discussions dominated by one or more individuals about what they are rating, and facilitator bias. Therefore, the general belief that group informant ratings represent reliable information on household wealth or food security should be carefully considered.

**15. Bigman, D. et al. 2000, “Community Targeting for poverty reduction in Burkina Faso,” The World Bank Economic Review**

The authors develop a method for targeting antipoverty programs and public projects to poor communities in rural

and urban areas. The method consists of constructing an extensive data set from a large number of resources: demographic data from the population census, household level data from a variety of surveys, community-level data on local road infrastructure, public facilities, water points, and so on, along with department-level data on agroclimatic conditions. Once the data is collected then the entire set is integrated into a geographic information system. An econometric model that estimates the impact of household, community, and department level variables on household consumption is used to identify the key explanatory variables that determine the standard of living in rural and urban areas. This model then is applied to predict poverty indicators for 3,871 rural and urban communities in Burkina Faso and to map the spatial distribution of poverty in the country. A simulation analysis assesses the effectiveness of village-level targeting based on these predictions.

The authors claim that geographical targeting of antipoverty programs can be a more effective way to reach the poor and reduce program costs in countries where information on individual households is incomplete or unavailable. The authors agree that narrowing the targeting at the level of communities or administrative departments can be an effective way to reach the poor. First, because in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, poverty tends to be concentrated in villages and certain parts of towns. Second, geographical targeting requires low administrative costs and, by relying primarily on local authorities, may ensure that a large portion of the benefits will reach the target population. Indeed, budget constraints are likely to restrict programs that are targeted to larger geographical areas and errors of inclusion and exclusion tend to be high. Targeting smaller geographic areas can reach many more of the country's poor. Moreover, lower-level targeting is likely to include villages and districts in all regions or states and therefore avoid ethnic, social or political exclusion. Finally, differences in the incidence of poverty among villages within the same region often reflect past policy biases that led to differences in the quality of access roads or public services, thus targeting future policies making use of these criteria can remedy past preferences.

**16. Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) 2007, “Policy Position Paper on Social Security and Social Protection in Botswana,” BFTU**

This paper is described as a policy position whose aim is to develop a unified position regarding social security and security protection in Botswana, based on the Botswana Federation of Trade Union (BFTU)'s thorough engagement of its affiliates. . The policy paper involves detailed research work and consultations with affiliates and puts forward consolidated policy guides for dealing with the challenges of social security and security in Botswana.

The study analyses the Orphan Care Programme. This program is a social allowance programme, therefore it is not means tested. Eligibility is open to all Botswanan children under the age of 18 who do not have parents and therefore lack access to basic human needs such as food, clothing, toiletries and shelter. Children over the age of 18 are covered by the destitute programme. Identification of orphans is the responsibility of teachers, social workers, relatives, community leaders as well as members of the community. Registration is finally done by social workers who conduct a thorough assessment of the situation. Once the status of the child has been determined and eligibility requirements met, children are then automatically registered. An orphan receives a food basket of P216.00 per month irrespective of the geographic location. There are other public and private elements that include free medical care in government health facilities, transport allowance and assistance with bills for utilities such as water and electricity. The study shows that social workers acknowledged that they find it impossible to conduct ongoing monitoring of those OVC who are registered because of the multiple roles they have to play in the delivery of social safety nets.

The study concludes that even though the majority of the very poor in Botswana are provided with some basic essential services to sustain their livelihoods, these schemes are not intended to provide skills to enable the poor to escape the poverty trap.

**17. Caeyers, B. and Dercon, S. 2011, "Political Connections and Social Networks in Targeted Transfer Programmes: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia," CSAE Working Papers Series, Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies**

The authors of this study explore community-based processes in Ethiopia for food aid allocation and the role of political and social networks as result of the drought crisis. In order to investigate whether social networks and/or political connections are of greater/smaller

significance in the period right after the drought the authors disaggregate the analysis into two periods, with period 1 denoting the first 6 months right after the drought (September 2002 – March 2003) and period 2 denoting the 12 subsequent months (April 2003 – March 2004). Although the study models and discusses FFD and FFW participation separately, the authors use similar estimation equations for both of them.

Food aid in Ethiopia is distributed via unconditional (free food distribution, FFD) or via work programmes (food-for-work, FFW) using administrative targeting at the central government level after which the beneficiary households are selected at the local community level by the "Kebele" committees. The results of this study show that targeting is associated with the political economy of Ethiopia. Targeting was influenced by local political leaders within the Kebele administration who in theory are elected but in practice are usually closely related to those in power at regional and national levels. The results show that although targeting is imperfect the allocation of free food aid is related to need and less influenced by access to support from relatives or friends. However, there is a strong correlation with political connections: households with connections have more than 12% higher probability of obtaining free food; especially after a drought this correlation is stronger.

The allocation of food for work seems to be based principally on labour supply characteristics such as the ability to work rather than political or social connections. Nevertheless, the amount of support received seems to be related to political networks. The explanations of this trend can be different: being connected to those with an official position can give more information about need or availability of support, favouritism regardless of whether the household needs the support or not. In conclusion, households which are less connected might be left without support. Therefore, increasing the accountability of the local Kebele committees is an essential requirement to improve targeting outcomes.



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**18. Chinsinga, B. 2003, "The participatory development approach under a microscope: the case of poverty alleviation programme in Malawi," *Journal of Social Development in Africa***

The author reviews the 1994 Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) to analyse the participatory development approach. The PAP was designed with the intention of addressing relevant features of poverty in the country. The PAP institutional matrix consists of the Presidential Council, the National Steering Committee and eight task forces. The task forces are responsible for the actual implementation of the poverty alleviation programmes which include agriculture, health, population, the informal sector, public works, social welfare and education. In combination with local communities they evaluate the needs of the poor and assist in the planning and design of poverty alleviation sectoral programmes. The PAP policy initiative is implemented through the district development committee (DDC) in order to afford local communities direct participation in the identification as well as implementation of programmes that affect them.

The author finds different challenges to the participation feature of the programme. First, it is highlighted that no attempt at all has been made to even define the concept of participation. Likewise, the mandate of the task forces within the PAP stands in contrast with the spirit of participatory planning. They have the responsibility to review and prioritize poverty alleviation interventions identified by communities through the DDCs. Communities depend on external forces in order to articulate their priorities. Furthermore, task forces are composed of technocrats who are not connected with the social, economic, political or cultural realities of the community. What the task forces do overall is to remove from the people their inalienable fundamental right to define their own development projects. Moreover, the author finds that there are many cases of corruption and patronage which have led to the perception among people that the visible beneficiaries of the programme tended to be the better-off and those well-placed within political circles. Indeed, there is a failure to identify clearly the various groups of the poor in the country and their needs. The author claims that it is obvious in the Malawian case that the grassroots cannot count themselves among the principal protagonists of participatory local planning processes. What happens is that the planning team almost always influences, animates, induces and manipulates the negotiation process. The author concludes that participatory local planning requires a pre-existing democratic structure and central policymakers who are sympathetic to the basic interests of the poor.

**19. Chinsinga, B. 2005, "The Clash of Voices: Community-based Targeting of Safety-net Interventions in Malawi," *Social Policy and Administration***

In this study the author analyses the 2003 Winter Targeted Input Programme (TIP) which was designed to extend free inputs to 400,000 households in rural Malawi on the basis of access to dambo (pieces of land used for winter cultivation primarily). Dambo is thus an agricultural asset that provides farmers with the opportunity to cultivate additional crops) and poverty status. The study was carried out in 14 villages in 14 districts. The key research instrument was the social mapping exercise, which was the entry point into each community. The social mapping exercise was concluded by a traditional focus group discussion whose aim was to understand how the 2003 Winter TIP logistics were actually organized and executed in each village. The data from the cards were entered into a specially designed Microsoft Access program and later exported to SPSS Version 11 for analysis.

Making use of community targeting the tendency of most communities was to adapt the specified official criteria of poverty to one according to their perceptions and interpretations of need, entitlement and equity. The study finds that there are discrepancies between the number of beneficiaries on the official list of the Winter TIP and the number identified by the community. There was a slight preference for wealthier households over poorer households and those with "dambo access" were excluded. It is noticed that much of the modification and reinterpretation of the official criteria were not mainly driven by fraudulent intentions. Village heads decided to give benefits, for example, to those individuals owning treadle pumps demonstrating their commitment to winter cultivation, to those households willing to adopt the manure technology, or those with a good record in upland farming. It is clear that in this case when targeting was left to communities they may be much more willing to exclude some poor households on the basis of a "justification" of deservingness. However, this targeting was acceptable since it was perceived by most villages to be fair and accountable.

This study demonstrates the importance of incorporating the views of the community in the targeting process so they can achieve the desired strategic impact. This study shows the different perceptions and interpretations that communities have of need, equity and entitlement. However, the concept of targeting generates resistance and dislike since targeting makes no sense when the welfare of most rural households is basically the same. Indeed, it is shown that communities should be involved in policy decisions right at the design stage so they can share their perceptions of poverty and the outcomes they want to achieve with the targeting process.

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**20. Chinsinga, B. 2005, "Targeting Safety Nets Interventions in Developing Countries: Some Insights from a Qualitative Simulation Study from Malawi," *The European Journal of Development Research***

This study presents the results of a simulated safety net implementation of in-kind and cash transfers to the poor and vulnerable in rural Malawi. The author explores three fundamental questions: first, if communities are able to develop criteria for targeting beneficiaries; second, whether communities can make decisions on which beneficiaries are included or excluded according to the recognised criteria, and third to analyse their views on how to make the safety net targeting system effective and efficient. Making use of participatory techniques such as social mapping, card games and scoring, the study covered almost the entire country. It was found that in spite of the resistance from communities to target (principally on the basis that everybody is poor and therefore deserves the transfer or because there is fear that targeting would increase tensions among themselves) they have clear ideas of egalitarian tendencies making an unbiased, clear and accountable distribution. Furthermore, the author shows that with the assistance of external facilitators, targeting could be achievable but the human and financial costs for the country make it unaffordable.

**21. Chinsinga, B., Christopher, D., Mufunanji, M., and Mpekansambo, L. 2002, "TIPS Messages: Beneficiary Selection and Community Targeting, Agricultural Extension and Health (TB and HIV/AIDS), 2001–02 Targeted Inputs Programme Evaluation Module 2," Report prepared for The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Malawi and The Department for International Development, UK**

The authors' aim is to assess whether the 2001-02 Targeted Inputs Programme (TIP) communications experience represented an improvement or a deterioration in comparison with the 2000-01 TIP experience in Malawi. Beneficiary selection and community targeting is one of the three broad areas in which the 2001-02 TIP made an effort to communicate messages to rural communities.

For their evaluation, a total of 22 sites in 22 districts were randomly selected to take part in the study. The information collection techniques were based on FGDs. Some specific techniques or "games" were developed in order to generate quantitative data on the outcome of community targeting under TIP, in particular what sort of households were selected to receive TIP and what criteria were used to select them. A social mapping exercise was used as an entry point in each village in order to check which households received TIP and to establish the food security of each household.

One interesting observation of this study is that it was hoped that the selection of beneficiaries and targeting in 2001-02 TIP would be better than in 2000-01 due to a nationwide sensitisation campaign whose aim was to

ensure that Village Task Forces (VTF) received the message about the criteria for beneficiary selection. However, communities still failed to target the poor for a number of reasons. First, VTFs are not always constituted according to the official guidelines or actively involved in the beneficiary selection process. In the south, 5 out of 9 sites did not have a VTF and very often beneficiary selection was done in secret. Second, the criteria for beneficiary selection were communicated to VTFs or village heads through different channels, most often verbally. Third, the data suggested that the message about the official criteria usually did reach the village-level authorities, but even if beneficiary selection took place in open village meetings, the households chosen first were often included because of relationship to the village head or membership of the VTF. Some villages opted for sharing the inputs equally to avoid unfairness. Indeed, the limited quota also clashed with the egalitarian values of rural communities in Malawi, which regard themselves as equally deserving of any external assistance.

Moreover, the card games results also showed interesting findings. First, in spite of the agreement among stakeholders about the main categories of beneficiaries, 14-18% of beneficiaries should not have qualified and half of non-recipients should have received TIP according to the criteria. Second, there was a slight preference for food insecure and extremely food insecure households in the selection process, but there were considerable inclusion and exclusion errors in the targeting, therefore many of the poorest or most vulnerable were left out. Third, there was widespread evidence of self-selection and some evidence of favouritism (inclusion of village heads' relatives). Finally, the process was perceived as lacking transparency, especially in the central and southern regions, causing resentment among non-recipients. Overall, the study found that the experiences of the 2001-02 TIP were not better than 2000-01. The targeting process was not well understood, it was perceived as unfair and lacking in transparency. Indeed, non-recipients threatened not to participate in development work and to use witchcraft, and some cases of physical confrontation were reported.

Finally, the authors make the following recommendations. First, communities should be informed about the concept of community targeting and beneficiary selection, including special training and sensitisation of VTFs. Second, an effective system of checks and balances to counter corrupt tendencies should be developed through ensuring that village heads work hand in hand with legitimately elected committees. Third, the selection of beneficiaries should be done in open village meetings, preferably with an independent facilitator to ensure impartiality. Finally, TIP receipt should be rotated, in case it is not possible to return to the universal Starter Pack programme.

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## 22. Coady, D., Grosh, M., and Hoddinot, J. 2004, *Targeting of Transfers in Developing Countries*, The World Bank and IFPRI

The aim of the authors of this book is to show what targeting options are available in developing countries, what results can be expected as well as information that will assist in choosing among them and to implement the chosen option adequately. The book provides a general review of experiences and lessons learned with methods used to target interventions in developing countries. In doing so, the authors claim that targeting is a means towards an end, where that end is poverty reduction. Indeed, they point out that there is no clearly preferred method for all types of programs or all country contexts. In their sample of programmes, 80 per cent of the variability in targeting performance was due to differences within targeting methods, and only 20 per cent due to differences across methods. The authors analyse quantitative evidence on targeting outcomes derived from an extensive review of existing studies; furthermore the quantitative analysis is complemented with a qualitative treatment of common targeting methods.

The authors distinguish between “methods” and “actors”. Methods refer to the approaches taken to reach a target group: individual/household assessment, categorical targeting, and self-selection. Actors refer to the identity of the individuals who perform two roles: the implementation of the targeting method and the subsequent implementation of the intervention. Community based targeting is identified as an assessment mechanism of the individual assessment method. The idea of CBT is that local knowledge of families’ living conditions may be more accurate than what a means test conducted by a government social worker or proxy means test could achieve. Community members such as teachers, health clinic staff, and elders are included in the actors that implement these interventions.

The authors were able to collect information for 122 interventions in 48 countries. Only 48 interventions use a single targeting method, while 42 use two methods, 21 use three methods and 11 use four methods. Of the 122 programs in their sample, 14 use community based methods: Albania Ngihme Ekonomika cash, Honduras PRAF cash transfer, Chile School lunches, Indonesia JPS Education Subsidy, Uzbekistan Child Allowance, Bangladesh Food for Education, and Uzbekistan Child/low-income benefit.

They are spread fairly across continents and over a large range of programme types. Several of the programs that use community targeting use other methods as well, for example, Mexico’s PROGRESA. Complementary to the argument based on information is one based on social capital. Where community members are enmeshed in multiple relationships, they may have less incentive or face repercussions if they hide or misuse information. A second reason pointed out to choose CBT is to allow communities

to define need as they think most appropriate or other differing definitions that can be routed in deeper cultural norms of what constitutes well-being. However, the authors highlight the different circumstances under which CBT works less well. For example, the person or group with the decision-making power may have other interests or may not use the information they have in the way that the central welfare agency funding the program might prefer. In addition, there might be other costs and problems that are not easy to identify like feelings of resentment and jealousy. Moreover, the authors suggest that CBT may also perpetuate local power structures which can mean both that leaders will benefit their families or client networks or that patterns of exclusion of certain groups are reinforced (e.g. Slovak villages in Roma or Chola-speakers in Mexican ejidos showed by Conning and Kevane, 2002).

Indeed, there are cases when the community prefers to share benefits with all members instead of accepting that some members should receive benefits and others not, for example in Indonesia. Finally, they authors claim that the notion of community is problematic. Usually CBT is recommended in small defined rural communities but even there the concept of community is more amorphous. Regarding the costs, it is claimed that CBT reduces the administrative costs, however the authors claim that these costs exist, but may be passed to the community or agency for which the community leader works rather than appear on the welfare programme’s budget. Thus the job of training and motivating actors will be even greater than if they were staff and, if community-based targeting is to work, must receive due attention and creativity. Finally, the authors claim that community-based targeting will probably work best where there is a hard budget constraint given to the community, otherwise the community will have no incentive to ration, and may just declare everyone poor, or a large share of the population, at any rate. Community-based targeting may also work relatively well in conjunction with demographic targeting.

Overall, the authors’ results show that some of the variability in outcomes was explained by country context which means that implementation highly matters to outcomes. They observed that targeting performance improved with country income levels, the extent to which governments are held accountable for their actions, and the degree of inequality. Generally, they suggest that using more targeting methods produced better targeting.

## 23. Coll-Black, S., Gilligan, D., Hoddinitt, J. et al. 2011, “Targeting Food Security Interventions When ‘Everyone is Poor’: The case of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme,” *International Food Policy Research Institute and Ethiopian Development Research Institute*

This article illustrates how targeting works in a country like Ethiopia with prevalent poverty and comparatively equal income distribution, a country where “everyone



is poor". To explore this, the authors analyse Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) whose objective is to assure food consumption and prevent asset depletion for rural food insecure households. This analysis is based on longitudinal quantitative survey data collected at the household and local levels in the four major regions covered by the PSNP. A first survey was implemented in June-August 2006. A follow-up survey was implemented in June and early July 2008.

The PSNP uses geographic and community-based targeting within the Kebeles programme to identify chronically food insecure households which are assigned to public works or direct support depending on available labour. Communities are given the possibility to modify their lists of food insecure households according to their local criteria taking advantage of local knowledge. However the risk is that local interests groups can emerge.

Within communities there is an emphasis on using poverty as a leading eligibility criteria but household food insecurity was not often reported as an explicit targeting criterion for public works which shows the difficulty in differentiating degrees of household food insecurity. Indeed, it was observed that communities give priorities to different groups. Family or friendship connections were not reported as factors in a household's likelihood to receive public works or direct support. Targeting is superior in some localities than in others but from an international perspective the PSNP is well-targeted. There is little evidence of elite capture. This study suggests that the PSNP has been able to target resources to the poorest households using a combination of geographical and community-based targeting.

#### **24. Conning, J. and Kevane, M. 2002, "Community-Based Targeting for Social Safety Nets: A Critical Review," World Development**

The aim of the authors is to review evidence and propose a framework for thinking about the community-based targeting mechanisms that target welfare or relief. CBT is defined as "a state policy of contacting community groups or intermediary agents to have them carry out one or more of the following activities: a) identify recipients for cash or in-kind benefits, b) monitor the delivery of those benefits, and/or c) engage in some part of the delivery process" (p.376). The authors claim that community-based targeting is not a separate targeting method, but rather a mechanism whereby community agents are in charge of assessing eligibility and/or implementing delivery.

The advantages that are expected from a CBT method mentioned by the authors are: lower costs of administration (for example Adams, Evans, Mohammed, and Farnsworth (1997) found that group ratings in Bangladesh were quite consistent with rankings arrived at from proxy means indicators), better information for identification of needs, local definitions of deprivation may be more adaptable to local conditions, strength of social capital and community organization (Fox (1996)

reports how, in indigenous communities in Mexico, waves of decentralization in provision of public goods and services expanded the reach and capacity of local social institutions), and legitimacy of programs that can help to build political support.

Nevertheless, different disadvantages can be identified: absence of minimal accounting records, lack of knowledge on how to make superior community information operational (a study of group informant food security ratings in Honduras questions the reliability of using community ratings as a guide to policy), conflict and divisions within the community, elite capture (Galasso and Ravallion find that in Bangladesh greater inequality in the village distribution of income reduced the incidence of poor households receiving targeted benefits), opportunity costs on community leaders, decrease of social capital (when community-organized and funded schools and self-help groups in Kenya received additional outside support in randomized trials, there was little evidence of an increase in measured social capital) and difficulty to take account of important externalities across communities such as differential benefits leading to population movements (Haenn (1999) discusses membership and exclusion decisions in agricultural ejidos in southeastern Mexico, or a recurrent debate of decentralization of safety nets in USA). An important danger as well is that for some governments CBT can appear as a formula for reconstructing a state-led safety net with a new local bureaucracy.

What can be observed is that CBT is likely to offer more advantages over other targeting mechanisms when communities are clearly defined either by region or social group. Indeed, governments need to pay attention to the fact that even if local democratic participation is to be encouraged when making the decision over how to target and the distribution of funds at the local level, it does not guarantee that the most vulnerable groups are going to be included since sometimes they cannot even participate in community life. The authors believe that on most occasions the best CBT is a hybrid mechanism where the centre defines and monitors targeting categories, instead of delegating all decisions to community groups with few tools for evaluation or control. Thus, they argue there is a difference between delegating and devolving the targeting process.

#### **25. Costella, C.V. and Manjolo, I. 2010 "Design and Implementation of Public Works Programs through Social Funds," Social Funds Innovation Notes, The World Bank**

This note highlights some of the advantages and challenges of public works programmes and reviews the experience of social funds in designing and implementing this kind of programme. The note looks at social funds as an implementation mechanism vis-à-vis more traditional models and focuses on the lessons learned from Egypt, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen.

Social funds have chosen to either directly partner with communities or to support communities' partnerships with local governments, NGOs or private firms. In particular, the authors claim that the use of the community-driven development approach has been successful in low institutional capacity contexts and has served to empower communities. Selection of beneficiaries in public works programmes can be done through several methods, one of which is the use of community-based targeting. In this case, social funds have promoted the use of methods like participatory wealth ranking exercises and local focus group discussions to identify beneficiaries for vulnerable groups' initiatives and have transferred these techniques when implementing public works programmes. The examples pointed out by the authors are first, the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) which uses CBT through wealth ranking, the impact evaluation of which confirmed the accuracy of community-based targeting in reaching the intended beneficiaries. Similarly, the impact evaluation of the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) Public Works Programme found that using community-based targeting directed jobs to the most vulnerable households.

In public works programmes, social fund-supported communities usually ensure that payments are made on site and in public; that information on the sub-project is posted or made readily available to the community at large for inspection; that the list of beneficiaries is known by the community; and that community meetings are held where information on subproject implementation is shared and discussed. Communities are able to monitor payment issues, as well as to use complaints and conflict resolution mechanisms in place. TASAF takes accountability and transparency into account in its design while ensuring that the community is involved in monitoring the record keeping of workers and materials.

Finally, the authors conclude that involvement of communities tends to positively contribute to targeting, implementation, monitoring and sustainability. Communities are key in determining sub-project preference but are also well placed to identify those individuals who are the most vulnerable to participate in public works. Involvement of communities during implementation leads to more transparent transfer of funds as well as monitoring progress of works. Community ownership tends to promote sub-project sustainability, reinforced by involvement of local governments.

**26. Croome, D. et al 2007, "The Impact of the Old Age Pension on Hunger Vulnerability: A Case-Study from the Mountain Zone of Lesotho," Prepared for the Regional Hunger Vulnerability Programme, Institute of Southern African Studies and National University of Lesotho**

The authors present a case study of the impact of the Old Age Pension on vulnerability to hunger among its recipients and their households. It is based on the work of the National University of Lesotho's Institute of Southern African Studies multi-disciplinary Lesotho Pensions Impact Group. The evidence presented comes mainly from a survey of 150 pension recipients living in White Hill, a community in the mountain zone of Lesotho. Where appropriate, the White Hill responses were compared with those from a similar survey undertaken in April 2006 in the relatively more prosperous foothills community of Manonyane. Indeed, the authors conducted interviews at the national level with government officials, multilateral and bilateral donors and NGOs. In the communities interviews were held with key informants, community groups, pensioner households and non-pensioner households.

In November 2004 the Government of Lesotho introduced the non-contributory Old Age Pension. The pension paid almost all citizens of Lesotho aged 70 years old or above a monthly cash pension of M 150 a month. For its delivery the government decided both that the criteria for registration would be kept as simple as possible without direct means testing and that registration and pension delivery would be based on structures already existing in Lesotho. As a result, registration could be based largely on the officially recognised documentation that most people already had, namely their Voter Registration cards. The Old Age Pension registration was done on a village by village basis whereby the information was attested by the local chief. Where documentation or other formal identification such as a passport or birth certificate were not available, the identity and age were agreed on the basis of an affidavit sworn before the local chief. The second simplifying decision was to sub-contract everything connected with the delivery of the pension to the Post Office.

The study shows that although the delivery cost to the government was kept very low, it must also be recognised that some of the costs of collecting the pension fall on the recipients where they have to travel to the pay point and have to use their time and, if they use public transport, their own cash for fares. It has been argued in Lesotho that for recipients in remote areas these costs will be higher than for people in more urban areas. However, almost all respondents agreed that the pension was going only to those who met the registration criteria. The recipients were generally amongst the most poor. There was no evidence of political or other biases in the selection of recipients. Pensioners regard the pension as a right that they 'earn' by being old. Finally, pensioners reported that in terms of their status in the

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household and community, this had been strengthened or, at the least, not worsened by getting the pension.

**27. Davies, M. 2009, "DFID Social Transfers Evaluation Summary Report," Institute of Development Studies, Centre for Social Protection**

This report reviews and assesses the effectiveness of DFID-supported social protection programmes in Africa and Asia. The study is a desk review of the four reports commissioned as part of the DFID social transfers evaluation.

It is noticed that targeting continues to be one of the most difficult challenges. The case of community-based targeting in Bangladesh "CHARS Livelihood Programme" is evaluated for its success and failures. CHARS is an example of a programme with high community involvement since committees are responsible for identifying beneficiaries, supervising public works and distributing payments. In its first year of implementation 80 per cent of asset transfers were accurately targeted with a transparent selection process well accepted by the community. The report points out that CBT can avoid inclusion and exclusion errors by the use of local knowledge of individual circumstances and it can enhance community acceptance of targeting decisions in spite of the risks of elite capture and exclusion of socially marginalised groups. The study concludes that targeting must be implemented carefully and it should be monitored.

**28. Davis, B. et al. 2012, "Evaluating the impact of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa: an introduction to the special issue," Journal of Development Effectiveness**

The authors examine cash transfer programmes in the sub-Saharan African context and how their exclusive characteristics both shape their design and present special challenges to evaluating their impact. It combines the results of five papers in this special issue considered as the first generation of cash transfer impact evaluations in the region and then highlights the new research questions currently being covered by the second generation of impact evaluations, including HIV risk, psychosocial status and mental health, conditionality, and the contribution of cash transfer to economic growth.

The authors point out three important differences in the design of programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. First, the community plays a much stronger role in verifying and selecting beneficiaries, in spite of the fact that proxy means tests are increasingly gaining acceptance in combination with community-based targeting, as well as other methods. Second, conditional cash transfers are exception rather than rule. Third, public works programmes are more prominent. The authors notice that while experimental design remains the goal of most evaluation frameworks in the region, non-experimental methods are often required to evaluate programme implementation, particularly community-based targeting. This first generation of

evaluations is concerned about vulnerable populations in the context of HIV/AIDS which drives the objectives and targeting of many of these programmes, focussing in terms of target population on the ultra-poor, the labour constrained, orphans and vulnerable children. One of the articles belonging to this first generation is the one by Handa, Huang, Hypher, Texeira, Veras and Davis which explores the effectiveness of community-based targeting in sub-Saharan Africa. The findings of the authors are mixed both in terms of its effectiveness in reducing inclusion and exclusion errors and in the factors that determine how well CBT works. In comparison with the targeting performance of Coady et al., the three programmes evaluated (Kenia, Malawi and Mozambique) performed better than the average CT programmes around the world. Overall, the findings are that CBT can be combined with other methods to be effective in reaching poor populations in Africa. However, the authors point out important issues to be evaluated in qualitative and programme evaluations: community perceptions of fairness, clarity in communication and application of programme eligibility criteria by community members, frequency of retargeting, and the effectiveness of appeals procedures.

The authors of this study conclude that the second generation of impact evaluations currently underway are exploring several new research questions: first, related to the potential for CTs to mitigate HIV risk; second, related to psycho-social status and mental health; third, related to issues of conditionality and finally, the issue of whether and how CT programmes can contribute to overall economic growth.

**29. De Silva, S. 2010, "Tanzania Community-Based Conditional Cash Transfer Pilot," HDNSP World Bank**

This concept note analyses the CCT pilot in Tanzania which provides cash transfers to poor households conditional on keeping their children in school and seeking regular health care for them, in a context of the HIV/AIDS crisis. The pilot also targets elderly-headed households, particularly those left with the responsibility of caring for orphan children. The general objective of the pilot is to test how a CCT programme could be implemented through a social fund (The Tanzanian Social Action Fund, TASAF) using a community-driven development approach. According to the author this is both the first time that a social fund agency is being used to implement a CCT in Africa and the first time that a CCT programme is being delivered using a community-driven approach. The pilot as well will test, in a few villages, a new transfer mechanism to ensure that funds reach the intended beneficiaries.

The CCT pilot will be implemented in the districts and villages targeted under TASAF I which began implementation in 2000 and targeted the poorest and most vulnerable districts of Tanzania. Regions were ranked using several indicators (poverty level, food insecurity, access to health facilities, among others). Districts were

then prioritised within regions using an index of relative poverty and deprivation. At the household level, eligibility criteria for beneficiary households are based on household characteristics of the very poor that were defined by communities themselves through group discussions. The criteria are that households be: very poor, not receiving similar benefits in kind or cash from another programme, and that there is an elderly person (60+) or an orphan or vulnerable child (OVC) living in the household. "Very poor" is defined by stakeholders. Prior to targeting the beneficiaries, an extensive communications and training programme on the CCT program will be conducted by TASAF.

Afterwards, the social fund will rely on the community's knowledge to target the vulnerable at the village level using community management committees under the oversight of the Village Council. TASAF will perform proxy means testing on a sample basis to ensure that targeted beneficiaries qualify. The community management committees play a key role as well in monitoring conditionalities as they are responsible for collecting the monitoring forms from school and health clinics and will need to conduct awareness sessions for the beneficiaries on a regular basis. The pilot will cover three districts and 80 villages. All 80 villages have community management committees that receive financial training from TASAF and have successfully managed at least one TASAF-supported project. Community Score Cards (CSC) will be used as simple community monitoring tools that blend different participatory monitoring approaches and social accountability techniques (such as social audits and citizen report card surveys) together. Finally, if the pilot is successful (completion is on December 2011) TASAF is committed to scaling up the model to cover all the villages in which it works.

### **30. Dubois, U. 2011, "From targeting to implementation: The role of identification of fuel poor households," Energy Policy**

The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology for the analysis of the fuel poverty policymaking process considering three elements in relation to each other: 1) proper targeting, 2) the possibility of identifying fuel poor households, and 3) the ease of implementation of fuel poverty alleviation measures. The author applies this framework to the analysis of the new French fuel poverty policy. The core of the new French fuel poverty policy is a programme called "Habiter Mieux", which is focused on the thermal renovation of homes of low income households. Even if it is a national programme, it will be implemented through "local contracts of commitment against energy precariousness" at the local or Department level. Each of them defines, at the local level, a framework for the financing of measures and sets up methods of identification of households. Therefore, the local contracts are the basis for the local implementation of the programme "Habiter mieux". The potential beneficiaries

are households who own their homes, whose incomes are below a given threshold and who are living in homes that were built at least 15 years ago. In the local contracts, the fact that households must be in energy precariousness is explicitly mentioned. However, since energy precariousness is not precisely defined, the local actors in charge of identification of the households have some autonomy in evaluating the situation of households.

The author points out that at the end of 2011, France was completing the process of signing local contracts which will define who will be in charge of the identification of fuel poor households and how identification will be done. Therefore, is too early to assess the French experience in terms of identification of households. However, the contracts that have been adopted locally show a diversity of approaches in terms of identification. These approaches rely on three methods: direct identification through database crossing, geographical identification as a proxy and decentralised identification. In this last method what is decentralised is the actual identification of fuel poor households. What remains centralised is generally the process of communication of the characteristics of the fuel poor households to the local coordinator of the programme. The main communication tool is the "fiche de liaison" which has to be completed by the actors who identify the households. After this, an "operator" is in charge of the implementation.

In conclusion, the author shows that fuel poverty in France has been defined in vague terms and no precise identification methods have been developed for the whole territory. However, the approach of a decentralised design of identification methods allows an adaption to the local circumstances. Its strengths are that the identification problems are probably not the same in rural and urban areas, it also allows relying on local actors who are already present and, it should allow a learning process on good practices in terms of identification of fuel poor households.

### **31. Edgard, M. 2009, Republique du Benin: Process d'identification des indigents, Afric' Mutalite**

This article proposes a model to identify the extreme poor in Benin. The different steps to identify the extreme poor are the following. First, the place of intervention is defined (villages, neighbourhoods, districts) according to the defined criteria. Then, before starting the process of identification within the locality it is important to create contacts with the political or administrative local authorities to share with them the objectives and design the appropriate interventions. Following this, professional interviewers need to be recruited. Subsequently, the existing networks of community assistance need to be identified with the help of local stakeholders. Afterwards, a group of people, with an important status in the community, is constituted based on their experiences and skills in poverty issues and the resolution of social problems within the community. This group of people would be responsible



of constituting the list of extreme-poor and their characteristics. After this, the classification of households according to their socio-economic situation is done by the same group of people based on their knowledge of the village. Each person in this group can use a regional agricultural census to support their choices. Then, the lists of households proposed by each member of the group are ranked with the aid of a research group and the final list is validated in a meeting with all members to avoid biased selections. Afterwards, a survey is conducted of the pre-identified households to evaluate their status. At the end eight variables result from a logistic regression model (applicable within all regions in Benin) as determinants of extreme poverty. This is useful to appreciate the household head's degree of poverty. Later, each of the eight variables deducted as poverty determinants is matched from a score variable from 0 and +315. A score is allocated to each household. The threshold that constitutes the poverty line is 615; therefore each household with a score of  $\geq 615$  is classified as extreme poor. Finally the final list is established but many possibilities need to be taken into account. The method chosen to make the final list depends on the degree of suitability and effectiveness of the research. This list can be: the one obtained from the group of people with members of the community; the list obtained from the identification tool; or a list making use of both processes comparing their results and combining them. This is the most recommended method and the one that is used in the research.

**32. Ellis, F. 2007, "Food Subsidy Programme, Mozambique," REBA Case Study Brief 7, Johannesburg: Regional Evidence Building Agenda, Regional Hunger Vulnerability Programme**

The author analyses the Food Subsidy Programme (Programa de Subsídio de Alimentos, PSA) in Mozambique which provides a monthly cash transfer to people who are destitute and have no capacity to work, including older, disabled and chronically ill people (but not those living with HIV/AIDS and TB), and pregnant women who are malnourished. The PSA is implemented by the National Institute of Social Action (INAS), a semi-autonomous agency of the Ministry for Women and Social Action (MMAS). This case study is based on secondary sources and data, including interviews.

At community level, INAS works through local volunteers, known as *Permanentes*, chosen by the community to act as its community agents. *Permanentes* are selected only in communities with a minimum of 25 beneficiaries (urban areas) or 15 beneficiaries (rural areas). Each *Permanente* receives an incentive payment of 300 Mtn per month. The *Permanente* is the link between INAS and the community and therefore should be someone who is available (that is, ready to carry out activities for INAS whenever asked), suitable, serious, honest and elected by the community. The *Permanente* has the tasks of informing

the community about the PSA, actively participating in the identification of vulnerable people as potential beneficiaries, making home visits to beneficiaries, advising beneficiaries of payment dates, being present at Payment Posts on payment days and helping to check the payment list. Overall, the PSA is known to be generally successful, especially due to the local knowledge and experience of *Permanentes*. However, inclusion and exclusion errors are sometimes made due to administrative mistakes, or lack of information about the broader family circumstances of applicants. Indeed, the process from applying to the programme and receiving the benefit is reported to be so long and in some cases an identification card is required which many people, especially the older do not have. The author highlights that PSA operational and administrative costs are high in relation to the value of the money disbursed, covering for example, the cost of vehicles and fuel required for site visits and delivery of the monthly cash amounts to pay points, salaries of the *Permanentes*, salaries of local staff members, per diems of the police contingent who accompany INAS personnel to the Payment Posts, and per diems of INAS officials on field trips. Moreover, INAS is dependent on allocations from the Ministry of Finance for the number of beneficiaries it can cover, and therefore the payment permits only a small proportion of potential beneficiaries to be covered, mostly in urban areas.

**33. Ellis, F. 2012, "‘We are all poor here’: Economic Difference, Social Divisiveness and Targeting Cash Transfer in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of Development Studies***

The author examines the social acceptability of poverty-targeted transfers and the social divisiveness that they can unintentionally create. One expression of this divisiveness is the perception of community members that "we are all poor here". Even if social transfers are targeted in a participatory, fair, transparent and equitable selection there is a sense of disorientation and unfairness about the selection process after the targeting decisions have been made within communities. The cases of Malawi (The Mchinji Cash transfer Scheme), Zambia (The Zambia pilot cash transfer, originally Kalomo scheme) and Ethiopia are considered using income-distribution data. The article focuses on differences in per capita consumption within the 60 per cent of the population that typifies national and rural income distributions in the poorest countries. It is observed that distributing transfers between administrative units of local governments cannot be done on the basis of a single national population proportion guideline. A striking difficulty discovered is that when there is a "target" population there is another 10 per cent or more households identified as living below the ultra-poverty line and a further 30–40 per cent of households the material circumstances of which do not differ by all that much ('we are all poor here'), so that invidious comparisons between households occur when some receive a benefit and others

do not. In short, because of wide variation across districts (and probably also within districts) in the incidence of severe deprivation, a guideline proportion established for the country as a whole results in inaccurate targeting, with a high prevalence of local inclusion or exclusion errors relative to the varying scale of the deprivation problem in different places.

The author concludes that the budget needs to be allocated in relation to the needs of the localities so that comparisons between households do not occur when some receive a benefit while others do not. Indeed, it is important to note that social transfers that might cause social frictions and do not offer compensating political advantages are unlikely to make much progress in the countries where they are promoted.

**34. Evans, D. 2008, "Tanzania Community-Based Conditional Cash Transfer (CB-CCT) Pilot," PowerPoint presentation, World Bank**

This power point presentation explores the case of the CB-CCT pilot programme, TASAF, in Tanzania. According to the author this project represents both the first time that a household-level conditional cash transfer programme is being delivered using a CBT approach and a social fund agency (TASAF) is being used to implement a conditional cash transfer programme in Africa. The pilot programme will be implemented in three rural districts that participate in TASAF-I covering around 40,000 beneficiary households in 40 villages. Households should meet the following three eligibility criteria: having an OVC or elderly person, being very poor, and not receiving benefits from a programme providing similar benefits in kind or cash. The targeting process is done through Community Management Committees under the oversight of Village Council collecting data from households using special screening forms. Following this, data is entered into the Management Information System including a list of eligible and rejected households to be generated and cross checked by MIS. Subsequently, the validation is done by the Village Assembly and a ranking is done when resources will not cover all eligible households.

The author plans to evaluate TASAF through an impact evaluation based on a survey of households that randomly assigns treatment and control villages for CCT including a qualitative follow up. The author points out that TASAF is faster than other governments, but still has delays. Indeed, he claims a need to coordinate timing between operation and evaluation, and to strengthen local capacity for innovations.

**35. Farrington, J., Sharp, K. and Sjoblom, D. 2007, "Targeting Approaches to Cash Transfers: Comparisons across Cambodia, India and Ethiopia," Social Protection Cash Transfer Series, Overseas Development Institute**

This study is a conceptual review of targeting methods in relation to poverty-focused interventions in the form of

cash and in-kind transfers using empirical evidence from Cambodia, Ethiopia and India. The authors point out that the idea of using CBT is that local knowledge of families' living conditions may provide more accurate criteria, more rapidly, more cheaply, and with fewer demands on human capacity than means tests conducted by a government social worker or a proxy means test. The use of community participation to identify the poor was stronger in Ethiopia and Cambodia.

In Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) the targeting responsibilities are shared between local government and community members through special committees (Food Security Task Forces) which are constituted at community/village kebele (sub-district) and woreda (district level). The most frequent reported problem is the pressure on the task force members to include their friends and family in the beneficiary list; political issues related to the 2005 national legislative elections have been also suspected in some areas. Opposition supporters were excluded from the safety net and ruling party members have made promises about inclusion and resource levels. It is recommended by the PSNP's Programme Implementation Manual that transparency can be improved if the list of beneficiaries is displayed in public for a week; however the majority of rural Ethiopians (70%) are illiterate and the names are read out in community meetings. The level of transparency and the degree of community involvement differ from place to place, being influenced by: high staff turnover and capacity constraints in local government; inadequate appeals process; and little or no record-keeping of complaints and appeals.

In Cambodia, the Identification of Poor Households (IPH) Project, which receives support from GTZ, aims to facilitate efforts to target services and resources to the poor. Village Working Groups (VWG), formed largely by members of the community, identify the poor households in their village. The problem may arise in establishing criteria to identify poor households and the involvement of the community needs to be monitored so the costs for the community members (financial or other) are not excessive.

Community involvement is seen as a tool to increase the accuracy of targeting and reduce costs, however there is the perception that little consideration was given to the costs experienced by community members like time and effort, but also of potential conflict with any who feel that they have been classified to their disadvantage. The authors claim that it is very difficult to assess how well the community targeting system is working without better independent monitoring. Therefore, improvements in the appeals process are needed to increase accountability and transparency. Finally, the design and implementation of selection criteria can have the potential to engage the poor, whether at the level of complaints or to a broader level of "voice" (helping the poor to identify and claim their entitlements). The poor are not fairly represented in public meetings and even if they go they generally do not have

the confidence to speak. As a consequence, simple and transparent criteria are likely to facilitate the engagement by the poor while sophisticated and more complex methods are likely to complicate or frustrate it.

**36. Feulefack, J. and Zeller, M. 2005, "How accurate is participatory wealth ranking (PWR) in targeting the poor? A case study from Bangladesh," Conference on International Agricultural Research for Development**

The authors seek to evaluate the accuracy of PWR in predicting absolute poverty (being below or above the international poverty line of one dollar a day), and compares it with the accuracy of three other tools: 1) The Microfinance Poverty Assessment Tool (PAT) of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), 2) the subjective assessment of the household's poverty status by the interviewer also called "visual impression" (VI), and 3) the Ladder of Life (LL).

To do this, the PWR was carried out in 8 villages from 4 districts in Bangladesh. The field research comprised an LSMS-type household expenditure survey and a PWR. The PWR begins with a community meeting convened by the facilitation team. After discussing the meaning and understanding of poverty in the local context, the people draw a map of all households in the village and complete a card with the name of each household. Only women were asked to join the groups. After filing the cards, each reference group then meets separately and sorts the household cards into piles according to the living standard from high to low. Next, comes the crosschecking whereupon the results of the ranking done by the three reference groups are brought together and the piles are scored. To ensure a consistent implementation of the PWR process, the facilitators were trained in a PWR course at the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development in Comilla, organized by the Microcredit Summit in February, 2004.

The results show that regulated PWR scores can achieve an accuracy of 70 to 90 per cent. Indeed, the so called Total Accuracy of PWR is higher if its scores are calibrated at lower geographical level, and highest if calibrated at the community level. PWR includes other aspects of human behaviour (happiness, all the daughters are married, having friends to rely on, etc.) and is a "consensus" form of ranking which makes it perform better in terms of the predicted poverty rate. In conclusion, for the case of Bangladesh the results confirm the accuracy of PWR as a poverty targeting method for development policies and projects if used at the community level.

**37. Fiszbein, A et al. 2009, "Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty," The World Bank**

This World Bank Report reviews the evidence on conditional cash transfers (CCTs), safety net programmes that have become popular in developing countries over the

last decade. It draws heavily on a large number of carefully constructed impact evaluations of CCT programmes. Some programmes are nationwide, others are niche programmes that serve a regional or narrow target population, and yet others are small-scale pilot efforts. The report shows that almost all CCTs have tried to target their benefits rather narrowly to the poor through a combination of geographic and household targeting (mostly via proxy means testing). Moreover, many programmes use community-based targeting or community vetting of eligibility lists to increase transparency. The report shows there is considerable evidence that CCTs have improved the lives of poor people. Transfers generally have been well targeted to poor households, have raised consumption levels, and have reduced poverty. The report suggests that community-based targeting may play a larger role in Africa and Asia than in Latin America.

The programmes identified that have combined a geographical or PMT method with community validation or assessment are the following: Kenya CT-OVC, Nigeria COPE, Cambodia JFPR, Indonesia JPS, Dominican Republic TAE/ILAE, Peru Juntos, Bangladesh PESP, Bangladesh ROSC, and Pakistan Participation in Education through Innovative Scheme for the Excluded Vulnerable.

**38. Fritzen, S. 2006, "Can the Design of Community-Driven Development Reduce the Risk of Elite Capture? Evidence from Indonesia," World Development**

This paper analyses the Indonesian CDD project, the Urban Poverty Project (UPP), in terms of elite capture at the community level. Data from qualitative field work and surveys carried out in 250 project communities are used to examine two questions. First, how well did project mechanisms, especially democratic selection procedures for the community boards set up to manage project funds, function to reduce the risk that elite status individuals would dominate project decision making? Second, what determined how competently the community boards pursued their tasks, especially with respect to facilitating the participation of the poor in project activities? In other words the author wants to examine whether the leadership exercised by boards was "benevolent" or "pernicious", and why.

Under the UPP, each community received a grant averaging US\$40,000, with small variations based on population size, to fund a range of anti-poverty activities. Activities could fall into three basic categories: microfinance, small-scale infrastructure and training. Activities were to be selected, and the fund itself managed, by a community development board, established exclusively for the project and registered as a legal entity.

There are three important findings in this study. The consistency and quality of project implementation varied radically across localities. Significant variation was observed on how local community boards were selected, the criteria used for the selection of beneficiaries, and

local implementation according to project guidelines and intentions. Second, investments of the project on capacity building, and the degree to which local project staff established cooperative relationships with local boards, arose as significant predictors of the degree to which local boards functioned with competence and targeted the poor for inclusion in project activities. Indeed, the degree to which local election procedures for the boards were democratic, according to project guidelines (many candidates and voters, comprehensive across a sub-district's community blocks) and based on secret balloting, was a consistent predictor of several intermediate project outcomes of interest. These included having a board less dominated by elite status individuals, and facilitating the motivation, effort, competence, and pro-poor attitudes of board members. The third finding is that the extent of elite presence on community boards had little effect on the boards' efforts or performances. Accountability mechanisms and pro-accountability norms matter more. Therefore, the author suggests it is important to distinguish between elite control of project funds and elite capture of project benefits, as Dasgupta and Beards (2006) pointed out. Elites can act and they often do act in the broader impacts of communities. Greater attention should therefore be allocated to understanding the mechanisms that may increase the likelihood that elites will play a constructive role in community development, rather than focusing on means for avoiding elite control that can be unrealistic in many CDD contexts.

**39. Galasso, E. and Ravallion, M. 2005, "Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program," *Journal of Public Economics***

The aim of this paper is to understand the distributional outcomes for the poor of a decentralized antipoverty programme, focusing on the factors that influence these outcomes. The authors offer a model that provides an econometric specification for explaining distributional outcomes when a decentralized targeting is used in anti-poverty programmes. Bangladesh's Food-for-Education (FFE) programme is analysed using the model to understand its targeting performance. The official aim of FFE is to keep the children of poor rural families in school. The federal or provincial government administers the programme across local government areas, but community groups select the beneficiaries. The selection is usually done by the School Management Committee (SMC) whose members are teachers, local representatives, parents, education specialists and donors of the school.

The results show that per-capita allocations from the FFE programme are higher for the poor than the non-poor which is an advantage of the CBT system. Targeting improves as the programme expands so the programme favours the poor's balance of power when it is expanded. Another important result is that the official allocation criteria of the programme do not seem to be of

any relevance to assuring higher gains to the poor from allocation which reveals that the official criteria of poverty is understood in different terms at the community level. However, the results reveal that inequality within villages matters. More unequal villages, in terms of the distribution of land, are worse at targeting the poor; in other words, greater land inequality is related to less power for the poor in village decision making. There is no evidence that CBT reaches the poor better in more unequal villages: the more unequal the original distribution of assets, the better positioned the non-poor to capture the benefit of external efforts to help the poor. Other factors influencing the probability that the poor receive benefits include isolation or substitution between private and public transfers. The conclusion of this study is that the centre is not more accountable to the poor than local communities since the majority of villages achieve a degree of pro-poor targeting at household level.

**40. Garcia, M. and Moore, C. 2012, *The Cash Dividend: The rise of cash transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa*. The World Bank**

This book reviews the results of a detailed investigation of the recent use of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. It aims to understand the evolution and current state of the programmes, their goals, and the challenges associated with using cash transfer programmes in the sub-Saharan environment. The authors highlight that most CTs programmes in sub-Saharan Africa combine different targeting methods to select beneficiaries and CBT is used frequently. They find that more than half of CTs in lower-middle-income countries use CBT, and almost 9 out of 10 do the same in low-income countries. Community involvement is very high in sub-Saharan Africa relying on them in ways beyond those found in other regions. Communities are involved in identification and targeting of beneficiaries, collecting data, verification of information about beneficiaries, cash distribution, monitoring the use of cash and addressing complaints. The benefits of CBT underlined are: easy identification of vulnerable households within the community, familiarity with households' needs and recent shocks they have faced and their willingness to use cash in a responsible way, the low costs of CBT and its potential to inform the community about the CT, involving them in it. However, opportunity costs and social and political costs are mentioned. Concerns such as nepotism or other types of favouritism have been found in the cases of Malawi and Zambia, which is related to the potential exclusion of eligible individuals and households. In sub-Saharan Africa extended family responsibilities and obligations influence this kind of problem. Clear targeting criteria and training of community members is recommended. Another inconvenience is the perception of non-eligible households of injustice or inconsistency especially in the poorest areas where the material differences between eligible and non-eligible



households is very small. Some countries have taken steps. Malawi, for example, does not allow village heads to be on community social protection committees. Malawian SCT has incorporated a verification method involving extension workers which may be more impartial since they are usually from outside the community. Another example is Zambia, which allows local leaders to be involved in targeting but created a confidential appeal process to make the process fairer. Additional checks can involve the complete understanding of CBT by community members. Kenya's CT for orphans and vulnerable children has generated confusion with the selection and a feeling of unfair exclusion or uncertainty of reasons for selection and as a consequence tensions among community members arise. The authors conclude that the use CBT has to be monitored to control abuses such as exclusion or discrimination.

#### **41. Ghorpade, Y. Community-based targeting methods: insights from Tamil Nadu and Orissa**

The aim of this study is to compare the targeting effectiveness of different methods to identify which are more effective in identifying the poor and under which conditions. To do this, the author examines the results of the community wealth grouping (CWG) method and the Below Poverty Line method (BPL) in the states of Orissa and Tamil Nadu. In Orissa, the CWG method consisted in creating a village map drawn by community participants. Then, indicators for each of the groups were discussed and households were slotted into the income groups. In Tamil Nadu community members resisted the categorisation of individual households for their income groups, especially in the higher income categories as they were afraid of conflict and disagreement with other village members. It was observed as well that in Orissa women were either absent or were passive in the exercise. In contrast, in Tamil Nadu between a third and four-fifths were women. Regarding representation of all caste groups in both states it was noted it was fair but particular caste members were cautious to express their views in the presence of other groups.

There are a set of operational and implementation-level challenges highlighted by the author. For example, applying CBT in larger villages might be more difficult, therefore there is a need to balance the different factors around an effective CBT system. Indeed, there is the requirement of well trained and experienced facilitators with CBT methods, like in this case the CWG which is a logistically-demanding qualitative exercise. Facilitators can monitor dominance and capture situations and should be able to deal with a variety of challenges. They must be able to communicate in the local language and to understand the local cultural context. Another important aspect is that there are many local definitions and indicators that are used by communities which are not measurable or clear but they have to be taken into account to identify beneficiary households objectively.

#### **42. Gilligan, D., Hoddington, J., Quisumbing, A. and Sharma, M. 2005, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Community-Based Targeting of Emergency Food Aid in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Malawi," Linking Research and Action. Strengthening Food Assistance and Food Policy Research**

This article examines the effectiveness of CBT in the case of emergencies like droughts or floods. Three different emergencies are analysed: the 1998 floods in Bangladesh; the 2002 drought in Ethiopia; and the 2001-02 failed maize harvest in Malawi.

In Bangladesh, IFPRI researchers evaluated the effectiveness of targeting using a survey of 750 households that was fielded three times over a 15-month period after the floods ended, as well as additional data collected in 2004. Gratuitous Relief (GR) allocated relief directly to the most affected households and it was organized immediately after the flood. The Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) was implemented later and employed criteria such as assets, income occupation and demographics. Both used community targeting. The results show that households that suffered more as a consequence of the flood were three times more likely to receive GR transfers while VGF benefited more the poor rather than those harshly affected by the flood. In addition, 43% of respondents claimed they did not know how assistance was targeted but 50% were able to identify targeting criteria and 75% thought the allocation was fair.

In Ethiopia the National Food Aid Targeting Guidelines promote local community participation to draw up criteria for the allocation of drought relief. In 2004, IFPRI and collaborators surveyed several households in 15 villages in localities covering all major crop growing regions of Ethiopia. These households had been surveyed several times prior to 2002. This pre-drought information made it possible to assess targeting based on ex-ante household characteristics, while the post- drought survey instrument collected information on access to various forms of drought assistance as well as information on other factors that might have affected access to aid. Drought assistance in 2002 was provided principally under the Food-for-Work (FFW) or Employment Generations Schemes (EGS) and the results show that poverty related targeting criteria was poorly understood and not always used but there is no evidence of favouritism to some individuals. In the case of the other form of assistance, Gratuitous Relief (GR), targeting criteria was better understood and there is no evidence of favouritism.

When Malawi's maize harvest failed in 2002 food assistance was provided through the Joint Food Emergency Programme and the General Food Distribution. Assessment of targeting was based on information collected from 529 households in 2001 and 2004 in 19 Traditional Authorities in rural Malawi, supplemented by a community level survey implemented in the same areas in 2004. The results show that targeting criteria were poorly understood by

households or community leaders. Indeed, about a third of the households living in programme areas did not know that aid was being offered through these programmes. In conclusion CBT worked best in Bangladesh, less well in Ethiopia and least well in Malawi. Three important points are noted: first, targeting experience improves targeting performance; second, CBT seems to work better when programmes face tight budgets; third, the more information communities have the more effective the targeting is along with an increase in communities' trust that aid is being distributed with just and correct criteria.

**43. Gomez, R., et al. 2011, Process evaluation of the community based conditional cash transfer (CB CCT) pilot programme of Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), Gesoc, Agencia para el Desarrollo, A.C.**

This report examines the effectiveness of the Community-Based Conditional Cash Transfer (CB-CCT) Pilot Programme developed by the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) since 2008. It assesses targeting, enrolment, coordination with health and education, verification of compliance, payment and case management process. The methodology of this study is consistent with a process evaluation in terms of its content. A qualitative methodology was selected using a range of different research techniques. The programme is based on a CCD approach. It targets poor and vulnerable households and provides them grants depending on beneficiaries keeping children in school and/or taking them to health facilities. The first cash payment was delivered to beneficiaries in November-December 2009.

The programme uses three targeting mechanisms to select beneficiaries. First, geographical targeting. Second, community targeting, whereby within the geographical areas identified for the programme, the programme set a quota in each village (50 per cent of the eligible households), the village council (VC) supported by the Community Management Committee (CMC) selects the poorest 50 per cent of households following the eligibility criteria. Third, a PMT is applied to the list defined by the village council to rank families and define the final beneficiaries. The following achievements were identified: 1) community members, community management committees, and local government authorities were able to manage the targeting process at the community level; 2) the process was mostly implemented as designed in the handbook; 3) activities within the process were clearly defined and appointed to the different stakeholders; and 4) the process was reviewed by the TASAF Management Unit (TMU) and an improved targeting mechanism was put in place with four stages instead of six, considering provisions to reduce errors of inclusion and exclusion and maximizing community based targeting. However the following challenges were found: 1) community validation for poor households was compromised because the final

targeting decision was taken on the basis of Management Information System (MIS) analysis; 2) appeal mechanisms were inadequate; and 3) communities did not participate in the ranking process. Most of these challenges faced can be attributed to design limitations.

The main challenge highlighted in the targeting process is to balance community participation and the statistical verification of households' conditions through a PMT. A new enhanced targeting procedure has been developed by the TMU. Its main challenge is to balance community participation as a tool to prevent exclusion errors with the application of the scoring formula of a PMT to prevent inclusion errors and potential space for fraud and patronage. The new targeting procedure simplifies the steps and gives a major relative weight to community participation. Use of CBT prior to PMT can bring more accuracy in the identification of potential beneficiaries and lessen costs as well as the time needed to collect information.

**44. Grosh, M., Del Ninno, C., Tesliuc, E. and Ouerghi, A. 2008, "The design and implementation of effective safety nets," For protection and promotion, The World Bank**

This book provides an analysis of safety net programmes and their potential effectiveness for the poor and vulnerable. The authors include as common elements in a safety net programme the use of cash transfer or food stamps, in-kind transfers, price subsidies, public works schemes, conditional in-cash or in-kind transfers and fee waivers. When evaluating targeting methods they distinguish CBT as the method that uses a group of community members or leaders whose principal functions in the community are not related to the transfer programme and decide who in the community should benefit. In this definition CBT can include a mix of community members and local officials to determine the beneficiaries. The advantages they highlight are: it relies on local information of individual circumstances, which may be more accurate and less costly than other methods. Indeed, it makes use of local definitions of need and welfare. However, CBT may have other disadvantages: local actors may have other objectives besides good targeting of the programme; the granting or denial of benefits may lower the authority or cohesion of local actors who target community members. Indeed, CBT may carry on or intensify any existing patterns of social exclusion. It may represent unreimbursed administrative costs for the groups that carry out interviews or home visits. Finally, its evaluation can be more difficult and uncertain since local definitions of welfare are used.

The essential requirements of a CBT method are: community members involved have to know the poverty situation of the community, they need an understanding of the programme to make effective decisions and to help those selected to sign up. Indeed, they need to understand some of the goals and concepts behind the rules to make

more effective decisions and be better ambassadors of the programme to applicants along with the legitimacy of the programme. The rest of the community needs to understand the criteria for eligibility so they agree with the decisions taken and they perceive the programme is operating fairly.

The authors conclude that CBT may be most appropriate in communities that are clearly defined and cohesive, for programmes that want to include only a small part of the population, and for temporary or low-benefit programmes that cannot support administrative structures of their own. Since the eligibility decision depends on a community group or agent, the verification process is essential either to the programme or the applicant.

**45. Haenn, N. 1999, "Community Formation in Frontier Mexico: Accepting and Rejecting New Migrants," Human Organization**

This ethnographic study compares two communities in frontier Campeche, Mexico. It describes how farmers within their "ejidos" (Mexico's village political unit) decide who may take up residence in their communities. These new residents are composed by farmers traveling from neighbouring villages in search of wage labour. Ejidos are governed internally by an assembly of ejidatarios who decide access to land, individual participation in development projects, inheritance and village infrastructure. Decisions made in the assembly are written in each village's rule book. Households in the two villages analysed (Orozco and Tejada) participate in small-scale development projects that promote grade-school education, agroforestry, reforestation, intensive cattle ranching, and ecotourism. Development programmes contribute to economic survival in these villages which are located in regions with poor farmland conditions. Each of these projects offers its own package of benefits to participants and an internal committee of villagers oversees its implementation.

However, in Orozco it was observed that through these committees influential farmers compete among themselves for control over development resources in the village and they exclude refugees from development projects. There were cases of "compadrazgo" or shared benefits among the most influential families who have been settled in the "ejido" for a longer time than the others. Indeed, ethnicity plays an important role in the participation of community affairs. It was observed that Spanish-speaking "Mestizo" families tend to dominate village assemblies excluding the indigenous members which are part of the Cholan group. Cholans accuse Mestizos of being heartless and rude and Mestizos accuse Cholans of being silent and unwilling to participate in community affairs. A similar case was noticed in Tejada where Mestizo migrants from the states of Veracruz and Tabasco argue over control of development resources and seniority in villages. This is a case that shows how influential farmers reproduce the monopolization of wealth and power to protect and benefit

themselves. In conclusion, established farmers either accept newcomers to exploit them or reject them to keep the scarce resources. Newcomers have little political voice and a high level of economic insecurity. This article shows the political factors involved in communities' decisions as the beneficiaries of development projects.

**46. Handa, S. et al. 2010, "Evaluating targeting effectiveness from a multidimensional perspective: Case studies from social cash transfer programs in Kenya, Mozambique and Malawi," Chronic Poverty**

The authors of this paper examine three cash transfer programmes: The Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCT), the Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) and Mozambique's Programa Subsidio de Alimentos (PSA) Program. The three programmes employ community based targeting mechanisms but target different kinds of households and employ different methodologies. The authors combine descriptive analysis of the targeting process with quantitative analysis comparing the characteristics of beneficiary households based on national household surveys. The study uses monetary, asset-based, and multidimensional measures to compare the targeting effectiveness of the programme when using economic poverty measures compared to multidimensional measures.

In Kenya, the target group is families with orphans and vulnerable children. Districts are selected based on HIV prevalence. The targeting process is led by the Location OVC Committees (LOC) based on eligibility criteria. LOCs visit all households and all members decide who qualifies. Afterwards, the list is sent to Nairobi and enumerators return to households to further prioritize them based on a ranking system. The results of the study show that targeting is progressive and that beneficiary households in Kenya are similar to those of Malawi: they tend to be headed by older females, have more orphans, and have fewer overall members and much fewer young children. Higher proportions of participants in the programme are poor or 'hard core' poor than national levels.

In Malawi, the target group is the ultra-poor and labour constrained households as identified through CBT. Community members from a Community Social Protection Committee visit each household to verify eligibility and rank each household according to need. Results are published publicly and the District verifies that all applicants qualify. The study shows that the implementation of targeting in the programme seems to be highly effective, with households coming from the poorest deciles of the welfare distribution (97%). In general terms, the targeting performance is significantly progressive.

In Mozambique the target group is the elderly, disabled and chronically-sick that are permanently unable to work and who live alone or are heads of destitute households. Results show that coverage of the programme is very low, reaching less than 20% of its main target group.

The programme is predominantly urban in spite of the fact that expansion to rural areas is a priority. In terms of accuracy of targeting, the PSA is generally known to be successful due to the local knowledge and experience of the “Permanentes”. However, there is some over-inclusion of ineligible households attributed to the limited training of INAS staff and “Permanentes” and difficulty in verifying application information.

In conclusion, based on evidence of these three programmes the paper shows that CBT can be effective in reaching the poorest households. Indeed, the Malawian and Kenyan programmes have higher targeting effectiveness than the median of all programmes analysed in Coady et al’s study, making the Kenya CT-OVC even more effective. In addition, these programmes encouraged systematic participation by beneficiaries and therefore improve community empowerment. Moreover, social acceptance of the programmes may be even more important for social cohesion.

**47. Handa, S., Huang, C., Hypher, N., Texeira, C., Veras, F. and Davis B. Forthcoming, “Targeting effectiveness of social cash transfer programs in three African countries,” *Journal of Development Effectiveness***

This paper analyses three cash transfer programs that employ community based targeting mechanisms in Kenya (Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children CT-OVC), Malawi (Malawi Social Cash transfer Scheme SCT) and Mozambique (Programa Subsidio de Alimentos PSA). Each programme targets different kinds of households and employs different methodologies. The authors do a quantitative assessment of targeting performance, using evaluation data from two programmes, SCT and CT-OVC. They compare the profile of beneficiaries with those of the population at large using nationally representative household surveys, and then develop a comparable, multidimensional measure of well-being and use it to assess targeting performance of each programme.

Kenya’s CT-OVC targets ultra-poor and labour constraints. The CT-OVC incorporates two features of cash transfer programmes found in demonstrations across sub-Saharan Africa: it targets the poor and incorporates community-based identification mechanisms to select programme recipients. The targeting mechanism used by the programme is based on geographic location, community, and individual selection. Malawi’s SCT relies on the community to select beneficiaries through the Community Social Protection Committee (CSPC). Mozambique’s Programa Subsidio de Alimentos (PSA) provides “emergency” type support to urban households with no members able to work and living in absolute poverty so they achieve an adequate diet. It uses CBT through a “Permanente” who is elected by the community and is the intermediary between the beneficiary and the government. The three programmes have demographic

eligibility and poverty criteria. Kenya, in addition employs a proxy means test.

The authors claim that CBT in Africa is under-represented in the recent world-wide assessment of targeting reported in Coady et al. covering 122 programs from the developing world. The results of this study find that CBT as implemented in Africa can be effective in reaching the poorest households. For the three countries the target group is set at the poorest 20%, the demographically eligible group is poorer than the national average. Each of the three African SCT programs have a targeting performance that is better than the 122 programmes assessed by Coady et al. and all do better when restricting the analysis to households with the same demographic eligibility criteria. In conclusion, as Coady et al. noticed, it is the quality of implementation of the targeting instruments rather than the choice of instruments which will affect performance. The results from this analysis show that CBT targeting can be implemented successfully to reach the poor in Africa.

**48. Hanson, K., Worrall, E. and Wiseman, V. Forthcoming, “Targeting services towards the poor: A review of targeting mechanisms and their effectiveness,” in Mills, A., Bennett S. and Gilson L. (eds.) *Health, economic development and household poverty: from understanding to action*, London: Routledge**

The authors of this chapter review the different approaches to targeting that have been applied in health and other sectors, and bring together the existing evidence about their effectiveness. According to the authors, there are three arguments in favour of targeting: efficiency, equity and sustainability. They point out how in health and social policy a range of different types of resource have been targeted towards specific groups, including products, services, vouchers, and cash subsidized by governments or other public bodies. Examples mentioned are targeted free insecticide-treated mosquito nets in Kenya, vouchers for sex workers in Nicaragua, vouchers for insecticide mosquito nets in Ghana and Tanzania, health services in Latin America, among others. The paper points out that the groups targeted in the health field may or may not overlap with the ‘poor’ since the target population are mostly those who are at greatest health risk or with greatest capacity to benefit from an intervention.

Different targeting approaches were adopted in the programmes analysed. Different dimensions of targeting include the degree to which they rely on administrative systems, community members, or self-selection to identify beneficiaries. The authors distinguish, like Conning and Kevane (2001), between “targeting method” which refers to the way beneficiaries are identified (geographical/ categorical, self-targeting, PMT), and “targeting mechanism” which refers to the broader delivery strategy which may include the choice of intermediary for



identifying beneficiaries, the channels for delivery of the benefit and the overall organisational design.

One targeting mechanism is to select the intermediary responsible for actually identifying beneficiaries. This choice may influence the effectiveness of the targeting mechanism, the cost of targeting, and other consequences such as the reinforcement or undermining of community cohesion. The authors recognise a small but growing literature on the use of community-based intermediaries in the targeting programmes. The use of the community may bring advantages such as superior information about each other's resources, needs and circumstances; more accurate targeting and less leakage; and lower costs. However, concerns are recognised like imposing these costs on the community; existence of political or power divisions that influence the allocation of resources undermining equity; or different objectives in comparison with those of external agencies.

The rest of the analysis provides an overview of six different targeting mechanisms that have been applied in the health sector: resource allocation formulae, contracting NGOs, user fee exemptions, cash transfers, vouchers and market segmentation strategies. There is no other mention of the use of community targeting in the health sector. The authors conclude that most evaluations have focused on the outcome (coverage, under-coverage and leakage) but they do not consider other aspects such as costs and sustainability which are issues of concern to policymakers. The study concludes that the importance of implementation issues is coming to be recognised but further analysis is needed.

**49. Hargreaves, J. et al. 2007, "Hearing the voices of the poor": Assigning poverty lines on the basis of local perceptions of poverty. A quantitative analysis of qualitative data from participatory wealth ranking (PWR) in rural South Africa," World Development**

In support of the literature that argues that participatory techniques can be used to generate statistics, the authors describe an application of participatory wealth ranking (PWR) that attempts to combine the strengths of both survey and participatory approaches. The authors focus on two specific goals of poverty appraisal: identifying how many poor households there are and second, assessing their level of poverty. The authors collect data from a population of eight villages of Limpopo Province, South Africa (nearly 10,000 households) using a large scale application of wealth ranking. The method they use combines qualitative and quantitative data to increase the comparability of the information produced across contexts, while the strengths of PWR were maintained since local perceptions of poverty were formally used to classify households into socioeconomic welfare rankings and to assign poverty lines.

The results show that, using this technique, the authors identified a group of 24.4% of households categorized as "very poor" by local PWR participants. A further 7.8% of

households were classified as "poor". Households that were classified as "poor" and "very poor" were characterized by descriptions of well-being indicating a genuine struggle to survive including a need to beg, limited access to food and housing and almost no access to formal employment. The authors point out that even if the study was representative of eight villages the pattern of deprivation may be matched in other rural areas in the province. Indeed, the authors claim that their analysis of PWR data has generated a rich appraisal of the prevalence and depth of poverty in the region. This method, according to the authors, is an example of a novel approach representing a significant departure from classical survey based techniques employed in poverty appraisal and a refinement in the use of PWR.

Finally, the authors found a high level of agreement between the three independent groups that rank each household's well-being within PWR. The findings show that it is unlikely that in general neither did participants know the wealth of households in their own village nor that a small group of participants were able to bias the wealth ranking. PWR produced a highly internally consistent (reproducible) measure of households' wealth. According to the authors, income/expenditure data are generally regarded as the most effective way of capturing household economic status and more comparative studies with PWR would be an important contribution to the literature. This is even more important in a complex rural society where migration, remittances, and social capital are all important components. This paper supports the view that standardized PWR methodology should be investigated as a potentially valid tool for assessment of household wealth.

**50. Hobson, M. 2008, "The productive safety net programme as social protection in Ethiopia," Compendium of papers presented during the international conference on social protection for the poorest in Africa. Learning from experience. Kampala, Uganda.**

The study evaluates Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) which dominates the social protection environment in Ethiopia. The PSNP aims to be a social protection measure with a focus on food security that helps individuals. Having been implemented for three years in sedentary agricultural areas with mixed results, the PSNP was to be expanded to pastoral areas in eastern Ethiopia by 2008.

The author points out the design and implementation issues around the targeting of people entitled to registration for the PSNP. He draws on recent studies to suggest that there are still significant numbers of people who are either benefiting from the PSNP when they are not included in the list or people who believe they have been excluded from benefits. The author claims the following reasons for these targeting errors: first, there is an unofficial quota system for processing people through the PSNP and especially processing Direct Support

beneficiaries (those households that cannot provide labour but which meet the PSNP's targeting criteria and therefore benefit from the PSNP on the basis of need alone); second, the implementation of the PSNP is based mostly on donor funding and concerns are increasing about the PSNP creating household dependency; third, the author points out the lack of community involvement in the process. He remarks that the involvement of community and/or kebele level leaders does not mean the same thing as community involvement in identifying beneficiaries. He suggests a better and serious engagement of the community into the targeting process in order to minimise inclusion and exclusion errors and to ensure community acceptance.

**51. Holden, S. and Lunduka, R. 2010, "The political economy of input subsidies in Malawi: targeting efficiency and household perceptions," NFY-conference**

This study assesses the targeting efficiency and household perceptions of the impacts of the new input subsidy programme based on data collected for the 2007/08 and 2008/09 season through a household survey covering six districts in central and southern Malawi. The authors want to provide evidence on the extent of leakages of coupons and seeds from the administrative/community targeting programme and how these leakages re-enter the rural economies through the informal market.

The Targeted Inputs Program in Malawi used community targeting, as it was previously shown and analysed by Chinsinga (2005). Severe targeting errors were identified and led to the more recent Farm Inputs Subsidy Programme. The programme uses a combination of community targeting and administrative targeting involving District Agricultural Offices and local extension agents in the selection process and distribution of coupons for inputs based on beneficiary lists that have been put together by local leaders in collaboration with local extension staff. The list of households that is established at the local level by traditional leaders is verified by agricultural extension agents and the District Agricultural Offices.

Leakages have been identified meaning the number of free coupons that reaches many of the villages is lower than it should be. The results show that 68% and 75% of the households received coupons for fertilizer in 2007/08 and 2008/09 but they received on average less than the standard package of two bags. Actually only 11% of female-headed households and 29% of male-headed households received the full package. Households with more livestock were more likely to have received free coupons, which was also the case for households with more children. It was common that the packages were split and distributed such that a larger share of households received at least one coupon for fertilizer or seeds. There were also cases where fertilizer bags were split among households, showing that the egalitarian idea is strong in the communities. There is no clear indication that poorer

and more vulnerable households were significantly more likely to be recipients. The results show that the TIP program in 2001/02 appeared more able to reach the poor and vulnerable than the current subsidy programme in which vulnerable households have been excluded while better-off households have been included.

Another finding is a high leakage of coupons. The leaked coupons and some of the fertilizer are traded in informal markets which become an alternative source of subsidized inputs. This sale of coupons and cheap fertilizers does not come from households that first received free coupons and then sold them. The author claims that they must come from leakages higher up in the system. Overall, improvement of the administrative targeting will require enforcement of transparency and accountability at all levels.

**52. Horn Relief 2007, Guidelines for cash interventions in Somalia, Horn Relief**

These guidelines for Cash Interventions in Somalia have been designed as a way of harmonising existing guidelines as well as the experience of agencies working in Somalia. They are intended for all agencies in Somalia in order to present a common approach to programming for food security and livelihoods activities. They consider the minimum assessment and planning processes that agencies should go through when designing cash interventions.

Targeting is a key aspect of project implementation in Somalia. The guidelines highlight that it has to be ensured that targeting is done in a transparent and participatory way. A transparent and clear targeting method has the potential to reduce the risks to beneficiaries as the community will be clear about why specific groups are being targeted while others are not. To avoid corruption it is important to use clearly and verifiable targeting criteria and verify beneficiary lists. Selection criteria should be developed together with the community and it has to be clear so it can be easily verified. To reduce conflict the guidelines recommend community mobilisation and awareness about the purpose of the projects and groups to be targeted. Also important is the participation of the community and community leaders throughout the project cycle.

In conclusion, when resources are limited or when only certain groups need assistance, CBT is seen by many agencies as the most appropriate way to identify beneficiaries in Somalia. These guidelines recommend the "Horn Relief Guide" which explains the Inclusive Community Based Targeting (ICBT) method including how to ensure committee representation, working with village relief committees and determining selection criteria.

**53. Horn Relief 2007, A practical guide to cash-based response in emergencies, Oxfam Novib**

This manual by Horn Relief aims to solidify and share the Inclusive Community Based Targeting (ICBT) methodology, developed for use in various cash programmes which have most commonly been a combination of cash grants and

cash for work projects. To ensure that the most food-insecure or vulnerable households benefit, Horn Relief has made use of its ICBT approach, which has proven to be an effective methodology in the case of rural and particularly pastoral areas of Somalia.

According to the manual, both community members' views and concerns in the development of target criteria and the size of the grant are essential to ensure accountability. Afterwards, a public meeting involving all members of the community who can realistically attend should first be held to share information about the planned project and establish the role and responsibilities of the Village Relief Committee (VRC) members. The next step is the setting up of a VRC composed of a 50% representation of women and to include well respected members and representatives of minority groups. It is important that project staff monitor the process and the VCR. Then, the VRC starts the preliminary identification of beneficiaries based on the vulnerability selection criteria determined by the agency. Later, the agency should verify the initial beneficiary list through extensive informal consultation and randomly visiting households. Finally, the revised list should be read in public to be endorsed by the community. It is important that community members raise their voices and engage in discussions along with complaint and response mechanisms. It is highlighted that local ownership should be promoted at every level and that it is important to analyse the potential negative impacts of the project on the economy, on communities, clans and social dynamics, potential interpersonal or inter-clan conflict, religious differences and gender imbalance. Indeed, it is important to ensure non-discrimination and that projects are not influenced by any external ideological or political pressures of family or clan interests. Finally, women's participation is encouraged both within VRCs and as beneficiaries due to the positive impact they have on preventing cash misuse. In conclusion, this manual shows how to effectively engage the community throughout projects and the potential it has during the targeting process.

**54. Hossain, N. 2007, The politics of what works: the case of the Vulnerable Group Development Programme in Bangladesh, Chronic Poverty Research Centre**

The author of this working paper explores how political ideologies, interests and alliances at national and local levels have influenced the establishment, evolution and maintenance of the Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) programme in Bangladesh, a large-scale programme of resource transfers and development interventions targeted at the poorest women, which has been in place since 1974. The paper is based on a review of the programme literature, stakeholder interviews, and on other recent empirical research into the politics of poverty in rural Bangladesh. The inputs of the programme include a monthly ration of 30 kg of wheat (sometimes wheat and

rice) and a savings facility and training programme. The beneficiaries receive a VGD membership card that should be kept with them. The Union Committee prepares a list which then goes up the chain of command: to the upazila and then to the district VGD committee chair (who is the District Commissioner) and to the Relief and Rehabilitation Directorate. The VGD programme draws on the local knowledge and administrative arrangements of local government in the expectation that this will take full advantage of the effectiveness and accuracy of targeting. The author claims that this triangular relationship between Government, local government officials and the community's poor is the central point in explaining the politics of what works in the VGD programme.

The author's results show that once the number of cards at the union level has been fixed, the process of selecting recipients from within the community is deemed to be generally quite fair. These resources are merely fit into and support a pre-existing system. It is important to note that the single most important group in the implementation of VGD is the local political elite. Through committees set up for the purpose, they are responsible for the selection of beneficiaries, allocation of cards, and delivery and disbursement of grain. However, the author suggests that there is less "leakage" from corruption than is popularly perceived. Instead, it seems that the programme's importance to local political leaders is closely linked to the scope it gives them for patronage of the poor. However, the author notes that while women selected for the VGD are almost all eligible, many more are excluded (up to 90 per cent) despite their eligibility. Leakage is a problem, but is not related to corruption. Bias in beneficiary selection is a more complex issue. Members selected are of the right profile but the process may be biased to reward political support without compromising programme goals, particularly in areas with a high concentration of eligible people. This is definitely part of the local political-patronage system.

In conclusion, the programme reaches the poorest reasonably effectively because it responds to the need for local political elites to continually rebuild their political capital through support for the vulnerable poorest within their communities. The well-connected poorest are included, but so are those who lobby actively on their own behalf for inclusion. This article gives evidence that decentralised targeted poverty reduction programmes can simultaneously serve both political and poverty reduction ends in the Bangladesh context.

**55. Hossow, N. 2010, Operational poverty by proxy means tests. Models and policy simulations for Malawi, Thesis, Department of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences in the Tropics and Subtropics, University of Hohenheim**

This study explores potential methods and models that might improve the targeting efficiency of agricultural and

development policies in Malawi. Specifically, it explores if targeting by proxy indicators is more targeted and cost-efficient than the 2000/2001 Starter Pack and the Agricultural Input Support Programme (AISP), both administered by CBT systems. The author developed two proxy means test models for rural and urban Malawi based on quantile regression. The costs, benefits, and impacts of targeting under the proxy system are compared to the performances of universal interventions and the community-based targeting system.

According to the author the CBT methods have not worked in Malawi since programmes have not efficiently targeted the beneficiaries. Only 65% and 64% of the poor received benefits under the Starter Pack and AISP programmes, respectively. Indeed, their leakages rates amount to 62% and 54%, respectively. This is caused by different issues such as local perceptions, favouritism, abuse, lack of understanding of targeting criteria, political interests, difficulty of evaluations, the tendency of communities to modify criteria to suit their interests, etc. According to this study, almost all interventions are poorly targeted in the country and some of them are too costly to sustain.

The results of the author suggest that the new system is fairly accurate and more target-efficient than the currently used mechanisms for targeting agricultural inputs in the country. Likewise, the simulation results indicate that targeting the poor and smallholder farmers is more cost and impact effective than universal coverage of the population. Furthermore, the newly designed system appears to be more cost-efficient than the 2000/2001 Starter Pack and the 2006/2007 AISP. Thus, under the new system it is possible to reduce leakage and undercoverage rates considerably and thus improve the cost and transfer efficiency of development programmes in the country.

In conclusion, under the CBT system, programmes are not benefiting the intended individuals and therefore they are unlikely to achieve their outcomes and bring economic development to the country. The suggested proxy system can also be combined with other targeting methods in the view of the author. For example, the system can be combined with geographical targeting to target regions with disproportionate numbers of poor and then target poor households within these regions.

#### **56. Houssou, N. and Zeller, M. 2011, "To target or not to target? The costs, benefits, and impacts of indicator-based targeting," Food policy**

This article examines if an indicator-based system is more target and cost-efficient in reaching the poor than the current CBT system used in agricultural subsidies in Malawi. For their research, the authors use the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) data. The IHS2 was carried out from March 2004 through March 2005 and covered a sample of 11,280 households that were selected based on a two-stage stratified sampling process and a Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) design.

This sample is representative at national as well as district levels. Due to substantial differences between rural and urban areas, separate models were estimated for rural and urban households. These models were fitted using quantile regression weighted by household weight. After estimation, out-of-sample validation tests were conducted to assess the predictive power of the models.

According to the authors their proposed system appears to be more target and cost-efficient than the 2000/2001 Targeted Input Programme (TIP) and the 2006/2007 Agricultural Input Support Programme (AISP) which rely on CBT. The authors find that while TIP and AISP transferred about 50% of total transfer, under their proposed system 73% of transfers are delivered to the poor and smallholder farmers. Indeed, the costs of leakage to the non-poor are cut by more than 50%. CBT has not been effective due to different factors as various local perceptions, favouritism, loosely defined or misunderstood targeting criteria, and political interests. The conclusion of the authors is that CBT is not effective and the system they propose can benefit poor and vulnerable poor while the costs of implementation are lower.

#### **57. Hunter, S. 2002, "Supporting and expanding community-based HIV/AIDS prevention and care responses: a report on save the children (US) Malawi COPE Project," Save the Children Federation**

This discussion paper analyses the COPE-Community-based Options for Protection and Empowerment pilot project initiated by Save the Children in Malawi. It relies heavily on the work and documentation prepared by Save the Children/Malawi's COPE Programme staff and other Malawi Field Office professionals.

COPE started in 1995 and its aim was to provide direct services to prevent and mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS on children, families and communities in one district. Over the years, the programme evolved and expanded to four districts, covering 9% of the national population. The goal of COPE is to mobilize sustainable community action utilizing local social infrastructures and a three tier structure: District AIDS Coordinating Committees (DACCs), Community AIDS Committees (CACs) and Village AIDS Committees (VACs). Through COPE, communities are assisted in developing a sustainable "package" of services for HIV/AIDS prevention, care and mitigation that addresses the needs of AIDS-affected families, including orphans and vulnerable children.

The community decides what services are needed and develops criteria for targeting assistance to the most needy; services depend on community resources and ability to raise funds. Village AIDS Committee (VAC) members receive training to understand the needs of their communities and respond more effectively by organizing and leading task-oriented groups within their villages. Normally, VACs enumerate the households within their village, identify families and children most in need of



assistance and target resources and services to the most needy. They also monitor their well-being, and tailor assistance to changing family needs.

The results show that services are fairly targeted, most VACs targeted services and benefits efficiently, transparently and fairly according to the availability of resources, without enormously complicated bureaucratic review procedures. If they do not, services are not sustained and VACs lose support. Other frequently cited benefits to participating communities include: community-cohesiveness, increased awareness of HIV/AIDS and its consequences, involvement, participation and empowerment to deal with orphans, peace of mind for HIV+ parents in the knowledge that when they die, the community will take care of their surviving children.

**58. Hurrell, A., Mertens, F. and Pellerano, L. 2011, "Effective targeting of cash transfer programmes in an African context: Lessons learned from the on-going evaluation of two cash transfer programmes in Kenya," Paper Prepared for the Special IARIW-SSA Conference on Measuring National Income, Wealth, Poverty, and Inequality in African Countries**

The authors of this paper evaluate two case studies of targeting challenges by analysing two cash transfers programmes. The first one is the cash transfer programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) which targets poor OVC households in 37 districts in Kenya and provides regular cash transfers. The second one is the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) which is in start-up phase and pilots three targeting mechanisms to identify 60,000 extreme poor/food insecure households in 13 districts in northern Kenya. Both evaluations include an assessment of targeting effectiveness.

The CT-OVC uses a hybrid targeting method combining PMT and consultation with the community. However, the role of the community is limited to the final check of eligibility and level of vulnerability. The results of this research show that this community method hardly changed the final list and it was more a tool to announce the list generated by the programme on the basis of information gathered by field officers. The perception of the community was that this meeting did not give them the opportunity to challenge the list.

The HSNP is on its initial pilot phase and employs three alternative targeting mechanisms to evaluate their effectiveness, one of which is CBT. The specific problem of the CBT method was that even if it was used for food aid distribution in the project areas, there is the fear that communities do not always successfully identify the poorest households. Another problem in its design is that a national ID card is required to be a recipient. However, many households in the four HSNP greater districts do not have national ID cards and for this reason they could be excluded. Another problem is that the HSNP requires applicants to physically meet the HSNP Administration

teams and this could potentially exclude many nomad households, many of whom may be chronically poor and therefore should really be included in the programme. A final potential problem relates to the fact that implementation is being undertaken by international NGOs, albeit in collaboration with local partner organisations. This is being done because the local administration systems are not seen to have the capability to do this.

In conclusion, the authors point out that implementation is a key feature. Even if the targeting mechanism is well designed, it may fail if its implementation is not effective in identifying and enrolling eligible households and minimising fraud and corruption.

**59. International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 2007, Guidelines for cash transfer programming, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement**

These guidelines are based on the extensive and different cash transfer experiences within the Movement and the humanitarian sector. Their aims are to both help to decide whether a cash programme is an appropriate response and to offer guidance about how to design and implement a cash programme. The report highlights that when targeting is needed its first level has to be geographical since it can act as the first filter. Afterwards, deciding the targeting approach and criteria are essential to identify people to be assisted. Possible risks are mentioned when choosing a CBT methodology: community leaders may include their own family; in some emergency situations community structures may have broken down; women might be excluded from the process; socially marginalized groups may be excluded; committees may judge eligibility according to long-term vulnerability rather than need in the particular emergency; interpretation of criteria may vary from location to location; communities may not feel ownership of the criteria; it may only benefit those who register first; the household, elderly, etc., may not be able to come and register, and therefore risk being excluded. However, one of the advantages of using CBT in emergencies is that it is often the most effective safeguard against inclusion errors.

Some recommendations are offered to reduce the potential problems of CBT in emergency situations. It is important to ensure representative, transparent relief committees. It is recommended to use a combination of selection committees (community and governmental). It is important to make an effort to include minority groups in the selection process and to ensure there is awareness of groups that may be excluded. Indeed, it is important to involve the recipient community directly in the programme management, the monitoring and the evaluation, including those who are not beneficiaries.

To ensure the community is consulted and involved as much as possible in the targeting process a series of steps are recommended: find out about local community social

structures and local welfare structures; hold a meeting with local community leaders to explain the programme's aims and process of selection; and the entire community should select committee members. In this phase it is important that the committee agrees with the selection criteria and with the process. Indeed, it is important that there is an equal representation of women, ethnic groups, etc. Subsequently, it is important to state who is entitled to the transfer so many eligible people are informed about the programme and enhance community support. Finally, it is recommended that the final list generated by the committee is discussed in public meetings and the final decision on the approval of applications may rest at the district level.

To finish, the report gives advice on when CBT is not appropriate: in situations of severe conflict where there is no community cohesion, where the differences in wealth or need within communities are not easily identifiable, where it is only possible to target a small proportion of the population, where the community does not cooperate in the targeting process, or when targeting must be done rapidly in case of a disaster.

#### **60. Jaspars, S. and Shoham J. 1999, "Targeting the vulnerable: a review of the necessity and feasibility of targeting vulnerable households," Disasters**

The authors examine how to target the most vulnerable in complex emergencies, in particular emergency food aid. One of these methods is the use of "community-based relief committees" (RC) to identify the most vulnerable households within their communities and distribute food to them. The article analyses this method which was applied in South Sudan, Kenya and Tanzania in emergency contexts. The authors base their analysis on case study material and a revision of literature review.

In Tanzania, members of the RC register households according to agreed selection criteria. In Kenya, members of the RC carry out wealth ranking of all households in the community. In South Sudan, the chiefs meet with clan leaders to determine the number of households to be targeted in each village.

The paper examines the difficulties with CBT, particularly in war situations. The authors found that when using CBT methods the reasons for failures are the following: First, selection criteria are influenced by the donor's perceptions of vulnerability and entitlement to food aid. These perceptions are different for communities and outsiders. Local people may consider that everyone is affected to some degree and are entitled to food aid. As a consequence, in most cases beneficiaries have to share their food with non-beneficiaries and food aid is redistributed among the entire community. Second, community representatives do not necessarily prioritise the most vulnerable. Community representatives tend to exclude socially and politically vulnerable groups (female headed households, lone elderly people, displaced people) and favour their own people. Third, powerful political

or military motivations by warring parties may make it almost impossible to ensure that all food aid reaches the most vulnerable.

However, the authors identify cases when CBT works. One case is Tanzania in 1998 in response to a severe pest attack on maize, sorghum and millet crops. The factors that made CBT work are: there was peace and stability; there was no excessive stress; a high proportion of the community was targeted with assistance; there was a well-established structure of the village; the participatory approach was consistent with national policy and initiatives already taken in the region; there was a common aim, understanding and support from local and national government; and the ability to identify a reliable community representative. In conclusion, the authors claim that in emergency situations targeting vulnerable households is either inappropriate or not achievable. Effective targeting cannot be achieved in all situations and sometimes it may be inappropriate or harmful.

#### **61. Jehu-Appiah, C. et al. 2010, "Efficiency, equity and feasibility of strategies to identify the poor: An application to premium exemptions under National Health Insurance in Ghana," Health Policy**

The authors aim to identify potential strategies to identify the poor, and to judge their efficiency, equity and feasibility. The analysis is illustrated by the case of premium exemptions under the National Health Insurance (NHI) in Ghana. The NHI makes a provision for premium exceptions for the core poor, however only a small proportion benefits. This is related to implementation problems at identifying the poor in the absence of clear guidelines/criteria and lack of detailed costing analysis to implement and fund the mandate.

The authors conducted a literature search in Medline. In total 62 articles were selected for inclusion in their analysis and were classified into four broad strategies to identify the poor: 1) means testing; 2) proxy means testing (PMT); 3) geographic targeting (GT) and 4) participatory welfare ranking (PWR). After this, the authors estimated the implementation cost for three out of four strategies: PMT, GT and PWR in two regions in Ghana, one with relatively low levels of poverty and the other one with relatively high levels of poverty. Total costs of strategies were estimated as the sum of the surveys costs to identify the poor, and costs of premium exemptions. The authors defined the efficiency of the different strategies as the cost per identified poor individual.

The results show that PMT, PWR, and GT achieve efficiency and equity objectives to different degrees. On the one hand, PWR appears the least costly and therefore most efficient strategy, but it is also the least equitable. In the other hand, GT covers all (poor) individuals in a given area, and is therefore the most equitable but also the most costly. Therefore, the authors propose a simple decision framework on a number of criteria: feasibility of implementation (determined by the extent of urbanization

and administrative complexity), efficiency (determined by poverty incidence) and equity.

Finally, the authors recommend PMT as an optimal strategy in relatively low poverty incidence urbanized settings, and PWR as an optimal strategy in relatively low poverty incidence rural settings. PWR was successfully applied in rural settings where it allows communities to determine which households or individuals can be exempted based on their own local criteria. It allows ranking households by prioritizing the allocation to those in greatest need, and it provides an opportunity to capture new settlements, such as street children or orphans who are traditionally missed by surveys. The potential disadvantage is that the method relies on detailed knowledge of the community structures and households, and is as such unlikely to work in urban contexts where the community networks are weak.

**62. Jones, N., Vargas, R. and Villar, E. 2007, "Conditional cash transfers in Peru: tackling the multi-dimensional of childhood poverty and vulnerability," Forthcoming chapter in Alberto M. et al. (ed.) 2007, Social Protection Initiatives for Families, Women and Children**

This is an analysis of Peru's first conditional cash transfer programme Juntos ("Together"). The study draws on documentary analysis and fieldwork in two communities in Ayacucho Department, the first region in which the pilot phase of the program was implemented. The qualitative research involved key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

Juntos targets poor children under the age of 14 years and aims to promote human capital development and breaks inter-generational transfers by ensuring children's rights to adequate nutrition, healthcare and education. The targeting system combines geographic targeting, household targeting and a process of community validation of potential beneficiaries. The final stage, community validation, brings together the community, local authorities and education and health sector personnel.

The aim is to recognize if the first two stages accurately identified errors of exclusion and inclusion. Once the list of beneficiaries is publicly displayed it is almost impossible to change the decision. Different problems have been acknowledged: even if it has been possible to exclude better-off beneficiaries, community members often prefer not to speak out about who should be excluded due to community power relations. Indeed, when some families are included and others are not, and when there is not enough clarity about the reasons, it generates feelings of sadness, resentment and anger. Moreover, families who do not receive the cash transfer have fewer resources to purchase school items and clothes or to give children pocket money which generates exclusion among children. Some interviewees mentioned that some children do not want to assume responsibilities at school as they consider

they should be done by the beneficiaries or "workers of juntos" who are getting paid. The same effect is observed among women who participate in community activities, meetings organized by the health sector, or paying joint fees for communal water. This could increase the political violence and community tensions that were present in those communities even before the implementation of Juntos.

However, in spite of the initial uncertainty, beneficiaries seem to believe that Juntos is making a positive difference in their lives. The authors propose that more resources are needed to include non-beneficiaries who deserve the cash transfer. At a minimum, it is necessary to create information and complaint channels and mechanisms for re-evaluating excluded families, including those with specific needs like single mothers and those who fall into poverty but were originally excluded.

**63. Kabbeer, N. et al. 2010, "Social protection in Asia: research findings and policy lessons. Programme synthesis report 2010," Social Protection in Asia**

This report evaluates the second phase (2007-2010) of the Social Protection in Asia (SPA) research and policy networking programme. The research was carried out in six Asian countries: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam and China. This second phase is concerned with informality, specifically those sections of the population who are excluded from formal social security systems and who must either work for their living in the informal economy or are dependent on others who do. These groups in question are the rural elderly and international migrants in Vietnam and China and the extreme poor, particularly women in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. The report analyses the various interventions based on a list of reports and publications.

One of the main findings of the report is that social protection support from the state is frequently driven by political considerations. One of the consequences is that particular groups are more likely to remain excluded from formal social protection systems. In each context particular groups are more likely to remain excluded (the rural elderly in China, migrants, the very poorest in Bangladesh). The lack of an adequate understanding of the situation, constraints, priority needs and preferences of these excluded groups can lead to interventions that are inappropriate and a waste of resources. One of the consequences is that civil society and communities can experiment with initiatives that provide alternative social protection to excluded groups. The authors claim that when evaluating a social protection programme's effectiveness is not only about the quality of implementation that matters, but also the "fit" between programme design and local needs. Local government officials are often better positioned to adapt programmes to the need and constraints of their areas, but may be influenced by local politics and power structures.

Moreover, the report highlights that expanding social protection is not only about expanding provisions but also about strengthening the capacity of the poor to make demands and claim entitlements. For example, the lack of a stable residence is often a barrier to access other benefits and reduces the likelihood of being reached by governments or NGO programmes. Social marginalisation in the Asian context is closely linked to local rights and privileges relating to homesteads and other residential and social uses of land. The example of Pakistan shows that the more upwardly mobile groups among the marginalised were in a better position to claim their inclusion in any scheme of regularisation process, however the beneficiaries were often those who were already engaged in active contests with local elites or state authorities over entitlements to residential land. An important finding reported is that the requirement of collective action to active regularisation led to strengthening group identity and willingness to act collectively.

Finally, the report points out that strengthening the capacity of the poor to make demands and claim entitlements is essential for the expansion of social protection. Programmes that require people to claim their entitlements can lead to a better position for the poor at negotiating their interests vis-à-vis powerful elites and to challenge customary privileges.

**64. Kakwani, N. and Subbarao K. 2011, Improving community based-approaches to targeting safety net programmes: a case study from Rwanda, The World Bank**

The authors provide a new targeting efficiency indicator and show the results of the application of a proxy means test in Rwanda with the objective of improving the current community-based approach of the Vision 2020 Umerenge Program (VUP). To do this, the authors developed a new targeting efficiency index, estimated a Proxy Means Test and derived possible indicators that predict a household to be in poverty, at varying levels of statistical significance. The Government of Rwanda under the VUP has introduced three social assistance programmes: Public works (PW), direct support (DS) and financial services (FS). “Ubudehe” is the main vehicle to identify the beneficiaries under the VUP programs. “Ubudehe” identifies extremely poor households using some kind of consensus within communities. Through this system, social maps have been generated in 15,000 villages in Rwanda, which have been used to assess the extent of extreme poverty in all villages. The information from the social maps is used as well to measure the performance of holding national government and relevant ministries accountable against commitments made. The “Ubudehe” system can provide a reasonably good assessment of households’ poverty status within communities. Nevertheless, its main disadvantage is that it cannot provide comparable income poverty assessments of similarly placed households that belong to

different communities. Therefore, the authors claim that there will not be consistency across the country in the selection of poor households and the programme risks not treating all households in the country in the same way irrespective of which communities households belong to, creating horizontal inequity. Therefore, the authors seek to complement and strengthen this system so that the degree of horizontal inequity is reduced (if not eliminated). They propose a modification of the “Ubudehe” system along the line of a community based monitoring system (CBMS) in which communities collect information on core poverty indicators in an organized way.

The modification is proposed in two steps. The first step consists of developing a PMT at the national level using a national household survey. The PMT would be able to identify the variables that are closely related to households’ poverty status. The second step involves collecting information from households based on the variables identified in the first step. The communities may conduct this survey on a regular basis and may identify poor households using the decision rule designed at the first step. Therefore, the authors propose having a community-based monitoring as well as targeting system that has greater objectivity and consistency across the country, combining both subjective and objective criteria, thus minimizing targeting errors. Through this method, communities can have the chance to include some households missed out in the quantitative selections or exclude those who communities believe are wrongly picked.

**65. Kohler, G., Cali, M. and Stribu, M. 2008, “Rethinking poverty: a discussion on social policies in Nepal - Child-centered social protection,” Paper submitted for the International Conference: “Child poverty and disparities: public forces for social justice, Cairo**

This paper suggests a child-centred policy proposal in Nepal. It presents a case study on the “theory and practice” of developing child-sensitive social protection in a post-conflict environment. In order to understand the perception of targeting children from the point of view of Nepali communities, UNICEF conducted ten focus group discussions (FGDs) in different regions of Nepal, with men and women of different socio-economic backgrounds and ethnic/caste groups.

All FDGs concluded that targeting may be problematic, nurturing divisions within the community or be perceived as unjust. One participant gave an example of this problem stating “who are the poor in a sea of poor”, others claimed that children’s rights are universal and cash transfers should be made available to all children in Nepal. The majority of participants in the FDGs voted for universality rather than a targeting system or targeting of only one group. The FDGs also pointed out the importance of appropriate and equal information to ensure everyone is included, especially the most disadvantaged. In practice,



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given the limited resources of the grant per child, the benefit is expected to be self-targeting as only those who need it will make the effort to collect it.

**66. Krishna, A. 2007, "For reducing poverty faster: target reasons before people," *World Development***

This paper discusses the steps that are taken when the objective of the aid effort is to reduce poverty. The first step is to identify the reasons for poverty. The second step is to develop a programme that tackles these particular issues. The third step is to identify the people who need the support. The author argues that attention has been given to the third step when the first and the second steps have been ignored from the analysis. In other words, it has been an error to focus on the "whom" to target instead on the "what" to target.

The author points out the different factors related to administrative cost, conflictive incentive effects, and political viability that have tended to challenge the process of targeting beneficiaries. From the beginning targeting is imperfect since information about the poor is flawed and not costless to obtain. The author identifies four mechanisms to target beneficiaries: indicator targeting, geographical targeting, community-based targeting, and self-targeting. Community based targeting is based on the unquestionable fact that there is richer and more accurate knowledge about poverty at the local level. The problem is that this knowledge is not always appropriately used. Indeed, it is noticed that inequality within villages may actually worsen if local elites capture processes of decision making and benefit from distributions. However, even if inequalities cannot be eliminated they can be ameliorated if the decisions are publicly justified through a transparent analysis and do not remain as an arbitrary process. Combinations of targeting methods have usually been applied, however results have been mixed and evaluations have been generally not progressive. The author claims that targeting beneficiaries has not led to a reduction of poverty, but rather has been more useful for relief programmes that act as social safety nets (Coady et al., 2004). "Who" to target is the first part of the puzzle and the essential "what" to target has been ignored. The result is that even if some people are escaping poverty more new poverty is being created strengthening the dynamic of poverty.

The author concludes that targeting resolves only one part of the problem. It helps those who are currently poor by allocating resources. It can also direct resources towards the newly impoverished, although after and not before they have fallen into poverty. However, it is not well-defined how these resources are going to affect the reduction of poverty. It is essential that programmes are designed in a way that directly targets the factors that can take poor people out of poverty in a particular context, otherwise they may offer only temporary relief and the impact on poverty reduction may be minimal.

**67. Leite, P. 2011, "Improving the targeting of the Community Based Conditional Cash Transfer (CB-CCT) program in Tanzania," *Draft***

In this note the author reviews the current implementation of the CB-CCT programme and proposes a new implementation strategy that is assessed to measure its expected targeting accuracy based on household data collected in 183 households from three new villages. The CB-CCT is a pilot programme designed to alleviate poverty and improve human capital of children in poor areas of Tanzania. The programme is implemented by the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) and it delivers cash to poor families that comply with health and education conditionalities. Children, pregnant women and the elderly living in beneficiary households must have regular health check-ups and children must attend school. The programme is based on a decentralized process where local government authorities are responsible for managing the programme and the Village Council (VC) and, principally the Community Management Committee (CMCs) are responsible for implementation, management at the village levels, including identification of the poorest and most vulnerable households in the community. However, the areas of implementation are selected geographically and the selected households must be screened applying PMT.

The role of the community is to reduce inclusion and exclusion errors and as a consequence, increase targeting accuracy. However, many issues during this stage have been identified: programme eligibility rules were considered too complicated; CMCs received a weak and short training on how to manage the programme, on their responsibility as supervisors, the programme rules/objectives and data collection; CMC had limited voice on selecting the beneficiaries and their role was to expand the list to have household level information from at least 50% of households with elderly or children; weak community validation and appeals process; weak information campaign to present the programme to villagers, especially in more urbanized areas; programme credibility affected due to ambiguities in a stage of the eligibility process; high costs for revisiting households; and programme ranking process and beneficiaries selection was giving priority to larger families. As a consequence, programme implementation had a negative impact on targeting accuracy.

The conclusion of this evaluation is that a new process is needed with the following characteristics: better training and better programme allocation of funds; improved PMT model; and higher participation of the community in the process, making use of the main advantages of community knowledge of the population.

**68. Lembani, M. 2006, "Assessing the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Targeting Methods in Public Works Programmes in Malawi: The Case of MASAF and CARE managed programmes in the Central**

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## **Region of Malawi,” Institute of Social Development, University of Western Cape**

The author’s aim is to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of Community-Based Targeting and self-targeting methods in the selection of beneficiaries in safety nets programmes in Malawi. This study is focused on Public Works Programmes managed by MASAF and/or CARE which targets relatively high numbers of people and have used both methods. The study used both quantitative and qualitative research methods to collect data on comparing the effectiveness of CBT and self-targeting. The community members were required to objectively assess the poverty levels of each household in their community. This was done by conducting community meetings in the form of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

There are three ways in which CBT is carried out in Malawi. The first one includes Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools such as social mapping and wealth ranking to select beneficiaries with the aid of a Community Based Facilitator (CBF). The second approach involves the chief only or the chief and a few people decide who they think deserves to participate in the programme. The third approach is similar to the first one but a CBF is not used since it is the chief that facilitates the process with all the villagers present and they decide together who they think should participate in the programme.

The results show that CBT is more effective at targeting the poorest compared to self-targeting. On the other hand self-targeting proved to be more efficient in administrative costs related to targeting compared to CBT. The factors identified which contributed to poor CBT were the following: some people complained that the CBT process was unfair, in that many poor people could not be present on the selection day and were excluded. Indeed, people do not want to categorize themselves in poor classifications claiming that they are all poor or because they prefer to avoid conflict. Moreover, the methodology is costly for some donors (e.g. training community representatives) and time-consuming as it involves PRA exercises. However, the general feeling of the people is that CBT is a better choice for targeting the poor, with the involvement of someone from outside in the targeting process. To improve CBT in MASAF the author recommends that communities should be trained on how to conduct CBT targeting. Indeed, developing very clear standard indicators to identify beneficiaries may improve outcomes since when communities use their own indicators they tend to fail since their standards are too general. Finally, PRA should be encouraged since it increases transparency and therefore reduces community conflicts.

### **69. Lentz, E. and Barrett, C. 2005, Food aid targeting, shocks and private transfers among East African pastoralists, SAGA**

This study uses frequency panel data among Ethiopian and Kenyan pastoralists to explore how efficacy varies

by targeting modality, how food aid flows affect private transfers, and how food aid responds to covariate shocks. The focus is on pastoral households in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL).

In Southern Ethiopia food aid to households was determined by self-targeting food-for-work schemes (FFW) or free food distribution (FFD) relying on indicator targeting based on age and gender of the household care or the presence of children in the household. Meanwhile, food aid distribution in northern Kenya was distributed through CBT leaving the decisions entirely to the community. Mostly, northern Kenyan communities were able to distribute food equally across households due to pressure within communities to share resources equally among all residents. It is important to highlight from this study that the form of CBT employed by these communities does not attempt to target the poor, therefore the results of this analysis of CBT are applicable only to communities engaging in equal distribution of transfers. Pastoral communities are considered by donors to be homogeneous so they prefer to propose CBT to these communities.

The authors find that free food distribution based on indicator targeting using household attributes seems more effective in reaching the poor than self-targeting through food-for-work schemes, which is in turn better targeted than food aid distributed through community-based targeting. However, poor targeting of CBT may be due to programme placement effects and local peculiarities of CBT distribution in northern Kenya, rather than to CBT as a targeting modality.

### **70. Lor-Mehdiabadi, W. and Adams, L. 2008, “Evaluation and Review of the Use of Cash and Vouchers in Humanitarian Crises: Part 2,” Review Report, European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid**

This is an evaluation report which provides recommendations on the use of cash and voucher initiatives in humanitarian crises. Standard review methodology was used. This report builds on interviews with field personnel, on additional information gained from discussions with staff at headquarters, and a secondary literature review.

Referring to implementation issues on cash and voucher projects the authors highlight the fact that a considerable number of agencies have strongly relied on community-based relief committees, which are expected to represent all sub-groups, for targeting and monitoring cash beneficiaries. This approach has had positive outcomes when it is well used (e.g. the cash distribution provided by Horn Relief to pastoralists in Northern Somalia in 2004) but is challenging to use when populations have been relocated affecting social systems. The strong knowledge of the affected population and the programme approach of donors are key elements for the success of CBT methods.

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**71. Mansuri, G. and Rao, V. 2003, "Evaluating Community-Based and Community-Driven Development: A critical review evidence," Development Research Group. The World Bank**

The authors examine the literature on CBD and CDD projects including any project that had community participation as a crucial element of its design.

One of the impacts of CDD initiatives highlighted is poverty targeting. Community involvement in identifying beneficiaries of anti-poverty programmes is increasingly common because it is believed it has the advantage of incorporating social knowledge which may improve the targeting of beneficiaries, lower the informational costs of delivery and safeguard quality verification and monitoring of programme implementation. However, the authors claim that these benefits likely depend upon the existence of institutions/mechanisms that can ensure local accountability and these institutions are more likely to emerge in more homogenous societies. Nevertheless, where programmes are more needed communities are characterized by rooted power hierarchies and local inequality in relations of power and authority which may allow non-target groups to benefit from the programme. In other words, the evidence suggests that the performance of decentralized targeting programmes depends on local inequalities. Indeed, the literature reviewed by the authors suggests that the community's definition of who is poor and vulnerable is not always similar to that of the social planner. They highlight that communities may have their own preference on inequality and exclusion and they can play an important role in the targeting process and what the community perceives as fair which can be different from the perception of projects' designers. This raises the question of whose preferences should count.

Another aspect that is highlighted is the political economy of the communities where targeting may depend on the political aims of local authorities or beneficiaries' support to these authorities. On balance, the evidence suggests that: 1) The centre's ability to target the deserving beneficiaries may be constrained in several ways due to information gaps, political economy concerns, etc.; 2) decentralized targeting can improve outcomes but it does not solve the targeting problem; 3) there is not enough evidence that suggests that decentralized targeting can be better than centralized targeting; 4) under certain conditions, local inequality can worsen when targeting is decentralized; 5) decentralized targeting can be more effective when it is effectively monitored.

**72. Marchione, T. 2005, Interactions with the Recipient Community in Targeted Food and Nutrition Programs. United States Agency for International Development**

The author analyses the relation between targeted nutrition and food assistance programmes and the

recipient communities. Four types of targeting methods are described: self-targeting, means tested, categorical, and community based.

Examples are used to demonstrate the possibly crucial consequences of ignoring community governance and social structures in the targeting programmes. The author claims that completely delegating responsibilities for targeting nutrition to communities might seem desirable and less costly, but it can be inefficient from the perspective of programme objectives if communities have different priorities, for example, using transfers for community enhancement or events and political advocacy which are far from nutrition concerns. It can also be unsuccessful if there are fundamental social divisions and resentments between ethnic groups, social classes, or religious groups, and if local control is given to one group over another. For example, in the Progressa program in Mexico, traditional systems of community services are undermined because of resentment of the excluded group. Moreover, local people seeking eligibility might take negative measures to qualify for the programmes. In Ethiopia, for example, in order to receive food aid households sell productive assets such as oxen in order to become destitute and thus threatening their future food security.

It is not advised to leave the definition of needs entirely to the community. The author points out that the most successful method of participation in targeting is the one that involves dialogue or negotiation between the programmes' designers and the community. Generally, it is claimed that there is little evidence about the efficacy of CBT and what is most common is that targeting approaches are combined. Independently of involving the community or not, the implementation will face formal and informal power structures that allocate scarce resources and local social systems for sharing and reciprocity that will benefit nutritional outcomes. The author points out that the governance arrangements and the social structure in communities are important when evaluating the targeting outcomes. Four important variables have to be taken into account when evaluating the participation of the community and the outcomes: 1) state governance contexts; 2) the nature of traditional institutions of leadership, patron-client relationships, resource allocation, and dispute adjudication at the community level (from cohesive communities to locally oppressive); 3) the ratio of magnitude and nature of the needy group to the quantity of the benefit (needs vs. supplies); and 4) the stability of the context (stable situations can facilitate the involvement of the community in the targeting process). Each of these variables is crucial to determine how to manage interactions with communities in a targeted food and nutrition programme.

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**73. Marnie, S. and Micklewright, J. 2005, "Targeting social assistance in a transition economy: the Mahallas in Uzbekistan," Southampton Statistical Research Institute**

This paper evaluates the performance and the success in targeting the most vulnerable of a new social assistance programme in Uzbekistan, the largest of the former Soviet Central Asian republics, administered by the community organisations, the "Mahallas". The authors use household survey data from 1995 and more limited data from 1999 to investigate the scheme's success in targeting benefit towards households in need. Some multivariate analysis is used to show how receipt is linked to various dimensions of living standards.

The Mahallas decide, using their local knowledge, which are the neediest families in the community and how much support they deserve. Guidelines advise the Mahallas on indicators of living standards to be considered, but there is no specific rule. Mahallas are neighbourhood committees formed of a group of elders who traditionally try to solve problems and conflicts within the community and help the needy in various ways. The chairman and secretary of each Mahalla are in principle elected by the local population and are paid a salary by the local authorities. Candidates for Mahalla chairman have to be approved by local government offices. Funds are distributed by the Ministry of Finance and each Mahalla distributes assistance to households in the form of a monthly cash transfer granted for three months (renewable).

This study highlights the problems found with this system. First, the criteria for allocating funding to each Mahalla are unclear. Funds in theory are distributed to each Mahalla according to the number of resident households with the result that Mahallas in the richest areas should receive the same funding per resident family as those in the poorest. Second, there is no guidance or circumstances stipulated as to which committees must award benefits. Moreover, according to the Ministry of Labour, committees have the right to "independently determine principles and criteria" for awards. This could result in discrimination against ethnic or religious minorities or abuse of power from Mahalla officials. Indeed, there is no appeal mechanism which can aggravate these problems. Third, there are important administration costs for the state. It has to pay state employees who participate in the committees investigating claims, the chairman and the secretary of Mahallas. Indeed, monitoring costs are increased by the large number of Mahallas. Fourth, the public nature of application and award can have financial and psychological costs to beneficiaries which may lead to some needy households not applying.

However, there are other advantages identified with the Mahallas system. The discretion given to them allows communities' preferences to be reflected. They have more information than the central government. The scheme represents lower administrative costs for the state budget.

It permits the diffusion of information and acceptance of the scheme's principles, increasing the benefits for the needy and discouraging the inclusion of better-off households. Indeed, the Mahalla chairmen can initiate an appraisal of eligibility without a household submitting a claim. Several aspects of living standards are considered (income in kind, agricultural production) which is important since in Uzbekistan verification of cash income is harder. The transfer is given to those households which "cannot significantly increase their income" rather than to just poor households.

The econometric results of this study show that poor households have much more probability of receiving the transfer than rich households. Indeed, the rich household's probability is practically zero. These results are a positive demonstration of the potential for flexible community-based targeting methods of social assistance. However, the poor household's predicted probability of getting support is not that high. The authors conclude that a part of both advantages and disadvantages in targeting probably emerges from the nature of the Mahalla as an institution in Uzbek society.

**74. Matin, I. et al. 2008, Crafting a graduation pathway for the ultra-poor: lessons and evidence from a BRAC program. Chronic Poverty Research Centre**

This paper analyses an approach that the Non-Governmental Organisation, BRAC, has been experimenting with since 2002 to tackle ultra poverty through the "Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting Ultra Poor, Targeting Social Constraints" (CFPR) programme. A previous evaluation of the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development (IGVGD) Programme led to the initiation of this new proposal which was developed and submitted to several donors and was finally approved for funding by a consortium of donors as the CFPR programme. It started in 2002 with the aim of assisting 100,000 ultra poor women and their households by achieving positive economic social and aspirational changes. It has two types of interventions: those that are targeted specifically at the ultra-poor and those that are targeted at the broader structures and processes that reproduce poverty. This paper is focused on the first intervention.

The CFPR targeting methodology combines a social mapping and participatory wealth ranking exercise of the households living in the cluster identified for the programme. The bottom-most wealth category of households identified through this exercise was then surveyed to collect information on the eligibility conditions developed by the programme. The local field staff then reviewed the information from the survey and identified a set of "preliminary selected" households. Senior level local staff then visited all of the "preliminary" selected households and generated a list of "finally selected" households. According to the study, this process of



targeting achieved much more than effective targeting of the ultra-poor. More importantly, it involved the community in the process. It provided the programme's field level workers with strong arguments to defend themselves against any undue pressure of influence from community elites. It provided more communication with the wider audience. This facilitated strong monitoring of the quality of the process and the perception of a transparent process from the community.

However, other problems were found. Participants began to appeal directly to BRAC staff for assistance, treating them as patrons. Indeed, assets given to extremely poor women appeared to be at risk from theft or damage, sometimes at the hands of other community members, who were jealous of the CFPR programme beneficiaries. There were instances when BRAC micro-finance group members displayed resentment against CFPR participants. They felt that the new beneficiaries were receiving gifts from BRAC, while they as BRAC microfinance-group members had received no such gifts. These divisions among the poor suggested that the scope for horizontal networks between them was less likely to apply where ultra-poor groups were involved. Therefore, with little support from the poor within the community, ultra-poor women were unlikely to be able to protect their newly gained assets. The main lessons of the study in terms of development programmes is that the poor are not a homogeneous group and it is better to design different packages for different groups of ultra poor with varying levels of transfer and supervision. Efforts to tackle rural poverty should seek to organise and target the poor separately from the rest of the community, and this should be done as a way to break the control of village elites over the poor.

### **75. Maxwell, D. et al. 2011, "Targeting and distribution in complex emergencies: participatory management of humanitarian food assistance," Food Policy**

This study assesses current practice and policies of humanitarian agencies involved in the targeting and management of humanitarian food assistance in complex emergencies, the limitations to beneficiary communities' participation, and the possibility for participatory approaches to improve targeting. To do this, the authors conduct five different country case studies including Sudan, Somalia, Colombia, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. This study reviewed the policies and field procedures of humanitarian agencies involved in the provision of food assistance. This

included the World Food Programme (WFP) and many of its partners, as well as agencies not affiliated with WFP. For the case studies the methods proceeded in three phases: desk review; individual country case studies; collective review of all case studies and development of programme guidance. A detailed qualitative research protocol was developed and given ethical approval by Tufts University, forming the basis for interviewing in all the cases.

The literature reviewed suggests that community-based or participatory approaches to targeting work better in slow-onset emergencies in communities with a strong tradition of local governance, with no conflict, displacement or marginalized minorities. However, the authors claim that programming design by agencies, including the process of targeting, tend to treat all emergency response the same way. The authors highlight the consequences of poor targeting in emergencies: targeting within a community may create conflict if some people are left out. On the other hand, targeting everyone just to prevent violence can have negative impacts on food security and challenges agency perspectives of impartiality. Providing inadequate rations for marginalized groups sometimes pushes people into dangerous coping strategies. Indeed, in emergencies there is very often the danger of looting of food aid which can be done, among others, by "gatekeepers" or community leaders. The evidence of the study suggests that CBT also provides a major opportunity for "elite capture" and resource diversion.

The authors conclude with some suggestions to improve participatory approaches in complex emergencies: first, it is important to evaluate the end of the process using participatory approaches if the views of the recipient community are to be seriously taken into account. Second, several practices improve participation including: a) increasing the amount of contact and trust between the humanitarian agency and the recipient community; b) clarifying and agreeing on objectives and targeting criteria; c) understanding local governance and leadership. Third, the monitoring stage is essential to increase accountability between community leaders and members of the community.

Finally, the authors point out that relatively few targeting mechanisms have genuinely participatory mechanisms. Committees' structures are often more for the purpose of helping with distribution or ensuring continuity of operations rather than community participation. However, they conclude that more participatory systems can reduce and improve targeting practices.

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**76. McCord, A. 2004, "Policy expectations and programme reality: the poverty reduction and labour market impact of two public works programmes in South Africa," ESAU Public Works Research Project, SALDRU, School of Economics University of Cape Town**

The aim of this study is to explore the contribution of public works to social protection in South Africa. It provides initial responses to the question of targeting of PWP and their microeconomic and labour market impacts. The research is based on a survey administered to current and former PWP employers and members of their households in two case-study programmes in Limpopo and KwaZulu Natal, in order to review the targeting of public works employment and the anti-poverty impact of participation in the programmes. The survey work was supported by qualitative focus group discussion work prior to and following implementation of the survey. Further analysis of the data was then carried out and the descriptive statistics relating to the key research questions extracted. Data were not weighted in either case, as both samples are assumed to be representative of their population.

The study points out that if programmes want to have a significant impact in either social protection or employment then the issues around targeting and rationing of access to PWP are critical, given the level of excess labour supply and that self-targeting is not adequate in the context of mass unemployment. The programme evaluated in this study which uses a CBT method is the Zibambele programme in KwaZulu Natal whose objective is the creation of sustainable job opportunities for poor rural families through the maintenance of rural roads. The programme targeted the poorest members of communities with no alternative forms of income or support, especially female household heads, selected by community representatives. Workers were contacted by the Department of Transport and paid at the minimum construction industry wage for 60 hours a month. The effectiveness of this programme was in relation to significant investment in social development by the implementing agency over a period of years which was possible because of the extended duration of the programme and the continual relationship between the workers, the programme, and the community institution managing the programme at the local level. This cannot be extended to cases of short-term employment projects and when neither targets nor incentives for targeting the poor are in place.

This study is part of the evidence that suggests that if poverty alleviation or social protection is the objective, then older women or female headed households in rural areas are likely to be the most appropriate target since they are characterised as the "unemployable". It is interesting that the unusual conditions of employment in the programme (part-time nature, flexibility of working hours, proximity of work location from domicile) were factors that increased labour market participation among those

who would be excluded from the conventional labour market because of domestic responsibilities and mobility constraints. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between labour market and social protection objectives to reduce the errors in targeting and programme design. In conclusion, there is a need to target explicitly and ration access to PWP employment since self-targeting is not sufficient. Indeed, targeting criteria should be developed in line with the programme objectives (for example youth or rural female household heads).

**77. McCord, A. 2005, "Public works in the context of HIV/AIDS," SALDRU Public Works Research Project, University of Cape Town**

This report reviews how public works programmes have adapted in response to the challenge of HIV/AIDS in Southern and Eastern Africa, including their ability to address the needs of OVC and households affected by HIV/AIDS. Within these programmes, six main approaches in terms of addressing HIV/AIDS and OVCs were identified, and a typology of public works programme and HIV/AIDS/OVC interventions was created. Four countries were selected for the case studies: Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The case study research involved a literature review relating to the selected programmes, and a country visit during which interviews were held with implementing agencies, donors and social protection agencies. The research relied on programme documentation and pre-existing evaluation documentation.

The authors point out that several programmes in the region have been designed in recognition that households with HIV/AIDS and those living positively are often excluded from regular public works programmes due to the work requirement. One of these programmes is the Zibambele Programme implemented by the KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport in South Africa which successfully targets extremely vulnerable labour constrained households affected by HIV/AIDS. The programme uses community targeting to reach the poorest which are mostly female-headed affected by HIV/AIDS, either directly through household illness and death, or through incorporation of orphaned children into the household. This group would be excluded from conventional public works employment but through sensitive design, employment is accessible to even severely labour constrained households. The programme offers part-time jobs and flexible working hours in recognition of domestic responsibilities. The findings show that the Zibambele programme has had a major impact on child welfare. It is noted that programmes such as Zimbabele are valuable where a public works programme intervention is only of limited scale due to funds or limited infrastructure. Without such close targeting and sensitive programme design public works might otherwise exclude this kind of vulnerable group. Indeed, it is important to highlight that accurate community targeting was only achieved due

to the significant investment in community mobilisation carried out by the implementing agency, and this was made possible by the sustained nature of the employment offered.

**78. McCord, A. and Slater, R. 2009, "Overview of public works programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa," Overseas Development Institute**

This report analyses the role and possible use of PWP in the region, based on a specially created database of 167 programmes across the region, original survey work and literature review. Programmes are divided in four categories: type A (the primary characteristic being direct support to households) and type C (primarily asset creation, with household-level benefits being anticipated indirectly as a result of the assets created) the most applied in the region. From all programmes identified, 50% adopted community targeting techniques, with local government selection, and lotteries occurring in 12% and 8% of instances respectively. Community targeting was more dominant in type A programmes than type C given the greater concern with safety net objectives rather than a more market oriented and typically private sector approach implemented by type C programmes. Type A programmes as well are heavily reliant on international donor funding. In terms of target groups, the most frequent targets were "the poor and marginalised", "those affected by disasters", and "women and female headed households".

The authors point out that even if there is only limited data on targeting efficiency there is some consistent evidence from the region that CBT has been more effective at targeting the most vulnerable than those methods that rely on self-targeting through the wage rate. Based on their analysis, the authors suggest that active poverty targeting may be required to promote the share of programme benefits transferred to the poor, rather than reliance on the work conditionality and a low wage. To do this it is necessary to involve community groups in selection. When community groups enjoy a degree of programme ownership in the context of a long-term relationship between local communities and implementing agencies, then it is possible to promote the participation of the very poor.

In conclusion, the authors suggest that if PWPs are intended to deliver social protection to the working age groups, more investments in targeting mechanisms are needed, such as the adoption of demographic or poverty criteria possibly using CB selection mechanisms. Indeed, it is necessary to create incentives for programme implementers to respect such targets during implementation, and improve monitoring of targeting outcomes. Moreover, effective and cost efficient community targeting may only be viable where longer term programmes are being developed.

**79. McLeod, D. and Tovo, M. 2001, "Social services delivery through community-based projects," Social Protection Discussion Papers Series, The World Bank**

The aim of this paper is to examine the community-based social services projects financed by the World Bank. The authors examine the entire Bank project portfolio for the last 10 years and reviewed Project Appraisal Documents, Project Information Documents, beneficiary assessments and ICRs of 80 projects in a social fund database. A total of 99 projects were identified. Information available from project documentation was supplemented in about one third of the cases with interviews with Task Managers or other people involved in the projects, as well as with supplementary project documents. The focus of the study is specifically on projects providing social care services. Most of these projects provide "traditional services" such as nutrition, maternal and child care or literacy but the authors note that newer services are included like counselling, home-based care for the elderly and disabled and early childhood development. The intended beneficiaries of these projects are predominantly children and women but include other groups such as youth at risk, the elderly, conflict victims, the disabled, institutionalized people, and ethnic minorities.

The three basic mechanisms identified by the authors for targeting in social care projects are: 1) geographic targeting; 2) targeting on the basis of individual characteristics; and 3) self-targeting. However, some projects do not specify a particular target group, leaving to the community the decision to determine who may need assistance. The authors point out the importance of community participation in development projects which can help to improve project impacts, enhance accountability, lessen corruption and promote sustainability.

One of the lessons highlighted from this paper is that if a project is working with NGOs and CBOs, it is essential to guarantee that social care projects occur with the consent, whether formal or informal, of governments or representatives at the lowest possible level. The best scenario is one in which local governments agree to take on recurrent costs, since CBOs and NGOs will not remain in the community.

Another important lesson pointed out by the authors is regarding community support. It is noticed that the support from local elders and other leaders can provide greater legitimacy to a social service project. Therefore, it is favourable to include local governments or village authorities in the decision-making process even if they do not have the economic resources or "official" authority to finance recurrent expenditures or make policy decisions.

**80. McPeak, J. et al. 2009, "Do community members share development priorities? Results of a ranking exercise in East African Rangelands," *Journal of Development Studies***

The authors of this study examine the development priorities expressed by people living in arid and semi-arid communities in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia in order to assess the potential for individuals' priorities to be reflected in projects defined at the community or higher level of social organisation. This research is part of the much larger Pastoral Risk Management (PARIMA) project that conducted intensive research in five communities in southern Ethiopia and six communities in northern Kenya. Selection of the study sites was defined after one year of preliminary socioeconomic research throughout the area. Thirty households in each site were randomly selected from the official list of residents of the area and were interviewed quarterly. The questionnaire used in the development ranking survey module was developed by first conducting open-ended interviews with key informants. The intervention categories revealed in these discussions were used in the questionnaire fielded among 310 household heads in the sample. Some interesting results are the following: 18% of respondents said that a project had harmed the community and 8% said that they had been harmed personally as a result of a development intervention. The interventions that have been appreciated as most successful and desired in future projects are (by order of importance): water, human health, food aid, education and livestock health. In contrast, transport improvement, natural resource management, and services such as electricity and phones obtained low rankings for personal benefits. The answers regarding projects that respondents want to have in the future show that the highest priorities are around meeting basic human needs like access to water and healthcare. In the view of residents these interventions had the highest benefits to themselves and their communities in the past and are the highest priorities for the future. Education is seen as the fourth highest priority for the future and is the fifth most commonly experienced and fifth most helpful in the past. A second group of livestock-related issues follows these basic human needs interventions.

Overall, the results show that basic human needs projects in human health and water are regarded as successful and are the most desired in future projects. Education and livestock health projects are also highly ranked. These priorities are different to those of development agencies whose focus is on pastoral livelihoods support interventions. Indeed, the results of the econometric analysis show that interviewees' rankings show more variation across communities rather than across households within communities. Therefore, there is a general agreement of priority interventions within communities.

**81. Mgemzulu, O. 2008, "The social impact of community based targeting mechanisms for safety nets. A qualitative study of the targeted agricultural input subsidy programme in Malawi," *School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal***

The author analyses the social impact of community based targeting mechanisms on society in relation to the implementation of the agricultural input subsidy programme (AISP) in Malawi, especially how social and cultural traditions affect and are affected by the implementation of CBT. The study draws on qualitative methodology and participatory tools such as social mapping, social card game, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with key informants such as village heads and agriculture extension workers.

The analysis from the social card game demonstrates that except for isolated cases communities can target the most vulnerable groups. Priority was given to female, elderly and orphan headed households instead of male headed ones which suggest that communities feel these groups are in need of more support. However, due to a limited quota only 33% of the deserving households were targeted. Participants showed resistance to targeting claiming that "we are all poor here" along with a fear of dividing their society. Unlike selection for inputs, targeting for cash transfers focused more on the physical condition of the individual household head. Priority was given to households considered to be weak and labour constrained like the elderly, chronically ill, disabled and orphans. Since their physical condition does not allow them to do heavy work such households could be supported through cash transfers. Households with a combination of orphans, chronically ill and female headed ranked higher than other vulnerable households. Even if the leakages for cash transfers were less than 4%, exclusion error was more than 42% among extremely food insecure households demonstrating the challenges of targeting where the majority of the population is poor.

However, the results of the perceptions of community members in the villages are interesting. In all villages except one, CBD did not qualify to be a democratic process with community leaders dominating decisions. Most of time community members were not aware of the selection criterion and the quota allocated to their villages, so there was a lack of information sharing. Indeed, the assumption that local institutions are more accountable to the poor was not proved in this study. The majority of local leaders and extension workers, key agents to the process, were perceived to be corrupt. Therefore, CBT is vulnerable to manipulation. Moreover, it is shown that the process was largely driven by a small group of better-off individuals with influence in society which shows that the process increased opportunities for elite capture.

Finally, the author shows in his study that targeting has the potential to cause social disorders especially when it is not done properly, causing fighting and conflicts in villages



and therefore weakening the local institutions responsible for maintaining peace and security.

**82. Miller, C., Tsoka, M. and Reichert, K. 2010, "Targeting Cash to Malawi's ultra-poor: A mixed methods evaluation," Development Policy Review**

The authors assess the Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCTS) in Malawi conducting an independent evaluation, using qualitative and quantitative methods, and multiple data sources, in order to understand the different issues around the targeting methodology and its implications. Given the lack of administrative infrastructure and available data, the SCTS makes use of CBT taking advantage of community knowledge in Malawi. Community members decide which are the most ultra-poor and labour-constrained households and the entire community has the chance to challenge the list of targeted households.

The results of this study show many issues with the targeting process. Community Social Protection Committees (CSPC) faced complications when detecting recipients because they must choose the poorest among households that are nearly all poor using criteria that are too broad and various definitions of terms which are conceptually different. During the implementation of the programme many other challenges were found. There were no performance assessments and no mechanisms to determine whether CSPC members understood the targeting criteria. Indeed, the District lacked information on accurate numbers of households to determine how many beneficiaries could be selected per zone. In some cases CSPS were instructed to list all possible beneficiaries and in other cases only 10% of households which made it more difficult. CSPS were more likely to list the households they knew. Moreover, during the visit of the CSPC to the households listed to fill up a form, problems were presented since there was a lack of communication strategy and high levels of illiteracy so that community members lacked information on the SCTS.

In addition, there were cases when CSPCs instructed applicants to inflate the number of children or beneficiaries to increase the size of the transfer. Additionally, it was observed that the village heads, who verify and sign that SCTS applications are accurate, sometimes influenced CSPCs to include their family members in the SCTS. Indeed, the explanation of the SCTS to the village leaders was inadequate. Furthermore, since there were more households which needed the transfer than resources available, targeting of the neediest households became subjective. Without documentation about the ranking process decisions could not be revisited or examined. Besides, the community meeting for debating decisions was disappointing: participation was minimal because people thought recipients had already been chosen, relatives of listed households argued for their inclusion, when there was rarely anyone to argue for the excluded ones. Also, it was difficult to monitor changes of beneficiaries'

circumstances which can lead to corruption within CSPC. In spite of all these problems and that the targeting approach presented errors of inclusion and exclusion (6-10% of households which deserved the transfer were excluded), it performed quite well in comparison with other cash transfers. Indeed, households receiving the transfers claimed a range of positive impacts, which is a strong motivation to tackle the inadequacies in the targeting process.

**83. Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) 2007, "Final evaluation report. Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Scheme," Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)**

This report evaluates the Kalomo social cash transfer scheme which started as a social protection mechanism in reaction to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Zambia. The data collection for the evaluation was conducted in two different agricultural blocks, one urban and one rural. The evaluation includes a quantitative survey along with focus group discussions (FGDs) and interviews with relevant stakeholders.

The SCTS goal is to assist the 10% most vulnerable and incapacitated households in the community. The scheme distributes a small amount of cash every month in the form of grants to households in Kalomo District without any or limited self-help potential. Targeted households are affected by HIV/AIDS and receive cash on a monthly basis while targeted households with children receive an additional cash bonus. The households are identified through a community based targeting mechanism. The Community Welfare Assistance Committee (CWAC) selects the beneficiaries according to the following criteria: 1) no self-help potential, 2) no valuable assets, 3) no steady source of substantial income. The headman checks each and every application form and verifies that all information is correct. After the potential eligible households have been selected, the CWAC meets again and decides which households are within the 10% most destitute in the community. Finally the District Social Welfare Office (DSWO) together with a representative of the District Welfare Assistance Committee (DWAC) and a CWAC member approve or reject the applications. The CWAC does not take the final decision on its own to avoid leakages to the non-poor.

The advantages of CBT identified are the following: it is cost effective since the members of the committee are volunteers and are active in difficult to access areas. Indeed, community committees also know the difference in poverty status among community members and can easily verify the information. Moreover, it allows communities to participate in interventions that have a direct impact on them. Looking at household characteristics, it is identified that the group of beneficiary households targeted is over proportionally vulnerable when compared to the national

average. Looking at the inclusion and exclusion error the study does not have any conclusive result yet but it highlights that the perception of beneficiary households and the communities about the targeting system is very positive; however regarding the exclusion error a larger number of beneficiary households think that qualified households have been excluded. In relation to the effects of the scheme on the communities, the study concludes that the SCTS has represented a great relief to the community. However, there are indicators of jealousy, especially among the poor who were not included but further research is necessary to evaluate these effects. In conclusion, the CBT system appears to be cost-effective in the Zambian context, however more research is necessary to determine its effectiveness.

#### **84. Morestin, F. et al 2009, "Criteria and processes for identifying the poor as beneficiaries of programs in developing countries," *Methods***

This information brief is based on a systematic review of all literature on identification of the poor in developing countries published between 1991 and 2008. It was not limited to experiences of user fees exemption; it included all experiences dealing with the poor but only those dealing with direct identification (on an individual case-by-case basis). Through the literature survey the authors were able to retrieve 52 documents presenting 68 experiences of direct identification of the poor, of which 27 were in sub-Saharan Africa.

A more participative, community-based criteria definition process was used in 17% of the experiences. The authors identify three experiences that specify how the communities were consulted. One is in Bangladesh where group discussions were organised. The other one is in Tanzania where several methods were used (group discussions, interviews with key informants, household surveys, etc.). The third one is in Burkina Faso where village selection committees select the indigent to provide free care. Another observation is that the 68 experiences surveyed used a total of 260 criteria to identify the poor. An additional finding is that in 26% of the experiences studied, identification of the poor was done by members of the community (villagers, local administrators, etc.). The authors note that using communities can reduce the costs of identification. In 44% of cases, identification of the poor was done through administrative processes; in 20% identification was done by mixed processes; in a further 20% the community did a first selection of potential beneficiaries, and the final selection was made by the programme managers.

The characteristics of the most successful experiences identified include: clear and specific identification criteria; criteria selected from among a large number of indicators reflecting many aspects of poverty; criteria developed at the level of each municipality, thereby taking into account the local poverty situation; a two-tiered beneficiary

identification process: community-based followed by administrative validation by an NGO employee; and no conflict between identification of the poor and the financial viability of the services provided. The characteristics of the least successful experiences identified are the following: criteria weakly correlated with poverty unable to differentiate the richest from the poorest; communities not having fully assumed their role as local experts in identification of the poor; local authorities responsible for identifying the poor but giving preferences to their own friends and relations; and conflicts of interest.

The authors conclude with a number of lessons: the selection criteria have to reflect the conditions of poverty in a given context, cover different aspects of poverty, be specific, be measurable using simple questions and answers, and be easily verifiable. They also have to be socially acceptable (consensus). The authors point out that it is likely that using a more participative process of criteria identification will make criteria more socially acceptable. Moreover, identification processes that involve many actors are generally more effective because they allow for a second validation, but it appears that involving communities can reduce costs and produce effective results when they are supported in their task and their choices are validated afterward. Finally, the identification process must be seen as legitimate by the whole community and not be stigmatising for the beneficiaries; the study highlights that it is important to find a balance between administrative and community involvement that best responds to these concerns. Finally, the study concludes that there is no strategy to identify the poor that is perfect. The successes have more to do with the attention paid to the implementation process and it is essential to experiment and to adapt to changing circumstances while evaluating the effectiveness of the identification.

#### **85. Narbeth, S. 2004, "Emergency cash relief to drought affected families of Sool plateau. Post distribution survey findings," United Nations OCHA Somalia**

This report evaluates the distribution of cash grants to targeted drought-affected families in the Sool plateau region of Somalia implemented by Horn Relief and Norwegian People Aid (NPA). To do this, a post cash distribution monitoring exercise was conducted.

The Emergency Cash Response Programme aimed to target the most at risk pastoral households. Beneficiaries were selected through a CBT model in which beneficiaries were chosen after a selection and registration process carried out by elected and approved Village Relief Committees and based upon targeting criteria (a combination of asset profile and vulnerable groups) established by Horn Relief and NPA.

The following observations are pointed out. There was a marked difference between the actual amount of cash received and their expectation of assistance. Some were

not aware of the distribution or were expecting nothing, while others expected more. Another common concern was that the total cash was not enough to cover the needs of all the “fara maran” or those who have nothing. The elders and members of the village communities commented that it was bad to give money to one person and not to the other when both of them are poor. However, this did not cause problems within the community. Moreover, there was no coordination with the implementation process: some people were sent to other communities to collect the money and there was nothing to collect. Also, some people were on the list but did not receive the cash grant. In spite of the problems identified in the targeting process, these should be considered minor given the overall success of the project in meeting its intended goals. The author suggests that targeting criteria are revisited since not all those who receive cash received food aid and some households who received cash transfers were indeed waiting for remittances from family members within or outside Somalia. The author recommends developing common targeting criteria and an assessment methodology that can be used by a number of agencies.

#### **86. Niehaus, P. et al 2011, “Targeting with agents,” International Finance**

The authors evaluate how targeting rules should be designed when they must be implemented by corruptible agents. The authors study a model in which a principal with progressive preferences defines a targeting rule to be implemented by a subordinate official who has distinct preferences: he is tempted to demand bribes, and may also want to give out benefits to voters or friends. In the absence of a monitoring mechanism the principal cannot perfectly discipline the official. Instead, the official sets a schedule of household-specific bribe-prices that optimally trade off his allocative preferences, bribe rents, and expected penalties. The price schedule then determines the allocation of slots and rents.

The authors then use this framework to examine properties of optimal targeting rules. The main theoretical finding is that conditioning eligibility on an additional poverty indicator may worsen targeting. The reason is that the additional indicator affects not only who is eligible but also how verifiable the (in) eligibility of other households is (the enforcement effect). If the enforcement effect is sufficiently negative it may trump the positive statistical effect. In other words, the more indicators are taken into account the harder is to verify them; therefore the official will be less apprehensive about giving (or selling) slots to ineligible households. If this enforcement effect is strong enough it may more than counterbalance the statistical gains.

In the second part of the paper the authors examine this model through the allocation of Below Poverty Line (BPL) cards in India. BPL cards are India’s most important targeting mechanism and they restrict participation in a wide range of public schemes. The authors observe

both households’ eligibility and their actual BPL status, letting them quantify rule violations. The authors find a series of irregularities: 70% of the ineligible households in the sample have BPL cards, while 13% of eligible households do not. A household’s probability of holding a card decreases with the number of eligibility rules it violates, consistent with the notion that degrees of ineligibility are important. Indeed, the results show that the allocation of BPL cards would thus be more progressive if the government could enforce an eligibility rule based exclusively on criteria. A second finding is that 93% of BPL card recipients reported they were charged for the BPL cards. The authors find that cards’ prices increase according to the number of eligibility criteria a household violates, again consistent with the notion that degrees of ineligibility matter. The results show that enforcement is weak and suggest that non-monetary favours (e.g. votes) may play an important role in the allocation process.

In conclusion, the data confirm that officials’ preferences are not associated with those of the BPL rule designers, that enforcement is weak, and that the degree of (in) eligibility matters. More dynamic enforcement of a targeting rule may, or may not lead to a more progressive allocation of benefits depending on how accurate the rule is and how progressive the officials’ own preferences are.

#### **87. Olken, B. et al 2011, “Indonesia’s PNOM Generasi Program, Final Impact Evaluation Report,” The World Bank**

This study reports on the final evaluation of the incentivized community block grant programme, PNPM Generasi. The Generasi project began in mid-2007 in rural areas of five Indonesian provinces selected by the government. To conduct the evaluation, surveys were directed over 45,000 household members, village heads, and school and health facility staff. A qualitative study was also conducted using focus group discussions, in-depth key informant interviews, and direct observation.

The programme works as follows: Each year villages receive a block grant. With the assistance of trained programme facilitators and service delivery workers, villagers undertake a social mapping and participatory planning exercise to decide how best to use the block grant funds to reach 12 education and health targets related to maternal and child health behaviour and education behaviour. Inter-village meetings and consultation workshops with local health and education service providers allow community leaders to obtain information, technical assistance, and support from the local health and education offices. Following these discussions, the elected management team makes the final Generasi budget allocation. To give communities incentives to focus on the most effective policies, the government bases the size of the block grant for the subsequent year partly on the village’s performance on each of the targeted indicators. Thus the authors claim that the Generasi project is the first

health and education programme worldwide that combines community block grants with explicit performance bonuses for communities.

The results show that the programme had a larger impact on the poor than on the non-poor. Communities were statistically significantly able to target the bottom two quintiles in providing school uniforms, other school supplies, and other school support. The targeting seems stronger for benefits that are provided in-kind than for benefits that are provided as cash or subsidies such as scholarships, transport subsidies, or subsidies for childbirth. Specifically, among the poorest two quintiles, primary school participation and attendance among 7-12 year-olds increased by 2%: 1.8% increase in participation and 2.3% increase in attendance. No notable differences were found in long-term health outcomes between the poor and the relatively better-off households. Indeed, overall the authors find that Generasi had the greatest impact on community effort, which is intuitive given the project's emphasis on community mobilisation as a centrepiece of its strategy. The impact on community efforts was greatest in relation to the increase of cadres working at village health posts, participation in meetings about health education, and number of junior secondary school committee meetings with teachers during the year. In conclusion, Generasi provides an example of a project that addresses certain education and health targets using a community approach.

**88. Pan, L. and Christiaensen, L. 2012, "Who is vouching for the input voucher? Decentralized targeting and elite capture in Tanzania," *World Development***

This article examines a large smallholder input voucher pilot programme introduced in 2009 in Tanzania and its targeting performance. To analyse the targeting performance based on poverty, the poverty line calculated in Christiaensen and Pan (2010) was used. For targeting based on efficiency, the median values in each village of households' marginal productivity from improved seeds and fertilizer on maize/rice (as observed in the previous survey round) are used as cut-off. The results are based on a multivariate analysis and focused on Kilimanjaro.

From all the methods used to target transfers, decentralized distribution has been the one chosen to distribute input vouchers. Geographic targeting is often combined with CBT to select the beneficiaries within the village. The results of this study show that households with members in the village voucher committee, who can be considered as members of the local elites, along with elected village officials together received about 60% of the distributed vouchers. Further analysis confirms that being a member of the local elite significantly increase the likelihood of receiving a voucher. Furthermore, it is shown that local elite capture significantly reduces the targeting performance of the programme, especially when poverty is the targeting criterion. Elite capture is even more marked in

villages with more unequal land distribution and in villages further away from the rural towns. The conclusions of the authors are three. First, this study justifies the concern that under decentralized targeting systems local elites tend to capture the benefits, thereby reducing effectiveness. Second, these tendencies can be defeated with greater programme coverage and a greater focus on higher trust sceneries when poorer farmers are targeted. Greater selectivity and examination is advised when relying on CBT. Finally, clearer focus in objectives can ameliorate the performance which requires the development of better proxies to target households with high marginal productivity.

**89. Park, A. and Wang, S. 2010, "Community-based development and poverty alleviation: An evaluation of China's poor village investment program," *Journal of Public Economics***

The authors of this paper conduct a systematic evaluation of China's poor village investment programme which began in 2011 and finances public investment in designated poor villages based on participatory village planning. They use matching methods and a panel household and village data set with national coverage to compare changes from 2001 to 2004 in designated poor villages that began plan investments and in designated poor villages that had yet to begin plan investments.

Each elected village has to complete a public investment plan according to the projects selected by the villagers. The authors claim that this programme is one of the few examples of CBD initiated by the government of a developing country rather than an international organization. The authors analyse how the presence and characteristics of local leadership can strongly influence project outcomes and especially, if governance characteristics influence the programme's ability to help the poor. In theory, projects are selected by a plenary session of the entire village, with the views of poor households given more weight. Once projects are chosen, a more detailed assessment is completed describing project beneficiaries, project requirements, implementation and a plan for monitoring and evaluation.

However, the research here shows that plans are often designed by a group including village committee members, small group (hamlet) leaders, Communist Party representatives, and household representatives. Many households were unaware or did not participate in village planning. The results of this article show that when leaders are more educated the benefits of the programme (measured by income or consumption) decline for the poor and increase for the rich. In other words, these results show that educated leaders are more likely to help the rich than the poor. In conclusion, there is no evidence that participatory decision making has helped the poorest of the poor. The evidence shows that governance factors matter in the distribution of programme benefits: more educated leaders tend to favour richer households and high quality



village committees deliver greater benefits whether for the rich or for the poor. The authors recommend measures to increase monitoring effectiveness and accountability.

**90. Pearson, R. 2008, "The Government of Kenya's cash transfer programme for vulnerable children: Political choice, capacity to implement and targeting from conception to adolescence 2002-2008," Compendium of papers presented during the international conference on social protection for the poorest in Africa. Learning from experience. Kampala, Uganda**

The author assesses the Kenya cash transfer programme for vulnerable children on the basis of four key strategic elements that required action by the promoters of the programme from 2002 to 2008 and will continue to receive attention as the programme continues. One of these key strategic elements is the targeting performance. The author calls for a targeting mechanism at community level that can be replicated across different communities and cultures and that is evidently efficient and fair both to central managers and funders, and to communities themselves, in reaching the intended target group.

In December 2004, a targeting mechanism was formulated for the pilot using a community-driven mechanism with public participation in making the final decision on which households should be enrolled. Early results showed that the pre-pilot had a positive impact on the welfare of the beneficiaries but the importance of targeting became evident when it was clear in the pilot that several very poor households had not been included while several less deserving households were in the programme. A space for improvement was recognized and the targeting process was adjusted based on the targeting analysis. Different lessons were learned from the first phase of the programme. First, districts are selected based on the capability of the government to expand the programme, therefore there is great pressure to expand it. Within the district the poorest locations are selected by committee decisions. Within locations a committee is formed and according to the budget they are informed approximately how many households can be enrolled in the scheme. A survey is carried out to determine the ultra-poor households based on a combination of community knowledge and objective criteria such as the quality of the building. After this, data is entered into a management information system to verify the criteria and to rank households. The ranked list is discussed in a community meeting to make a final decision. Adjustments to the targeting process will give priority to those districts with the biggest numbers of OVC households and will make the criteria more rigorous in order to reduce the inclusion errors.

In conclusion, the author proposes that the programme must work towards an efficient transparent targeting mechanism with the monitoring elements in place to evaluate its efficiency varying from place to place.

**91. Pellerano, L. et al 2012, "CGP Impact evaluation (UNICEF/FAO) Targeting and baseline evaluation report," Oxford Policy Management**

This report evaluates the Child Grants Programme (CGP), and unconditional cash transfers targeted to poor and vulnerable households in Lesotho. An essential component of the evaluation was a review of the effectiveness of targeting. The targeting analysis conducted for this report was based on the integration of qualitative and quantitative methods. The quantitative targeting analysis was based on a comparison of consumption expenditure levels and poverty rates between households eligible for CGP and those not eligible. The qualitative targeting assessment consisted of interviews with programme officials in Maseru and fieldwork in two selected community councils. In the two villages within each community council, focus group discussions were conducted with CGP eligible and non-eligible households and key informant interviews were conducted with chiefs, councillors, members of the Village Assistance Committee (VAC) and CGP eligible and non-eligible households.

The CGP goal is to improve the living standards of Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) and to reduce their malnutrition, improve health standards, and increase school enrolment. It provides a regular cash transfer to poor households with children selected through a combination of PMT and community validation. The targeting process was elaborated through the following steps: after phases of community mobilisation and formation of VACs, a door-to-door census was conducted to collect information that would inform a first stage of selection: using a PMT to distinguish five different poverty groups (from poorest to richest). Some categorical filters were also added at this stage, including the requirement that only households with children 0-18 be included in subsequent targeting steps. The next phase included sharing lists of all households registered in the census with the VAC and asking them to validate the poorest households. The intersection between PMT-eligible households and validated households was used to generate the final list of selected households.

The results show that eligible households were significantly more likely to be poor than those not eligible. However, 67% of households were not included in the programme. This is not only a result of financial constraints since approximately half of the poorest households with children that could have been covered with the available budget were missed by the programme. Nevertheless, inclusion errors were not excessive (26%). Indeed, there was no predetermined quota to be identified as poor. As a result there were different results in the outcome of community validation across villages: some VACs indicated between 10 and 40% of village members as poor and in other cases above 50%. Moreover, PMT results did not often match community validation results that could have been caused by badly designed PMT,

biased selection on behalf of the VAC, or a combination of the two. During the validation process some VACs were rarely present and often dominated by leading figures in the community. Errors of inclusion and exclusion were both at 5%. However, even if most households did not have a good understanding of the programme and the targeting process, they perceived the process as fair and transparent and were happy with the outcomes.

Another important observation made by the authors is that a feeling of distrust and loss of credibility of the programme emerged as a result of irregularities during the enrolment process when eligible households were turned away during the enrolment event and others which were not eligible were given certificates for enrolment. This created tension and resentment that could be avoided. However, tension in the community was still at an emerging stage since community members were still trying to understand the targeting process and the purpose of the programme. Moreover, households believed that the selection was made by a computer without the influence of community members. The authors expect a challenge to community relations once the first payments are made and households understand the results of being included or not.

## **92. Platteau, J.-P. and Abraham, A. 2010, "Participatory development in the presence of endogenous community imperfections," *Development***

The aim of the authors is to demonstrate that the egalitarian communities in Africa are afflicted by a number of community imperfections that tend to make the participatory approach difficult, particularly in a context where market opportunities are expanding, access to education is improving and land and time become limited. The study is focused on decentralised development only in rural communities which need external agency financing.

The authors first analyse the definition of "community". They point out that for a community to succeed in reaching cooperative outcomes, the members of the communities must share a cooperative strategy. Communities have one important advantage which is the easy circulation of information whereby people may act co-operatively and achieve socially efficient outcomes. However, there is a challenge that has not been taken into account which is the fact that the personalised character of human interactions in the context of small groups leads to community imperfections.

The authors highlight three especially important dimensions of community life in lineage-based societies, especially in sub-Saharan African communities namely: 1) decision-making procedures, 2) norms of sharing, and 3) attitudes towards strangers. In all these dimensions the authors claim that market development is likely to make rural communities more dysfunctional. Regarding the first dimension, in traditional agrarian societies, members of the elite (typically the elders belonging to the lineage of the descendants of the first settlers) cannot be removed

from their position which is fixed. Punishment mechanisms cannot effectively operate towards people whose social position and status are fixed. Indeed, the principle of majority voting is not deemed acceptable because it would officialise the existence of disagreements and because the minority would thereby feel justified to behave as it likes. The second sphere (norms of sharing) means that when social and economic differentiation is low, such as is observed in tribal societies, constant comparisons, arousing jealous and envious feelings, create a highly charged emotional climate that can easily lead to the deterioration of the group. To counter this ominous threat, tribal societies have evolved egalitarian norms that compel or induce enriched individuals to share their surplus. The third sphere (attitude towards strangers) shows that as a consequence of land scarcity there are open manifestations of hostility and discrimination against strangers who are perceived as dangerous rivals on the limited land available.

The authors point out three different lessons. First, to avoid "elite" capture in decentralized programmes it is important that communities be strengthened institutionally before they receive a certain amount of money. This means training on participatory development programmes not only for community leaders but other members of the community. Second, institutional support of communities should not be delegated completely to private organisations since they are likely to be captured by officials or other members. The main rules, criteria and guidance have to be established by the state which is a fundamental precondition for decentralisation. Third, effective decentralisation requires that local actors have the skills and capability to support communities in spite of their political preferences. To do this, a vigilant civil society must exist. All these requirements are difficult to achieve, especially for most countries in sub-Saharan Africa where imperfections are evident in both state and community levels. In conclusion, more efforts need to be tested and are required in order to improve institutional support within communities and state structures based on useful lessons adapted to the African continent.

## **93. PNPM 2007, "Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, Generasi Sehat Dan Cerdas," Quarterly updates**

This is a quarterly update which evaluates the pilot of the Conditional Cash Transfer programme of the Indonesian Government which was launched in 2007. The programme applies two different approaches: conditional cash transfers to households (Program Keluarga Harapan, PHK) and conditional cash transfers to communities (PNPM Generasi) both of which are implemented in seven provinces. This quarterly update focuses on the PNPM Generasi aimed at achieving universal basic education, reducing child mortality and improving maternal health. Based on proposals raised by communities, village funds are expected to fund activities such as awareness raising,

supplementary feeding for small children at school, school uniforms, and subsidies for mothers using health services, among others. Through social mapping, villagers identified over 450,000 children under-five, 750,000 school-aged children, and over 90,000 expected pregnancies and deliveries in the coming year. These beneficiaries directly benefit from the PNPM Generasi funds and activities. Assisted by project consultants and facilitators, communities follow a cycle consisting of four main stages: socialization, village planning, village implementation, and performance measurement. At the time of this article, villagers were at the tail end of their planning process, making collective decisions on the most effective use of their community block grants.

In general, it was observed that the PNPM Generasi was proceeding well. Indeed, it was noted that it increased community awareness, introduced opportunities for collaboration among community leaders, parents, midwives and school teachers, resulting in better partnership towards improved health and education in participating villages.

**94. Rai, A. 2002, "Targeting the poor using community information," *Journal of Development Economics***

This study analyses how community information can be useful in targeting beneficiaries and reducing its costs even in situations of villager collusion, and highlights the limitations of community information. To do this, the author uses an implementation theory framework to study targeting with community information.

The author starts from the premise that it is reasonable to imagine that agents who live in the same community may collude against government. The only way for a government to differentiate rich from poor is by conducting audits but they can be costly and can reduce the transfers available to the poor. However, the author claims that there is a way to avoid agents colluding against the government. If the government commits to a hard budget constraint, the poor can be targeted and they do not collude with just the "threat" of an audit. Villagers are asked to report on each other, and audited only if their reports disagree. An audit is conducted if an agent reports himself as poor but the other agent contradicts this information. If a rich agent is found to be providing wrong information or is found to have made an untruthful report, then he is fined to cover the audit cost. But if both agents are found to be poor, then transfers are reduced to cover the audit cost. In equilibrium, the reports always agree and transfers are made to agents who are reported to be poor.

In conclusion, the author shows how inducing villagers to make reports about each other can reduce targeting costs if the government can commit to a hard budget constraint for each community and can threaten a costly audit. The author gives the example of the Mahallas in Uzbekistan which shows how some CBT schemes

impose hard budget constraints. Another example is the government of Albania which targets social assistance by giving block grants to local councils. These local councils face a hard budget constraint and have to determine which families should receive the benefits. One limitation of this model is that if the government has no information on communities' wealth, all communities should receive the same total transfer in an efficient collusion-proof targeting scheme. A repercussion is that poor villagers in the poorer community will receive fewer resources than poor villagers in the richer community. The trade-off presented by the author in designing a CBT scheme is between reducing costs and preserving horizontal equity. When a government wants to ensure that a poor member in a village receives the same transfer no matter where she is living, then asking villagers to make reports about each other is not useful.

**95. Rao, V. and Ibáñez, A.M. 2007, "The social impact of social funds in Jamaica: a "participatory econometric" analysis of targeting, collective action, and participation in community driven development," *Journal of Development Studies***

This paper evaluates how CDD works inside the particular political, social and cultural systems of communities. The authors base their analysis on the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), a community-driven project assisted by the World Bank. The authors combine qualitative and quantitative methods to conduct an in-depth analysis of data from five pairs of communities selected randomly from 200. In each pair, one community has been a beneficiary of the JSIF while the other community has not received assistance. Quantitative data is analysed to evaluate the impact of social funds on participation and collective action capacity, using propensity score matching methods and regression analysis.

JSIF is an autonomous government agency that reports directly to the Ministry of Finance. Communities submit their proposals and JSIF screens applications on the basis of its targeting criteria and field visits in order to identify the needs of the community. Communities funded by JSIF are usually required to make a contribution to construction costs either cash or in-kind. Projects are supposed to be decided in broad consultation with the community from a menu of projects.

The qualitative evidence from the five pairs of communities shows that the CDD process is often dominated by a small group and is normally organized by a local leader who may or may not be a politician. The selection process is not usually participatory but is influenced by better-off, better networked individuals who receive their preferred projects. The selection process is not usually participatory but is influenced by the opinions of this small group. However, the authors observe that once the construction has started this group is often able to motivate the community to participate by making contributions to the project. Once the project has been

finished it is perceived as something that belongs to the community and was constructed with the community's active support and participation. The quantitative study shows similar results. Participation seems to have been restricted to a small group of active individuals who were close to the community leaders and who seemed to be highly motivated for reasons that benefited the community. Their private reasons for this type of kindness are uncertain but what is clear is that obtaining the JSIF project enriched their importance within the community.

Overall, results show that targeting is very poor, with three of five communities not obtaining the project that would have been preferred by a majority. However, at the end of the JSIFS project, people seem to be satisfied with the choice of project. This suggests an unintended consequence of the CDD project in Jamaica: it may exacerbate existing inequalities and even perpetuate them by enhancing the ability of the better educated and better-off to work more effectively as a group. The argument that CDD "empowers" the poor is not indicated by the evidence provided by this study but it improves the capacity for collective action.

#### **96. Rapid Social Response MDTF Funded Technical Assistance 2010, "Case Study Sri Lanka: Strengthening Samurdhi Targeting and Monitoring Systems, Concept Note," Rapid Social Response MDTF funded Technical Assistance**

The objective of this technical assistance (TA) funded by the Rapid Social Response MDTF is to build on existing diagnostic studies and to strengthen the Samurdhi Relief programme. Previous evaluations of the Samurdhi Relief have found the programme has been poorly targeted and has been inadequately allocating transfers.

The Government of Sri Lanka decided to experiment with a community-based targeting system known as the Family Classification Methodology (FCM) which was pilot tested in 2006 and expanded in 2007 and 2008. By using FCM people can define their own welfare situation comparing themselves to the rest of the households in the village and a Samurdhi Development Officer (SDO) who is randomly appointed assists the process. A working group is formed and there is a general meeting where they agree the poverty criteria ranking all families by order of wealth. The final ranking can be modified if any family appeals the decision. The number selected depends on the total allocation available.

The advantages of this process are that it brings more transparency and greater satisfaction among community members who feel included in the process. However, there is not enough evidence about its ability to minimise inclusion/exclusion errors or political capture. In addition, there is no "national reference poverty line" to define the households and the districts that need the transfer and the ones that do not. The allocation of benefits depends on the budget that is assigned to the village and can

include non-poor households if there is still available budget. The study suggests that FCM can be improved if the process is reinforced with a hybrid mechanism that brings some clearer guidelines for selecting households based on objective selection criteria which is validated by the community's perceptions of poverty. A set of official indicators which determines poverty can improve the selection of beneficiaries.

#### **97. Ravallion, M. 2003, "Targeted Transfers in poor countries: revisiting the trade-offs and policy options," Chronic Poverty Research Centre**

This article revisits the role of targeted transfers in poor countries taking into account the new theories on the social costs of uninsured risks and unmitigated inequalities. The author's aim is to determine whether efficient redistribution can be achieved using targeted transfers, given the constraints faced in poor countries.

The author highlights how community participation in programme design and implementation is a popular strategy for relieving information constraints during the targeting process. The main concern regarding this method has been the possibility of elite capture which can potentially overshadow its informational advantage. However, it is not possible to generalize on the outcomes since it is important to take into account heterogeneity across communities as well as local asset inequalities and the extent of engagement in local social networks. One example is the FFE programme in Bangladesh in which participants from economically backward areas were supposed to be identified by the centre. Higher allocations from the centre to a village tended to produce better targeting performance, but there was no sign that poorer villages were any better or worse at targeting the poor. The author points out that inequality within villages matters to the relative power of the poor in local decision-making. More unequal villages in terms of the distribution of land are worse at targeting the poor which is consistent with the view that greater land inequality comes with lower power for the poor in village decision making. This suggests that inequality is perpetuated through the local political economy: the more unequal the initial distribution of assets, the better positioned the non-poor will be to capture the benefits of external efforts to help the poor. In conclusion the author claims that the potentially important role that transfers can play has to be recognized, but using careful design and evaluation to ensure that goals are achieved.

#### **98. Ravallion, M. 1998, "Reaching poor areas in a federal system," The World Bank development research group**

The author explores how well a federal antipoverty programme reaches poor areas, taking into account the reactions of lower levels of government. The author studies performance in reaching poor areas before and after World Bank-sponsored reforms in Argentina focusing



on Trabajar 1 which was replaced by Trabajar 2, with increased spending and greater targeting to poor areas. A measure of success at poor-area targeting is proposed, namely the regression coefficient of programme spending on the welfare indicator. A decomposition of this measure is used to assess the contribution of the centre's provincial reallocation (versus intra-provincial targeting) to the programme's overall performance. Later, the author investigates the determinants of why some provinces did better than others at reaching their poor areas.

The results of the author show that provinces which received higher allocation of programme resources from the centre tended to be the ones which are more effective in reaching poor areas. The results also suggest that the incentive to reach the poor areas within provinces was less for a poorer province. The finding that provinces which are poorer on average tend to target poor areas less well is then consistent with pro-poor targeting overall. Overall, there was a marked improvement in the programme's success at reaching the poor provinces. Performance in reaching the poor areas within provinces also improved for half of the provinces. However, provinces varied greatly in their success at reaching poor areas. These differences are partly a reflection of early differences under the old programme. Indeed, efforts to keep workers previously employed on the old programme in Trabajar jobs tended to constrain success at reaching poor areas. With this factor poorer provinces were less successful in targeting their poor areas at any given budget allocation. At the same time, higher levels of spending from the centre tended to result in pro-poor spending within provinces. But even with this effect, poorer provinces were less successful at reaching their poor areas. Finally, the author suggests that the centre needs to provide stronger incentives for pro-poor targeting by provincial governments. This will depend not only on the allocation of resources but on how successful it is at discriminating in favour of poor areas.

**99. Ridde, V. et al 2010, "Low coverage but few inclusion errors in Burkina Faso: a community-based targeting approach to exempt the indigent from user fees," BMC Public Health**

User fees were generalized in Burkina Faso in the 1990s and it was projected that the poor would be exempted from paying these fees. However, their identification was ineffective with the result that they do not have access to care. Therefore, a CBT method was implemented for selecting indigents for user fees exemption and this study evaluates its effectiveness in a rural district. The process included the implementation of 124 village selection committees (VSC) in the catchment areas of ten health centres. VSCs were asked to agree on a list of people considered indigents. Before, in a prior workshop including all stakeholders, consensus was reached on the definition of the indigents who were to be selected in the village. Lists

of indigents were subsequently validated by the health centres' management committees.

The authors make a comparison of the socio-economic profiles of households in which indigents resided and of certain basic needs in three groups of indigents based on chi-square testing (partial or complete tests) or mean comparison testing. The effectiveness of the targeting was assessed with respect to how well the selection process was able to minimize inclusion and exclusion biases.

The results show that the households in which the three groups of indigents lived appeared to be more vulnerable and poorer than the reference rural households. Indigents selected by the management committees and the nurses were very comparable in terms of levels of vulnerability, but the former were more vulnerable socially. The majority of the indigents proposed by the village committees who lived in extremely poor households were retained by the management committees. Whatever the eligibility criteria, the low level of coverage of the poor is very illustrative. Only 0.36% of the population living below the poverty threshold and less than 1% of the extremely poor population were selected. This shows that while the targeting is very restrictive, it is also effective in minimizing inclusion biases. In conclusion, this study shows that CBT was more appreciated by the social actors and it was potentially effective at minimizing inclusion biases since the people selected were poorer and more vulnerable than the rest of the population. However, there were significant exclusion biases, in other words, it was not possible to ensure acceptable coverage of indigents. However, the authors believe that decisions were not biased in favour of important or influential people. The VSCs and management committees were very conservative in the selection process and the authors believe that this was because of the decision to use local and endogenous funding to pay for the exemption. Therefore, this article shows as well the conflict of interest between identifying the poor and ensuring the financial viability of the services as a core factor in explaining the very small coverage of this selection. In conclusion, this CB method should be retained because it is efficient and appreciated by the people, but it covers a very small segment of the population.

**100. Ridde, V. et al 2011, "Targeting the worst-off for free health care: A process evaluation in Burkina Faso," Evaluation and Programme Planning**

The aim of this article is to evaluate three processes for selecting indigents in Burkina Faso in one health district in order to better understand how the persistent exclusion experienced by the worst-off, who are unable to pay for healthcare when they are ill, can be abated. The authors analyse three processes. The first was organized by the State authorities (state-led policy) and the other two were conducted in the context of an action research project coordinated by the authors of this article (community based interventions and criteria-based intervention).

Individual and group interviews were conducted of key stakeholders (health staff, community members) to get information on the strengths and weaknesses of key components of the interventions (relevance and uptake of the information, worst-off selection and information, financial arrangements). Data was subjected to content analysis and thematic analysis.

The results show that the community-based process minimized inclusion biases, as the people selected were poorer and more vulnerable than the rest of the population. Indeed, it is based on a democratic idea and emphasises local solidarity. However, there were significant exclusion biases. This was caused by the waivers being funded by the profits accumulated by the village health committees (COGES) over the previous 20 years from drug sales and user fees. However, the community-based process may be preferable to the administrative approach but it is important to point out that it requires further testing and evaluation to be effectively modified.

Overall, the information available to the stakeholders and the funding for indigent coverage are two fundamental factors for an effective targeting mechanism. Also, the CB process seems to be the most suitable in that social context, but it will require further testing and evaluation.

**101. RuralNet Associates Limited 2008, "Assessing Administrative Capacity and Costs of Cash Transfer Schemes in Zambia Implications for Rollout," International Poverty Centre United Nations Children Fund**

This report assesses the administrative capacity and costs of five social cash transfer schemes that have been piloted in Southern and Eastern provinces in Zambia. The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) has taken the decision to roll out starting in 2009 a national social cash transfer scheme (SCTS) to cover the whole country by 2012. Implementation of pilot schemes started in 2004 with the Kalomo SCTS followed by one in 2005 in Kazungula, 2006 in Chipata and in 2007 in Monze and Katete. Information for the assessment was obtained through a review of various documents, focus group discussions held at all levels (national, provincial, district and sub-district level) and, personal interviews of key informants. Field visits were undertaken to all the five districts in the pilot and two districts in North Western Province without SCTS.

One of the main questions is to examine whether the targeting approach has the potential to include the most deserving beneficiaries. The five social cash transfer schemes are using with some variation the targeting, approval and payment process which was developed for the Kalomo SCTS. The efficacy of the outreach and targeting process is mainly driven by the Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs). They apply a means testing criteria that require them to identify and select the poorest 10 per cent of households in the community.

This system had very high inclusion errors since 15 to 40 percent of beneficiaries were said not to qualify which reflects a serious problem of the targeting process. This was caused for many factors. People preferred to remain silent because they did not want to be known as the ones who had another person excluded. Another reason was apathy by those who were not on the list of recommended beneficiaries who preferred not to go to a meeting to examine others' situations. The case of lack of transparency was reflected in the high number of complaints, however there are not enough alternatives for people to speak out since they do not like to use the forms provided to complain and they have to face the problem directly with officials at the district. Nepotism and corruption were also important reasons for mis-targeting. Indeed, it was observed that in a few cases, CWAC members preferred to quit their position so that they could benefit from the scheme.

In conclusion, two important conditions are proposed by the authors before expanding the programme at a national level. First is the need to adopt a much simpler means testing criteria to match the level of literacy and skills available at community level. Second, they point out the need to upgrade the skills of the ACC members so that they can provide intensive and better supervision and monitoring of CWACs.

**102. Salim, M. 2001, "The Thailand Social Investment Fund: Providing Social Assistance and Building Social Capital," Social Innovations Funds Update, The World Bank**

This article analyses the impact of the Thailand Social Investment Fund (SIF), particularly its "Menu 5" component in which Community Organization Networks, composed entirely of volunteers, distributes social fund financing directly to needy groups in the form of social assistance and cash transfers. Menu 5 finances student fees and materials, cash transfers for indigent families and AIDS patients, and start-up costs for income-generating schemes. The intermediaries are the community networks that are already a well-established feature of Thai civil society, whose members also serve as subproject volunteers. These Community Organization Networks are local confederations of community groups and NGOs based around shared interests such as geographical location or economic/social issues such as small-scale fishing associations, anti-AIDS work, or environmentalism. Any given network may represent the interests of up to thirteen separate community organizations. The networks are responsible for distributing micro-grants to community organizations who in turn disburse funds to the intended beneficiaries within their respective communities.

According to the article, this organisation within civil society has helped to improve the pace and targeting of disbursements, and indeed it has strengthened community networks themselves. Two impact assessments in 2000 and

2001 have pointed out that in spite of the concern around transparency, most beneficiaries were satisfied with the assistance because they could use the funds immediately for their most urgent priorities, such as their children's education. Another important but not measurable outcome highlighted by the author is the strong voluntary response and clear sense of community ownership of the projects. Even if the funds were important, they seem almost secondary to the sense of community and togetherness that the projects create. One key aspect of success was the development of partnerships at all levels of society (e.g. volunteer Provincial Task Forces, or Regional Committees) for every aspect of project implementation, from subproject approval to supervision and impact evaluation within communities. Indeed, working so closely with civil society partners has helped the SIF to become more transparent since public oversight helps limit the possibility of misuse of funds. Moreover, the author points out the achievement of social capital formation. Visits to subprojects demonstrated that social capital is being built through wide and voluntary community participation, ownership, and leadership.

### **103. Samson, M. et al 2010, Designing and implementing social transfer programmes, Economic Policy Research Institute**

This is a book that evaluates social transfer programmes. It dedicates one of its chapters to explaining how social transfer targets should be determined, drawing upon an international evidence base. Community-based targeting is defined as “a state policy of contracting with community groups or intermediary agents to have them carry out one or more of the following activities: 1) identify recipients for cash or in-kind benefits, 2) monitor the delivery of those benefits, and/or 3) engage in some part of the delivery process” (p.123). Even if it has most commonly been used within small-scale or pilot programmes there are some examples of its use at a national level, such as in Bangladesh and Indonesia. The advantages of CBT mentioned are: community representatives are able to define poverty more appropriately in a local context, and they can more efficiently gather information about individuals with whom they have personal connections. Indeed, it provides a role for local ownership and control, promoting participation. Moreover, it facilitates community mobilisation, empowering disadvantaged groups and legitimising the social transfer programme with positive political consequences.

However, there are risks that are pointed out. It is susceptible to manipulation and capture by more powerful community members and local elites who do not follow targeting guidelines when choosing beneficiaries. Even when the process follows the recommended procedures it can raise costly social tensions and resentment. Indeed, it is frequently the case that decisions taken within the community tend to benefit as many people as possible,

including the non-poor. In addition, it may lead to changing benefit levels for the same group in different regions since it decentralises important policy elements. The costs may undermine political support for the programme.

The study points out that the empirical evidence on CBT is mixed: in some cases it produces very attractive outcomes, while in other cases its performance is poor. For example, in Ethiopia CBT had positive and negative outcomes varying from region to region. In Bangladesh, CBT seems to have progressive results but outcomes are also varied. Indeed, in communities with the worst distribution of incomes, the poorest were most excluded, possibly for their lack of political power. In Malawi's the Starter Packs programme in 2000 community representatives refused to target the poorest of the poor alleging “we are all poor”. The authors conclude that there is no agreement on how to design a CBT approach. The alternative that has been provided is a hybrid mechanism, where central authorities define and monitor the targeting categories, and community representatives implement the regulated process but with significant discretion. Therefore, public meetings, elected community representatives and external audits can improve transparency and accountability. A similar approach (Sharp, 1998) identified by the author finds four ingredients that contribute to the effectiveness of CBT: 1) members of the community should understand the targeting process; 2) information about rules and allocations should be available to the community; 3) community representatives should be accountable, and those denied benefits should have recourse to appeal; 4) an impartial outside authority should audit the process.

### **104. Save the Children, UK 2009, “How Cash Transfers Can Improve the Nutrition of the Poorest Children: Evaluation of a Pilot Safety Net Project in Southern Niger,” Save the Children**

This report evaluates a pilot project to give cash transfers to 1,500 of the poorest households in Tessaoua district, Maradi region, Niger. In 2008, Save the Children, in partnership with CSR/PGCA of Tessaoua district, decided to implement this pilot cash transfer project targeting the poorest households. The report is based on Save the Children surveys, interviews and other reports.

The targeting criteria are very poor households, based on data from a Household Economy Approach (HEA) analysis and wealth ranking, and households with widows and people with disabilities. The HEA captured data on poverty and wealth, based on community perceptions. These were then used to determine targeting criteria to identify the poorest households. Households benefiting from the project were required to take part in awareness sessions on malnutrition and other public health activities, including setting up community health committees.

The report points out that the criteria were easily accepted by communities as they felt it reflected the status of the poorest households. However, it was difficult for

community leaders to accept that only households meeting these criteria would be entitled to direct support through the project, especially as targeted aid was a new concept. It was difficult for some people, especially women, to accept that they would not receive anything while other neighbours did. Therefore, there was a feeling of unfairness since project resources only could cover the poorest households. Moreover, the report points out that during the implementation of the project several checks were necessary to ensure that beneficiary lists were accurately targeting the poorest. This caused tensions and feelings of envy in some villages and strong negotiation skills were required to reduce them, including the protection of leaders' status. The report claims that traditional community leaders cannot be held fully accountable for the targeting, therefore it is recommended that government authorities should officially validate and be accountable for targeting. In many villages, it was reported that households that received the transfer were taxed by the head of the village or the person in charge of writing the list. In few cases, villagers asked for the money to be redistributed across the whole community, although the initial beneficiaries still received more than others.

The report points out that there is no preferred method of targeting by communities but it depends on the complex power relationship that exists within a village or community. Even if the targeting process was controversial, all beneficiary communities agreed that the transfer was effective in helping the poorest. Moreover, the targeting process contributed to the project's cost-effectiveness. Giving a smaller amount to a greater number of households would have had less of an impact. Finally, the report suggests that the different approaches to targeting that are easier to implement and more acceptable to communities need to be further researched. However, it is recommended that criteria should continue to be economic rather than social, easily acceptable by communities, easy to implement, and ensure that those most in need are reached.

**105. Schubert, B. 2008, "Social Cash Transfers as a Component of a Comprehensive National Social Protection Programme - Lessons learned from facilitating the process of designing, piloting and scaling up inclusive social cash transfer schemes in Zambia and Malawi," Compendium of papers presented during the international conference on social protection for the poorest in Africa. Learning from experience. Kampala, Uganda**

The paper analyses the process and the results of establishing social cash transfer schemes using examples from Malawi and Zambia. The Kalomo pilot social cash transfer scheme in Zambia aims to reduce starvation and extreme poverty in the 10 per cent most destitute and incapacitated households in the pilot region. The focus is on "generation gap" households, headed by the elderly who are caring for OVC because the breadwinners are

chronically sick or have died due to AIDS or other reasons. Targeting is done by Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) using a multi-stage participatory process to identify the 10 per cent neediest incapacitated households in their area involving the headmen, the community and the District Welfare Committee (DWAC). The two criteria that households need to meet are: 1) extreme poverty and) being labour-constrained. The process from the first community meeting to paying the first transfer to the beneficiaries takes two months.

The Malawi Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme targets ultra-poor households which at the same time are labour constrained. Stakeholders agreed on Mchinji District as a pilot region and on the District Assembly as the implementing agency for the pilot scheme. By the end of 2008, the scheme was covering 7 districts and 20,000 households. The targeting criteria are similar to those used by Kalomo Scheme: being ultra-poor and labour-constrained. Community Social Protection Committees (CSPC) at village cluster level list, visit and interview all households that seem to meet the targeting criteria. The CSPCs present the households selected and the ranking at a community meeting in order to make the process transparent. The process has been shown to be effective in identifying ultra-poor labour constrained households. A Social Protection Sub-Committee (SCSC) at district level assisted by extension workers, checks if the targeting process has been fair and if results are correct, and then it approves the 10% neediest households.

The study refers to external evaluations of both programmes which report significant positive impacts with regard to food security, health, shelter, and education of the members of beneficiary households. However, it is argued that these evaluations focus more on impact than on performance. Therefore, future evaluations should pay more attention to whether the schemes reach the target group (effectiveness of targeting) and whether they transfer an appropriate amount of cash in a reliable, client-friendly and cost-effective way. In summary, the focus has to be on making sure that the targeted households get the money and not too much on how they use it. Moreover, while both countries have achieved considerable progress in reaching their target (ultra-poor and labour-constrained), the ultra-poor households that are not labour constrained have not received much attention. The author claims this is a matter of concern.

**106. Schubert, B. and Huijbregts, M. 2006, "The Malawi social cash transfer pilot scheme, preliminary lessons learned," Conference on "Social Protection Initiatives for Children, Women and Families: An Analysis of Recent Experiences**

The aim of this paper is to share experiences and information about the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme in Malawi and its role as the Malawi Social Protection Policy and Framework is being developed.



The targeting criteria used for this pilot scheme are ultra-poor and labour constrained. A multi-stage participatory targeting method is then applied. Community Social Protection Committees (CSPCs) at Village Group level record, visit and interview all households which seems to meet the targeting criteria. After this, households that have a dependency ratio of more than 3 according to neediness are ranked. Afterwards, the CSPCs present the households selected and their ranking at a community meeting in order to check that no households meeting the criteria are left out, that undeserving households are not included in the list, and that a consensus on the appropriate ranking is achieved. This helps to show that the Scheme and the targeting process are as transparent as possible. Finally, a Social Protection Sub-Committee (SPSC) at district level, assisted by extension workers, checks if the targeting process has been fair and transparent and if the results are correct. The SPSC approves the 10% neediest households.

The results of the evaluation made by the Social Cash Transfer Secretariat of Mchinji based on random visits to beneficiary households show that effectiveness of targeting is high. All households visited fulfilled the targeting criteria. Community leaders and relatives of the beneficiaries welcome the Scheme because it reduces the overwhelming weight of social obligations. Indeed, it has shown that a Social Protection Scheme that targets ultra-poor households is at the same time a large scale Child Welfare Scheme by adding a school bonus to the transfer. Finally, it is recommended that during the targeting process households are addressed, not individuals. Indeed, it has to be organised as simply as possible, designed in a transparent, well documented and participatory way and it should receive appropriate and long term capacity building assistance.

**107. Schuring, E. 2012, "To condition or not-is that the question? An analysis of the effectiveness of ex-ante and ex-post conditionality in social cash transfer programs," Thesis. Maastricht University**

This dissertation explores the conditions under which the decentralization of targeting is an optimal choice for SCT programmes in low-income countries. The author highlights that in spite of the qualitative and quantitative assessments of performance of CBT, there is a gap in social policy about the underlying mechanisms and motives around CBT. In other words, the author wants to explore the targeting preferences of community members and the extent to which community members are driven by egalitarian or progressive motives, by favouritism towards friends, relatives and socially important people and/or by selfishness, along with the conditions that lead to success or achieve more optimal results.

The study draws on controlled field experiments, carried out in rural communities to understand and reveal targeting preferences of community members, the compatibility of individual targeting preferences with group outcomes, and determinants of progressiveness of CBT. Community experiments were conducted in 25 different districts in Zambia randomly selected. The experiments were designed to simulate the existing SCT scheme and its CBT mechanism in Zambia.

The first highlighted finding is that preferences for redistribution prevail over egalitarian motives of individuals, with allocations being given to the very poor and the vulnerable. Second, when individuals and groups make decisions for other community members, excluding themselves, neither favouritism to close relatives nor favouritism to those in the community with an important social position seems to drive the allocation of benefits. Indeed, it an inclination was noted of people to give preference to those who share similar characteristics, or in other words to those with whom they could identify. Third, the likelihood of being selfish is larger in SCT communities and among people who are very dissatisfied with community life. Selfishness does not seem to be more prevalent among people who are better-off or who have an important position in the community, pointing out that elite capture is not an over-emphasized problem of CBT. Fourth, participants were overall satisfied with the group outcomes and process, suggesting that the majority did not feel that the group decision was imposed on them. The study does not find either that greater transparency produces more progressive outcomes. Previous exposure to targeting seems to have an impact on the incidence but not on the depth of progressiveness of group distributions. There are in general other determinants of progressiveness at the individual level: givers who enjoy a particular social status in the community are more progressive, while unhappiness with community life, distrust vis-à-vis other community members as well as a strong belief in individual responsibility for one's destiny produce fewer progressive choices.

In conclusion, this study shows that CBT leads to at least mildly progressive outcomes and does not produce any conflicts or greater dissatisfaction among participants. People with a certain authority in the community on the targeting committee are both more progressive and not selfish in their choices. CBT appears to have greater potential in communities where people are generally satisfied with community life, where they know each other better and where there is less distrust. It is recommended to governments to either use CBT selectively in communities where there is already a high degree of cohesion and information or to ensure that more information about community members is made publicly available. A committee with prior exposure to and training on targeting, rather than the entire community deciding, leads to less egalitarian and more progressive results. Even if the process limits the possibilities for self-enrichment it is advisable to have additional checks and balances in place. Zambia's example of not permitting committee members to register themselves as beneficiaries is a wise provision. The disadvantage is that it might reinforce paternalistic patterns of the rich granting transfers to the poor.

**108. Sen, B. and Begum S. 2002, Methodology for identifying the poorest at local level, Chronic Poverty Research Centre**

The objective of the authors is to identify the poor in rural Bangladesh by developing sensitive targeting indicators that are effective in minimising leakage to the non-poor while ensuring coverage of the target group. The authors start from an initial choice set of indicators, examine their targeting ability to predict the incidence of extreme poverty and assess their representativeness. After giving attention to practical considerations of easy implementability, they finally come up with the preferred variant of core indicators.

They argue that targeting is frequently done under imperfect, incomplete information since generation of full information (e.g. income/expenditure surveys) is costly. The authors argue that since no single indicator (however efficient) contains sufficient information, it is better to combine the best among the lot. Moreover, the authors claim that even the most effective set of indicators may have little effect on the status of the extreme poor if the process of administering is left to the bureaucratic discretion of the programme managers. In this case, the risks of leakage cannot be avoided when using bureaucratic targeting as is the case of Food for Education in Bangladesh. These risks can only be minimized through local consultation with community and NGOs, a process that can be facilitated by the presence of effective local government.

Nevertheless, the study warns that it is unlikely that in the short to medium term the local government will become an efficient organ of power to manage development at the grass roots. Local governments' discourse is influenced by electoral issues and there are still questions about the election of members (whether they are

elected via direct vote or selected by the upper tier, their gender composition, etc). Therefore, if there is not a local government able to supervise the process, then the risks of bureaucratic targeting and leakage can be difficult to avoid. The authors ultimately favour an "intermediate" solution at least for the short to medium term. They claim to locate potential health beneficiaries from the extreme poor group in the programmes which are in any case self-targeted to the need of the poorest. Evaluations have proven this is possible as is the case of programmes in Bangladesh such as Food-for-Works (FFW) and Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) which target the poorest.

**109. Sharp, K., Brown, T., and Teshome, A. 2006, "Targeting Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)," Overseas Development Institute**

This is a report which reviews the targeting design, implementation and outcomes of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia during its first year to eighteen months of operation. The results are based on qualitative fieldwork and a household survey in eight woredas (districts) (two in each of the four main PSNP regions), on key informant interviews, and on a review of secondary sources. The study is focused on how and how well the targeting system is working.

The PSNP's primary objective is guarantee transfers to the most food-insecure people in the most food-insecure areas. The main responsibility for targeting of the PSNP falls on the Food Security Task Forces (FSTFs) at woreda, kebele (sub-district or peasant association) and community levels, supported by the Woreda and Kebele Council Administration. Woreda Food Security tasks Forces (WFSTFs) are empowered to set criteria for beneficiary selection to suit the particular conditions of the Woreda. The majority of beneficiaries are required to contribute their labour to PSNP public works. The beneficiary selection is a combination of administrative and community targeting. It is in principle driven from the community level, while the administrative bodies provide guidance and supervision, and control the allocation of resources. Woreda and Kebele councils are given the main responsibility for hearing appeals and complaints.

The results show that the PSNP is now reaching the poor and the food-insecure. However, there is a large inherent exclusion rate due to a lack of resources. Women representatives are few and hardly ever in leadership roles which shows how they tend to be excluded and their appeals are less heard. The combination of administrative and community targeting which are in place in most areas are working fairly well with variable degrees of success. Some major misinterpretations and confusions in targeting during the first year have now been corrected. Local decision-makers felt that there have been improvements in targeting from the first to the second year and were attributed to better understanding of the PSNP principles, more involvement and in some places specific instructions

from higher levels to correct such errors as cutting family numbers, excluding the landless, or targeting the better off. Quotas were also higher making the targeting process less contentious. The research team also found little evidence of systematic corruption or misuse of PSNP resources by administrators.

**110. Shepherd, A. et al 2011, “Addressing chronic poverty and vulnerability through social assistance in Tanzania: assessing the options,” Chronic Poverty Research Centre**

The authors explore the Tanzania Action Fund community-based conditional cash transfer pilot which was launched in September 2009. Households benefiting from this programme were very poor, not receiving in-kind or cash from other programmes and those which contained older people, orphans or vulnerable children. The targeting method used is a “verified community based targeting” in which communities pre-select the most vulnerable 50 per cent of households in the community. A PMT questionnaire is applied and the 50 per cent of households are ranked according to vulnerability. At the end the most vulnerable 15 per cent of households, according to the PMT questionnaire, are enrolled in the programme if they are approved in a second round of public validation. The targeting process takes around seven days to implement in each village and the conditions of the transfer are regular attendance at primary school by vulnerable children and occasional visits to health centres.

The results of this evaluation of social assistance in Tanzania show that local focus groups are very good at categorising households in terms of poverty or well-being. This implies a less bureaucratic process than other methods but it could imply as well the need of a system of verification which can increase the costs. One of the methods described and that can work in Tanzania is “focus group based wealth ranking” in which focus groups identify six well-being classifications ranging from destitute to rich. It required taking into account assets, income levels of consumption and vulnerability to risk. The authors claim that this method would work across communities in Tanzania while retaining local relevance, representing distinctions among poor people around the poverty line and capturing the specific characteristics experienced by the destitute. In this exercise the characteristics attached to each well-being classification varied between different communities.

Another pilot programme is the Kwa Wazee project which targets poor and vulnerable people over the age of 60, including those households with children without parents. Initially village leaders targeted poor households but up to 60 per cent of households selected by community leaders were not eligible and the methodology was abandoned. The authors conclude that the problems of targeting are many in Tanzania but verified CBT could be relied on to identify the destitute and very poor according to their analysis of performance in the Tanzania Social Action Fund.

**111. Shiree 2011, “Targeting the Extreme Poor: Learning from Shiree,” Extreme Poverty Research Group, Shiree**

Shiree/EEP is a Challenge Fund supported by DFID and the Government of Bangladesh, specifically designed to target the extreme poor and whose goal is to help Bangladesh to achieve MDG target 1. This paper analyses the experiences from Shiree and partner NGOs’ projects on targeting the extreme poor over the first year and a quarter of implementation across different regions of Bangladesh. The paper is based on discussions with Shiree and partner NGO staff (management to field-level), as well as available documentation and data arising from the projects.

Each NGO has used individual models of targeting to select extreme poor households; afterwards Shiree undertakes the verification process. Mixes of essential (often underlying themes like food security or ownership assets) and supplementary criteria (reflecting the vulnerability of households) are used but differ across projects.

One of the lessons highlighted is that a mix of criteria is needed; these should be as simple as possible and they need to reflect the realities of social and economic vulnerability depending on particular contexts. In identifying the extreme poor, this study shows that using a mix of targeting methods and strategies, and relying on various “knowledge streams” unique to each project context improved its effectiveness in targeting the extreme poor. Generally, the use of participatory methods that involve communities in the selection and validation of households (using social mapping, wealth ranking and FGDs) has proved to be effective. The advantages are that it has allowed communities to define extreme poverty in their own context and to perceive the process as transparently as possible. Indeed, communities possess knowledge about its poorest members that external workers lack. However, the paper points out that it is important to adapt traditional targeting methods to the area, the project intervention, and to the particular characteristics of extreme poverty in a given area. Across the different projects they experimented with some shifting from community-based methods to undertaking door-to-door visits or key informant interviews, and vice versa, mainly because of project specific and contextual circumstances. They highlight a methodological issue when community definitions of extreme poverty are different to those of NGOs or Shiree during verification. This was one of the reasons for shifting targeting methodologies. Another observation was that the poorest communities are least likely to be geographically situated near primary elites; therefore it is more difficult to identify the most disadvantaged communities and subsequently the extreme poor within them. Indeed, there are reports of attempts of local elites to capture the selection process, influencing PRA sessions by providing incorrect information.

One of the most important lessons is communication with community members and consultation with a broad

range of stakeholders. Good training and facilities for field staff are important so they can include the voices of the extreme poor. Likewise, involving community participants in validating the status of extreme poor households is useful. This analysis concludes that selection strategies need to be context specific and to recognise diversity in a country like Bangladesh where a mix of contextually specific criteria and methods has to be applied.

#### **112. Shoham, J. 2005, "Community Based Targeting in Myanmar," Field Exchange**

This article analyses a key component of the World Food Programme's (WFP) Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) in Myanmar, which has been employing community based targeting as part of the vulnerable group feeding (VGF) programme. The PRRO has the following components: Protracted Relief for Vulnerable Groups, Food for Education, Food for Training and Food for Work. This is a programme that provides assistance directly to communities through a UN agency and not through government channels since the country is under sanctions. For the evaluation of the programme the author focuses on the Northern Rakhine State including discussions and interviews with WFP staff and the UN Resident Representative, field site visits and meetings with stakeholders including UNHCR, Food Management Committee members, beneficiaries, and non-beneficiary community members.

CBT is the system that has been employed for a number of years for identifying recipients for the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF). It involves a village meeting, organised by village elders, where WFP field monitors define eligibility criteria. Villagers were then asked to nominate beneficiary households. There were different problems found with this approach. Many people were left out and criteria were not always linked to food security which meant that more beneficiaries were excluded. Also, many villagers felt that the community was not effectively involved in the process and that there was too much influence of village leaders in the process. As a result, a new system was established in 2004 in which WFP field monitors list all the households in the hamlet and arrange a village meeting. WFP then suggests criteria for inclusion which can be modified at the village meeting. Village participants allocate each household one of four wealth categories and in order to qualify for inclusion in the VGF, households/individuals have to be considered as extremely poor. At this point WFP field monitors visit the households to ensure that nominated households are extremely poor. In the case of Food for Work, households are targeted through an elected Food Management Committee. According to WFP the VFG has been 88% successful in identifying the most vulnerable people in the communities.

In conclusion, the CBT method has been very successful and the system has been strengthened. CBT appears to avoid political influence at the village level and may also

strengthen civil society. CBT may work particularly well in the context of Myanmar since other "poor" are included in FFW/FFT and school feeding, so that the community does not feel under pressure to include everyone in the VGF.

#### **113. Slater, R. and Farrington, J. 2009, "Targeting of social transfers: A review for DFID," Overseas Development Institute**

The aim of this report is to review the effectiveness and efficiency of a range of alternative targeting approaches for social transfers in low-income and low-capacity contexts. The authors focus on countries where poverty levels are high and combine qualitative and quantitative evidence and analysis to generate lessons on targeting that are useful to the designers and implementers of social transfer programmes. The authors focus on three main targeting approaches (poverty, social categorical and geographical) and on a number of targeting mechanisms (community-based, proxy indicators, means-testing, self-targeting and geographical).

The report defines community-based mechanisms as those implemented by elected or imposed committees at the local level; however it is rare in CBT for communities or committees to identify policy (political) priorities and criteria themselves. The common assumption in CBT is that administrative costs can be minimised because local community members are not remunerated, however other costs are identified. Financial costs are presented when community members are paid to sit on panels that carry out wealth ranking exercises in communities. (In Cambodia, there is an urgent need to assess the financial costs in community-based targeting amidst concerns that these costs may be excessive). Private costs as well are reported and vary from the costs of travelling or queuing in order to receive the benefit (the MEGS in India, the Cash for Education Programme in Bangladesh), the costs to attend a community wealth ranking meeting, to the payment of bribes (90% of the NGBS' beneficiaries in India had to pay bribes) to get enlisted onto programmes. Other costs identified are social and political. Social costs and stigmatization can affect local community decision-makers as well as beneficiaries as in the PSNP in Ethiopia or the efforts of BRAC to reduce these costs in Bangladesh.

In conclusion, the costs and capacity requirements of designing and implementing approaches that rely on formal means-testing of households or individuals, or involve significant conditionality are likely to be excessive for many countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Approaches that rely on proxy and/or informal assessments (including CB assessment) may offer an alternative. This study shows cases of progressive targeting outcomes but also cases of committee members abusing power and excluding beneficiaries. The authors conclude that social categorical targeting is likely to remain a popular policy option, in part because of the difficulty of means-testing and other reasons like political or community acceptability. Indeed, when targeting approaches are inappropriate or



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poorly conceived, targeting is likely to fail, no matter how thorough the implementation is. It is also highlighted that politics play a key role in determining targeting choices but mechanisms to openly evaluate the influence of politics on design, implementation and outcomes in social transfer programmes are limited.

**114. Slaymaker, T., Christisen, K. and Hemming, I. 2005, "Community-based approaches and service delivery: Issues and options in difficult environments and partnerships," Discussion paper. Overseas Development Institute**

This background paper evaluates the relationship between community-based approaches (CBA) and basic service delivery based upon international experiences and a focus discussion on Sudan. The authors want to explore specifically the challenges of this approach in the context of highly aid dependent post-conflict situations. Examples from the provision of water and sanitation are provided throughout the analysis.

The authors show the different issues and challenges of CBA specifically in communities within fragile states or difficult environmental contexts. They point out that it is inevitable that decision-making processes around management of public goods are dominated by elites, even in the most egalitarian societies and this domination or control of decision-making needs to be distinguished from capture of public good benefits through theft and corruption as Mansuri and Rao (2003) differentiated. Indeed, problems of elite capture are more frequent, especially in communities with existing ethnic, social or economic divisions where indeed there is an acceptance of highly unequal distribution of resources in a context of a war economy. Another problem identified in post-conflict contexts, like the case in South Sudan, is the continued military dominance of, and interference with, local administration, along with a feeling of mistrust between government and communities.

Targeting issues are included in this study. The authors highlight that training of skilled community-level facilitators, as recommended to avoid elite capture, is a particular problem in post-conflict contexts. Indeed, the idea of leaving the targeting decision entirely to the community is not likely to guarantee targeting of vulnerable groups. Moreover, targeting seems difficult and expensive to monitor in conflict or recent post-conflict settings where capacity is often weak. Therefore, the authors suggest targeting should be kept as simple as possible and focus on a small number of key indicators around equity and accessibility. An example is the Community-based Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) project in South Sudan which shows that community-based

approaches are useful to identify the needs and priorities of beneficiary communities but they are less able to identify solutions and frequently require technical support to facilitate informed decision making. It shows as well that community-level priorities are not always the same as broader societal goals or public benefits. Finally, the authors recommend that community interventions are complemented and guided by a system of norms and standards to ensure quality and equity in services provided.

**115. Soares, F. V. and Teixeira, C. 2010, "Impact Evaluation of the Expansion of the Food Subsidy Programme in Mozambique," International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth**

This policy research brief provides results on both the targeting performance of the 2008 expansion of the Food Subsidy Programme (PSA) in Mozambique and the impact of the programme on some key indicators. For the evaluation of the PSA, the authors tried to emulate the beneficiary-selection process in places where the programme was not implemented, and then they applied weighting techniques to make the comparison group as similar as possible to the treated group. The evaluation involved the follow-up of both the treated group and the comparison group before the former began receiving the benefit, and then one year after receiving the benefit so that difference-in-difference techniques were applied. The evaluation is based on quantitative data drawn from 11 districts in seven provinces in Mozambique. The methodology used to assess the quality of the PSA's targeting consists of comparing the distribution of a "well-being indicator" for the overall rural population in Mozambique, and identifying the relative position of the sample of potential PSA beneficiaries and/or actual beneficiaries in that distribution.

The results of this study show that the PSA has a good targeting performance. It even performs much higher than the worldwide averages calculated by Coady et al (2004) and Handa et al (2010). In addition, the authors' results show that "age of head of the household" is a reasonable criterion to identify the poor households in rural areas, since elderly heads are more likely to be poor. This assessment showed that the localities where the programme had not been implemented were much poorer, according to the authors' well-being indicator, than the ones in which the programme was being implemented. Their sample is very much concentrated among the poorest households in the rural areas, but this concentration is higher in their comparison group, suggesting that geographical targeting can be an efficient way of improving the targeting of the PSA, even within districts.

**116. Souares, A. et al 2010, "Using community wealth ranking to identify the poor for subsidies: a case study of community-based health insurance in Nouna, Burkina Faso," Health and Social Care in the Community**

This article examines the use of community wealth ranking (CWR) in a community-based health insurance (CBI) project in Burkina Faso. The strengths and weaknesses of the approach are assessed in the CWR exercise made by the authors. The CBI project was initiated in 2004 in a portion of the Nouna Health District (NHD) and a CWR approach was used from 2007 to identify the poorest quintile of households who were subsequently offered insurance at half the usual rate. Enrolment of households is voluntary although the premium is set on an individual basis.

For the analysis of this paper the authors applied the CWR method in three sequential steps within a district in Burkina Faso and the district capital of Nouna. The first one was a focus group discussion with community members to obtain some of the local criteria or characteristics of poverty and wealth. The second step was the ranking through key informants. The third step consisted of reaching a consensus. At the end the list was read with the poorest 20% households determined by the key informants and the official list was given to the village chief.

The results of the study show that the agreement between the key informants was more (37.5%) in the villages than in Nouna town (27.3%) and the discussion to reach the consensus was less necessary in the villages (9.9%) than in Nouna (19.3%). Only nine complaints were received from villagers who considered that some better-off households were wrongly identified. The advantages of CWR pointed out on this study are the following: CWR is easy to implement and requires minimal material; it overcomes the barriers presented by long surveys which take longer. Indeed, the results are immediately available compared to a household survey and it allows getting quality information comparatively quickly. Moreover, members of the community play an active role during the implementation of the programme increasing acceptability. Finally, CWR's great strength lies in its sensitivity to local circumstances and seems to be a very good method to improve targeting of the poorest for CBI enrolment. The main disadvantages found are the following: CWR requires a feeling of being one community and it does not seem to work where community ties are weak or where there are high levels of conflicts and mistrust. Indeed, it has proved to be problematic in urban areas where people do not know their neighbours. Moreover, this method has the risk of worsening equity since it can cause leakage or under-coverage. In conclusion, the use of CWR observed in this study resulted in an increase in enrolment in health insurance among the poor, suggesting that this method is appropriate for targeting the poor for health insurance enrolment.

**117. Sparrow, R. 2008, "Targeting the poor in times of crisis: the Indonesian health card," Health policy and planning**

The author examines the targeting performance of the Indonesian health card programme that was implemented in 1998 as part of the Indonesian Social Safety Net (Jaring, Pengam Sosial, JPS). Households that were considered to be the most vulnerable to economic shocks were allocated health cards, which entitled all household members to the price subsidy at public health care providers. The targeting process was decentralized, involving both geographic and community-based targeting. Particular focus is given to the effectiveness of regional targeting policy in contrast to local (within-district) targeting by the allocation committees. The author employs a micro-simulation-based method to attribute overall targeting performance to geographic and local targeting instruments. The basic source of data is Indonesia's main socio-economic survey.

Targeting within districts was done by two processes. Special district committees allocated compensation funds to public health care providers according to the estimated number of health card eligible households in the area. Health cards were allocated to villages and then distributed to eligible households through local health centres and village midwives. Eligible households were those that were considered poor following the National Family Planning Coordination (Badan, Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, BKKBN) measure, and subsequently distributed to eligible households through local health centres and village midwives. In addition, targeting depended heavily on local knowledge by allowing local health officials and community members to define additional criteria according to their own insights regarding the effects of the crisis. It is important to note that local officials and community members determine the eligibility of the health card, engage in their distribution or take part in the monitoring process.

The results show that health cards distribution is pro-poor. Amongst the poorest 20% of the population, 18.5% had a health card. The poorest 20% of the population own 33.7% of the health cards. However, there is still considerable leakage to the more wealthy households. The wealthiest 60% of the population own 40.6% of the health cards. The middle quintiles are more likely to use it suggesting that those who received the benefits were on average wealthier than those who received the card. The use of the card is similar in urban and rural areas. Indeed, the author's results show that while remote and less wealthy areas with little access to health care receive priority in the targeting process, the direct and indirect costs (e.g. travelling, little access to public health providers) of using the cards are relatively high. On the other hand, the probability of selection increases as the number of midwives living in the village increases. Indeed, medical staff of local clinics are the ones who distribute the cards, this suggests the possible importance of informal contacts within the village for awareness of, and participation in

social programmes. In conclusion, most of the targeting gains are to be made within districts, with the district allocation committees and public health care providers.

**118. Steindhardt, L. and Peters, D. 2010, "Targeting accuracy and impact of a community-identified waiver card scheme for primary care user fees in Afghanistan," *International Journal for Equity in Health***

This study uses data from Afghanistan and qualitative interviews to examine the targeting performance and effects on healthcare utilization of a community-identified waiver scheme in a very low-income post-conflict context. Principal component analysis (PCA) was run as part of the evaluating process. In Afghanistan, data on household poverty is not available making the use of PMT difficult. However, it has a rich tradition of community-based decision-making bodies which makes CBT the most realistic way to identify poor households.

The standardized user fee system examined in this study was piloted in summer 2005 at 27 facilities in 10 provinces of Afghanistan. Under the user fee pilot, waiver cards were distributed to very poor and female-headed households in the areas implementing user fees. All members of the household receiving a waiver card were entitled to receive all services for free at the pilot facility. Community leaders were in charge of identifying which households met the criteria for being female-headed or very poor. Results show that households receiving waiver cards had lower average wealth scores from PCA than those without cards. They also had lower self-rated wealth scores and higher average food insecurity scores. Only 30.3% of respondents whose household had received a waiver card reported being able to pay fees with little to no difficulty, compared to those 60.5% without a card. Among those with waiver cards, 57.6% reported being unable to pay fees at all, compared to a 17.9% of those without a card. However, leakage and under-coverage scores were very high, being 54.9% and 85.0% respectively, when considering the bottom 40% as poor. In terms of perceptions of the communities, interviewed facility staff and community leaders reported that the waiver card system was implemented effectively, with little leakage but some under-coverage due to high rates of poverty. Facility staff and community leaders reported that in most areas, communities made use of a combination of village council (e.g. shura) members and elders, and in some cases, community health workers (CHWs) and the Mullah/Imam as well were authorized to draw up a list of very poor and female headed households. The list was then approved by user fee committee members (facility staff and community members) after verifying the economic status of the households through their collective knowledge and in some cases visits to households.

Overall, the process progressed easily at most facilities and was transparent and effective in targeting deserving households. In addition, in numerous cases community

leaders pointed out that the number of cards should be increased. In general, facility staff agreed that the targeting process was fair, transparent and relatively accurate but mentioned some cases of leakage to wealthier households. However, the authors highlight potential biases of village leaders and facility staff since they were involved in the waiver card process and have to present themselves and the process as effective. In spite of the limited information available to capture households' points of view, open-ended survey questions indicated that they mostly have a positive perception of the targeting process. This is an important success for a country in a post-conflict context. Targeting, as mentioned, did not perform well according to PCA scores, indicating that these measures may not be the most appropriate for capturing income and/or that community leaders are considering other important factors when choosing beneficiaries. The authors recommend that a new waiver card system should consider more active involvement in targeting households by Mullahs/Imams who are respected and have a good knowledge of the communities.

**119. Subbarao, K. et al 1997, "Safety net programs and poverty reduction. Lessons from cross-country experience," *The World Bank***

This book revises the conceptual issues and the different approaches and experiences of social assistance and poverty targeted programmes in different countries and regions. The authors point out the importance of measuring poverty and identifying the poor for designing any targeting transfer programme. Likewise, they highlight the importance of beneficiary participation in decision-making.

In the case of livelihood programmes the authors claim that country experiences suggest that by far the least effective way to reach the poor is to directly target subsidized credit to the poor identified by bureaucrats or project managers. Bureaucrats tended to select people living just below the poverty line to claim the programme was successful. The non-poor could receive benefits only when powerful local interests clashed with bureaucrats. In contrast, programmes that used communities, local groups, and NGOs to identify the poor have proved to have better targeting performance. One example is the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) in India (that directly targeted the poor and offered subsidized credit). The states that used village councils to select beneficiaries had lower leakage errors.

Similarly, the authors highlight the importance of beneficiaries' involvement in different projects. For example, the empirical study of Narayan (1995) analysing 121 water supply projects showed that participation by beneficiaries in decision making made a major contribution to project effectiveness. The private delivery model operating thorough NGOs and community-based organizations is more likely to promote beneficiary participation. However, it can be costly and difficult. Poor people's time has opportunity costs and they will

get involved only if they expect sufficient returns. One example is Zambia's Beneficiary Assessment for Social Recovery Project (SRP) in which women refused to participate in project committees arguing they were too busy. The Zambian example also showed that community groups (like parent-teacher associations) can be highly participatory but not necessarily accountable to beneficiaries. Indeed, local people may have different interests to public agencies and they may not necessarily be pro-poor. For example, Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr programmes, which selected beneficiaries through local committees, showed that the selection was made according to personal preferences rather than poverty criteria. Moreover, the authors highlight that communities are hardly harmonious and traditional structures often reflect the interests of the elite. Using NGOs as intermediaries represent other problems. For example, most NGO's are located in cities or towns and tend to work in these areas and not in the poorest locations.

Finally, the authors point out that where programmes have succeeded, they have been adapted to the local environment, and beneficiaries have felt involved and "owned" the programme. One example is the Philippines Communal Irrigation project (NIA) in which full-scale participation took a huge effort but farmers assumed ownership and were motivated to maintain the project. However, the authors conclude that beneficiary participation is more desirable in some projects than in others. For example, projects that depend on participation of a large number of beneficiaries and require regular maintenance and supervision, local involvement at almost all stages of project design and implementation, may improve projects' effectiveness and sustainability. By contrast, projects that require significant capital investments (infrastructure, construction) tend to be more consultative with beneficiaries than participatory. In these cases it is suggested that services be provided through existing central or private organizations.

**120. Sulaiman, M. and Matin, I. 2006, "Targeting Effectiveness of CFPR/TUP in Scale-up Environment," CFPR/TUP Working Paper Series, Dhaka: BRAC**

The aim of the authors of this paper is to investigate whether BRAC is reaching the poorest with its CFPR/TUP programme in Bangladesh. A survey was conducted right after the completion of beneficiary selection of 512 participants and 820 non-participants. Information on households was collected using a structured questionnaire. To measure the poverty status of the beneficiaries, the CGAP tool is used.

The beneficiaries of the programme are given some income generating assets with training for managing the enterprise. Other elements of the programme include stipend, health care provisions, social support through community mobilization, savings and credit facilities.

Since the aim of the programme is to reach the ultra-poor, and the cost of leakage is very high, considerable effort is put into the selection criteria. The beneficiary selection involves geographical, community based and proxy means targeting. The programme operates through Area Offices (AO) usually covering a sub-district. Within each AO, spots (usually clusters of 100-120 households) are selected where participatory wealth rankings are done. The households in the bottom group of wealth ranking are identified as ultra-poor. Subsequently, information on the ultra-poor households is collected using a small questionnaire. All the ultra-poor households fulfilling at least two of the inclusion criteria and no exclusion criterion are selected.

The results show that the participants are much poorer than the non-participants, suggesting the strength of the wealth ranking exercises carried out by the programme. Three quarters of beneficiaries are within the poorest group. Only 5% of the participants belong to the 2nd least poor category and 0% in the least poor category which shows a great amount of success in avoiding inclusion error. However, the results show as well that 57% of households that belong to the poorest group of the study were not selected by the programme. Even if the authors do not investigate this further they suggest that the little disparity may have been due to community ignorance of the status of some households and sympathy towards a few others. Overall, there is a high level of convergence of community wealth ranking and objective measures of poverty. This success, according to the authors is not only from the usage of targeting tools but also due to rigorous implementation of them. The targeting criteria used also seem very effective in correctly identifying the poorest among the ultra-poor identified by wealth ranking.

**121. Tembo, G. and Freeland, N. 2008, "Baseline survey report for the Monze Social Cash Transfer Programme," Ministry of Community Development and Social Services**

This report analyses the Monze SCT scheme designed with soft conditions regarding children's health and education. Is the first in Zambia to provide a platform for testing if attaching soft conditions to cash transfers can result in improved outcomes. The authors present the findings of the Monze baseline survey involving households that had been identified as potential beneficiaries of the SCT scheme. The aim is to provide information of the pre-programme living conditions of the potential beneficiaries and to provide standards against which the impact of the programme will be measured. The survey was applied in 93 Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACS). Data entry was done in Microsoft Access. Data cleaning and analysis were done in SPSS and Stata to generate descriptive statistics, measures of inequality and measures of association. The household data were supplemented by community data, which were collected at formal gatherings of community leaders and other informed persons like teachers and



health workers. The report also benefited from the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS).

SCT schemes in Zambia use a CBT system through the Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs). CWAC members meet to identify households in their community that are impoverished and incapacitated as defined in their training processes and in the operations manual. The identified households are interviewed and the information is recorded in official forms which are approved by the village headman. The second step is a second meeting in which the households are ranked according to their level of destitution. All eligible households are presented to the rest of the community members at community meetings chaired by Area Coordination Committee (ACC) officials. The ACC members check the forms for completeness, correctness and consistency before submitting them to the District Social Welfare (DSWO) Office. In the presence of CWAC representatives, a DSW officer and the DWAC representative examine each application for eligibility and approve or reject applications including amounts of money to be received accordingly. Cases which need further investigation are reviewed at a DWAC meeting. Retargeting is done every two years.

The internal and external monitoring of the programme indicates that the beneficiary households were relatively more vulnerable than the national average, suggesting some effectiveness in the targeting process. However, a qualitative analysis by Wietler, 2007 suggests that beneficiary households were still receiving help from non-beneficiary households because they were still considered to be destitute as the transfers were not large enough to get them out of poverty. However, what SCT did is that it changed the nature of relationships as the beneficiaries were reported to be paying for assistance in performing labour intensive jobs rather than being helped for free. Indeed, there may be an over-reliance on the SCT since it was also observed that beneficiaries changed their livelihoods strategies in terms of hiring labour and investing in livestock. Another interesting fact mentioned by the authors is that social networks are important in the community and do sometimes influence access to aid programmes such as the SCT schemes. Monze, which is traditionally home to Tonga-speaking people, may place Tonga people in a more advantageous position with respect to traditional leadership and other power positions. The results show that although 78% of the households had attended community meetings during the 12 months prior to the survey, only 15% considered themselves members of community groups. Since these community groups are often considered as entry points for projects the authors claim that there is still too much to do to consider the community-based approach fully representative of sub-population interests. Indeed, the authors suggest that the poor may also lack the capacity not only to participate but also to make contributions in community meetings.

Moreover, the differential characteristics and vulnerability levels may as well influence participation in these meetings. The results of this study show that better-off and more educated households are the ones who fully participate in the meetings.

In conclusion, this study shows that for interventions that target the poorest population, it is important to understand the characteristics that distinguish participants from non-participants and the social relations within communities.

## **122. The World Bank 2004, "Implementation completion report on a credit in the amount of US\$66 million to the Republic of Malawi for a second Social Action Fund Project," The World Bank**

The preparation of this report was based on a stakeholders' workshop that was attended by the project staff, Government staff, NGOs, and donors. The Malawi Second Social Action Fund (MASAF II) was a follow-on operation of MASAF I. The project had the following five components: 1) Community Sub-Projects (CSP); 2) Public Works Programme (PWP); 3) Sponsored Sub-Projects (SSP); 4) Capacity Enhancement and Studies (CES) and 5) Incremental Operating Costs. MASAF II continued to support the creation of community level social and economic infrastructure to benefit the poor, enhance their participation in prioritizing and implementing sub-projects through Project Management Committees (PMCs), and the increase the participation of women. In an economy that was prone to adverse weather shocks, MASAF II continued to provide support for the poor through targeted PWP.

According to the report the poor have benefited from the SSP and the PWP components. There was consensus that targeting has been achieved through extended Participatory Rural Appraisals. The 2003 Beneficiary Assessment points out the importance of the participatory method to select beneficiaries in which many stakeholders, from community leaders, CBOs, community members and others, are involved in the selection process. However, the report highlights that some of these methods were neither harmonized nor participatory. Additionally, under PWP, a self-targeting wage (20% below the market minimum wage rate) was used but led in some instances to the exclusion of the deserving and the inclusion on the non-deserving due to the high levels of labour supply. The results, through appraisal processes, show that the programme contributed to the building of ownership. Experiences from communities, local authorities and NGOs show the provision of useful knowledge and information contributed to increased and informed community participation in the sub-project implementation process as well as accountability at the community level. Indeed, MASAF I and II experiences with community participation has shown the potency of social capital as a vehicle for meeting economic goals.

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**123. The World Bank 2009, “Kenya - Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Project,” Project Appraisal Document, The World Bank**

This paper evaluates the CT-OVC Programme in Kenya. The programme started in 2004 initially supported primarily by UNICEF and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). The programme focuses on households which: a) are poor, b) have OVC (defined as either single/double orphans, children or a caregiver who are chronically ill and child-headed households); and c) are not receiving benefits from other cash transfer programmes. There is a clear five-step targeting process for beneficiaries, including the participation of community leaders as well as validation processes. The targeting mechanism for identifying eligible households at the location level uses a two steps approach which makes the process transparent and effective. Members of the community defined as Location OVC Committees (LOCs) are in charge of identifying households based on the eligibility criteria using pre-set criteria on a questionnaire known as “Form 1”. Thereafter, enumerators collect systematic information using another pre-set questionnaire (“Form 2”) on households identified by the LOC members and verified as eligible by the Management Information System. Information about the programme is also disseminated in the communities where it operates; and the list of beneficiary households is shared with the communities for validation. This allows the Central Programme Unit (CPU) to verify whether the households identified by the community actually meet the following eligibility criteria. To strengthen participation, operational awareness sessions are conducted in the communities to promote understanding of the programme.

A baseline survey was done for a comprehensive impact evaluation which indicated that the targeting mechanism successfully reached households caring for OVC, but not necessarily the poorest. The results show that there is a need to adjust the targeting mechanism to better reach the poorest OVC, especially as the analysis shows a significant difference between the poorest and the better-off beneficiary households. The data shows that only 24 per cent of recipient households are among the 21 per cent poorest, suggesting that a large fraction of the poorest OVC households do not benefit from the programme. Three quarters of recipients are not from the poorest 21 per cent of households, and 62 per cent are above the \$1 per day poverty line. However, only 16 per cent are above the \$2 per day poverty line, suggesting that the programme does reach poor households, although not the poorest. The report shows that the current eligibility criteria is highly indiscriminative and does not successfully identify the poorest OVC households. In conclusion, it is agreed that the targeting mechanism needs to explore other methodologies and be further reviewed.

**124. UNDG Policy Network for MD/MDGs 2010, UNDG MDG Good Practices. Chapter 1 on Poverty, Employment and Hunger, United Nations Development Group**

The aim of this study is to provide good practice cases that contribute to MDG1 achievement. One analysed case is Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCTS) pilot which targets ultra-poor households whose members are unable to work due to disability, age, illness or a high dependency ratio. The process of targeting includes the use of Social Protection Committees that list, visit and interview all households that seem to meet the targeting criteria. The Social Protection Sub-Committees at the district level approve the beneficiaries recommended by the identification and targeting process, and oversee the process to verify the fairness, transparency and correctness of targeting process. According to this report the SCTS has been successful. It has allowed communities to get resources, strengthening decentralization and assuring that resources allocated for the poor actually reach the poor.

The study points out how decentralization can also be a powerful redistributive tool, as seen in the case of Uganda’s National Fiscal Decentralization Policy. Uganda’s National Fiscal Decentralization Policy was applied to facilitate greater efficiency of service provision at the local level. Responsibilities for community services were transferred from the central government to local governments, along with the power of local governments to tax their residents to fund those services. In addition, grants were provided by the central government to local governments to fund many programmes. Uganda is presented as a successful case of decentralization since it reduced the information costs of identifying the poor and the transaction costs of designing poverty reduction policies, since governments closer to the people are often in a better position to deliver services according to the needs of the community. Since the Local Government Act was enacted in 1997, there has been a 30.8% reduction in poverty nationwide.

Another example provided by the study is Rwanda, Community Development Support in Gicumbi and Rulindo (PADC/GR) which provided technical assistance and established a local development fund to strengthen the capacity of local government. It was possible to introduce an efficient and transparent system of planning, financing, monitoring and evaluation at the local level. The programme contributed to the improvement of household incomes through socio-economic public investments for financing public infrastructure, increasing access to local finance, and supporting the most vulnerable households through social safety nets.

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### **125. UNICEF 2011, Equity and Reaching the Most Marginalised Selected Innovations and Lessons Learned from UNICEF programmes, UNICEF**

This report presents different UNICEF programmes which illustrate the organization's work on equity and reaching the most marginalized in order to share lessons and good practices. A relevant case described is the Lesotho Child Grant Programme (CGP) which is financed by the EU and receives technical assistance from UNICEF. The CGP aims at supplementing the income of poor households caring for OVC, including child-headed households, with a cash grant disbursed quarterly. The emphasis was on developing a combined child and gender social protection system based on a cash transfer. The CGP, during the examination of this paper, was being piloted in three community councils in three districts. The pilot was planning to be expanded to a total of 15 community councils by 2011.

The two basic criteria to be an eligible household are the following: a family must live in the household community for at least 12 months before the programme started and must have at least one child under the age of 18 permanently living in the household. However, additional indicators are included in the final selection like poverty. Poverty status (using data from the bureau of statistics) is used to establish household targeting indicators, and a multi-stage community targeting system is used to identify poor and vulnerable households. The targeting mechanism is the following: first, the Auxiliary District Welfare Officer visits households to verify information contained in the application forms. Then, a Village Verification Committee also assists in verifying information and it ranks households according to level of vulnerability. Afterwards, the list of eligible households is prepared by this committee and posted in public spaces for two weeks. Community members have the opportunity to make adjustments to the list through the Community Appeals and Complaints Committee for two weeks. The final list of eligible households is signed by the Village Chief and the District Welfare Officer and posted in villages.

Anecdotal evidence gathered during field monitoring showed that 80% of beneficiaries are using the cash for the benefit of children. CGP's policy and delivery facilitates community management structures and social development. The major challenges include the following: capacity limitations, shortage of staff and workload at the DSW, a difficult and time consuming targeting process not well suited to the geographical terrain of the majority of the country. The study recommends that before initiating a new intervention such as the CGP, it is necessary to include a preliminary assessment. This includes developing and strengthening local management systems (e.g. village or community grassroots institutions). Finally, by the end of 2011, the development of a single targeting system based on proxy means testing was envisioned, as well as a community validation.

### **126. UNICEF 2012, "Integrated Social Protection Systems. Enhancing Equity for Children," UNICEF Social Protection Strategic Framework**

This report evaluates social protection programmes and their effects on children. Even though social protection programmes do not directly target children there is enough evidence, from pensions to public works, that they can have important positive impacts on children. The targeting approaches that are most appropriate in different contexts are still in debate. However, there are important lessons for the potential of community-based targeting.

This report claims that CBT works better in contexts of low data availability and administrative capacity but strong community traditions. There is evidence from three programmes that include CBT supported by UNICEF in Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique showing that CBT is useful in identifying poor and vulnerable populations and results are even better when is used in combination with other methods like geographical targeting. Besides, if CBT is complemented by clear programme communication and transparent selection it can help build community participation and ownership in social protection programmes. However, the role of local authorities is important and is important to highlight that success in CBT relies on the quality of its implementation and further research needs to be done on risks of social stigma and exclusion. This article gives the example of the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer in Malawi which began in 2006 and target ultra-poor and labour constrained households. By targeting households without adults aged 19 to 64 fit for productive work or more than three dependants per fit adult, the programme was able to go beyond simply targeting poor households to reach orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs). The outcomes of the programme have included improvements in food security, child nutrition and school attendance. In addition, the Malawian government plans to bring the cash transfer to scale all over Malawi by 2012.

The report claims that the most appropriate mix of targeting methods will be determined by a variety of factors including: programme's objective and approach; efficiency and technical capacity in terms of data availability and human resources; political economy considerations; financial resources and implementation costs; social costs including unintended impacts associated with changes in behaviour, status and even location to be able to access programme benefits; and potential stigmatization or tensions between included and excluded groups.

### **127. Watkins, B. 2008, "Independent Monitoring & Evaluation Study Alternative Methods for Targeting Social Assistance to Highly Vulnerable Groups," Kimetrica International Limited**

The aim of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the current CBT system of the Zambian Cash-Based Social Protection scheme and compare it with alternative methods suited to the Zambian context. The study covers

heterogeneous population groups including both rural and urban areas. The analysis of CBT uses data from provinces where the system is being practiced. The other targeting methods were assessed using data from the current TWG-SA project alongside the national Living Conditions Monitoring Survey. The study focuses on quantitative measurement, supplemented with qualitative information from focus group discussions.

CBT is the current method used in the districts of Chiapata, Kalomo and Kazungula. The CWACs are usually elected representatives of the community. Overall, CBT has been effective in identifying the worst-off households, especially in one of the districts. In Chiapata, the CWACs were successful in identifying the poorest of the poor and excluding the richest ten per cent. However, 50% of the selected group are non-poor households. The findings confirm that in peri-urban groups community members do not possess enough information on one another's poverty levels and cannot make distinctions. Kalomo district shows the potential of CBT when it is combined with multiple-proxy and administrative elements. The targeting generally captures the neediest. However, there is evidence of elite capture. A large number of high-expenditure households are included, which has an impact on the accuracy of targeting. Kazungula district proved to have serious targeting problems. The poverty levels of the target group were not significantly higher than those of the non-targeted group. However, the richest households are excluded. The study points out four essentials that can improve the chances of targeting accuracy under CBT: 1) high levels of poverty within the community and easily identified ultra-poor; 2) a "closed" community knowledge (principally from members of the CWAC) with frequent interactions; 3) equitable allocation mechanisms within the community structures (perceived fairness of the CWACs); and 4) strong support and supervision arrangements from the executive agency. Households' interviews show a general belief that the targeting was fair but with a significant minority believing that powerful families had preferential access to assistance. From the CWAC interviews it seems that the primary reason for becoming a CWAC member was the desire to serve the community.

Regarding costs, there are obvious financial costs related to training, capacity-building and supervision, but the main costs of CBT are borne by community members and are not officially compensated. CBT requires that there are enough CWAC members to provide data on all households in the community, it requires that CWC members can arrive at a consensus and the more members the CWAC has the less chances of favouritism. Indeed, CWAC members encounter other problems: time spent, transport, accusations of bias and insults, and lack of remuneration. Other costs are the possibility of social conflicts.

The final research found that all targeting options have different costs and accuracy implications, and that no method is perfect nor cheap. The study concludes that

the targeting approaches that will best reach the poor will include geographic targeting. For household level, the choice of selection method is between multiple-proxy, means testing and community-based targeting and should be based on consideration of local conditions.

**128. Worral, E. et al 2003, "Targeting Subsidies for Insecticide Treated Mosquito Nets (ITNs): A conceptual framework, experience from other sectors and lessons for ITNs," Health Economics and Financing Programme, Department of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine**

The authors' objective is to develop a framework for describing and assessing alternative approaches to targeting subsidies based on a review of targeting evidence both within and outside the health sector. Through this framework the authors compare the benefits and weaknesses of a targeted versus untargeted approach to subsidising the Insecticide Targeted Mosquito Nets (ITNs) and then compare alternative targeting strategies.

The authors point out that many ITN distribution activities are almost universal or very broadly targeted, especially in response to emergency refugee situations. However, there are a variety of options available for the scaling up of ITN coverage in Africa. These go from a universal freely available "nets for all" approach to a purely private sector model. Within the second approach there are different options for targeted delivery including various hybrids of demand, supply and community led approaches.

Community-led targeting's advantages are identified by the authors: superior information about community members, more accurate targeting and fewer possibilities of leakage, lower costs, community support and value to the participation process. However, disadvantages are also recognised like internal political or power divisions and the fact that evaluation mechanisms may be more difficult.

The main argument in favour of an untargeted 100% subsidy of ITNs is that there are public health commodities and therefore a high degree of coverage is required. In addition, it is suggested that in case charges are made towards the cost of ITN they have to exclude the poorest population groups. However, the discussion of universal distribution versus targeted subsidised distribution of ITN ignores a number of factors. First, the crowding out effects that providing universal free nets may have on the commercial sector. Second, inefficiency issues such as free provision to wealthier individuals and leakage from the target group are also neglected. Finally, there is no guarantee that the poorest of the poor will be reached by universal subsidies due to lack of information, access problems and a lack of infrastructure to reach the poor in remote areas. On the other hand, it is not sensible to design a targeting strategy aimed to biologically vulnerable groups such as pregnant women and under-fives and then evaluate the success or failure of the strategy according to its ability to



reach the poor or economically vulnerable. If poor groups are targeted there are many trade-offs to be considered. First, targeting the poor may exclude the biologically vulnerable and may be less efficient. Second, targeting the biologically vulnerable may exclude many of the poor and may also be inefficient. The authors suggest that this is perhaps an issue in which the views and expectations of communities involved should be carefully tested and considered. For example, some communities may not accept targeting an intervention to young children rather than the breadwinner, since if the breadwinner is unable to support the family the child will suffer anyways. In conclusion, more evidence is needed to carefully monitor alternative ITN delivery strategies in order to help define appropriate strategies to scale up insecticide net coverage in Africa.

**129. Yamauchi, C. 2010, "Community-Based targeting and initial local conditions: Evidence from Indonesia's IDT program," *Economic Development and Cultural Change***

Yamauchi's article analyses the local conditions associated with community based targeting in Indonesia. He studies the targeting performance of Indonesia's antipoverty programme Inpres Desa Tertinggal (IDT 1994-1997). Yamauchi examines the pre-programme characteristics, such as levels of inequality, poverty, local leaders, local government, population density and infrastructure. This study contributes to the literature of community-based targeting by exploring the relationship between targeting and characteristics of local leaders.

The author uses panel information on targeting performance which is measured by the degree to which relatively poor households receive benefits and the share accruing to relatively poor households. The effectiveness of targeting is estimated by the coefficient of the household poverty level in the regression. The author also explores how coefficients differ depending on original circumstances.

Inpres Desa Tertinggal (IDT) was launched by the Indonesian government to strengthen the income-generating power of poor households in disadvantaged communities during the economic growth of the 70s and 80s. The government provided these selected poor villages with grants designated for loans for productive investment. The selected villages were then allowed to identify households eligible for a loan without imposing any selection criteria. A village head and a village community residence board were consigned to facilitate the selection of poor households. After the 3-year programme period, IDT was followed by a similar community-based scheme called the Kecamatan Development Program and there has been an ongoing call for continuing with a community-based development approach.

The results show that in general IDT benefits are more likely to be provided to relatively poor households. In spite of the concern of local capture in communities with larger inequality, the author's findings show that in wealthier and

unequal villages more resources are likely to be provided to relatively poor households. The author's explanation for this is that village leaders have incentives to follow the national guidelines for redistributing benefits to the poorest. The author suggests that the relationship between inequality and targeting might also be specific to local and programme contexts. Another interesting result is that targeting performance deteriorated over time, partly because the successful performance associated with young, educated, village heads, did not last. Village heads initiated the selection of eligible households in the initial year but did not directly monitor loan allocations in later years when it was done by community group leaders instead. Yamauchi's article ends by raising the question whether community-based targeting could be improved by training village heads and officials, and strengthening monitoring.

**130. Yusuf, M. 2007, *Pakistan: Supplementary Support for Poverty Reduction Initiatives in Pakistan*, Manila: ADB**

The aim of this report is to develop a method of identifying the poor that is suitable to the Pakistani context. To do this, the author analyses the targeting methodology of various international and Pakistani programmes with the aim of identifying their major strengths and weaknesses in terms of targeting approaches and related governance concerns. The study is based on a review of secondary literature and included a small field component based on 13 interviews with key informants, field visits and six ex post interviews.

The author analyses the Pakistan experience using the case study of the Zakat programme. Zakat is the largest cash transfer programme in Pakistan. Zakat's targeting criteria is administrative in nature. Local zakat committees (LZCs) are responsible for the identification and distribution of resources to the poor. These LZCs are the lowest level of governance in the five-level hierarchy. The LZC is formed by "pious" community members, and verifies applicants' eligibility according to criteria that remain unclear. The LZC can also use its discretion to provide assistance to those in need. Moreover, there is no institutional arrangement or system in place to keep track of and validate spending at the local level. Indeed, the Central Zakat Council at the top of the hierarchy lacks the mandate and the resources to closely monitor and maintain checks on provincial and district councils.

The author points out that Zakat suffers from important targeting errors. According to some estimates, the rate of leakage is as high as 30%. One study found that LZCs only managed to select part of the mustahiqueen in their jurisdiction. The rest were included by local people of influence. Indeed, political agendas are reflected in the implementation of the programme due to the excessive discretionary powers conferred on LZCs. Moreover, the programme requires no public disclosure of the final list of beneficiaries and reasons for selecting them, and has

no system of appeals or public accountability. As a result high levels of corruption are found. The author points out that other studies show that some beneficiaries need to bribe officials to get the money to which they are entitled, increasing leakage from those who can pay for their inclusion. Moreover, payments to beneficiaries are not made regularly, sometimes for months on end due in part to the lack of coordination among the local council head, district committee, and administrative staff.

The author also analyses specific microfinance programmes operating in Pakistan, one of which is the Rural Support Programme (RSPs). Targeting involves a participatory assessment approach described as follows. A social organizer from the RSP arrives at a selected village, introduces the programme, and looks for suitable people in the village who can assist in carrying out the village's poverty ranking. These people rank households based on their own definition of poverty/wealth. Subsequently, the households are categorized. After the poverty profile has been completed, a community organization (CO) is formed by 15-20 member borrowers drawn mostly from the "poor" and "very poor" categories, but not the destitute. The results are reviewed and attested by the CO members at a general body meeting that is open to the wider community. Therefore, the reliability of the poverty profile is ensured by drawing on local knowledge and by further confirming this through the CO's endorsement. The strength of this PWR approach is the transparent and collective manner of identifying the poor. It offers credibility, guarantees ownership to the community and a public disclosure of the list of beneficiaries. However, it was found that in some cases COs were based on people's desire to obtain loans rather than on relative poverty levels. Since the CO leader is responsible for ensuring loan repayment, leaders tend to include "safer members" rather than the truly poor. Indeed, there is a lack of comparability in the targeting approach, inherent to the PWR approach. Instead, RSPs limit their scope to a sub-village level leaving the rest of the community out of the ranking.

The author highlights a number of factors that could potentially promote the success of any targeting mechanism including: the need for a strong governance structure, the presence of political will among government authorities, community participation but without discretion and in the presence of a robust monitoring and evaluation framework, and a strong accountability mechanism. Finally, the author points out that the targeting design itself should be specific but simple and recommends an umbrella approach that entails using a combination of the PWR and indicator approaches.

**131. Yusuf, M. 2010, "Community Targeting for Poverty Reduction: Lessons from Developing Countries," The Pardee Papers, Boston University**

The author evaluates the performance of 30 community targeted programmes in order to analyse the efficacy of the

CBT approach. The author defines community targeting as "a sub-set of community participation, a broader concept that applies to all cases where communities lead the decision-making process" (p.3). The author presents his analysis as the first large scale study focusing specifically on community targeting.

The author presents a meta-analysis of existing evaluations of community-targeted programmes. To select the sample a literature review was conducted in order to identify all anti-poverty programmes with a community component designed to select individual or household level beneficiaries. The final sample includes both cash and in-kind transfer initiatives. The authors categorized programmes as "progressive", "mildly progressive" or "regressive" based on their performance. The author identified two models for community involvement. One that limits community roles strictly to identification of beneficiaries and the other one which involves the community in transferring benefits as well. In order to target individuals, all but three programmes used selection committees with strong community representation. Communities are rarely used as single targeting agents since twenty-eight of the 30 programmes also employed geographic (the most used by far as a complementary technique), self-targeted, means test and proxy-means test techniques. Of the 30 programmes, 10 cases across seven countries were progressive in their targeting, 16 cases across nine countries were middle progressive, and four programmes across three countries were regressive. In terms of regional spread, programmes in Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia have highly varied performance. Programmes in Asia and Southeast Asian countries have been progressive, middle progressive and regressive. In Africa, countries feature in the middle progressive and regressive categories. Latin America, Central Asia and Europe have very small numbers of programmes so no meaningful analysis of them can be included. Moreover, monitoring, transparency and accountability mechanisms have a strong positive correlation with targeting performance. Elite capture and corruption are negatively correlated. Furthermore, CBT has a better performance in communities without social tensions or disparities and where there is no tendency towards cultural exclusion.

However, capital stock seems to be responsible for pushing communities to ignore programme criteria in terms of benefits transfer, therefore risking the achievement of poverty reduction goals. CBT is also not recommended for programmes where aggregation of poverty data is a high priority, such as programmes that seek to create national or regional poverty rankings. In conclusion, the author claims that in general community interventions have great potential to benefit the poor and are preferable to universal poverty programmes whose benefits are spread across the entire population.



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Cover photo: Harvesting a better quality of life, DFID, Robert Stansfield

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