

A photograph of a young African boy carrying a large, light-colored plastic jerrycan balanced on his head. He is wearing a light brown corduroy jacket over a red shirt. The background shows a yellow tarp and some rocks.

Report



# Making humanitarian and development WASH work better together

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August 2016

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# Acknowledgments

We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Victoria Chambers (ODI) and Richard Aludra (Independent Consultant), co-authors for the DRC and South Sudan case studies, respectively.

For their invaluable support in the DRC case study research we would like to thank Modeste Zihindula and Patrick Mbay (Independent Consultants), as well Franck Abeille (UNICEF DRC) and the other members of the UNICEF WASH Programme in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. Similarly in South Sudan, we are especially grateful for the kind assistance provided by Lillian Okwirry (UNICEF South Sudan) and the other members of the UNICEF WASH Programme in Juba, and by Peter Mahal Dhieu (Ministry of Electricity, Dams, Irrigation and Water Resources).

At the global level, the research has been consistently steered by members of UNICEF WASH Programme Division and the World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme. In particular, we thank Andrew Parker

(UNICEF), Dominick de Waal (WSP), Jamal Shah (UNICEF), Timothy Grieve (UNICEF), Laure Anquez (UNICEF) and Evangeline Mutunga (UNICEF).

Simon Levine (ODI) provided extensive and very valuable comments on this draft, as did many anonymous members of staff from UNICEF and WSP. We also extend our thanks to Gerbrand Alkema (Save the Children), Kerstin Danert (Rural Water Supply Network), Mareike Schomerus (ODI), Leni Wild (ODI) and Irina Mosel (ODI) for their inputs to the country case study reports.

Finally, we would like to thank all the people we interviewed in the course of the project who gave their time so generously, and engaged in an open and constructive manner throughout. We have anonymised all quotations from interviews to ensure contributors could speak freely, but this in no way diminishes our debt to the individuals listed at the end of the report.

As authors we take full responsibility for errors or omissions.

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# Contents

Acknowledgments	3
Abbreviations	8
Executive summary	9
1 Introduction	11
1.1 Purpose	11
1.2 Scope	11
1.3 Overview	12
2 Analytical approach and methodology	13
2.1 Study design	13
2.2 Data collection	13
2.3 Methodological limitations	14
3 Context	15
3.1 Key concepts and terms	15
3.2 Emerging issues	17
4 A structure to understand siloes	19
5 Norms	21
5.1 Mission	21
5.2 Principles	22
5.3 Standards	24
6 Incentives	25
6.1 Finance	25
6.2 Accountability	28
6.3 Risk	30

---

7 Operational processes	32
7.1 Distribution and targeting of resources	33
7.2 Implementation modalities	34
7.3 Staff recruitment and development	36
7.4 Mechanisms for dialogue and co-working	37
8 Conclusions: from diagnosis to action	40
8.1 Summary of key findings	40
8.2 A framework to guide action	41
9 Recommendations	44
9.1 Operational processes: identifying shared priorities for WASH in crisis	44
9.2 Incentives: adjusting the structures that separate the siloes	45
9.3 Norms: engaging a wider community to resolve key differences	45
9.4 Assessing and adapting: a monitoring and learning framework	48
9.5 Call to action	48
References	50
Annex 1: List of research questions and sub-questions	53
Interviews with international and regional experts	53
Interviews in DRC	54
Interviews in South Sudan	55
Annex 2: List of interviewees (global and country)	56
Annex 3: Example Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis	59

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# List of tables, figures and boxes

## Tables

<b>Table 1:</b> Summary analysis of normative issues underlying the humanitarian-development siloes in WASH	<b>21</b>
<b>Table 2:</b> Summary analysis of incentive issues underlying the humanitarian-development siloes in WASH	<b>25</b>
<b>Table 3:</b> Key incentives characterising the humanitarian-development silo	<b>32</b>
<b>Table 4:</b> Checklist to guide development of Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis	<b>46</b>
<b>Table 5:</b> Focal areas for adjusting the incentives underpinning the siloes	<b>48</b>
<b>Table A1:</b> List of people and organisations interviewed for this study	<b>56</b>
<b>Table A2:</b> List of people and organisations interviewed for the DRC case study	<b>57</b>
<b>Table A3:</b> List of people and organisations interviewed for the South Sudan case study	<b>58</b>
<b>Table A4:</b> Illustrative Common Principles for WASH in Crisis, Katanga, DRC	<b>59</b>
<b>Table A5:</b> Illustrative Common Principles for WASH in Crisis, South Sudan	<b>61</b>

## Figures

<b>Figure 1:</b> Hierarchy of norms, incentives and operational processes that underlie the humanitarian-development siloes in WASH	<b>19</b>
<b>Figure 2:</b> Total requested for the DRC Humanitarian Response Plan, and amount funded, 2012-2013	<b>26</b>
<b>Figure 3:</b> South Sudan CHF allocations for WASH as compared to other sectors, 2012-2013	<b>26</b>
<b>Figure 4:</b> Prioritisation of action across norms, incentives and operational processes	<b>42</b>

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## **Boxes**

<b>Box 1:</b> What is a protracted crisis?	<b>11</b>
<b>Box 2:</b> Key research questions	<b>13</b>
<b>Box 3:</b> Water and the refugee crisis in Jordan	<b>18</b>
<b>Box 4:</b> The Sanitation and Water for All Collaborative Behaviours	<b>23</b>
<b>Box 5:</b> Increasing use of cash transfers in emergencies	<b>28</b>
<b>Box 6:</b> Finding a balanced approach to sanitation in post-quake Nepal	<b>36</b>
<b>Box 7:</b> A global platform and fund for education in emergencies	<b>43</b>
<b>Box 8:</b> Facilitating the agreement of Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis	<b>45</b>

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# Abbreviations

<b>AAP</b>	Accountability to Affected Populations	<b>MEDIWR</b>	Ministry of Electricity, Dams, Irrigation and Water Resources
<b>CAST</b>	Cluster Support and Advocacy Teams	<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organisations
<b>CATS</b>	Community Approach to Total Sanitation	<b>NNGOs</b>	National Non-Governmental Organisations
<b>CHF</b>	Common Humanitarian Fund	<b>OCHA</b>	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>CERF</b>	Central Emergency Response Fund	<b>ODF</b>	Open Defecation Free
<b>CLTS</b>	Community-Led Total Sanitation	<b>ODI</b>	Overseas Development Institute
<b>CNAEA</b>	National Water and Sanitation Committee	<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee	<b>PBSB</b>	Peace-building and state-building
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development	<b>PMSEC</b>	Multi-Sectorial Plan for the Elimination of Cholera
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo	<b>PoC</b>	Protection of Civilians
<b>DRR</b>	Disaster Risk Reduction	<b>SDC</b>	Swiss Development Cooperation
<b>ECHO</b>	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department	<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agricultural Organisation	<b>SNHR</b>	National Service for Rural Water Supply
<b>GoN</b>	Government of Nepal	<b>SWA</b>	Sanitation and Water for All
<b>GWC</b>	Global WASH Cluster	<b>SWIFT</b>	Sustainable WASH in Fragile Contexts Programme
<b>HRP</b>	Humanitarian Response Plan	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>IASC</b>	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross	<b>UNHCR</b>	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced People	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>INGOs</b>	International Non-Governmental Organisations	<b>USAID</b>	U.S. Agency for International Development
<b>JMP</b>	Joint Monitoring Programme	<b>VEA</b>	Healthy Schools and Villages
<b>LRRD</b>	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development	<b>WASH</b>	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene
<b>MARP</b>	Methods of Accelerated Participatory Research	<b>WIMS</b>	Water Information Management System
<b>MDGs</b>	Millennium Development Goals	<b>WSP</b>	Water and Sanitation Programme

# Executive summary

## Key messages

- This report examines the structural barriers which exist between humanitarian and development forms of water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), and identifies how they can be overcome for more effective and sustainable services.
- We highlight barriers at three levels: the normative level, expressed in the humanitarian and development communities' respective mission statements, principles and standards; the level of incentives, which are expressed in the signals given by funding and accountability arrangements as well as engrained attitudes to risk; and the level of operational processes for targeting, implementation, staff recruitment and development, and dialogue.
- We recommend action to develop mutually agreeable ways of working to provide guidance at the country level and below to tackle the incentive structures created by funding, reporting and risk management structures, and to increase dialogue between humanitarian and development communities within and beyond the WASH sector.

The worlds of humanitarian and development WASH (water supply, sanitation and hygiene) operate as siloes. A lack of complementarity and collaboration increases costs and threatens the sustainability and effectiveness of interventions, ultimately increasing the vulnerability of poor and marginalised people to disease and missed socio-economic opportunities.

This report examines the levels at which the siloes exist and the underlying reasons. We also look at positive examples of where and how WASH service providers and donors are overcoming these siloes. From this, we recommend a number of specific actions, building on existing capacity and structures rather than creating new ones.

The research was commissioned by the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Section in the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) together with Water Sanitation Program (WSP) of the World Bank, and was undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

We draw on extensive consultation with global experts, literature review and two in-depth case studies in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). We argue that the siloes between humanitarian and development WASH exist at all levels, from local, to national, to global. They are sustained by a hierarchy of underlying causes, comprising contradictions and tensions in:

- **High-level norms**, which are expressed in the two communities' mission statements, principles and standards (largely at the international level, not necessarily WASH-specific)
- **Incentives**, which are rooted in the architecture for humanitarian and development assistance and the related signals given by funding and accountability arrangements as well as engrained attitudes to risk (international to national level, not necessarily WASH-specific though given expression in sector financing, reporting and planning systems)
- **Operational processes**, which include procedures and systems for targeting effort, for implementing new services and sustaining existing ones, for recruiting and developing staff, and for initiating and sustaining productive dialogue (national to local level, more often WASH-specific).

Across different levels, we find islands of success where greater complementarity is achieved despite the structural barriers. For example in South Sudan, the Cholera Task Force has shown how a specific challenge can offer a starting point for joint working and collaboration between the humanitarian and development WASH communities, with increasing leadership for national government. In DRC, the WASH Consortium and its donor, the UK Department for International Development, have tackled the usual inflexibility of development finance by building in rapid response mechanisms. At the local level in Katanga, an 'ex-province' of DRC, development-focused partners are invited

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to join humanitarian colleagues at meetings of the WASH Cluster to share information and improve complementarity.

In moving from norms, through incentives, to operational processes, the individuals and organisations in the WASH sector are increasingly able to make material changes. We recommend that effort is concentrated in the short term on changing operational processes and incentive structures within the sector. In the longer term, it may be possible to contribute to wider efforts to reconcile the high-level norms governing humanitarian and development assistance more broadly. Our headline recommendations are as follows:

## To increase complementarity at the level of operational processes

By end 2017, UNICEF should facilitate development of ‘shared priorities for WASH in crisis’ in 3-5 countries and invest in accompanying evaluation and lesson learning. Shared priorities are a set of 5-10 short, actionable statements that both humanitarian and development WASH actors can fully commit to around their ways of working.

Building complementarity at the level of operational processes requires collective action between multiple stakeholders at the country level or below. While other dual-mandate organisations can also take the initiative, UNICEF is well positioned to facilitate the development of shared priorities, due to its geographic presence and extensive experience at the implementation and policy levels in both humanitarian and development WASH. Initial operational testing of the shared priorities should be concentrated in a small but diverse set of pilot countries, and include focused evaluation and lesson learning.

## To tackle underlying incentives that inhibit complementarity

By end 2018, all leading development WASH donors should ensure that an agreed minimum percentage of total sector allocations are routed via flexible windows that permit rapid reallocation in emergencies. By the same date,

all leading humanitarian WASH donors should ensure a similar percentage of total sector allocations are routed via multi-year financing mechanisms.

Fostering complementarity at the level of incentives requires targeted action by a smaller number of powerful stakeholders, notably donors financing development or humanitarian WASH, or both. To support the above, and ensure other incentive structures besides incentive structures are tackled, WSP-World Bank and the UNICEF Cluster Advocacy and Support Team (CAST) should convene a ‘champions group’ of bilateral development and humanitarian WASH donor agencies and other providers of finance. The objective of the champions group would be to share and test approaches (finance modalities, accountability structures, and mechanisms for risk) which can help correct the incentives currently enforcing the silos.

## To challenge the cultural and normative barriers to complementarity:

By end 2019, Sanitation and Water for All and the Global WASH Cluster should establish a cross-sector initiative, in collaboration with counterparts (other platforms and clusters) with the goal of enhancing complementarity between the wider development and humanitarian communities.

Changing norms to enhance complementarity is a longer-term project which is unlikely to be achieved by the WASH sector alone. Sector coordination platforms – for example Sanitation and Water for All and the Global WASH Cluster – can take a lead by reaching out to their counterparts in other sectors to build a broader case for how to enhance complementarity. WASH-focused groups within larger organisations – for example UNICEF WASH Programme Division or the World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme – can undertake similar efforts.

# 1 Introduction

The worlds of humanitarian and development water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) operate as siloes. A lack of complementarity and collaboration makes it more costly to provide WASH services, reduces effectiveness of targeting and sustainability, and ultimately increases the vulnerability of poor and marginalised people to disease and missed socio-economic opportunities. This study attempts to understand why this is the case and what can be done.

## 1.1 Purpose

This report is the synthesis of a broader study focused on understanding the nature and causes of the disconnect between development and humanitarian WASH, and possible solutions. It was commissioned by the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Section in the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) together with Water Sanitation Program (WSP) of the World Bank, and was undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). In addition to the present synthesis report, we have produced a briefing note and two detailed case studies on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.

The overall objective of the study is to identify and recommend actions to tackle issues causing and sustaining the disconnect between development and humanitarian WASH and promote opportunities that seek to advance complementarity of these types of intervention.

The intended audience of the report is primarily international donors and implementing agencies seeking to support sustainable and equitable WASH outcomes

in contexts where both humanitarian and development modalities are used.

## 1.2 Scope

The research focuses on a single sector and primary evidence is gathered from two country case studies and interviews with global and regional level experts conducted between June and December 2015. The study did not involve any consultation or fieldwork involving communities receiving humanitarian or development assistance.

The scope is relatively narrow and it is not possible to generalise the findings too far beyond the specific case of WASH in protracted crises. Protracted crises can be defined as longer-term emergencies characterised by weak governance and often conflict, of the type ongoing in DRC and South Sudan (Box 1). Long-term and recurrent emergencies now dominate humanitarian spending. It has been estimated that 89% of humanitarian aid goes to countries that have needed it for more than three years, and while two-thirds goes to places that have needed humanitarian funding for more than seven years (Els and Carstensen 2015).

Shorter crises, typically caused by natural disasters, can also lead to challenging overlaps and disconnects between the development and humanitarian communities. For example, countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Ethiopia have relatively stable governance and receive substantial official development assistance, but also periodically require humanitarian aid to respond to

### Box 1: What is a protracted crisis?

According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), protracted crises are characterised by their longevity, the presence of conflict, weak governance, unsustainable livelihoods and the breakdown of local institutions (FAO 2010; 2012). Therefore, engagement in these contexts will be impacted by:

- The presence of extreme and widespread needs (where the ‘normal’ continuously passes emergency thresholds)
- Unpredictable and rapidly changing needs, with different segments of the population requiring different support at any given time
- High insecurity, as state structures are weak and contested or have broken down completely, leading to absent or weak rule of law
- Deep mistrust within societies and between societies and what is left of state structures, as there is a high a degree of politicisation of resources, including aid.

Source: Mosel and Levine (2014)

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rapid-onset emergencies. Although we did not conduct a case study in these types of context, they were considered through the global-level interviews. Where possible, we nonetheless aim to offer findings and recommendations that can be relevant both to protracted crises and acute emergencies.

While the study has a specific sectoral focus, water supply, sanitation and hygiene offer a useful entry point to wider debates on humanitarian-development ‘siloisation’, as well as those that occur in other sectors. WASH has characteristics of both infrastructure and social sectors, and is essential to survival, livelihoods, and longer-term economic productivity. It is a sector in which the challenges of increasing complementarity humanitarian and development assistance are starkly represented.

## 1.3 Overview

The report is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical approach and methodology, including limitations. In section 3 we introduce key concepts from the wider literature. Section 4 introduces the conceptual framework that we have evolved in the course of the study, which organises the underlying drivers of the siloes between humanitarian and development WASH into a hierarchy of norms, incentives and operational processes. We unpack our findings regarding each of these in Sections 5-7, drawing on insights from the many experts consulted as well as the wider literature. In Section 8 we conclude by offering a summary of the findings and what the overall picture suggests about how the siloes can be overcome. We use this as the basis of Section 9, in which we set out our recommendations and a clear call to action for a range of different stakeholders.

# 2 Analytical approach and methodology

## 2.1 Study design

There is limited pre-existing research on humanitarian and development siloes in the WASH sector. We therefore adopted an inductive approach in place of a pre-defined analytical framework, adjusting the research design iteratively. Box 2 sets out the overarching research questions adapted from the terms of reference for the study, which provided the starting point. An expanded set of research questions evolved in the course of our enquiry is available in Annex 1. The approach allowed us to focus on different issues as they emerged, from formal procedures and structures, to less formal concerns around incentives, institutional cultures and personal attitudes and values.

As with most inductive research, we cannot pretend that we were working in a vacuum, without any prior assumptions about what might underlie the siloes between humanitarian and development WASH. We therefore formulated some initial working theories before starting the work, namely that the siloes are at least in part attributable to:

- accountability failures
- the norms at work in humanitarian and development communities
- institutional and organisational arrangements

We nonetheless interrogated these assumptions and added to them in the course of gathering and analysing data, culminating in the development of our conceptual framework (Section 4).

## 2.2 Data collection

Data collection through desk research by the ODI team in London was interspersed sequentially with fieldwork in the case study countries.

The desk component of the work consisted of a literature review on WASH service delivery in conflict and protracted crises and disaster situations, coupled with semi-structured key informant interviews with 26 experts who were identified purposively, in consultation with UNICEF. See the references list for a list of reports, papers and other sources consulted.

Case study data were collected in South Sudan and DRC. In South Sudan, key informant interviews were conducted in Juba in August 2015 over 10 days with over 25 representatives of donors, UN agencies, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), national non-governmental organisations (NNGOs), and government. Representatives from subnational level were also interviewed via a mid-year review and planning meeting,

### Box 2: Key research questions

- How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their interaction up to now?
- Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian and development WASH collaborate effectively? If not, why?
- How are decisions made around programming and policy, within and between humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to effective action on the ground? If not, what are the underlying reasons?
- What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and incentives?

*Source: Authors, adapted from Terms of Reference supplied by UNICEF and World Bank Water and Sanitation Program*

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convened in Juba by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and UNICEF, 5-6 August 2015. Preliminary findings from the South Sudan case study and desk research were presented and discussed at Stockholm World Water Week in August 2015.

In DRC, 35 interviewees were consulted in Kinshasa and also in Lubumbashi and its environs, Katanga, in September 2015, across a similarly broad range of stakeholder categories. Katanga was selected as a subnational case study in consultation with the UNICEF DRC Country Office. In both DRC and South Sudan, ODI researchers worked in partnership with a national consultant.

See Annex 1 for a generic questions used to guide semi-structured interviews, and Annex 2 for a full list of interviewees.

## 2.3 Methodological limitations

The case studies countries for this research were purposively selected by UNICEF and WSP, given their joint presence in the two countries and the protracted, complicated nature of the crises. The very small sample of countries (and of locations within each country) limits generalisability. Whilst this was largely dictated by the resources available, the choice of DRC and South Sudan also means that our findings may be biased towards

protracted crises. It means we have been able to concentrate less on situations in which international emergency response is needed for natural disasters in otherwise largely stable countries. Wherever possible, we attempted to use information from our global-level interviews to triangulate and where necessary round out the findings from the two case studies to make up for this limitation.

All primary data for this report was obtained from key informant interviews. Due to the short timeframes for the country case studies and the need for remote interviews to consult international experts, we were not able to arrange focus group discussions or surveys. Interviewees were also mainly purposively selected on the recommendation of UNICEF and WSP. Key informant interviews were semi-structured, which means that questions were drawn from a long list and sometimes adapted depending on the respondent. It is therefore generally difficult to quantify the level of support for different statements across our sample of respondents. In the report we have done so only where statements appear clearly aligned. As with all qualitative research, there is potential that we have introduced our own bias as subjective individuals. The paper has been extensively reviewed, however. This resulted in corroboration of the core argument and numerous suggested modifications, which we have generally made.

# 3 Context

## 3.1 Key concepts and terms

This section provides an overview of broad trends in concepts and terminology in the academic and grey literature around coordination and complementarity for humanitarian and development assistance in general, and for WASH specifically.

### 3.1.1 Linking relief, rehabilitation and development

This research can be situated within the long-standing debate on the challenges of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). The longevity of the LRRD concept suggests that it still represents a live and intractable problem for the international community. This is important context for any sector-specific study, given that key barriers and opportunities may exist at a level that cannot be resolved through action on one sector alone.

Mosel and Levine (2014) trace the history of the theory and application of the LRRD concept back to the food security crises of the 1980s in Africa, where the term originated with a focus on risk reduction. They identify original appearances as framing the challenge around a ‘continuum’ – securing a linear transition from emergency relief, through transitional reconstruction, to longer-term development aid. Early appearances of the term took a systemic view, opening up the potential to reform the full spectrum of assistance, rather than simply finding ways to link between the two (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994). Critics were nonetheless quick to focus on the simplicity of the linear, continuum framing, proposing that LRRD is more often applicable within a ‘contiguum’, in which ‘all instruments (whether relief, rehabilitation or development) may be appropriate simultaneously’ (Mosel and Levine 2014: 3).

The contiguum model for LRRD gained prominence over the 1990s and recognised that humanitarian and development assistance could be needed simultaneously and in the same place. However, it led to few major changes in terms of complementarity. LRRD has meanwhile been further complicated by the addition of domestic and global security considerations alongside humanitarian and development objectives. These concerns were manifested by donor countries adopting ‘whole of government’ approaches, linking together departments responsible for development, military and foreign affairs.<sup>1</sup>

Political considerations have nonetheless long guided both development and humanitarian assistance (Bailey 2010). As was pointed out by a large number of our interviewees, some of the most intractable causes of the siloes between development and humanitarian aid relate to political calculations made by donor governments. These calculations often relate to the (perceived) preferences of their electorates, in terms of life-saving emergency response versus messier, longer-term development assistance (Glennie, Straw and Wild 2012), as well as the extent to which untrusted recipient governments can be bypassed with different forms of aid. By placing explicit emphasis on domestic security interests, these latter manifestations have at least given due emphasis to the political realities underpinning the LRRD concept (Mosel and Levine 2014).

Within WASH, specifically, analysis by the German WASH Network gives separate prominence to rehabilitation, rather than seeing it as a blurred middle space between development and humanitarian assistance – one that ‘aims to at least recreate the pre-emergency situation of the affected population by gradually incorporating development principles’ (Gensch, Hansen and Ihme 2014: 18). Relevant interventions may include rehabilitation of both infrastructure and markets for WASH services. This contrasts with the majority of humanitarian interventions, which focus on temporary measures to reduce WASH-related disease transmission and meet minimum needs for safe water, and with development programming which may include provision of new infrastructure and an emphasis on building sector and local systems for sustainable management of services. As the authors recognise, however, ‘the division into the three assistance types should be viewed as a rather theoretical and simplified classification model’ (*ibid.* 19).

Several related terms have become widely used in associated debates, and require brief consideration.

### 3.1.2 Peace-building and state-building

The interrelated concepts of peace-building and state-building (PBSB) are concerned with supporting countries to transition out of the conflict and fragility. Aligned to the security and stabilisation agenda with which LRRD has been latterly associated with, they carry their own considerable baggage. The debates around the concepts

<sup>1</sup> Such as the UK Department of International Development, Ministry of Defence, and Foreign & Commonwealth Office in the ‘Conflict Pool’

are explored extensively elsewhere, including in relation to WASH (Mason 2012) and service delivery more broadly (Ndaruhtse et al. 2011). There are plausible linkages between the manner in which services such as WASH are delivered, and PBSB outcomes such as greater state legitimacy or reduced violence at community level (Wild and Mason 2012). Empirical exploration of these effects is, however, rare, and what evidence is available suggests a need for caution in terms of, for example, how far services contribute to legitimacy of central and local government (Brinkerhoff et al. 2012; Mallett et al. 2015).

Within a specific service sector such as health, education and WASH, there are also parallel debates about how service delivery can best be supported at a systemic level in states that lack legitimacy or capacity (OECD 2008). These share with the PBSB debates an interest in the role of the state, especially in post-conflict contexts where questions of how to transition from humanitarian programming are particularly prominent. The World Bank Water and Sanitation Program has pointed to various routes to enhance systemic capacity for WASH services as a country emerges from conflict and fragility, including building on strengths (for example where local private entrepreneurs have emerged to fill the gap in public services), and using dialogue and aid modalities to encourage the building of linkages between sector ministries and core country systems, such as those for public financial management and procurement (WSP 2014).

### 3.1.3 Resilience

*Resilience* has featured prominently in more recent debates around overcoming siloes between humanitarian and development assistance. The term enjoys considerable political capital (Mosel and Levine 2014), evident in its frequent appearance in the aid policy, financing and programming grey literature. The concept is used more widely than LRRD in contexts beyond the consideration of humanitarian and development siloes. For example, it features prominently in the text of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, under goals concerning poverty (Goal 1), hunger (Goal 2), infrastructure (Goal 9), cities (Goal 11), climate change (Goal 13) and oceans (Goal 14).<sup>2</sup> The term is of interest to both humanitarian and development audiences, because it implies a shared objective of reducing vulnerability both *to*, and *in*, crises. A recent report produced for UNICEF on humanitarian and development linkages generally frames its recommendations under a similar spectrum (strengthening resilience *before, during and after crisis*), implying joint contribution (Vine Ltd 2015). In WASH, specifically, the concept of resilience is deployed both in terms of how

services can support the resilience of populations (WaterAid 2013), but also how services themselves can be made more resilient (UNICEF and GWP 2014). In both cases, vulnerability to climatic shocks is particularly prominent as a concern, perhaps unsurprising given the dependence of WASH services on a water resource base that may be affected by climate change and variability.

### 3.1.4 Disaster risk reduction

UNICEF has deployed disaster risk reduction (DRR) as a bridging concept relevant to both humanitarian and development WASH, highlighting prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities that can contribute to DRR, within more development-oriented approaches to WASH, as well as those that can be undertaken in an emergency response and early recovery stages (UNICEF 2012). Much of the DRR literature focuses, however, on ex-ante prevention, in other words as part of mainstream development. The United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction, for example, refers to ‘an ethic of prevention’.<sup>3</sup>

### 3.1.5 Early recovery

*Early recovery*, meanwhile, has so far been more extensively used in relation to humanitarian programming, most tangibly in the early recovery clusters established as part of the humanitarian reform process. Defined as ‘recovery that begins early in a humanitarian setting [...] guided by development principles’,<sup>4</sup> early recovery is nonetheless not yet much used in mainstream development programming, despite the fact that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) hosts the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery. As such, DRR and early recovery are largely ‘owned’ by the development and humanitarian communities, respectively, and thus risk being perceived as less relevant and compelling concepts by the counterpart community.

### 3.1.6 Connectedness

A similar conundrum arises for the concept of *connectedness*, introduced as a criterion for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as an alternative to sustainability. Acknowledging that fundamentally, most humanitarian programmes seek to avoid creating dependencies and thus do not aim at sustainability themselves, the term connectedness emphasises that humanitarian interventions should still take interconnected and longer-term problems into account (OECD 1999). Although the DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance include sustainability, this is

2 See <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

3 [www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/what-is-drr](http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/what-is-drr)

4 [www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus\\_areas/early-recovery.html](http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/early-recovery.html)

not usually framed as the corollary of connectedness. Ultimately, this implies that while humanitarians are obliged to take the longer term into account, there is no equivalent explicit requirement for development programming to consider how it can help to prevent and mitigate emergencies.

### 3.1.7 Does terminology matter?

Questions of ownership and alignment around specific terms are important, we will argue, because overcoming the siloes is a collective action problem, in which it is easier for each side to defer responsibility for reform than to take action. The broad applicability and traction of resilience can be contrasted with other, related terms that are frequently used in the space between humanitarian and development assistance such as DRR, early recovery and connectedness. In this context resilience is a relatively neutral term that could engage both development and humanitarian communities, rather than alienating one or other. This is not to say it is free of baggage – in WASH, particularly, it may be already too associated with climate change adaptation, neglecting other drivers and forms of vulnerability.

## 3.2 Emerging issues

A number of issues are gaining prominence for those concerned to enhance links between development and humanitarian assistance. The scope of the study did not allow us to investigate all of them in detail, but they nonetheless represent an important set of considerations that could inform the direction of reform efforts on the specific question of overcoming the siloes in WASH. They include: the shifting geography of protracted crises; the rise of new actors in development and humanitarian response; and broader reform and policy agendas for development and humanitarian assistance.

### 3.2.1 Shifting geographies

Two major geographic trends are apparent in considering the last decade and a half of protracted crises. A first relates to urbanisation, and what the growing concentration of the global population in urban areas might mean for both development and humanitarian assistance. As recognised in preparations for the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, ‘adapting to the *urbanisation of emergencies* will be key to ensuring the humanitarian system is fit to respond to future challenges’ (WHS Urban Expert Group 2015: 1). The challenge is to capitalise on the potential strengths of urban settlements and systems – including concentration of resources and people, existence of infrastructure and market systems, and presence of institutions – to overcome inherent vulnerabilities. These structural vulnerabilities of urban areas include that same concentration of people, which may be further swollen by displaced populations, over half of which are now estimated to reside in towns and cities.

The second geographic shift relates to how far protracted crises have arisen in (formerly) middle-income countries outside sub-Saharan Africa, predominantly in the Middle East and North Africa – including Iraq, Syria and Libya. Prior to their crises, these countries tended to have a higher level of infrastructure and basic services, including in WASH, than the countries of sub-Saharan Africa which dominated the long-term emergencies of the 90s and early 00s – such as Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. While this is a simplification, middle income countries with severely damaged water and sewerage infrastructure networks, especially in cities, can represent a different set of challenges compared to those where such infrastructure did not exist in the first place.

As Box 3 indicates, the challenges of crises arising in new global regions, and of displacement to urban areas, intersect in the countries that are receiving huge numbers of refugees from Syria – such as Jordan.

### 3.2.2 Rise of new actors

While relatively modest in global terms, a number of countries are emerging as providers of humanitarian and development assistance, which are perceived as having different priorities and norms compared to the ‘old guard’ of DAC donors comprising a number of European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan Australia and New Zealand.

These include China, which has a long history of internally oriented disaster response and is a still small but increasing contributor to external emergency relief (Krebs 2014), and the gulf states, notably Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These four countries have been at the vanguard of emergency relief funding to meet the growing need in the region: from 2013 to 2014, Saudi Arabia trebled its contribution and rose from the fourteenth to the sixth largest government donor. Compared to China, the Gulf States have a longer history of externally facing humanitarian assistance, more aligned to the ‘conventional’ global systems. For example, in 2014 the four Gulf donors routed almost two-thirds of their assistance via UN agencies and the International Organisation for Migration (GHA 2015).

Flows from ‘non-DAC’ donors are difficult to trace, and this is particularly the case for sector-specific flows. It is therefore extremely difficult to assess the impact of these new donor countries for WASH modalities and programming priorities. At the macro level, however, the rise of a new diversity of donors has been presented as an ‘age of choice’, in which a larger volume and range of finance is available to recipient countries, accompanied by a broader range of attitudes to conventional preoccupations for ‘effective’ aid – such as ownership and alignment (Greenhill et al. 2015). Aid effectiveness considerations have long been part of the debates about managing transitions between humanitarian and development assistance – for example, how far it is possible to align to country systems in post-conflict

contexts where state structures are weakened, absent, or suffering from a legitimacy gap. If nothing else, the new range of choice and attitudes may mean the traction of conventional aid effectiveness norms (or humanitarian principles) in influencing donor and recipient behaviour is further complicated and potentially diluted.

The contribution of private sector is still relatively modest (Greenhill et al. 2015). However, both in general (Zyck and Kent 2014) and in relation to WASH (Mason, Matoso and Smith 2015), there is growing attention to the role of the private sector in supporting more systemic aspects of relief and development.

### **Box 3: Water and the refugee crisis in Jordan**

In 2012, over 93% of Jordan was covered by piped water services and 70% by sanitation services. However, the influx of some 1.4 million Syrians to Jordan (as of 2015), escaping from war-torn Syria, made these percentages drop to 67% and 42%, respectively. As Jordan is already prone to water scarcity (the per capital water share in Jordan is among the lowest in the world), the estimated 40% increase in water demand risks causing a real water crisis, as Jordan Minister of Water Hazem Nasser has recognised in multiple occasions, including at the 2015 Stockholm World Water Week.

More than 600,000 of the 1.4 million of Syrians in Jordan are refugees and 85% of them live outside camps in some of the poorest areas of the country. In some municipalities Syrian refugees even outnumber residents; for example, in Mafraq City the government estimates that the number of refugees is equivalent to 128% of the population (90,000 Syrians to 70,050 Jordanians). Coping with the increased needs has placed enormous pressure on public services that were never designed to deal with such numbers, driving up expenditures and reducing the quality and accessibility for local residents (MPIC and UNICEF 2015). Tensions between refugees and host communities over access to water and sanitation resources have already been registered (de Albuquerque 2014; MPIC and UNICEF 2015).

The Jordan Water Ministry estimated that a total of \$750 million is needed to sustain water and sanitation services for Syrian refugees and host communities. Although donors pledged almost \$1 billion for Jordan within the framework of a United Nations joint humanitarian appeal, only about half of that amount has been disbursed. As of 2014, the water, sanitation and hygiene sectors had received only 13% of the funds necessary (de Albuquerque 2014). The Syrian crisis has also prompted the development of a National Resilience Plan (2014-2016) to mitigate the impact of the crisis on host communities in Jordan. The Plan envisages activities on WASH at a cost of more than \$750 million that would aim to enhance the capacity of the Government of Jordan and in particular the host communities to meet the increase in demand in the water and sanitation services. A stronger financial commitment is clearly needed; but innovative responses to deal with the crisis are also required to respond with the immediate and long-term WASH needs of refugees and vulnerable host communities.

Recognising this, the 2015-2017 Jordan Response Plan for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, prepared by the Water Ministry and UNICEF, seeks to enhance the capacity of the government and host communities to meet the increased demand for water and sanitation services. The response focuses on a number of projects that link refugee assistance in Za'atari and Azraq camps with medium-term resilience-oriented interventions, such as rehabilitation of water supply infrastructure, expansion of wastewater treatment plants, and the extension of sewer systems in urban areas with a large refugee population. Thus, rather than creating rhetorical linkages between short-term humanitarian interventions and development goals, the JRP embeds the refugee response into national development plans, with a view to implement sustainable service delivery systems that meet the needs of both refugees and vulnerable host communities (Al Emam 2015).

*Source:* Authors.


# 4 A structure to understand siloes

In the following sections we reflect on the findings of our case studies, as well as analysis of our global level interviews and literature review, to examine the underlying causes of siloes between humanitarian and development WASH. In line with the objective of the study to develop actionable recommendations towards a well-connected WASH sector, we also look at how organisations and individuals are already working to resolve the underlying causes of ‘siloisation’.

Before doing so, we present a structure for understanding the underlying causes, which we constructed in the course of interrogating our initial working assumptions, and the additional data and insights that we gathered from documentary review and key informants. We present the framework here because it provides an organisational device for our findings and recommendations.

The structure we put forward can be represented as a pyramid, with a hierarchy of norms, incentives and processes (Figure 1). It can also be visualised as a wedge, which drives the two communities apart. Read from top to bottom (apex to base), the pyramid structure helps to explain why the siloes are so entrenched. Deep-set differences at the *normative* level condition the types of *incentive* that arise within the humanitarian and development aid architecture, and their respective communities. These incentives, relating to available resources, lines of accountability, and attitudes to risk, in turn condition *operational processes* that enforce the siloes on the ground – around modalities for implementation; division and targeting of effort; recruitment and development of staff; and mechanisms for dialogue. The fact that the operational processes flow from strongly held

**Figure 1: Hierarchy of norms, incentives and operational processes that underlie the humanitarian-development siloes in WASH**



Source: Authors

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norms, via structural incentives that often operate at a level above the WASH sector, means they can appear hard to shift. This is especially the case from the perspective of a single sector such as WASH.

At the same time, it is clear that operational processes in many ways support and entrench the higher-level causes of siloisation. Different financing channels, for example, persist because the architecture and processes for implementation have become so embedded – with different types of organisation performing different roles and seeking different types of funding. Read from base to apex, therefore, the pyramid holds a clue as to how the silos could be overcome. By tilting the operational processes by which WASH services are organised and delivered on the

ground, it may be possible to overcome siloisation. This can send a powerful signal to higher levels, for example donor policies and financing arrangements, at which incentives and norms tend to arise and take root. The operational processes are also arguably more directly in the reach of WASH sector agencies, though in developing our recommendations (Sections 8 and 9) we also consider how the WASH sector can actively engage on issues of norms and incentives.

In the following sections we consider each of the underlying causes of siloisation in greater detail. In each case we highlight examples, drawn from our case studies and global review, where there is already effort to overcome them.

# 5 Norms

A norm can be defined as ‘an established standard of behaviour shared by members of a social group to which each member is expected to conform’.<sup>5</sup> Norms of the humanitarian and development communities are given expression at different levels, from high-level mission statements to detailed implementation standards for individual sectors like WASH. They permeate the cultures of the respective communities and may appear difficult to shift. Examining different expressions of norms, however, we find that while simplistic interpretations tend to reinforce a division, through opposing stereotypes, there may be more commonality than is often assumed. A summary of the key normative factors that reinforce the division between humanitarian and development communities ('constraining' factors) and where we identify commonality ('enabling' factors) is presented in Table 1 below.

## 5.1 Mission

Our interviews suggest that perceived differences in mission have over time become entrenched. The aim of humanitarian assistance, WASH included, was frequently characterised as being to ‘save lives’ and address ‘basic’, ‘immediate’ needs. There was no succinct equivalent to articulate the core purpose of development assistance. By implication, the aims of development assistance seemed most clearly defined in opposition to humanitarian assistance – i.e., if assistance is not about meeting acute needs and saving life in an emergency, it is categorised as development. The way in which our interviewees, especially those in the country offices of international agencies, described their work was largely reflective of this perceived difference in missions. Staff of humanitarian agencies tended to focus on the life-saving nature of their interventions – as one humanitarian donor representative in South Sudan stated, ‘our terms of reference are about saving lives, intervening in emergencies’. Staff of development agencies meanwhile highlighted their long-term presence and engagement with the government and/or communities. In the words of a donor representative funding development WASH in DRC, ‘we want to improve the lives of people in the long-term; this means developing infrastructure, delivering services working with communities and governments’.

Divergent missions are reflected in how each community self-identifies, often in opposition to a stereotypical representative of the other. In the words of two of our interviewees: ‘humanitarians are saving life, development

**Table 1: Summary analysis of normative issues underlying the humanitarian-development siloes in WASH**

	Constraining factors	Enabling factors
Mission	Perceived differences in mission: humanitarian WASH to ‘save lives’. Purpose of development WASH has strong health dimension but extends to other considerations e.g. socio-economic opportunity	Differences largely self-defined and overlook key similarities e.g. necessity of WASH for safeguarding public health across emergency and non-emergency contexts
Principles	Humanitarian principles such as neutrality and independence sometimes perceived as incompatible with development principles such as ownership, especially in politically charged contexts	Principles do not prevent compromise, e.g. neutrality and independence does not prohibit engaging with government entirely. Even in more challenging contexts, collaboration at the local level may be possible as an interim step towards sector leadership and ownership with the government (e.g. VEA in DRC)
Standards	Separate sector standards for development (MDGs, UNICEF JMP indicators) and humanitarian (Sphere standards) WASH interventions	Opportunities to find complementarity between technical standards with SDG WASH monitoring; e.g. SDGs may refer to refugee camps as extra-household settings

*Source: Authors*

<sup>5</sup> Collins English Dictionary.

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[specialists] are bureaucrats – it attracts different people'; 'it is very difficult to have development people understand about humanitarian work, and humanitarian "cowboys" understand about development work'.

Such self-defined differences can seem somewhat flimsy, however, in the face of the acknowledged need for WASH to safeguard public health in both emergency and non-emergency contexts. Especially among respondents at headquarters level, we found more awareness of the artificiality of this dual mandate, and of its consequences for effective service delivery in situations of protracted crisis. However, even there, our interviews highlighted that self-perceived differences have become reinforced by how organisations are structured: humanitarian and development programmes remain confined to different departments ('physically separated, located in different floors or buildings', in the words of a humanitarian donor), which often do not communicate with each other. Respondents from governments or national NGOs were sometimes best placed to perceive the artificiality of the divide, and did not identify themselves with either 'world', but rather with the international agency or donor with which they were collaborating. As one NGO representative in South Sudan put it: 'our activities can be development or humanitarian, it depends on the donors'.

## 5.2 Principles

More detailed expressions of norms appear in the form of general principles to which each community subscribe – both at the level of the entire humanitarian and development architecture, and in specific sectors such as WASH. A brief review of those principles nonetheless suggests that there may be more commonality than is usually realised, or admitted.

As the responses of our interviewees seem to suggest, the humanitarian community as a whole arguably has a more straightforward job to articulate its core principles. The humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, which have long guided the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the national Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies and are formally enshrined in two General Assembly resolutions,<sup>6</sup> are concise and readily defended (OCHA 2012). Most of our interviewees in humanitarian agencies mentioned them at least once when describing their approach to planning and implementing WASH interventions. Critics argue that the principles are impossible to apply in politically charged context. Champions meanwhile respond that they are especially

important to ensure humanitarian response remains viable in violent settings in the long term – given increasing political polarisation and threats to life and safety not only of affected populations, but also humanitarian responders.<sup>7</sup> Certainly, interpretations of humanitarian principles, and how they are applied in practice, diverge more than might be thought, given their relative simplicity. 'Although [humanitarian organisations] are arguably driven by the principle of humanity, the philosophy and ethics underlying their work differ substantially' (CHS Alliance 2015: 22).

There are no equivalent overarching principles for the development community, though the evolving aid effectiveness agenda provides a reference point, expressed in the outputs of a series of High Level Fora in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). The principles emerging from these global meetings are focused more at the level of funding than operations, and themselves tell a story of evolving politics of international development assistance. The principles evolved from Rome to Accra included harmonisation, ownership, alignment, mutual accountability and managing for results. These were replaced following the Busan agreement with a modified set of four: ownership, focus on results, inclusive development partnerships (involving all development actors), and transparency and accountability. Across the agreements there is continued emphasis on the principles of ownership, results and accountability, with transparency as a fundamental pre-requisite (Mason and Rabinowitz 2014). Despite some continuity from Rome to Busan, the 'aid effectiveness principles' are highly contested. Many core tensions come down to questions of ownership, and who ultimately controls the development process in terms of how funds are allocated, routed and spent.<sup>8</sup>

Simplistic divisions between humanitarian and development communities are an important part of self-definition. These framings tend towards homogenous stereotypes. But it is important to note that there are huge differences of opinion within each 'community', which may itself imply that there is greater room for dialogue to establish common ground between the two. In the words of a NGO representative in South Sudan, 'Often, especially at country level where competition for funding is higher, there is more difference of vision and goals within development or humanitarian organisations than between humanitarian and development ones'. As noted above, the involvement of a new diversity of providers of both development and humanitarian assistance further complicates the picture. It may imply that a sharp division into humanitarian and development siloes will be increasingly difficult to maintain.

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6 The first three principles (humanity, neutrality and impartiality) are endorsed in General Assembly resolution 46/182, which was adopted in 1991. General Assembly resolution 58/114 (2004) added independence as a forth key principle underlying humanitarian action. Source: OCHA (2012).

7 As specified in the ICRC's mandate, see: <https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/mandate>.

8 It is worth noting, however, that in WASH ownership does not necessarily mean public service provision – rather the role of Government may be to set an enabling and regulated framework for different kinds of service provider, including the private sector.

There are some moves to acknowledge the priorities and concerns of counterpart communities at the highest level. For example, the Busan Partnership has the ambition to ‘ensure that development strategies and programmes prioritise the building of resilience among people and societies at risk from shocks, especially in highly vulnerable settings’ (Busan Partnership 2011: 8). This said, other mentions of humanitarian assistance are scarce, even in the accompanying agreement signed at Busan, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which has a focus on many countries receiving significant humanitarian aid (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2011). As one representative of an international donor agency put it, there is some way to go before the core question of how to build resilience is answered: ‘How in development work are we able to bring country systems up to a level in which they can handle emergency situations as well?’

Tensions over principles such as ownership are also visible in WASH. Sanitation and Water for All (SWA), the principle global partnership of country governments, external support agencies, civil society organisations and other development partners working on WASH, has developed four ‘collaborative behaviours’. These collaborative behaviours effectively translate the aid effectiveness principles to the WASH context. Development WASH arguably features more prominently in SWA’s agenda and its membership – particularly among the civil society constituency, from which major emergency WASH providers such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and INGOs such as Oxfam are absent. The behaviours (Box 4) are therefore interesting to review from a humanitarian perspective. The emphasis on enhancing government leadership of the sector, using country systems, and mutual accountability, could be challenging for many humanitarian agencies. Especially where government legitimacy is compromised by recent or ongoing crisis, engaging at all with government, even with a sector line ministry, could be at odds with neutrality and independence.

This said, at least for natural disasters, humanitarian agencies have *de facto* incorporated some of these principles into their guidelines. For example, the code of conduct for disaster response of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement pledges to ‘attempt to build disaster response on local capacities’ (principle 6) (IFRC 1995). In practice, the principle of neutrality applies mainly to conflict settings but even here it does not prohibit engaging with government at all – rather it implies engaging with all belligerent parties equally. At the same time, it has been suggested that development actors can productively reflect on the humanitarian principles in their work, especially if operating in conflict contexts (Levine and Sharp 2015).

Besides issues of principle are questions of pragmatism. A large number of international respondents in DRC, for example, expressed little confidence in the capacity or willingness of the government to implement and coordinate programmes, or even the effective functioning of key sector bodies such as the National Service for Rural Water Supply (*Service National de l’Hydraulique Rurale*, SNHR) and National Water and Sanitation Committee (*Comité Nationale des Agences de l’Eau et Assainissement*, CNAEA). Perceived failures of legitimacy and capacity therefore present a real challenge to adopting the collaborative behaviours in protracted crises. This said, few of our interviewees in either the humanitarian or development siloes implied views that would deny their validity or importance as long-term goals.

There is, furthermore, some evidence that concrete steps towards the collaborative behaviours can be taken in very challenging contexts. One of the largest development WASH interventions in DRC is the Healthy Schools and Villages Programme (*Ecoles et villages assainis* – abbreviated as EVA or VEA), which has been jointly implemented by the ministries of health and education, with the support of UNICEF, since 2006. The extent to which VEA is genuinely government-owned was a point of debate for our interviewees: although it is always described as a ‘national programme’, in reality UNICEF provides the funding (\$250m since 2008) and technical expertise and

#### **Box 4: The Sanitation and Water for All Collaborative Behaviours**

The SWA global partnership has agreed four collaborative behaviours that, ‘if adopted by countries and their partners, can improve the way that they work together to improve the long-term sector performance’. The Collaborative behaviours are based on country case studies, cross-country monitoring reports and learning from other sectors. They are summarised as:

- Enhance government leadership of sector planning processes
- Strengthen and use country systems
- Use one information and mutual accountability platform
- Build sustainable water and sanitation sector financing strategies

Source: <http://sanitationandwaterforall.org/about/the-four-swa-collaborative-behaviours/>

without UNICEF's continued intervention the programme would not function. Government officials are nonetheless heavily involved in the roll out and certification process, especially at the local health zone level. The VEA example indicates that collaboration at the local level may be possible as an interim step towards more systemic and higher-level efforts to embed sector leadership and ownership with the government.

In South Sudan, several UN agencies and NGOs in the WASH and health sectors are collaborating with the Ministry of Electricity, Dams, Irrigation and Water Resources (MEDIWR) and the Ministry of Health in a Cholera Task Force, co-chaired by UNICEF and MEDIWR. Examples discussed during our interviews suggest that the Task Force is looking beyond reactive responses to the immediate emergency, with preventative approaches based on more development-oriented modalities like school-based and mass media hygiene promotion. The realities of sporadic conflict and what this means for working with Government were nonetheless brought home in the words of one of our interviewees: 'In Malakal, the local government had to flee and relocate to Renk – in this context, all perspectives of participatory approaches for sustainable WASH supply vanish.'<sup>9</sup>

### 5.3 Standards

High-level principles can be difficult to grasp, and therefore debate, in the abstract. It is important to look at how they translate into operational practice and standards. Here, particularly, there is perhaps more room for agreement than is commonly realised. Within WASH, development sector standards have been heavily influenced by the global sector monitoring and reporting architecture under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The World Health Organization and UNICEF's Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) defined technical standards for MDG monitoring around the type of infrastructure used by households – a relatively narrow definition, forced by the availability of globally comparable data. This effectively ignored more sophisticated service standards such as affordability of water services or the safe management of faecal waste. The JMP has recently played a central role in developing targets and indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In practical terms, SDG WASH monitoring is likely to significantly increase the range of variables being measured and level of disaggregation, with an emphasis on progressively reducing and eliminating inequalities. Accompanying benchmarks and standards are likely to follow – for example for quality, affordability, and management of sanitation waste. The JMP briefing on WASH post-2015 refers to "Special cases" including refugee camps' (JMP et al. 2015: 2).

While this reinforces the sense that emergencies require substantively different types of service intervention, it at least acknowledges one common emergency setting.

Humanitarian WASH interventions are usually intended to be impermanent, whatever the realities, especially in protracted crises. In theory, this means that they are not required to directly contribute to MDG or SDG achievement. Humanitarian WASH technical standards have been developed separately. The Sphere Project, a voluntary initiative aimed at improving the quality of humanitarian assistance, has set widely accepted technical standards. These are presented as 'a practical expression of the shared beliefs and commitments of humanitarian agencies and the common principles, rights and duties governing humanitarian action that are set out in the Humanitarian Charter' (Sphere 2011: 83). For development specialists, the Sphere standards can appear to formalise the supply-driven, technology-focused stereotype of humanitarian WASH interventions, which cause problems of dependence and expectations among recipient communities. In the words of one of our global-level interviewees, 'the focus of humanitarian interventions is to 'go there and save lives at any cost', which in their view justifies the irrational use of expensive and unsustainable service delivery modalities; for example, they fly equipment in rather than buying materials in the country'.

But a closer reading suggests there are many commonalities with what is viewed as good practice in development contexts. For example, on sustainable management the Sphere standards require 'a system in place for the management and maintenance of facilities as appropriate, and different groups contribute equitably' (*ibid.*: 89). There is also a strong focus on safe excreta disposal, and the Sphere standards have always emphasised the equal importance of hygiene promotion alongside sanitation and water supply, something which was absent from the MDG WASH targets and monitoring framework but is picked up under the SDGs. Indeed, as one respondent acknowledged, 'sanitation and hygiene are areas in which the interaction between development and humanitarian actors has been particularly low ... but this will hopefully improve under the SDGs.' The same respondent noted that 'we [humanitarians] need to become better at understanding and building on results achieved through development work in hygiene promotion and sanitation'.

Any commonality in technical standards does not imply that emergency WASH interventions can follow the same model as development ones. As we discuss below (Section 7), there are sound reasons why the timeframes and modalities for service provision are often very different. Yet an understanding of commonality can help overcome assumptions that the communities are divided by the standards that guide their work day to day.

<sup>9</sup> Interviews with representatives of UNICEF, August 2015 in Juba, South Sudan.

# 6 Incentives

If the question inherent in our discussion of norms was ‘What should be done?’ the equivalent for incentives is ‘Why should it be done?’ We next reflect on three broad categories of incentive to act, or not act: having and acquiring finance to act; extent of accountability for any action; and the risks of action producing negative outcomes. In the subsections which follow, we examine humanitarian and development funding, reporting and programming systems. We find that these systems – in general and as they arise in WASH – create very different structural incentives, translating high-level norms into differences at the operational level. A summary of the key set of incentives that reinforce the division between humanitarian and development communities ('constraining' factors) and where we see common ground ('enabling' factors) is presented in Table 2 below.

## 6.1 Finance

For any organisation with a certain mandate or individual with a job description, being able to secure enough resources to get the job done is a key concern. Over time, securing finance also becomes an end in itself, in that competitive funding awards become a proxy for the success of individuals and organisations. A potent set of incentives arise around financing that have over time come to condition the cultures of the two siloes. As one interviewee put it: ‘budget is DNA, if you have two budget lines you create two different industries.’ As we will see in subsequent sections, finance-related incentive structures have far reaching implications down to the level of operational processes and procedures, e.g. for staffing and implementation modalities.

Development and humanitarian funding streams are of course compartmentalised. The system is perhaps a predictable response to the basic accounting challenge of having funds available for rapid deployment to emergencies versus longer-term commitments needed for development-oriented work. Over time, however, the division has become so embedded that specialists in one community have limited awareness of how the other is financed. Key humanitarian funding channels are the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) pooled funding systems: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) and Emergency Response Funds (ERFs). These are largely unfamiliar domains for many development WASH specialists, just as the world of programmatic aid and budget support are beyond the experience of many in humanitarian agencies. Often,

**Table 2: Summary analysis of incentive issues underlying the humanitarian-development siloes in WASH**

	Constraining factors	Enabling factors
Finance	Different degrees of coherence of development and humanitarian funds: more coordination at country level in protracted crises for humanitarian WASH within cluster architecture; Different timeframe and flexibility of funding streams: 'short-sighted, unpredictable' for humanitarian WASH, longer timeframes but limited flexibility for development WASH; Perceived competition for finance between humanitarian and development interventions.	Humanitarian pooled funds and the associated coherence lent by the cluster architecture has the potential to incentivise a more strategic approach to sector issues; Some donors are trying out mechanisms to better enable reprogramming of funds in crisis situations; Decreasing funding availability could equally encourage rationalisation and partnerships.
Accountability	Existing accountability and reporting systems to donors (in turn, based on visibility of the crisis/public pressure and geopolitical considerations) discourage longer-term approach focused on end impact, for both humanitarian and development agencies; Perceived greater emphasis among development programmes for accountability to national government.	Accountability to beneficiaries acknowledged as a shared goal for both humanitarian and development WASH communities; Examples of more effective involvement of and accountability to national government especially in response to specific challenges, e.g. cholera containment and prevention.
Risk	High levels of risk (or perceptions of it) reinforce the short termism and inflexibility of both humanitarian and development programmes; skew resource allocations; and further incentivise a tendency to resort to familiar, siloed ways of working.	Examples of risk-based programming to retain ability to reallocate for emergency response where a crisis re-occurs. In more stable contexts, examples of national governments leading on emergency preparedness.

*Source: Authors*

implementing agencies overlap around a fragmented middle ground of project-based funding, which does little to support coherence or sustainability.

### 6.1.1 Common themes differentiating humanitarian and development finance – timeframe, flexibility and coherence

On the humanitarian side, the CHFs, such as those in South Sudan and DRC, do aim to provide funding on a long-term, country-specific basis to tackle recurrent and persistent crises. A brief survey of recent allocations, however, suggests that humanitarian funding remains unpredictable, both at the country level and for specific funding channels and sectors. In DRC, for example, the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) received 66% of the funding requested in 2014, as compared to 83% in the previous two years (Figure 2). This is attributed by OCHA to a combination of competing crises in other countries, ‘donor fatigue’, and a shift to transition and development funding (OCHA 2015). Whether this latter trend is really happening is difficult to confirm, given the diversity of development funds flowing to DRC. The OECD DAC statistics for 2012 and 2013 in fact depict a slight fall in net Official Development Assistance, from \$2.9m to \$2.6m.

An examination of one particular pooled fund in one particular country – the CHF in South Sudan – depicts similar fluctuations (Figure 3). These are amplified for a specific sector like WASH, which in 2014 received more than double the allocation compared to 2012 or 2013, while the total increased only marginally.


Unpredictability and annual budgeting cycles conspire to incentivise short-term planning. In the words of one

interviewee for the South Sudan study: ‘funding for humanitarian interventions is short, 1 year, 18 months if you are lucky! Therefore, you come in and you have to spend your money and hit your targets quickly, otherwise the donor will give money to the next agency. We are too busy to strategise with the development sector, and thus we miss opportunities.’

The pooled nature of much humanitarian funding can nonetheless incentivise a degree of coherence, directing effort in a more strategic fashion, including towards greater complementarity with development interventions. In both DRC and South Sudan, in common with many emergency contexts, the WASH Cluster plays a key role in facilitating the allocation and division of funds to and within the sector. Each cluster has a lead agency – UNICEF in the case of WASH. In both our case study countries, the Cluster represented the most functional sector coordination body, with representation at national and subnational levels. The clusters effectively liaise between implementing agencies and OCHA as the coordinator of the pooled funds to determine the financial envelope for humanitarian response plans (HRPs) and the allocation of funds that are secured.


By virtue of their role in financing, and the fact that they are often the most effective coordination body in contexts of protracted crisis, clusters therefore have an influential role in building complementarity across the siloes. For example, in South Sudan, activities for the 2015 HRP have expanded to cover hygiene promotion in schools and other institutions and scaling up the implementation of Community-led Total Sanitation (CLTS). The WASH Cluster is also supporting the Water Information

**Figure 2: Total requested for the DRC Humanitarian Response Plan, and amount funded, 2012-2013**



Source: OCHA 2015

**Figure 3: South Sudan CHF allocations for WASH as compared to other sectors, 2012-2013**



Source: [www.unocha.org/south-sudan/common-humanitarian-fund/resources-and-publications](http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/common-humanitarian-fund/resources-and-publications)

Management System (WIMS) for data collection and exchange between the states and the central WIMS unit based in Juba.<sup>10</sup> The WASH cluster strategy also recognises community resilience as a cross-cutting theme to all its activities, and commits to linking its exit strategies with development programmes (UNICEF 2015).

Experience in DRC appeared less promising: development agencies and funders interviewed generally did not feel the WASH Cluster was particularly relevant to them. These challenges were, however, less apparent in our provincial level case study (Lubumbashi, Katanga). Here, the WASH Cluster was felt to be inclusive and there was limited attention to development WASH activities, largely due to UNICEF's role as lead for the cluster and key agency for the VEA programme.

While development finance tends to have longer timeframes of several years, it usually comes with inflexible conditions, meaning funds cannot be easily reprogrammed when circumstances change. One interviewee framed the problem as a drive to efficiency, reducing the slack needed to step back and re-programme in response to change: 'Slack is considered to be inefficient, but I disagree... You cannot be super-efficient in countries where so many things are going wrong'. According to a representative of a national development NGO in DRC, procurement processes are also more complicated, time-intensive and with long delays (up to nine months) between the moment in which the tender is issued and when the intervention can actually start. Another national NGO in DRC reported that despite having expertise in both humanitarian and development interventions, they find it easier to access humanitarian funds for their operations in Eastern DRC, as compared to other funding pots that would allow them to implement long-term, more sustainable and participatory approaches.

There were few positive counterexamples from our case studies, though some attempts to better enable reprogramming of funds are under way among donors. For example the World Bank's Immediate Response Mechanism allows International Development Association countries to rapidly access up to 5% of undisbursed project balances in the event of a crisis (World Bank 2012). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in South Sudan has adopted transitional plans with a programming cycle of one to two years, instead of the five years typical of most of its development aid. With this, USAID aims to respond to the unstable political situation of the country and overall risks to its investments, without being locked in an emergency mode that impedes long-term thinking. While it is too early to judge whether this approach was beneficial in the case of South Sudan, it was cited in our interviews as at least allowing USAID

to resume development WASH interventions after their suspension in 2013.

Superficially, the coherence of development funds also appeared much lower in both the case study countries – to the extent that consolidated information on development flows to individual sectors was not available. At the same time, one explanation for the difficulty in tracking development funds is that they can be routed through government systems – with the long-term objective of improving coherence. For example the UK Department of International Development (DFID) reports directing over 30% of its development budget to the DRC government.<sup>11</sup> In WASH, any such development funding goes primarily to the Ministry of Health, as the major partner in the VEA programme; some support is also provided to the CNAEA and its provincial offices.

In summary, issues of timeframe, flexibility, and coherence therefore divide the humanitarian and development WASH financing architectures. The conventional criticisms of humanitarian funding as short-sighted and development funds as too inflexible were reiterated by a number of interviewees. Perhaps more interesting, is the potential offered by humanitarian pooled funds and the associated coherence lent by the cluster architecture to incentivise a more strategic approach to sector issues – including reducing humanitarian-development siloisation. In both our case study countries, development-oriented agencies and government tend to participate on the periphery of the WASH cluster. That said, integration and active moves to encourage greater complementarity are more evident in South Sudan than DRC, and within DRC, at the provincial than the national level. We reflect further on the potential of the WASH cluster as an entry point to greater complementarity below (Section 7.4) and in our recommendations.

### 6.1.2 Competition for finance – incentive or disincentive to complementarity?

Despite their compartmentalisation and generic differences, however, the interrelationship between humanitarian and development funds is also important. In particular, there may be a perceived trade off, whereby drops in humanitarian or development related budgets are attributed to growth in the other. The attribution of the drop in funding of the HRP in DRC to a shift to more development-oriented programming, mentioned above, was mirrored by the equivalent perspective from development specialists: 'Emergencies eat up development activities. Resources are limited – and that creates conflict/competition between the two.' This pattern between humanitarian and development communities mirrors

10 Information from various interviews with UNICEF staff, held from 3<sup>rd</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> August 2015 in Juba, South Sudan.

11 See DFID Development Tracker website at: <http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/CD>

similar views within each. Levels of the CHF in South Sudan for 2015 appeared reduced at the time of our case study, attributed by one interviewee to competition with other crises such as the ones in Syria and Yemen: ‘South Sudan is not sexy to donors anymore, they grew tired of hearing the same story of failed peace negotiations over and over.’ The effect of competition could diminish trust between agencies – within and between the siloes – decreasing the ability of entities such as clusters to support coordination and complementarity in the long run (Campbell and Knox Clarke 2015). There were some alternative and more optimistic views, however: ‘dwindling resources are not necessarily a bad thing; people might finally start rationalising their projects and efforts, focusing on partnerships, working more closely together on the ground.’

### 6.1.3 Innovative finance – additional disruptor

A final, related point of note that could tilt the incentives to collaborate is the prospect of broader efforts to innovate within both development and humanitarian financing. Innovations like payment by results for development programmes and humanitarian cash transfers can create new winners and losers, and may be resisted by organisations who are used to working in a certain way. They also have the potential to radically reshape the incentives around finance and the existing humanitarian and development architectures that respond to those incentives. Like competition, they could entrench or disrupt the existing siloes. For example, the Sustainable

WASH in Fragile Contexts (SWIFT) Programme, led by Oxfam (partnering with local NGOs) and Tearfund in North and South Kivu and Maniema provinces in DRC, is funded by DFID under a payment-by-results arrangement. A share of payments are made to implementing partners on the basis of continued use of water supply and sanitation, and adoption of hygiene behaviours, one and two years after the majority of implementation takes place. In a highly changeable context where humanitarian interventions have historically dominated, the approach provides an explicit financial incentive to ensure long-term sustainability. At the same time, the design of the programme has placed considerable pressures on front-line staff in terms of monitoring and reporting. This is perceived by some as a less positive aspect of the approach, detracting from the ability to deliver under difficult and changeable circumstances.<sup>12</sup> We consider the specific case of humanitarian cash transfers in Box 5 below.

## 6.2 Accountability

From our interviews, a recurrent theme was the complexity of accountability lines and, implicitly, the potential tensions between them. As we shall see, accountability is often closely related to finance – i.e. both development and humanitarian agencies often feel pressure to respect accountability to their donors. Here, *what* they are accountable for matters as much as *whom* they are accountable to: an emphasis on financial inputs rather than outcomes or impact discourages longer-term perspectives.

### Box 5: Increasing use of cash transfers in emergencies

The core idea of humanitarian cash transfers is to provide cash to people affected by crisis, rather than in-kind aid like shelter, food, clothing, medicine and clean water. The hypothesis, tested in a number of programmes and extensively evaluated, is that this can allow people to meet their priority needs at lower overall cost, or more people at the same cost. A comparative study of cash transfers versus food aid across four countries found provision of cash could increase reach by 18% (Margolies and Hoddinott 2014). Proponents argue that, compared to provision of in-kind aid, there is much less risk of diversion (electronic audit chain, greater security), risk of aid spending going to meet objectives not prioritised by recipients, or risk of assistance undermining local markets. Indeed, the provision of cash may stimulate local market demand, generating economic opportunity.

A move toward greater use of cash transfers would disrupt the humanitarian system, because cash is by its nature not limited to one sector, whereas the humanitarian system is organised around sector-focused clusters, and has made substantial bureaucratic and logistical investments to provide physical items rather than cash.

There is some acknowledgement that cash is less appropriate in some sectors (water and sanitation, health), and is inappropriate to others, such as mine action. Discussion among WASH experts at a recent meeting suggested that humanitarian cash transfers might have potential in limited circumstances, but would not remove the need for ancillary supply-side support to safeguard public health and human rights.

Thorough understanding of markets is in any case necessary. A recent review of cash transfers in emergencies in WASH and shelter sectors recommends that ‘There is a need to advocate for market-based programming, not Cash Transfer Programming, to be a standard response’ (Juillard and Islam Opoo 2014)

Source: ODI (2015b); *Urban sanitation markets: scale and resilience event*, ODI, London, 4 December 2015.

12 ODI is a global partner of the SWIFT Consortium, which also operates in Kenya. See <http://swiftconsortium.org/>

A second important theme is increasing discussion around accountability to beneficiaries, a subject of considerable attention for the humanitarian community, including in WASH. A third important line of accountability discussed by our interviewees and visible in the literature is to government at different levels. This may be motivated by normative concerns such as increasing government ownership, or more pragmatic ones such as maintaining political relationships and licence to operate.

The procedures and institutions governing behaviour around each line of accountability will be systematised more or less formally in different circumstances – ranging from donor logframes, to field guidance on Accountability to Affected Populations, to verbal exchanges with government counterparts. While accountability is a critical category of incentive underpinning the siloisation between humanitarian and development WASH, it is therefore also a complex area, in which there are similar as well as different effects on the two communities.

### **6.2.1 Donor accountability dominates in both siloes**

Accountability to donors was a core preoccupation among both development and humanitarian-oriented interviewees: ‘If communities, governments question our work – we wait a bit before answering (and often we do not answer). But when donors have questions, we jump on the plane to explain why and when and how things happened.’ Respondents drew some differences in terms of the types of results that are sought by humanitarian and development donors. For example, in DRC, humanitarian organisations implied a focus on shorter-term results, relating to activities and simple outputs such as the number of people reached with chlorine tablets. With renewed attention to WASH sustainability there are some moves among development donors to require reporting further down the assumed causal chain, for example more sophisticated outputs like whether a water system is constructed and functioning, or even outcomes (use of a service, or continued behaviours, sustained for some time after an intervention) as in the DFID payment-by-results example above. Commonly, however, there was a feeling on both sides that the existing donor accountability systems tend to skew implementers towards tracking financial inputs rather than service outcomes, let alone impacts: ‘in the sector the donors ask “what have you done with my money?”’ more than whether we have satisfied the needs of the population we try to support.’

Donors of course have their own accountability concerns, including to their governments and electorates. International development spending is a major political issue in many donor countries, with emotive but not always clear direction. Aid can come under attack from populist media and politicians, but at the same time publics can pressure governments to increase their contribution through mainstream and social media, often in response to specific, high-profile disasters. For a representative of one donor agency interviewed, a key priority in accountability

lines from donor agencies to their governments was to maintain public support for aid in general: ‘Fraud is a big risk: if [money] goes missing from my programme, people will think [it] is lost in corruption and stop supporting our work.’ For another, geopolitical concerns were cited as important: ‘In post-conflict areas, there is a stronger say [from the donor’s government] – there are some political and diplomatic questions in that kind of fragile environment.’ These accountability incentives felt by donors are just as relevant for the siloes as those they set for implementing agencies. Although they can affect both humanitarian and development assistance in similar ways, they increase the overall pressure on each community, and as such are unlikely to be conducive to complementarity.

### **6.2.2 Accountability to service users could increasingly become a starting point for dialogue**

If our interviewees acknowledged that most effort went into accountability towards donors, the majority felt it *should* be directed towards the people whom development and humanitarian assistance aims to support. Within the humanitarian community, this agenda is encapsulated as ‘Accountability to Affected Populations’ (AAP). Underemphasised in previous efforts to reform the humanitarian system, AAP has received renewed attention in recent years. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee established a Task Force on AAP in July 2012, which framed several commitments, to be mainstreamed through the Cluster system. In WASH, a study of efforts towards AAP by WASH Cluster partners in the Kachin and Rakhine Emergency Responses in Myanmar suggests positive progress but that partners were still struggling to operationalise some commitments. These range from sharing WASH project goals, timeframes and summary finances with beneficiary communities, to having functional mechanisms that can track complaints and redress (Sow et al. 2015).

The conventional wisdom seems to be that development programming is more likely to establish accountability to beneficiary communities. One development agency we interviewed in DRC attributed this to the fact that programme staff stay longer in post and so have time to build relationships with the communities they work with. Certainly, the measures that were yet to be developed in the Myanmar responses above are often viewed as standard practice in development WASH interventions (though systematic evaluations on this are rare). That said, the concerted drive on AAP within the humanitarian community may signal that this is an increasing point of alignment and could therefore be an important theme to open dialogue on complementarity.

Here, development practitioners may have as much to learn from humanitarian approaches, as the reverse. An instructive example emerges from SNV in DRC. Involved in capacity building of VEA partners and local authorities through cooperation and partnership agreements with UNICEF, SNV identified that humanitarian interventions

were typically better received by the local population because of their more rapid implementation. As a result, SNV has experimented with incorporating participatory rapid appraisal methods (referred to by the French acronym, *Méthodes actives de recherche participative*, MARP) into the VEA programme. This method involves facilitating a dialogue that enables the community to identify problems, come up with solutions and mobilise resources to implement them (establishing implementation schedules, community cards, defining the scope of the interventions, etc.). The process is intended to increase both visibility and ownership of interventions, but with a quicker turnaround than conventional approaches for community participation and accountability.

Despite the emphasis placed on AAP and equivalent concepts, one of our contributors pointed out that there are significant limits to how far accountability goes when it comes to those whom international assistance, whether humanitarian or development, aims to help. The first is that there is limited accounting for end impacts of aid (as opposed to reporting to finance) to anyone – whether recipients or to donors. The second is that accountability is largely exercised for activities which are committed to. In the words of one of our contributors: ‘we are only accountable for what we say we will do... The decision to do a risk-free but largely irrelevant (or low priority) project? Who is accountable for that abdication of responsibility?’

### 6.2.3 Accountability to government remains a particular challenge in protracted crises

The reluctance of humanitarian organisations to work through, with or under government structures in some countries may extend even to a lack of communication. In DRC, the government officials we interviewed were critical of externally driven interventions. One respondent claimed that humanitarian organisations do not inform the relevant local authorities when they arrive and what their activities will involve, nor give them notice of when they will leave. Public officials interviewed complained that INGOs come to DRC for financial gain and that their purpose and objectives often change depending on where finance is available.

Also, the neglect of accountability to government is not only a problem for humanitarian agencies. In the words of one donor representative concerning their development as well as humanitarian activities in South Sudan: ‘we do not have formal agreement with the government around which kind of programming we are going to take. Specific activities do not need to be approved by the South Sudanese government. The mission has an agreement with the government about the portfolio of activities. But not like [donor x] that has a specific MoU with the government on activity-specific basis.’

For both humanitarian and development agencies, the institutional fragmentation within government represents a challenge for engagement. This can exist horizontally within subsectors (e.g. many countries lack a clearly

designated lead ministry for sanitation) but also vertically, with unclear lines of accountability between national and subnational levels.

The climate in DRC and South Sudan, where government may be regarded as lacking capacity or even legitimacy, creates a significant challenge even for limited steps towards accountability, like information sharing and consultation. That said, a dysfunctional relationship between government and external agencies is not uncommon in protracted crises, and is therefore an area where both development and humanitarian agencies jointly put effort.

One of the few positive examples from our case studies comes from the Cholera Task Force in South Sudan, already mentioned above. The task force is co-chaired by the Ministry of Water. Also in the DRC, the government and international agencies collaborate in the framework of the Multi-Sectorial Plan for the Elimination of Cholera (*Plan Multisectoriel Stratégique d' Elimination du Choléra*, PMSEC). The PMSEC identifies 120 ‘at risk’ health zones in the country and defines a preventive and responsive approach that spans across multiple sectors (hygiene, sanitation, water, education, etc.) and responds to both prevention (long-term) and response (short-term) objectives (UNICEF 2015). It is led by the Ministry of Health. Our interviewees were positive about the effectiveness of the Task Force in helping control outbreaks, despite no specific funding being allocated for cholera. The example suggests that specific sector challenges, like cholera containment and prevention, could provide an entry point to fostering broader accountable relationships with government.

## 6.3 Risk

Incentive structures around risk can differ between the siloes, but broadly we argue that the major implication of risk and uncertainty in protracted crises is that it encourages both humanitarian and development communities to stick to familiar ways of working, which can be neatly compartmentalised into either ‘humanitarian’ or ‘development’ boxes.

### 6.3.1 Further incentives towards short termism and inflexibility

For those working within protracted crisis, this can further encourage short-termism. In the words of one donor representative: ‘in conflict environments and for humanitarian programmes... there is quite a high discount for future benefits. For humanitarian programmes, it is much better to have 100 people having access tomorrow according to humanitarian logics [than] to make sure 500 have access in three years’ time.’ While development programmes may have ambitions towards longer-term engagement, if there is no provision in place to adapt if the situation deteriorates, the response may be suspension or complete termination. In South Sudan, several major investment programmes were suspended with the resumption of conflict in 2013. USAID

largely suspended development work after December 2013, and stopped their collaboration with the MEDIWR and South Sudan Urban Water Corporation initiated in 2012 under their \$8 million WASH programme. Similarly, the African Development Bank cancelled their plan to invest in 11 small and medium towns' water supply and sanitation facilities. The programme was supposed to run from September 2013 to December 2015 (28 months) and \$3.7 million had been committed to the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (AFDB 2013).

### 6.3.2 Perceived risks skew resource allocation

The above examples are predictable responses to risk for agencies making difficult decisions about where to allocate funds across competing urgent crises. At this higher level of allocation decisions, perception of risk can have paradoxical effects. On the one hand, the high risk presented by protracted crises can lead donors to look elsewhere for safer returns, given that investment gains may be reversed by resumption of conflict. The deteriorating security situation and inaccessibility of certain areas in South Sudan, combined with a macro-economic crisis, mean that any intervention has become highly expensive. As one implementing agency representative put it: 'for donors it is not good value for money to invest in South Sudan; they can obtain many more results at a lower cost in countries like Bangladesh and Nepal'. On the other hand, resources can become concentrated in perceived high risk contexts. Eastern DRC has for several years received a high share of humanitarian resources due in part to the (relatively) high profile recurrence of conflict. Other areas, meanwhile, historically received far less assistance, humanitarian or development, despite facing a raft of challenges which regularly exceed emergency thresholds (Lilly and Bertram 2008).

### 6.3.3 Importance of integrating of risk acknowledged but far from mainstreamed in protracted crises

The ability of agencies to integrate risk into programming appears quite variable. Agencies that regularly intervene in high-risk contexts rightly have sophisticated systems to ensure the safety of their staff and partners. Within humanitarian interventions especially, the safety and security of civilians is obviously also a core concern in active conflicts. In post-conflict and unstable settings, the 'Do No Harm' framework (Anderson 1999) provides a cornerstone of many planning and management approaches that aim to ensure that interventions do not exacerbate existing tensions, and where possible build on local capacities for peace. Nonetheless, the extent to which agencies are able to turn approaches and tools, such as context and conflict analysis, into operational recommendations, has been variable (Wild and Mason 2012).

Our case studies suggest that in both countries, WASH actors are endeavouring to ensure that risks are adequately considered and mitigated, or persistence and flexibility is built into programming. In South Sudan, the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) reallocated a small proportion of its development spending to humanitarian assistance when conflict resumed in 2013. It nonetheless made a decision to maintain a number of development programmes including its WASH project in Aweil, in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state, which had been running since 2010. After a cessation of a few months in the immediate aftermath of conflict breaking out, SDC returned to Aweil and found that the government agencies and communities they had been working with were still present. After careful local conflict analysis and assessment of capacities, security and needs, SDC resumed the programme, with a commitment to maintain it to 2017.

Another promising example is provided by the DRC WASH Consortium, funded by DFID. Comprising five INGOs, the WASH Consortium is, in principle, development-oriented, supporting the VEA programme in relatively stable areas from 2013 to 2017. In view of the risks facing notionally stable areas of DRC, however, the Consortium established a rapid response mechanism to cholera outbreaks, led by *Solidarités International*. This mechanism aims at providing emergency funding for epidemics in areas where WASH consortium members are already intervening. Importantly, the rapid response mechanism is funded through DFID's development funding window. Rapid response teams can be deployed within 72 hours of the identification of the first cholera cases. They work with the health zones and NGOs to decide, in a given context, how they can best intervene in the event of a cholera epidemic. This way, the need for humanitarian responses is reduced in areas that are at high risk of cholera outbreaks. There have been four cases of epidemics since the WASH consortium has been running this system and in our interviews the mechanism was cited as successfully mitigating the scale of humanitarian response required.<sup>13</sup>

More systemic approaches to mainstream anticipation and responses to risk are rarer in protracted crises. Examples tend to come from contexts where there is government leadership backed by an extensive and competent bureaucracy. In our global-level interviews, Indonesia was highlighted as an example, where, under the leadership of the National Board for Disaster Management (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana*), disaster management planning has been rolled out to provinces and now district and city level (PreventionWEB 2015). The Indonesia WASH Cluster has produced a Contingency Plan, which is regularly revised to define standard operating procedures in the event of emergencies, provide scenarios of emergency action, and map standing capacity for response (Indonesia WASH Cluster 2014).

13 For more information, see: <http://consortiumwashrdc.net/laboratoire-strategique/>

# 7 Operational processes

The operational level at which interventions are planned, implemented and managed day to day shows many examples of siloisation. All show a certain logic, entrenched by the norms and incentives described above. We highlight four main variants. First is where the communities work. Geographic separation of interventions is to some extent inevitable but is also a particularly clear manifestation of siloisation: without concerted effort to consider complementarity (beyond just coordination), it creates challenges for both communities' work that can lead to antipathy. Second, and with similar potential for adverse effects, are the significant differences in specific implementation modalities, for example in terms of the use of demand-led versus supply-driven approaches. Third are the differing procedures by which staff are

recruited and trained, which can further embed different ways of working and organisational cultures. Finally, while there are examples of mechanisms for dialogue and collaboration between the humanitarian and development WASH siloes, they have so far not allowed the communities to take a systematic approach towards building complementarity. The key factors underlying the division between humanitarian and development communities at the operational level are presented in Table 3. As before, we use this to highlight entry points towards greater commonality ('enabling' factors).

In the sections that follow we consider each of these issues in more detail, framing a set of operational areas which we believe provide an important entry point to tackling siloisation from the bottom up.

**Table 3: Key incentives characterising the humanitarian-development silo**

	Constraining factors	Enabling factors
Distribution and targeting of resources	Geographic and thematic compartmentalisation of humanitarian and development WASH actors and interventions reduces the scope for day to day interactions, and risks leaving gaps in delivery; mechanistic and often ad hoc definition of what constitutes an emergency skews allocation of resources.	Protracted displacement situations, including in cities, have steered some attempts at bridging humanitarian and development work
Implementation modalities	Perceived polarisation between rapid, supply-driven and lengthier, demand-driven approaches for humanitarian and development WASH interventions, respectively; tensions can arise on ways to approach an involve communities (especially around sanitation) and incentives for specific individuals.	Examples of agencies working to invest in stimulating demand and supporting community capacities to meet their own WASH needs including in emergency contexts.
Staff recruitment and development	Separate career paths reduce potential for interaction and finding common ground; short-term contracts and performance objectives (especially for humanitarian agencies) do not incentivise long-term perspectives; limited use of locally based organisations with contextual experience to navigate complex emergencies.	Some moves to increase collaboration across the divide, at least within the same organisation e.g. through staff training and exchange
Mechanisms for dialogue and co-working	Disconnect between strategic decision-making at headquarters and operational management in country reinforces siloes and inhibits potential for locally based workarounds; differing involvement of national government; limited cross-sector dialogue (sectoral siloes overlaid on development-humanitarian siloes).	Emphasis on managing transition between WASH clusters and government processes, with pragmatic consideration of national systems' vulnerability to, and ability to prevent and manage, shocks and conflict threats. Some cross-cluster collaboration in relation to specific challenges, such as cholera response and prevention.

Source: Authors

## 7.1 Distribution and targeting of resources

The disconnect between humanitarian and development WASH programming is not only a consequence of separate funding streams; it is reinforced by allocation mechanisms that perpetuate a pre-set division of labour within and between agencies, based on thematic and geographic criteria. The mechanistic and often ad hoc definition of what constitutes an emergency also skews the allocation of resources, strengthening the artificial division between short-term humanitarian and long-term development programming, eventually creating competition between agencies.<sup>14</sup>

### 7.1.1 Geographic compartmentalisation aids coordination but inhibits complementarity

Typically, humanitarian and development WASH actors focus on different geographic contexts: provision of emergency water and sanitation access to internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and displaced populations during crises for the former, and building the infrastructure and capacity of governments, communities and other service delivery actors to provide WASH to settled rural and urban populations for the latter. Ultimately, this reduces the scope for the two communities to physically interact on their day-to-day work and find ways to support each other. In the DRC, for example, development agencies have concentrated their efforts in the government-run VEA programme as well as on building WASH governance systems in urban areas; humanitarian organisations are not involved in either type of programme.

‘Dividing up the country’ to ensure that each agency operates in the region/province where it has a competitive advantage (in the form of experience, capacity, network, etc.) also appears common. It is a pragmatic way to approach coordination in complex crises, and indicates that agencies are willing and able to at least coordinate their interventions. However, it does not necessarily lead to more cooperation and complementarity in the sense active collaboration, nor even of humanitarian and development intervening in ways that can support the work of the ‘other side’. Interventions planned and implemented in ways that acknowledge that the geographic locations of emergencies might change. This emerged very clearly in the case of South Sudan especially since the 2013 conflict, as humanitarian actors concentrated operations in the three ‘red’ states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, or in UN Protection of Civilian (PoC) and IDP sites,<sup>15</sup> while development actors continued working with rural communities in the remaining ‘green’ states.

In DRC, the immense size of the country and its lack of transport and communication infrastructure has led to a

concentration of humanitarian action in the conflict-affected eastern provinces, while development interventions remain in the capital Kinshasa or in other provinces with the VEA programme. This risks leaving serious gaps in terms of who is targeted and what services are delivered. For example, in the provinces of the DRC where humanitarian aid is concentrated, the population remains vulnerable to health epidemics and food insecurity; where development programmes are run, there is little capacity to respond to sudden inflows of refugees of outbreaks of violence.

### 7.1.2 Targeting priorities are determined by familiarity and politics, rather than jointly agreed criteria

Our analysis highlighted two main reasons why development and humanitarian actors decide to focus on specific geographic areas, suggesting an understandable tendency to seek predictability and familiarity in uncertain contexts. First, development actors privilege working in areas that they know well because of previous work and collaboration with existing government and community structures. This limits their capacity to reach areas that may require long-term investments, for example after a crisis. A representative of an INGO in South Sudan stated that ‘we prefer staying where we know the communities, and who we can work with; it is easier and less expensive than starting operations in new places’. Humanitarian organisations have the tendency to want to deal with affected populations in neatly defined areas, like IDP camps, where it is easier to distribute goods and deliver services to a high number of people in a short time. In DRC, an international NGO lamented that, by concentrating their efforts in camps, humanitarians not only fail to reach a large majority of the population in need, but miss the opportunity to undertake interventions that could also benefit host populations in the longer term.<sup>16</sup>

The political priorities and preferences of both donors and country governments can also condition the choice of WASH organisations to focus on specific geographies, be it IDP camps, regions, or countries. For instance, a WASH agency representative in Katanga said that the area was being overlooked by development and humanitarian interventions despite frequent WASH challenges and cholera outbreaks, because of its perceived mineral wealth: ‘Donors here are not keen on funding neither emergency interventions, nor development projects... there is conflict also in Katanga, but the government does not want to talk about it, for fear of discouraging investors.’

The division of work between humanitarian and development agencies is further compounded by the fact that emergencies tend to be defined on an ad hoc and

14 For a discussion on different typologies of crises, see Levine and Sharp (2015).

15 In theory, PoC sites, established by the UNMISS when the conflict broke out in December 2013, were conceived to only provide refuge for civilians ‘under threat of physical violence’. In reality, however, this distinction has not been maintained (Lilly 2014).

16 As recent data and research by international organisations and research centres have also highlighted, see e.g. Crawford et al. 2015.

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mechanistic basis, conditioning who is willing to intervene where, when and for what. While it is arguably a response to overwhelming needs, the delineation of what is and isn't an emergency can limit the ability of humanitarian agencies to address more systemic problems, despite apparent commitments to integrating resilience and developing exit strategies. For example, in DRC, it was reported that certain humanitarian organisations would intervene to distribute food and water kits in the aftermath of a flood, but would not do so to address situations of more generalised food insecurity.

### 7.1.3 IDP camps give physical expression to the siloes

One interviewee questioned the entire logic of containing displaced people in semi-permanent camps, as opposed to investing in host communities' infrastructure so that the additional needs can be absorbed, while increasing access and/or service standards among existing residents. In many ways, the camp-based approach of much humanitarian response gives the clearest physical expression to the siloes. Camps represent a logical way to deal with displaced or homeless vulnerable people in the aftermath of disasters. But they can create challenges of their own especially in protracted crises lasting several years (or even decades). Here, short term, supply-driven service provision in camps can create challenges to sustainability both within the camp boundaries and between residents of the camp and their neighbours.

By clearly physically separating incoming populations from host communities, camps are often intended to prevent population movements from further destabilising societies. But there are documented examples of where differences in access to WASH services between displaced people and host communities give rise to tensions (including in DRC and South Sudan – see Wild and Mason 2012). In any case, IDPs or refugees may not always choose to travel to camps. Where they have family or other networks, it may be preferable to seek temporary residence in cities or other settlements, where incoming populations can place additional demand on existing infrastructure, which is rarely recognised let alone addressed.

Although the issue extends well beyond the WASH sector, WASH agencies are exploring alternatives that acknowledge the imperfections of concentrating most humanitarian resources on establishing and maintaining camps. As a consequence of the increasing number of protracted armed conflicts that are fought in or impact upon cities, humanitarian agencies are gradually moving to intervening in urban contexts and developing new tools and strategies accordingly. Protracted displacement situations, including in cities, have steered some attempts at bridging humanitarian and development work. Looking at lessons learned from its interventions in urban settings in protracted crises such as Gaza and Iraq, a recent ICRC report (2015) argues for the need to shift from assistance

paradigms focused on rural or disaster-relief experience to one that takes into account the realities of urban conflict.

UNICEF, the UNHCR and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme are leading the development of an operational framework design for urban humanitarian WASH. A scoping study and analysis of humanitarian action in urban settings was undertaken in 2014, with visits to Haiti, Lebanon, the Philippines and Zimbabwe. The study generated an understanding of urban humanitarian WASH, identifying practical actions and progressive steps that must be taken by WASH stakeholders (UNICEF 2014).

## 7.2 Implementation modalities

The different objectives and goals of humanitarian and development WASH programmes translate into different modalities for service delivery – how, where, with whom, and for whom services are delivered. As a result, humanitarian and development approaches are not only often separated, but potentially in tension. One global-level interviewee from a UN agency simplified as follows: 'The objective of humanitarians is service provision during and in the immediate aftermath of a crisis; development people do not like this approach, they have a longer-term perspective in mind and want to work with local communities and service providers. Sometimes these two approaches clash.'

Our analysis highlighted that problematic differences in implementation arise around timeframes, (over)reliance on supply-driven or demand-driven approaches, and community responsibilities for contributing to implementation and longer-term management. There are some efforts to reconcile these differences and find an appropriate balance given the practical realities of programming in highly uncertain and changeable contexts. We nonetheless find that these tend to be somewhat piecemeal.

### 7.2.1 For agencies, a self-perpetuating emergency intervention mode can be costly

In South Sudan emergency interventions tended to be planned with a very short timeframe in mind (weeks to months), focused on distributing kits and vouchers to meet immediate needs, and often resorting to off-shore procurement to speed up delivery. In theory, they aim at responding to crises when they happen and should stop soon thereafter in order for 'normal' service delivery to resume. The reality is, of course, that emergencies can last much longer, but all too often we found that in protracted crises like South Sudan, humanitarian agencies do not have credible exit strategies for short-term relief efforts, partly as a consequence of the absence of long-term initiatives to which to anchor them. Agencies involved in emergency relief find themselves forced to use inappropriate tools and short-term funding to respond to chronic needs because they cannot find an acceptable way of walking away

(Mosel and Levine 2014). Incentives are also skewed by the signals associated with finance. In the words of one interviewee from an INGO: ‘In protracted crises, the more you “create” the emergency, the more you receive funding for it – so it is in every agency’s interest to always operate in an emergency mode and never move to longer-term development programming; it becomes a survival strategy.’

The net effect can be expensive – repeated short-term provision based around overseas procurement can cost more, over several years, than a longer-term approach based around more permanent infrastructure. This is a difficult area to find the right balance. Conventional humanitarian approaches aim to avoid creating dependencies through more permanent infrastructure, and may view a series of short-term, expensive investments as a sensible financial strategy given chronic uncertainties (the high ‘discount rate’ endemic to humanitarian planning, referred to above). Nonetheless, there are efforts to find an alternative to the status quo. UNICEF, in the Za’atari camp in Jordan and the Kule-Tierkidi camp in Ethiopia, is working to reduce the life-cycle costs of emergency WASH interventions by investing in water and sanitation systems where appropriate, along with other cost-saving measures such as local procurement of supplies (UNICEF 2014).

## 7.2.2 Tensions between subsidised and demand-led approaches

Payment and reward to communities is another major point of contention for organisations that see a need to move towards a longer-term approach. For example, humanitarian WASH interventions in DRC often include payments to community members to ensure that the work is completed as quickly as possible (related to the short-term perspective on results discussed above – see section 6.1.2). Beneficiaries are also usually provided with services and infrastructure for free (i.e. food, non-food items or water). This contrasts with the common approach of development WASH interventions, which require voluntary inputs from communities to enhance ownership and reduce costs, for example in the form of time to participate in committee meetings, or labour to build sanitation facilities and water points. This tension between ways to approach and involve communities is particularly strong in contexts within DRC that have historically relied on (free) emergency service provision from international agencies. According to our interviewees in Kinshasa, beneficiaries have often perceived humanitarian programmes in Eastern DRC as ‘gifts’. This has conditioned expectations and promoted a degree of dependency on external assistance, making it difficult for agencies to move to a greater emphasis on community contribution.

Beyond community contributions, an increasing tension was reported around differing incentives for specific individuals – for example community leaders in DRC. There some humanitarian WASH interventions have become accustomed to paying per diems to customary

chief and other actors to facilitate rapid results; not only does this create expectations for other implementing organisations who do not pay per diems (e.g. local NGOs) but also creates competition between NGOs to buy the attention and cooperation of local actors, who favour working with those who pay higher per diems.

Tensions around subsidised versus demand-led approaches are particularly likely to arise around sanitation. In development contexts, there is widespread use of approaches like Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) which can prohibit the use of any subsidies in order to avoid distorting or disrupting collective action around ending open defecation. For many humanitarians, subsidised, supply-driven service provision meanwhile remains necessary for reaching highly vulnerable households and safeguarding public health.

UNICEF has concluded that investing in stimulating demand and emphasising community capacities to meet their own WASH needs can be worthwhile in emergency contexts. It is promoting use of its Community Approach to Total Sanitation (CATS) in emergencies – for example, the Pakistan Approach to Total Sanitation, the Sierra Leone adaptation of CATS for Ebola response, and the Philippine Approach to Total Sanitation (see UNICEF 2014). CATS is conventionally a development oriented approach, which like other total sanitation approaches emphasises demand stimulation and changing norms around open defecation. Even in emergencies, such efforts may produce longer term effects, which are resilient to conflict and other crises in a way that infrastructure investments tend not to be. One interviewee describes CATS as ‘an effective response methodology that also advances national sectoral goals’.

Box 6 describes in more depth the tensions that arose around subsidies in relation to CLTS following the earthquake in Nepal, and how these were resolved.

## 7.2.3 Community management – underused in emergencies, but requires significant backstopping

Involving the communities at least in the selection and design of interventions is a major part of the Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) agenda. In South Sudan, an approach asserted by ACTED aims to go further by involving beneficiaries in the upkeep of facilities. ACTED is implementing a seven-month project aimed at promoting adequate WASH standards and a better humanitarian information management system in the Gendrassa refugee camp, in Jonglei State. One of the objectives of this project is also to increase community-level participation in the maintenance of WASH facilities. In the words of a national NGO representative: ‘Working with communities is always a challenge, especially in refugee camps where people expect NGOs will deliver services for them, but it is essential as these camps will probably be there for a long time.’

This does not mean that community management is a simple fix. In South Sudan, WASH development

### **Box 6: Finding a balanced approach to sanitation in post-quake Nepal**

Tearfund's work on CLTS in Nepal following the earthquake on 25 April 2015 provides an interesting example of how to balance the realities of WASH programming in contexts where humanitarian and development norms and operational approaches are under tension. Before the earthquake of April 2015, the Government of Nepal (GoN) had taken a strong lead in addressing total sanitation and hygiene in the country, by putting the Open Defecation Free (ODF) movement at the core of its National Hygiene and Sanitation master plan of 2011. Even after the earthquake, the GoN continued showing its leadership and commitment to ODF goals, making it clear to humanitarian agencies planning the emergency response that these could not be undermined. In the post-quake context, agencies were not permitted to construct or subsidise household toilets, and were discouraged from engaging in 're-triggering' activities – which were entrusted solely to GoN District WASH Coordination Committees. Following extensive consultation with communities, Cluster forums and review of relevant policies, it was clear to concerned agencies that commitment to the ODF narrative was strong, but that many communities had insufficient resources to self-build new replacement household toilets. Communities advocated sharing toilets to prevent open defecation, but some community members (excluded groups and small children) were not permitted or able to use neighbours' toilets – forcing them to return to open defecation.

Tearfund and other agencies engaged with the National Working Group for hygiene and sanitation to push for an 'ODF kick-start campaign kit' made up of a minimum package of essential material for vulnerable households to reconstruct their own toilets. Negotiations were extensive due to the strongly held positions and vested interests. The agencies involved promoted their involvement in the ODF process by emphasising that they could support local builders and communities with awareness more disaster-resilient construction, while agreeing to work within GoN approved community WASH structures as a basis for coherent planning and monitoring. Central authorities such as the WASH Cluster eventually agreed that decision on provision of in-kind support should be delegated to the district level. Tearfund was then able to use its established relationships to work closely with the relevant District authorities, who agreed to the provision of the ODF kick-start campaign kit. Criteria for targeting according to vulnerability have been devised and are being verified by communities.

The compromise reached represents concessions by both sides. The implementing agencies involved took into account the pre-disaster context, particularly around respect for the ODF narrative and leadership from government and communities. The GoN, especially at the district level, realised that modest and targeted support could be necessary to protect public health and ensure vulnerable groups did not have to resort to open defecation. The concept of resilience provided an entry point to allow external agencies to work within GoN systems and structures to support adequate sanitation in the post-quake context. The compromise was not easy to achieve and implementation challenges persist, for example around the ongoing fuel crisis, political disruption and the limited capacity of District WASH structures to oversee the Total Sanitation approach.

*Source: Information from personal communication with Enos Wambua, WASH Advisor Tearfund Nepal. Based on internal case study prepared by Tearfund, 'Linking Relief to Development continuum – Total Sanitation in Nepal'*

programmes were depicted as emphasising cost-sharing and cost-recovery schemes, and work with local actors (e.g. communities and community-based organisations, local authorities and governments). However, the long-held assumption amongst development agencies and practitioners that communities are able to manage systems with minimal support has come under review, especially in protracted crises. Significant investments in 'software', such as supporting structures within local government and the private sector, are needed to ensure the sustainability of WASH interventions based around community management. For example, Swiss Development Cooperation in South Sudan, invested considerable resources to enable the Ministry of Water, Cooperatives and Rural Development of Northern Bahr el Ghazal state to develop and implement its own framework and handbook for the operation and maintenance of rural water supply services (Danert 2013; Ministry of Water, Cooperatives and Rural Development 2015).

### **7.3 Staff recruitment and development**

Processes and systems alone do not hold the key to increasing complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH. 'It all comes down to people', commented one interviewee from an INGO in South Sudan; 'the current aid system is personality-driven, and this is true for humanitarian and development organisations, for WASH and other sectors'. People and their professional background and experience will influence both the design and implementation of WASH (and other) interventions. Therefore, recruitment practices, staff development, and rewards and sanctions for performance of job roles play an important role in maintaining or overcoming the siloes.

We highlight three ways in which the separation tends to be maintained: separate career paths reducing potential for interaction and finding common ground; short-term contracts and performance objectives (especially for humanitarian agencies) which do not incentivise long-term

perspectives; and limited use of locally based organisations with contextual experience to navigate complex emergencies.

### 7.3.1 Separate career paths even within the same organisation

The majority of our respondents reported that the professional cadres that make up the development and humanitarian WASH communities remain fundamentally isolated from each other. While humanitarian and development WASH professionals share similar skillsets – such as engineering, social development, or logistics – they are persistently separated by institutional arrangements, job descriptions and recruitment policies.

In part this is due to recognisable differences in technologies and approaches needed to meet emergency WASH needs as opposed to developmental WASH needs. However, staffing and professional development policies can end up artificially reinforcing this divide. One global-level interviewee argued that ‘there can be schizophrenia’ even within the same organisation: ‘In general, it is very difficult to have a meaningful transition from one category to the other.’ One donor organisation in South Sudan emphasised the simple step of appointing a programme manager with a development background in an organisation primarily doing emergency interventions, to help maintain a focus on long-term sustainability, community participation, and involvement of government authorities.

UNICEF has tried to address this divide in a number of ways. In some smaller countries, for example, UNICEF’s chief of WASH also acts as emergency coordinator when a crisis occurs. The need to concurrently respond to Level 3 emergencies, ongoing large-scale complex emergencies and to smaller crises in countries throughout the world has led UNICEF to search for ways to maximise its emergency response capacity (UNICEF 2013). Since 2014, UNICEF has started bringing in staff and other resources from the regular WASH programme. The need to build staff capacity for WASH humanitarian action was clearly emphasised in UNICEF’s Strategic Plan for 2014-2017. To date, about two-thirds of the regular WASH staff have received training on WASH in Emergencies. In addition, UNICEF has organised courses on climate change impacts on WASH for cluster members in Bangladesh, and a course on WASH Sphere Standards for humanitarian actors, including private sector and youth groups, in Indonesia (UNICEF 2014).

### 7.3.2 Short-term contracts and performance incentives prevent long-term vision

The disconnect between humanitarian and development interventions appears increased by the short-term nature of contracts and the limited staff development and performance incentives that are offered, especially in the humanitarian field. Most of our interviewees noted that staff employed to deliver WASH humanitarian projects typically do not stay long in the country (maximum one year); they are recruited for their technical rather than

contextual expertise and receive rapid training. In the words of one INGO respondent in South Sudan: ‘They come, do their thing, and leave; they do not have time and incentives to understand the context in which they are operating; to them, South Sudan and Afghanistan are the same thing.’ Short-term performance targets also tend underemphasise the importance of delivering services that last. ‘Once you declared that 50,000 people have been treated for cholera, you are free to go somewhere else, hopefully with a higher salary,’ said an interviewee from an INGO in DRC. Indeed, one respondent noted that assignments in emergencies are often considered as an opportunity for career advancement: ‘being deployed in emergencies situations offers a quick route to promotion; however, this lowers the standards of the operations as not always these people are ready or have the capacity to operate in emergencies,’ said a respondent from UNICEF.

Recognising that working across siloes could in practice mean bringing in staff with limited emergency experience, UNICEF has attempted to address this with the reinforcement of its surge deployment system. This allows it to backstop its in-house staff capacity for response and coordination with pre-qualified professionals from outside the organisation (UNICEF 2014).

### 7.3.3 Over-reliance on external experts

Desire for rapid results also leads to a preference for international over local expertise and capacity. In DRC, for example, responses from humanitarian workers and government officials indicate that there is an underlying assumption that humanitarian INGOs know best how to respond to emergency situations. While development programmes also often use INGOs, we encountered more examples of partnerships with domestic NGOs and/or government authorities. This was the case with the VEA programme in DRC, implemented by UNICEF and the provincial sections of the Ministry of Health. Belgium Technical Cooperation also reported implementing its projects with Congolese public officials and organisations like CARITAS in an attempt to integrate activities within local structures. There was, however, a feeling that more could be done. A representative of one INGO suggested that international technical experts could be paired with Congolese ones as the latter have a deeper understanding of the political economy context – though significant effort would be needed to overcome inherent imbalances in power in such relationships.

## 7.4 Mechanisms for dialogue and co-working

Our analysis highlighted that improving the complementarity between humanitarian and development WASH interventions and programming will require mechanisms, time and resources for data sharing, planning, operations and reporting. Ultimately these will need to go

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beyond coordination, which can reinforce separation, to find ways to jointly plan, implement and evaluate.

Currently, the presence of mechanisms varies a lot depending on the context and type of situation. In the face of short-term crises such as earthquakes or floods, dialogue is relatively straightforward; most likely, development actors have been present in the country/region before; they support the efforts of humanitarian agencies when the crisis hit, and return to their normal operations when the crisis is over. More importantly, in contrast to many protracted crises, the government may be able to coordinate a response at national or international level. In protracted crises like South Sudan and DRC, the fact that humanitarian agencies may remain in country for many years has not led to enhanced dialogue. Due in part to the complexity of the context and urgency and diversity of needs, but also to the various divisions and tensions mentioned above, humanitarian and development organisations can often end up competing rather than collaborating.

Our case studies and global analysis points to three key challenges: finding an appropriate scale for dialogue; involving and empowering government as a key partner in dialogue; and investing in sector mechanisms while also ensuring cross-sector dialogue.

#### **7.4.1 Challenges in finding an appropriate scale for dialogue**

Our interviews suggest that it is important to consider how dialogue can be fostered at different scales. There is limited evidence that cascading imperatives to work better together from global level downwards will have the required effect. Respondents pointed at the disconnect between the strategic decision-making that typically occurs in an organisation's headquarters, and the operational management. This can be mirrored within countries, between country offices and field offices. One interviewee recalled: 'I was working in the sub-national cluster in a state of South Sudan and I was not aware of the content of the Strategic Response Plan; that strategy never guided the discussions we had in individual clusters or in the inter-agency cluster at the field level.'

It may also be simply more straightforward to organise dialogue between humanitarian and development silo structures, at a level at which there are fewer actors, and a greater sense of the operational realities and specific challenges. In DRC, we found that dialogue at national level between development structures like the Water and Sanitation Donor Group (GIEA) and the humanitarian-focused WASH Cluster was limited. Yet the huge size, extremely challenging communications and transport links, and enormous diversity of contexts meant that it would in any case be difficult for national level actors to have a full sense of practical implications of the siloes. Our interviews in Lubumbashi, DRC meanwhile revealed that the WASH Cluster there appears to be well established and also includes organisations implementing development

interventions. Working on building dialogue at lower levels, and sending information and joint resolutions upwards, may be an important piece of the puzzle.

#### **7.4.2 Involving and empowering government**

Most respondents highlighted the challenge of involving national and subnational governments in the implementation of WASH interventions in both emergencies and non-emergencies. As noted above, the normative importance of themes such as independence and neutrality are a focus of long-standing debate in the humanitarian community. There are also practical reasons why engaging with government may not appear straightforward. Institutional fragmentation within government for WASH is one issue: WASH responsibilities are often scattered among ministries of health, water, and public infrastructure, provincial authorities and city councils. This can lead to uncertainty among external agencies around whom to engage on different issues. As we discuss under 'Incentives' (Section 6), humanitarian agencies that are funded tend to look towards their internal accountabilities first: they need to have the approval of the headquarters before involving the government in their programming, and this largely depends on international politics or criteria that go beyond the operational or sectoral. We note that these issues are particularly challenging in protracted crises where the legitimacy and/or capacity of government to take a leadership role may be under question. But they remain important in all contexts – it is at best short-sighted, and at worst counterproductive, to aim only at improving dialogue between external humanitarian and development agencies, without involving the parties who will ultimately need to take responsibility for safeguarding services.

Under the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) transformative agenda there has been an increasing focus on promoting the transition between WASH clusters and government processes. Guidance to support country teams in making the transition from the WASH cluster into existing government-led national WASH sector coordination platforms has been developed (Maskall, unpublished). This provides a structured approach to analysing the factors driving and potentially constraining nationally led humanitarian WASH coordination functions. Based on case studies in Ethiopia, Mali and Haiti, the approach encourages WASH Cluster stakeholders to thoroughly examine institutional attitudes, capacities and relationships so as to consider where and how transitions to national leadership are appropriate. It therefore encourages a move away from default normative positions about government capacity and legitimacy to assume a leadership role, to a pragmatic consideration of national systems' vulnerability to shocks and their ability to prevent and manage them, as well as their capacity to manage underlying conflict threats. Of course, transitioning in this way implies having a defined government entity that

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can take a lead, which may be a challenge given general fragmentation in the WASH sector. Nonetheless, the approach is reported to be in use in a number of countries including those affected by Ebola.

In Lubumbashi, government representatives also attend the cluster meetings. The fact that UNICEF is leading on the VEA programme in close partnership with government is also relevant, though it additionally helps that many of the participating NGOs have a double mandate, being involved in both humanitarian and development interventions. ‘The WASH cluster could be well-positioned to eventually facilitate a transition to development, it should be its exit strategy’, one interviewee from a UN agency said. However, for now it remains part of the humanitarian aid architecture, which means that the approach it encourages its members to take through funding allocation will tend to remain a short-term one.

#### **7.4.3 Matching sector coordination structures with cross-sector dialogue**

In the case studies we reviewed, there seemed to be more coordination amongst humanitarian agencies as a consequence of the presence of the cluster system. According to a number of evaluations, the IASC humanitarian cluster approach, launched in 2005, did actually improve coordination amongst WASH emergency organisations and hence their response effectiveness and efficiency (UNICEF 2013). As noted, in South Sudan the WASH Cluster’s role in coordinating humanitarian pooled funding through the CHF and CERF encourages implementing partners to participate. A similar coordination structure is nevertheless missing amongst development actors. Development aid tends to be delivered through bilateral funding channels, especially in fragile states – i.e. the incentive provided by pooled funds is absent.

Sector-focused efforts are likely to reinforce another form of siloisation in the long term – underscoring the

importance of also building dialogue across sectors and clusters. Our assessment of the situation in DRC revealed limited interaction between the eight humanitarian clusters including those closely interlinked with WASH, such as food security and health. The way data is collected and recipients are defined in the different clusters and in different organisations does not facilitate comparative and complementary working. For example, in DRC, FAO and UNDP target ‘communities’. However, the WASH sector typically counts the number of people who potentially have access to water from an intervention, or receive sanitation or hygiene promotion, hence targeting ‘people’ as beneficiaries. OCHA is trying to promote more multi-sectoral interventions by establishing better links between sectors/clusters. Nevertheless, in practice this has generally resulted in OCHA knowing who is doing what, where and when, but has not translated into better integration across the various clusters. OCHA reportedly does not identify cross-cutting priorities which would really assist with coordination.

We noted some instances of collaboration across clusters in relation to specific problems, such as the cholera outbreak in Juba, South Sudan. In this case, UNICEF collaborated with other UN agencies, NGOs and several government counterparts in the WASH and health sectors in the framework of the Cholera Task Force to implement a number of WASH activities focused on hygiene promotion and behavioural change. These contributed to emergency response, but were also conceived to help prevent future outbreaks. Also, multilateral funds such as the CHF are increasingly promoting efforts to improve cross-cluster interventions. For example, in DRC Action Against Hunger implemented a \$2 million project in 2014, co-funded by USAID and the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, aimed at improving access to WASH facilities while promoting economic recovery and markets towards achieving food security.

# 8 Conclusions: from diagnosis to action

## 8.1 Summary of key findings

For the most part, our findings confirm that humanitarian and development WASH communities do tend to operate in siloes at all levels, and that this undermines the objectives of both. Manifestations of the siloes range from the communities having their own global dialogue and coordination processes (e.g. SWA versus the Global WASH Cluster, GWC); to donors funding humanitarian and development WASH programmes in the same countries from different budget lines, on different timeframes; to implementing agencies in one silo creating additional burdens for their counterparts by ignoring risks, increasing vulnerabilities, or adopting incompatible approaches.

In our analysis the humanitarian and development WASH siloes are sustained by a hierarchy of underlying causes, which can be visualised as a pyramid. These include differences, contradictions and tensions in:

- High-level norms, which are expressed in the two communities' mission statements, principles and standards.
- Incentives, rooted primarily in the international architecture for humanitarian and development assistance and the related signals given by funding and accountability arrangements as well as engrained attitudes to risk.
- Operational processes, including procedures and systems for targeting effort; for implementing new services and sustaining existing ones; for recruiting and developing staff; and for initiating and sustaining productive dialogue.

At the same time, we identify that there are grounds for optimism: there is a real appetite from the representatives we spoke to on both sides to address the problem. Furthermore, there are clear instances where the communities already see eye-to-eye and are attempting to make meaningful changes. Highlighting areas of commonality can help stimulate further effort. Even at the normative level there may be more commonality than is often assumed, particularly around standards. For example, we find that there are points of agreement between the Humanitarian Sphere standards and the targets and

proposed indicators for (generally development-oriented) WASH under the SDGs.

We summarise our key findings as follows:

### 8.1.1 Perceived differences in norms are the foundations of siloisation

By norms, we mean the standards of expected behaviour shared by members of a community or group. While simplistic interpretations tend to reinforce a division, through opposing stereotypes, there may be more commonality than is often assumed. Key divisions between the siloes arise around:

#### Mission

Perceived differences in mission, as humanitarian WASH aims to 'save lives', whereas the purpose of development WASH has strong health dimension but extends to other considerations, e.g. socio-economic opportunity.

#### Principles

Humanitarian principles such as neutrality and independence are sometimes perceived as incompatible with development principles such as ownership, especially in politically charged contexts.

#### Standards

Separate sector standards have arisen for development (MDGs, JMP indicators) and humanitarian (Sphere standards) WASH interventions.

### 8.1.2 Incentives drive siloed ways of working

If norms are about 'What should be done?', incentives deal with the question 'Why should it be done?' Three broad categories of incentive play important roles in translating differences at the level of high-level norms into differences at the operational level.

#### Finance

Timeframes and flexibility of funding streams enforce a division, with humanitarian WASH characterised as short-sighted and unpredictable, while development WASH has longer timeframes but limited flexibility.

## **Accountability**

For both humanitarian and development agencies, existing accountability and reporting systems to donors discourage a longer-term approach focused on end impact for citizens and states in need.

## **Risk**

High levels of risk (or perceptions of risk) reinforce the short termism and inflexibility of both humanitarian and development programmes; skew resource allocations; and further incentivise a tendency to resort to familiar, siloed ways of working.

### **8.1.3 Operational processes express and entrench the siloes on the ground**

The operational level at which interventions are planned, implemented and managed day to day give expression to and reinforce the siloes ‘on the ground’.

## **Distribution and targeting of resources**

WASH actors and interventions are compartmentalised geographically and thematically, reducing the scope for day-to-day interactions, and risking gaps in delivery.

## **Implementation modalities**

There is a perceived polarisation between rapid, supply-driven humanitarian WASH interventions and lengthier, demand-driven approaches for development WASH. Tensions also arise around how to involve and incentivise communities and local leaders.

## **Staff recruitment and development**

Career paths are separate – contract duration and performance objectives reduce potential for interaction and finding common ground. Involvement and use of locally based organisations with contextual experience to navigate complex emergencies is still limited.

## **Mechanisms for dialogue and co-working**

Within organisations, there is a lack of organisational interaction between the strategic decision-making level (headquarters) and operational management in country. Dialogue with other sectors and with national government is also limited, overlaying the humanitarian-development siloes with other divisions.

### **8.1.4 Windows of opportunity for increasing complementarity**

In setting out the causes of the siloes, we also identified numerous instances of positive efforts to overcome them, from our case studies and elsewhere, at all levels within the pyramid of underlying causes. These include:

## **Overcoming normative differences**

In South Sudan, the Cholera Task Force has shown how a specific challenge like cholera can offer a starting point for joint-working, bringing together a range of external agencies

with government representatives from both the health and water sectors for cholera mitigation and prevention.

## **Working with risk**

In Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation maintained its development programmes after the outbreak of renewed conflict through engagement with local partners and careful contextual analysis.

## **Getting finance to support flexibility**

The DRC WASH Consortium has built rapid response mechanisms into what is ostensibly a development programme, in order to cope with sudden onset emergencies. It received the support of its donor, the UK Department for International Development.

## **Finding mechanisms for joint working**

In Lubumbashi, DRC, development partners are invited to WASH Cluster meetings to share information and improve complementarity.

## **Reaching compromise on implementation modalities**

Tearfund and other NGOs providing emergency sanitation response following the Nepal earthquake found an appropriate balance between subsidised approaches to meet emergency needs for the most vulnerable, and demand-led approaches that build and sustain community empowerment in line with the national Open Defecation Free movement.

These, and the many other examples highlighted in Sections 5-7 give further ground for optimism. The overall picture, however, is that existing efforts are piecemeal, confirming that the WASH sector, both globally and in country, lacks a coherent approach to building connectivity and complementarity between the siloes.

## **8.2 A framework to guide action**

We contend that, in moving downwards through the pyramid, from norms, through incentives, to operational processes, the ability of the WASH sector to make material changes increases. Many of the normative tensions we identify – for example between the humanitarian principle of independence and the development principle of government ownership – are deeply rooted and extensively debated beyond the WASH community. For these reasons we would argue that it is likely to be more effective if WASH actors concentrate their initial effort on changing operational processes and incentive structures within the sector. In time, by demonstrating that siloes have been successfully overcome in WASH, it may be possible to contribute to wider efforts to reconcile the norms governing humanitarian and development assistance more broadly.

WASH sector stakeholders from both the humanitarian and development communities require a simple framework to guide efforts towards complementarity. We propose that the hierarchy of norms, incentives and operational processes provides such a framework, and that effort should be organised from the ground up. Accordingly, we suggest that effort is organised as follows:


- Building complementarity at the level of **operational processes** requires collective action between multiple stakeholders at the country level or below, to agree a set of shared priorities that can guide humanitarian and development WASH interventions.
- Fostering complementarity at the level of **incentives** requires targeted action by a smaller number of more powerful stakeholders, notably donors.
- Changing **norms** to enhance complementarity is a longer-term project which is unlikely to be achieved by the WASH sector alone. Agencies with dual mandates should therefore advocate with colleagues in other sectors to ensure normative differences are debated appropriately within appropriate fora.

Figure 4 sets out the appropriate scale, actors, tasks, and timeframes for action across each of these levels.

In the last section we build from this framework to provide more detailed recommendations for action. Before turning to this, it is worth considering whether efforts to build complementarity between the siloes in WASH should involve development of entirely new platforms or organisations – the approach taken in the education sector (Box 7).

The experts consulted on this paper were not inclined to see another platform or fund proposed for the sector. Overall, there was less sense that WASH is falling through a gap in emergency contexts, as opposed for a need for existing humanitarian and development WASH stakeholders to put their own houses in order and work together to achieve better complementarity. New initiatives could add further complexity and risk overlaying new siloes on top of existing ones. As such, our recommendations focus wherever possible on using existing structures and resources rather than seeking new ones.

**Figure 4: Prioritisation of action across norms, incentives and operational processes**



Source: Authors

### **Box 7: A global platform and fund for education in emergencies**

An estimated 476 million children between the ages of three and fifteen live in 35 countries affected by crises. 65 million are estimated to be directly and severely affected by emergencies, whether they are in school (but facing severe disruption) or not.

Domestic governments bear the formal responsibility for preparing for and providing education in emergencies, under UN General Assembly resolution A/64/L.58. Fulfilment is patchy, though countries such as the Philippines and Pakistan have set up emergency units for education. Responsibility for education for refugees is formally under the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Governments that are signatories to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees have responsibilities to fulfil care to refugees, which extends to education, as well as to cooperate with UNHCR. It has been estimated that over half of the world's refugees are 18 or younger, with 2.6 million children out of school in Syria and neighbouring countries alone, due to the four-year war there. Only 16 of 25 UNHCR priority countries officially permit full access to national education systems for refugee learners, at primary and secondary levels.

Coordination in emergencies largely falls to the IASC Education Cluster, UNHCR (education for refugees) and national governments playing a role. The Global Partnership for Education, which pools funds and makes grants to countries, is active in several protracted crises, although it has historically been focused more on stable contexts. An International Network on education in Emergencies has also been in place since 2000 to promote collaboration, develop standards and share information. Given the additional complexities over care for refugee children vs. nationals of emergency affected countries, fragmentation is at least as problematic as it is for WASH. In addition to the above, significant roles are played by UNICEF, UNESCO, the World Bank, and a wide range of national and international NGOs.

Beyond the familiar problem of achieving greater complementarity, there appears to be a stronger perception of a funding gap for education in emergencies, as compared to WASH. This extends beyond the general gap for humanitarian assistance exemplified by the failure to meet totals requested by humanitarian appeals. According to the UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, in 2013 education received \$0.16 billion (40% of the total requested for the sector). Water and sanitation received \$3.3 billion (48% of the total requested). In total \$8.3 billion was received across 13 sector categories (\$12.8 billion requested). Spending on education by governments in crisis-affected countries is difficult to estimate but thought to have fallen over the 2002-2013 period. Development aid is a significant contributor to emergency education needs (besides those of refugee children) – \$1.1 billion in conflict-affected contexts in 2012, as compared to humanitarian assistance of \$0.1 billion.

In response to these challenges, agreement was reached at the Oslo Education Summit in July 2015 to launch a Global Humanitarian Platform and Fund for Education in Emergencies. Proposed functions include: inspiring political commitment; generating new funding and managing this through a dedicated financing facility (towards a total estimated financing gap of \$4.8 billion per year); improving planning and response; and building national and global capacity for education response and recovery. A number of options have been framed for ambition and approach. At the lower end, the cost has been estimated at \$0.15 billion per year, which would reach approximately 1.95 million children, or 3% of crisis-affected children globally. At the upper end of the options proposed, \$1.2 billion annually would reach 16.25 million children across 8-10 crises, a quarter of the estimated children affected globally.

*Source: For background information on education in emergencies, Nicolai et al. (2015), UNHCR (2015) and OCHA (2016), For options on the Platform and Fund: ODI (2015a).*

# 9 Recommendations

In keeping with our framework (Figure 4 above), we propose that effort is targeted across the hierarchy of underlying causes (norms, incentives and operational processes). However, in prioritising action, we argue that the ‘pyramid’ should be inverted, so that effort initially focuses on demonstrating how siloes can be overcome on the ground, at the level of operational processes. Tackling problems of structural incentives is a longer-term project, and changing culture and perception around norms within the humanitarian and development communities could take still longer. Nonetheless, there are specific and immediate actions that can be taken across all levels. In this closing section, we set out our recommendations for action at each level in detail, as well as the frameworks needed to assess progress and course-correct, before summarising with targeted calls to action.

## 9.1 Operational processes: identifying shared priorities for WASH in crisis

To overcome operational siloes, WASH humanitarian and development stakeholders at the country level or below should develop ‘Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis’.

Shared priorities do not aim to cover all possible issues, but rather to frame a series of short, targeted and actionable statements, based on a shared analysis of the problems, which both development and humanitarian stakeholders can fully commit to. Their development requires discussion of the key challenges in a given context, and deliberation about which can practically be resolved. A focus on operations may make it easier to engage a broad range of views, but at the same time the practical frustrations of working in siloes will be more obvious at the operational level.

The appropriate level for agreeing shared priorities is that at which operational challenges can be properly understood and the majority of day-to-day programme management decisions are taken. In smaller or more centralised countries, it may be possible to agree shared priorities at the national level. In larger countries, for example DRC, interventions may more often be planned and implemented from the subnational level.

The formal procedure for developing shared priorities needs to be carefully facilitated (see Box 8 below). Wherever possible, leadership on developing shared priorities should come from the government. In countries that are not affected by protracted crisis, this may be possible as a dedicated initiative within, for example,

a Sector Wide Approach. Where protracted crises have hampered the capacity and/or legitimacy of government, however, it may be necessary for external entities to take a lead. In South Sudan and DRC, for example, we identified the WASH Cluster as being able to play this role. Although formally part of the humanitarian architecture, in both countries the national and/or subnational Cluster structures have begun already to incorporate development stakeholders and consider cross-silo themes such as resilience. In other countries there may be development-oriented coordination bodies (such as donor groups) that could play this interim coordination role, in the absence of effective government leadership.

Shared priorities should be agreed and properly tested through a phased approach, as follows:

- Identification and prioritisation of key problems
- Elaboration and piloting of shared priorities and related actions
- Review and approval of shared priorities
- Light-touch monitoring of actions around shared priorities

A checklist of questions and examples to support this process is presented in Table 4 below, while a set of example shared priorities for the national level (South Sudan) and subnational level (Katanga, DRC) are presented in Annex 3.

In terms of stimulating action on developing shared priorities, we identify UNICEF as particularly well placed to take a lead, for three reasons: (1) experience in delivering both humanitarian and development WASH programmes; (2) engagement at implementation and policy levels across a wide range of countries, including many facing protracted crises; and (3) its role in both development and humanitarian global platforms – particularly Sanitation and Water for All and the Global WASH Cluster. Piloting shared priorities could be a two-year project over 3-5 countries, comprising a mixture of contexts, for instance protracted crises and countries that are vulnerable to natural disasters. A first step could therefore be for the UNICEF WASH Programme Division at global level to solicit interest among regional and national WASH representatives. Other parts of UNICEF can also support the endeavour, for example the WASH Cluster Advocacy and Support Team (CAST) can promote the concept within its upcoming revised strategy (2016-2020).

## 9.2 Incentives: adjusting the structures that separate the siloes

To improve the structural incentives to overcome the siloes, donors financing development or humanitarian WASH or both should lead the effort by recalibrating financing modalities, reporting structures, and attitudes to risk.

In some cases, room for reform may be constrained by political priorities (in response to foreign policy interests or public pressure) and bureaucratic issues that exist above the level of a single sector. Nonetheless, WASH specialists within donor agencies (including International Financial Institutions) have a degree of discretion as to how funding modalities and contracts are designed. Other interested parties such as INGOs and multilaterals can support them to exploit whatever room for manoeuvre is available.

This is potentially a longer-term project than the development of operational ‘Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis’. It is also likely to require experimentation by individual donors.

To send a concrete signal, we recommend that a medium-term commitment is agreed to route a certain proportion of total WASH spending via flexible windows that permit rapid reallocation in emergencies (development WASH finance) and multi-year financing mechanisms (humanitarian WASH Finance).

This is only one, albeit significant, way that donors can agree to change the incentives that currently entrench the siloes. In view of this, an immediate next step could be for WSP-World Bank and UNICEF CAST to convene a ‘champions group’ of bilateral development and humanitarian WASH donor agencies and other providers of finance, from their respective networks.

The champions group would be tasked with sharing and testing approaches to improve incentives across finance, accountability and risk. Examples of possible initiatives that could be shared and tested by the champions group are shown in Table 5.

## 9.3 Norms: engaging a wider community to resolve key differences

To shift fundamental norms that entrench the siloes, global WASH sector platforms should increase the space they provide for bringing humanitarian and development communities together, and reach out to counterparts in other sectors to build a wider coalition.

Finding practical ways to reconcile the deep-rooted normative differences between development and humanitarian WASH specialists is probably the longest-term project of all. More so than incentives, humanitarian and development norms are also beyond the influence of one sector alone. The way that norms guide individual and organisational values, and the knock-on effects of those values on decision making, is complex. For this reason it is less likely that there is any kind of roadmap, with neat lines of cause and effect, through which to reshape norms around humanitarian and development WASH for greater complementarity.

This does not remove the need to begin to challenge assumptions and attitudes through dialogue. Within the WASH sector, that means bringing humanitarian and development organisations together to examine where they genuinely disagree, and to share examples of where and how apparent differences have been resolved. As a first

### Box 8: Facilitating the agreement of Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis

Facilitating the agreement of Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis requires striking a careful balance in a number of dimensions:

- **Common ground / common sense:** Each principle should be rooted in *common ground*, i.e. should not contradict the core tenets of either humanitarian or development ways of working. Given real differences in these tenets, however, the principles may not be easy to agree on. The ultimate test should be: in view of all that we are trying to achieve, and the constraints we are under, is the principle compatible with ‘common sense’?
- **Cost neutral / cost effective:** The shared priorities should be *cost neutral* wherever possible, i.e. they should be possible to achieve in the severely constrained funding environment which characterises many protracted crises. Even more importantly, they should be *cost-effective* in the true sense of the term, i.e. geared towards maximising the depth and breadth of positive WASH outcomes (people using services, behaviour change) for the available resources. Higher cost actions may be considered and justified in terms of their likely effectiveness.
- **Just enough / good enough:** There is a self-evident tension between devising principles or rules and allowing decision-makers and practitioners the space to innovate and develop appropriate responses to locally specific challenges. The shared priorities should therefore provide ‘*just enough*’ guidance – a minimal framework to support decision makers and practitioners to innovate in difficult circumstances and to avoid wasting effort, time and money. In a similar spirit, they should aim for what is *good enough*, under challenging circumstances, rather than unrealistic ‘best practice’.

Source: Authors

**Table 4: Checklist to guide development of Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis**

	<b>Key issue</b>	<b>Key questions</b>	<b>Example Shared Priority</b>	<b>Example of associated action</b>
Distribution and targeting of resources	Communities are geographically separated	What minimum standards, common approaches or mechanisms for information exchange are needed (i) to ensure a degree of consistency for humanitarian and development agencies working in geographically separate areas; (ii) to avoid gaps?	Exchange information on programme priorities and commit to filling gaps	Nominate existing sector coordination body (e.g. WASH Cluster; Donor group) to act as information clearing house, compiling and sharing information on both humanitarian and development projects and programmes in the country
	Targeting methods are inconsistent	Can criteria for targeting (e.g. emergency thresholds, needs assessments) be harmonised across organisations working in a given context?	Work toward and use common targeting criteria; invest in common data collection and reporting	Assess and review targeting criteria used by development and humanitarian agencies working in country. Develop and promote common standards
	Camp-based interventions are unsustainable	What proportion of IDPs/refugees are estimated to take up residence in camps? How can their needs be met without creating tensions with host communities? How can host community services be supported to meet additional need?	Collaborate to support host communities and displaced populations outside camp settings	Agree to allocate a proportion of development/humanitarian WASH funding for infrastructure rehabilitation/extension and capacity building in towns and cities that have absorbed IDPs or refugees.
Implementation modalities	Emergency intervention mode is self-perpetuating	How can operational planning and programming approaches (e.g. intervention timeframes, procurement practices) be encouraged to ensure longer-term duration while maintaining flexibility?	Encourage continuity within and between projects	Undertake review and evaluations of interventions (2+ years after close) and build basic scenario planning into project planning to identify: how humanitarian interventions can build off previous work and avoid long-term negative consequences; and how development interventions can be made resilient to conflict or other plausible shifts in the context ('bonus' scores could be offered in proposal evaluations to incentivise this)
	Tensions arise between subsidised and demand-led approaches	In view of existing expectations, social norms and vulnerabilities, what is the appropriate balance between demand- and supply-driven or subsidised implementation approaches?	Balance meeting urgent needs for the vulnerable with maintaining social norms	Where development implementation approaches rely on stimulating demand (e.g. CLTS), agree a minimum package of support, and how it will be targeted to the most vulnerable, in emergency contexts
	Community management is under-used and/or insufficiently backstopped	How far can community management be used to enhance sustainability of emergency and development WASH interventions? What backstopping is required?	Take consistent approach to community involvement in maintenance and management of services, with appropriate support	In relatively stable contexts or where displacement is likely to be protracted, utilise community management approaches and invest in local backstopping capacity (e.g. local government)

**Table 4: Checklist to guide development of Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis (continued)**

	Key issue	Key questions	Example Shared Priority	Example of associated action
Staff recruitment and development	Limited skills transfer between siloes	What training and exchange opportunities can be provided within and between organisations in each silo?	Build capacity to think 'outside the siloes'	Include training on relevant skills for cross-silo working as standard for programme management and operations staff, e.g. for development roles, offer training on emergency response
	Short-termism in contracts and performance incentives	What incentives can be provided to encourage emergency and development professionals to remain longer in post and interact more with their counterparts?	Encourage longer term postings and perspectives through recruitment and personnel management	Build requirement for cross-silo cooperation into job descriptions and positively reward initiative taken by staff to innovate in ways that contribute to resilience of services (e.g. through career progression).
	Local capacity under-used and developed	How and where can locally based partners (civil society, private sector, government) be engaged for resilient development WASH interventions and/or more sustainable emergency WASH response?	Invest in and collaborate with those that are there to stay	Agree to partner with or subcontract or partner with local implementing agencies (e.g. NGOs, domestic private sector, local government) by preference (i.e. unless there are strong reasons not to)
Mechanisms for dialogue and co-working	Difficult to initiate dialogue on the siloes in the abstract	What entry points for dialogue exist around specific hazards (e.g. cholera) or themes (e.g. resilience)?	Prioritise common challenges and areas of intervention	Initiate cross-silo collaboration around a specific challenge such as cholera response and prevention
	Government not involved or empowered	What is the legitimacy and capacity of government at subnational and/or national levels to be engaged in sector dialogue and, in the longer term, take a lead role for sector coordination?	Enable national leadership development in the WASH sector	Undertake thorough analysis of potential to transition to national leadership and agree plan for how this will be progressively achieved <sup>17</sup>
	Change depends on other sectors besides WASH	How can collaboration and coordination with other sectors (e.g. food security, health) strengthen sustainable WASH services?	Exploit inter-sectoral linkages	Agree a set of priority collaborations with counterparts, e.g. with Health Cluster on Cholera.

Source: Authors

step towards this, SWA could target increased participation from humanitarian WASH agencies and WASH Cluster representatives. The SWA Collaborative Behaviours present an obvious starting point for dialogue and debate, given their development has involved a number of fragile states, and they are likely to have a key influence on how development WASH norms evolve in the post-2015 context. Within a structure such as a SWA working group, humanitarian and development WASH agencies could work together to define guidance on how to progressively implement the collaborative behaviours in contexts characterised by protracted crises. While SWA may be an appropriate platform to host such an initiative, the

humanitarian community brings, via the WASH Cluster, a structure that offers an on-the-ground presence to liaise and engage with a range of stakeholders in countries affected by protracted crises and disasters. Importantly, WASH Cluster members are already closely considering how to transition to country leadership of emergency preparedness and response in a more systematic way (Maskall unpublished). This could provide an entry point to help agreements reached at the global level to cascade more readily to action in specific countries.

Beyond this, there is scope to build a coalition with other sectors that are themselves attempting to address their humanitarian and development siloes. For example,

17 More detailed guidance on this important area is provided by Maskall (unpublished).

**Table 5: Focal areas for adjusting the incentives underpinning the siloes**

Incentive	Area of experimentation
Finance	<p>Balancing flexibility and persistence in financing modalities Example: For short-cycle relief projects, offer ‘bonus’ score in proposal evaluations for clearly showing that the work is leveraging and building off existing interventions; commit to longer-term funding for WASH emergency response interventions.</p> <p>For longer-term projects and programmes, build in contingency windows, that can be reallocated swiftly if the context suddenly changes – these may not imply additional funding commitment, but rather earmark percentages of an existing allocation that can be repurposed in an emergency. Development proposals with contingency plans could also be favoured in proposal evaluation processes.</p>
Accountability	<p>Encouraging accountability to beneficiaries and government Example: In setting requirements to report back to the donor agency, streamline to the minimum key information needed for accountability to donor government and citizens.</p> <p>Mandate information sharing on WASH provision with host government, and AAP, as part of proposal assessment and contractual arrangements</p>
Risk	<p>Investing in foresight and resilience Example: Require WASH projects in protracted crises (humanitarian or development) to include thorough contextual analysis as part of their proposals or inception phase outlining (i) how, where, for whom, and by whom WASH services are being delivered and what the implications could be after project conclusion and over the medium term (e.g. 2 years); and (ii) what measures can be put in place to reduce adverse effects, e.g. in terms of exacerbating conflict, environmental degradation, and population displacement. Higher value proposals should include deeper consideration based on e.g. mandatory conflict and context analysis.</p> <p>Strengthen requirement to work with and/or through local counterparts in both development and humanitarian WASH projects/programmes – including government, civil society and/or the private sector.</p>

Source: Authors

the food security and nutrition sector has recently developed a list of 11 general principles and concrete measures that should shape government and development actors’ efforts to meet immediate humanitarian needs while building resilient livelihoods (CFS 2015). Efforts within the education sector were highlighted above (Box 7). Sector-focused initiatives can better demonstrate both the operational challenges that the wider humanitarian-development siloes create, and how they can practically be resolved. Building a community of practice of like-minded specialists, across a range of sectors, is therefore an important step towards making the wider case that the

mission, principles and standards guiding humanitarian and development assistance can be better aligned. This effort will likely be most far-reaching if the key global WASH platforms take a lead – on the development side by SWA (until SWA itself succeeds in bridging the siloes) and on the humanitarian side by the GWC. The World Humanitarian Summit 2016 is one relevant window of opportunity to bring together applied sector-level insights, but it is likely to represent only one milestone in a much longer process of change.

## 9.4 Assessing and adapting: a monitoring and learning framework

Even within a single sector such as WASH, the above is an ambitious agenda. Systems to track progress and course-correct in the face of new challenges are therefore essential. Defining clear, outcome-oriented indicators and milestones is one way to approach this. At each level (norms, incentives, operations) the key stakeholders could agree their monitoring priorities – for example, UNICEF could monitor the number of countries for which ‘Shared Priorities’ are being developed or are under implementation; the proposed ‘Donor Champions Group’ could monitor the percentage of development WASH funding routed through windows that permit rapid reallocation to emergency relief.

More broadly, however, the wider cultural shift needed to overcome the siloes requires an adaptive approach to monitoring and learning. Over-specifying indicators and logical frameworks can be counterproductive when there is no room to adapt goals and objectives in response to wider changes in context. At the systemic level, therefore, we recommend use of alternative approaches such as Outcome Mapping, a set of flexible tools that support ‘an iterative process to identify... desired change and to work collaboratively to bring it about’ (Jones and Hearn 2009: 1). Outcome Mapping is well suited to measuring changes in behaviour and in relationships with wider sets of stakeholders that a group of individuals or organisations might be trying to influence. Outcome Mapping could therefore be deployed as a wider framework for defining objectives and progress markers, while allowing for course-correction in response to new information. The approach could be used at a specific level (norms/incentives/operations) or as part of an overarching effort to assess and steer progress across all levels.

## 9.5 Call to action

Building on the previous section, we close with specific and targeted recommendations for action in the coming years.

### **9.5.1 To increase complementarity at operational level:**

By end 2017, UNICEF should facilitate development of ‘shared priorities for WASH in crisis’ in 3-5 countries and invest in accompanying evaluation and lesson learning. Shared priorities are a set of 5-10 short, actionable statements that both humanitarian and development WASH actors can fully commit to around their ways of working.

The following immediate next steps will complement this objective:

- UNICEF WASH Programme Division should solicit the interest of country representatives (WASH Chiefs, Regional and National WASH Cluster Leads etc.) to develop and pilot ‘Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis’ in a number of countries, and support and share learning from that process.
- UNICEF WASH Cluster Advocacy and Support Team (CAST) should continue to promote the LRRD agenda within Global, regional and National WASH Clusters, including in the upcoming review of the 2011-2015 Global WASH Cluster Strategy and Ways of Working, and the preparation of the 2016-2020 strategy (for example by including the development of Shared Priorities or their equivalent as a core initiative).

### **9.5.2 To tackle underlying incentives that inhibit complementarity:**

By end 2018, all leading development WASH donors should ensure that an agreed minimum percentage of total sector allocations is routed via flexible windows that permit rapid reallocation in emergencies. By the same date, all leading humanitarian WASH donors should ensure a similar minimum percentage of total sector allocations are routed via multi-year financing mechanisms.

Towards tackling finance and other incentive structures, as an immediate next step WSP-World Bank and UNICEF

(e.g. via CAST) should convene a ‘champions group’ of bilateral development and humanitarian WASH donor agencies and other providers of finance. The objective of the champions group would be to share and test approaches to:

- Finance modalities: how to balance flexibility and persistence in financing.
- Accountability structures: how to encourage accountability to beneficiaries and national governments.
- Mechanisms for risk: how to incentivise investment in foresight, resilience and local capacity.

### **9.5.3 To challenge the cultural and normative barriers to complementarity:**

By end 2019, Sanitation and Water for All and the Global WASH Cluster should establish a cross-sector initiative, in collaboration with counterparts (other platforms and clusters) with the goal of enhancing complementarity between the wider development and humanitarian communities.

In support of this, immediate actions include:

- UNICEF WASH Programme Division and WSP-World Bank should engage colleagues in other Programme Divisions and Global Practices to build a community of practice in their respective organisations, and use this to recommend how SWA and WASH Cluster structures at global, regional and country level can prioritise their own outreach to other sectors. The World Humanitarian Summit 2016 represents a window of opportunity to bring together applied sector-level insights.
- the WASH sector, UNICEF and WSP-World Bank should promote the LRRD agenda to other SWA partners and encourage the participation of humanitarian WASH agencies and WASH Cluster representatives within SWA. In particular this could support practical guidance on how the Collaborative Behaviours can be progressively implemented in protracted crises.

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# Annex 1: List of research questions and sub-questions

## Interviews with international and regional experts

How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their interaction up till now?

In your opinion, what constitutes the development and humanitarian WASH sector silos?

- What is your organisation's approach in 'fragile/conflict states', and how does it differ from the one you take in other, non-conflict contexts?
- How do you work with the other 'half'? When, how and why do you work/not work with development/humanitarian focused sector?
- In your interventions and general approach to WASH service delivery, what is the balance between meeting basic human needs and long-term capacity building?

Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian and development WASH collaborate effectively? Why/why not? Identify challenges with reference to operational model:

- Planning and budgeting, modalities of programme/project management (e.g. country office vs headquarters, work through local NGOs, or other operational modalities)
- Implementation (working with other actors, e.g. NGOs, community groups, local government, etc.) and coordination (between whom, at what level?)
- Funding and M&E: to what extent do they encourage flexibility?

How are decisions made around programming and policy, within and between humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to effective action on the ground? If not, what are the underlying reasons?

- What are the main limitations of your current approach? What are you not doing well enough, and why in your opinion?
- Who/at what level do you decide where to intervene, for how long, adopting which approach? (e.g. at HQ, regional, country offices level). What scope is there for adaptive decision-making as situations change?
- What are the underlying reasons /incentives and/or 'rules of the game' motivating decisions?
- What are the main trade-offs you face during your work in fragile/conflict contexts (in general, as well as for WASH-specific interventions), and who decides priorities?
- Who are the interventions for? To whom are you accountable (beneficiaries, donors, national government, etc.)? In your view, how does this impact on your operations?

What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and incentives?

- What do you think should change in your approach?
- What institutional set-up (and at what level) do you think would work to overcome disconnect?

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## Interviews in DRC

Understanding general context/working modalities:

- How long have you been working in DRC, focusing on what/in what regions (urban/rural, states, community focus), at what level (community-based vs national-level work)?
- How does the crisis/health emergencies/political and violence situation on the ground affect the capacity of your organisation to work?
- Who are the predominant actors in the WASH sector, and how do you engage with them? To what extent the national legislative/policy framework in the sector constrains/enables your interventions?
- What have been the impacts of the decentralisation reform, if any? What do you think will be the impacts of this reform on the future of your activities?

How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their interaction up to now?

- [For humanitarian audience] Besides humanitarian intervention, what are your activities/areas of work that specifically aim at development transition?
- What are the specific ‘development-oriented/long-term components of your WASH intervention in DRC? (e.g. cash-based approach, combining nutrition and WASH, etc.)
- [For development audience] Besides your activities/areas of work that specifically aim at development what is your approach to emergency preparedness, resilience etc.? What is your organisation’s traditional approach in ‘fragile/conflict states’, and how does it differ from the one you take in other, non-conflict contexts?
- How do you work with the other ‘half’? When, how and why do you work/not work with development/humanitarian focused sector?
- What is the balance between meeting basic human needs and long-term capacity building?
- How has capacity in your organisation varied through time? (Presence has augmented/diminished, more funding available, staff turnover, different mechanisms for coordination e.g. clusters being set up etc.)
- Are relevant DRC government agencies/ministries involved equally in humanitarian and development WASH – if not why not? What are their perceptions about each and why? To what extent are you negotiating/engaging with MONUSCO and other belligerent parties? And the civil society (NGOs, faith-based groups, others?) How do you think this helps you deliver your mission (in general and in terms of WASH service delivery in particular)?

How are decisions made around programming and policy, within and between humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to effective action on the ground? If not, what are the underlying reasons?

- What scope is there for adaptive decision-making as situations change?
- How does the crisis affect the capacity of your organisation to work?
- What are the main trade-offs you face during your work? Who decides when trade-offs emerge?
- What are the main limitations of your current approach (challenges you face)? What are you not doing well enough, and why in your opinion?
- Who are the interventions for? To whom are you accountable (beneficiaries, donors, national government, etc.)? In your view, how does this impact on your operations?

Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian and development WASH collaborate effectively? If not, why?

- In your opinion, what constitutes the development and humanitarian WASH sector silos in DRC?
- What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and incentives?
- What would be on your top priorities if you were to stay in DRC for another 2 years?

## Interviews in South Sudan

Understanding general context/working modalities:

- How long have you been working in S Sudan, focusing on what/in what regions (urban/rural, states, community focus)? How do your interventions vary between the regions in which there is active conflict and those characterised by protracted crisis and lack of access to basic services?
- How did independence impacts on the general political, socio-economic context of the country? What was the impact on your work of the resurgence of the conflict in December 2013?
- Why are you doing WASH? (E.g. to save lives, to improve livelihoods, etc.) What other activities are you doing in the country/region/community?
- Talk about specific work with IDPs: in what does it differ from work with South Sudanese population?
- To what extent the South Sudanese Government is still able to provide services to the people (and where)? Who is delivering services instead, e.g. communities, INGOs, private sector (especially focus on WASH)?

How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their interaction up till now?

- What is your role in delivering the UN Humanitarian Intervention Strategy for South Sudan? To what extent does that leave space for development-oriented interventions? E.g. to what extent do you collaborate/liaise with UNMISS?
- Are you part of other development strategies for the country? Are these still in place, or have resources completely been reallocated to emergency interventions?
- In your activities, what is the balance between meeting basin human needs and long-term capacity building?

Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian and development WASH collaborate effectively? If not, why?

- How has capacity in your organisation varied through time and in particular since the beginning of the crisis? (Consider also capacity in the WASH sector overall, and for both national and international agencies).
- To what extent does the WASH Cluster look at development/peace-building as well? How well does it work in ensuring coordination between the different actors?
- To what extent and on what aspects of WASH delivery are you collaborating with government agencies (for international orgs and NGOs) / international orgs and NGOs (for government)? What are the main challenges of this collaboration and what is working well instead?

How are decisions made around programming and policy, within and between humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to effective action on the ground? If not, what are the underlying reasons?

- What scope is there for adaptive decision-making as situations change?
- Who/at what level do you decide where to intervene, for how long, adopting which approach?
- How does the crisis affect the capacity of your organisation to work?
- What are the main trade-offs you face during your work? Who decides when trade-offs emerge?
- More generally, what are the main limitations of your current approach (challenges you face)? What are you not doing well enough, and why in your opinion?
- Who are the interventions for? To whom are you accountable (beneficiaries, donors, national government, etc.)? In your view, how does this impact on your operations?

What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and incentives?

- What do you think should change in your approach?
- What institutional set-up (and at what level) do you think would work to overcome disconnect? Other solutions? (Specific to South Sudan context and challenges)

# Annex 2: List of interviewees (global and country)

**Table A1: List of people and organisations interviewed for this study**

Name	Organisation	Position
Graham Alabaster	United Nations Human Settlements Programme	Chief Waste Management & Sanitation (Urban Basic Services Branch)
Alejandro Jimenez	UNDP Water Governance Facility Stockholm International Water Institute	Programme Manager GoAL WASH Programme
Denis Heidebroek	DG ECHO - Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (Regional Support Office for Latin America and Caribbean)	Global Thematic Coordinator WASH & Shelter
Trevor White	U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance	WASH Technical Advisor
Dominick Revell de Waal	Water Sanitation Programme (WSP), World Bank	Senior Economist
Marcus Howard	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)	Water and Sanitation Adviser
Gerbrand Alkema	Save the Children (Humanitarian Department)	Health Cluster Support Expert
Aidan Cronin	UNICEF Indonesia	ChiefWater, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)
Mark Zeitoun	University of East Anglia	Reader in Development Studies
Thomas Handzel	Center for Global Health, Emergency Response and Recovery Branch	Epidemiologist
Paul Shanahan		Independent consultant
Heather Skilling	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)	Senior Water and Sanitation Advisor
Greg Keast		Independent consultant
Kerstin Danert	Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN)	Director
Peter Harvey	UNICEF, Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office	Regional Adviser - Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
Leonard Tedd	Department for International Development (DFID), Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Team, Policy Division	Senior Infrastructure Adviser
Clarissa Brocklehurst	Sanitation and Water for All Secretariat	Senior Advisor
Muyatwa Sitali		Independent consultant
Thanh Le	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)	Director
Brian Reed	Loughborough University	Lecturer
Jan Kellett	UNDP	Disaster and Climate Partnerships Advisor
Bjoern Hofmann	German Federal Foreign Office Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Demining	Regional and Humanitarian Policy Advisor
Jonathan Parkinson	Oxfam GB	Senior WASH Programme Development Strategist
Marc-André Bünzli	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Switzerland	Chief, WASH Programme
Kitka Goyol	UNICEF Ethiopia	WASH Specialist

*Source: Authors*

**Table A2: List of people and organisations interviewed for the DRC case study**

Name	Organisation	Position
<b>Interviews in Lubumbashi:</b>		
Philippe Lwabo	EHB	National coordinator
Jean Kazadi	EHB	Programme manager
(Anonymous)	AIDES	WASH Programme Manager
Michel Santos	MMG	Social Development Manager
Dimitry Ilunga Ngoy	MMG	Social Development Team
Mulaj Musasa Gilbert	MMG	Social Development Team
Baudouin NYANGOMBALE SANZOU	IRC	Emergency Coordinator
Daniel Mushaga	Defi Michee	National Coordinator
George Kadinga	Action Contre la Pauvreté (ACP)	General Coordinator
Souleymane Beye	OCHA	Head of Katanga Sub-Office
Anthony Bertrand Bonhommeau	ALIMA	Head of Mission
John Shamamba Muchuba	Assistance aux Communautes Demunies (ACD)	National coordinator
Magali Carpy Botoulou	UNICEF	Head of Mission
Patrick Bilanda	UNICEF	WASH Specialist
Patrick Lilombo	World Vision	Senior FAIRO
(Anonymous)	Health Zone	Technician
Ambroise Ilunga	CPAEA/Katanga	Provincial Executive Secretary
Patrick Mbay	PROVIC	Health Specialist
Jacques Kasake	SNHR	Technician
Hugues Nsenga	Ministry of Health, Hygiene Department (D9)	SNV Focal Point
<b>Kinshasa interviews:</b>		
Deo Marindi	Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP), World Bank	Water Supply Specialist
Elena Ferrari	UNDP	Early Recovery Advisor
Dr Mavard KWENGANI	Department of Hygiene, Ministry of Health	Director
Tolo Assad	SNV	
Dominique Sowa	ADIR	
Antoine Mesu	Belgian Technical Cooperation	Head of WASH programme
Dr Kebela	Ministry of Health	Director, Department of disease prevention,
Franck Abeille	UNICEF	Head WASH Chief
Lisa Rudge	Department for International Development (DFID)	WASH Advisor
Aude Rigot	UNICEF	Head of Emergencies
Francois Landiech	Swedish International Development Cooperation (SIDA)	
Stephen Jones and Amaleye Dia	WASH Consortium	
Jean Claude Luyela Musiewob	Comité Nationale des Agences de l'Eau et Assainissement (CNAEA)	Director
Modeste Zihindula	Independent WASH consultant	

Source: Authors

**Table A3: List of people and organisations interviewed for the South Sudan case study**

Name	Organisation	Position
Katrice King	Oxfam UK	WASH Coordinator
Michael Hossu	ACTED	WASH Program Manager
Mary Langan	ACTED	AME Manager South Sudan
Richard Aludra	Independent consultant	
Andrea James	UNICEF	Chief of Field Operations
Felix Hoogveld	Dutch Embassy	First Secretary
Laetitia Beuscher	ECHO	Field Expert
Manhiem Bol Malek	MEDIWR (Directorate for Rural Water Supply Development)	Director
Magol Gabriel Alueth	SSUWG (Directorate for Rural Water Supply Development)	SG Urban Water
Nujulee Begum	UNICEF	WASH Specialist
Bejur Noel Modi Boyong	Japan International Cooperation Agency	Assistant Program Officer - Water infrastructure
Samuel Riak	UNICEF	WASH specialist
Lillian Okiwirry	UNICEF	Chief of WASH
John Fitzgerald	ACF	WASH Specialist
Peter Mahal Dhieu	MEDIWR	Director General
David Ayaga	AWODA	Chief Executive Director
Sibonakaliso C. Mpala	World Vision South Sudan	WASH Officer
Mohammed Ali	Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW)	WASH Officer
Repent Taban	International Aid Service (IS)	WASH Officer
Margaret (Peggy) D'Adamo	USAID	Health Officer
Isaac Iwa Mark	SDC	National Programme Officer (Focal point for WASH Project in Aweil)
David Thorp	UN OCHA	Head of Humanitarian Financing Unit
Various representatives of 10 states	Ministry Of Physical Infrastructure, Directorate of Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	

*Source: Authors*

# Annex 3: Example Shared Priorities for WASH in Crisis

**Table A4: Illustrative Common Principles for WASH in Crisis, Katanga, DRC**

Common principle	Who it applies to	How it could be operationalised
1. Identify common areas of intervention and exploit inter-sectoral linkages	Implementing partners; provincial government agencies; WASH cluster	In Katanga, cholera prevention and response has been identified as a priority by both humanitarian and development WASH actors. It is also the common topic that receives funding from both humanitarian and development donors. It can offer an entry point for the two ‘communities’ to initially come together for integrated planning. For example, longer-term WASH programmes could combine the expertise of development actors in setting up water and sanitation infrastructure, promoting hygiene practices, etc.; and the expertise of humanitarian actors in deploying rapid response measures to avert the escalation of cholera outbreaks into epidemics.
2. Hold regular joint meetings to create space for cross-silo decision making	WASH Cluster and/or other fora that bring together humanitarian and development actors	The WASH Cluster already offers a space for debate and discussion between humanitarian and development actors in the Katanga. It could be used to continue this debate by more formally involving development actors in addition to humanitarian ones, under the coordination of UNICEF for instance (given its focus on both humanitarian and development interventions through the VEA). Periodic update meetings and consultations could be increased also between WASH and other sectors, such as nutrition, health, protection, etc.
3. Involve governmental authorities at the local level, and enable leadership development in the WASH sector	WASH Cluster, Provincial and local government	In Katanga, international donors and implementing agencies consider governmental authorities in the health and education sectors as credible partners to work with (they are perceived to be more organised, have more expert staff and resources). These partnerships, already active for the implementation of the VEA programme, can be exploited for the implementation of WASH emergency responses too. <sup>18</sup> Over time, involvement of water sector officials should also be encouraged.
4. Collaborate with domestic partners	WASH Cluster, NGOs, Provincial and local government, corporations	WASH Cluster members may consider sharing information with and involving government, NGOs and even the private sector (mining companies in Katanga) in planning interventions at provincial level; some of the latter have active WASH programmes in different regions of Katanga, and can provide additional/complementary resources to increase the impact of individual WASH interventions (both emergency response and longer-term development/resilience-building ones). NGOs and community-based organisations can provide important information on issues that risk compromising the positive outcomes of the project, for example around local-level governance. <i>Note that ‘collaborating with’ does not mean ‘conforming with’; this principle may need to be put into practice sensitively, e.g. should be avoided if following the recommendation of local actors, or even providing local actors with information about intended interventions, would clearly endanger life or compromise principles such as neutrality.</i>

<sup>18</sup> For specific donors or implementing partners, diplomatic missions may be able to advise on windows of opportunity within a fast-evolving and contentious political situation, to engage with local government authorities while respecting the principles of neutrality and impartiality that are typical of humanitarian interventions.

Common principle	Who it applies to	How it could be operationalised	
5. Engage and support local in-country capacity	WASH implementing partners	Use local implementing capacity (e.g. NNGOs, domestic private sector, local government) unless there are strong reasons not to, in recognition of the fact that local partners can be more qualified to respond to some crises, and more likely to remain when international actors leave.	
6. Encourage continuity within and between projects	WASH Cluster, implementing partners	The WASH Cluster should play a role in ensuring that funded WASH interventions incorporate thorough conflict sensitivity and environmental assessments. 'Keep the focus on the beneficiaries', and ensure that projects reflect the needs of the people on the ground, rather than requirements set in Kinshasa. All WASH project proposals should include, and be evaluated against, consideration of (i) how, where, for whom, and by whom WASH services are being delivered and what the implications are after project conclusion and over the medium term (e.g. 2 years); <sup>19</sup> and (ii) what measures can be put in place to reduce adverse effects, e.g. in terms of exacerbating conflict, environmental degradation, and population displacement. Higher value proposals should include deeper consideration based on e.g. mandatory conflict and context analysis.	
7. Build capacity to think 'outside the siloes'	WASH implementing partners	<p>Include training on emergency preparedness and response for key development WASH positions.</p> <p>Include training on M&amp;E, administration and practical WASH skills such as community-based hygiene and sanitation promotion, for key humanitarian WASH positions.</p>	Where possible, enable learning for relevant staff through exchange/ secondments rather than one-off training events.

Source: Authors

<sup>19</sup> The questions 'How', 'Where', 'For whom' and 'With whom' provide a helpful structure to consider positive and negative consequences of an intervention, for example:

- How? Can this type of intervention be done if there is: active conflict, no Government counterpart or other legitimate authority, low security conditions (e.g. road security), high prices or lack of markets e.g. for spare parts, limited existing WASH infrastructure (and in what conditions?).
- Where? What is the hydrological and geological context, what is the settlement type now and in future (urban/rural/ small town; IDP camp/PoC/ host communities?)
- With whom? Who are potential partners, enablers and blockers to WASH service delivery? What is the water governance structure at local level, i.e. who is in charge, do conflicts occur around water points and/or other water infrastructure? Given the context and capacities/resources available, is it possible to partner up with other international agencies (e.g. if they have already established presence on the ground), communities, NGOs, local/national government, the private sector?
- For whom? What is the level of need? What is the likely capacity of local populations to collaborate to support operations and maintenance? How are different groups excluded or included in the benefits and responsibilities of service provision? What is the potential for benefits to be captured by particular groups (including access to services but also rents e.g. from monopolising markets for spare parts)?

**Table A5: Illustrative Common Principles for WASH in Crisis, South Sudan**

Common principle	Who it applies to	How it could be operationalised
1. Hold regular joint meetings to create space for cross-silo decision making	Members of WASH Cluster and WASH DoG	Incrementally increase interactions and overlap between humanitarian and development processes and structures, from periodic update meetings; to consulting WASH Cluster/DoG counterparts for key decisions; to transitioning to a single coordination forum in time. Periodic update meetings and consultations could be increased also between WASH and other sectors, such as nutrition, protection, health, etc.
2. Develop adaptive WASH policy and planning documents	RoSS WASH agencies, Members of WASH DoG and WASH Cluster	Develop light-touch interim policy and planning documents, including operational guidance – to be reviewed yearly and based on achievable near-term targets (rather than, for example, focusing on a comprehensive update of 2011 WASH Strategy). This could include national contingency plans and/or preparedness plans that identify gaps in roles, responsibilities and capacities in the WASH sector; to be addressed through institutional and capacity-building by development actors. RoSS and WASH DoG should take lead on developing documents with a focus on key standards for example on sector regulation and financing. WASH Cluster to be extensively consulted in preparation of these documents.
3. Strengthen WASH sector leadership within RoSS	WASH DoG and WASH Cluster	Enable leadership development within RoSS agencies for WASH e.g. by facilitating links with other sector ministries (especially Ministry of Finance) <sup>20</sup> and supporting the framing of a long-term, country-led vision for WASH in South Sudan. <sup>21</sup> While WASH DoG may be better positioned for deeper engagement with Government, WASH Cluster members should also explore room for manoeuvre. <sup>22</sup>
4. Encourage continuity within and between projects	WASH humanitarian and development donors	Ensure all WASH project proposals include, and are evaluated against, consideration of (i) how, where, for whom, and by whom WASH services are being delivered and what the implications are after project conclusion and over the medium term (e.g. 2 years); <sup>23</sup> and (ii) what measures can be put in place to reduce adverse effects, e.g. in terms of exacerbating conflict, environmental degradation, and population displacement. Higher value proposals should include deeper consideration based on e.g. mandatory conflict and context analysis.  For short cycle relief projects, offer ‘bonus’ score in proposal evaluations for projects which clearly show that they are successfully leveraging and building off existing interventions.  For longer-term projects and programmes, build in contingency windows, that can be reallocated swiftly if the context suddenly changes – these may not imply additional funding commitment, but rather earmark percentages of an existing allocation that can be repurposed in an emergency. <sup>24</sup> Development proposals with contingency plans should also be favoured in proposal evaluation processes.

20 For example, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was invited to present on the impact of current economic crisis on basic service delivery in WASH by at the recent two-day review and planning meeting of WASH interventions in South Sudan convened by UNICEF.

21 Reference to case studies of countries that have succeeded in making this transition may be helpful - see WSP (2011).

22 For example, while engaging with central government may contradict principles of impartiality and, it could be possible to open channels with leaders of sectoral agencies. For specific donors or implementing partners, diplomatic missions may be able to advise on windows of opportunity within a fast-evolving and contentious political situation.

23 The questions ‘How’, ‘Where’, ‘For whom’ and ‘With whom’ provide a helpful structure to consider positive and negative consequences of an intervention, for example:

- How? Can this type of intervention be done if there is: active conflict, no Government counterpart or other legitimate authority, low security conditions (e.g. road security), high prices or lack of markets e.g. for spare parts, limited existing WASH infrastructure (and in what conditions?).
- Where? What is the hydrological and geological context, what is the settlement type now and in future (urban/rural/small town; IDP camp/PoC/host communities?)
- With whom? Who are potential partners, enablers and blockers to WASH service delivery? What is the water governance structure at local level, i.e. who is in charge, do conflicts occur around water points and/or other water infrastructure? Given the context and capacities/resources available, is it possible to partner up with other international agencies (e.g. if they have already established presence on the ground), communities, NGOs, local/national Government, the private sector?
- For whom? What is the level of need? What is the likely capacity of local populations to collaborate to support operations and maintenance? How are different groups excluded or included in the benefits and responsibilities of service provision? What is the potential for benefits to be captured by particular groups (including access to services but also rents e.g. from monopolising markets for spare parts)?

24 For example, the World Bank’s Contingent Emergency Response Component under the Immediate Response Mechanism allows International Development Assistance lending to be rapidly repurposed for emergency response. See [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1365611011935/Guidance\\_Note\\_IRM.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1365611011935/Guidance_Note_IRM.pdf) for more details [last accessed: October 9, 2015].

**Table A5: Illustrative Common Principles for WASH in Crisis, South Sudan (continued)**

Common principle	Who it applies to	How it could be operationalised	
5. Invest where money goes furthest	WASH humanitarian and development donors	Coordinate to allocate a proportion of total WASH funding to towns and cities that have absorbed IDPs from conflict affected areas. To strengthen urban service delivery, such investments should include capacity building for local authorities on issues such as waste management and cholera prevention. Given private sector presence in WASH has grown, filling a gap left by public provision but giving rise to quality and safety concerns, international agencies may also wish to explore regulated public-private partnerships for urban service provision, e.g. to manage water kiosks, and facilitate chlorination of water trucks.	
6. Collaborate with those that are there to stay	WASH Cluster leads/members	Involve government and NGOs (at national and subnational levels) in preparation of major WASH Cluster planning and allocation decisions. Note that ‘collaborating with’ does not mean ‘conforming with’; this principle may need to be put into practice sensitively, e.g. if following the recommendation of local actors, or even providing local actors with information about intended interventions, would clearly endanger life or compromise principles such as neutrality.	
7. Agree common indicators and common reporting mechanisms	WASH development and humanitarian donors and implementing partners	Identify simple, common indicators which are relevant to both humanitarian and development WASH projects (e.g. number of new cholera incidences); monitor and share data. <sup>25</sup> Progressively embed these indicators into a common mechanism for sector reporting and accompanying mechanisms for accountability to affected populations. Data sharing should be streamlined as far as possible, ideally using a common framework such as WIMS. <sup>26</sup>	
8. Build capacity to think ‘outside the siloes’	WASH development donors and implementing partners	Include training on emergency response for key development WASH positions.	Where possible, enable learning through exchange/secondments rather than one-off training events.
	WASH humanitarian donors and implementing partners	Include training on M&E and financial administration for more long-term/ complex interventions, for key humanitarian WASH positions. <sup>27</sup>	
9. Engage and support local in-country capacity	WASH development and humanitarian donors and implementing partners	Use local implementing capacity (e.g. NGOs, domestic private sector, local government) unless there are strong reasons not to, in recognition of the fact that local partners can be more qualified to respond to some crises, and more likely to remain when international actors leave. In many cases, this may require more flexible contractual arrangements for short-term interventions (for example pre-signed/ framework agreements so that NGOs can be quickly deployed as soon as the crisis strikes). Donors and managers of pooled funding can incentivise this by including specific requirement for involvement of domestic actors, for any medium and longer-term funding (e.g. above one-year duration). Given some concerns over capacity, international actors that partner with NGOs should also be encouraged to work closely with them, to allow for ‘on the job’ training in project management and reporting.	

Source: Authors

<sup>25</sup> Short-term humanitarian projects may not realistically be able to track service outcomes such as people or households using services. Indeed, recent research on Value for Money in WASH programming confirms that many ‘developmental’ WASH programmes also fail to monitor and evaluate outcomes (Trémole et al. 2015). Cholera outbreaks are a potential proxy indicator for the success or failure of a coordinated response on WASH, and prevention and control of cholera outbreaks is an area where both humanitarian and development WASH actors have shown themselves able to collaborate.

<sup>26</sup> Given challenges with operationalising WIMS, an interim solution may be necessary, e.g. a common standard cloud-based spreadsheet (e.g. Google Sheets), with relevant fields that can allow data to be transferred easily to WIMS at a later date.

<sup>27</sup> For example, Save the Children has included in its 2016-2018 South Sudan strategy an objective on ‘building humanitarian capability’ that aims at preparing and equipping the entire South Sudan Country Programme to respond to spikes, shocks and emergencies (staff costs will be recovered through existing and future awards).





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