



Report

Improving WASH service delivery in protracted crises

The case of South Sudan

Beatrice Mosello, Nathaniel Mason and Richard Aludra

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Key messages

- In protracted crises, humanitarian and development approaches to water supply, sanitation and hygiene lack complementarity, undermining sustainable, equitable services.
- In South Sudan, humanitarian and development WASH programming and delivery have remained siloed, for a range of ideological and practical reasons.
- We recommend that humanitarian and development actors develop and agree on 'Common Principles for WASH in Crisis' to guide their interventions, finding the middle ground between practical and ideological differences.
- The South Sudan WASH Cluster could initially coordinate the negotiation and implementation of these Common Principles, with relevant stakeholders in the WASH sector, including the government.

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All quotations from interviewees are anonymous. Any errors or omissions are our own.

Table of contents

Acknowledgements	ii
Abbreviations	iii
Disclaimer	iv
Executive summary	v
1 Introduction	1
2 Characterising the crisis in South Sudan	4
3 WASH needs and interventions in South Sudan	8
4 Structural determinants of the siloes in South Sudan	16
4.1 Differing modalities for service delivery follow from contrasting missions	16
4.2 Geographic separation reinforces lack of communication and integration	18
4.3 Unstable politics and insecurity lead to (justifiable) risk aversion	19
4.4 Timescales and funding channels of the wider development-humanitarian 'architecture' are unaligned	20
4.5 Scarcity of resources breeds competition rather than collaboration	21
4.6 Different people, behaviours, personalities underlie opposing organisational cultures	21
5 Attempts to improve complementarity	23
5.1 UNICEF: integrating and partnering around focal challenges	23
5.2 Bilateral donors: determination to pursue a long-term agenda	24
5.3 INGOs: adding value to differentiate themselves from the competition	25
5.4 Government and NNGOs: advocating complementarity	26
6 Conclusion and recommendations	29
6.1 A starting point to increase complementarity	29
6.2 Standing back, drawing conclusions	29
6.3 Recommendations: towards common principles for WASH in crisis	31
REFERENCES	37
Annex 1: Methodology	42
Annex 2: Interview guide, South Sudan	46
Annex 3: Agenda of Stockholm World Water Week seminar	49

Figures

Figure 1: Humanitarian assistance to South Sudan as of July 31, 2015.	7
Figure 2: Number of WASH Cluster partners present in each county of South Sudan, as of May 2015.	19

Tables

Table 1: Humanitarian WASH interventions funded by the CHF.	11
Table 2: Bottlenecks, before (2013) and after (2015) the conflict.	15
Table 3: Humanitarian and development 'typical' WASH approaches in South Sudan. Information from desk-based research and in-country interviews.	17
Table 4: Examples of approaches to increase the complementarity of humanitarian and development WASH approaches in South Sudan.	27
Table 5: Nine illustrative Common Principles for WASH in Crisis, South Sudan.	34
Table A1: List of people and organisations interviewed for this study.	44

Abbreviations

CBOs	Community-based organisations
CBPFS	Country-Based Pooled Funds
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Swiss Franc
CLTS	Community-Led Total Sanitation
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DFID	Department for International Development
GoSS	Government of South Sudan (before Independence)
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPC	International Food Security Phase Classification
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MEDIWR	Ministry of Electricity, Dams, Irrigation and Water Resources
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NNGOs	National Non-Governmental Organisations
ODA	Official Development Aid
ODF	Open-defecation free
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
PoC	Protection of Civilians
RoSS	Government of the Republic of South Sudan (after Independence)
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanisms
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSRF	South Sudan Recovery Fund
SSUWC	South Sudan Urban Water Corporation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
W4L	Water for Lakes
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WASH DoG	WASH Donors Group
WFP	World Food Programme
WIMS	Water Information Management System
WSP	Water and Sanitation Programme

Disclaimer

Data collection for this study was conducted in June 2015. Since then, the political situation of South Sudan has evolved significantly. After prolonged peace talks, a deal was finally signed by the two factions of President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Vice-President Riek Machar in August 2015. Machar returned from exile and was sworn in as First Vice-President of a new unity government under Kiir in April 2016. Meanwhile, conflict continued in Unity state, as well as in the Equatorias and Western Bahr el Ghazal, in addition to the long-running conflict in Greater Upper Nile. In July 2016 fighting erupted again in Juba, leaving hundreds of people dead or injured and tens of thousands displaced. As of late July 2016 fighting in Juba had stopped. President Salva Kiir announced on 26 July 2016 that former rebel leader Riek Machar had been replaced as Vice-President and Taban Deng Gai had been appointed to the post. Given the volatility of the political and security situation of South Sudan, we were unable to reflect the latest developments in the present report.

The authors, 27 July 2016

Executive summary

In this study, we analyse humanitarian and development water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) approaches in South Sudan, and consider how and why siloes have arisen between the two. To improve complementarity, we identify a need for common principles for WASH in protracted crises. These common principles comprise a short set of pragmatic, mutually agreeable ways of working for all external agencies that support the delivery of WASH, whether they identify themselves as part of humanitarian or development communities.

We offer nine illustrative common principles in the report, but emphasise that to be relevant and useful, the Common Principles should be deliberated and agreed between stakeholders in South Sudan. Given its key coordination role in the WASH sector, the South Sudan WASH Cluster Secretariat could initiate the process, aiming to transfer leadership to government in the longer term. The nine illustrative examples are summarised as:

1. Hold regular joint meetings to create space for cross-silo decision making	2. Develop adaptive WASH policy and planning documents	3. Strengthen WASH sector leadership within Government
4. Encourage continuity within and between projects	5. Invest where money goes furthest	6. Collaborate with those that are there to stay
7. Agree common indicators and common reporting mechanisms	8. Build capacity to think 'outside the siloes'	9. Engage and support local in-country capacity

Certain characteristics define the 'Common Principles for WASH in Crisis'. They should be rooted in the common ground that already exists between humanitarian and development approaches, but take a common sense approach, respecting that differences in missions and values may be deeply held. They should be operationally focused on delivering equitable and sustainable WASH services, but also be operationally viable under wider humanitarian and development policy and financing architecture. They should be cost neutral to implement (wherever possible) and cost effective. Finally, the Common Principles should provide 'just enough' guidance, allowing decision makers and practitioners the space to innovate, and aim for outcomes that are 'good enough' in difficult circumstances.

Supporting the delivery of services like WASH during humanitarian emergencies and immediate recovery phases has been seen as essential in terms of addressing life-saving needs; at the same time, choices about how WASH services are delivered may undermine or support future development and peace. These difficulties become even more evident in protracted or recurrent crises, with confused, overlapping and often cyclical phases of emergency, relief, recovery and development. In these contexts, practitioners and academics alike have acknowledged the problem of reconciling the fundamentally different institutional cultures, assumptions, values, structures and ways of working that characterise the humanitarian and the development communities. In this report, we argue that the problem is

not so much about filling a ‘gap’ between humanitarian and development siloes. Instead, in each specific context, the challenge is to align the principles and practices of both communities to a sufficient extent that the overall response can meet changing needs and constraints. We develop this argument by considering the history of South Sudan and its WASH sector, how the humanitarian and development WASH siloes have manifested and been maintained, and the recent efforts to overcome ‘siloisation’.

South Sudan’s crisis is a complex one to describe, let alone to resolve, characterised by intricate internal and external political legacies which come from its status as the world’s newest nation, combined with very low levels of human development. Since 2013, more than 2.1 million people have fled their homes, and 1.5 million people are internally displaced. These numbers are expected to rise as tension remains high especially in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei States, notwithstanding the peace agreement. Low rates of WASH access have resulted in increasing health risks for the population. Combined with food insecurity this is likely also to contribute to accelerating malnutrition rates. The economic situation of South Sudan is also dramatically deteriorating, causing disruptions in government and non-governmental organisation (NGO) service delivery and affecting humanitarian operations.

External assistance, including humanitarian relief and development aid, has been provided in South Sudan for decades, including Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and the efforts at stabilisation and peace-building through the South Sudan Recovery Fund after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. The supply and delivery of water and sanitation and other basic services has been a focus of both humanitarian and development interventions in South Sudan. Since the conflict resumed in 2013, donors have spent \$73.6 million on WASH in South Sudan through the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). However, funding levels started shrinking as of 2015, as crises in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Nepal have taken a larger share of international attention and resources.

The case of South Sudan reveals that there are strong reasons for the persistence of siloes. First, humanitarian and development WASH interventions pursue different modalities for service delivery, in turn stemming from their differing core missions. Secondly, humanitarian and development actors generally operate in different geographical areas; without adequate communication this can reinforce the lack of integration and complementarity. South Sudan’s unstable politics and widespread insecurity make international donors and agencies risk-averse, encouraging them to fall back on familiar ways of working that can be neatly compartmentalised into either ‘humanitarian’ or ‘development’ boxes. Programme planning, management and reporting frameworks are not usually aligned: development programmes have long-term project cycles and elaborate reporting mechanisms that do not allow for rapid changes of strategy; the short-term nature of humanitarian funding, meanwhile, reduces ability to invest long term in services and capacity, including capacity of staff and partners. Competition for WASH funds in South Sudan is intensifying, prompting a rush for resources and diminishing trust between agencies. And finally, while individual personalities and relationships often drive complementarity, it is a constant challenge to recruit and retain the right people.

In the face of South Sudan’s enormous difficulties, however, there is increasing awareness and recognition that short-term emergency responses are no longer enough. Some have attempted to achieve more complementarity between humanitarian and development WASH. For example, UNICEF in South Sudan articulated a case for sustained international attention and funding around the 2015 cholera outbreak in Juba; this funding has been invested in prevention activities, including hygiene promotion and behavioural change. Some bilateral donors maintained their development programmes despite the current insecurity, but included conflict analyses and regular monitoring, so as to be able to more rapidly adapt their interventions to changes on the ground. Other agencies have emphasised the importance of ‘thinking locally’, by building on and strengthening existing systems and coping mechanisms to implement an immediate response. These positive examples suggest that there may be more

commonality and complementarity than is sometimes claimed – and that there is already a strong base from which to find Common Principles.

1 Introduction

This report is part of a broader study focused on understanding the nature and causes of the disconnect between development and humanitarian WASH, and possible solutions. It was commissioned by the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Section in the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) together with Water Sanitation Program (WSP) of the World Bank, and undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). In addition to the present report, summarising findings from the South Sudan case study, ODI researchers are producing a second case study on the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as a synthesis report and briefing note. The overall objective of the study is to propose a way forward in terms of ensuring better complementarity between humanitarian and development approaches in protracted conflict and crisis situations to improve WASH service delivery.

This research can be situated within the long-standing debate on the challenges of ‘Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development’ (LRRD). Supporting the delivery of services like WASH during humanitarian emergencies and immediate recovery phases has been seen as essential in terms of addressing life-saving needs; at the same time, modes of WASH service delivery may undermine or support future development and peace. In WASH, as in the broader LRRD debate, siloes continue to exist between humanitarian and development programming (Wild and Mason 2012).

Practitioners and academics alike have acknowledged the problem of reconciling the fundamentally different institutional cultures, assumptions, values, structures and ways of working that characterise the humanitarian and the development ‘communities’. While this debate has resulted in some actual changes in the delivery of relief, for example through cash transfers and a stronger focus on exit strategies and sustainability, it has had a far weaker impact on the way in which development assistance is being provided and targeted (Mosel and Levine 2014).

In the face of protracted crises (see Box 1) it becomes paramount to identify ways in which international aid can address the emergency needs of the most vulnerable while supporting, or at least not undermining, the long-term development prospects of a country and its people. Processes to operationalise the Sustainable Development Goals offer unique opportunities to reflect on these questions. To this end, we seek to identify actionable changes to principles, policies and ways of working.

Box 1: What is a protracted crisis?

According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation, protracted crises are characterised by their longevity, the presence of conflict, weak governance, unsustainable livelihoods and the breakdown of local institutions (FAO 2010; 2012). Therefore, engagement in these contexts will be impacted by:

- The presence of extreme and widespread needs (where the ‘normal’ continuously passes emergency thresholds)
- Unpredictable and rapidly changing needs, with different segments of the population requiring different support at any given time

-
- High insecurity, as state structures are weak and contested or have broken down completely, leading to absent or weak rule of law
 - Deep mistrust within societies and between societies and what is left of state structures, as there is a high a degree of politicisation of resources, including aid.

Source: Mosel and Levine (2014)

We argue that the problem is not so much about filling a ‘gap’ between humanitarian and development approaches. Instead, in each specific context, the challenge is to align the principles and practices of both communities to a sufficient extent that the overall response can meet changing needs and constraints. It is not about ‘bridging the gap’ by creating a new category or funding mechanism that sits in the middle of humanitarian and development aid, but by ensuring better complementarity and collaboration.

The scope of this study is delineated in two main ways: it focuses on WASH, and on a particular country case. The supply of water, sanitation and hygiene offers a useful entry point to the debate, as it is a key pillar of both humanitarian intervention strategies and development programmes focusing on the participation of local communities and governments towards long-term resilience-building and sustainability. Although this case study focuses on South Sudan, certain findings may be relevant to other protracted crises as well, e.g. Haiti, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan-Pakistan. Note, however, that for this case study we focus less on the challenge of how development assistance can support emergency preparedness. Countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Ethiopia receive substantial international assistance that could be characterised as developmental, but humanitarian response is often required for rapid-onset emergencies, particularly natural disasters or chronic food insecurity.

Box 2 sets out the overarching research questions that guided this study. Further methodological details and an expanded set of questions are available in Annex 1 and 2, respectively. Due to the relative lack of research on humanitarian and development siloes in the WASH sector specifically, an iterative, inductive approach was selected in place of a predefined analytical framework. While the overarching research questions were agreed in advance with UNICEF and WSP, the research design and particularly the expanded set of questions (Annex 2) were adjusted through the course of desk research and fieldwork. This allowed us to incorporate insights from discussions with global and regional sector experts and humanitarian and development professionals. We selected this approach to avoid constraining our analysis to pre-set categories, and instead incorporated issues as they emerged, such as institutional cultures, assumptions, values, structures and ways of working, principles and practices, interaction and effective collaboration, decision-making, institutional arrangements, operating structures and incentives.

Box 2: Key research questions:

- How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their interaction up to now?
- Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian and development WASH collaborate effectively? If not, why?
- How are decisions made around programming and policy, within and between humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to effective action on the ground? If not, what are the underlying reasons?
- What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and incentives?

Source: Authors

The rest of this report considers, in turn, the nature of the protracted crisis in South Sudan (Section 2); the recent history and architecture of the WASH sector in the country, including the core features of ‘siloesation’ (Section 3); the structural determinants which give rise to and maintain this ‘siloesation’ (Section 4); what efforts have been made to enhanced complementarity (Section 5); and finally, our recommendations, centred around the elaboration of ‘Common Principles for WASH in Crisis’, which aim to set out a mutually agreeable basis for increasing complementarity between humanitarian and development WASH, and with other actors including the government and civil society within South Sudan.

2 Characterising the crisis in South Sudan

All crises are complex. South Sudan's is particularly intense, characterised by intricate internal and external political legacies which come from its status as the world's newest nation, combined with very low levels of human development.

In July 2011, South Sudan became officially independent from its northern Sudanese neighbours after decades of struggle between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan – a struggle that claimed an estimated 2.5 million lives. Already with the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and then with independence, the citizens of the new country had high hopes in their government to provide the badly needed basic services that had eluded their society for decades. 'There was no transition period; to get legitimacy from its citizens and the international community, the new government went straight into development mode, without passing through the gradual phases of recovery and peace-building', an expert from an international NGO (INGO) recalled.¹ However, many evaluations of CPA-era programmes highlighted that development partners underestimated the state-building challenge in South Sudan, and overestimated the capacity of the government and how soon it would be able to take on responsibility for service delivery (Conway 2013).

Post-independence euphoria in South Sudan was short-lived. In December 2013, political tensions between President Sava Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar erupted into a fully-fledged violent conflict, which was at first confined to military barracks in Juba, but quickly spread through the country's north-east. At the time of publication, the situation remains highly fluid and unstable (see Disclaimer). South Sudan has been at war for more than two thirds of its existence.²

Between 2013 and 2015, more than 2.1 million people fled their homes; 1.54 million people are internally displaced; and over 144,000 individuals are seeking protection in the bases of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (IOM 2015). These numbers are only expected to rise, especially given more pronounced tensions in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei States (where the lucrative oil fields, the main economic resource of the country, are situated). According to many observers, ethnicity has increasingly become the line along which loyalties are demarcated. For example, the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) noted that: 'The scope and level of cruelty that has characterised the attacks against civilians suggests a depth of antipathy that goes beyond political differences. Allegations include rampant killing, rape, abduction, looting, arson and forced displacement and even such horrific acts as burning of

¹ Quote provided by expert from Save the Children on 1 October 2015.

² For a complete overview of the history of Sudan, see for example: Ryle et al. 2012. A timeline of Sudan's history to June 2015 is available on the BBC website at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14095300.

people inside their own homes. There is evidence of deliberate ethnic targeting of and reprisals against women and girls' (UN OCHA 2015).

Conflict is only one of many problems plaguing South Sudan today. Displaced populations and host communities are faced with public health risks, including communicable disease outbreaks. In June 2015, shortly before field work was undertaken for this study, a major cholera outbreak was declared in Juba and Bor counties where the World Health Organisation reported a total of 1,530 cholera cases including 43 deaths (WHO 2015). The crisis had also deepened food insecurity, as forced displacement impacts the ability of communities to cultivate their crops and care for their animals. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis indicated a further deterioration in the number of people facing food insecurity from 2.5 million in January-March 2015 to 4.6 million during the lean period of May-July 2015 in the three conflict affected states of the Greater Upper Nile and most parts of the Greater Bahr el Ghazal (IPC 2015). Nutrition surveys in the same states also pointed to acute malnutrition levels in excess of the emergency threshold; accordingly, one in three children are acutely malnourished and 250,000 children face starvation (IOM 2015).

Last but not least, the economic situation of South Sudan has dramatically deteriorated. Falling domestic oil production, depressed global oil prices, poor revenue controls and budgetary overspending has generated inflation, a rapidly widening gap between the official exchange rate and the black market rate, and disruptions in government and NGO service delivery (King 2015). An acute shortage of hard currency is causing shortage in the supply of food, water and fuel, and rapidly rising cost of living. Economic factors are also rendering humanitarian operations more difficult and expensive. For example, crime, including robbery and other violence, is deepening community insecurity overall and is affecting humanitarian offices, assets and vehicle fleets, as well as the residences of national and international humanitarian staff (HRP 2015). In many areas, traders have fled fearing for their own safety, taking away essential commodities for local economies (IOM 2015).

External assistance, including humanitarian relief and development aid, has been provided in South Sudan for decades, even before it was a country in its own right; this has had significant implications for the country's political development. An international presence became active in southern Sudan to support reconstruction and refugee settlement in the south after the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement. At that time, in Juba there were six UN agencies, four bilateral development agencies and 22 international NGOs, all involved in post-war refugee repatriation, construction and development activities (Ryle et al. 2012). Further international operations followed in response to drought and famine (such as the 1984-1986 Western Relief Operation or 1986 Operation Rainbow, see: Ryle et al. 2012), in a period in which the rise of global media had made the Western public particularly sensitive to African crises.

Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was a landmark in the story of external interventions, as the first operation in which the UN dealt with a non-state armed group without conferring recognition to it (Akol 2005). Started in 1989, OLS was a tripartite agreement between the Government of Sudan, the SPLA and the UN to allow humanitarian relief in both government and rebel-held territories.³ At the time the largest-ever coordinated humanitarian programme, OLS was managed by UN agencies and involved more than 40 international aid organisations (Maxwell et al. 2014). The operation was a major financial, logistical and human effort and undoubtedly saved many lives; however, there was controversy over its impact and the accountability of the international agencies involved in it (Duffield 2002). Some of the points of criticism were quite broad: OLS was unsustainable and disempowering to local populations; it was tremendously expensive; and it created aid dependency (see Maxwell et al. 2014). Among the numerous controversies plaguing the legacy of the OLS was the decision to shift from a sole focus on emergency relief to more of a development agenda in the southern sector at the beginning of the 1990s. Some observers viewed this decision as 'an

³ For more readings on OLS, see for example: Marriage (2006), Macrae et al. (1997), Akol (2005), Ryle et al. (2012), and Maxwell et al. (2014).

attempt by Western governments to assist the SPLM/A in resisting the Khartoum government's onslaught' (Bradbury et al. 2000: 24). Under criticism were also the policies and operating procedures of the OLS, deemed inconsistent and inadequate for responding to both sudden-onset and long-term situational shifts (Duffield et al. 2000). Today, analysts make comparisons between the OLS and the large-scale humanitarian operation mounted in South Sudan since 2013, in the hope that the international community can learn lessons and avoid repeating past mistakes.⁴ 'Countries like South Sudan are deeply affected by the history of aid; we have been doing things in the wrong way for the past 20 years, only reinforcing, instead of solving existing problems', one interviewee from an international NGO commented.⁵

International agencies and donors have attempted development programmes in South Sudan immediately after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).⁶ 'There was a very optimistic outlook and investments started coming in; development was the focus, not relief', an expert from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recalled.⁷ The Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was set up in South Sudan in 2008 under the mandate of the CPA and administered by the World Bank.⁸ In all, 14 donors pledged \$650 million under the MDTF, which were allocated against priority national programmes and implemented by the Government and UN actors, the private sector and NGOs. While it was originally expected to enable the rapid expansion of basic services, the MDTF took a longer-term view of development planning and focused on building central government structures and capacity (Fenton and Phillips 2009; Fafo 2013).

In May 2008, donors established the South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) under the MDTF to bridge a perceived gap between the short-term emergency/humanitarian aid and longer-term development assistance.⁹ The first round of the SSRF allocated \$20 million to rural livelihoods initiatives. It was praised for delivering immediate, household-level impacts, but its mid-term evaluation concluded that it suffered from sustainability problems, with NGO implementing partners outpacing the local government's capacity to meaningfully participate in projects (UNDP 2014). Therefore, the second and third rounds of the SSRF, implemented in four of South Sudan's most insecure states, were based on a robust analysis of causes of insecurity, and focused on addressing the absence of effective state authority and legitimacy in insecure areas. Reviews of these programmes found evidence that they helped expand the presence and capacity of the state and reduce competition over natural resources (Conway 2013). Eventually, however, donors opted out of the SSRF in March 2014, as the widespread deterioration of the security situation in many parts of the country had affected implementation of SSRF activities, causing substantial damage and loss to the projects amounting to \$16.7 million. All projects were terminated by June 2015 (SSRF 2014).

⁴ See: <http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/any-lessons-operation-lifeline-sudan>

⁵ Interview with programme manager from Action Against Hunger, held on 6 August 2015 in Juba, South Sudan.

⁶ The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a set of agreements culminating in January 2005 that were signed between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan, at the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). Importantly, the CPA set a date for a referendum to decide on the independence of the Southern Sudan (2011), and stipulated that until then 50% of the net government revenues from oil produced in the south should go to the semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS). For more information, see: Ryle et al. (2012: 140, 178).

⁷ Interview with expert from UNDP, held on 12 August 2015 in Juba, South Sudan.

⁸ For more information on the MDTF, see the World Bank's webpage at:


<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANEXTN/EXTAFRMDTF/0,,contentMDK:20884870~menuPK:2317424~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:2193668,00.html>

⁹ Under the overall authority of SSRF Steering Committee, chaired by the GoSS and co-chaired by the UN Deputy Resident Coordinator, the SSRF is a pooled funding mechanism intended to channel funds to support GoSS recovery priorities and provide immediate benefits for the population while laying the foundation for sustainable development. The SSRF will operate under the same governance arrangements as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund – South Sudan (MDTF-SS) administered by the World Bank and will complement it by ensuring that critical recovery needs are flagged and supported in a timely manner.

Today, the only funding mechanism that remains active in South Sudan under the MDTF is the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). The CHF was set up in 2012 as a pooled fund to support the allocation and disbursement of joint donor resources to meet the critical needs of the South Sudanese population.¹⁰ Since December 2013, the CHF has allocated more than \$199 million to implementing partners, providing life-saving assistance to vulnerable people, including displaced people, refugees and host communities.¹¹ While the CHF is clearly humanitarian-oriented, no corresponding funding mechanism for development interventions has been set up or continued in South Sudan. To date, individual bilateral donors or INGOs are responsible for most of the development efforts, but ‘it becomes increasingly difficult to find money for development programming’, one interviewee from one INGO said, ‘nobody wants to invest in the future of this country anymore, too much has already gone wrong in its past.’¹²

With these considerations in mind, it is fair to say that humanitarian funding in ‘emergency mode’ has remained the main type of assistance delivered to South Sudan. In some cases, our interviewees reported that: ‘sometimes development programmes have to be “disguised in emergency”’; even if you are building infrastructure and empowering communities, you will have to do it to save lives, not to build community resilience or other long-term results.’¹³

Figure 1: Humanitarian assistance to South Sudan as of 31 July 2015



Source: ReliefWeb at: <http://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/usg-humanitarian-assistance-south-sudan-complex-emergency-last-updated-06192015>

¹⁰ For more information on the CHF, see: www.unocha.org/south-sudan/common-humanitarian-fund

¹¹ Data from CHF’s website at: www.unocha.org/south-sudan/common-humanitarian-fund

¹² Citation from interview with representative of INGO, held on 3 August 2015 in Juba.

¹³ Information from interview with INGO programme manager, held on 3 August 2015 in Juba.

3 WASH needs and interventions in South Sudan

As a consequence of decades of war and under-investment, South Sudan has some of the worst safe water and sanitation statistics in the world. The majority of the rural population relies on self-supplied water from shallow/hand-dug wells, or surface water; for those with improved access, around 95% of both rural and urban populations do so from boreholes (JMP 2015). In addition, between 30 and 50% of the existing water points in South Sudan are known to be non-functional due to weak operation and maintenance capacity (GoSS 2011), and less than 50% of existing primary schools – and even fewer health facilities – have access to safe water and sanitary latrines (GoSS 2011). Improved and shared sanitation facilities are available to only 16% of the urban population and 4% of the rural population; 50% and 79% of South Sudanese practise open defecation in cities and rural areas, respectively (JMP 2015).

The supply and delivery of water and sanitation and other basic services has been a typical focus of both humanitarian and development interventions in South Sudan. As of 2012, INGOs provided 85% of basic services (Kooy and Wild 2012). Interviews with government authorities at state level revealed that this tendency persists, despite their intentions to have a more prominent role in the future ‘when we have the capacity and resources to do so’.¹⁴ In the towns of Juba, Wau and Renk, water supply systems remain managed by the South Sudan Urban Water Corporation (SSUWC), but long years of neglect and poor maintenance practices have undermined the performance of these facilities.¹⁵ Between 2007 and 2009, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the MDTF supported the construction of treatment plants, boosted stations and tanker truck refilling stations, especially in Juba and Wau. However, less than 10% of investment costs were allocated to improving the distribution system, which led to the development of private wells characterised by the poor quality of their water – hence the almost cyclical recurrence of cholera outbreaks in Juba (AFDB 2013).

The 2005 CPA triggered a process of institution-building in the new state of South Sudan that touched upon the water sector, too. Getting water to conflict-devastated communities was a major priority of the government, which became even more pressing as hundreds of thousands of refugees returned to the region (Huston 2014). Even before the CPA, a conflict analysis of Southern Sudan suggested that the acute shortage of water access was not only a humanitarian concern, but also a threat to security (Pact Sudan 2002). On these bases, the USAID started

¹⁴ Information from interview with Government representative, held on 6 August 2015 in Juba.

¹⁵ The SSUWC also used to manage the water supply system of Malakal; however, today Malakal, one of the hotspot of the current conflict, has practically ceased to exist, and its infrastructure almost completely destroyed by heavy fighting. Information from written communication with expert from research organisation, held on 1 October 2015.

the Pact Sudan's Water for Recovery and Peace Programme in 2005, one of the rare programmes that consistently targeted water service delivery for peacebuilding, conflict prevention and stabilisation, and one of the biggest WASH development interventions in South Sudan to date (Huston 2014).¹⁶

From the Government's side, the then Ministry for Water Resources and Irrigation with the help of international consultants, developed the South Sudan Water Policy in 2007.¹⁷ The WASH Strategic Framework, drafted in 2011 to operationalise the Water Policy, promoted sanitation and hygiene alongside water supply and the provision of targeted and affordable services through the involvement of the private sector, in line with the Millennium Development Goals (GoSS 2011).

However, resumption of conflict in 2013 stalled plans for the development of water and sanitation infrastructure and services. Faced with very high levels of insecurity and demand from displaced people and host communities in rural and urban areas throughout the country, the international community redirected its efforts towards humanitarian aid and relief interventions.¹⁸ New humanitarian actors came in what was already a crowded space: between 2005 and 2011, there were 43 organisations receiving international humanitarian aid for the implementation of WASH projects; this number increased to 63 in 2014 and went down again to 50 in 2015, according to the UN OCHA Financial Tracking System.¹⁹ Existing development actors either left the country or redirected their interventions to delivering humanitarian relief. For example, in the State of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, one of the 'green' states that have been less affected by the conflict, the number of partners undertaking WASH activities dropped from 23 in 2013 to 11 in December 2014; many NGOs closed or adopted a much reduced scale of operation (Danaert et al. 2015).²⁰

'Everyone wanted to make sure to get a piece of the cake as generous donors suddenly made funding available to respond to the South Sudan crisis,' commented a respondent from an INGO.²¹ Indeed, the financial needs for South Sudan have been huge. According to the 2015 mid-term review of the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), the revised requirements for strategic response were \$1.633 billion (HRP 2015). The estimated budget for WASH was \$129.5 million, aimed at assisting 3.5 million people. At the time of research, only \$57.3 million have been secured, reaching 1 million people.²²

¹⁶ An external evaluation conducted in 2008 concluded that 'there was clearly a positive impact of improved services on people's lives' but major challenges remain in terms of the sustainability of these interventions, mostly as a consequence of the lack of spare parts and tools (Welle et al. 2008).

¹⁷ The key principles of the 2007 Water Policy are: improved access to be prioritised over improved quality of water; improved access to basic sanitation in small towns and peri-urban areas to be prioritised over rural sanitation investment; the need to combine water supply with sanitation and hygiene interventions; and the requirement to provide technological options and give communities a choice based on financial and managerial capacity and accessibility of location. The policy sees water as a human right, and actively encourages community participation as well as the involvement of the private sector in water service delivery. See the full text at: www.unicef.org/southsudan/South_Sudan_Water_Policy.pdf

¹⁸ One respondent noted that: 'In essence, there have been two very different types of humanitarian response in South Sudan. The first type consisted in intervening in several IDP camps (Bentiu, Malakal, Bor, etc.) with increased mortality and morbidity rates, the almost total absence of the local government, and ongoing fighting. In other parts of the country, IDPs seemed more settled, and mortality and morbidity rates under control. Even in those, 'humanitarians' continued focusing on providing humanitarian assistance, rather than moving on through the 'disaster-phases' of recovery, resilience and development.' Information from comments provided to the draft report by expert from Save the Children (1 October, 2015).

¹⁹ See: <https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=home>

²⁰ In humanitarian and development 'jargon', 'green' states are those that have been only passively affected by the 2013 conflict, i.e. where actual fighting has not happened or has happened to a very limited extent; instead, the 'red' states of Unity, Lakes and Upper Nile are characterised by continuous and widespread violence between the rebel and government forces.

²¹ Citation from programme manager from an INGO, held on 6 October 2015 in Juba.

²² According to the HRP strategy, WASH interventions should prioritise settlements and PoC sites. There, implementing agencies should implement longer-term, more sustainable services where possible (e.g. shared household latrines, rather than communal toilets), and encouraging community participation in the

Humanitarian and development assistance has mostly been delivered through pooled financing mechanisms, including for WASH (see box 3). Since 2012, donors spent \$73.6 million on WASH in South Sudan through the CHF; in 2014, the WASH Cluster got the highest share of CHF funding (\$30 million; see Table 1).²³ Soon after the crisis broke out, South Sudan was the single largest recipient of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), UN OCHA's global pooled funding vehicle, amounting to a total of \$53.7 million.²⁴ However, in 2015 the CERF allocations for South Sudan reduced drastically to \$13 million, as the crises in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Nepal grabbed the donors' attention.²⁵ As a consequence, as one respondent from UNICEF noted: 'Our budget keeps shrinking, while the needs of the South Sudanese people keep increasing. The CERF and CHF allocations for WASH this year are ridiculously low: we asked for \$129.5m [in the mid-year revised HRP 2015], we have been secured less than half of the money so far [44% according to the same document].'²⁶

Box 3: Review of main funding vehicles in South Sudan

The **Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)** focused on rebuilding the southern states of Sudan and providing capacity-building support initially to the newly-formed, then semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and then to the independent Republic of South Sudan (RoSS).²⁷ The fund is administered by the World Bank from its office in Juba, in South Sudan. Currently, the MDTF has been suspended pending peace agreement signature. The World Bank has not yet indicated whether and when the MDTF will be resumed after the 2015 CPA.

For more information, see:

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANEXTN/EXTAFRMDTF/0,,contentMDK:20884870~menuPK:2317424~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:2193668,00.html>

The **South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF)** is a UN Multi Donor Trust Fund that was established in 2008 to facilitate a transition from humanitarian to recovery assistance, and receiving financial support from four donors: Norway, Swedish International Development Cooperation, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID). Since its inception, three rounds of funding allocations were delivered in South Sudan. Rounds One and Two focused on livelihoods, and small grants mechanisms and support to the South Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund, respectively, and projects under these two rounds were operationally closed in 2012. The SSRF Round Three was developed by UNDP, and focused on stabilisation in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Warrap (\$120 million). The SSRF was ended in March 2014; its final report is expected in December 2015 (SSRF 2014).

For more information, see: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/SRF00>

UN OCHA administers two Country-Based Pooled Funds in South Sudan: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) for South Sudan.

The **Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)** for South Sudan was set up in February 2012 by the Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan, UN Agencies and donors to support the

maintenance of WASH facilities. In urban areas, investments should go into cholera preparedness and other preventive activities such as hygiene promotion focused around behaviour change. To respond to new displacements, the HRP recommends collaboration with other clusters on the development and delivery of multi-sectoral 'survival kits', and work with rapid response teams, NNGOs, and Red Cross partners on the ground to better reach populations on the move (HRP 2015). For data, also see UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service at: <https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1062>

²³ Data from MDTF's website: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/HSS10>

²⁴ Data from: CERF's website: www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/allocations-country/2015

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Citation from UNICEF respondent, interview held on 7 October 2015 in Juba.

²⁷ Although conventions differ, the denomination of Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) is used to refer to the post-independence government, while Government of South Sudan (GoSS) indicates the pre-independence government. In this report, we use RoSS to indicate the current Government of South Sudan.

timely allocation and disbursement of donor resources to the most critical humanitarian needs in South Sudan.

Donor contributions to the South Sudan CHF are used to finance projects carried out by the Participating UN Organisations, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and NGO partners (international NGOs, South Sudan NGOs, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and community-based organisations registered in South Sudan). The South Sudan CHF is structured around 13 priority clusters, of which WASH is one. Since 2012, more than \$260 million have been disbursed through the CHF South Sudan. Major contributors to the fund are the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, and Australia.

For more information, see: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/HSS10>

The **Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)** is a global fund established in 2006 to enable fast delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to millions of people affected by natural disasters and other crises. It receives voluntary contributions year-round to provide immediate funding for life-saving humanitarian action from donors – mainly governments, but also foundations, companies, charities and individuals.

In 2014, South Sudan was the largest recipient of CERF funds – totalling \$53.7 million or 11.65% of the total. WASH started becoming a focus of CERF allocations as of June 2014, mostly in response to the cholera outbreak (South Sudan CHF 2014).

For more information on the CERF see: www.unocha.org/cerf

Table 1: Humanitarian WASH interventions funded by the CHF

Year	Allocated funds	Main receiving states	Main donors	WASH
2012	\$113 m	Upper Nile (31%), Unity (16%), Warrap (14%), Jonglei (12%), NBEG (10%)	UK (49.7 m), Netherlands (20 m), Sweden (19.1 m), Norway (12.1 m)	\$12.9 (21%)
2013	\$89.6 m	Jonglei (25%), Upper Nile (17%), Unity (15%), Lakes (15%), Central Equatoria (12%)	UK (45.9 m), Sweden (14.0 m), Norway (8.7 m)	\$12.0 m (13%)
2014	\$134.9 m	Jonglei *27%), Unity (22%), Upper Nile (18%), Juba (14%), Lakes (9%)	UK (42.5 m), Sweden (33.2 m), Netherlands (15.7 m), Norway (11.4 m)	\$29.6 m (22%)
2015 (as of July)	\$63.1 m	Unity (29%), Upper Nile (23%), Jonglei (23%), Lakes (10%), Central Equatoria (7%)	UK (36.1 m), Sweden (7.1 m), Norway (6.4 m), Netherlands (5.3 m)	\$9 m (14%)

Source: www.unocha.org/south-sudan/common-humanitarian-fund/reports-and-infographics

To date, most of the WASH activities in South Sudan have been channelled through humanitarian mechanisms and delivered by non-state service providers, thus largely bypassing state institutions (see Box 4).²⁸ In addition to the CHF, a number of bilateral agencies also fund WASH humanitarian and development interventions. For example, USAID’s Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance allocated \$110 million to the South Sudan crisis in 2014; 30% of this amount went to fund WASH interventions, including to contain

²⁸ A list of the WASH projects supported by the CHF in 2014 is available here: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/SouthSudan/2015_SouthSudan/List%20of%20CHF%20supported%20projects.pdf

the cholera outbreak, rehabilitate boreholes, water trucking and the construction of emergency latrines and hand-washing stations in internally displaced person (IDP) camps (USAID 2014). As of July 2015, the percentage of funding for WASH declined to 24% and was primarily directed to address the cholera outbreak in Juba County. Some of the WASH interventions in Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites in Upper Nile and other states affected by open conflict (generally referred to as ‘red states’) had to be suspended for security reasons (USAID 2015). The European Commission also allocated €217.5 million in 2015 to the South Sudan crisis; its WASH interventions amounted to €15 million, generally aimed at increasing the availability of water and sanitation facilities for uprooted populations (ECHO 2015).²⁹

The WASH Cluster, led by UNICEF, is the main vehicle through which humanitarian funds were allocated and interventions were decided and coordinated at the country and state levels.³⁰ Clusters comprise UN agencies, international and national non-governmental organisations (INGOs/NNGOs) that receive humanitarian budget; other ‘development’ NGOs and government authorities are not involved. When the conflict broke out in December 2013, the initial WASH response consisted of delivering water and sanitation services to IDPs, refugees and the general population across the country. Currently, and in line with the updated 2015 HRP, activities have expanded to cover hygiene promotion in schools and other institutions, and improved sanitation through increasing the number of open defecation-free (ODF) villages and scaling up the implementation of Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS). The WASH Cluster also focuses on the enabling environment for WASH, and is supporting the Water Information Management System (WIMS) for data collection and data exchange between the states and the central WIMS unit based in Juba.³¹ The WASH Cluster has a dedicated website, and a WASH Cluster Google Group has been recently set up to ease the communication and sharing of information between partners.³²

A similar coordination mechanism, the WASH Donor Group (WASH DoG) also exists on the development side. It suspended its functions as of 2014, but resumed them at the beginning of 2015.

Box 4: The role of the South Sudanese Government in WASH service supply and delivery

The water and sanitation sector lead in South Sudan is the Ministry of Electricity, Dams, Irrigation and Water Resources (MEDIWR). The MEDIWR has the mandate to enact regulations and policies on rural water and sanitation and urban water supply programmes. Its institutional set-up is strongly interlinked with the federal and decentralised administrative system of local government, established in 2009.

However, in practice, the lower tiers of Government have not yet been harmonised with the institutional needs of the sector; each of the ten state Ministries of Physical Infrastructure has a Water Resources Management and Irrigation Directorate and a Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Directorate (Kooy and Wild 2012) – although it is worth noting that these Ministries and Directorates have different denominations in different states (for example, it is the Ministry of Water, Cooperatives and Rural Development in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State).

The institutional framework for urban sanitation is even more complex – at least six Government ministries at both national and state levels are involved in the regulation of this sub-sector, including the MEDIWR, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Physical Planning, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Environment (USAID/SUWASA 2015).

²⁹ Data from UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS), <https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emergencyDetails&appealID=1062>

³⁰ For more information about the WASH Cluster in South Sudan, see its brochure at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/South%20Sudan%20WASH%20Cluster%20Advocacy%20Leaflet_11%20Feb%202014.pdf

³¹ Information from various interviews with UNICEF staff, held from 3 to 12 August 2015 in Juba.

³² See: <https://sites.google.com/site/washclustersouthsudan>

Besides the fragmented institutional mandate, the MEDIWR suffers from limited capacity (in turn due to high staff turnover, low salaries and incentives structure) and budget limitations that have prevented it from playing a significant role in the water sector. This is especially true at state and county levels, where problems have been exacerbated by the recent conflict, forcing people (including Government staff) out of the rebel-held areas.

Interviews with different donors and INGOs in Juba revealed that, when the conflict broke out in 2013, most agencies suspended development WASH activities and redirected funds and staff to emergency WASH.³³ At least from the donors' side, this was 'to better respond to the dire needs of the population – as of December 2013, we were not talking about creating Water User Committees to maintain boreholes anymore, but about saving the life of people fleeing out of conflict.'³⁴ One respondent explained that, like many other organisations, they had to adapt to the new funding context: 'We have had WASH projects in the Northern Bahr el Ghazal State for more than 10 years; we are now specifically targeting returnee communities there, so that we can frame our activities as 'humanitarian' and receive funding through the WASH Cluster, otherwise they would not even invite us to their meeting.'³⁵

Several interviewees highlighted moral and practical difficulties of engaging with the Government due to its participation in the conflict. This was seen as a significant obstacle to continuing investments in development WASH in South Sudan, together with the perceived limited capacity and resources of Government staff at both national and local levels.³⁶ For example, donors like USAID largely suspended development work after December 2013, and stopped their collaboration with the MEDIWR and SSUWC initiated in 2012 under their \$8 million WASH programme. USAID's 2013-2018 WASH Programme³⁷ never really kicked off as the position of WASH program manager at USAID's Juba office remained vacant until August 2015.³⁸ Similarly, the African Development Bank had a plan to invest in 11 small and medium towns' water supply and sanitation facilities. The programme was supposed to run from September 2013 to December 2015 (28 months) and \$3.7 million had been committed to the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (AFDB 2013).³⁹ Once again, the programme was suspended due to the resumption of conflict in 2013.⁴⁰

There nonetheless appears to be some geographic differences in how far organisations are willing to engage with the RoSS: 'In some states more than others you can still work with local governments and communities; the so-called 'green states' have been less affected by the conflict, but their people still face important needs, if you do not continue addressing them, you risk to cause even more emergencies.'⁴¹

³³ Due to the limited time that the team of researchers spent in Juba, a number of relevant actors (e.g. World Bank, AFDB, UNDP, GIZ) could not be interviewed and hence their views are not incorporated in this report, despite their previous and present involvement in the WASH sector in South Sudan.

³⁴ Citation from interview with representative of UNICEF, held on 7 October 2015 in Juba.

³⁵ Citation from interview with representative of INGO, held on 6 October 2015 in Juba.

³⁶ Information from several interviewees from donors' organisations and UN agencies held between 3 and 12 August in Juba.

³⁷ USAID's draft WASH Programme 2013-2018 can be accessed here:

www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20South%20Sudan%20Draft%20Water,%20Sanitation%20and%20Hygiene%20Program%202013-2018.pdf

³⁸ Information from interview with USAID programme officer held on 6 August 2015 in Juba.

³⁹ The full project document is available at: www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/South_Sudan_-_Small_and_Medium_Towns_Water_Supply_and_Sanitation_Feasibility_Study_and_Detailed_Design.pdf

⁴⁰ Information from interview with an independent consultant, held on 8th August 2015 in Juba.

⁴¹ Citation from interview with respondent from bilateral organisation, held on 5 August 2015 in Juba.

Box 5: UNICEF's role in WASH

UNICEF plays a lead role in WASH in South Sudan, both as a humanitarian and development actor.

In response to the 2013 crisis, UNICEF refocused its 2014 country programme to prioritise the delivery of humanitarian aid and relief (UNICEF 2014). UNICEF adopted a variety of strategies both inside Protection of Civilian (PoC) and internally displaced persons (IDPs) sites and in hard to reach areas, such as the introduction of the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), in partnership with the World Food Programme. Technical specialists from UNICEF and partners assessed and immediately responded to the situation on the ground, reaching otherwise inaccessible locations with few or no NGOs. Thirty-four RRM missions were undertaken in 2014, reaching 603,000 people, often in contested or opposition-controlled area (UNICEF 2014). Due to the scale and urgency of humanitarian needs, UNICEF focused its WASH programme on immediate life-saving responses, increasing the delivery of supplies and services with partners and direct implementation (UNICEF 2014).

In the first half of 2015, UNICEF also started working with other sectors (child protection, health and education) to expand the scope of WASH interventions in areas such as the reintegration process of child soldiers, WASH in schools and health facilities, and the cholera response. It further strengthened its strategic leadership and alliances with government and NGOs through the WASH Cluster, in order to ensure a more timely and coordinated response to the crisis.

Some significant results have been reported. For example, the scaling up of CLTS in the states of Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal has led to increased demand for sanitation coverage; hygiene promotion and awareness creation campaigns conducted during the cholera outbreak reached 1.2 million people; and more than 1 million beneficiaries in PoCs and hard to reach areas have been provided with essential WASH supplies.⁴²

If donors and INGOs have withdrawn from developmental WASH due to the difficulty of long-term programming and engagement in South Sudan, humanitarian WASH interventions have not been an easy task either. UNICEF and other members of the WASH Cluster reported increasing challenges to their capacity to deliver WASH services to the people in need. Continuous fighting in the so-called 'red' states of Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity has made it difficult to access people in need; the continuous influx of IDPs to PoCs has put increased pressure on existing WASH facilities including in the 'green' states that have not been directly affected by the conflict so far. The following general conditions have arisen as a consequence of the conflict that broke out in December 2013 and have been reported to continue throughout 2014 and 2015 (as of August 2015):

- Conflict and access: Shooting or shelling has been a high risk.
- Economic situation: South Sudan is undergoing economic stress. This further compounds the already high costs of doing business in the country and poses security risks to operations. This may lead to reduced opportunities to recruit and retain high calibre international staff.
- Supply routes: Logistics are a major challenge in South Sudan with poor road networks, many of which are impassable during the rainy season.

Table 2 presents a summary of the bottlenecks that UNICEF and its partners admitted to face in 2013 compared to the situation in 2015; the conflict has worsened most of the challenges.

⁴² Data from presentations given by UNICEF staff at the RoSS/UNICEF Mid-Year Review and Planning meeting that took place in Juba on 5-6 August 2015.

Table 2: Bottlenecks, before (2013) and after (2015) the conflict

Challenges to WASH interventions	Bottlenecks in 2013 (before the conflict)	Bottlenecks in 2015 (ongoing conflict)
<p>Capacity – Limited capacity of staff in governments, NGOs at national and local levels. The ethnic dimension of conflict limits use of national staff from outside of local areas. Most of the service delivery is undertaken by international agencies.</p>	<p>Inadequate staff (numbers and capacity) at local government level, low salaries, high turnover rates.</p>	<p>Worse. Local government staffing remains insufficient and has limited capacity. Some local government staff had to leave rebel-held areas.</p>
<p>Technology and infrastructure options – Limited existing water and sanitation infrastructure throughout the country; limited technology options.</p>	<p>Communities have limited choice of WASH technologies (especially in rural areas).</p>	<p>Worse. The conflict has reinforced the tendency of international partners to deliver the technology they want, without consulting with communities. The provision of free spare parts and subsidies causes dependency from international aid.</p>
<p>Enabling environment – An updated and coherent institutional and policy framework is lacking.</p>	<p>An updated WASH sector assessment is missing. Innovation in WASH sector and promotion of WASH sector are still lagging behind.</p>	<p>Same. Last comprehensive WASH strategy was in 2011; needs to be updated.</p>
<p>Markets – Due to limited infrastructure, markets are limited, particularly in the rural areas. Very limited local procurement is possible.</p>	<p>Lack of supply chain and its regulation, and spare parts availability; if there is a breakdown of the system, communities cannot easily go to the market and get the spare parts.</p>	<p>Worse. Because of the conflict, supplies cannot reach communities, and prices have become too high as a consequence of currency deflation and South Sudan's import dependency, in addition to 'informal' taxes at road blocks.</p>
<p>Cost – Transport costs, costs of living, and cost of goods are all high in South Sudan.</p>	<p>Private sector engagement is very weak.</p>	<p>Worse. Even the limited private sector that was present before the conflict has reduced its operation; pump mechanics cannot do their work due to insecurity.</p>
<p>Communications – The connectivity between Juba and field offices is limited. Greater investments in radio and communications equipment in field sites is required.</p>	<p>WIMS exists, but very weak. WIMS is in MEDIWR, with support of UNICEF, but capacity challenges.</p>	<p>Same. The WIMS remains weak. All data and information from NGOs and international organisations were supposed to be transferred to government in 2013, this did not happen because attention shifted to emergency response (typically with no formal data reporting requirements).</p>

Source: Adapted by the authors from Graham (2015) and information obtained from RoSS/UNICEF Mid-Year Review and Planning meeting that took place in Juba on 5-6 August 2015.

4 Structural determinants of the siloes in South Sudan

Before considering ways to ‘bridge’ development and humanitarian WASH in South Sudan, however, it is important to understand what structural features have kept humanitarian ‘cowboys’ and development ‘bureaucrats’ apart to date.⁴³ We identify six key determinants from our interviews – drivers that inhibit greater complementarity and coordination between humanitarian and developmental WASH interventions.

4.1 Differing modalities for service delivery follow from contrasting missions

A first and most visible difference between the two siloes lies in the way they operate on the ground, which appears to stem from differing missions. Emergency interventions typically provide water and sanitation goods and services for free to save lives in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. Development programmes meanwhile aim to operate on a longer-term basis and emphasise cost-sharing and cost-recovery schemes by working with local actors (e.g. communities and community-based organisations, local authorities and governments).⁴⁴ Table 3 summarises other characteristics of ‘typical’ humanitarian and development WASH modalities in South Sudan. Our contention is that many of the differing modalities stem from contrasting missions (the first row in Table 3). A note of caution is needed, as in practice the two categories often overlap, as the more detailed cases considered in this section illustrate; humanitarian funding may go to projects that have some development traits, and vice versa. While Table 3 presents stereotypes, however, it is a picture confirmed by our interviews and research.

⁴³ Quote from interview with (anonymous) respondent at global level, conducted by ODI researchers in July 2015.

⁴⁴ Information from interviews with various stakeholders, held in August 2015 in Juba.

Table 3: Humanitarian and development ‘typical’ WASH approaches in South Sudan

	Humanitarian WASH in South Sudan	Development WASH in South Sudan
Mission	‘Save lives’ imperative and meet urgent needs: focus on rapid service delivery, e.g. emergency WASH support to IDPs and conflict-affected and vulnerable host communities, lifesaving WASH to crisis-affected IDPs and returnees, prepositioning of core pipeline WASH emergency supplies to enhance the sector’s preparedness and response.	Empower beneficiaries, support ownership and participation in service delivery (e.g. through establishment of Water User and Sanitation Committees), attempts at cost sharing and cost recovery, behavioural change programmes (hygiene promotion campaigns, GBV prevention), capacity-building to and collaboration with governmental authorities (to set up enabling framework, build capacities and expertise).
Service delivery modalities	Distribution of kits and vouchers. Off-shore procurement. UN agencies and INGOs partner with NNGOs to implement interventions (subcontractor-like relationship, direct implementation in some cases); government is often ‘by-passed’, focus is more on service delivery that ownership and capacity-building.	Self-supply, self-help, self-construction. Local procurement. UN agencies and INGOs work with NNGOs and CBOs, partnerships with Government (at national level for interventions aimed at setting or modifying the enabling environment; at state level for service delivery); emphasise on capacity-building.
Geography	Focus on ‘red states’ and IDP settlements / PoCs.	Focus on ‘green states’ – where conditions are stable, and preferably long-term (pre-conflict) presence.
Programme management approaches	Short-term programming: 3-6 months, simple monitoring and evaluation requirements, focused on results (e.g. # of people reached)	Long-term programming cycle: 3-5 years, complex logframe/theory of change, M&E focused on outputs, outcomes and impacts.
Funding sources	CHF, CERF and bilateral donors.	Mostly bilateral donors.
Guiding documents	Strategy based on HRP, coordination in WASH Cluster (led by UNICEF).	2011 WASH strategy updated; WASH DoG recently resumed its activities (one meeting at the beginning of 2015).

Source: Author information from desk-based research and in-country interviews.

4.2 Geographic separation reinforces lack of communication and integration

The different operational objectives of humanitarian and development interventions are one of the typical causes of the divide between the two. Humanitarians ‘save lives’; development people empower people to meet their own needs in the long-term. In the case of South Sudan, these different mandates have translated into a clear geographical separation of the interventions, especially since the beginning of the 2013 conflict. Humanitarian actors mainly operate in the three ‘red’ states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, or in PoCs and IDP sites.⁴⁵ Development actors continue working with rural communities in the ‘green’ states (see Figure 2). ‘Funding is available for emergency response, which constrains the geographical focus of our projects’, one respondent from an INGO said.⁴⁶ However, while the needs of IDPs and communities in the states of Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile, where humanitarian actors concentrate, are undoubtedly very high, low access rates to water and sanitation services also characterise the ‘green’ states. For example, according to the 2009 South Sudan Household Survey (NBS 2012), before the conflict, Lakes and Jonglei states actually had the highest percentage of people with access to an improved water source (71% and 67%, respectively). The lowest percentages were in Unity and Western Equatoria states (35% and 40%), but very low percentages were also recorded in the states of Western Bahr el Ghazal (45%) and Central Equatoria (51%) (NBS 2012).⁴⁷

Familiarity is also a factor influencing where WASH actors choose to work. Often, especially for smaller organisations with limited resources, a criterion to select the intervention area is ‘staying where we have worked before, as we know the communities, who we can work with and who we can’t; it is easier and less expensive than starting work from scratch’.⁴⁸ These organisations admitted that they would at least modify their focus of operation towards meeting the immediate needs emerging from the conflict, for example working with refugees rather than host communities, so as to attract humanitarian funding. Overall, it seems the WASH Cluster cannot always guarantee the coordination that is required to avoid the concentration of multiple actors in one region, and the underservice of others.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ In collaboration with UNMISS, UN agencies and INGOs are providing assistance and protection to an average of up to 140,000 people per day at six UN Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites in five states, as of June 2015 (HRP 2015). In theory, PoC sites, established by the UNMISS when the conflict broke out in December 2013, were conceived to only provide refuge for civilians ‘under threat of physical violence’. Thus, they differed from IDP camps gathering all those who are forced from their homes due to conflict. In reality, however, there has been little difference between the status of IDPs sheltered at UNMISS bases and those in other settlements elsewhere (Lilly 2014).


⁴⁶ Citation from interview with WASH programme officer at Action Against Hunger, held on 6 August 2015 in Juba.

⁴⁷ Based on distance to nearest water source. Source: NBS (2012).

⁴⁸ Citation from interview with INGO, held on 5 August 2015 in Juba.

⁴⁹ Information from various interviews with staff of INGOs held between 6 and 12 August 2015 in Juba.

Figure 2: Number of WASH Cluster partners present in each county of South Sudan, as of May 2015



Source: ReliefWeb
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wash_partners_may10_2015.pdf

4.3 Unstable politics and insecurity lead to (justifiable) risk aversion

When asked how to ensure more complementarity between humanitarian and development WASH interventions in South Sudan, a respondent from UN OCHA replied that ‘there is nothing to bridge to and from – WASH funding in the country is predominantly dedicated to responding to the current crisis; we need to save lives first of all’.⁵⁰ Besides the cases of bilateral agencies funding development WASH projects described in Section 2, most WASH interventions in South Sudan have become predominantly short-term, focused on life-saving measures, and largely setting aside concerns about long-term sustainability, or potential for resilience-building. This does not mean that development partners have been robbed of resources and pushed out of the country by their humanitarian colleagues. Part of the reason why development WASH interventions have been drastically reduced is also because agencies have not been able to adapt to the conflict – and the political, economic, demographic, societal changes it triggered. As such, they have resorted to conventional and relatively narrow humanitarian activities in the face of significantly increased risks.

The political and security situation in South Sudan remains unpredictable and volatile. Especially in the states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, but increasingly also Lakes and Northern Bahr el Ghazal, it has become increasingly difficult to reach the population in need with even basic water and sanitation supplies. Violence also causes a constantly growing number of IDPs fleeing their villages and moving into other villages, camps, or PoCs. As a consequence, long-term planning and participatory approaches, two cornerstones of traditional development WASH interventions, cannot be realised. ‘In Melut, we invested a lot of resources to build water supply systems and sanitation facilities to support 40,000 IDPs’, one representative of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure of Upper Nile State

⁵⁰ Citation from interview with representative of UN OCHA, held on 11 August 2015 in Juba.

reported, ‘then the rebels arrived from Malakal, the IDPs had to run away, and all these facilities have been abandoned, some destroyed’.⁵¹ ‘In Malakal, the local government had to flee and relocate to Renk – in this context, all perspectives of participatory approaches for sustainable WASH supply vanish’, added a UNICEF staff member.⁵² Another consequence of the difficult security situation and inaccessibility of certain areas, combined with the economic crisis that is hitting South Sudan, is that logistics has become very expensive. Therefore, as one programme officer at UNICEF put it, ‘for donors it is not good value for money to invest in South Sudan; they can obtain many more results at a lower cost in countries like Bangladesh and Nepal.’⁵³

4.4 Timescales and funding channels of the wider development-humanitarian ‘architecture’ are unaligned

In the context of rapid change, the time dimension of humanitarian and development modalities is also important to consider. The long-term project cycles and elaborated reporting mechanisms that are employed in development programmes do not allow for rapid changes of strategy. The Common Humanitarian Fund, meanwhile, makes allocations twice a year. Other humanitarian donors have even shorter timeframes, for example funding interventions for three months only. This discourages long-term programming: ‘There has not been room for development programming here since 2013; we can work with NGO partners for maximum six months, then we have to stop and start another project, eventually with another partner – if your goal is, for example, behavioural change, which is by definition long-term, you are doomed to failure,’ said one programme officer at UNICEF.⁵⁴ The fragmentation of humanitarian and development WASH interventions is compounded by the lack of oversight of what especially INGOs and NNGOs are doing, according to some respondents.⁵⁵

It would appear that a middle ground is needed between the flexibility of humanitarian funding vehicles and the persistence of developmental ones. Crises are processes rather than single events, which can persist in time and have mid- to long-term consequences inevitably changing the status quo. Typical cases in point are IDP settlements and Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites. Conceived as temporary refuges for people fleeing their homes, they tend to stay there for months, even years. ‘With hindsight, more sustainable solutions than water trucking could have been found to deliver water in PoCs, but the government was against drilling boreholes there, as they were supposed to be short-term solutions; nobody could foresee the camps would have been there for more than one year,’ said an international aid worker.⁵⁶ At the same time, more permanent solutions in what should be temporary settlements risk creating new artificial communities, leading to competition with host communities and dispossessing people of their existing land rights.

⁵¹ Citation from interview with representative of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure of Upper Nile State, held on 4 August 2015 in Juba.

⁵² Citation from interview with representative of UNICEF, held on 4 August 2015 in Juba.

⁵³ Citation from interview with representative of UNICEF, held on 7 August 2015 in Juba.

⁵⁴ Citation from interview with UNICEF staff, held on 7 August 2015 in Juba.

⁵⁵ Information from various interviews and conversations with staff of UN agencies, held in Juba and London in August and September 2015. Danaert et al. (2014) reached the same conclusion for the state of Northern Bahr el Ghazal: ‘as there are no formal reporting requirements for organisations involved in WASH, the WASH Cluster meetings provide the main way to find out what they are doing, and where, how and what is planned’ (p. 13).

⁵⁶ Citation from interview with WASH Programme Officer at ACTED, held on 3 August 2015 in Juba.

4.5 Scarcity of resources breeds competition rather than collaboration

In the view of several respondents, competition for resources for WASH in South Sudan is intensifying. Levels of the CHF have dropped in 2015, due to the competition with other crises such as the ones in Syria and Yemen; ‘South Sudan is not sexy to donors anymore, they grew tired of hearing the same story of failed peace negotiations over and over’, argued one interviewee from a UN agency.⁵⁷ This has created a real ‘rush for money’, in the words of a respondent from a national NGO, ‘which obliges you to submit a project proposal every three months; there is no time to assess the real needs on the ground, or for thinking of alternative, more sustainable interventions you could do, the most important thing is that your proposal is in line with the humanitarian agenda of the CHF.’⁵⁸ In absence of adequate funding, this process could inspire competition and diminish trust between agencies, decreasing the ability of the clusters to support coordination in the long run (Campbell and Knox Clarke 2015: 45).

Given limits to total funding, the CHF’s processes and priorities can be justified: ‘the terms of reference of the CHF are quite clear: it is about life saving, emergency interventions. The priority should go to projects that fulfil these criteria, resilience-building and sustainability are secondary concerns’ (UN OCHA representative).⁵⁹ A 2015 evaluation of the CHF nonetheless recognised that the current number of small projects funded across numerous sectors through an annual decision process, with changing priorities each year, does not reflect a strategic approach, especially when amounts are uncertain and partners have no guarantee of follow-on funding (OCHA 2015). On a more positive note, shrinking funding could encourage prioritisation and an increased coordination of interventions for example through the cluster (UN OCHA representative).⁶⁰ Overall, finance (who finances, and what is financed) seems to have an enormous influence on what intervention can be implemented effectively in South Sudan.

4.6 Different people, behaviours, personalities underlie opposing organisational cultures

‘It all comes down to people’, commented one interviewee from an INGO; ‘the current aid system is personality-driven, and this is true for humanitarian and development organisations, for WASH and other sectors.’⁶¹ Often, it is individual personalities that lead the agenda. Some respondents observed that, for example, the appointment of a programme manager with a development background in an organisation primarily doing emergency interventions helped maintain a focus on long-term sustainability, community participation, and involvement of government authorities.⁶² Even when humanitarian and development professionals share similar backgrounds – such as engineering, or social development, or logistics – it seems that they rarely perceive the complementarity of their skillsets. Instead, ‘everyone should be trained on how to work in conflict situations; and everyone should know the context in which they are operating.’⁶³

These statements indicate that people and their professional background and experience influence both the programming and implementation of WASH (and other) interventions in South Sudan. They also stress that the recruitment policies and job descriptions of both the

⁵⁷ Citation from interview with UNICEF staff, held on 4 August 2015 in Juba.

⁵⁸ Citation from interview with NNGO respondent, held on 6 August 2015 in Juba.

⁵⁹ Citation from interview with UN OCHA representative, held on 11 August 2015 in Juba.

⁶⁰ See also: Campbell and Knox Clarke (2015)

⁶¹ Interview with WASH Programme Manager in an international NGO, held on 3 August 2015 in Juba.

⁶² Information from interviews with respondents from SDC and Dutch Embassy, held in August 2015 in Juba.

⁶³ Information from interviews with respondents from UNICEF, held on 7 August 2015 in Juba.

humanitarian and development sectors may not be the most appropriate to ensure that the right people are in place to deal with complex situations. In particular, interviewees noted that humanitarian staff are usually employed on short-term contracts; ‘they come, do their thing, and leave; they do not have time and incentives to understand the context in which they are operating; to them, South Sudan and Afghanistan are the same thing.’⁶⁴ Because of the difficult living conditions of international humanitarian and development aid workers in South Sudan, people tend to stay one or two years maximum. ‘After the outbreak of the conflict in 2013, expat life in Juba has become more and more regulated; we live in our aid bubble, which can be a bit suffocating at times’, a NGO worker said. He added that: ‘South Sudan is a great place to advance your career, but not a great place to work and live in general.’⁶⁵ In this context of rapid staff turnover and consequent loss of institutional memory, it is difficult to implement long-term programmes.

⁶⁴ Citation from interview with respondent from an INGO, held in August 2015 in Juba.

⁶⁵ Citation from interview with respondent from an INGO, held in August 2015 in Juba.

5 Attempts to improve complementarity

As the discussion above highlighted, especially since the breakout of the conflict in December 2013, WASH interventions in South Sudan have tended to be oriented towards providing humanitarian aid and relief. Because of the protracted nature of the crisis, however, there is awareness and recognition amongst donors and international and national organisations in the country that short-term interventions are not enough anymore, and in some cases risk doing more harm than good, for example by creating aid dependency within communities and the government. Some attempts at bringing more complementarity between humanitarian and development WASH approaches in South Sudan exist, demonstrating that development programmes can continue to be implemented in crisis contexts, and humanitarian aid can be delivered in such a way as to increase the impacts and benefits of its interventions in the medium to longer term. A selection of examples are presented below to highlight success factors and lessons learned that can be helpful to WASH actors in South Sudan and other protracted crisis situations.

5.1 UNICEF: integrating and partnering around focal challenges

The UNICEF South Sudan Country Office is well aware that the current crisis will not be solved with the signature of a peace agreement. Our interviewees there recognised that while emergency interventions are a priority, longer-term development approaches to WASH and other basic service delivery are also required, ‘or all the money we have been investing in this country in the past decade, for example through the MDTF, will go to waste’, as one UNICEF staff member put it.⁶⁶ At the same time, continuously having to respond to one crisis after the other does not allow for strategic thinking to occur: ‘We know we should do more to bring in a sustainability dimension to our work, but we also have to respond to the needs of thousands of IDPs fleeing into PoCs every day, we have a cholera epidemic going on in Juba, we have children dying of water-borne diseases, malnutrition rates ramping up; we do not have time to think’.⁶⁷ Still, in practice, UNICEF’s interventions provide some useful illustrations of how the provision of emergency WASH can have positive long-term implications to the benefit of communities and people.

By focusing on a particular dimension of the overall crisis that encapsulates the risks of a longer-term outlook, namely the cholera outbreak in Juba, UNICEF has succeeded in mobilising a more coordinated response. ‘Raising awareness of the fact that the cholera crisis happens every year in Juba because there is no WASH infrastructure was a good way to make donors interested in funding WASH interventions that went beyond the provision of drinking

⁶⁶ Citation from interview with UNICEF staff, held on 7 August 2015 in Juba.

⁶⁷ Citation from interview with UNICEF staff, held on 7 August 2015 in Juba.

water in PoCs.⁶⁸ Working with other UN agencies and NGOs in the WASH and health sectors, and collaborating with the Ministry of Health and other Government counterparts in the framework of the cholera task force, UNICEF implemented a number of WASH activities focused on hygiene promotion and behavioural change, which contributed to the emergency response, but are conceived so as also to help prevent future outbreaks. For instance, while conducting vaccination campaigns in crowded PoC sites, UNICEF is working through its ‘WASH in Schools’ programme in Central Equatoria to educate teachers and students on the importance of handwashing with soap and safe handling of food. UNICEF and partners are broadcasting cholera prevention messages and hosting talk shows on radio stations and putting up posters in schools and public locations, reaching more than 40,000 households as of June 2015.⁶⁹ Worthy of mention is also UNICEF’s initiative in 2013 to stop the supply of free spare parts to state governments in South Sudan aimed at avoiding situations of dependency and encouraging the emergence of market-based mechanisms within communities (Danaert 2013).

5.2 Bilateral donors: determination to pursue a long-term agenda

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) identified a niche for development work in Juba, where urban infrastructures such as roads and water supply facilities are greatly lacking. Using Official Development Assistance, JICA is collaborating with the South Sudan Urban Water Corporation (SSUWC) for the construction of a new water treatment plant for Juba City. The initial study for this project was done in 2009, but plans had to be interrupted because of the crisis. They have been resumed in 2015. In the pipeline, JICA also has a technical training programme to be delivered to the SSUWC in various locations (Juba, Wau, Maridi, Bor, Malakal, and Yei) which will start in 2016. A JICA staff member reported that ‘the operational model of JICA is geared more towards development and direct cooperation with the government; investing in the water infrastructure in Juba is key to prevent emergencies to happen in the first place. Not enough is being done in this sense, especially in cities, we wanted to fill a gap.’⁷⁰

The work of the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) in South Sudan presents another interesting case of maintaining a humanitarian and development portfolio of activities. Before 2013, the SDC was conducting numerous development projects with a focus on WASH, food security and protection. When the conflict broke out, its budget was partly reoriented to humanitarian aid. In 2012, the SDC spent CHF 0.96 million in bilateral development cooperation versus CHF 8.63 million in humanitarian aid; development cooperation dropped to CHF 0.75 million in 2013, while humanitarian interventions were boosted up to a total of CHF 12.45 million.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the SDC decided to maintain a development focus in its WASH project in Aweil, in Northern Bahr el Ghazal state.

Started in 2010, the project was conceived around a hardware component, consisting of drilling boreholes to provide drinking water for the communities, and a software component, building the capacity of government staff to manage the boreholes and deliver the services to its citizens. ‘The project was going very well; by 2013 we were in its third phase, but then the conflict broke out. We stopped our activities for a while, then in March 2014 we went back to Aweil, assessed the situation and noted that the government and communities were still there and willing to work with us, not much had changed for them. So we went back and will be there until 2017. It would have been an incredible waste of money and efforts if we just

⁶⁸ Citation from interview with UNICEF staff, held on 7 August 2015 in Juba.

⁶⁹ Information from key interviews with various staff of UNICEF, held between 5 and 6 August 2015 in Juba.

⁷⁰ Interview held on 7 August 2015 in Juba.

⁷¹ Source: SDC’s website: www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/countries/horn-africa/south-sudan.html

dropped five years of work there because of the conflict in other states,’ commented a project manager at SDC.⁷² A careful local conflict analysis and assessment of capacities, security, and needs, was required to ensure the project could successfully continue and deliver the desired results. ‘Doing mid-term evaluations of your development programme is generally a best practice, it allows you to understand what needs to be done and how,’ the same respondent recommended.⁷³ The drive and commitment to development cooperation of SDC staff, and their long-term engagement in Aweil were also crucial factors that ensured the project was not dropped when circumstances on the ground changed.

Another interesting initiative is the Water for Lakes Programme (W4L), a bilateral programme of €31.8 million for five years, funded by the Dutch Government as part of the bilateral programme for the water sector with the Republic of South Sudan. Taking place in the Lakes State, this programme (from November 2013 to October 2018) aims to ‘balance the development and management of natural resources, with water as an entry point, in order to contribute to national security and to reduce dependency on food aid’.⁷⁴ As part of the same programme, the Dutch Government is also funding a similar work in the Eastern Equatoria State, with a budget of €28 million for a five-year implementation period. The long-term strategy is to strengthen state governments and counties to provide WASH services and develop water resources for economic uses and set up the enabling environment that is required for local government and private sector to take up responsibility and ownership of their own development. When the conflict broke out in 2013, the Netherlands requested all partners to elaborate a conflict sensitivity analysis and to integrate conflict sensitive approaches in their methodologies, with the support of International Alert.⁷⁵ This enabled the programmes to better understand and adapt to the changed situation on the ground, thus being able to continue their activities.

5.3 INGOs: adding value to differentiate themselves from the competition

INGOs in South Sudan involved in WASH interventions denounced the increasing competition for funding especially within the cluster: ‘More and more actors want to eat a bigger slice of a smaller pie’, a respondent from an INGO said.⁷⁶ In theory, as an interviewee at UNICEF noted, ‘dwindling resources are not necessarily a bad thing; people might finally start rationalising their projects and efforts, focusing on partnerships, working more closely together on the ground.’⁷⁷ In practice, INGOs have responded to the budget cuts by reorienting their interventions to meet the needs of people in crisis, dropping off long-term developing programming cycles ‘that are not a good investment in a country like South Sudan.’⁷⁸

Still, certain INGOs are showing interesting examples of WASH programming that aim at operating in crisis environments while stimulating recovery and development. Oxfam GB, for example, are programming a ‘resilience in emergency’ approach, which aims at ‘supporting people in crisis through empowerment of affected communities and building on existing local capacity’, according to Oxfam’s WASH programme coordinator.⁷⁹ ‘In contexts like South Sudan, blueprint approaches do not work; we should have learnt our lessons from Operation Lifeline Sudan. Humanitarian interventions need an approach that is informed and

⁷² Interview held on 11 August 2015 in Juba.

⁷³ Interview held on 11 August 2015 in Juba.

⁷⁴ See W4L’s website at: www.waterforlakes.org

⁷⁵ Information from written communication with representative of Dutch Government held on 8 October 2015.

⁷⁶ Interview held on 10 August 2015 in Juba.

⁷⁷ Interview held on 7 August 2015 in Juba.

⁷⁸ Interview held on 7 August 2015 in Juba, South Sudan

⁷⁹ Interview held on 3 August 2015 in Juba.

takes account of the complexities of this context to adequately support the needs of people in continual crisis,' she added.⁸⁰ 'Oxfam's new strategy will target IDPs in informal settlements, "people on the move", host communities, as well as "at risk" populations. It will focus on localised rapid interventions that rely less heavily on complicated logistics by tapping into local resources and capacities.'⁸¹ This way, they hope that their context-relevant interventions will actively maintain and stimulate household and community resilience and have built-in transition and exit mechanisms from the planning stage.

5.4 Government and NNGOs: advocating complementarity, but increasingly bypassed

Donors, UN agencies and INGOs are not the only ones reflecting upon the question of whether and how to ensure better complementarity between humanitarian and development WASH. Government authorities and NGOs at the national and local level are also starting thinking along those lines (see Box 7). The MEDIWR and other governmental authorities in Juba in the water sector are concerned that too much humanitarian focus will divert resources from them.

There is some recognition that local and national NGOs could contribute, ensuring that development programmes maintain the degree of flexibility that is required to respond to changing circumstances on the ground. 'Local and national NGOs are often best positioned to assess the needs, constraints and available resources on the ground and hence to inform both development and humanitarian WASH interventions', commented a respondent from UNICEF.⁸² There is an increasing frustration, however, that humanitarian WASH interventions, in the spirit of acting quickly to save lives, privilege direct implementation over partnerships with local actors. The increasing competition for funding between better-equipped and resourced INGOs also means that local NGOs are cut out from budgetary allocations for example in the context of the WASH Cluster. 'At best we become contractors or sub-contractors of INGOs for 3-6 months; at worst, we are pushed out of the game', complained a respondent from a local NGO.

Box 7: A view from the states: what needs to be changed in the way in which we deliver WASH services?

During the RoSS/UNICEF Mid-term review and planning meeting that was held in Juba on 5-6 August 2015, the representatives of the State Ministries of Physical Infrastructure (Directorate of Water Supply and Sanitation) commented on what would be needed in their states to maximise the impact of WASH interventions. The points indicate an appetite on the part of decentralised levels of government to engage (and be engaged) strategically, in spite of the crisis. Below are some of the proposals they put forward:

Unity State ('red' state): Due to the high insecurity situation in our state, we need to focus on rehabilitating what is already there, we cannot drill boreholes now. Hygiene promotion with IDPs and host communities could also be done and would represent a good long-term investment.

Warrap State ('green' state): There are some political controversies here between different offices; we need to clarify responsibilities and mandates at state level first. Then we should invest more in building the capacity of government authorities, enhance our 'WASH in schools' activities (as these are very successful), and do cholera prevention.

⁸⁰ Interview held on 3 August 2015 in Juba.

⁸¹ Interview held on 3 August 2015 in Juba.

⁸² For a more thorough discussion on NGO space in South Sudan, see Helton and Morgan (2013), also available at: www.odhpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-57/maintaining-ngo-space-in-south-sudan-the-importance-of-independent-ngo-coordination-in-complex-operating-environments

Northern Bahr el Ghazal State ('green' state): We should invest in expanding the water scheme so that it can cover the areas where IDPs are located. We have been successful in reaching ODF villages; we need to scale up those interventions to reach more villages.

Jonglei State ('red' state): We could provide subsidised CLTS during the crisis as no private sector is available to provide the tools and spare parts that are required to maintain the sanitation systems. We also need to invest in a treatment system for the boreholes drilled near the river as they are experiencing water quality problems.

Eastern Equatoria State ('green' state): We should continue the drilling activities we have started in 2014 (to achieve a total of 30 boreholes) and work on guinea worm eradication, training of WASH committees, continuous cholera prevention activities, WASH in schools (10 schools), follow-up on ODF in villages, strengthen the WIMS, and invest in water quality laboratory.

From these short examples, we distil the key success factors and lessons learned in Table 4, before presenting our recommendations.

Table 4: Examples of approaches to increase the complementarity of humanitarian and development WASH approaches in South Sudan

WASH actor	Example of 'bridging' work	Factors of success/lessons learned
JICA	Capacity-building and technical assistance to government authorities on urban WASH infrastructure and management in Juba. Investments in 'development' as a requirement to prevent future crises/emergencies, especially in Juba (cholera outbreak).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identified its niche (in line with specific organisational self-identified skillset), targeted interventions Collaboration with local government partners on technical interventions (building on pre-conflict relations) Used recurrent crisis (cholera outbreak) to attract attention and resources for its planned intervention.
SDC	2010-2017 WASH development project in Aweil: both hardware and software components of the project continued when conflict broke out in order not to lose previous achievements.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Careful conflict analysis, continuous assessment of the situation on the ground, mid-term project evaluations Long-term presence/collaboration with local governments and communities (reputation and trust), presence of researcher and staff in Aweil Development background of staff/'commitment to development as preventive strategy to conflict' Co-existence of humanitarian and development WASH.
Dutch Government	Water for Lakes Programme (W4L) and Eastern Equatoria Programme: enabling environment for local government and private sector to manage water resources (WASH and productive uses).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enabling conditions for water resources management (capacity-building, institutional/policy framework) as conflict prevention measures Use of conflict sensitivity assessments to adapt project/programme characteristics to changed situation on the ground.
UNICEF	Cholera crisis: prevention and mitigation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Current cholera crisis offered evidence that longer-term, 'developmental' interventions are important for preventing further crises e.g. focused on hygiene promotion and awareness-

		<p>raising, behavioural change programmes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Importance of coordination with other UN agencies, INGOs and national government/NGOs for more far-reaching response (national cholera taskforce) • Hygiene promotion activities and behaviour change can be inscribed in emergency response interventions and have longer-term effects.
UNICEF	Integrated approach to maximise impact of WASH interventions, working with education, health, protection and nutrition.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As WASH Cluster lead, UNICEF is in a privileged position to establish partnerships with NGOs, CBOs and government, which in turn are essential to ensure interventions are sustained in the long term • Leveraged upon the multi-sector span of activities of UNICEF ('knock on other people's doors, listen to what they are doing, and work with them')
Oxfam	'Resilience in emergency' approach; to bring in sustainability dimension to WASH interventions in conflict-affected states (Northern Jonglei)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phrased 'development' language (resilience) in humanitarian terms • Strengthened and capitalised on work with local partners especially existing community structures ('work with who is there to stay') • Overcame security restrictions and logistical programmes by 'thinking locally', building on what already exists to implement an immediate response, and on people's existing coping mechanisms • Start from existing programming and think about sustainability/resilience dimension through all phases of programme cycle.
Local/national NGOs	Often engaged in delivering WASH services to communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can be more responsive to changes in situation on the ground • Can be more 'culturally aware' and easier to establish trust relations with beneficiaries • Work with 'who is there to stay.'
Government (national and local)	Key actors to set up the enabling environment for WASH supply and services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Convening power' of UNICEF can be used to facilitate coordination with other international agencies, gradually including government partners into WASH decision-making and interventions • Capacity-building programmes to empower government staff with a view to transfer competencies from international agencies.

Source: Authors.

6 Conclusion and recommendations

6.1 A starting point to increase complementarity: acknowledging and respecting difference

We have argued that the problem is less a ‘gap’ between two separate siloes, and more a lack of complementarity between these siloes, around the shared concern of effective and sustainable WASH. Water, sanitation and hygiene should be recognised as fulfilling people’s basic survival needs and rights *and* as an engine of longer-term welfare, productivity and opportunity. Agencies must fight the temptation to simplify the inevitable trade-offs that arise in complex, protracted crises, and focus instead on what can be realistically achieved to enable WASH to make its full contribution to short-term basic needs and longer-term development.

There are strong reasons for the persistence of siloes. Humanitarian and development aid programming and delivery have fundamental differences of mission, mandate and vision, manifested in separate institutional set-ups and a differing ‘mind-set’ within the two communities and the people working in them. If the lack of complementarity originates in, and is sustained by, strongly held differences in norms and values, the siloes will not be overcome by ignoring their existence. Acknowledging the validity of differences, and the real constraints that individuals and organisations face in delivering on their missions, is a first important step in constructive dialogue.

At the same time, differences between humanitarian and development communities should not be overplayed in the abstract, but rather considered on specific terms. The synthesis report for this study reveals that, at the high level, there is as much room for agreement as difference.⁸³ It is in applying norms and values in specific circumstances, such as a sectoral intervention in a particular context, that differences need to be understood, debated and reconciled.

6.2 Standing back, drawing conclusions

This paper has considered the history of South Sudan and its WASH sector, how the humanitarian and development WASH siloes have manifested and been maintained, and the recent efforts to overcome ‘siloesation’. We have compiled the information as a narrative, since, to understand where the WASH sector needs to go in South Sudan, it is important to grasp where it

⁸³ The synthesis report sets out, for example, the OCHA Humanitarian Principles and OECD DAC Principles, and considers areas of agreement and contention, with reference to plausible scenarios in delivering WASH in protracted crises.

has come from. Taking a step back, however, it is important to return to the overarching questions which underlie our analysis, set out in the Introduction in Box 2. Against these questions we would synthesise our findings as follows:

Question 1: How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their interaction up to now?

- Given the protracted nature of the crisis in South Sudan, humanitarian funding has prevailed over development funding (most development donors suspended or terminated their interventions when the conflict resumed in 2013).
- There is now a geographical concentration of funding in conflict-affected states, neglecting possibilities for longer-term development interventions in some more stable areas (the ‘green states’).
- Those responsible for humanitarian and development aid programming and delivery in South Sudan generally seem to see themselves as having differing missions, mandates and visions.
- We noted, however, that both development and humanitarian WASH agencies share the goal of delivering effective and sustainable WASH, which opens the way for complementarity in programming and implementation.

Question 2: Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian and development WASH collaborate effectively? If not, why?

- The WASH Cluster is the main coordinating structure through which pooled funds, including the CHF and CERF, are allocated; this represents an incentive for all implementing partners to regularly attend and participate in WASH Cluster meetings.
- However, the CHF funds many small projects across numerous sectors through an annual decision process, with changing priorities each year, making coordination difficult.
- Levels of the CHF and CERF have dropped in 2015, due to the competition with other crises such as those in Syria and Yemen. In the absence of adequate funding, competition between agencies can increase, and scope for collaboration and building complementarity can diminish.
- The fragmentation of both humanitarian and development WASH interventions is compounded by the lack of coordination and information sharing with regard to what partners are doing, particularly smaller actors including INGOs and NNGOs.

Question 3: How are decisions made around programming and policy within and between humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to effective action on the ground? If not, what are the underlying reasons?

- Long-term project cycles and elaborate reporting mechanisms employed in development programmes do not allow for rapid changes of strategy.
- Humanitarian funding modalities discourage long-term programming, and limit ability of implementing agencies to contract permanent staff, in turn leading to loss of institutional memory and fragmented approaches.
- Government agencies appear to be side-lined from the actual decision-making process over funding allocations and WASH interventions.

Question 4: What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and incentives?

- There is increased awareness and recognition amongst donors and international and national organisations in the country that short-term interventions are not enough anymore, and in some cases risk doing more harm than good.
- Some attempts at bringing more complementarity between humanitarian and development WASH approaches in South Sudan exist. These seem to be encouraged when WASH actors (UN agencies, INGOs, NNGOs):
 - Deliver WASH interventions in areas where they have long-term presence; hold the trust of local communities and authorities; and seek to collaborate with government offices, especially on technical matters.
 - Articulate a case for sustained international attention and funding, for example around recurrent crises such as cholera outbreaks; and then invest in prevention activities, including hygiene promotion and behavioural change that can be inscribed in emergency response interventions, but can have longer-term effects too.
 - Conduct conflict analyses and regularly monitor the situation on the ground, e.g. through mid-term project evaluations, adapting their programming rapidly to respond to changes on the ground.
 - Recruit and retain staff with experience in both humanitarian and development WASH.
 - Collaborate and/or partner with other development and humanitarian organisations in the sector as well as in other, related sectors (e.g. nutrition, health).
 - Overcome security restrictions and logistical challenges by ‘thinking locally’, capitalising and building on what exists to implement an immediate response, strengthen existing systems and building on people’s existing coping mechanisms.

6.3 Recommendations: towards common principles for WASH in crisis

With the above in mind our recommendations focus on the development of a set of ‘Common Principles for WASH in Crisis’, framed as short, targeted and actionable statements. The Common Principles are intended as ideas that both those in humanitarian and those in development siloes can subscribe to, as a basis for working towards greater complementarity.

The idea of deriving a set of Common Principles builds on several recent streams of thinking. One is the idea of ‘Doing Development Differently’, developed by ODI and others, which emphasises enabling and empowering actors to develop entrepreneurial, locally grounded responses to the challenges they face.⁸⁴ Another is the concept of evolving a simple framework to provide a bare minimum of guidance to enable contextually appropriate, innovative decision making. For example, DFID’s ‘Smart Rules’ (DFID 2015) offer a simplified, unified framework and manual to guide DFID staff throughout the programme

⁸⁴ Starting from the recognition that the outcomes of our development programmes largely depend on institutions – the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ that shape how politics works and how policies are delivered, ODI researchers recommended development actors to: i) work in problem-driven and politically informed ways, avoiding ready-made solutions but tracking down problems and proposing feasible remedies to them; ii) be adaptive and entrepreneurial, allowing for cycles of doing, failing, adapting and learning; and iii) support change that reflects local realities and is locally led (Wild et al. 2015).

cycle.⁸⁵ As another example, the food security and nutrition sector has recently produced a list of 11 general principles and concrete measures that should shape Government and development actors' efforts to meet immediate humanitarian needs while building resilient livelihoods (CFS 2015).

Arguably the most relevant example is the identification of four 'collaborative behaviours' by the Partners of Sanitation and Water for All (SWA 2015):⁸⁶

- Enhance government leadership of sector planning processes
- Strengthen and use country systems
- Use one information and mutual accountability platform
- Build sustainable water and sanitation sector financing strategies.

SWA Partners include many governments of countries that urgently need to accelerate progress on WASH, as well as key WASH agencies and other organisations supporting this endeavour (though we concede that many arguably fall in the 'development', rather than humanitarian, silo). The Collaborative Behaviours are also based on a strong evidence base, including eight country case studies, regional and global monitoring reports, and comparative analysis from other sectors. As such, they form a crucial reference point for the Common Principles for WASH in Crisis that we propose here. The Common Principles can be viewed as an elaboration on the SWA Collaborative Behaviours, for those countries where humanitarian and development WASH exist alongside each other and complementarity is an acute challenge. In these contexts, often labelled protracted crises, the lack of functioning or legitimate government can mean the Collaborative Behaviours need to be approached incrementally. Nonetheless, the Collaborative Behaviours are important encompassing ideals that both development and humanitarian WASH agencies can aim for in the long term.

Common Principles for WASH in Crisis should be deliberated and agreed between stakeholders in the country in question, based on careful consideration of complementarity, and respect for difference. It is also up to them to determine the exact content and priorities of the actions to follow to implement the Common Principles. For example, for South Sudan, we suggest that members of RoSS, the WASH Cluster and WASH Donor Group, and other important parties that may not be represented in these groups (e.g. representatives of state government) participate in the process to deliberate and agree on the Common Principles. Given its key coordination role in the WASH sector, the WASH Cluster Secretariat should initiate this process – aiming to transfer it to the government in the medium to long term. The synthesis report for this study proposes overarching guidance to support a process of deliberating and agreeing Common Principles in particular countries.

In Table 5 below we offer a set of illustrative common principles for South Sudan. We developed these principles on the basis of our observations and analysis of humanitarian and development WASH programming in South Sudan, but offer them as much to show what we mean in terms of style, as in terms of content.

The defining features of the Common Principles for WASH in Crisis can be summarised as follows.⁸⁷ In each case, two related concepts are presented alongside each other, to draw attention to the balancing act required to devise and implement Common Principles.

⁸⁵ The 'Smart Rules' are intended to 'encourage teams to focus more on the what and how of delivery and less on the why and rationale; introduce leaner documentation and processes that encourage a proportionate approach, to help people spend their time on the right things to deliver results and effectively manage risk; bring together all the information we need to comply with [DFID/ UK Government] rules in one place, which saves time and increases compliance' (DFID 2014).

⁸⁶ Also see: <http://sanitationandwaterforall.org/about/the-four-swa-collaborative-behaviours>

⁸⁷ Tbc. Synthesis report will provide overarching guidance to allow for development of 'Common Principles' for specific crises/ emergencies.

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- **Common ground / common sense:** Each principle should be rooted in *common ground*, i.e. should not contradict the core tenets of either humanitarian or development ways of working. Given real differences in these tenets, however, the principles may not be easy to agree on. The ultimate test should be: in view of all that we are trying to achieve, and the constraints we are under, is the principle compatible with *common sense*?
 - **Operationally focused / operationally viable:** The Common Principles for a sector such as WASH should be *operationally focused*, i.e. supporting the design, implementation and monitoring of WASH service delivery in protracted crises. This also means ensuring they are *operationally viable* in the face of two sets of constraints: constraints derived from the complexity and magnitude of challenges that protracted crises present; and constraints imposed by the overarching architecture for humanitarian and development policy and financing. These may change over time, and may even be influenced by action in the WASH sector. In the longer term, demonstrated successes in improving complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH may support transition from crisis, as well as inspiring more systemic reform in policy and finance – with dividends for other sectors beyond WASH.
 - **Cost neutral / cost effective:** The Common Principles should be *cost neutral* wherever possible, i.e. they should be possible to achieve in the severely constrained funding environment which characterises many protracted crises. Even more importantly, they should be *cost-effective* in the true sense of the term, i.e. geared towards maximising the depth and breadth of positive WASH outcomes (people using services, behaviour change) for the available resources.⁸⁸ Higher cost actions may be considered and justified in terms of their likely effectiveness.
 - **Just enough / good enough:** Self-evidently, there is a tension between devising principles or rules, and allowing decision-makers and practitioners the space to innovate and develop appropriate responses to locally specific challenges. The Common Principles should therefore provide ‘*just enough*’, a bare minimum framework to support decision makers and practitioners to innovate in difficult circumstances and to avoid wasting effort, time and money. In a similar spirit, they should aim for what is *good enough*, under challenging circumstances, rather than unrealistic ‘best practice’.

To kick-start a process of agreeing appropriate Common Principles for WASH in Crisis in South Sudan, we set out nine possibilities, which appear, from our analysis, to be both feasible and impactful.

⁸⁸ Ultimately, costs should be judged against impact – on health, peace, livelihoods. Framing cost-effectiveness against outcomes in a specific sector such as WASH is a reasonable compromise, however, given the challenges of measuring and attributing results to a given financial input. Note also that cost-effectiveness cannot be reduced to purely quantitative measures, e.g. the number of WASH beneficiaries for a given financial input. Quality of outcomes must also be considered – e.g. whether those beneficiaries are hard to reach, or whether outcomes are likely to be sustained – this will ensure that cost-effectiveness does not become an excuse for focusing on short-term, easy to achieve results.

Table 5: Nine illustrative Common Principles for WASH in Crisis, South Sudan

Common principle	Who it applies to	How it could be operationalised
1. Hold regular joint meetings to create space for cross-silo decision making	Members of WASH Cluster and WASH Donors Group (DoG)	Incrementally increase interactions and overlap between humanitarian and development processes and structures, from periodic update meetings; to consulting WASH Cluster/DoG counterparts for key decisions; to transitioning to a single coordination forum in time. Periodic update meetings and consultations could also be increased between WASH and other sectors, such as nutrition, protection, health, etc.
2. Develop adaptive WASH policy and planning documents	RoSS WASH agencies, Members of WASH DoG and WASH Cluster	Develop light-touch interim policy and planning documents, including operational guidance – to be reviewed yearly and based on achievable near-term targets (rather than, for example, focusing on a comprehensive update of 2011 WASH Strategy). This could include national contingency plans and/or preparedness plans that identify gaps in roles, responsibilities and capacities in the WASH sector; to be addressed through institutional and capacity-building by development actors. RoSS and WASH DoG should take the lead on developing documents with a focus on key standards for example on sector regulation and financing. WASH Cluster to be extensively consulted in preparation of these documents.
3. Strengthen WASH sector leadership within RoSS	WASH DoG and WASH Cluster	Enable leadership development within RoSS agencies for WASH e.g. by facilitating links with other sector ministries (especially Ministry of Finance) ⁸⁹ and supporting the framing of a long-term, country-led vision for WASH in South Sudan. ⁹⁰ While WASH DoG may be better positioned for deeper engagement with government, WASH Cluster members should also explore room for manoeuvre. ⁹¹
4. Encourage continuity within and between projects	WASH humanitarian and development donors	Ensure all WASH project proposals include, and are evaluated against, consideration of (i) how, where, for whom, and by whom WASH services are being delivered and what the implications are after project conclusion and over the medium term (e.g. two years); ⁹²

⁸⁹ For example, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was invited to present on the impact of current economic crisis on basic service delivery in WASH by at the recent two-day review and planning meeting of WASH interventions in South Sudan convened by UNICEF.

⁹⁰ Reference to case studies of countries that have succeeded in making this transition may be helpful – see WSP (2011).

⁹¹ For example, while engaging with central Government may contradict principles of impartiality and, it could be possible to open channels with leaders of sectoral agencies. For specific donors or implementing partners, diplomatic missions may be able to advise on windows of opportunity within a fast-evolving and contentious political situation.

⁹² The questions ‘how’, ‘where’, ‘for whom’ and ‘with whom’ provide a helpful structure to consider positive and negative consequences of an intervention, for example:

- **How?** Can this type of intervention be done if there is: active conflict, no Government counterpart or other legitimate authority, low security conditions (e.g. road security), high prices or lack of markets e.g. for spare parts, limited existing WASH infrastructure (and in what conditions?).

and (ii) what measures can be put in place to reduce adverse effects, e.g. in terms of exacerbating conflict, environmental degradation, and population displacement. Higher value proposals should include deeper consideration based on e.g. mandatory conflict and context analysis.

For short-cycle relief projects, offer 'bonus' score in proposal evaluations for projects which clearly show that they are successfully leveraging and building off existing interventions.

For longer-term projects and programmes, build in contingency windows, that can be reallocated swiftly if the context suddenly changes – these may not imply additional funding commitment, but rather earmark percentages of an existing allocation that can be repurposed in an emergency.⁹³ Development proposals with contingency plans should also be favoured in proposal evaluation processes.

5. Invest where money goes furthest	WASH humanitarian and development donors	Coordinate to allocate a proportion of total WASH funding to towns and cities that have absorbed IDPs from conflict affected areas. To strengthen urban service delivery, such investments should include capacity building for local authorities on issues such as waste management and cholera prevention. Given private sector presence in WASH has grown, filling a gap left by public provision but giving rise to quality and safety concerns, international agencies may also wish to explore regulated public-private partnerships for urban service provision, e.g. to manage water kiosks, and facilitate chlorination of water trucks.
6. Collaborate with those that are there to stay	WASH Cluster leads/ members	Involve government and NNGOs (at national and subnational levels) in preparation of major WASH Cluster planning and allocation decisions. Note that 'collaborating with' does not mean 'conforming with'; this principle may need to be put into practice sensitively, e.g. if following the recommendation of local actors, or even providing local actors with information about intended interventions, would clearly endanger life or compromise principles such as neutrality.
7. Agree common indicators and	WASH development and	Identify simple, common indicators which are relevant to both humanitarian and development WASH projects (e.g. number of new cholera incidences); monitor and

- **Where?** What is the hydrological and geological context, what is the settlement type now and in future (urban/rural/ small town; IDP camp/PoC/ host communities)?
- **With whom?** Who are potential partners, enablers and blockers to WASH service delivery? What is the water governance structure at local level, i.e. who is in charge, do conflicts occur around water points and/or other water infrastructure? Given the context and capacities/resources available, is it possible to partner up with other international agencies (e.g. if they have already established presence on the ground), communities, NGOs, local/national government, the private sector?
- **For whom?** What is the level of need? What is the likely capacity of local populations to collaborate to support operations and maintenance? How are different groups excluded or included in the benefits and responsibilities of service provision? What is the potential for benefits to be captured by particular groups (including access to services but also rents e.g. from monopolising markets for spare parts)?

⁹³ For example, the World Bank's Contingent Emergency Response Component under the Immediate Response Mechanism allows International Development Assistance lending to be rapidly repurposed for emergency response. See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1365611011935/Guidance_Note_IRM.pdf for more details.

common reporting mechanisms	humanitarian donors and implementing partners	share data. ⁹⁴ Progressively embed these indicators into a common mechanism for sector reporting and accompanying mechanisms for accountability to affected populations. Data sharing should be streamlined as far as possible, ideally using a common framework such as WIMS. ⁹⁵	
8. Build capacity to think 'outside the siloes'	WASH development donors and implementing partners	Include training on emergency response for key development WASH positions.	Where possible, enable learning through exchange/secondments rather than one-off training events.
	WASH humanitarian donors and implementing partners	Include training on M&E and financial administration for more long-term / complex interventions, for key humanitarian WASH positions. ⁹⁶	
9. Engage and support local in-country capacity	WASH development and humanitarian donors and implementing partners	Use local implementing capacity (e.g. NNGOs, domestic private sector, local government) unless there are strong reasons not to, in recognition of the fact that local partners can be more qualified to respond to some crises, and more likely to remain when international actors leave. In many cases, this may require more flexible contractual arrangements for short-term interventions (for example pre-signed or framework agreements so that NGOs can be quickly deployed as soon as the crisis strikes). Donors and managers of pooled funding can incentivise this by including specific requirement for involvement of domestic actors, for any medium and longer-term funding (e.g. above one-year duration). Given some concerns over capacity, international actors that partner with NNGOs should also be encouraged to work closely with them, to allow for 'on the job' training in project management and reporting.	

Source: Author

⁹⁴ Short-term humanitarian projects may not realistically be able to track service outcomes such as people or households using services. Indeed, recent research on Value for Money in WASH programming confirms that many 'developmental' WASH programmes also fail to monitor and evaluate outcomes (Trémolet et al. 2015). Cholera outbreaks are a potential proxy indicator for the success or failure of a coordinated response on WASH, and prevention and control of cholera outbreaks is an area where both humanitarian and development WASH actors have shown themselves able to collaborate.

⁹⁵ Given challenges with operationalising WIMS, an interim solution may be necessary, e.g. a common standard cloud-based spreadsheet (e.g. Google Sheets), with relevant fields that can allow data to be transferred easily to WIMS at a later date.

⁹⁶ For example, Save the Children has included in its 2016-2018 South Sudan strategy an objective on 'building humanitarian capability' that aims at preparing and equipping the entire South Sudan Country Programme to respond to spikes, shocks and emergencies (staff costs will be recovered through existing and future awards).

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Annex 1: Methodology

Study design

We selected a sequential desk-field design for the research, whereby desk research was interspersed with fieldwork. The two tracks were closely interconnected, allowing the team to inform outputs with international good practice and thinking, as well as insights from case study contexts and experience of programming and policy realities. Preparatory research consisted of a literature review on WASH service delivery in conflict and protracted crises and disaster situations, coupled with consultations with UNICEF and WSP and interviews with key global stakeholders.

Secondly, for this case study interviews were conducted in Juba over 10 days with UNICEF staff (at country office and field offices), donors, UN agencies, International non-governmental organisations (INGOs), national non-governmental organisations (NNGOs), and Government counterparts. A complete list of the experts that were interviewed for this case study (and the organisation they represented) is reported in Table A1 below. The interview guide is presented in Annex 2.

Analytical framework

As noted, the research approach was inductive and iterative, incorporating a focus on emerging issues as they arose in the course of interviews. Guided by the overarching research questions detailed sub-questions (see Annex 2) were adapted to explore a range of issues including institutional cultures, assumptions, values, structures and ways of working, principles and practices, interaction and effective collaboration, decision-making, institutional arrangements, and operating structures and incentives.

We initiated the research with a broad conceptual approach emphasising three types of disjunction that give rise to and sustain the siloisation between humanitarian and development WASH – in accountability, norms, and institutions. These disjunctions are common to most service sectors, but all too apparent in the case of WASH. In emphasising these three disjunctions, we sought to apply, implicitly, a political-economy approach, rooted in understanding fundamental incentives and power differentials at organisational and individual levels. A starting point was the belief that it is misaligned incentives and imbalances of power and information that inhibit more productive outcomes for WASH users in poor and fragile contexts, but are, at the same time, key to unlocking such outcomes.

We present the three original categories below (summarised from our proposal) both to demonstrate our starting point, and to confirm that the inductive nature of the research revealed considerable nuance and a need to look beyond these three overarching categories.

We revisit the question of analytical frameworks in our Synthesis report for this project.

Accountability: Driven by accountability to domestic constituencies, donor governments emphasise short-term, easily enumerated results. In fragile and conflict affected contexts, this breeds reliance on international non-governmental organisations, working directly or through local partner NGOs, which have the capacity and flexibility to bypass, or work loosely in parallel with, inadequate government structures. Where this works well, it provides incremental services which ultimately may be taken over by government agencies and communities. Where it fails, it leaves redundant and collapsing infrastructure, without the capacity – either in communities, the private sector, or government – to sustain services. Results don't tend to come as easily (nor are they easily counted) if those same funds are entrusted to national governments which are struggling to establish basic bureaucratic and technocratic functions, including public financial management and sector monitoring and information systems.

Meanwhile accountability to the constituency that all parties ostensibly aim to serve – end users – may be jeopardised. The accountability of NGOs, working through project modalities, to service users, is high in the short term. But over the long term, discrete project funding cycles close and emergency and relief organisations move on to the next most crisis-affected area. As they do so, the accountability gap may not be filled by government actors, which have been bypassed or undermined by the reliance on third parties. We acknowledge the fundamental challenge for donors seeking to route funds to low capacity environments, and the potential for non-governmental organisations to play a critical role in the transition from emergency relief to longer-term development.

Norms: Organisational missions are accumulated over time and go far deeper than short statements on agency websites. OCHA's emphasis on the four humanitarian principles – humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence – constitute a rational response to the challenges of meeting basic needs in contexts where such ideals are severely compromised by political oppression or violent conflict. The ability to maintain independence and non-alignment in fast-changing political and military situations is critical to protect staff and service users alike. The primary purpose for such agencies, of meeting fundamental needs and protecting life and health, take precedence, and are shielded from the messy realities of building durable political settlements. But this normative approach becomes more challenging in a post-conflict environment. Here, the risk of crises reoccurring, and legacies of community mistrust of elites and officials, can prevent relief agencies from engaging with the groups that will, ultimately, need to assume responsibility for sustainable services.

Development agencies, meanwhile, have the luxury of looking beyond the relatively narrow purpose of WASH to meet immediate survival needs and contain epidemics. As a country and its partners shift into the developmental mode, the purpose of WASH also begins to shift: to being a fundamental pillar of health systems, and an enabler of productivity for households and economies. Achieving results of this nature is still necessarily complex, and cannot be achieved without investment in sector systems, and the core-government systems (above all fiduciary management) which underpin them.

So what of the middle spaces – post-conflict, or in situations of recurrent crisis where government maintains a skeleton presence but faces severe problems of legitimacy and capacity? Relief and development agencies alike acknowledge the complexity of these transitional phases, and the need for adaptive, iterative responses. Yet the world of international assistance continues to organise itself, normatively as much as operationally, on the basis of 'two-size-fits-all'. The unpredictable nature of the fragile contexts and crises does, of course, force humanitarian agencies into longer-term engagement; development agencies can become entangled in emergency response – as exemplified by the setbacks experienced in South Sudan. But the fundamental challenge posed by deep-seated norms, within development and humanitarian communities – including about the very purpose of WASH (as basic need or engine of productivity and opportunity), remain urgently in need of better understanding.

Institutions: The professional cadres which make up the development and humanitarian WASH communities remain fundamentally isolated from each other – their operational and management tiers sometimes prioritising radically different things. Funding streams are

compartmentalised, not least because of the basic accounting challenge of having funds available for rapid deployment to emergencies versus longer term commitments needed for systems-building. OCHA pooled funding (the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) and Emergency Response Funds (ERFs)) remain a largely unfamiliar domain for developmental WASH policy specialists, even where, in the case of CHF and ERFs, pooled funding is available on a long-term, country-specific basis to tackle recurrent and persistent crises. Key developmental modalities of programmatic and budget support are, similarly, a world away for many humanitarian agencies, leaving an uneasy and often unsustainable middle ground of project-based funding.

On the ground, while humanitarian and development professionals share similar skillsets – such as engineering, or social development, or logistics – they are persistently separated by institutional arrangements, job descriptions and recruitment policies. In part this is due to recognisable differences in technologies and approaches needed to meet emergency WASH needs, versus developmental WASH needs. But the organisations involved can usefully be questioned on how, and why, their staffing and professional development policies reinforce this divide. Similar questions can be asked of the WASH knowledge and policy community, which does little to overcome the gap – exemplified in the apparent disconnect between emergency WASH technical standards (such as Sphere) and the standards monitored (and now proposed for post-2015) by the Joint Monitoring Programme.

Table A1: List of people and organisations interviewed for this study

Name	Organisation	Position
Katrice King	Oxfam UK	WASH Coordinator
Michael Hossu	ACTED	WASH Program Manager
Mary Langan	ACTED	AME Manager South Sudan
Richard Aludra	Independent consultant	
Andrea James	UNICEF	Chief of Field Operations
Felix Hoogveld	Dutch Embassy	First Secretary
Laetitia Beuscher	ECHO	Field Expert
Manhiem Bol Malek	MEDIWR (Directorate for Rural Water Supply Development)	Director
Magol Gabriel Alueth	SSUWG (Directorate for Rural Water Supply Development)	SG Urban Water)
Nujulee Begum	UNICEF	WASH Specialist
Bejur Noel Modi Boyong	JICA	Assistant Program Officer – Water infrastructure
Samuel Riak	UNICEF	WASH specialist
Lillian Okiwirry	UNICEF	Chief of WASH

John Fitzgerald	ACF	WASH Specialist
Peter Mahal Dhieu	MEDIWR	Director General
David Ayaga	AWODA	Chief Executive Director
Sibonakaliso C. Mpala	World Vision South Sudan	WASH Officer
Mohammed Ali	Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW)	WASH Officer
Repent Taban	International Aid Service (IS)	WASH Officer
Margaret (Peggy) D'Adamo	USAID	Health Officer
Isaac Iwa Mark	SDC	National Programme Officer (Focal point for WASH Project in Aweii)
David Thorp	UN OCHA	Head of Humanitarian Financing Unit
Various representatives of 10 states	Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Directorate of Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	

Source: Author

Richard Aludra participated in the fieldwork as an independent consultant and co-authored this paper. As a South Sudanese national with deep knowledge and experience of the WASH sector in South Sudan, Richard contributed to shaping the research focus and identifying suitable respondents. While the security situation did not allow the team to leave Juba, UNICEF held a two-day mid-year review and planning meeting of WASH interventions in South Sudan that attracted key WASH stakeholders across the country. By interviewing stakeholders from regions affected by the ongoing civil war and relatively peaceful parts of South Sudan, the research team was able to get the experiences of WASH interventions in areas that could have not otherwise been accessed.

Dr Beatrice Mosello also presented the preliminary findings of the report at Stockholm World Water Week in a session on 'Moving forward complementarity of humanitarian and development WASH approaches in protracted crises', organised by German WASH network (see Annex 3). Feedback from the participants on the South Sudan case study was incorporated into the analysis and 'smart rules' proposed in this study.

Annex 2: Interview guide, South Sudan

Understanding general context/working modalities:

- How long have you been working in S Sudan, focusing on what/in what regions (urban/rural, states, community focus)?
- How did independence impacts on the general political, socio-economic context of the country? (Impact of macro-changes like independence and resurgence of crisis on development prospects – and hence interventions of international agencies). What was the impact on your work of the resurgence of the conflict in December 2013? (E.g. did you move out of some regions, delivered different types of interventions/shifted budget and efforts from development to humanitarian?)
- [If operating in both active conflict regions e.g. Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity and other regions] How do your interventions vary between the regions in which there is active conflict and those characterised by protracted crisis and lack of access to basic services? What are the main issues you are tackling in the different contexts? (e.g. underdeveloped infrastructure, lack of access, etc.)
- Why are you doing WASH? (E.g. to save lives, to improve livelihoods, etc.) What other activities are you doing in the country/region/community? (*to get a sense of the underlying norms e.g. 'to keep people alive' vs. 'to support health and dignity' etc. what else they are doing in addition to WASH, how they connect with other sectors*)
- Talk about specific work with IDPs; in what does it differ from work with South Sudanese population? Different needs, different strategies?
- To what extent the South Sudanese Government is still able to provide services to the people (and where)? Who is delivering services instead, e.g. communities, INGOs, private sector (especially focus on WASH)?

How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their interaction up till now?

- What is your role in delivering the UN Humanitarian Intervention Strategy for South Sudan? To what extent does that leave space for development-oriented interventions? E.g. to what extent do you collaborate/liaise with UNMISS?
- Are you part of other development strategies for the country? Are these still in place, or have resources completely been reallocated to emergency

interventions? AND/OR Do your programmes/interventions have a peace-building/reconciliation component, which one?

- What is the balance between meeting basic human needs and long-term capacity building?

Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian and development WASH collaborate effectively? If not, why?

- How has capacity in your organisation varied through time and in particular since the beginning of the crisis? (Presence has augmented/diminished, more funding available, staff turnover, different mechanisms for coordination e.g. clusters being set up etc.) Consider also capacity in the WASH sector overall, and for both national and international agencies. *Investigate also key reasons underlying these changes in capacity.*
- Would you say there is enough coordination between the different actors operating in South Sudan, as well as line ministries and local authorities when appropriate? (Especially for health and WASH clusters). Important to get reflections on how far you can work with and through the state – how is the state considered, how are international organisations considered?
- To what extent does the WASH Cluster look at development/peace-building as well? (or is it only a humanitarian tool?) How well does it work in ensuring coordination between the different actors?
- To what extent and on what aspects of WASH delivery are you collaborating with Government agencies (for international orgs and NGOs) / international orgs and NGOs (for Government)? What are the main challenges of this collaboration and what is working well instead?

How are decisions made around programming and policy, within and between humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to effective action on the ground? If not, what are the underlying reasons?

- What scope is there for adaptive decision-making as situations change? (Understand underlying reasons, both at organisational and personal level inhibiting or enabling adaptive approaches).
- Who/at what level do you decide where to intervene, for how long, adopting which approach? (e.g. at HQ, regional, country offices level) Does the specific decision-making process you have in place lead to effective action on the ground?
- How does the crisis affect the capacity of your organisation to work? (e.g. violence can restrict access in certain regions, military groups target INGOs' personnel, etc.)
- What are the main trade-offs you face during your work? Who decides when trade-offs emerge, i.e. who takes operational decisions vs who sets the broader framework within which interventions take place? Do other organisations have similar problems (or are there some organisations that for instance have better access to certain areas, have a better negotiating position with military/state, etc.)?
- More generally, what are the main limitations of your current approach (challenges you face)? What are you not doing well enough, and why in your opinion?

-
- Who are the interventions for, to whom are you accountable (beneficiaries, donors, national Government, etc.)? In your view, how does this impact on your operations?

What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and incentives?

- What do you think should change in your approach?
- What institutional set-up (and at what level) do you think would work to overcome disconnect? Other solutions? (Specific to South Sudan context and challenges)

Annex 3: Agenda of Stockholm World Water Week seminar



Agenda (August 22)

SWWW Seminar I "Moving forward: complementarity of humanitarian and development WASH approaches in protracted crisis"
(ID: 4677 / Tuesday 25-08-2015, 09:00-10:30)

09:00 Welcome & Opening

- Mr. Thilo Panzerbieter, German WASH Network
- Dr. Eitje Aderhold, Federal Foreign Office, Germany

09:10 Key Note

- Dr. Hazim El Naser, Minister for Water and Irrigation, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

09:20 Input presentations: "LRRD in protracted crisis - opportunities from different perspectives"

- Challenges and opportunities of Urban WASH: LRRD and gearing up for universal access to WASH services, Mr. Mark-Andre Bünzli, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland
- Sanitation matters: supporting service delivery for refugees in Northern Iraq, Mr. Stefan Reuter, BORDA, German WASH-Network
- Preliminary findings from research in South Sudan on humanitarian and development WASH approaches, Dr. Beatrice Mosello, Overseas Development Institute
- UNICEF's institutional adjustments as dual mandate organisation to implement LRRD within development WASH programs, Mr. Andrew Parker, UNICEF
- Share success of PATS, a Government Led approach which achieved Humanitarian-Development complementarity at large scale, Mr. Tanveer Aslam Malik is the Honourable Minister of Housing, Urban Development and Public Health Engineering, in the Government of Punjab, Pakistan

09:45 World Café Workshop: "Developing Options to Overcome Challenges"

- Table 1: The Donor Contribution (Facilitator: Mr. Björn Hofmann, Federal Foreign Office, Germany / Rapporteur: Daniel Clauss, EC ECHO)
- Table 2: The Crisis Affected Country Contribution (Facilitator: Dr. Beatrice Mosello, Rapporteur: Mr. Peter Mahal, South Sudan)
- Table 3: The Implementing Organisation Contribution (Facilitator: Mr. Ajay Paul, Welthungerhilfe/ German WASH-Network, Rapporteur: Ms. Simone Klawitter, UNICEF)

10:15 Reporting back from the groups

10:25 Summary and wrap-up: Take aways (to the World Humanitarian Summit)

- Dr. Eitje Aderhold, Federal Foreign Office, Germany



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Cover photo: Working together to find water, Jamam camp, South Sudan © Alun McDonald/Oxfam (March 2012)

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