



# Evaluative learning for resilience

## Providing Humanitarian Assistance for Sahel Emergencies (PHASE)

BRACED Evaluation Activity 5: Detailed Evaluation Design



# A note to the reader

This document represents the Detailed Evaluation Design for one specific evaluation activity conducted under the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme. BRACED is a major resilience investment by the UK government's Department for International Development (DFID), under its contribution to the International Climate Fund. This Evaluation Design was developed by a dedicated evaluation team, which forms part of the BRACED Knowledge Manager.

Subject to approval by the DFID team responsible for overseeing the delivery of the BRACED programme, the evaluation described in this plan will take place between July 2016 and March 2017, although data collection began in February 2016 to document the earlier applications for **Providing Humanitarian Assistance for Sahel Emergencies** (PHASE) funding. Relative to the other evaluation components within the Knowledge Manager, this is relatively small scale, with a total budget of £100,000. This design will develop as the evaluation progresses, and as we learn more about the recipients of the Contingency Mechanism under assessment in this evaluation.

## Acknowledgements

The core evaluation team comprises Katie Peters (Team Leader), Dr Paul Venton (Deputy Team Leader), Florence Pichon (Lead Technical Advisor) and Lindsey Jones (Technical Advisor – design phase only). The core team is supported by technical experts including Catherine Gould (independent), Paula Silva Villanueva (independent), Dave Wilson (Itad), Courtenay Cabot Venton (independent), Dr Elizabeth Carabine (ODI) and Dr Catherine Simonet (ODI). Support to the team was provided by Clare Shaw (Itad), Fran Walker (ODI), Charlotte Rye (ODI) and Beth Bradshaw (ODI). Thanks go to our internal peer reviewers Robbie Gregorowski (Itad) and Derek Poate (external consultant).

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This evaluation was designed before the PHASE funding was allocated to Implementing Partners. As the design developed, applications were received and granted, to: ASSuReD, a consortia led by Catholic Relief Services in Niger; PRESENCES, a consortium led by CARE International UK in Niger; a consortia led by Acting for Life in Burkina Faso, and; Zaman Ledibi, a consortia led by Christian Aid in Burkina Faso. With the Evaluation Design approved, the team now look forward to reaching out to those Implementing Partners, and to working with a sub-set over the lifetime of BRACED to learn lessons about the PHASE funding mechanism.

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# Abstract

This Detailed Evaluation Design aims to assess how flexible humanitarian finance and development investments can be combined to deliver better resilience outcomes despite the occurrence of a shock or stress. Using a theory-based approach, we aim to test the following hypothesis:

*By utilising Providing Humanitarian Assistance for Sahel Emergencies (PHASE) contingency funding, Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) Implementing Partners are able to offer protection to BRACED programme outputs 1, 2 and 4 in the event of early warning of a shock or stress that threatens target areas, and thereby help prevent the derailing of resilience-strengthening progress being made and maximise the maturity of resilience outcomes attainable over the full term of the BRACED programme.*

The Evaluation Design takes this hypothesis and breaks it down into a generic chain of events to explain the process by which this change will happen. By examining a series of causal steps, we aim to examine why and how they link together, testing our assumptions at each step of a PHASE intervention. The objective is to understand the added value of a contingency mechanism to safeguarding longer-term development gains, from both a project-specific and a programme-wide perspective. For each PHASE intervention, the team will establish a theory of change that explains how the intervention effected change at the project level, explicitly tracing the causal steps. The findings from these case studies will be used to validate the overarching theory, and to provide generalisable lessons on the use of flexible humanitarian finance in a development programme.

## Acronyms and abbreviations

AAR	After Action Review
BRACED	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters
DFID	Department for International Development
EA	Evaluation Activity
EC	European Commission
ECHO	EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
DQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid
ICF	International Climate Fund
INGO	International NGO
IP	Implementing Partner
KMEL	Knowledge Manager Engagement Leader
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PHASE	Providing Humanitarian Assistance for Sahel Emergencies
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VfM	Value for Money

# Executive summary

In a world of increasing risk and instability, humanitarian and development actors must adapt to work more closely. This was a clear outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit and Ban Ki Moon's Agenda for Humanity (UN Secretary General, 2016). Development programmes do not have the flexibility to rapidly reallocate funding to address spikes in need, and humanitarian organisations are confined to funding instruments that prevent longer-term engagement.

A contingency mechanism that allows development agencies to quickly respond to anticipated crises, while continuing to invest in programmes that address the root causes of people's vulnerability to shocks and stresses, is likely to be one vital step towards making humanitarian and development aid work more effectively together. This is what the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is trialling.

The Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme in the Sahel will deepen ways to better connect humanitarian–development financial programming by using the implementing modalities of humanitarian aid through the Providing Humanitarian Assistance for Sahel Emergencies (PHASE) programme and its Contingency Mechanism. This Evaluation Activity (EA) 5 Detailed Evaluation Design describes how knowledge and evidence will be generated to evaluate this connection, from a resilience-building perspective.

Since November 2015, BRACED Implementing Partners (IPs) in the Sahel have been eligible to apply for grants of up to £250,000 from the £1.5 million PHASE Contingency Mechanism to take early action against shocks or stresses. The initiative presents an opportunity for DFID, humanitarian and development actors and those interested in building resilience to understand how these organisations anticipate and mitigate against the impacts of shocks and stresses, while achieving desired resilience outcomes. To build resilience, both emergency and longer-term livelihood and development support may be appropriate at the same time. By assessing how BRACED IPs use PHASE funds, this evaluation seeks to learn whether BRACED can build resilience more consistently and effectively by accessing flexible humanitarian finance. The hypothesis is as follows:

*By utilising PHASE contingency funding, BRACED IPs are able to offer protection to BRACED programme outputs 1, 2 and 4 in the event of early warning of a shock or stress that threatens target areas, and thereby help prevent the derailing of resilience strengthening progress being made and maximise the maturity of resilience outcomes attainable over the full term of the BRACED programme.*

The essence of the EA5 Detailed Evaluation Design is to test a theory of change describing how humanitarian and development finance can be used together to protect development gains. Theory-based evaluations break down the logic of an intervention into steps; in the context of PHASE, the team will trace the process of disbursing PHASE funding and test each causal link to understand how this contributed to protecting BRACED project outcomes. A theory-based design engages with contextual factors and assumptions, and can be validated against observations and evidence generated through qualitative and quantitative methods. EA5 aims to determine what worked to keep resilience programming on track and what assumptions held true about how BRACED IPs used humanitarian finance to take early action. The evaluation is driven by the overarching question: *To what extent did flexible humanitarian finance applied within a resilience-building programme protect development gains made and ensure development progress remained on track?*

The evaluation will respond to a series of standardised headline evaluation questions tracing the process and documenting outcomes from PHASE interventions.

Evaluation Question 1 focuses on establishing the context of the BRACED work and how the shock or stress is thought to be a threat. Evaluation Question 2 and 3 are concerned with the design of the intervention and the process of accessing the contingency finance. Evaluation Questions 4 through 6 aim to assess outcomes, asking whether the contingency mechanism helped beneficiaries absorb the effects of the shock or stress, whether BRACED activities continued without disruption and how the Contingency Mechanism supported the attainment of BRACED resilience outcomes. By assessing both the process and the outcomes of PHASE interventions, EA5 aims to generate lessons on how change was generated through PHASE and whether it helped achieve BRACED objectives.

The theory developed by the evaluation team will be tested through specific case studies of BRACED IPs that have successfully applied for PHASE finance. Each case study will trace the process and results of applying PHASE funding in the context of BRACED, elaborating a specific change pathway that was followed in each context. After action reviews will be the primary method of data collection, with other mixed methods supplementing analysis, allowing for a triangulation of data from multiple sources. After all PHASE funding has been disbursed, the team will conduct a synthesis of the case studies against the generic, overarching, theory of change. Finally, we will generalise about the validity of the overarching theory of change and draw lessons for future development–humanitarian financial linkages and the implications for development programmes.

# Section A: BRACED, PHASE and the Contingency Mechanism

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 BRACED

The Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme aims to tackle poverty and to build the resilience of over 5 million vulnerable people against climate extremes and disasters.<sup>1</sup> Through 15 non-governmental organisation (NGO) consortia working in the Sahel, East Africa and Asia, the programme is working to scale up proven technologies and practices to build resilience, develop national capacity to respond to climate-related disasters and generate evidence of what works on adaptation and disaster risk reduction. BRACED works across 13 countries and includes 108 organisations in total, including NGOs, local government, research institutes, UN agencies and the private sector. These organisations work on a wide range of issues to address the root causes of climate vulnerability, including supporting smallholder farmers to take advantage of investments in climate-smart technologies, securing and promoting trans-border livestock mobility and improving access to financial services and weather-indexed insurance.

The Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the BRACED Knowledge Manager to work across the portfolio of projects to lead the creation and dissemination, and ensure the uptake, of an evidence base of knowledge on resilience derived from the programme (BRACED Knowledge Manager, 2016a). The Knowledge Manager works alongside BRACED-funded projects to identify what is working, to increase the impact of projects by integrating learning and to feed these lessons into policy and practice at the national and international level.

As part of a significant portfolio, the Knowledge Manager leads five main evaluation activities (EAs), which are focused on experimental evaluations of projects, strategic evaluations to test theory of change assumptions and synthesising evidence at the project and programme level. The five evaluations in the Evaluation Plan (Itad, 2015) are designed to have a utility for DFID and for Implementing Partners (IPs) (the organisations working in the 15 NGO consortia). The Knowledge Manager is playing a brokering role in sharing lessons from these EAs, ensuring that evidence can be used for broader uptake by international NGOs (INGOs), donors and governments, both within and beyond the 13 countries where BRACED operates.

### 1.2 Evaluation Activity 5

This evaluation fits within the BRACED Knowledge Manager's broader programme of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) work. It is resourced from the budget allocation 'Flexible Knowledge Manager Evaluation Resource' (Itad, 2015). This budget is unique, with the core evaluation questions initially left open-ended in order to respond to knowledge gaps as BRACED projects unfold on the ground. The Providing Humanitarian Assistance for Sahel Emergencies (PHASE) Contingency Mechanism came on-stream mid-way through BRACED and was identified as a gap with evaluative value that warranted further exploration.

In September 2015, the Fund Manager released a guidance note for BRACED IPs working in the Sahel, making available a PHASE Contingency Mechanism (PHASE, 2015a). DFID contracts the Fund Manager (led by KPMG) to oversee fund disbursement, and monitoring for accountability of the BRACED fund, to the recipient NGO-led consortia. It is also responsible for the disbursement of PHASE funding to successful BRACED applicants. The Contingency Mechanism is designed to provide rapid response to new crises and facilitate early action, providing up to £250,000 per tranche in additional funding to protect BRACED development gains and maintain progress. The fund is intended to enable pre-approved organisations to apply for funding for early action when needed, with

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.braced.org/>

minimal bureaucracy, facilitating a rapid approval and disbursement process on the part of DFID and the Fund Manager (led by KPMG).<sup>2</sup>

This evaluation will use a theory-based approach to examine the added value of the combined use of humanitarian and development finance. Through specific case studies to test the theory, the Evaluation Team aims to answer the following questions (a summarised version of the Evaluation Questions) about flexible humanitarian financing and how it complements resilience programming in areas with recurrent crises:

- What evidence is there that the Contingency Mechanism helped prevent or minimise disruption to resilience gains being made?
- What role did the Contingency Mechanism have with respect to the attainment of BRACED resilience outcomes in light of other factors affecting BRACED programme progress?
- To what extent are the funding mechanics of the PHASE Contingency Mechanism suited to early action of the type needed to prevent or minimise disruption to resilience gains being made?

Findings from these questions (for more detail see Section 3.3) will inform our driving evaluation question: *To what extent did flexible humanitarian finance applied within a resilience-building programme protect development gains made and ensure development progress remained on track?*

DFID has commissioned a separate, independent evaluation of the PHASE programme as a whole (see details in Section 2.2). EA5 generates different but complementary lessons, focusing specifically on the added value of a contingency mechanism to BRACED. It capitalises on the Knowledge Manager's existing relationship with IPs to generate deeper understanding of the extent to which additional humanitarian finance mobilised rapidly in the context of development practice can protect and sustain development results.

There is sparse evidence on the process and results of using humanitarian financing in a development programme to manage external shocks and stresses. These lessons on how development organisations can take early action, addressing humanitarian need and building long-term resilience simultaneously, will inform the design of a possible extension of the BRACED programme, consider the value of a contingency mechanism for Component B (DFID priority countries, non-Sahel) in BRACED and orient DFID investments towards improved risk management.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.braced.org/about/about-the-fund-manager/>

## 2. Providing Humanitarian Assistance for Sahel Emergencies (PHASE)

### 2.1 PHASE and the Contingency Mechanism

DFID created the PHASE fund (see Annex 1 for details) in response to the UK government's Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (Ashdown et al., 2011) and a growing body of evidence on the value of early action.

PHASE introduces innovative approaches and instruments in a number of areas, responding directly to humanitarian policy recommendations. First, it is a multi-year humanitarian fund, which allows it to work on the delivery of more sustainable programmes, with reduced commodity procurement costs, faster response times to food crises and the foresight to plan for uncertainty in the longer term (Carpenter and Bennet, 2015). Second, it includes a Contingency Mechanism, which provides agencies with resources for early action and timely response to evolving crises. Third, it encourages coherence by working with other long-standing actors in the Sahel, including the EC, to improve coordination and ensure joint planning.

DFID is providing up to £139 million over three years for the PHASE programme. PHASE is subdivided as follows:

- The majority of this funding (£107.5 million) will be implemented through a Contribution Agreement with the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO), for an initial period of three years. In addition, £2.1 million is available for surge staffing, evaluation and contingency/risk financing for new emergencies, and £1.4 million for evaluations of core components (ARD Evaluator TOR).
- Up to £7 million per year to a total of £28 million has been pre-approved for early and rapid response, as part of the PHASE Contingency Mechanism (PHASE, 2015b). The PHASE Contingency Mechanism is designed to be disbursed through the START network (funding through existing Accountable Grants); BRACED partners (Component A, Sahel); existing arrangements with multilaterals or NGOs (including ECHO and Accountable Grants); and (a potential fourth option) disbursement to a Common Humanitarian Fund or Emergency Response Fund.
- From the PHASE Contingency Fund, BRACED projects will start with an initial budget of £1.5 million, which DFID will be open to increasing based on demand, held within the DFID African Regional Department.


### 2.2 Independent PHASE evaluation

An independent evaluation team – separate to the BRACED evaluative learning team – will undertake a formal evaluation of PHASE in its entirety. Its approach and focus is markedly different. The PHASE evaluation team is independent (in contrast with in the evaluative learning approach and the 'critical friend' relationship between the BRACED Knowledge Manager and IPs).

The independent evaluation team is responsible for analysing whether the PHASE fund as a whole (see Figure 1) has been effective in delivering a timely response. It will investigate how the fund has responded to humanitarian need without a specific focus on how a contingency mechanism complements resilience programming. The formal PHASE evaluation will take place after the start-up and implementation of EA5. Where viable, the teams will work together, harnessing the substantively increased scope and budget of the formal and independent PHASE evaluation to collect data to supplement the BRACED analysis – including specifically at the field level – by providing detail on how effectively humanitarian funding has been used for early action. These connections have already been established. The team leader for EA5 has met the independent evaluators on numerous occasions. They have discussed and committed to routine check-ins to discuss progress on their respective evaluation design and delivery, the changing Sahelian context and points of synergy.

## 2.3 The connections between BRACED and PHASE

**Figure 1: Relationship between PHASE and BRACED**



The BRACED IPs operating in the Sahel are eligible to access the PHASE Contingency Mechanism. These include Acting for Life, Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale, the Near East Foundation, Blue Mont, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Christian Aid, Welthungerhilfe and Concern, working in Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger.

Of the PHASE Contingency Mechanism, individual BRACED projects will be eligible to apply for up to £250,000 from a total amount available of £1.5 million. DFID may consider increasing this value based on demand. BRACED IPs may apply for PHASE funding where they assess that a humanitarian crisis (e.g. an epidemic, weather-related crisis, food security crisis or conflict) is threatening or affecting existing BRACED projects or activities. The fund is not intended to address chronic needs or needs that do not have an impact on the success of the BRACED project (BRACED Sahel Contingency Fund, 2015).

The BRACED Fund Manager will be responsible for managing BRACED applications to the PHASE Contingency Mechanism, payments and financial monitoring, and will manage the reporting process outlined in Section 5 of the Guidance Note (BRACED Sahel Contingency Fund, 2015). The Knowledge Manager will be responsible for leading the process of learning about flexible humanitarian finance and its contribution to keeping resilience programming on track, in conjunction with IPs in receipt of PHASE funding (as detailed in this Evaluation Design). An Assessment Panel from DFID and the Fund Manager will make decisions about BRACED applicants to the PHASE Contingency Mechanism. For the purposes of data collection, the Knowledge Manager has ‘observer status’ on the panel.

The PHASE Guidance Note (PHASE, 2015a) provided to fund applicants includes reference to this Evaluation Design, and the request for successful applicants to collaborate with the Knowledge Manager evaluation team. In this guidance, a suggested process includes ‘engagement’ at various points in time (e.g. on receipt of application, mid-way through delivery and on completion). The guidance states that the level of engagement, and timing, will be discussed and mutually agreed between both parties (the IP and the evaluation team). This process holds true, though this detailed Evaluation Design supersedes any prior description of the evaluation.

# Section B: Evaluative learning for resilience

## 3. Evaluation approach


### 3.1 Hypothesis and objectives

The objective of the evaluation is to understand the added value of a contingency mechanism to safeguarding longer-term resilience gains, from both a project-specific and a programme-wide perspective. Although the evaluation aims to understand outcomes of PHASE funding and document how resilience gains were protected in the event of a shock, the team will also collect evidence to understand how such change was effected. This secondary aim focuses on the process of deploying PHASE funding, to understand what type of interventions helped minimise disruption to resilience gains, the value for money (VfM) of the resources required to deliver PHASE interventions, the practical and logistical problems and how the change was achieved. Using a theory-based approach, we aim to test the following hypothesis:

*By utilising PHASE contingency funding, BRACED IPs are able to offer protection to BRACED programme outputs 1, 2 and 4 in the event of early warning of a shock or stress that threatens target areas, and thereby help prevent the derailing of resilience strengthening progress being made and maximise the maturity of resilience outcomes attainable over the full term of the BRACED programme.*

The Evaluation Design examines this hypothesis through a general theory about how BRACED development finance and PHASE humanitarian finance can be combined to maintain and protect development results. We test this general theory through three cases of BRACED IPs that have applied for PHASE funding. In each case, we develop a context-specific theory that will be nested in the overall generic theory. The theory explains how the PHASE intervention intends to effect change at the project level and explicitly trace the process by means of which this change is intended to happen. Finally, the team synthesises the set of cases to draw some findings, conclusions and recommendations about the general theory. The synthesis will inform a wider question on how flexible humanitarian finance can be combined with development finance in crisis-prone contexts and the evidence of results that this has delivered.

Figure 2. Causal chain model for delivering PHASE interventions in the context of BRACED



A causal chain model unpacks the sequential components of a PHASE intervention. Evaluation theory often refers to theories and causal chain models as the ‘black box’ of assumptions about change (Valters, 2015). By using this as a method of tracing the whole process, we can isolate and test assumptions about why an intervention worked – or not. Where a PHASE intervention did not work as expected, defining these components helps the evaluators and the implementers determine at what point and why an intervention deviated from the pathway or ‘theory’ implicitly articulated in the PHASE applications.

The steps in Figure 2 are articulated in the evaluation approach below. Each step is populated with headline evaluation questions, assumptions, data needs and additional notes on the analytical methods.

### 3.2 Evaluation approach

A theory-based approach intends to test a theory that explains *why* and *how* an intervention effected change. It offers a clear framework to analyse information gathered from diverse sources, using a range of methods. With all BRACED projects operating independently with heterogeneous approaches, this allows the team to organise and synthesise information across projects. There are several advantages to using a theory-based evaluation approach for this EA, based on the context of the intervention and the timeframes.

1. Theory-based evaluations can assess processes and outcomes in real-time (Puri et al., 2015). This evaluation will assess the process through which change unfolds, which can be documented during and

immediately after a PHASE intervention. Where data on longer-term impacts are not available, a theory-based approach can still draw meaningful conclusions about the mechanisms for change.<sup>3</sup>

2. It does not require the evaluation of a counterfactual, which is logistically and conceptually a challenge in this context. There is no baseline study to draw from, and the timeframes of PHASE intervention (three to six months) precludes robust surveying that would require developing, translating, testing survey instruments and training enumerators before deploying PHASE funding.
3. Documentation is limited in humanitarian response interventions. According to Brusset et al. (2010), 'documents in the early stages tend to be descriptions of on-going response and the intent of the responding agency'. A theory-based evaluation allows the team to revisit assumptions and ideas consolidated in the early stages of the intervention, supplementing these with additional data collected through after action reviews, key informant interviews and other methods.
4. Theory-based evaluations can serve a learning function (Valters, 2015). By working at case level and with an overarching theory, this evaluation aims to critically appraise the assumptions applied when humanitarian and development finance are combined in the context of a development intervention. If some assumptions consistently prove problematic, working through a theory-based evaluation can allow us to investigate with BRACED IPs alternative explanations for why change did or did not occur. These lessons can be integrated into the design of subsequent development programmes with attached contingency mechanisms, such as an extension of the BRACED programme.

### 3.3 Evaluation questions, assumptions and matrix

The main evaluation questions (EQs) are in sync with the causal chain model presented in Figure 2. As such, the chronological sequence of questions begins with a focus on the threat posed by the shock or stress, progressing through the design process, accessing contingency funding and implementation of the intervention to culminate with an investigation of how the intervention may have safeguarded longer-term resilience gains.

The main EQs, and their likely sub-questions, are presented below. Following this, Table 1 presents an evaluation matrix. This shows sources of data, data collection methods and assumptions made in relation to the evaluation questions.

EQ1 focuses on establishing the context of the BRACED work and how the shock or stress is thought to be a threat. Absorptive capacity (Bahadur et al., 2015) is an important theme that is considered first here, as it's relative to the shock or stress is a determinant for the scale of risk.

#### **EQ1. What is the nature of change that the shock or stress is expected to cause?**

- EQ1.1 What are the characteristics of the shock or stress, including its timing?
- EQ1.2 How has the BRACED programme been building resilience to this specific shock or stress?
- EQ1.3 In what ways are existing absorptive capacities likely to be exceeded by the shock or stress?

EQ2 is concerned with the design of the intervention. Of special relevance to the questions posed is the extent that the humanitarian intervention has been designed *differently*, if at all, as a result of being joined to the protection of development gains.

#### **EQ2. In what ways is the proposed intervention intended to protect gains made in the BRACED programme?**

- EQ2.1 How does the design of the PHASE work seek to be complementary to the longer-term BRACED development goals?

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<sup>3</sup> At this stage of project implementation, BRACED IPs are not reporting against outcome- or impact-level indicators, particularly with regard to resilience capacities. PHASE interventions are not reporting to this level of detail. The ambition of EA5 is not to investigate the impact of BRACED programmes, which will be explored in detail through EA1.

- EQ2.2 Are there any constraints impinging the ability of IPs in their design of PHASE interventions? If so, what?

EQ3 has its focus on the process of accessing the contingency finance. This is important because, while the intent of a contingency intervention may be sound, the way this is turned from design into practice can have significant implications on the results.

**EQ3. How suitable for delivering early action are the funding mechanics of the PHASE contingency mechanism?**

- EQ3.1 Did the IPs anticipate the crisis before its onset?
- EQ3.2 How effective were the procedures for accessing PHASE contingency funding?
- EQ 3.3 What are the main enablers and constraints in the process of accessing the contingency fund and how could the process be improved?
- EQ3.4 How was eligibility for contingency funding operationalised?
- EQ3.5 Did the funding application template provide enough and suitable information for the assessment panel to make a sound decision?

EQ4 is the first of three questions that investigate the actual benefits achieved by implementing the Contingency Mechanism. This question looks at the short-term ability of the intervention to absorb the shock or stress. It therefore has a distinct focus on absorptive capacity.

**EQ4. Did the intervention provide early action to absorb the shock or stress?**

- EQ4.1 Were changes in the programme activities made between those in the application and those undertaken?
- EQ4.2 Why and how?
- EQ 4.2 Did the intervention have the desired short-term results in terms of reducing loss and damage?
- EQ 4.3 To what extent have PHASE investments helped people avoid adopting negative coping strategies?

EQ5 is about whether the contingency intervention enabled BRACED activities to continue and remain on track. This is very much an issue of continuity in BRACED programming despite shocks and stresses, and so gets to the heart of the hopes for this work and the hypothesis being investigated. This is also a time to reflect on what would have happened *without* the intervention, which is a critical evaluation need with respect to VfM analysis.

**EQ5. Did the Contingency Mechanism help prevent or minimise disruption to resilience gains being made?**

- EQ5.1 To what extent were recipients of PHASE contingency funding able to continue participation in other BRACED resilience-building project activities?
- EQ5.2 What would have happened without contingency funding?
- EQ5.3 After what time period did regular programming resume?
- EQ5.4 Did the activities implemented through PHASE enhance resilience-building progress being made? How?

EQ6 is the last question and takes a step back to consider the bigger picture on how important the Contingency Mechanism is to the achievement of BRACED resilience outcomes in light of other influences and factors that might strengthen or hinder progress.

**EQ6. To what extent did the Contingency Mechanism have a meaningful contribution with respect to the attainment of BRACED resilience outcomes?**

- EQ6.1 How important a contribution is PHASE contingency funding with respect to the overall attainment of BRACED resilience outcomes?
- EQ6.2 What lessons can be learnt on what worked and what did not with respect to this specific intervention?
- EQ6.3 What learning is relevant in other contexts?

Table 1. Evaluation matrix										
Evaluation questions	Sub questions	Sources of data and data collection methods								Assumptions <i>The assumptions are illustrative, and will be developed during Stage 1 of delivery.</i>
		Secondary data					Primary data			
		Data collection methods	Document analysis	Document analysis	Document analysis	Document analysis	Secondary literature review	Observation in Assessment Panel	Key informant interviews in the after action review	
Sources of data	Theories of change	BRACED monitoring and results reporting	PHASE application and Fund Manager assessment of application	PHASE reporting	Independent source material (e.g. hazard data, UN situation reports)	PHASE Assessment Panel	PHASE stakeholders (IP, Fund Manager, DFID)	Key informants: internal & external stakeholders (e.g. UN, regional actors)		
<b>Shock/stress threatens to affect BRACED IP progress</b>										
EQ1. What is the nature of change that the shock or stress is expected to cause?	<i>Shock or stress:</i> EQ1.1 What are the characteristics of the shock or stress, including its timing?			x	x	x		x	x	IPs have access to high-quality, accurate early warning information.  BRACED programme is building resilience to anticipated crisis.
	<i>Resilience-building:</i> EQ1.2 How has the BRACED programme been building resilience to this specific shock or stress?		x	x				x		
	<i>Absorptive capacities:</i> EQ1.3 In what ways are existing absorptive capacities likely to be exceeded by the shock or stress?		x	x				x		
<b>BRACED IP plans intervention and applies for PHASE funding</b>										
EQ2. In what ways is the proposed intervention intended to protect gains made in the BRACED programme?	<i>Design of intervention:</i> EQ2.1 How does the design of the PHASE work seek to be complementary to the longer-term BRACED development goals?	x		x			x	x		Implementing partners recognise the added value of <i>ex-ante</i> response and have the foresight and capacity to complete a high-quality proposal well in advance of a crisis situation escalating.  PHASE applications are designed by IPs as an important contribution to protect resilience gains made, rather than treated solely as an additional source of funding to meet needs
	<i>Implementing Partner capacity:</i> EQ 2.2 Are there any constraints impinging the ability of Implementing Partners in their design of PHASE interventions? If so, what?			x				x	x	

										under a deteriorating context. As such, PHASE designs will be distinctive (in type and timing) in comparison with other interventions.  Options for action to redress escalation in the crisis can be identified and are viable (i.e. existing BRACED activities are running smoothly and the IP has contacts/means to implement identified interventions).		
<b>BRACED IP secures PHASE funding</b>												
EQ3. How suitable for delivering early action are the funding mechanics of the PHASE Contingency Mechanism?	<i>Timing:</i> EQ3.1 Did the Implementing Partners anticipate the crisis before its onset?		x	x				x	x		There is effective communication between DFID, the Fund Manager and/or within the IP consortia of the funding opportunities from PHASE and clearly articulated proposal guidelines.  The assessment areas (i.e. criteria outlined in the proposal guidance), including funding assessment, are suitable for sound decision-making by the proposal Assessment Panel.  Panel members have the capacity to make effective decisions and are available in accordance with the Contingency Mechanism's protocol and dependence on timeliness.  Communication of funding decision allows for immediate action and/or lessons learnt about why the proposal was not successful.	
	<i>Procedures:</i> EQ3.2 How effective were the procedures for accessing PHASE contingency funding?			x				x	x			
	<i>Enablers and constraints to access:</i> EQ3.3 What are the main enablers and constraints in the process of accessing the contingency fund and how could the process be improved?				x				x	x		
	<i>Eligibility:</i> EQ3.4 How was eligibility for contingency funding operationalised?				x				x	x		
	<i>Decision making:</i> EQ3.5 Did the funding application template provide enough and suitable information for the assessment panel to make a sound decision?				x				x	x		
<b>Timely PHASE intervention helps beneficiaries absorb shock/stress</b>												
EQ4. Did the intervention provide early action to absorb the shock or stress?	<i>Adjustments in programming:</i> EQ4.1 Were changes in the programme activities made between those in the application and those undertaken? Why and how?					x				x	Activities as outlined in the proposal continue to be the most appropriate (i.e. no significant de/escalation of crisis; changes in the security situation that jeopardises implementation; significant exchange rate fluctuations).	
	<i>Results:</i> EQ4.2 Did the intervention have the desired short-term results in terms of reducing loss and damage?				x	x			x	x		

	<i>Protection of gains:</i> EQ4.3 To what extent have PHASE investments helped people avoid adopting negative coping strategies?		x		x	x		x	x	Implementing Partners remain able to implement the activities with suitable high capacity staff and necessary resources.
<b>BRACED activities remain on track</b>										
EQ5. Did the contingency mechanism help prevent or minimise disruption to resilience gains being made?	<i>Continuity:</i> EQ5.1 To what extent were recipients of PHASE contingency funding able to continue participation in other BRACED resilience-building project activities?		x		x			x		PHASE contingency mechanism is sufficient in size, suitable in design and implemented strongly, such that meaningful protection is offered to BRACED gains being made.
	<i>Alternate:</i> EQ5.2 What would have happened without contingency funding?					x		x	x	
	<i>Bounce back:</i> EQ5.3 After what time period did regular programming resume?		x		x			x		
	<i>Bounce back better:</i> EQ5.4 Did the activities implemented through PHASE enhance resilience-building progress being made? How?		x		x			x	x	
<b>BRACED resilience outcomes are protected in spite of shock/stress</b>										
EQ 6. To what extent did the contingency mechanism have a meaningful contribution with respect to the attainment of BRACED resilience outcomes?	<i>Relative contribution:</i> EQ6.1 How important a contribution is PHASE contingency funding with respect to the overall attainment of BRACED resilience outcomes?	x	x					x	x	PHASE contingency mechanism is sufficient in size, suitable in design, and implemented strongly, such that meaningful protection is offered to BRACED gains being made.
	<i>Lessons learnt:</i> EQ6.2 What lessons can be learnt on what worked and what did not with respect to this specific intervention?	x	x		x		x	x	x	
	<i>Applicability:</i> EQ6.3 What learning is relevant in other contexts?						x	x	x	

## 4. Methodological approach

The approach described in this Detailed Evaluation Design provides a robust framework for gathering and assessing information relating to the evaluation of questions identified as well as testing of the central assumptions outlined in Section 3. The design of the methodological approach for EA5 also reflects the flexible design of the PHASE Contingency Mechanism itself.

This theory-based evaluation will take place in five stages. Each stage is nonspecific, aiming to account for the timing, location and nature of crises that PHASE interventions are responding to – which are inherently uncertain. Evidence-gathering therefore needs to be responsive, flexible and suited to evaluating a range of potential programme interventions. It also needs to be flexible, as the interventions will commence at different points in time.

The five stages in the methodological approach are described below.

**Table 2. The five stages of EA5’s methodological approach**

Stage 1: Develop a programme-wide and intervention-specific theories of change	First, a programme-wide theory of change will be developed. This will illustrate the relationship between PHASE interventions in BRACED programmes, based on the hypothesis and causal chain mapping in Section 3.1. This will be informed by a programme document analysis (Section 4.1.4 for details).  Next, a theory of change will be designed for each case study. A purposive sampling strategy will be used to determine the sample of up to three applicants (Section 4.1.2 for details).	Section 4.1
Stage 2: After action reviews	Test the case study level theories through after action reviews. This will be done 1) after initial disbursement of PHASE funding and 2) after PHASE implementation is complete, when IPs have a sense of initial results.  Primary data will be collected through the after action reviews. In both stages 1 and 2 these will be guided by a semi-structured interview template, devised on the basis of headline questions in the evaluation matrix.	Section 4.2
Stage 3: Supplementary material and triangulation of findings	Secondary material will be collected, for each of the three case studies. Where required, further key informant interviews will be undertaken.  The after action reviews and supplementary material will be triangulated. These will inform up to three case studies (limited to three for budgetary reasons), each of which will be validated against the case study-level theory of change.	Section 4.3
Stage 4: VfM analysis	Using the data collected in stages 1–3, a VfM analysis will be conducted to assess and compare the value of the contribution PHASE has achieved. This will provide a quantitative contribution to the case studies.	Section 4.4
Stage 5: Synthesis of cases	The three cases will be synthesised against the programme theory of change. The evaluation team will highlight specific results pathways, generalise about the validity of the overarching theory of change and generate lessons regarding the value of a contingency mechanism in the context of a resilience-building programme.	Section 4.5

Stages 1 through to 5 are detailed further throughout this section. Each stage will be followed sequentially for the three case studies. However, each case study will not commence at the same time, given the responsive nature of the PHASE disbursement. Therefore, the evaluation team will need to be flexible to accommodate the different timeframes for each case study.

## 4.1 Develop a programme-wide and intervention-specific theories of change

### *Summary of Stage 1: Develop a programme-wide and intervention-specific theories of change*

1. A programme-wide theory of change will be developed. This will illustrate the relationship between PHASE interventions in BRACED programmes, based on the hypothesis and causal chain mapping in Section 3.1. This will be informed by a programme document analysis (Section 4.1.4 for details).
2. Next, a theory of change will be designed for each case study. A purposive sampling strategy will be used to determine the sample of up to three applicants (Section 4.1.2 for details).

#### 4.1.1 Programme-wide theory of change

First, a programme-wide theory of change will be developed. This will illustrate the relationship between PHASE interventions in BRACED programmes, based on the hypothesis and causal chain mapping in Section 3.1.

In order to assess the contribution of PHASE interventions towards BRACED's overall programmatic objectives, the theory of change analysis will be used to determine the extent to which projects supported under PHASE are aligned with BRACED's theory of change. The analysis will primarily be done through a desk-based review and consolidation of the following materials:

- BRACED design, theory of change and logframe
- BRACED Knowledge Manager M&E guidance and BRACED Knowledge Manager evaluation plan
- PHASE and PHASE in BRACED documentation to date (e.g. guidelines to IPs, questions and answers with IPs, application form template, applications to date)
- insights from key informant interviews with BRACED IPs and BRACED management

#### 4.1.2 Selection of the case studies

As described by Better Evaluation, 'A case study focuses on a particular unit – a person, a site, a project. It often uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative data.'<sup>4</sup> In this case, the unit is a PHASE Contingency Mechanism intervention, and the case study method will allow the evaluation to understand how the implementation, context and other factors produced the observed results (Yin, 2014).

The Contingency Mechanism available for BRACED Sahel applicants is to a value of £1.5 million. The guidance for BRACED applicants states that they can apply up to a value of £250,000 per tranche. It is anticipated that six applications will be funded, although this figure may be higher should applications be received and awarded funding to a value lower than the maximum allowed.

Up to four applications will be selected as case studies. Our sampling strategy is purposive, based on a set of case study criteria. The status of the PHASE applications, at the time of writing, and the selection criteria for the purposive sampling of the case studies are outlined below.

#### Status of the PHASE applications

By June 2016, at the time of completion of the EA5 detailed design, the PHASE Assessment Panel (comprising DFID and KMPG) had received three applications to the PHASE Contingency Mechanism). These included:

- **Emergency intervention to support agro-pastoralists and pastoralists in the 2016 severe food crisis in Tillaberi:** This is to support vulnerable householders to meet their immediate food needs through 1) a

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<sup>4</sup> <http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/triangulation>

cash for work programme; 3) provision of improved seeds and agricultural inputs for the upcoming planting season; and 3i) distribution of cattle food. The application was submitted by CARE International UK, for the BRACED-PRESENCES consortium in Niger on 29 January 2016.

- **Assistance to SUR1M to Reduce Displacements (ASSuReD):** This is a cash for work activity to offset the food insecurity crisis in vulnerable SUR1M communities. The proposal is to work in Niger and Mali and was submitted by Catholic Relief Services in Niger on 5 April 2016.
- **Emergency assistance to agro-pastoralists displaced in Nounbiel:** The crisis here is inter-communal conflict in Bouna, which has caused population displacement, mostly of agro-pastoralists in the province of Nounbiel. The proposal is to work in Burkina Faso. It was submitted by Acting for Life on 14 April 2016.
- **Application from Christian Aid:** Details of this are not yet available to the evaluation team.

### Case study criteria

Purposive sampling will be used to shortlist three applicants as case studies. Purposive sampling is, *'a form of non-probability sampling in which decisions concerning the individuals to be included in the sample are taken by the researcher, based upon a variety of criteria which may include specialist knowledge of the research issue, or capacity and willingness to participate in the research'* (Oliver, 2013).

On commencement of the evaluation, the existing applications funded will be reviewed in line with the criteria set out below. Though the sample size is small, purposive sampling will enable the team to select the cases that are most appropriate for the evaluation and ensure they are able to engage in the evaluative learning process. When making a selection, the evaluation team will also be cognisant of future possible applicants to the fund.

The criteria for choosing an application as a case study includes (in no particular order):

- geographical spread to ensure a cross section of the Sahel countries
- diversity in hazard and crisis type
- diversity in proposed intervention activities
- willingness to engage in an evaluative learning process
- timing of the fund applications
- security situation and possible de/escalation of the crisis situation
- fund recipients evaluated by the formal PHASE independent evaluators

Based on the above criteria, the evaluation team will determine which, if any, of the current applications are suitable for a case study.

#### 4.1.3 Developing case study-based theories

For each case study, the evaluation team will develop a plausible and intervention-specific theory of change. It is anticipated that this theory will be implicit in the documentation reviewed, and will form the testable hypothesis used to evaluate the case study.

As soon as an application for PHASE funding is approved, the team will use the application to construct a simple causal chain tracing the process through which BRACED IPs aim to protect development gains using PHASE funding. This process will be similar to the causal chain model in Section 3.3. Wherever possible, the evaluation team will collaborate with IPs to develop these theories, though participation is not necessary for a conventional theory-based evaluation. Where feasible, the team will conduct a first round of cross-checking to verify that the implicit case-level 'theory' has been understood correctly, and will make amendments if/where required. For IPs that have already begun implementing PHASE interventions, the evaluation team will develop case study theories of change (for the subset selected) after completion of the programme-wide theory.

Towards the end of our analysis, after the implementation is finished and the final after action reviews and triangulation of data have been conducted, we will update these case-level theories to reflect the empirical evidence generated by this evaluation activity. This entails revisiting the assumptions in each case theory and verifying that the causal mechanism has contributed to the change the theory outlined. With the final set of

theories, we will revisit the overarching theory for how PHASE funding has contributed to protect development gains in BRACED programmes, and update the programme-level theory according to our findings.

#### 4.1.4 Programme document analysis

Many of the insights required to determine PHASE's added value will be found in project documents and reports. Therefore, a thorough desk-based analysis of all key documents will be performed at a number of stages, covering all aspects of project design and procurement, implementation and impact. Evidence from the document analysis will be synthesised and used as raw data and as a means to triangulate with key informant interviews. In addition to those listed in the theory of change analysis, the following documents will be used as part of the programme document analysis:

- Assessment Panel Knowledge Manager observer template (one per application/review board)
- Fund Manager minutes from Assessment Panel
- PHASE application form (including those before and after feedback from the Assessment Panel and/or Fund Manager interactions)
- accompanying documentation for the application (this includes budgetary information, which will be treated with sensitivity – see data protocols later in this plan)
- progress report from the PHASE applicant, on implementation progress and completion (template still to be designed by the Fund Manager)

PHASE funding provided to BRACED IPs has a few additional monitoring requirements that this EA will use to understand what development gains PHASE funding is meant to protect. Recipient organisations must report the following:

- the number of people reached, and the extent to which the people assisted are already included in BRACED funding
- time taken to respond from disbursement to reaching beneficiaries
- how additional contingency activities have affected the existing BRACED programme, with supporting evidence as appropriate
- any expected effects on BRACED objectives that could be tracked
- key performance indicators defined by BRACED IPs; these should be set out in BRACED IPs' concept notes to ensure the project(s) have achieved objectives

This evidence complements questions outlined in the evaluation matrix.

## 4.2 After action reviews

### **Summary of Stage 2: After action reviews**

1. *Test the case study-level theories through after action reviews. This will be done 1) after initial disbursement of PHASE funding and 2) after PHASE implementation is complete, when IPs have a sense of initial results.*
2. *Primary data will be collected through the after action reviews. In both stages 1 and 2 these will be guided by a semi-structured interview template, devised on the basis of headline questions in the evaluation matrix.*

An after action review is 'an assessment conducted after a project or major activity that allows team members and leaders to discover (learn) what happened and why, reassess direction, and review both successes and challenges. The AAR does not have to be performed at the end of a project or activity; it can be performed after each identifiable event within a project or major activity, thus becoming a live learning process (the learning organization)' (USAID, 2013).

After action reviews are an appropriate method because they support the ambition to pursue an evaluative learning approach because, 'as well as turning unconscious learning into tacit, it helps to build trust among team

members and to overcome fear of mistakes. When applied correctly, AARs can become a key aspect of the internal system of learning and motivation.<sup>5</sup>

Many successful examples of after action reviews exist, with interventions of a similar nature to the PHASE Contingency Mechanism. One example is the Joint After Action Review by CARE and World Vision International, with Oxfam Great Britain and Catholic Relief Services, April 2005 (CARE et al., 2005). The focus here was on the consolidation of a number of country-level learning activities following the crisis caused by the tsunami of 26 December 2004.

The specific participants to be included in the after action review, and the location and scheduling, cannot be predetermined as the timing of the PHASE interventions is unknown. The practicalities of conducting the after action review will be discussed and mutually agreed on by the fund recipients as part of the case study selection (see case study criteria ‘willingness to engage’).

Once scheduled, the after action review will follow a predefined format, with simple after action review questions adapted to fit the nature of the intervention. An example of a simple standard set of after action review questions is in Table 3.

**Table 3. After action review simple sample questions**

Question	Purpose
What was supposed to happen? What actually happened? Why were there differences?	These questions establish a common understanding of the work item under review. The facilitator should encourage and promote discussion around these questions. In particular, divergences from the plan should be explored.
What worked? What didn't? Why?	These questions generate reflection about successes and failures during the course of the project, activity, event or task. The question ‘Why?’ generates understanding of the root causes of these successes and failures.
What would you do differently next time?	This question is intended to help identify specific actionable recommendations. The facilitator asks the team members for crisp and clear, achievable and future-oriented recommendations.

Source: *Better Evaluation* (2015).

## 4.3 Supplementary material and triangulation of findings

### **Summary of Stage 3: Supplementary material and triangulation of findings**

1. Secondary material will be collected for each of the three case studies. Where required, further key informant interviews will be undertaken.
2. The after action reviews and supplementary material will be triangulated. These will inform up to three case studies, each of which will be validated against the case study-level theory of change.

Supplementary material will be sourced from:

- key informant interviews
- routine monitoring and results reporting in BRACED
- programme document analysis
- review of secondary literature

<sup>5</sup> <http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/triangulation>

#### 4.3.1 Additional interviews

Additional key informant interviews provide the primary source of supplementary evidence. Detailed interviews will be conducted with a range of stakeholders to obtain a diversity of perspectives on the PHASE activities, in response to the overarching evaluation questions. The interviews will be conducted with 'internal' stakeholders such as the PHASE IPs (in the UK and in-country) and 'external' stakeholders such as the managers of the fund. As a minimum, the team will request interviews with:

- the PHASE applicant project leader (named individuals in the application form)
- the BRACED IP project leader (where these differ from those named above)
- representatives from implementing agencies part of the PHASE delivery team (specific number will depend activities and consortium members)
- DFID advisor, thematic, technical or regional (where applicable)
- Fund Manager account handler for the Sahel

A non-probability sampling technique will identify key informants; specifically, snowball sampling techniques will be used. Though the sample is not unique or hard to track down *per se*, understanding who within large organisations or a consortium has the necessary experience of the PHASE process and institutional knowledge of the application and implementation will require referral. The evaluation team will depend on this form of 'chain referral' until sufficient information has been collected and/or time and resource constraints prevent further interviews.

As part of the delivery of the evaluation, the team will devise a semi-structured interview template based on the headline questions in the evaluation matrix. Interviews will gather evidence relating to the key evaluation questions (see Section 3.3). Each interview will be 30–45 minutes in length with all notes transcribed and stored centrally and securely. In order to encourage greater validity, and given the sensitivity of the information collected, interviewees will be informed of the degree of confidentiality that can be assured (noting that case studies will be identifiable).

#### 4.3.2 Routine monitoring and results reporting in BRACED

A number of mechanisms exist for collating evidence on the BRACED IP outputs, outcomes and impact. Some focus on accountability, others for learning. On-going monitoring and results reporting through the BRACED programme, led by the BRACED Knowledge Manager, provides a valuable source of information that can be triangulated with the EA5 data collection. This includes reporting on BRACED outputs and (progress towards) outcomes on a quarterly basis, and more in-depth reporting on a quarterly and annual basis.

Routine monitoring and results reporting within BRACED requires BRACED IPs to complete templates that detail the progress of project activities, as well as changes to the wider socio-economic-political and hazard context in which the project is being delivered. The routine monitoring and results reporting within BRACED therefore provide a rich and rare source of data on the effect of an impending shock or stress (whether a crisis comes to fruition or not) on the 'normal' programming –within BRACED. This makes the critical and unique connection between development programming and a humanitarian contingency mechanism.

#### 4.3.3 Review of secondary literature

EA5 is needed because of the dearth of experience and knowledge integrating contingency funding within development programming in order to withstand shocks and stresses and avoid crises. However, some relevant examples do exist (e.g. the US Agency for International Development's (USAID's) use of 'crisis modifiers'). Learning from these will be an important contribution to this work.

A synthesis of findings from existing literature will take place, in the form of a secondary literature review of:

- key documents on the use of evaluative learning methods in development and humanitarian evaluations
- key documents on evaluating resilience-strengthening interventions and their relationship to contingency finance
- any examples where a contingency finance mechanism has been tied/designed into a longer-term development/resilience-building programme
- other documents recommended by interviewees

In particular, the secondary literature review will inform the final Evaluation Report.

#### 4.3.4 Triangulation of results

The data collection and analysis processes are clearly documented within this Evaluation Design, to help enable evaluators to be aware of the possible biases they face, and to systematically collect and analyse data to address them and minimise their impact (White and Philips, 2012: 23). The triangulation of results is necessary to ensure information collected from a range of sources, including individuals with diverse backgrounds, methods and settings, can help reduce the risk of systematic biases due to a specific source or method. Triangulation is not something peculiar to supplementary material and will inform all stages of data collection.

To expand, triangulation ensures *'consistency of findings obtained through different instruments and increases the chance to control, or at least assess, some of the threats or multiple causes influencing our results. Triangulation is not just about validation but about deepening and widening one's understanding... It is an attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint.'*<sup>6</sup>

Findings collected through documented interview transcripts and IP self-assessment (e.g. application forms, project reports, monitoring reports) will be triangulated by information, where viable, from an independent source. The primary aim of this triangulation is to ensure findings are technically plausible. As Ludi et al. (2016) states, *'This was a minimum requirement to ensure that findings were credible, addressing the lack of rigour that can be a challenge, particularly in relation to qualitative research when findings may be accepted uncritically.'*

The triangulation process seeks to ensure findings in early action/early response are within the bounds of technical feasibility. For example, information on results from IP self-assessment will be cross-referenced with independent sources. Depending on availability, this could include, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) SitReps (Situation Reports issued by country or region or crisis, depending on the context), Fund Manager field visit notes on the BRACED routine progress, interviews with DFID Sahel advisors, BRACED monitoring and results reporting and independent PHASE evaluator reports.

For example, by way of an illustration from the Evaluation Design of the impact of public works assets on livelihoods, by Ludi et al. (2016: 8), *'Reports of yield increases of several hundred percent as a result of anti-erosion measures was found to be not technically plausible, and was not corroborated by reports from traders in terms of the local patterns of trade in food crops.'*

With EAS having a focus on qualitative data, this is all the more important. Triangulation of information, where feasible, helps ensure a healthy degree of scientific scepticism is adopted to ensure analysis is robust and conclusions are credible.

In addition, the expertise of the Evaluation Team will be harnessed to conduct rapid reality checks using a range of sources, such as secondary literature, on the viability of results from early warning interventions, early response and short-term results produced by contingency mechanisms. Rapid reality checks will be informed by intelligence on the local conditions from the Knowledge Manager engagement leaders (KMELs). The KMELs are local staff living in various countries in the Sahel, and are part of the Knowledge Manager consortium. These individuals will provide independent verification of the viability of the claimed results from IP self-reporting.

A flexible approach will be adopted wherein it is accepted that additional data collection methods and instruments may be introduced as required, in response to the need to find ways of triangulating emerging findings and to fill in information gaps as they arise (Ludi et al., 2016). In this regard, the KMELs are an important source in terms of identifying triangulation material, be this through in-country status updates, reports or technical resource persons for interview.

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<sup>6</sup> <http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/triangulation>

## 4.4 Value for money analysis

### *Summary of Stage 4: Value for money analysis*

*Using the data collected in stages 1–3, a VfM analysis will be conducted to assess and compare the value of the contribution that PHASE has achieved. This will provide a quantitative contribution to the case studies.*

A core component of EA5's methodological approach will be to assess VfM of at least one PHASE intervention (subject to budget availability). The primary goal here is to measure and compare what would have happened without PHASE contingency, and what happened with PHASE contingency.

A synthesis of common evaluation questions will be asked to BRACED organisations and relevant stakeholders at various stages in the process of applying for and using PHASE funding. EA5 will commence by collecting qualitative information – requesting partners to articulate with PHASE contingency and without PHASE contingency scenarios. It will then look at what within these submissions can be quantified for the economy (cost of inputs), efficiency (cost of outputs) and effectiveness (cost of outcomes) aspects of a VfM analysis. Questions will relate to the following considerations:

- What is the shock or stress that threatens BRACED outputs/outcomes/impact?
- What do you hypothesise would happen to your project without PHASE contingency funding as a result of the shock or stress described in the first question? Please be very specific regarding the change in impact or outcomes as a result of the stress, and quantify this change to the extent that it is possible.
- What anticipated gains under BRACED will the contingency funding protect? Please detail specifically what these gains will be, and the magnitude of these gains.

In order to carry out the main VfM assessment, the evaluation team will work together with a selected consortium (subject to data availability and willingness to engage) to detail and identify relevant data suitable for quantitative assessment, for at least one of the case studies identified in the previous steps. Depending on data and viability of applying the VfM methodology to the interventions, a case study will be selected for the VfM analysis based on expert guidance from the technical advisor.

The evaluation team will work with the relevant agencies to gather quantitative data on the VfM components of the PHASE funding, specifically:

- Economy: Has PHASE funding resulted in any changes to the cost per input and what is the magnitude of this change for the activities being implemented (e.g. procurement costs have changed as compared with a scenario without PHASE funding)?
- Efficiency: Has PHASE funding resulted in any changes to the cost per output and what is the magnitude of this change for the activities being implemented (e.g. the cost per beneficiary has changed as compared with a scenario without PHASE funding)?
- Effectiveness: Has PHASE funding resulted in any changes to the cost per outcome and what is the magnitude of this change for the activities being implemented? The outcomes will be specific to the project activities being implemented.

It is important to note that data-gathering will be very dependent on the sector identified, as different sectors will have different intended impacts and therefore data requirements.

The data from the 3es will be used to construct an overall analysis of the costs of PHASE contingency funding, as compared with the anticipated benefits, or avoided losses, as a result of the contingency funding.

## 4.5 Synthesis of cases

### *Summary of Stage 5: Synthesis of cases*

*The three cases will be synthesised against the programme theory of change. The evaluation team will highlight specific results pathways, generalise about the validity of the overarching theory of change and generate lessons regarding the value of a contingency mechanism in the context of a resilience-building programme.*

The synthesis of case studies is the key method for collating IPs' experience of using PHASE funding in a BRACED programme and drawing lessons across the case studies.

The synthesis method will be driven by the nature of our three case study-based approach. Data will be narrative-based and drawn from the expert judgement of the team, led by the team leader. The narrative synthesis may apply some thematic coding if feasible. The synthesis will assess the strength of the evidence generated against the evaluation matrix and in line with the theory-based approach. We do not anticipate that another form of methodological synthesis will be necessary or appropriate, given the case-based analysis. The team will use the narrative synthesis to identify key points of divergence between the cases as well as areas where assumptions have been consistently validated.

## 4.6 Limitations of approach

Given the scope and the scale of the evaluation, the team believes a theory-based approach using case studies is the best-suited methodology for our purposes. Still, there are a number of limitations to the approach.

One of the inherent limitations of our case study-based approach is the small sample size. The three to four case studies are not necessarily representative of the total range of possible interventions from the contingency fund, although the selection criteria detailed in Section 4.1.2 were designed to ensure the sample of applicants is as representative of the total possible PHASE interventions as it can be. By adhering to criteria that allow the team to choose different types of PHASE interventions (i.e. one responding to food insecurity, one responding to displacement, one responding to another crisis), the team aims to ensure the case studies reflect the types of stresses and responses from the portfolio of BRACED projects in the Sahel. The findings from the case studies do not intend to be directly transferrable or easily replicable, but instead pull out lessons that are relevant for other similar interventions facing chronic shocks and stresses. By conducting an evaluation in real time and with a limited budget, the evaluation does not intend to answer whether a contingency mechanism attached to a resilience-building programme works across all contexts and for every project, but instead elucidates the conditions regarding when, where and how this does or does not protect development gains.

The relatively small scale of this evaluation has also prevented the inclusion of beneficiary perspectives. Although the evaluators would like to solicit end beneficiaries for their perspectives, the resources available could at best allow a light touch sample of beneficiaries that would not be representative. Because a robust sampling of beneficiaries was not possible, the team designed the questions in the evaluation matrix to ensure the lines of inquiry are focused on how the PHASE intervention was sequenced with regular BRACED programming and how the shock or stress affected resilience programming. Local and national project staff are best placed to answer the questions we intend to ask, particularly concerning the process of accessing and delivering contingency finance.

Lastly, the timeline of the evaluation does not extend significantly beyond the close of PHASE interventions themselves, prohibiting outcome-level data collection or analysis. Where possible, the evaluators will draw on BRACED project-level reporting to assess impacts of resilience programming and the Contingency Mechanism, but the team anticipates it will rely primarily on output-level data and observations from project staff.


### 4.7 Timeline for data-gathering, assessment and delivery

Since November 2015, BRACED IPs in the Sahel have been eligible to apply for the PHASE Contingency Mechanism. By June 2016, at the time of completion of this EA5 Detailed Evaluation Design, four applications to the PHASE Contingency Mechanism had been received by the PHASE Assessment Panel (comprising DFID and KPMG). These are:

- 29 January 2016: CARE International UK, for the BRACED-PRESENCES consortium in Niger
- 5 April 2016: Catholic Relief Services for work in Niger and Mali
- 14 April 2016: Acting for Life in Burkina Faso
- June 2016: Christian Aid (details not yet available to the evaluation team)

Data collection began in February 2016 to document the earlier applications for PHASE funding, and this will be drawn on in accordance with the sequencing detailed below.

**Figure 3. Indicative timeline for EA5**



*Note: In practice, the timeline is responsive to applications from PHASE applicants and their implementing timelines.*

The latest envisaged completion date for this evaluative learning process and delivery of outputs under current BRACED and PHASE programming is March 2017, although with four PHASE contingency mechanisms already in the pipeline it is possible that completion will be sooner.

# Section C: Quality assurance and presentation of findings

## 5. Quality assurance

### 5.1 Potential Sources of Bias: Guidance for Evaluation Activity 5 team

Evaluators are charged with drawing informed evaluation findings, with data that are as accurate as possible. There is a long history of improving the accuracy of humanitarian evaluations, which focuses on increasing awareness of, and managing bias in, data collection and description (see Alexander, 2014). Important bias to take account of in EA5 includes desirability bias of respondents and courtesy bias.

Consideration and countering of bias is relevant in both primary and secondary data collection:

*‘For example, assessment data from a study in Ethiopia found that government needs assessments data had an economic slant and was more of a “wish list” than an accurate assessment of needs. In this case, clusters and local NGOs were important in building confidence in government data and its accuracy’ (Darcy et al., 2013 in Alexander, 2014: 2).*

This is likely to be a cause for concern given the IP applications to PHASE are designed to secure funding, and self-reporting mechanisms are designed to demonstrate success. This makes triangulation even more important. Though PHASE is not a needs assessment, many similarities in the nature of the bias exist that will need to be considered. To expand:

*‘It is perhaps inevitable that needs assessments – which will form the basis of distributions of limited amounts of scarce and much needed resources – should encounter problems of accuracy. They provide obvious incentives for people to exaggerate the seriousness of a situation to increase the level of support provided. At the same time, governments may underestimate the extent of needs to deny that a crisis is occurring’ (Knox Clarke and Darcy, 2014: 25)*

Managing bias is part and parcel of the evaluator’s role. Being aware of potential bias and the influence it can have on findings necessitates means minimising or mitigating bias. Table 4 outlines the main potential sources of bias that the evaluation team is likely to encounter in EA5.

**Table 5. Potential sources of bias and definitions**

Type of bias		Explanation
Respondent bias	Courtesy bias	Respondent tells you what they think you want to hear. Especially noticeable when asking about the influence a particular agency or programme might have had in effecting change.
	Social acceptability or political correctness bias	Responses that reflect what people regard as being the socially acceptable thing to say: ‘This kind of bias is likely to appear if there is a prevailing consensus concerning how things have occurred, or concerning the role that a particular agency has played in achieving outcomes’ (White and Phillips, 2012: 21).
	Attribution biases	1) ‘Fundamental error of attribution’: People are more likely to attribute changes to individuals than to contextual factors. Significant danger that respondents will emphasise the role of individual actors, while ignoring the more general social or political context and its effects on the timing and course of events. 2) ‘Self-serving bias’: Biased view of own contribution to changes, taking credit when things go well, but blaming other factors (people, situation, fate) when things go badly. Can be present in groups as well as individuals.
	Self-importance bias	Overstating their role in events.
Evaluator bias	Friendship bias	If an evaluator has spent time with programme staff and has developed a good relationship with them, it becomes difficult to upset them with a critical report.

	Cognitive biases associated with giving greater weight to the accounts of people with whom there has been direct contact, and those with whom we most strongly identify, e.g. similar person bias.	Giving more weight to the narratives of people we interview, reinforcing their already overinflated role arising from self-importance and self-serving biases. Evaluators typically speak mostly to staff of the agency that they are evaluating, staff of other relevant external agencies and selected government officials. They often conduct very limited work in the field and rarely speak to parliamentarians, traditional authorities (such as village chiefs), trade unions, journalists and other key actors. Evaluators will most readily make sense of, and therefore trust, data from people 'like them', who have a similar world view. It requires a mental effort and considerable empathy to understand the quite different perspective from which other people may see things.
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Source: Extracted from White and Phillips (2012), adapted from BRACED EA2.

Measures taken by the team to minimise or mitigate bias are as follows:

- Sampling will be carefully undertaken, informed by a mapping of key actors involved in the BRACED and PHASE application process and delivery of Contingency Mechanism funds. The team will ensure views from all key stakeholders are taken into consideration.
- Interviews will be carefully planned, semi-structured and targeted to explore key parts of the causal chain.
- Interview transcripts will be created to accurately document interviewee responses, and to provide a reference point for cross-checking with secondary sources.
- The team will independently carry out all interviews with key informants, based on a predefined set of interview questions. The team will adhere to interview best practice, including providing a full explanation of the nature of the evaluation, confidentiality clauses and closing debrief.
- 'Ensure that all potentially relevant external factors have also been accounted for and consideration has been given to the possibility that assumptions and theorised causes may have varied' (Gregorowski et al., 2016).
- Triangulate results with information collected using a variety of methods, so as to reduce the risk of systematic biases owing to a specific source or method (see section on Triangulation).

## 5.2 BRACED quality assurance protocols

As with all Knowledge Manager outputs, the EA5 PHASE products will be subject to the BRACED Knowledge Manager Quality Assurance Strategy, Data Protocols: Minimum Standards (version 2, May 2016). In accordance with that strategy, the PHASE outputs fall under Type 2: Publications authored and/or coordinated by the BRACED Knowledge Manager.

The PHASE Evaluation Design, as with all evaluation designs, falls under Type 2. This means it is subject to intensive peer review, including by internal and external reviewers, as well as the component lead (Katie Peters) and the leadership Team nominee – who, for coherence and consistency, is the head of M&E (Robbie Gregorowski). As with all BRACED Knowledge Manager Evaluation Designs, the review process will include Derek Poate, external consultant, who oversees the quality of all plans prior to submission to DFID. As the PHASE Detailed Evaluation Design also forms a DFID milestone, this will also receive sign off by the Programme Management Unit (team leader or programme coordinator).

The specific products to be delivered in this evaluation (see relevant section in this plan) will also be subject to the BRACED Knowledge Manager quality assurance strategy. Depending on the type of output, these will either be deemed Type 1 or Type 2.

- Type 1: Functional and internal outputs. These are subject to review by the team leader of the evaluation, as well as the leadership team nominee (head of M&E). Publications being shared externally must also receive sign-off from a member of the Programme Management Unit.
- Type 2: Publications authored and/or coordinated by the BRACED KM. This applies to publicly available reports, and will undergo internal and external peer review in line with all Knowledge Manager outputs.

The BRACED Knowledge Manager quality assurance strategy also includes a data protocol on both data collection ethics and use of sensitive material. To expand, during data collection, the evaluation team will be subject to the

Overseas Development Institute Ethics in Research and Policy Engagement Policy (which forms part of the affiliate agreement with all Knowledge Manager organisations).

In addition, there is a data use process that will be followed when the evaluation team is using data or information from IPs that is not publicly available. This is detailed in the data protocol section of the quality assurance strategy, and includes a process whereby IPs are offered a chance to review outputs before they are made public, where they rely on non-public material. In order to maintain the integrity of the output, this is not a peer review but an opportunity for IPs to flag any factual inconsistencies regarding information on their project, and to request a formal review of any information that the IP believes to be in breach of its grant agreement or the Knowledge Manager's research ethics.

The quality assurance strategy is complemented by the BRACED branding guidelines (2015a) and the Gold and Silver Accreditation Guide (2015b), which together provide comprehensive support on the BRACED output production process. The PHASE evaluation outputs will be subject to the Knowledge Manager branding and design protocols (more information can be found in the BRACED Branding Guidelines). Importantly, this includes the requirement that BRACED branding must be used when outputs draw on BRACED data (with the exception of journal articles and some social media outputs, though all should as a minimum reference/credit BRACED as the source of material).

More details on the peer review process, quality assurance and data protocol are detailed in the BRACED Knowledge Manager Quality Assurance Strategy, Data Protocols: Minimum Standards (version 2, May 2016).

## 6. Presentation of findings

EA5 will generate evidence of relevance to a wide range of stakeholders and decision-makers. In response, a number of different products will be delivered in order to tailor the evaluation findings to relevant audiences. The findings will also be fully integrated into the wider BRACED programme of work led by the Knowledge Manager.

### 6.1 Products

Specific products to be delivered as a result of EA5 include:

- **Detailed Evaluation Design (up to 40 pages):** The Evaluation Design (this document) will detail the approach, rationale, aims and ambitions for the evaluative learning work. It will describe the methodology, analytical approach, team roles and responsibilities, and outputs and timeframe.
- **Technical report (up to 30 pages):** The primary written output will be the final technical report that will outline the methodology, document all evidence gathered and present EA5's findings. This will be aimed at technical staff in development and humanitarian agencies, as well as the wider research communities. Although the timing of the report depends on how and when BRACED IPs apply for PHASE funding, the team anticipates the final version will be compiled after the second round of gathering and consolidation of evidence by March 2016.

Discretionary (subject to nature of the evaluation findings and budgetary constraints):

- **Policy brief (up to 5 pages):** Findings from EA5 will also be used to inform relevant decision-makers and non-technical staff in development agencies. A short brief will be prepared, based on synthesis of the technical report, and will feature a series of concrete policy recommendations aimed at donor and NGO communities.
- **DFID seminar:** Presentation of key findings to DFID advisors (including the BRACED Steering Group and Africa Regional Department) will occur. This may alternatively take the form of a BRACED webinar.
- **Op-ed (opinion piece) or blog:** This will connect key findings to topical news items, for promotion via the BRACED website. Finding ways to communicate findings of technical work to the general public and non-technical audiences is important to ensure greater understanding of the potential for cross-fertilisation between humanitarian and development work and the evidence for improving poverty reduction in fragile and conflict-affected states.

### 6.2 Links to wider knowledge management activities

EA5 fits within a set of evaluation activities supported through BRACED, and a wider set of knowledge management activities as described in the detailed Year 2 plan (BRACED Knowledge Manager, 2016a). Outlined below are some of the connections to be made between this work and other activities.

- **Policy influencing and outreach to the humanitarian policy and funding:** Connections can be made with the wider on-going work to draw lessons from the BRACED programme and use these to inform policy and funding decisions in the follow-up to Agenda 2030 and the World Humanitarian Summit commitments (UN Secretary General, 2016), and beyond.
- **Realities of Resilience:** Where geographical overlaps exist between the Realities of Resilience and PHASE funding recipients, there are opportunities to connect real-time documentation of stories of experiences of disaster events, and actions to build resilience to disasters, with the findings of PHASE. This provides an interesting opportunity to achieve real-time reportage of disaster events in advance of findings from the evaluative work from PHASE.

- **Evidence and Learning Report:** Findings from EA5 will contribute to the BRACED Knowledge Manager Evidence and Learning Report, which seeks to bring together lessons on resilience building from the broader BRACED portfolio of International Climate Fund (ICF) investment.
- **Annual Learning Event 2017:** This will see presentation of findings and facilitation of knowledge and lesson sharing between IPs and EA5 evaluation team.
- **Adaptive programming:** The staged process for analysis (described in this Detailed Evaluation Design) is purposeful, allowing for lessons from the Contingency Mechanism to be fed into on-going programming approaches and fund disbursement. This supports the BRACED ambition to trial adaptive programming approaches, as described further below.

## 6.3 Contributions to adaptive programming

DFID is leading the way among international donors in considering the added value of adaptive management approaches to development and humanitarian programme delivery. This is a new field, where evidence and practical application of adaptive management are in their infancy (see Root and Jones, 2015 and Valters et al., 2016). In programmes beyond BRACED, Itad and ODI are working closely with a number of DFID advisors to explore, document and learn from the application of adaptive programmes. Specifically, in the BRACED programme as a whole, DFID is enlisting the support of Leni Wild, ODI Research Fellow, who is undertaking research to explore how lessons from existing DFID programmes (attempting to adopt more flexible and adaptive practices) can be incorporated into the BRACED programme.

As a direct contribution to this broader ambition, the PHASE evaluation team will provide periodic suggestions and recommendations for adjusting the design and delivery of PHASE – for consideration by the PHASE Assessment Panel comprising DFID and the Fund Manager. This periodic guidance will draw on practical experience and lessons identified through the PHASE delivery period, thus ensuring lessons can be highlighted in real time. Where learning is taken on board, this will help support the DFID ambition for PHASE to adhere to the principles of flexible and adaptive programming. Practically, the periodic guidance will involve lessons being shared by the PHASE team leader at the BRACED Management Group meetings, on a quarterly basis.

As part of the evaluation, the PHASE evaluation team will track the changes in the delivery mechanism, which will provide a basis for lessons to be learnt about what works and what does not work, as a contribution to the field of adaptive programming.

## Section D: risks and resourcing

### 7. Activity-level risk log

A number of the risks identified in the BRACED Knowledge Manager risk register directly impact planned PHASE evaluative learning activities, and a number of additional delivery and methodological risks have been identified during the design process. The PHASE evaluation team will work closely with the Knowledge Manager head of M&E, DFID advisors (of BRACED and PHASE funding streams) and IPs to manage these risks.

As Table 5 outlines, each risk has been given a score out of 5 for likelihood (l) and severity (s), and the combined risk is calculated using the formula (l\*s)+s. This is to give extra emphasis to severity. The following rating is then applied: low risk – score 10 or less; moderate risk – score between 11 and 20; high risk – score of 21 or more.

**Table 5. EA5 activity-level risk log**

Description	Unmitigated			Management strategy
	Likelihood	Severity	Combined	
<b>Quality Risk 1:</b> The PHASE team is reliant on data generated by the recipients of the PHASE fund and documentation and communication of the PHASE delivery by the Fund Manager. Failure to document and communicate PHASE delivery process will result in incomplete information being provided to the evaluation team, and partial data.	2	4	12	<p>The PHASE team will provide standardised EQs and methodological templates to the evaluators, who will work with the PHASE recipients to generate and document high-quality data.</p> <p>The PHASE team comprises members who are also part of broader BRACED activities – as such the team leader (also the deputy team leader) will work closely with the Fund Manager to ensure they understand the critical role they have to play in documenting and communicating PHASE delivery to the PHASE evaluation team – including, specifically, scheduling the PHASE Assessment Panel on dates/times where the evaluation team can act as observers.</p>
<b>Quality Risk 2:</b> A disconnect (in geography, recipients and activities) between activities implemented using the PHASE Contingency Mechanism and the BRACED programme may result in weak evidence from which to explore or substantiate findings specifically addressing the EQs. This would result in a lack of quality data for EA5 reports. Relatedly, if the PHASE Assessment Panel does not substantively account for the links with BRACED recipients, this would result in funding that did not provide substantive means to explore the EQs.	2	3	9	The evaluation team has included criteria in the PHASE application form to ensure the PHASE Assessment Panel verifies that recipients can demonstrate a benefit to the BRACED programme.
<b>Methodological Risk 1:</b> Evaluative learning is an innovative, but largely unproved and untested, method for evaluating the relative benefits of contingency funding to long-term resilience-building programmes.	3	4	12	The evaluation team combines strong expertise in resilience with significant realist evaluation experience. The PHASE evaluation will add value by capturing and sharing learning from the evaluation process itself, as well as the PHASE delivery mechanism.
<b>Methodological Risk 2:</b> Differences in PHASE recipient project contexts and approach mean divergent evaluation results cannot be meaningfully synthesised.	3	3	12	A realist design was chosen because PHASE is characterised by an array of different contexts and interventions. It is well suited to managing possible divergence.
<b>Methodological Risk 3:</b> While the PHASE evaluation is focused on lesson learning and therefore it is in the interests of the PHASE recipients to be as self-reflective as possible, there is potential for bias in relation to the recipient organisations making connections between positive delivery and possible future funding streams.	3	3	12	<p>The PHASE evaluation team will include in the interview protocol the principles and ethos of the Knowledge Manager, which include learning what works, and what doesn't, for the wider benefit of the programme.</p> <p>Adherence to the quality assurance strategy and data protocols will help reassure PHASE recipients that they have the chance to view findings in outputs before they are made public.</p> <p>Finally, the evaluation team comprises experienced evaluators who are adept at triangulating material in order to verify findings and reduce the interference of bias.</p>


## 8. Evaluation team and key stakeholders

### 8.1 Evaluation team composition

The evaluative learning approach adopted within EA5 requires a team comprising high-quality evaluation staff to lead a rigorous evaluative learning process, complemented by Knowledge Manager staff connected to the BRACED programme – to ensure integration of findings into the wider learning system. As a result, the EA5 team has core team members and a set of experts who will be brought in at various points in the process.

The core evaluation team contains Katie Peters (Team Leader), Dr Paul Venton (Deputy Team Leader), Florence Pichon (Technical Advisor) and Lindsey Jones (Technical Advisor – design phase only). The team is supported by a suite of technical experts, including Robbie Gregorowski, Catherine Gould, Paula Silva Villanueva, Dave Wilson, Courtenay Cabot Venton, Dr Elizabeth Carabine and Dr Catherine Simonet.

**Figure 4. EA5 team structure**



Outlined below are the roles and responsibilities of the evaluation team.

#### **Team Leader: Katie Peters**

- Overseeing the EA5 – PHASE component. This includes strategic leadership and direction of the evaluative learning design, implementation and outputs, including initial briefing of the evaluation team and provision of all background materials for the desk-based review.
- Top-line responsibility for the quality, timely delivery and impact of EA5 as set out in the Evaluation Design.
- Responsibility for ensuring connectivity across stakeholders, including top-line representation of the EA5 team with DFID, the Fund Manager and key BRACED partners, including the IPs and Knowledge Manager consortium.
- Provision of internal quality assurance and final sign-off on all products and deliverables from the team, including ensuring adherence to the Knowledge Manager quality assurance and data protocol processes.
- Contributing to authoring of evidence and learning synthesis products based on the evidence and new knowledge generated across the evaluation.
- Control and oversight of the budget and resource allocation, as agreed with the BRACED head of M&E.
- Leading the connectivity of EA5 to the Knowledge Manager learning approach and to Work Package 3 (see BRACED Knowledge Manager, 2016a).
- Responsibility for leading the process connecting the EA5 process and products to the wider M&E community of practice. This includes the strategic promotion of evidence and key findings from the

evaluation as a contribution to the Knowledge Manager's 'amplified impact' route to change (see Knowledge Manager Vision).

**Deputy Team Leader: Dr Paul Venton**

- Responsibility for leading the planning, design and technical delivery of EA5 as articulated in this terms of reference.
- Responsibility for coordinating inputs from the technical team members, as well as the team leader and peer consultation group (as required).
- Ensuring the Evaluation Design (and, later, the implementation and products) adheres to BRACED Knowledge Manager quality assurance and data protocol processes. This includes incorporating internal and external peer review feedback. In addition, managing and incorporating feedback from the DFID M&E team (in line with the SEQAS review process) and Itad quality assurance.
- Writing the Evaluation Design process (as set out within this terms of reference) and the Evaluation Design (and, later, leading the team in the delivery of that design and undertaking the mainstay of written outputs – as articulated in the full Evaluation Design).
- At a later stage, being a key contributor to the authoring of evaluation reports, academic articles and evidence and learning synthesis products based on the evidence and new knowledge generated from EA5, as articulated in the full Evaluation Design.
- Delivering to a high quality, ensuring a high level of technical rigour in the data collection, methods, analysis and synthesis of findings, in line with the expectations of a SEQAS review board and Knowledge Manager M&E team.

**Technical Advisor: Florence Pichon and Lindsey Jones (design phase only)**

- Provision of in-depth support to the team, specifically the deputy team leader, in planning the process, evaluation design and technical delivery of EA5.
- Ensuring a robust evaluative learning agenda is a core part of the evaluation design, and an iterative learning perspective and adaptive programming approach is adopted, as part of the approach and parameters of data collection.
- Being a core member of the writing and delivery team, providing support to the team leader and deputy team leader in the evaluation activities, in order to ensure timely and high-quality delivery of EA5.
- At a later stage, being a key contributor to the authoring of evaluation reports, academic articles and evidence and learning synthesis products based on the evidence and new knowledge generated from EA5, as articulated in the full Evaluation Design.
- Specifically, supporting the Evaluation Design, ensuring a high level of technical rigour is employed in the design, delivery and written outputs, in line with the expectations of a SEQAS review board and Knowledge Manager M&E team.

**Observer for the PHASE Assessment Panel: Catherine Gould**

- In collaboration with the team leader, provision of a full handover to the evaluation team, on the historical record of the BRACED–PHASE interface and its future directions.
- Provision of feedback on the initial and fully developed Evaluation Design.
- Being the 'observer' in the PHASE Assessment Panel, working with the Fund Manager and DFID in that Assessment Panel. Production of a documented record of the Assessment Panel, using an ethnographic approach initially, then in line with the Evaluation Design once completed.
- Being part of the peer consultation group, specifically advising on connections with the project- and programme-level routine monitoring and results reporting of BRACED and lessons learnt from the practical implementation of PHASE within BRACED.

**Head of M&E (for BRACED): Robbie Gregorowski**

- Provision of technical quality assurance inputs to the design of the evaluation, and support to the technical quality assurance of final written products. Specific contributions to be discussed and agreed as part of the full detailed design.

- In line with available resources, provision of guidance and support, as required, to the team, including on the overall steer of the evaluative learning approach.
- Leading the internal-Itad quality assurance processes, and providing written inputs to ensure the design aligns with DFID evaluation team expectations.

#### **Derek Poate: Itad reviewer**

Provision of guidance and advice on the full design, and undertaking a full review of the final Evaluation Design against the SEQAS criteria. This internal process aims to help reduce the likely feedback from the DFID team by addressing any possible areas of weakness in advance, and to support the smooth sign-off of the final design.

**Peer consultation group: Courtenay Cabot Venton (on humanitarian contingency finance), Dr Elizabeth Carabine (on governance systems), Dr Catherine Simonet (an economist – BRACED Sahel livelihoods) and Paula Silva Villanueva (on BRACED theory of change).**

- Members of the peer consultation group to be called on, as required, to provide advice and support on specific aspects of the evaluation design, delivery and outputs.
- In the later stages of the work, act as a consultation group to advise on effective communication of the findings to the wider stakeholder group (both internal BRACED audiences and external stakeholders).
- Courtenay Cabot Venton: specifically on humanitarian contingency finance and VfM.
- Paula Silva Villanueva: specifically on fitting PHASE into the BRACED theory of change.

#### **Administrative support: Beth Bradshaw**

- Primary contact on all contractual, management/work planning and resourcing matters.
- Overseeing the subcontracting process of the consultants, and leading on the budgeting and administrative requirements, including liaison with the Itad M&E coordinator.
- Ensuring the on-going documentation and up-to-date knowledge management of the Knowledge Manager's PHASE evaluative learning work within the Knowledge Manager's central repository and evaluation teams' access to this.
- Coordinating and assisting in the delivery of events and meetings.
- Responsibility for all administrative and practical arrangements related to copy-editing, proof reading, design and outreach of products.

## 8.2 Key stakeholder groups

A description is provided below outlining how the evaluation team will interact with key stakeholder groups, beyond the PHASE recipients.

#### **Relationship with DFID M&E team and the BRACED Steering Group:**

- DFID staff will be kept abreast of the progress of the evaluation, through the routine monthly Knowledge Manager–DFID meetings (where the PHASE team will be represented by the EA5 team leader). Where helpful, the Sahel DFID representative will be brought into the conversation and/or provided with a bilateral briefing on the progress of the PHASE evaluative learning work.
- Evaluators' learning notes on the PHASE Assessment Panel will be shared with the Fund Manager. In line with the Knowledge Manager data protocol, this will be to check accuracy of information.
- In line with the quality assurance strategy, the key DFID advisors will be eligible to be part of the internal and external peer review process, to inform the completion of the public products (see related section in this plan).
- As part of the outreach, following the completion of the work, the team will present the key findings to DFID through a brownbag lunchtime seminar, hosted at Whitehall.

#### **Relationship with the Fund Manager:**

- The Fund Manager and Knowledge Manager are two separate entities. For the BRACED programme as a whole, it is crucial that both entities work together for coherence, but at the same time the Knowledge Manager must remain independent in order to provide high-quality unbiased evidence generation and

lessons learnt to inform practice and policy. A document outlining the relationship between the Fund Manager and the Knowledge Manager was devised at the start of the progress and guides the relationship between the two entities, and equally applies to this PHASE evaluative learning work.

- The Fund Manager will be invited to participate, as with other stakeholders at relevant points in the process. These are:
  - Data collection: The Fund Manager is a crucial interlocutor, the primary (and sole) source where the evaluation team can access documents related to the IP applications. This data will be shared by the Fund Manager with the team, via the secure and purposefully established PHASE email address.
  - Evaluators' learning notes on the PHASE Assessment Panel will be shared with the Fund Manager. In line with the Knowledge Manager data protocol, this will be to check accuracy of information.
  - Review of final products: In line with the data protocol strategy, the Fund Manager will be entitled to review the final written products (that will be made public), to fact check the contents.

**Relationship with the formal PHASE evaluators:**

- The PHASE fund (in its entirety, of which the Contingency Mechanism is one part) has a dedicated set of independent evaluators who will assess PHASE – from a formal evaluation perspective. This work will not explore the connections to BRACED or address the crucial EQ of the potential added value of a contingency mechanism to longer-term resilience programming. Nor will the independent evaluators take an evaluative learning approach.
- In order to ensure coherence and avoid duplication of any kind between the two pieces of work, the evaluation team met with the lead evaluator of the independent PHASE evaluation on numerous occasions during the course of the design phase.
- Given differences in the timing of the two strands of work, it was discussed and agreed that, by liaising, we could confidentially ensure that lessons from one evaluation will feed into the other. As the BRACED PHASE evaluative work is starting sooner than the formal evaluation and is of a very limited budget, our findings will be shared with the team at appropriate intervals. Moreover, the formal evaluation team will – where viable – provide additional data and information for use in the evaluative learning work.

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# Annex 1. Background on BRACED and PHASE

## **BRACED**

BRACED is the UK's flagship resilience-building programme, operating in over 13 countries. By tackling the root causes of vulnerability while supporting climate-resilient livelihoods, practices and policy, the programme aims to reduce poverty and improve preparedness to climate-related shocks and stresses. In the Sahel, where nine BRACED projects operate, this challenge is all the more salient. Across the Sahel, communities face weak infrastructure, poor service delivery and recurrent food crises. Building resilience in these contexts requires a flexible and proactive approach to programming, responding to signals from early warning systems to prevent or minimise disruption to the development gains being made. Crucial to anticipating shocks is analysing and addressing vulnerability to specific and predictable shocks (Levine and Sharp, 2015), which BRACED programmes are undertaking through their regular programme activities. With their extensive networks on the ground and close relationship with project communities, BRACED IPs are in a good position to respond quickly to shocks or stresses caused by crop failure, flooding, disease outbreak and insecurity before they become life threatening – when they have access to appropriate resourcing and capacity to do so.

## **PHASE**

PHASE is the UK's multi-year humanitarian aid programme managed by and working in partnership with the EC. It aims to respond to three major challenges in the Sahel: food insecurity, displacement and the rise of epidemics and other natural hazards (ECHO Factsheet, 2016). The programme is not only reactive to emergencies; it also intends to address the causes of humanitarian need and build the resilience of vulnerable people. PHASE includes a £7 million per annum Contingency Mechanism, which provides resources to respond quickly to new crises (PHASE Business Case, 2014). Of this funding, £1.5 million has been ring-fenced for BRACED programmes working in the Sahel.

## Annex 2. The need for early action/early response

The progression of slow-onset disasters is routinely tracked and anticipated by early warning systems. These have a good track record of predicting food crises but a poor track record of triggering early action. In slow-onset disasters, the long lead times provide governments and humanitarian actors with the chance to take early action and prevent the situation from escalating into an emergency. All too often, the link between early warning and early action fails and the opportunity to mitigate a gathering crisis is lost (PHASE Contingency Mechanism, 2015). To expand (ARD ITT):

*'A number of major reports have identified two key challenges facing humanitarian action in fragile and conflict-affected states.'*

*'While existing humanitarian interventions are designed to meet life-saving needs, there is increasing interest in whether and how aid interventions might also help to build the resilience of individuals, households and communities to future stresses and shocks' (Ashdown, 2011).*

*'How to ensure that if and when conditions deteriorate significantly, humanitarian efforts can be scaled up sufficiently in time to avoid major human and livelihood losses' (Bailey, 2012; ICAI, 2012).*


The main barrier to early action is not a lack of early warning information but institutional inertia. Development agencies have traditionally not had the flexibility to take timely decisions with the resources to back them, and humanitarian agencies have not had the remit to invest over the longer term. To catch up to the challenges of operating in crisis-prone contexts, development and humanitarian agencies need to be able to take early action in order to avoid livelihood losses in places where they have built relationships and contributed time and resources.

# Annex 3. BRACED and PHASE theory of change

The evaluation team will be developing theories for how PHASE contingency finance contributed to protecting resilience gains in BRACED. We began our analysis by investigating the BRACED theory of change and PHASE theory of change as a starting point to test assumptions and understand the pathways of change that these projects intend to follow.


BRACED and PHASE are two different funds, designed separately and led by different departments within DFID. As a result, each has its own theory of change.

The way the BRACED theory of change relates to this EA has been described above and is shown in the figure below.



The overall PHASE theory of change articulates how multi-year humanitarian programming can deliver effective, needs-based assistance that differentiates between chronic and acute need but also helps build communities' resilience. It also aims to reduce the number of deaths from malnutrition, disease and conflict-related causes each year. The figure below shows that an outcome of vulnerable communities being more resilient to shocks is supported through the availability of a contingency mechanism for 'rapid response'.

**PHASE theory of change**



The descriptive theory of change for PHASE is outlined in the background documents and Business Case constructed by DFID.

What is *not* currently represented with the visualisation of the BRACED theory of change is how a shock or stress may negatively influence the attainment of outcomes and impact and how this may be treated. However, the PHASE theory of change does assume that the use of a timely contingency mechanism in the event of a crisis will support vulnerable communities in becoming more resilient. In this way, the complementarity between PHASE and BRACED theory of change is most clear.

In the context of BRACED, the PHASE theory of change posits that a contingency system that provides partners with access to funds will support resilience outcomes.

The BRACED theory of change is iteratively developed, as the programme matures and expands. Learning from EA5 will inform how PHASE will be integrated into the BRACED theory of change.



The BRACED Knowledge Manager generates evidence and learning on resilience and adaptation in partnership with the BRACED projects and the wider resilience community. It gathers robust evidence of what works to strengthen resilience to climate extremes and disasters, and initiates and supports processes to ensure that evidence is put into use in policy and programmes. The Knowledge Manager also fosters partnerships to amplify the impact of new evidence and learning, in order to significantly improve levels of resilience in poor and vulnerable countries and communities around the world.

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