



Development
Progress

Regional Scorecard

Projecting progress

The SDGs in sub-Saharan Africa

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Young boys play soccer in Windhoek, Namibia. Photo: © John Hogg for the World Bank.

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
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Acronyms

AU	African Union	LMIC	Lower-Middle-Income Country
EAF	East Africa	MDG	Millennium Development Goal
GDP	Gross domestic product	SAF	Southern Africa
LDC	Least-Developed Country	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
LIC	Low-Income Country	WCA	West and Central Africa

Map of regions used in report*



* While care was taken in the creation of this map, neither the authors nor ODI can accept any responsibility for errors, omissions, or positional accuracy.

Key messages

- This paper shows how sub-Saharan Africa is likely to progress across the SDG agenda by 2030, if current trends continue. Although we can expect gains for many of the goals and targets, low starting points and inequality both within and between countries will make sub-Saharan Africa's achievement of the global goals particularly difficult.
- While goals and targets relating to economic growth and the strengthening of domestic-resource mobilisation are set to make considerable progress, the majority of goals – including ending extreme poverty, reducing maternal mortality, and access to energy – must increase the speed of progress by several multiples of current rates in order to reach SDG targets.
- One group of five goals and targets is especially worrying: they are heading in the wrong direction across sub-Saharan Africa. These include reducing slum populations, reducing waste, combating climate change, marine conservation and reducing violent deaths.
- That said, progress has been seen, and is possible, across the continent. A number of case studies in selected countries in the region show how development progress can be achieved; this includes progress in growth and employment in Ethiopia, poverty reduction in South Africa and improved food security in Ghana, amongst others.
- This analysis for sub-Saharan Africa is one of a series of regional scorecards, which also includes papers offering a closer look at Asia and Latin America. The analysis is modelled on a global scorecard for the SDGs, presented in the ODI report *Projecting Progress: Reaching the SDGs by 2030*.

1. Introduction



The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which followed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), have set out an ambitious global development agenda for the next 15 years. The 17 goals and 169 targets highlight the need for solutions to the world's urgent development issues, with 'all countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, [to] implement this plan' (UN, 2015).

But is it really possible to deliver the SDG agenda, and what would it take to do so? While there is agreement on what the *global* goals should be, the likelihood of achieving these goals by 2030 varies across *regions* and *countries*. With the first year of SDG implementation now under way, it is timely to take a more detailed look at likely progress on a regional basis, and consider what the results would mean for prioritisation and early action.

In September 2015, ODI published a global SDG scorecard, *Projecting Progress: Reaching the SDGs by 2030*. It was the first systematic attempt to project progress across the SDG agenda, and it assessed how close to achieving the goals the world would be in 2030 if current trends continue (Nicolai et al., 2015).

This report, modelled on that global scorecard, presents a more detailed analysis of projected progress for

sub-Saharan Africa. It uses data collected during the MDG period and calculates progress forward to establish where we would be in 2030 if current trends continue. It is one of a series of regional scorecards we are publishing in 2016, identifying at a more granular level where things are going well, what issues need greater attention, and which trends must be reversed to achieve the goals by 2030.

1.1 Sub-Saharan Africa during the MDG era

Several countries in sub-Saharan Africa have made progress toward achieving the MDGs. However, given that they started from a very low position, this progress has been inadequate to meet most of those goals.


Income poverty has fallen across the subcontinent – from 57% in 1990 to 43% in 2012 (World Bank, 2016); but this is considerably less than the MDG target set to be met in 2015. Poverty declined in 24 out of the 30 African countries with available data, and increased in the remaining six countries. There was fairly strong economic growth across the continent, although in a number of countries this was led by extractive industries that are susceptible to shocks (UNECA, 2015). Additionally,

Box 1: What do people in sub-Saharan Africa want?

We can gain further understanding of sub-Saharan Africa development priorities in MY World, a global UN survey, which aimed to understand the development priorities of people from across the world in order to inform and influence the SDGs. It asked respondents one simple question*: which six (out of 16) development priorities were most important to them and their families? To date, over 9.7 million people have responded to the survey.

In the MY World survey African priorities seem to reflect much of what is important to people globally. Both globally and in sub-Saharan Africa people have ranked a good education, better healthcare and job opportunities highest, with more than half of respondents selecting these three among their six top priorities. Following these, access to clean water and sanitation was ranked fourth in sub-Saharan Africa (it was ranked sixth globally), reflecting in part the limited progress on improving access in the region.

Figure 1: MY World African priorities (%)



* It is available online (in the six UN official languages), through mobile phones using a short message service (SMS) and toll-free phone using interactive voice response, and via paper-and-pencil-based offline surveys conducted by grassroots organisations. It was designed to be as open as possible to encourage maximum responses; as a result, it does not employ a rigorous sampling methodology and is not intended to be representative in the statistical sense.

growth was not sufficient or inclusive enough to sustain job creation and poverty reduction. For instance, the average employment-to-population ratio declined from 58% in 2005 to 44% in 2012 (UNECA, 2015).

Turning to social issues, most sub-Saharan Africa countries have expanded access to basic education. The largest absolute increases in the primary net enrolment ratio across the globe were observed in sub-Saharan Africa, from 59% in 1999 to 79% in 2012, and 11 out of the 17 countries where net enrolment ratios in primary school increased by at least 20 percentage points over this period are in sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO, 2015). Yet, while the

region is close to reaching universal primary-education enrolment, progress has been slower amongst those hardest to reach, and there is little evidence of improvements in the quality of education.

In terms of health, efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis have yielded impressive results, with a downward trend in incidence, prevalence and death rates (UNECA, 2015). There has also been substantial progress in reducing child mortality – its annual rate of reduction increased from 1.6% in the 1990s to 4.1% in 2000-2015 (UNICEF, 2015). However, the region continues to face challenges in improving maternal health, and still has

a high maternal mortality rate in part due to limited antenatal-care coverage, the low proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel, and unmet need for family planning.

Persistent conflict in Central Africa and unfavourable weather conditions such as droughts and flooding in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa have also exerted pressure on food security and nutrition. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the most food-deficient region globally. Across the region, protected terrestrial and marine areas increased from 10.7% in 1990 to 15.2% in 2012, placing the region higher than the global average of 14% (UNECA, 2015). Equally, carbon dioxide emissions per capita are the lowest globally across sub-Saharan Africa, although this is partially due to its limited economic activity relative to other regions (ibid.). Access to basic infrastructure services linked to the environment, such as safe drinking water and sanitation, has also improved very slowly.

1.2 The SDGs and sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa played a significant role in the development of the SDG agenda. For instance, a number of leaders from the region were closely involved in the process. The High Level Panel on the post-2015 development agenda, running from 2012 to 2013, was co-chaired by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia, and included several other prominent actors from the continent. Furthermore, the UN President of the General Assembly, the co-facilitator of the intergovernmental negotiations, the Chair of the G77+China, and the Special Advisor of the UN Secretary-General for post-2015 development planning were all from the region.

Africans also brought a strong consolidated position to the table. In May 2013, a high-level committee of heads of state and government produced the Common African Position (CAP) on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, which was subsequently adopted by the countries of the African Union (AU) at its January 2014 summit.

The CAP highlighted poverty eradication as an overarching goal for the continent and strongly emphasised the need for a people-centred structural transformation of Africa. This priority is prominent in the new SDG agenda, which also answers the African call for productive capacities development. Indeed, economic growth, jobs, energy, and industrialisation were all included in the SDGs, despite

their absence from the previous MDG framework. The link between development and peace and security was also included, which is particularly relevant in the African context.

Sub-Saharan Africa hosted the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD3), in Ethiopia in July 2015. The adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda is set to guide development financing for years to come. The Agenda took forward a number of issues key to the African context, including the establishment of a Technology Facilitation Mechanism, the creation of a Global Infrastructure Forum, the provision of a 'social compact' supporting education, health and social-protection measures, and the goal for official development assistance to least-developed countries (LDCs) to reach 0.2% of gross national income by 2030.

The SDGs reflect African context and priorities, and have the potential to serve as a foundation for long-term sustainable solutions across the continent, especially if coherence and alignment is maintained with the vision outlined in Agenda 2063, the AU's 50-year vision and action plan.

1.3 About this regional scorecard

This scorecard presents projections based on recent trends extended forward to 2030. Following from the global analysis prepared for the *Projecting Progress* report (Nicolai et al., 2015), we used the same 17 targets and the same methodology, and projected forward to 2030, grading sub-regions within sub-Saharan Africa according to how close they will be to goal-completion in 2030. Based on these projections, we provide a scorecard of where sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, as well as three sub-regions of East, Southern, and West and Central Africa, will be in 2030 on each target, assuming progress continues at its present pace.

The report is structured in five sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 provides a brief overview of the methodology used to produce the scorecard. Section 3 discusses the key findings of the projections by goal and target for sub-Saharan Africa and the three sub-regions, and details case studies of top performers across some of the goals. Section 4 points to the key role equity issues play in the achievement of the SDGs. It also looks more closely at what the core SDG commitment to 'leave no one behind' might mean for sub-Saharan Africa, and provides a few country examples. Section 5 concludes.

'What we have adopted, and referred to simply as the SDGs, is perhaps the most ambitious, transformational development ever attempted in the history of the United Nations' – John Mahama's statement at the UN Summit for the Adoption of the Post 2015 Development Agenda

2. Approach and methodology

This section explains how we constructed the projections, assigned grades, and sourced data. The annex contains further detailed description of the methodology and shows how certain targets were adjusted to allow for projections to be made.

The SDGs comprise an integrated agenda across 17 goals and 169 targets. Projections for all the targets are not feasible, for several reasons: not all targets are quantifiable, and, for those that are, data are not always available. Among the targets that can be projected, we selected only one target per goal in order to make analysis and discussion more manageable.

Each of the 17 targets we selected broadly reflects the essence of its overarching goal. That said, the projections only relate to a specific target within each goal, and should not be interpreted as indicative of how the whole goal will fare. This scorecard therefore presents the trend for one key target for each goal, as opposed to all targets under all goals. We used the same targets and indicators as the global SDG scorecard, *Projecting Progress: Reaching the SDGs by 2030* (Nicolai et al., 2015); a detailed discussion about the selection of each target and the assumptions behind projecting the SDG indicators to 2030 can be found in the annex to that report.¹

Most of the projections in the global SDG scorecard were sourced from leading international organisations. However, when no projections were available, we calculated our own. Unfortunately, very few of the projections sourced from international organisations are disaggregated to the country level. To produce this

regional SDG scorecard, we needed to develop our own projections for most of the targets. The target exceptions are: education (Goal 4), waste (Goal 12), domestic resource mobilisation (Goal 17) and marine environment (Goal 14). For the first three, country-level projections are available² (see Table 2). For marine environment, the best available data indicated that it is impossible to disaggregate beyond the regional level.

This sub-Saharan Africa scorecard provides grades at regional, sub-regional and, to some extent, country level. We have used standard UN geographic breakdowns.³ To determine regional and sub-regional grades, we calculated a simple average⁴ across countries that had data available. In some instances, there are only a small number of countries in a specific sub-region, owing to limited data availability; this is indicated by an asterisk in the scorecard on page 15.

Steps to calculate grades

Four main steps were used to calculate the grades assigned to countries in the sub-Saharan Africa scorecard. Each of these steps is summarised below (see Annex for further details):

1. Calculate current rates of progress based on recent trends: we calculated the average annual change over the past decade using the most recent 10 years of data.⁵
2. Project what would be achieved in 2030 if current trends continue: we determined levels of achievement by 2030 by assuming that the current rate of progress would continue over the next 15 years.

Table 1: SDG Scorecard 2030 grading system

Grading System	A	B	C	D	E	F
Current trends suggest:	Meets the target	More than half way to target	More than a third of the way to target	More than a quarter of the way to target	Little to no progress	Reverse direction of current trends

1 http://www.developmentprogress.org/sites/developmentprogress.org/files/scorecard_annex.pdf

2 The target for domestic-resource mobilisation relies on International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections to 2020. The trajectory of the IMF projections is assumed to continue to 2030, as per the methodology in the global SDG scorecard.

3 <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm>

4 A simple average was used, as opposed to a population-weighted average, for two main reasons. Firstly, owing to limited data availability, it was not possible to produce a robust population-weighted average. This is because, when data was missing, we would have had to make assumptions about how countries performed. For example, one of the most populous countries in region is the Democratic Republic of the Congo; however, limited data exists for most of the indicators. Secondly, a population-weighted average would mean that a few populous countries would drive the sub-regional average. Using the example of Southern Africa, whereby South Africa makes up the vast majority of the population, a population-weighted average for the sub-region would obscure the performance of all the other countries. In other words, Southern Africa's grades would effectively be the same as those of South Africa.

5 For illustrative purposes the formulas included in this section show data being available in 2015. However, sometimes the most recent data was earlier than 2015. In these instances the formula was adjusted accordingly.

3. Determine how much faster progress would need to be to achieve the SDGs: we applied a standard approach to each indicator in order to determine how much faster the rate of progress would need to be to achieve the relevant SDG. The formula used can be found in Annex 1.

4. Assign grades based upon the projected rate of progress: we allocated grades in order to provide an easy way to understand the increase in rates of progress needed, in order to achieve the SDG target by 2030. Table 1 explains the basis of each of the grades.

Data sources

The World Bank was the main source of data for 12 of the projections. For the remaining five projections, we relied on the leading international organisation to provide the best available data (see Table 2). For example, data on child marriage was sourced from UNICEF (2016) and data on slums was sourced from UNHABITAT (2016).

Table 2: Data sources used in projections

	Topic	Target	Indicator used	Data Source
1	Poverty	1.1 End extreme poverty	Share of population living under the international poverty line.	World Bank (2016), <i>PovcalNET</i>
2	Hunger	2.1 End hunger	Share of population that is undernourished (food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements continuously)	World Bank (2016a) <i>World Development Indicators (WDI)</i>
3	Health	3.1 Reduce maternal mortality	Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	World Bank (2016a) <i>WDI</i>
4	Education	4.1 Universal secondary education	Percentage of the population age 20-24 that have completed upper secondary level education	World Bank (2016) <i>EdStats: Education Statistics</i>
5	Gender	5.3 End child marriage	Share of 20-24 yr old women who were married before 18 years	UNICEF (2016) <i>State of the World's Children</i> reports
6	Water/ Sanitation	6.1 Universal access to sanitation	Share of population with access to improved sanitation facilities	World Bank (2016a) <i>WDI</i>
7	Energy	7.1 Universal access to energy	Share of population with access to electricity	World Bank (2016a) <i>WDI</i>
8	Growth	8.1 Economic growth in LDCs	Annual percentage GDP growth	World Bank (2016a) <i>WDI</i>
9	Industrialisation	9.2 Industrialisation in LDCs	Industry, value added (% of GDP)	World Bank (2016a) <i>WDI</i>
10	Inequality	10.1 Reduce income inequality	Growth of income of the bottom 40% relative to average	World Bank (2016a) <i>PovcalNET</i>
11	Cities	11.1 Reduce slum populations	Share of urban population living in slums	UNHABITAT (2016) <i>Urban Data</i>
12	Waste	12.5 Reduce waste	Solid waste generated per person (tonnes)	Hoornweg, D. and Bhada-Tata, P. (2012) <i>What a Waste: A Global Review of Solid Waste Management</i> . Washington: World Bank.
13	Climate Change	13.2 Combat climate change	Average annual carbon emissions per country (millions of tonnes)	World Bank (2016a) <i>WDI</i>
14	Oceans	14.2 Protect marine environments	Reefs under threat (%)	World Resources Institute (2011) <i>Reefs at Risk Revisited</i>
15	Biodiversity	15.2 Halt deforestation	Forest area as a share of total land area	World Bank (2016a) <i>WDI</i>
16	Peace	16.1 Reduce violent deaths	Violent deaths as a share of total deaths	WHO (2016) <i>Mortality and Causes of Death</i>
17	Partnerships	17.1 Mobilise domestic resources	Government revenue as a share of GDP	IMF (2016) <i>World Economic Outlook</i>

3. Projections based on current trends

This section indicates the level of progress against the selected SDG targets sub-Saharan Africa countries are set to achieve by 2030 if current trends continue. We discuss the findings for each target and include case studies that focus on the drivers of progress in top-performing countries.

The scorecard below shows the grades based on the projected performance of sub-Saharan Africa and each sub-region. We examine trends separately for East Africa, West and Central Africa, and Southern Africa.⁶

If current trends continue, a few targets are on track, or close to it, for achievement by 2030. Many, however, are way off track. We have grouped the targets into three categories, depending on how much faster progress will need to be, relative to current trends, to achieve the targets by 2030.

- Those that require **reform**. Current trends would take these targets more than half way to achievement by 2030. This group includes strong economic growth in LDCs (Goal 8), and strengthening domestic resource mobilisation for development (Goal 17).
- Those that require **revolution**. These are targets where progress needs to speed up by multiples of current rates to meet the target. Ten targets fall into this group: ending extreme poverty (Goal 1), eliminating hunger (Goal 2), reducing maternal mortality (Goal 3), secondary-school completion (Goal 4), ending child marriage (Goal 5), access to sanitation (Goal 6), access to energy (Goal 7), industrialisation in LDCs (Goal 9), reducing inequality (Goal 10) and halting deforestation (Goal 15).
- Those that require a **reversal**. The targets in this group are heading in the wrong direction. They include reducing slum populations (Goal 11), reducing waste (Goal 12), combating climate change (Goal 13), marine conservation (Goal 14) and reducing violent deaths (Goal 16).

In addition to looking at aggregate projected grades across the region, it is crucial to consider the often-considerable differences between sub-regions and countries. For instance, in the target on biodiversity for Goal 15, Southern Africa is projected to be on track and was graded 'A', based on current trends, while West and

Central Africa scored an 'F' – indicating that present trends are moving in the wrong direction for this sub-region.

Finally, it is worth noting that even a negative score does not imply a prediction of failure but rather sets out the scale of the challenge. The purpose of goals is to stretch beyond current trends, and the SDGs set out an ambitious agenda that aims to inspire action.

3.1 'Reform': moving toward the last mile

Target 17.1 Mobilise domestic resources in low- and lower-middle-income countries (Grade A)

Strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection.

On average, sub-Saharan Africa is on track to meet this target, resulting in an 'A' grade. Almost half the low- and lower-middle-income countries (LICs, LMICs) in the region are on track to increase government revenue as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) by 20% or more, a level that we have taken as meeting the target. However a similar number of countries are set to experience a fall in government revenue as a share of GDP (see Annex). This includes Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo.

In terms of sub-regions, on average LICs and LMICs in West and Central Africa are on track to experience an increase in government revenue as a share of GDP by 20%. For example, in Ghana the IMF projects that government revenue as a share of GDP will increase from 17% to 21% between 2013 and 2020 alone. However, LICs and LMICs in East Africa fall just short of this benchmark. The two LICs/LMICs in Southern Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, are both projected to experience a fall in government revenue as a share of GDP.

Two notes of caution in regard to these projections: first, progress on this indicator may not reflect improvements in overall taxation capacity, such as broader tax bases or greater efficiencies in collection, as the indicator also includes non-tax sources of revenue. In Uganda and Ghana, for example, recent reform efforts have improved

⁶ While UN classification has separate categories for West Africa and Central Africa, in line with several UN and other agencies (including UN Development Group (UNDG), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Women and UNICEF), we group these two sub-regions together in our analysis.

SDG SCORECARD 2030

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Goal	Target	Grade			
		Sub-Saharan Africa	Southern Africa	East Africa	West/Central Africa
17. PARTNERSHIPS	17.1 Mobilise Domestic Resources	A	F*	B	A
8. GROWTH	8.1 Economic Growth in LDCs	B	B*	B	B
7. ENERGY	7.1 Universal Access to Energy	C	B	C	C
1. POVERTY	1.1 End Extreme Poverty	D	C	D	D
2. HUNGER	2.1 End Hunger	D	F	D	C
3. HEALTH	3.1 Reduce Maternal Mortality	D	C	C	D
10. INEQUALITY	10.1 Reduce Income Inequality	D	D	D	D
15. BIODIVERSITY	15.2 Halt Deforestation	D	A	D	F
4. EDUCATION	4.1 Universal Secondary Education	E	E	E	E
5. GENDER	5.3 End Child Marriage	E	C	E	E
6. WATER & SANITATION	6.2 Universal Access to Sanitation	E	E	E	E
9. INDUSTRIALISATION	9.2 Industrialisation in LDCs	E	F*	E	E
11. CITIES	11.1 Reduce Slum Populations	F	F	F	F
12. WASTE	12.5 Reduce Waste	F	F	F	F
13. CLIMATE CHANGE	13.2 Combat Climate Change	F	F	F	F
14. OCEANS	14.2 Protect Marine Environments	F	F	F	F
16. PEACE	16.1 Reduce Violent Deaths	F	F	F	F

* means that grades are based on trends in three or fewer countries due to limited data availability

tax administration but continue to encounter obstacles in implementation, and compliance gaps remain high (IMF, 2015; World Bank, 2012). Second, the projections are sensitive to oil prices, which have fallen lower than expected.


At the time of publication, the current oil price is nearly half what the IMF assumed it would be in 2016. These revenue projections are therefore likely to be an overestimate.

Box 2: Growth and employment in Ethiopia

Ethiopia's economy grew at an average of 11% a year over the past ten years, placing it among the fastest-growing countries worldwide. Urban unemployment fell by 10% between 1999 and 2013, and the share of people working in the informal sector almost halved. In terms of policy, agricultural-led development and public-works programmes have played a key role.

Ethiopia has implemented an agriculture-led development strategy. Since 2005, agriculture has been allocated over 15% of national expenditure, far exceeding the 4% average for the rest of Africa in 2010. Knowledge transfer has driven productivity gains: nearly 62,000 agricultural extension agents were trained from 2004 to 2005 and from 2009 to 2010 (Grips Development Forum, 2011). Extension to the road network has improved market access, with an increase in road density from 29 to 44.5 km per 1,000 km² from 2000 to 2010 (IFAD, 2015). Agricultural growth alone explained a 7 percentage-point decline in poverty between 2005 and 2011 (see Figure 2) (World Bank, 2015).

Figure 2: The contribution to poverty reduction by sector in Ethiopia



Source: World Bank, 2015

Public-works programmes have also stimulated employment. Housing and infrastructure projects, such as the Integrated Housing Development Programme (designed to address housing shortages), have created jobs and boosted growth in small and micro-enterprises (World Bank, 2009). The Productive Safety Net Programme, the largest social-protection scheme in sub-Saharan Africa, provides rural employment through its public-works component, employing 1.2 million workers annually (Lieuw-Kie Song, 2011).

However, Ethiopia will have to overcome significant obstacles to make further progress. Structural changes to the economy – including stronger competition and manufacturing growth – are needed to reduce urban unemployment and poor-quality employment in rural areas. The chronic poor need stronger government support: households in the bottom income decile experienced consumption losses of 0.5% per year between 2005 and 2011 (World Bank, 2015).

For more information, consult Lenhardt et al. (2015).

‘We are grateful that the new development agenda calls our attention to the unfinished business of the MDGs while broadening the vision to incorporate new challenges’ – Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s statement at the UN Summit for the Adoption of the Post 2015 Development Agenda

Target 8.1 Economic growth in LDCs (Grade B)

Sustain per-capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances, and in particular at least 7% per annum GDP growth in the LDCs.

If current trends continue, the region will be close to achieving this target, which is why it receives a 'B' grade. The average growth rate for LDCs in each sub-region in sub-Saharan Africa is around 4.5% to 5% a year.

Around half of the 30 LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa⁷ that had data available are projected to have a GDP growth rate close to or above the target of 7% a year to 2030, based on current trends. However around 25% are set to grow less than half that rate (see Annex).

One example of a top-performing country to date is Ethiopia, where GDP growth has averaged around 11% for the past decade (see Box 2 for some of the drivers of this fast growth). GDP growth in the region overall, however, would need to be two percentage points faster to be in line with the SDG target.

3.2 'Revolution': slow gains mean falling short


Target 7.1 Universal access to energy (Grade C)

By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services.

Sub-Saharan Africa would be on track to reach this target of universal access to energy⁸ if current trends were to increase two- to three-fold, which is why the region receives a 'C' grade. The continuation of current trends would result in all countries increasing access to electricity, with around one in five countries achieving universal coverage (see Annex). Countries projected to meet the target include South Africa and Gabon. However, two-thirds of countries are on track to make less than 50% of the progress required to reach this target. For instance, by 2030, less than 25% of the population in Madagascar and Burundi are projected to have access to electricity.

On average, by 2030, more than 50% of the population in all sub-regions are on track to have access to electricity (Figure 3). Yet, progress would need to be around two to three times as fast as recent trends for this target to be achieved in East, West and Central Africa. In Southern Africa, countries are doing slightly better, and if current trends continue, most will be over half way towards the target in 2030.

Figure 3: Projections for target 7.1 – Universal access to energy




Target 1.1 End extreme poverty (Grade D)

By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than US\$1.25 a day.

To end extreme poverty by 2030, current rates of progress in sub-Saharan Africa will need to increase three- to four-fold, which is why the region receives a 'D' grade for this target. Although no country is on track to eliminate extreme poverty completely, one in five countries is set to

Figure 4: Projections for target 1.1 – Ending extreme poverty



7 Twelve in East Africa, one in Southern Africa and 17 in West and Central Africa.

8 As per the global SDG Scorecard, access to energy means access to electricity.

reduce extreme poverty by more than two-thirds. However, in a similar number of countries, extreme poverty is set to worsen over the next 15 years.

As a sub-region, Southern Africa is doing slightly better than East Africa and West and Central Africa, however it is projected that there will be considerable variation in progress between countries (see Annex). On average, countries in East as well as West and Central Africa will need to increase their current rate of progress between three- to four-fold if they are to reach the target of ending extreme poverty by 2030. If not, around a third of people in these two sub-regions are set to remain in extreme poverty in 2030 (see Figure 4, previous page). In Southern Africa, progress would need to be two to three times as fast to reach the target, as current trends suggest that around 20% of the population will still be in extreme poverty in 2030.

One example of a top-performing country over the past decade is South Africa, where the extreme poverty rate fell from 35% in 1995 to 16% in 2012. The drivers of progress behind this rapid reduction in extreme poverty are discussed in Box 3.

Target 2.1 End hunger (Grade D)

By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round.

Current rates of progress will need to increase three- to four-fold in sub-Saharan Africa to end under-nourishment, which is why the region receives a 'D' grade for this target.

A wide range of progress is projected for countries and sub-regions in regard to reducing under-nourishment, as was the case for ending extreme poverty (see Annex). One in five countries in the region are set to make more than two-thirds of the required progress to achieve the target and a similar number are set to make zero or negative progress.

This target is set to see significant differences between sub-regions, as can be seen in the chart below. Progress would need to be two to three times faster in West and Central Africa, and three times faster in East Africa, to end under-nourishment by 2030. At current rates of progress, East Africa will still have 20% of its population suffering from under-nourishment in 2030, which is similar to the 2003 rates of hunger in West and Central Africa. Southern Africa meanwhile is heading in completely the wrong direction, which is why it receives an 'F' grade.

Ghana is one example of a country that has made rapid progress in reducing under-nourishment, from 14% to 5% of its population over the past decade. We discuss the main drivers of progress in reducing hunger in Ghana in Box 4, page 20.

Target 3.1 Reduce maternal mortality (Grade D)

By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births.

Current rates of progress will need to increase three- to four-fold in sub-Saharan Africa to eliminate preventable maternal mortality⁹ by 2030, which is why the region receives a 'D' grade for this target. Nine out of ten countries are set to get less than half way towards the maternal mortality target (see Annex). However, all

Figure 5: Projections for target 2.1 – End hunger





Figure 6: Projections for target 3.1 – Reduce maternal mortality



⁹ As discussed in the Annex in detail, the global maternal-mortality target of 70 deaths per 100,000 live births is translated to a country-level target of ending maternal mortality.

Box 3: Poverty reduction in South Africa

Since its transition to African National Congress rule in 1994, income-poverty has declined substantially in South Africa. While 35% of the population was in extreme poverty in 1995, this share halved to 16% by 2012. This has been driven by several factors: income growth, above-inflation wage increases and the expansion of credit and social-protection measures (Statistics South Africa, 2014). One crucial factor for those who had been living in extreme poverty has been the government's commitment to extending social protection.


Social protection has grown significantly in terms of coverage and financial outlay. As obligated under its Constitution (1996) and Social Assistance Act of 2004, the government has introduced a series of social grants: the old-age grant, disability grants, foster-care grants and the child-support grant (Magombeyi and Odhiambo, 2015). Beneficiary numbers have recorded an eightfold increase over seven years – from just 2 million in 1996-1997 to 16 million in 2013-2014 (National Treasury, 2010; South Africa Reserve Bank, 2015). A large part of this is due to the extraordinary growth of the child-support grant, from 0.3 million grants in 2000 to 11.9 million by 2015 (SASSA, 2015).

Social grants have been the most pro-poor of the government's poverty-reducing interventions. As the graph indicates, social assistance has had large, positive effects at the bottom end of the income distributions, when compared to other interventions (such as education provision, housing and health care). Social grants have also been linked to improvements in non-monetary aspects of poverty, including improved health and nutrition indicators among recipient household members, higher rates of child growth and school attendance, and greater freedom to pursue labour-market opportunities (Samson et al., 2005; UNICEF, 2012).

South Africa will need to address key challenges to progress further. First, its Gini measure of income inequality was estimated at 63.4 in 2011, one of the highest in the world (World Bank, 2016a). Second, unemployment stands at 25.5% (Statistics South Africa, 2015). Third, the social-protection system largely excludes the working-age poor, and public-works schemes have so far proved ineffective (Meth, 2011).

For more information on poverty reduction in South Africa, consult Hagen-Zanker et al. (2011).

Figure 7: Pro-poor nature of social spending in South Africa, 2001-2006



Source: National Treasury in Samson et al. (2005)

countries except two – South Africa and Mauritius, which already have low rates of maternal mortality compared to the rest of the region – are set to make some progress.

In terms of sub-regions, Southern and East Africa will need to speed up progress on average two to three times relative to current trends in order to meet the target. Some countries have made rapid progress, showing that change can be faster than expected. Progress will need


to be even faster in West and Central Africa. If current trends continue, the sub-region will still have around 400 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 2030. This is similar to the average level in Southern Africa in 2005.

Rwanda is one example of a top-performing country; over the past decade, it reduced its maternal-mortality rate from 567 to 290 deaths per 100,000 live deaths (see Box 5, page 22).

Target 10.1 Reduce income inequality (Grade D)

By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40% of the population at a rate higher than the national average.

Figure 8: Projections for target 10.1 – Reduce income inequality



On average, across sub-Saharan Africa and for each its sub-regions there was little difference between the growth rate of average incomes and the incomes of the bottom 40% of the population (see Figure 8). For this reason, the region receives a ‘D’ grade; the target requires the incomes of the bottom 40% to grow faster than the average.¹⁰

At the top end, in around a quarter of countries, the bottom 40% grew more than two percentage points faster than the average. Niger and Burundi are examples of countries that experienced this degree of ‘pro-poor’ growth. On the other hand, in almost half the countries, the bottom 40% grew one to two percentage points slower than the average; these include South Africa and Chad.

Target 15.2 Halt deforestation (Grade D)

By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests, and increase afforestation and reforestation globally.

On average, deforestation is set to continue in sub-Saharan Africa at a relatively slow rate, which is why a ‘D’ grade¹¹ is given. Around a quarter of countries in sub-Saharan

Box 4: Ghana’s progress on food security

Ghana has achieved an impressive reduction in food insecurity since the 1990s. In 1991, 47% of the population were under-nourished.* This figure fell to 5% by 2013. Growth in the per capita food supply and falls in the real price of food explain these gains. Between 1983 and 2008, agricultural output grew at an average annual rate of 5%, ranking Ghana among the top five countries globally for agricultural growth.

The single most important driver of change has been the broad-based macroeconomic reforms introduced under the J.J. Rawlings regime after 1983. The reform agenda prioritised economic stabilisation in the 1980s, through rapid devaluation of the Cedi, and measures to control inflation. This increased the Cedi value of cocoa exports, incentivising production growth. In the 1990s, reforms focused on liberalising trade, removing input subsidies, and overhauling the cocoa marketing board (Seini, 2002). This supported a continuation of the rise in producer prices and a cocoa boom that spread to the rest of the economy. In addition, a stable, liberalised economy encouraged large-scale investment in cash crops such as pineapples and palm oil.

Agricultural research has led to improved crop yields as well as growth in the proportion of land under cultivation. New, disease-resistant cassava varieties have supported the increase in yields of roots and tubers from around eight tonnes/ha in the early 1980s to 12 tonnes/ha by the mid-2000s. The area under cultivation tripled over the same period. Since 1983, cassava production grew by over 7% a year (Breisinger et al., 2008).

Rising incomes also explain the expansion in Ghana’s food supply. Demand for certain foods (such as chicken, fish, roots and vegetables) grew faster than incomes, incentivising the development of new agricultural products. For instance, production of tomatoes increased six-fold between 1985 and 1997. Even the smallest farmers were relatively well integrated into the domestic market, allowing them to benefit from these income opportunities (Chamberlain, 2008).

Significant challenges remain. Agricultural inputs have been endemically under-utilised. Northern regions have lagged behind in agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction (Coulombe and Wodon, 2007). Current agricultural practices have strong environmental costs including forest clearance, loss of biodiversity and unsustainable soil management.


For more information on hunger reduction in Ghana, consult Leturque and Wiggins (2011).

* According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, under-nourishment occurs when a person is not able to acquire enough food to meet their daily minimum dietary energy requirements, over a period of one year. When referring to an entire population, the minimum energy requirement is the weighted average of the minimum energy requirements of the different age/sex groups. Hunger is defined as chronic under-nourishment (FAO et al., 2015).

10 See Annex, which contains a detailed description of the basis of the grading for this specific target.

11 See Annex for detailed discussion around grading of this target.

Figure 9: Projections for target 15.2 – Halt deforestation



Africa are projected to experience an increase in forests (as a share of total land area) if current trends continue (see Annex). For example, from a low base, forest area as a share of total land area is on track to grow by over 10% in Burundi and Rwanda. Another two-thirds of countries are set to maintain close to current levels.

Some countries in East, West and Central Africa are projected to have significant reductions in forest area as a share of total land area. For example, if current trends continue in Togo, Uganda and Nigeria, total forest area will shrink by more than 25% in less than a decade. On average, forests as a share of total land area are set to decline in West and Central Africa as well as East Africa, but remain stable in Southern Africa.

Target 4.1 Universal secondary education (Grade E)

By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes.

Sub-Saharan Africa is set to make very limited progress toward universal secondary education, which is why it receives an ‘E’ grade. Most countries are starting from an incredibly low level of completion for secondary education, which makes achieving this target quite challenging. As such it is expected that all countries will fail to make it 33% of the way towards achieving universal secondary education completion (see Annex).

As a whole, secondary-school completion is only projected to reach around 25% by 2030 in East as well as West and Central Africa (see Figure 10 below), whereas it is set to reach almost 50% in Southern Africa. In all sub-regions, progress will need to be more than four times faster to be able to achieve the target by 2030.

Kenya has performed relatively well in regard to secondary-school completion, although even this country has a long way to go to reach the target (see Box 6, page 24 on the drivers of progress in Kenya). Based on current trends, projections suggest that secondary-school completion in Kenya will reach almost 50% by 2030, from around only a third today.

Target 5.3 End child marriage (Grade E)

Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation.

An ‘E’ grade is given for child marriage as limited progress is set to occur across sub-Saharan Africa, however there is

Figure 10: Projections for target 4.1 – Universal secondary education





Figure 11: Projections for target 5.3 – End child marriage



Box 5: Health gains and declining maternal mortality in Rwanda


Despite its low-income status, Rwanda has achieved significant progress on health, increasing both the quantity and quality of health services and recording commensurate gains across a range of health indicators. Its estimated maternal-mortality ratio has fallen from 1,300 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 290 in 2015 (World Bank, 2016a). This has been accompanied by rising contraceptive prevalence, growing demand for antenatal care, and improvements in skilled birth attendance.

Several factors have driven the Rwandan success story. On the demand side, community health insurance (the *mutuelles*) has been central to overcoming financial barriers to health services. By spreading the financial risk of seeking care across their membership, *mutuelles* have kept service costs down for households. The consequent increase in uptake of services has led individuals to receive care before conditions worsen, reducing treatment costs.

On the supply side, government investment in staff numbers and quality and performance-based financing (PBF) measures have incentivised quality service delivery. PBF links ‘top-up’ financing and salary staff bonuses to results. As shown graphically, the districts applying PBF (Butare and Cyangugu) saw higher growth in the proportion of births attended by skilled personnel than control districts (Figure 12) (GPOA, 2005).

Donors have absorbed most of the financial outlay for these investments, contributing 61% of total public spending on health, mostly through government-directed sector budget support (MoH, 2010). Governance reforms have decentralised service delivery, while introducing rigorous and systematic evaluation metrics at all levels to ensure performance targets are met.

Figure 12: Births attended by skilled personnel in two sets of districts in Rwanda, 2001, 2002 and 2004



Source: GPOA, 2005 in Rodriguez Pose and Samuels (2011)

In addition, maternal health has benefited from specific, targeted policies. Community-health workers, who receive training in maternal and child health care, have helped improve reproductive health and family planning (World Bank, 2009). Since 2005, some districts have introduced fines for households where women deliver at home instead of the health centre (Chambers, 2010). The first-ever Family Planning Policy was developed in 2005, and Paul Kagame declared family planning a development priority one year later (Solo, 2008). Contraceptive use increased markedly from 4% in 2000 to 27.4% by 2007/2008 (DHS, 2000; DHS, 2007-2008).

Key challenges to further progress include Rwanda's high rates of malnutrition and poverty, shortages of equipment and staff, access problems for remote health centres, and possible financial sustainability issues for the *mutuelles* in the future, particularly given the scaling up of this insurance in order to cover secondary and tertiary services.

For more information on maternal-mortality reduction in Rwanda, consult Rodriguez Pose and Samuels (2011).

considerable variation (see Annex). One in four countries is on track to reduce child marriage by more than a third, while a similar number of countries are projected to make no progress in reducing child marriage. Ghana, Rwanda and Gabon are all set to reduce child marriage by more than 50% by 2030, which is substantial progress but still far from the ambition of the target.

In East as well as West and Central Africa, very limited progress is projected to occur if current trends continue (Figure 11, previous page). East Africa, on average,

has made effectively no progress in recent decades.

One exception is Rwanda, which has made significant progress and is almost set to eliminate child marriage by 2030. In addition, Uganda, Ethiopia (Box 7, page 25) and Mozambique have all seen some progress, although rates of child marriage remain high. In Southern Africa, although prevalence is considerably lower than the other two sub-regions, progress will need to be three to four times faster to reach the target of ending child marriage by 2030.

Target 6.1 Universal access to sanitation (Grade E)

By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations.

Very limited progress is set to occur against this target in the region, resulting in an 'E' grade. All sub-regions will need to speed up rates of progress more than four times compared to recent trends if they are to meet the target (Figure 13). By 2030, less than half the population in West and Central as well as East Africa are projected to have access to sanitation. In Southern Africa, only 60% of the population is set to have access to sanitation.

The only exception is Cape Verde, which is on track to achieve universal access to sanitation by 2030. Ethiopia, Angola and Rwanda are projected to make around half the required progress to meet this goal. More than half the countries are set to make less than 10% of the required progress to achieve the target (see Annex). In fact, recent trends in Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea have shown access to sanitation there has been declining.

Target 9.2 Industrialisation in LDCs (Grade E)

Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation, and by 2030 raise significantly industry's share of employment and GDP in line with national circumstances, and double its share in LDCs.

Very limited progress is projected to occur against this target, which is why an 'E' grade is given. More than half the 25 LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa¹² that had data

available are projected to experience a reduction in industry's share of GDP, which means these countries are heading in the opposite direction of the target (Figure 14). Niger and Zambia are on track to get around half way towards the target, while some countries like Benin and Chad are set to experience a significant contraction of their industrial sectors.

Only two countries, Sierra Leone and Mauritania, are on track to double industry's share of GDP by 2030. Excluding these two countries, there is projected to be no change in industry's share of GDP in LDCs in West, Central and East Africa. In Lesotho, the only LDC in Southern Africa, industry's share of GDP is set to continue to shrink, which is why it receives an 'F' grade.

Figure 14: Projections for target 9.2 – Industrialisation in LDCs





Figure 13: Projections for target 6.1 – Universal access to sanitation



3.3 'Reversal': changes in direction are needed

Target 11.1 Reduce slum populations (Grade F)

By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and upgrade slums.

Almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to experience increases in the number of people living in slums, which means they are travelling in the opposite direction of the target (Figure 15, overleaf). As such, an 'F' grade is awarded for the region and each of the sub-regions. Only in Lesotho, Senegal, Kenya and South Africa are the number of slum dwellers set to reduce.

Some governments, including those of South Africa, Kenya and Uganda, have slowly begun to change their approach towards slum settlements, from evictions to participatory upgrading (see Box 8, page 26).

12 Ten in East Africa, one in Southern Africa and 14 in West and Central Africa.

Box 6: Kenya's progress on education

Kenya has made significant progress on expanding access to post-primary education. The secondary-school gross enrolment ratio grew from 40% in the early 2000s to 67% in 2012. School life expectancy increased from 8.4 years in 2000 to 11 years in 2009. Strong demand among citizens, both as consumers and voters, combined with political commitment to the sector have contributed to these rapid gains.

Major reforms to education policy, supported by competitive electoral dynamics, were critical to Kenya's success. Recognising that fees were limiting access, the key objective was to lower the financial barriers to education (Jagero, 2011). The Free Primary Education policy announcement of 2003 led to 1.1 million extra school-aged children attending the first school-day, from a total of 7.7 million primary-age children (Cifuentes, 2012; DHS, 2003). The Free Day Secondary Education reform of 2008 led to the disbursement of capitation grants worth 10,265 Kenyan Shillings per student (equivalent to US\$115) directly to public secondary schools (Mualuko and Lucy, 2013).


These reforms have been accompanied by substantial budgetary commitment, with more than 20% of national expenditure directed to education every year since 2000 (Government of Kenya, 2010). At 5.5% of real GDP in 2010, government spending on education is much higher than the 4.3% average for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2016a). Donor resources have played a minor role: aid per capita to Kenya's education sector was estimated at US\$4, the lowest among LICs (UNESCO, 2012).

Growing demand for schooling has underpinned these reforms. Kenya's population has nearly doubled from 23 million in 1990 to 44 million in 2013, with a progressive expansion in the proportion of the population aged 16-25 (the post-primary age cohort). Declining fertility rates have allowed families to invest a greater proportion of family income in schooling.

A number of major challenges remain. Inequality is entrenched across the system. Just 13% of girls in the poorest quintile were attending secondary school in 2008/09 compared to 87% of boys in the richest quintile (KNBS and ICF Macro, 2010). Poor learning outcomes, high rates of teacher absenteeism and difficulties in facilitating the school-to-work transition for Kenya's youth population are also critical areas for improvement (UNDP, 2013).

For more information on secondary education in Kenya, consult Nicolai et al. (2014).

Figure 15: Projections for target 11.1 – Reduce slum populations



Target 12.5 Reduce waste (Grade F)

By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling, and reuse.


All countries and therefore sub-regions in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to experience increases in the amount of waste generated per person living in urban areas, which is why the region receives an 'F' grade for this target. The only exceptions are three small island nations off the east coast of the continent, Seychelles, Comoros and Mauritius, which are projected to experience a slight decrease (see Annex).

Target 13.2 Combat climate change (Grade F)

Integrate climate-change measures into national policies, strategies, and planning.

All countries and sub-regions in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to see increases in carbon emissions over the next

Figure 16: Projections for target 12.5 – Reduce waste




15 years, which is why an ‘F’ grade is given for this target. Based on current trends, the only exceptions are countries that have experienced significant economic upheavals, such as in Zimbabwe (see Annex).

The average annual emissions in Southern Africa are several times greater than those of the other sub-regions, and they are projected to increase significantly. However, the projected increase is largely driven by South Africa.

A few caveats are needed when using emissions as an indicator for sub-Saharan Africa. First, the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, included in the Paris Agreement in December 2015, recognises that emissions reductions should not be shared equally across countries. Countries with large historical emissions should make the steepest, early cuts to emissions per capita. In this context, low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa must be accorded ‘carbon space’ to further their development and ensure that the global burden of emissions reductions does not impinge on poverty reduction efforts.

Second, many of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa contribute so little to global emissions that emissions per capita could rise in these countries without significantly affecting emissions reduction globally. For example, Ethiopia’s carbon emissions were 0.08 metric tonnes per capita in 2011, while the US’s carbon emissions were over 200 times higher, at 17.02 metric tonnes per capita in 2011 (World Bank, 2016a).

Figure 17: Projections for target 13.2 – Combat climate change



Note: SAF is largely driven by South Africa

In this context, adaption and resilience to climate shocks are stronger priorities in many countries on the sub-continent. The Horn of Africa and the Sahel, in particular, are expected to experience more frequent droughts as climate change increases the variability of rainfall patterns (Masih et al., 2014). Without mechanisms to protect farmers from rainfall shocks and rural livelihoods diversification, these changes can be expected

Box 7: Ethiopia’s progress on reducing child marriage

Ethiopia has made progress in reducing child marriage in the past few decades, although the national incidence remains high. The proportion of girls married before 18 has declined from 73% among women currently aged 45-49 to 41% among women currently aged 20-24 (DHS, 2011).

Rising educational attainment accounts for some of this progress. The proportion of Ethiopian girls attending school has shown good progress: the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary school increased from 0.65 in 2000 to 0.81 by 2006, with the gross primary-school enrolment ratio increasing from 0.55 to 0.87 over the same period (World Bank, 2015). Girls with education are far less likely to be married early than those without education. Indeed, the majority of child brides in Ethiopia have not received any education (Erulkar, 2013). Direct programme interventions by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have incentivised school attendance through conditional cash transfers and the provision of school materials have had measurable effects on delaying age of first marriage among programme participants (Erulkar and Muthengi, 2009).

Second, a shift in social norms has facilitated community acceptance of changing marital patterns in some regions, although strong cultural barriers certainly persist. The Ethiopian government has supported a number of measures to promote delayed marriage and raise awareness of the adverse health impacts associated with early childbearing, including school advocacy campaigns, partnerships with local associations, and the national deployment of women’s affairs officers and female-health extension workers at the municipal level (Boyden et al., 2012).

Third, declining poverty rates have played a contributory role. Ethiopia’s extreme poverty rate (the proportion of the population living on less than US\$1.25 a day) fell from 63% in 1995 to 38% by 2010, driven in major part by improvements in agricultural productivity (see Box 2). Rising incomes and employment opportunities decrease the perceived financial burden of girls, reducing parental incentives for early marriage (Malhotra et al., 2011).

Critical challenges remain. Certain regions are proving particularly resistant to change: nearly 75% of girls in the Amhara region are married as children, compared to fewer than 15% of girls in Addis Ababa (Brown, 2012). The continued use of marriage payments makes it harder for girls to refuse spouses. Heavy domestic workloads, partly explained by poor food and water security, limit opportunities for girls to study (Watson, 2014).

Box 8: Reforming Uganda's policy on slums

In Uganda, although a relatively small share of the population lives in urban areas, the urban population has been increasing at the rate of 5.2% a year (Cities Alliance, n.d.). In this context, Uganda's secondary cities, while still fairly small, are expected to expand significantly. The slum population of Uganda is projected to increase between now and 2030, if present trends continue. Inadequate human-settlement planning in urban areas has led to haphazard development and wasteful and inappropriate settlement systems and patterns. However, the country has recorded significant improvements in terms of the government's approach to slum settlements through the adoption of participatory policies.

The Ugandan government launched the Transforming the Settlements of the Urban Poor in Uganda (TSUPU) programme in 2010 to manage the country's rapid urbanisation and improve living conditions for the urban poor. Initial activities under the programme focus on five towns – Arua, Jinja, Kabale, Mbale and Mbarara – but the programme is designed to develop a national initiative through the systematic sharing of experiences and lessons with all local governments. The programme is a multi-stakeholder collaboration implemented through a partnership between the national government, local governments, the Urban Authorities Association of Uganda, the Slum Dwellers Federation of Uganda, ACTogether and Makerere University, and is supported by the World Bank and UN Habitat along with Shack/Slum Dwellers International.

Although a relatively new initiative, various elements of the design of the programme are worthy of note.

The design institutionalised spaces for participatory planning. The programme focuses on building dialogue between the national government, local governments and communities. It recognises the central role of slum dwellers in urban development. Slum-dweller federations in the participating five towns enable communities to organise around activities such as savings groups, enumeration and mapping, and to have a platform for collective action. The programme institutionalises spaces for the communities' engagement and participation in planning and decision-making processes.

While implementation happens at the local level through stakeholder collaboration, support from the central government has played a critical role. Local governments engage with the urban poor on a regular basis; the programme recognises that there can be no meaningful impact on their lives without active municipal involvement. In effect, the municipality is the community's key partner in resolving problems and unleashing creative energy. However, the backing of the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development has given the federation a solid footing to approach council officials (Cities Alliance, n.d.).

to have strong negative impacts on food security and poverty across much of sub-region (Shiferaw et al. 2014). Successfully meeting SDG 13 globally will necessitate a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, which is why ODI's global scorecard report used 'reduce greenhouse gas emissions below current levels' as a proxy indicator, used here for the sake of comparability. Thus, the indicator used here is appropriate at the global level but raises some issues when strictly applied to many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, the 'F' grade awarded here is not intended to capture the performance of the region across the breadth and variation of Goal 13. In fact, some countries are already making significant advances in integrating climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning.

Target 14. 2 Sustainably manage marine ecosystems (Grade F)

By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration, to achieve healthy and productive oceans.

Across the world, 90% of all reefs are set to be at risk by 2020, from a starting point of 75% of reefs under

threat in 2007. All regions, including sub-Saharan Africa, are heading in the wrong direction to manage marine ecosystems sustainably by 2020. More than half the reefs in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans (which border sub-Saharan Africa) are projected to be at 'high risk' of being threatened in 2030, up from around 30% in 2007. As a result of this negative trend an 'F' grade is awarded.

Further analysis on this was not pursued, given that many reefs are directly linked to a particular country, and thus progress on this target could not be broken down as with others.

Target 16.1 Reduce violent deaths (Grade F)

Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.

On average, the region is heading in the wrong direction for this target, which is why an 'F' grade is given. If current trends continue, violent deaths as a share of total deaths are set to increase in almost 80% of sub-Saharan African countries (see chart below). However, in around 10% of countries violent deaths as a share of total deaths are set to decline by 50% or more. For example, in South Africa, if current trends continue the share of violent deaths is projected to fall by just over 50% from 2012 to 2030. On average, all sub-regions are heading in the wrong direction on this target, especially East Africa.





Figure 18: Projections for target 16.1 – Reduce violent deaths



4. Leaving No One Behind

Our projections show sub-Saharan Africa failing to reach most of the SDGs by 2030, which follows on from its relatively poor performance on the MDGs. Indeed the MDGs emphasised the weak performance of sub-Saharan Africa compared with other regions. This was notable in the mid-2000s when it was found to be the only region not ‘on track’ to meet any goals.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s failure to hit uniform global goals in 2030 is understandable in the context of its lower starting position in 2015. Given absolute targets (‘getting to zero’) in the SDGs, the region is being set the most challenging targets compared with other regions. Absolute targets overlook non-linearities by assuming that similar efforts will result in similar ‘gains’ across different countries (Rodriguez-Takeuchi and Samman, 2015), and could unduly penalise many countries while overstating the accomplishments of others.

However, improvements in people’s lives across dimensions occur at varying rates across countries (ibid.). Methodologies that measure countries’ final distance away from their starting points yield very different results. Rodriguez-Takeuchi and Samman (2015) find that many poor countries – up to 46%, depending on the indicator – registered better-than-expected progress on some MDG targets despite not being ‘on track’ to meet them. For most MDG indicators, once starting points are factored into the trajectories of progress, the picture is more optimistic than that presented by World Bank and UNDP monitoring reports using the traditional tracking method (Melamed and Samman, 2014).

Moreover, a wider historical perspective, including country starting-points, helps to show that projected progress in sub-Saharan Africa is more encouraging. For instance, in terms of inequality, the bottom 40% in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to share far more of its income (16%) than the world as a whole did (6%) when it was at the region’s projected 2030 income in 1969 (Nicolai et al., 2015). Global extreme poverty was estimated to have been around 36% in 1969 (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002), similar to the projected poverty rate for sub-Saharan Africa in 2030.

Another point to consider is that even within sub-regions, averages can conceal significant differences in outcomes between and within countries. In this regard, it is important that the SDG agenda recognises the need to reduce inequalities between countries (Bhattacharya, 2015; Samman, 2015). A wide range of country-specific factors

including location and social and political tensions impact countries’ abilities to enable broad-based development. Such considerations must be made when assessing progress, and they also highlight the role of the international community in helping addressing these concerns.

Country-based aggregate levels of progress can be misleading and conceal underlying group-based inequalities where groups of people are ‘left behind’. The poorest and most marginalised groups have often not benefited enough or indeed at all. For example the bottom 5% of the global income distribution made no progress on the key MDG target of reducing income poverty between 1988 and 2008 (Milanovic, 2012).

In sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the incomes of the bottom 40% have grown marginally slower than the regional average since 2000 (Nicolai et al., 2015). The Gini coefficient for the region increased from 0.42 in 2006 to 0.50 in 2013 alone (World Bank, 2016). These marked inequalities in monetary terms are often reproduced in terms of disparities in social development and access to basic services (for instance, see Box 9 on inequality in Namibia).

In addition, horizontal or group-based inequalities between culturally defined or constructed groups (e.g. based on ethnicity, religion or race) persist, although their specific forms and extent depend on regional and national context. Such inequalities are multidimensional, including political, social and economic dimensions, and often persist over long periods (Stewart and Langer, 2006).

The prevalence of group-based inequalities makes examining progress through a group lens important (Kabeer, 2010). The first step to doing this is knowing who is being ‘left behind’, which is why national statistics offices need better funding and training to conduct household surveys¹³ and use participatory research methods to identify groups being ‘left behind’. Until recently, international development policy has largely neglected horizontal inequalities.

Available data point to the persistence of group-based inequalities in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. While each country’s unique political, economic and historical circumstances influence how inequality manifests itself, ethnic marginalisation is an issue across a vast set of countries (for instance, see Box 10 on Nigeria overleaf). In addition to poverty, ethnic minorities often experience discrimination based on their identities. This is significant

13 Household surveys and censuses contain valuable information but pose limitations when identifying marginalised groups. For instance, by design, household-survey sampling frames tend to exclude the homeless, people in institutions, and mobile, nomadic or pastoralist populations; in practice, they also tend to under-represent people living in urban slums, dangerous places, and fragile or transient households (Carr-Hill, 2013). There are also limitations relating to the topics covered. For example, household surveys often focus on the health of young children and mothers, which can make estimating outcomes for older adults difficult.


Box 9: Wealth and social inequality in Namibia

Namibia gained independence in 1990, following nearly a century of colonial rule by Germany and, after World War I, South Africa. Since then, the share of people living below the national poverty line declined from nearly 70% in 1990 to 29% in 2009 (World Bank, 2016). Since 2009 Namibia has been classified an upper-middle-income country. However, it has one of the most skewed distributions of income per capita in the world. Its GINI coefficient, which measures inequality in the distribution of incomes on a scale of 0 to 1, was 0.61 in 2009, the second highest in the world (ibid.). This income inequality is also mirrored in unequal development outcomes across a range of indicators.

Lower economic groups fare worse on a range of social-development outcomes and in terms of access to social and infrastructural services. For instance, using DHS data for 2013, even after controlling for other relevant factors*, the probability of being in education poverty (having completed fewer than four years of schooling among those between the ages of 20 and 25 years) was much higher for those in the bottom quintile compared to the top quintile. The likelihood of being in education poverty for the bottom quintile was 13%, compared to 5% in the middle (third) quintile, and only 1% for those in the top wealth quintile (Figure 19).


In terms of basic infrastructure, there were significant disparities in access to electricity (Figure 20). Even after accounting for other factors,** the probability of people in the bottom quintile having electricity access was less than 2%, compared to 26% for population in the third (middle) quintile, and over 99% for those in the top quintile.

Figure 19: Education poverty rate by quintile, Namibia



Source: DHS (2013)

Figure 20: Share of households with access to electricity by quintile, Namibia



Source: DHS (2013)

* The analysis controlled for, in addition to wealth quintile, location (rural/urban), region, gender and gender of the household head.

** The analysis controlled for wealth quintile, sex of household head, region and location (urban/rural) of the household.

not least because it points to the need to address politically sensitive drivers of change such as social discrimination.

Gender is also a cross-cutting axis of inequality in most countries. While factors such as age, ethnicity, religion and location – both in terms of region and disparities between urban and rural areas – are salient, girls and women often have worse development outcomes compared to their male counterparts. Female-headed households often also face higher levels of deprivation and exclusion (see Box 11 on Tanzania overleaf).

It is worth noting that looking at group-based measures of inequality reveals the social exclusion that precludes large numbers of people from benefiting from broader progress, but it may still mask severe exclusion as it assumes that all people belonging to a group experience exclusion equally.

In reality, there may be considerable intra-group disparities due to intersections of different forms of inequality. Overlapping disadvantages or ‘intersecting inequalities’ (Kabeer, 2010) faced by individuals or groups often reinforce exclusion. For instance, in 2008, while

the average woman in Ghana had six years of education, the poorest women from the Gruma ethnic group had on average less than one year of schooling (Lenhardt and Samman, 2015). In Ethiopia, the likelihood of completing primary schooling was 15% for rural Somali women compared to 77% for urban women from other ethnic groups in 2011 (ibid.).

The SDGs explicitly highlight the need for progress to ‘leave no one behind’, identifying a series of groups that have typically been disadvantaged and excluded from

progress. These groups include the elderly, people with disabilities, ethnic and religious minorities, and women and girls, among others.


Reaching the SDGs by 2030, particularly those that require universal achievement, is critically dependent on active efforts by governments and other stakeholders to include these groups. Going forward, a focus on equity is needed across the full SDG agenda; the goals will not be reached unless progress is made for all groups, and in all countries (UN, 2015).

Box 10: Ethnicity and marginalisation in Nigeria

Since independence in 1960, regional fissures – markedly between the north and the south – have been at the centre of discussions on inequality in Nigeria. However, looking merely at regional differences simplifies inequality in Nigeria. While regional inequality is strong, the effect of ethnicity is an equally powerful determinant of development outcomes. Ethnicity ‘is demonstrably the most conspicuous group identity in Nigeria’ (Lewis and Bratton, 2000).


Nigeria has more than 250 ethnic groups, each of which has their own tradition in terms of language and customs. The largest are the Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Fulani, which account for more than 65% of the population.

Figure 21: Likelihood of being in bottom quintile in Nigeria, compared with Yoruba, 2008 and 2013 (%)



Source: Lynch et al. (2016)

Figure 22: Likelihood of not attending school in Nigeria, by ethnicity, compared with Yoruba, 2008 and 2013 (%)



Source: Lynch et al. (2016)

Ethnic inequalities between the Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo in particular are substantial. The Hausa and Fulani are far more likely to fall into the bottom wealth quintile than the Yoruba (Figure 21). Being both rural and Hausa or Fulani greatly increases this likelihood, and this inequality rose between 2008 and 2013. Rural Fulani were over 50 percentage points more likely than the Yoruba to be in the bottom quintile in 2013.

Similarly, inequalities between ethnic groups in the likelihood of attending school are wide and increasing. The Yoruba were 13 percentage points more likely than the Hausa and 18 percentage points more likely than the Fulani to attend school in 2013 (compared with 12% and 15% in 2008), with smaller but still significant gaps for other ethnicities (Figure 22). Strikingly, these gaps have been increasing over time.

For more details see Lynch et al. (2016).


Box 11: Female-headed households in Tanzania

Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere, have recorded significant increases in the share of female headed households (FHHs) in recent decades. In Tanzania, legal protection for women remains limited, in part because Tanzania's judicial authorities take into account both customary and Islamic laws (OECD, n.d.). For instance, widowed and divorced women are exposed to customary stripping of assets by husbands or their kin, and women's statutory rights to land and marriage legislation are not always upheld (Magongo and Da Corta, 2011). With increasing land shortage, such dispossession has increased. As a result, FHHs are often deprived in material ways.

For instance, data from the DHS survey for 2012 for Tanzania indicates that households headed by women are disproportionately represented in the bottom wealth quintiles. Even after controlling for other relevant factors,* FHHs were 9 percentage points more likely to be in the bottom two wealth quintiles than male-headed households (MHHs) (see Figure 23 below).

Overall, there are marked differences between urban and rural areas, with rural households faring much worse. In both sectors, however, FHHs fared worse than household headed by men. In rural areas, FHHs were 11 percentage points more likely to be in the bottom two quintiles than rural MHHs (60% and 49% respectively), and this difference was 6 percentage points in urban areas (11% and 6% respectively).

Figure 23: Share of households in bottom 40% by gender of household head, Tanzania



Source: DHS (2012)

* This analysis controlled for location (rural or urban), region and the age of the household head.

‘This new agenda therefore presents a unique opportunity to not only ensure that the critical issues confronting Africa and other parts of the world: poverty, hunger, youth unemployment, social inequality and the impact of climate change, to name but a few; are effectively addressed, but also to find integrated and innovative solutions to address the special needs of the conflict affected, fragile and Least Developed Countries’ – Samura Kamara’s statement at the UN Summit for the Adoption of the Post 2015 Development Agenda

5. Conclusion

With the *global* SDGs and targets agreed, the key task now is to bring them to bear at the *national* level. This will include setting new or aligning existing targets, a focus on implementation, and processes for monitoring and accountability. The projections for sub-Saharan Africa presented in this report can help to draw attention to likely progress and challenges around goals and targets, both across the region and at a more granular sub-regional and country level. This, in turn, can help to shape SDG priorities across the continent.

While the level of progress needed to achieve the SDGs varies extensively, results indicate that, unless significant changes are made, only SDG 17 (graded 'A') and SDG 8 (graded 'B') will be close to meeting the target.

The majority of targets reviewed fall in the middle range – between 'C' and 'E' – which means they are moving in the right direction, but progress needs to be hastened considerably to meet the goals.

Finally, the targets for five of the goals – on cities, oceans, waste, climate change, and peace – are graded 'F', as present trends suggest that these outcomes have been deteriorating and would need a reversal to meet the target.

There are a few differences in this regional assessment from that conducted globally (Nicolai et al., 2015).

- Only three goals and targets reviewed seem to be progressing better in sub-Saharan Africa than globally. SDG 17 and the mobilisation of domestic resources in particular stands out, but others doing well include SDG 7 and its target on universal access to energy, and SDG 10 and reducing income inequality.
- Eight goals and targets are on a par with the global scorecard. These include four goals classed as moving in the right direction but needing to speed up progress: SDG 2 to end hunger, the SDG 5 gender goal and its target to end child marriage, SDG 8 on economic growth in LDCs, and SDG 9 on industrialisation. An equal

number of goals need to see reversal: SDG 11 on cities and reduction of slum populations, SDG 12 on waste, SDG 13 on climate change, and SDG 14 on oceans.

- The remaining six goals and targets are lagging behind global progress: SDG 1 on efforts to end extreme poverty, SDG 3 on health and reduction of maternal mortality, SDG 4 on education and completion of secondary schooling, SDG 6 and its target on universal access to sanitation, SDG 15 on biodiversity and efforts to halt deforestation, and SDG 16 on peace and its target on reducing violent deaths.

Despite what could be taken as a gloomy assessment, this scorecard is far from a prediction of failure. Goals should stretch one beyond current trends, with ambitious targets that inspire action. Instead, it sets out the scale of the challenge. Development efforts in sub-Saharan Africa clearly need to speed up progress in terms of human and social-capital investment to avoid falling further behind the rest of world by 2030.

Moreover, there are considerable variations between sub-regions and countries across the full SDG agenda, with goals such as those on hunger, biodiversity and partnership (domestic-resource mobilisation) having very different projections across the sub-continent.

Despite the challenges for sub-Saharan Africa, there is much to be hopeful about. The overall alignment of the global SDG agenda with African priorities can help drive greater progress in coming years. While a number of sub-Saharan African countries have low starting points on these goals, the top-performing countries show that major gains can be made, as evidenced in this report and its case studies. And even though inequality could threaten progress across the full SDG agenda, greater attention to 'leaving no one behind' has the potential to drive progress forward across the continent.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Calculating the projections

There are four main steps in calculating the projections used in this regional scorecard on a country-by-country basis.

1. Calculate current rates of progress based upon recent trends

Current rates of progress were calculated by using the most recent 10 years of data.¹⁴ The average annual change over the past decade was determined by using the following formula:

$$\text{Average Annual Change} = \left(\frac{X_{2015} - X_{2005}}{X_{2005}} \right) \left(\frac{1}{10} \right)$$

whereby:

X_{2005} represents the relevant indicator for each goal in 2005

X_{2015} represents the relevant indicator for each goal in 2015

2. Project what would be achieved in 2030 if these current trends continue

Levels of achievement by 2030 were determined by assuming that the current rate of progress would continue over the next 15 years. This is calculated by the following formula:

$$X_{2030} = X_{2015} \times (1 + \text{Average Annual Change})^{15}$$

whereby:

X_{2030} represents the relevant indicator for each goal in 2030

3. Determine how much faster progress would need to be to achieve the SDGs

A standard approach was applied for each indicator to determine how much faster the rate of progress would need to be to achieve the relevant SDG. This was calculated as:

$$\text{Rate of Progress towards SDG} = \frac{X_{2030} - X_{2015}}{X_{GOAL} - X_{2015}}$$

whereby:

X_{GOAL} represents what the indicator would need to be in 2030 for the target to be achieved

4. Assign grades based on the projected rate of progress

Grades were assigned based on how much faster the rate of progress would need to be for the SDG target to be achieved. The table below explains the basis of each of the grades.

Table 3: SDG Scorecard 2030 grading system

Grading System	A	B	C	D	E	F
Current trends suggest:	Meet the target	More than half way to target	More than a third of the way to target	More than a quarter of way to target	Little to no progress	Reverse direction of current trends

¹⁴ For illustrative purposes the formulas included in this section show data being available in 2015. However sometimes the most recent data was earlier than 2015. In these instances the formula was adjusted accordingly.

Table 4: Target 10 – Inequality grading system

Grading system	A	C	D	F
Difference in annual income growth between the average and the bottom 40%	-0.5 ppt or greater	Between -0.5ppt and 0	Between 0 and +0.5ppt	+0.5 ppt or greater

We had to make specific considerations for a number of the projections, largely due to the wording of the target or the availability of data. Most of these issues are discussed at length in *Projecting Progress: Reaching the SDGs by 2030* (Nicolai et al., 2015). However, due to the country-by-country nature of this report, some further adjustments had to be made. These are discussed below.

Target 3 – Maternal mortality

The maternal-mortality target aims for the global number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births to fall to 70. It is not clear what the country-level figure would be required to be, therefore we assumed that the target is 0 deaths per 100,000 live births. This is unrealistic as no country has ever achieved this, but it best reflects the spirit of the goal: to ‘ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’. Countries that already have very low rates of maternal mortality are slightly disadvantaged by selecting a target of zero, as it is expected it will be more difficult to reach the final mile.

Target 5 – Child marriage

Data on child marriage is notoriously patchy. As such our projections had to rely on dividing the available data into two sub-groups, one that was before 2005 (1986-2005) and the other from 2005 (2005-2012) onwards. This reduces the accuracy of the projection because the exact number of years between surveys is unknown. We had to make a simple assumption that the gap between surveys was the median year of data available before 2005 and the median year of data from 2005 onwards. In line with this assumption, the year starting the projection was the median year of the data from 2005 onwards.

Target 10 – Inequality

This target requires the incomes of the bottom 40% to grow faster than average incomes. It is challenging to assign a grade based on the general scale above as it is an absolute target and all countries would receive either an ‘A’ or an ‘F’ even if differences were very small. As such, we applied a slightly different grading system, shown in Table 4.

Target 14 – Reefs

It is not possible to disaggregate this target to the country level. However all countries have a role to play in achieving this target. For example, coral reefs are heavily impacted by carbon emissions and by waterway pollution in land-locked and coastal countries. For this reason, the regional grade from the global SDG scorecard is given to all countries, regardless of specific location.

Target 15 – Forests

This target implies that forest area as a share of total land area needs to increase by 2020. It is challenging to assign a grade based upon the general scale above as this is an absolute target and all countries would receive either an ‘A’ or an ‘F’ even if the differences were very small. As such, we applied a slightly different grading system, shown in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Target 15 – Forests grading system

Grading system	A	D	F
Forest area as a share of land area in 2020 compared to today	Over 100%	Between 100% and 95%	Less than 95%

Annex 2: Country-level projections

Country	Sub-region	Target															
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	15	16	17
Angola	WCA	B	B	C			B	E				F	F	F	D	D	
Benin	WCA	F	B	D	E	E	E	B	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	B
Botswana	SAF	B	C	B			C	B			A	F	F	F	F	F	
Burkina Faso	WCA	C	C	D	E	D	E	E	B	E	A	F	F	F	F	F	F
Burundi	EAF	E		D	E	F	E	E	B	E	A	F	F	F	A	A	F
Cape Verde	WCA	B	B	D	E		A	B			A	F	F	F	A	F	B
Cameroon	WCA	F	B	D	E	D	E	D			F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Central African Republic	WCA	E	E	E	E	F	E	E	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	F	A
Chad	WCA	B	E	C	E	E	E	D	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	A
Comoros	EAF	F		D	E		E	A	D	F		F	E	F	F	F	F
Congo, Dem Rep.	WCA	D		E	E		E	B	B	E	A	F	F	F	D	F	A
Congo, Rep.	WCA	B	F	C	E		E	A			A	F	F	F	A	F	F
Cote d'Ivoire	WCA	F	E	E	E	F	E	E			F	F	F	D	A	F	A
Djibouti	EAF	E	C								F						
Equatorial Guinea	WCA			C	E		F	E	B			F		F	D	F	
Eritrea	EAF			D		E	E	E	E			F	F	D	D	A	F
Ethiopia	EAF	B	E	B	E	D	B	B	A	F	F	F	F	F	D	B	B
Gabon	WCA	D	B	D	E	B	E	A				F	F	F	A	F	
Gambia	WCA	C	B	E	E		F	E	C		D	F	F	F	A	F	A
Ghana	WCA	B	C	E	E	B	E	A			F	F	F	F	A	F	A
Guinea	WCA	B	C	D	E	E	E	C	C	E	A	F		F	D	F	A
Guinea-Bissau	WCA	F	C	D	E		E	D	C	F	F	F		F	D	F	A
Kenya	EAF	D	E	C	E	F	E	D				E	F	F	A	F	A
Lesotho	SAF	E	E	C	E	D	E	A	B	F	F	C	F		A	F	F
Liberia	WCA	E	C	C	E	C	E	A	B			F		F	D	D	E
Madagascar	EAF	F	D	C	E	F	E	E	C	E	C	F	F	F	D	F	A
Malawi	EAF	E	D	E	E	F	E	E	B	F	A	F	F	F	F	F	F
Mali	WCA	E	B	D	E	D	E	D	B	E	A	F	F	F	F	F	A
Mauritania	WCA	B	B	D		E	C	E	B	A	C	F	F	F	F	F	F
Mauritius	EAF	B	D	F	E		E				D		E	F	D	B	
Mozambique	EAF	C	C	C	E	D	E	B	A	F	D	F	F	F	D	F	F
Namibia	SAF	B	F	C	E	D	E	C			A	F	F	F	F	F	
Niger	WCA	B	B	D	E	E	E	C	B	B	A	F	F	F	F	F	F
Nigeria	WCA	C	C	E	D	E	F	C			F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Rwanda	EAF	C	C	B	E	B	C	B	A	D	D	F	F	F	A	F	F
Sao Tome and Principe	WCA	E	B	E	E		D	C	B	F	C		F	F	D		B
Senegal	WCA	C	B	C	E	E	E	A	B	F	D	D	F	F	D	F	B
Seychelles	EAF	B					E				D		E	E	A		

Country	Sub-region	Target															
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	15	16	17
Sierra Leone	WCA	D	B	C	E		E	E	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	E	A
Somalia	EAF			D	E		E					F		F	F	F	
South Africa	SAF	B	E	F	E	C	D	A			F	E	E	F	A	A	
South Sudan	EAF			C				F								F	A
Swaziland	SAF	E	F	C	E		E	C			F		F	E	A	F	F
Tanzania	EAF	B	E	B	E	E	E	E	B	E	C	F	F	F	D	F	B
Togo	WCA	E	B	E		D	E	B	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	D
Uganda	EAF	B	F	C	E	C	E	C	B	F	C	F	F	F	F	F	A
Zambia	EAF	F	F	B	E	E	E	E	A	C	F	F	F	F	D	F	F
Zimbabwe	EAF		C	C	D	F	F	E				F	F	C	F	F	F

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